Holding

The definition of family unit under the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act includes separated minor sons, the transferred lands are part of the holding, and the Act is constitutionally valid, leading to dismissal of the petitions.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined several Special Leave Petitions challenging the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973. The petitioners argued that a separated minor son should not be treated as a member of the family unit, that land transferred by such sons before the Act should not be counted in the family holding, and that the definition of family unit violated Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The Court held that a separated minor son is indeed a member of the family unit, that all lands held by members—including those transferred earlier—form part of the holding for ceiling calculations, and that the Act’s provisions are constitutionally valid and saved by Articles 31A and 31B. The Court also rejected the petitioners’ claim for drought‑prone area benefits due to lack of notification and refused to allow new pleas not raised before the High Court. Consequently, all the petitions were dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether a separated minor son is a member of the family unit under Sec. 3(f) of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act
Whether land transferred by such minor sons to third parties before the Act forms part of the family holding for ceiling purposes
Whether the definition of family unit under the Act violates Article 14 of the Constitution
Whether the inclusion of such land infringes Article 21 or the basic structure doctrine
Whether petitioners can claim drought‑prone area benefits without a government notification
Whether a new plea not taken before the High Court can be raised for the first time in the Supreme Court
Whether petitioners may be given liberty to produce documents at a later date

Legislation cited

Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973s. 10, s. 3(0), s. 3(1), s. 3(f), s. 4, s. 5(3), s. 5(4), s. 7, s. 8
Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) (Amendment) Act, 1977s. 4A
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976

Subjects

family unitseparated minor sonagricultural land ceilingconstitutional validityArticle 14Article 21drought‑prone areasurplus landland reformsbasic structure doctrine

Judgment

701

BEGULLA BAPI RAJU ETC. ETC.
A
••
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH ETC. ETC.

August 23, 1983
B
[A.P. SEN, E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND R. B. MISRA JJ.J

Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act,
1973, Section 3(/), definition of family unit-Whether the term ''mi~or sons"
would include a "separated minor son" long before the coming into force of the
Act and whether the lands transferred by ·such separated minor sons to third c
parties by separate sale deeds would also for"! part. of a holding for the purposes
of Sections 3(/), 3(o), 4, 5(3), 5(4), 7, Explanations I and II to Section 8 and
/~Whether to answer in the affirmative and holding so would be· in violation of
Articles 14 aiid 21 of the Constitution-Whether a new plea not taken before the
High Court would be allowed to be taken for the first time in the Supreme Court
and a petitioner be given liberty to produce a document in future. D
The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings)
ACt, 1973 was enacted on January 1, 1973. Soon after, its constitutional vali-
dity was challenged before the Andhra Pradesh High Court on various grounds
but a Full Bench of the said High Court negatived the same on 11th of April
1973. Therefcire, the Act was prought into force on January l, 1975 by virtue
of a notification issued by the State Government. E
The three petitioners in SLP 6794/1978 filed separate declarations in
accordance with Section 8 of the Act on the footing that the minor sons sepa-
rated long before the enactment or enforcement of the Act did not constitute
a "family unit" and their holdings cannot be tagged with the holding of the
father and that land transferred to oµtsiders long before the enactment either F
under agreement to sale or under gift deed should not be included in the
holding of the petitioners. The Land Reform.s Tribunal, Kovvur rejected the
said pleas and on September 27, 1976 declared that the 'family unit' was in
possession of excess land over the ceiling limit. The appeal Preferred before
the -Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal was allowed in part. The revision
petition filed before the High Court was dismissed on .the 7th of July 1978 and
hence the Special Leave petitions to appeal. G

, During the pendency of the revision petition in the High Court the
Andhra Pradesh ~Hing on Agric;ultural Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1977 was
enacted with retrospective effect from 1st January, 1975 which introduced
Section 4A among other provisions. The constitution3.I validity of the Amend- B
ment) Act was challenged on the grounds, namely, the State Act is void and
inoperative by reason of enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)
A.~t! 1976 \Central Act) and ~h;i~ the <:Jefinition of •familr unit' was violativ~
702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1983) 3 S.C.R,

of Article 14 of the constitution .. This Court upheld the validity of the Act in ·
A Tumati Venkaish v. State of Andhra Pradesh etc., [1980) 3 SCR 1143.

In .the Special Leave petitions under consideration the following ·-f
contentions were raised :

t. A separated minor son is not a member of the 'family unit'
and, therefore, his property cannot be tagged with that of his
8 father •.

2. Some of the plots fall in drought-prone area and, therefore,
the petitioner should have got an advantage of twelve and a
half per cent.

c 3. The definition of family unit under S. 3(f) as interpreted by the
High Court is also violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

4. t and transferred by the petitioners under v~rious transfer
deeds to outsiders and who canie in possession also could not be·
included in' the holding of the petitioners .. · ·
D
5. (a) Section 3(f) of the Andhra Pradesh Act coupled with
explanation thereto being destructive of Article 21 of the
Constitution is , violative of the basic structure of the
C_onstitution. J

E, (b) Life and livelihi;>od go together and, therefore, deprivation
of the minors of thi land is hit by Article 21 of the Consti-
tution which contemplates not only a mere existence but
living with dignity.

Dismissing the petitions, the Court
F
HELD : l. There is no infirmity in any of the provisions of the
Andhra Pradesh Land reforms (Ceiling on ·Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973.
All the·Contendons raised are rio longef res integra, since they are covered by
earlier decisions of this Court. [718 F]
/
G 2:1. From a reading of sections 3(£), 3(o), 4, 5(3), 5(4), 8 and 10, it
will be clear that the ceiling area in case of an individual who is not a member
of the family unit is equivalent to one standard holding. and so also in the case
of a family unit with not more than five members the ceiling area is the same.
But if the family unit consistcc\ of more than' five members the ceiling area
· would stand increased by one-fifth of one standard holding for every additional
H member of the family unit, subject, however, to the maximum limit of two
standard holdings. In view of the explanation added to S. 4 the land held by
all the members of the family unit shall be aggregated for the purpose of
~omputin$ the holding of the family unit Obviously, therefore, where a family
B,B. RAJU V. ANDHRA PRADESH 703

unit consisted bf father, mother, and minor sons or daughters the land held by ~·
811 these persons would have· to be clubbed tOgether and then ceiling area limit A
applied to the aggregate holding. No distinction has been made in the defini-
tion of family unit between a divided millor son and an undivided minor son.
Both stand on the same footing.and a divided minor son is as much a member
of the family unit as an undivided minor son. Family unit is not to be
confusod with )oint family. [710 A-D]

2:2. The definition of family unit a:tongwith the eXplanatiOn does n.ot B
leave the slightest doubt that a separated minor son is as much a member
Of the family unit as a joint son With his father. [713 BJ

Kanuru Venkatakrishna Rao v. The Authorised Officer, Land Reforff1S~
Bandar & Ors, [1978] Andhra Law Journal Vol. U, p. 114, approved.
c
Stateof Maharashtra v. Vyasendra, C.A. No. 4264/83 decided by S:C· on
3-5-1983, followed. _.

3:1. rn Order to attract the provisions or clause (iv) of section s of'..the
Act, the petitioners have to esta~lish that the Government by notification has
declared a particular area to be a drought prone area. Here, the petitioners
should have raised a contention to that effect before the High Court and should
D
have produced the neceSsary notification but they did not do so. Even before
this Court they have not been able to produce the specific notification issued by
the Governrnent. Under the circumstances they cannot be allowed to urge
this.new point for want of necessary foundation. [713 F-H]

3:2: This Court cannot· give a blank cheque to the petitioners to E
prQduce the required notification as and when they like according to their
sweet will. r 713 G]

4. The definition of family unit under sectiOn 3(f) ·or the Act, as
interpreted by the High Court is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
Further it is saved by the protective umbrella under Article 31A and 31B of F
the Constitution. [714 B·C]

Seth Nand wl & Ors. v. State of Haryana & 'Ors., (1980] 3 SCR 1181,
followed. •

5. After taking into consideration the various relevant prov1s1ons of
the Act, the Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Mohd. Ashrafuddin AIR 1982 G
S.C. 913 correctly came to the conclusio~ that the same land can be the land of
the tranferor as well as the transferee in view of the definition of the term
'holding' in section 3(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Act and the said view does
not require reconsideration .. (717 A-B]
H
6. The.contention that life includes livelihood within the meaning Or
Article 21 of the Constitution was repelle-0 in In re : Sant Ram, [1960] 3 SCR
499 and A. V. Nachane v. Union of India, [1982j I SCC. 206 and since Maneka
SUPREME
J, •
COURT.
•
REPORTS
•
[1983) 3 s.c.R.

Gandhi v. Union ofl1!dia did not take into consideration Sant Ram's case, these
A ~~~ thei:ef~r~, ~till-~~Id; i~e field.· · B~sides, t.he petitioners hilve Qeen d"epriVed
of..~h~ir h~J~,ing ip. th~ ~«?rm of surplus I.and but it was only for the purPose of
giving.relief t.o th~ downtrodden and the pOor agricllltural labourers.' -ThC
surplus land would: v~st in the State ~nd the State' in itS tUrn would give it to the
poor and the downtrodden and thus suCh a deprivat_ion will be protected undei-
Articte 39 of the Directive Principles. [718 C-EJ · ·· · ·

B Maneka Gandhi. v. Union of India, [1978] 2 SCR 621, disti_o~ished.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Special Leave Petition (Civil)
Nos. 1671, 2631, 3322-23, 3904, 4418, 9796, 9127 of 1979, 6639-40,
6794, 5121-22 of 1978, 10403 of 1979, 3 797 of 1980.
c
• • - - , I ' '

From the Judgments and Orders dated the 6-7-77, 19.12.77,
20.12. 71;
20-4'.-78, 28~2-78, ~7-79, 8-6-78, 1~1:18, 12-7-78, '9-8-79,
18-1-78 and 13-10-77 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Civil
Revision Petition Nos. 1991/76 & 403/77, 1612/77, 1268 & 1275/77,
4436}77, 2571/77, 7175/78, 7174/78, 70 & 1907/78, 564178, 1036 &
D ll261(s; 1686/79, 1.387/77 and 2677 of 1977
•· - l -

WITH
"-,

Writ Peti.tion No. 4789 of 1982 J
·e. AND

Writ Petition No. 4703 of 1978

(Under article 32 of the Constitution of India)
F FOR THE APPEARING PARTIES
f
'

M.N. Phad"e, q. f. S,qs{')! an.d P. Rama Reddy.
A. Subba Rao, B. Partha Sarathi, T. V.S.N. Chari, B. Kanta Rao,
K.R. CfJowdhari, A.V.v. Nair, Mrs. Y.D, Kh_anna·and V.M. Phadke.
§ . . .

The ...
. ·- Judgment
;·
of
-
the Court
. was delivered by
~-· ' ~ '
' ·~ .
MISRA J. This batch of special leave petitions and wr.it petitions
arising outof proceedings under the Ancihra Pradesh Land. Reforms
~ (Ceiling O!l Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to -./
as the' 'Andhra
~··~ ·- -
Prades~ Ad) js 'directed
' . 'against the "judgments of
the Hi~h Court of An<lhra Pradesh and raise common questions of
D.B.- RAJU v. ANDERA PRADESH (Misra, J.) 705

Jaw. They are, therefore, being disposed of by a common judgment.
Itwillsuffice to refer to the facts of Special Leave Petition No. 6794 ·A
of 1978, Chinnam Nagabhushnam and~ others v. State of Andhra
·--~ Pradesh to bring out the points of controversy in these cases.

Chinnam Jaganmohanrao and Chinnam Sivaramprasad,
petiti_oners Nos. 2 and 3 are the sons of the first petitioner, Chinnam ,p
Nagabhushnam. Petitioner No. 2 is still a minor but petitioner No. -
3 has become major recently. The first petitioner and the thrid
petitioner partitioned their property by metes and bounds by vittue
of a registered partition deed dated 12th of April 1960 and since then
they are in separate possession of the land falling in their respective · ,,..
shares. By a second partition deed dated 11th of April, 1969 the ,..
first petitioner and the ·second petitioner further partitioned the
.,_ properties that fell to the-share of the first petitioner in the first
partition between themselves. On 10th January 1970 the third
petitioner sold an area of 12.00 acres of Pangidigudem village to P.
Pattabhi. On 10th of April 1970 he sold an area of 10.22 acres- i!ld D
J0.00 acres of village Pangidigudem under sale agreement Ext. A-9,
for Rs. 80,000 to G. Veeraju and the vendee was put in possession.
On 12th of June 1970 the first petitioner sold an area of 22.63 acres
of Pangidigudem village to one B. Appa Rao under sale agreement
Ext. A-12. Again on 16th of June 1970 the third petitioner sold an
area of 8.00 acres of Pangidigudem village to B. Balaram Singh E
under sale agreement llxt. A-10.

The Andhra Pradesh Act came into force on !st of January
1975 by virtue of a ·notification issued by the State Government.
By April I, 1975 all the three petitioners filed separate declarations in F
accordance with s. 8 of the Act on the footing that separated minor
sons did not constitute a 'family unit' and their holdings cannot be
tagged with the holding of the father and that · 1and transferred to
outsiders either under agreement of sale or under gift deed shouid not
be included in the holding of the petitioners. The Land Reforms
Tribunal, Kovvur, however, treated the holding in question as th~
holding of the 'family unit' on the finding that divided minor sons
also constituted a 'family unit', and the part of holding transferred to
various persons either under agreements of sale or 'under glrt deed
formed a part and parcel of the holding of the 'family unit'.
B
Accordingly, on 27th of September, 1976 the Tribunal declared that
the 'family unit' was in possession of excess land over the ceiling limit.
The petitioners filed an appe~I before the Land Reforms Appellate
706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS !1983] 3 s.c.R.

·Tribunal. Tbe Appellate Tribunal, in its turn, allowed the appeal
in part. The petitioners still feeling aggrieved filed a revision to the
High Court of Andhra Pradesh. The High Court dismissed the same
on 7th of July, 1978. · '):'he petitioners have now filed the special
leave petition to challenge the order of the High Court.

Shri M.N. Phadke appearing for the petitioners has raised the
· following contentions :

I. A separted minor son is not a member of the 'family
unit' and, therefore, his property cannot be tagged·
with that of his father.
c
2. Some of the plots fall in drought-prone area and,
therefore, the petitioner should have got an advantage
of twelve and a half per cent.

3. The definition of· family unit under s. 3 (f) as
·D
interpreted by the High Court is also violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution. ·

4. Land transferred by the petitioners under various ./
transfer deeds to outsiders and who came in
Jil possession also could not be included in the holding
. of the petitioners.

5.(a) Section 3 (f) of the Andhra Pradesh Act coupled
with explanation thereto being destructive of Article
p 21 of the Constitution is violative of the basic
structure of the Constitution.

5.(b) Life and livelihood go together arid, therefore,
deprivation of the min.ors of the land is hit by Article
21 of the Constitution which contemplates riot only
a mere existence but living wi\h dignity .

. The argumant by. the counsel for the parties was over on 23rd
of March, 1983 when the judgment was reserved: Two weeks ·were,
·H however, allowed to Shd Phadke to file written submissions and
three weeks time to file the notification with respect to drought-prone
areas in the above matter. Time for filing written· submissions was
e11tended up to 14th April, 1983. The petidoners, however, were
ii.B. iW!l v. ANDHRA PRADESH (Misra, J.) 70t
"not able to get the exact notification in respect of the drought-prone
area. They have, therefore, in their written arguments sought permis- A
sion to withdraw the said contention for the present_ with liberty to
raise the same befere the appropriate authority whenever the said
notification is available.

Before dealing with the points raised by the learned counsel for B
the petitioners it may be pointed ont that the Andhra Pradesh Act
was enacted by the Andhra Pradesh Legislature on 1st of January;
1973. Soon after, its constitutional validity was challenged before
the Andhra Pradesh High Court on various grounds but a Full Bench
of the High Court negatived the chatlenge and held the ,Act to be
constitutionally valid on 11th of April, 1973. Effective steps for
c
fmplementation of the Act could not, however, be taken till the -!st
of January, 1975. •

The Andhra. Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings
(Amendment) Act, 1977 was enacted with retrospective effect. from D
!st January, 1975 which introduced s. 4 A among other provisions.
As soon as the amending Act was passed another round of litigation
was started by the land holders by filing writ petitions in this Court
challenging again the constitutional validity of the Andhra Pra_desh
Act. One of the grounds taken was that by reason of enactment of
the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter
E
referred to as the 'Central Act') the Andhra Pradesh Act had become
void and inoperative. The other ground taken in those cases was
that the definition of 'family unit' was violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution. The ground of discrimination under Article 14 was,
however, negatived by the Court. Certain other questions involving F
the interpretation of the provisions qf the Andhra Pradesh Act were
also raised in some of the writ petitions. But this Court in Tumati
Venkaish etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh(') observed· that the other
questions could be agitated by the land holders in the appeals filed
by them against the orders determining surplus land. This Court did
not invalidate the whole of the Andhra Pradesh Act but only in G
respect of the provisions. which were found repugnant to the
'·, provisions of the Central Act.

This is the third attempt on the part of the land holders· to
challenge the constitutional validity.of some of the provisions of the H
Andhra Pradesh Act.

• (!) [1980) 3 S.C.R. 1143;
768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1983] :J s.c.ll.

All the points raised by Shri Phadke are covered by some
A decision or the other of the Supreme Court. Shri Phadke, however,
tried to distinguish those cases on the ground that the specific pleas
sought to be raised by him in the present petition were not actually
considered in those decisions, and, therefore, l).e cannot be precluded
from raising the contentions which were conspicuous by their absence
B in· those decisions. We take up the first' ground first.

In Tumati Venkaish's case (supra) this Court made it clear, as
stated earlier, that it would examine only the constitutional validity
of.the Andhra Pradesh Act and other questions could be agitated
c the land holders in the petitions filed by them against the orders
determining the surplus land. In spite of the aforesaid observation
the Court did consider the question whether a separated minor son
wm·or will not be construed as a member of the fiami!y unit, as will
be evident from the following observations made by the Court :

D "The next contention urged on behalf of the land-
holders was that on a proper construction of the relevent
provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Act, a divided minor
son was not liable to be included in "family unit" as
defined in section 3 (f) of that Act.,,
E_
and eventually the Court held :

"We do not therefore see how a divided minor son
can be excluded from the family unit. That would be
flying in the face of sections 3 (f) and 4 of the
Andhra Pradesh Act."

It will . be relevant at tl;iis stage to refer to certain material
provisions of the Act in order to appreciate the arguments :

"3. In this Act, unless the · context · otherwise
G requires.,-- (f) 'family unit' means -

(i) in the case of an individul who has a spouse or
spouses, such individual, the spouse or spouses ,
and their minor sons and 'their unmarried minor
daughters, if any;
H
(ii) in the case of an indlVidual who has no spouse
such individual and his or her minor sons and
and unmarried minor daughters; ·
•
i\.B, i>.AJtl v. ANOHRA Pa'AOESH ~Misra, J.) 709
(iii) in the case of an individual who is a di'Jofoed
husband and who has no't.remarded, such inaivi-
.,.. . dual and his minor sons and. unmarried minor
daughters, whether in his custody 'or not; an'd

(iv) where an individual and his or her ·spouse are
. both d~ad, their minor sons 'and unmarried
minor daughters.

Explanation :- Where a minor son is m~r"ried, · hjs
wife and their off-spring, if any, shall al.so be deemed. to
be memb'ers of the family unit of which the minor son is
a ~ember." c'
'· Section 3 (o) defines 'person' as. induding il!ler blia. an
individual and a family unit. Section JO is a key section which imposes
ceiling on the holding of land by providing that if the extent of iJ:fo
holding of a person is in excess of the ceiling area, the person , shiill
be liable to surrender the land held in excess. If, therefor¢, an indivi-
dual or family unit holds land in excess of the ceiling area, the excess
land would have to be surrendered to the State ·Gove'rnihent. The
extent of the ceiling area has been provided by s. 4 (I) of the Andhra
"Pradesh Act, which reads :
lil
"4(1) The ceiling area in the case of a family unit
consisting of not more than five members shall be an
extent of land equal to one standard holding.

(2) the ceiling area in the case of a . family nnit
consisting of more than five members shall be an ·extent'of F
land equal to one standard holding plus an additional ·
extent of one-fifth of one standard holding for every siicn
member in excess of.five, so however; that .the ceiling area
shall not exceed two standard holdings.

(3) The ceiling area in the case of every individtia1
who is not a member of a family unit, and in the case of
any other person shall be an extent of land equal to one
standard holding. ·

. Explanation :- In the case of a family unit, the
ceiling area. shall be applied to the aggregate of
tlie lands
held by all ihe members of the family unit."
7ici SUPREME COURT REPORTs (1983] 3 s.c.R..
It will· thus be clear that the ceiling area in case of an
individual who is not a member of the family unit is· equivalent to
one standard holding and so· also in the case· of a family unit with
not more than five members the ceiling area is the same. But if the
family unit consisted of more than five members the ceiling area
, would stand increased by one-fifth of one standard holding for
8 every additional member of the family unit, subject, however, to the
maximum limit of, two standard holdings; In view of the explanation
added to s. 4 the land held by all the members of the family unit
shall be aggregated for the purpose of computing the h~lding of the
family unit. Obviously, therefore, where a family unit consisted of
father, mo.ther, and minior sons or daughters the land held by all
c these persons would have to be' clubbed together aud then ceiling
area limit applied to the aggreate holding. No distinction has been ·
made in the definition of a family unit between a divided minor son
an undivided minor son. Both stand on the same footing and a
divided minor son is as much a meml)er of the family unit as an
undivided minor Son. Family unit· is not to be confused with joint
D family ..

The contention of Shri Phadke is that the definition of various
terms as given in s. 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Act opens with the
words . "In this Act, unle~s the context otherwise requires." Accord-
E ing to the learned counsel the context 'otherwise requires' that the
word 'minor' in s. 3 (f) cimnot include a divided minor son, Section
4 (2), argued the learned counsel, deals with the . ceiling area of a .
family unit and s. 4 (3) deal~ with the ceiling ·area of an individual
who is not a member of a family unit. A divided minor son, sub-
mits the counsel,' is ail individual and is no longer a member of the
F
family unit in as much a~ a partition has not only the effect of
division of the property but a complete severance from membership
of the joint family. Thus a minor who is separated under a partition
deed cannot be a member of the family unit but becomes an
individual.
G-
The counsel supported his argument by reference to els. (3) and
(4) of s. 5 of the Andhra Pradesh Act. Clause (3) deals with the . ·"'\
holding of an individual who is not a member of a family unit b.nt is
a member of joint family, and reads : · ·
H
"(3) In computing the holding of an individual who
is not a member of a family Ullit, but. is a member of a
ii.B. !Wu v. ANo!iRl' PRADESH (Misra, J.) ?11
joint family, the share of such an individual in the lands
held by the joint family shall be taken into account and A
aggregated with the lands, if any, held by him separately
and for this purpose, such share shall be deemed to be the
extent of land which would be allotted to such individual
had there been a partition of the lands held by thejoint
family." B
Clause (4) deals with the member of· a family unit who is also a
member. of a joint family, and reads :

"(4) In computing the holding of the member of a
family unit .who is also a member of a joint family, the c
share of such member in the lands held by the joint family
shall be taken into account and aggregated with the lands, .
.·
.if any, held by him separately and for this purpose, such
share shall be deemed to be the. extent of land which
would be allotted to such member, had there been a parti- D
tion of the land held by the joint family."

On the strength ef these clauses ·it is sought to be argued for the
petitioners that joint family is recognisecj as a legal entity in the
computation of holding. Reference was also made to s. 3 (f), cl. (iv) ·
which provides that where an individual and his or her spouse are E
both dead, their minor sons and unmarried daughters will be a
constituent of 'family unit'. The contention of Shri Phadke is that
in view of cl. (iv) of s. 3 (f) an orphan constitutes a family unit and
is a· member thereof, and in the light of these provisions 1f one looks
at s. 8, Explanation I regarding declaraiion of holding it will be clear
that it speaks of "where the land is held or is deemed to be held by F
a minor not being a member of a family unit, the declaration shall be
furnished by his· guardian". Explanation II deals with the land held
by the family unit and the declaration on b,ehalf of the family unit is
to be made by a person in the management of the property of such
family ·unit. Such a minor not being a member of the family unit, G
says the counsel, can only be a separated member of the joint
family.

Shri Ram Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent State
relied on Kanuru V•nkatakrishna Rao v. The Authorised Officer, Land H
Reforms, Bandar & Ors.(') in support of his contention that a scpa-

(I) [1978] A.L.J. Vol. II, p. 114.
112 sllPREME 'collRT iEJioRTS !1~8313 s.c.R.

rated minor son is as much a member of the family unit .as a non-
separated minor son. The precise argument of the learned counsel
in that case was that since no provision is made in the :Act to ·indicate
the holding of a 'family unit', the other provisions of the Act cannot·
have any application with regard to a family unit. The High Court
held:
B
"According to the definition of the term 'person' a
family unit is also a person. All the provisions of the Act
are intended by the Legislature to apply to the family unit
, like the other categories of the term 'person' as per its
definition. Therefore, the legislature intended the family
c' unit also to have a holding. for the purpose of applying
provisions of the Act relating to determination of the
ceiling limit and excess land, ·if any, ove.r it. It is. true the
provision is not specific that such and such land consti·
tutes the holding of a fa'mi!y unit. But from what was
said in the explanation to section 4, it is clear what is
D meant by the Legislature to be the holding of a family
unit. The implication is very clear that the holding of a
family unit is the aggregate of all the lands lield by all the
members of the family unit ..... By means of the Expla-
nation itself the Legislature intended to make that
provision.,,

.A similar question arose in a recent case before this Court in
Civil Appeal No. 4264 of 1983: State of Maharashtra v. Vyasendra
decided on 3rd May, 1983 by a Division Bench on Section· 4 of the

' Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961
dealt with 'family unit' and the land held by it. Dealing with the
question Hon'ble the Chief Justice speaking for the Court observed :

"The circumstance that the land held by a constituent
member of the family unit is separate property or stridhail
G property is ·a matter of no consequence whatsoever for the
purpose of determining the ceiling area which the family
unit can retain. The respondent, his wife and their minor
sons and ininor unmarried daughters, if any, are all consti-
t~ent members of the family unit and all the lands held
H by them have to be pooled together for the purpose of
determining the · ceiling area which is permissible to the
family unit. The nature or character of their interest in
li.B. RAill v. ANf>HRA PRADESH'(Mlsra, J.) 713

the land held by them is irrelevant for computing the
ceiling area which the family unit may retain .

. In our opinion, therefore, the definition of family unit along with. the .
explanation does not leave the slightest doubt that a separated mmor
son i~ as much a me'mber of the family unit as a joint son with his
father. 8
This leads us to the second group relating to drought-prone
area. It may be pointed out at the very oqtset that no such plea had
been taken before 'the High Court. The petitioners seek to get an
advantage of 121 per cent 'on account of the land. lying in dr<iught-
prone area in view of s. 5 (iv) of the Andhra Pradesh Act. Section c
5 (iv) provides :

"5 (iv) In the case of any dry land situated in any
area declared by the Government by notification to be a
drought prone area, the extent of standard holding shall · D
be increased,-

(a) by twelve and a half per centum, in the· case of
any dry land falling under Class G or Class H
of the Table below ;
E
(b) by twenty per centum, in the case of any dry
land falling under Class I, Class J or Class K of
the said Table."

In order to attract the provisions of cl. (iv) of s. 5 the petitioners
have to establish that the Government by notification has declared a F
particular area to be a drought prone-area. The petitioners. were
given an opportunity to produce the notification which they have
failed to do and now the p~titioners seek that they should be given
. an opportunity to produce the specific notification as and when they
are able to procure the same. We are not inclined to give such a
blank cheque to the petitioners to produce the required notification
as and when they like. Indeed they should have 'raised a contention
to that effect before the High _(Court and should have produced the
·necessary notification but that they did not do. Even before this
Court they have not been able to produce the specific notification
issued by the Government. Under the circumstances they cannot be
allowed to urge this point for want to necessary foundation for the
714 SUI'REMB COURT REPORTS iI983) 3 s.c.a.

argument. We also decline to accede to their request that they may
A be allowed to produce the required Government notification accord-
ing to their sweet will and as and when they are able to produce the
same.

We pow take up the third ground that the definition of family
unit under s. 3 (f), as interpreted by the High Court is violative of
8 Art. 14 of the Constitution. This point is also covered by a decision
of this Court in Seth Nand Lal & Anr. v. State of Haryana & Ors.(1)
and the Court repelled the argument firstly on the ground that it was
saved by the protective limbrella under Art. 31A and Art 3!B of
the .Constitution and also on other considerations as will be evident
C from the following observation :

"It has been pointed out that adopting 'family' as a
unit as against 'an individual' was considered necessary
as that would reduce the scope for evasion of law by
effecting mala fide - partitions and transfers since such
D transactions are usµally made in favour of family members
that normally in rural agricultura!' set up in our country
the family is the operative unit and all the lands of a
family constitute a single operational holding and that
'therefore ceiling should . be ·related to the capacity of a
E family to 'Cultivate the lands personally. It has been
pointed out that keeping all these aspects in view the con-
cept of family was artificially defined and double standard
for fixing.ceiling, one for the primary unit and other for
the adult son living with the family was adopted In fact,
a provision like s. 4(3) which makes for the augmentation .
. of the permissible area for a family when the adult sons
do' not own or hold lands of their own but are living with
the family has one virtue, that it ensures such augmenta-
tion in the case of every family irrespective of by what
·personal law it is governed and no discrimination is made
G between major sons governed by different systems of
personal laws. So far as an adult son living separately
from the family is concerned, he is rightly regarded as a
separate unit who will have to file a separate <jeclaration
in respect of his holding under ·•. 9 of the Act and since
H he is living separately and would not be contributing ·9is
capacity to the family to cultivate the. famiiy lands

(1) (1980] 3 S.C.R, 1181.
B.B. RAJU v. ANDHRA PRADESH (Misra, J.) 715

personally, there is no justification for increasing the
permissible area of the primary unit of the family.. The A
case of an unmarried daughter or daughters living with
the family, counsel pointed out, was probably considered
to be a rare case and it was presumed, that daughters
would in normal course get married and would become
members of their husbands' units and that iS why no sepa· B
rate provision was made for giving additional land for
every unmarried ma]or daughter living with the family.
On the ·materials placed and the initial presumption of
constitutionality, we find considerable force in this sub·
mission. It is, therefore, not possible to strike down an
enactment particularly the enactment dealing with agra· c
rian reform which bas been put on the Statutes Book with
th.e avowed purpose of bringing about equality or rather·
reducing the inequality between the haves and the have
nots, as being violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution
simply because it has failed to.make a provision for what D
was regarded as an exceptional case or a rare .contingency.
In our view, the material furnished on behalf of the State
Government by way of justification for adopting an arti-
' ficial definition of family and a double standard for fixing
ceiling is sufficiel)t to rebel the attack on these provisions
under Art. 14." E
...
We fully concur with the view of the Court.

We now take up the fourth ground. The learned counsel for
the petitioners contends that the land transferred by the petitioners
in favour of outsiders under various deeds could not be included in F
their holdings, especially when those transfers were not hit by s. 7 of
the Andhra Pradesh Act in as much as the transfers were made
much before 24th of fanuary, 1971. This point is again covered by
a decision of this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh- v. Mohd.
Ashrafuddin(1; to which one of us was a party. In that case the Court
G
had to construe the expression 'held' as defined in s.3 (i) of the
Andhra Pradesh Act. It reads : ·

"3(i) · 'holding' means the entire land held by a person,-·

(i) as an owner ;

· (3l A,.I.~. 19sz s.~. 91'\,
716 SUPR,BME COURT REPOKT$ [1983j 3 s.c.tt

(ii) as a limited owner ;

(iii) as a usufructuary mortgage ;

(iv) as a tenant ;

(v) who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by condi·
B tional sale or through part performance of a contract for
the sale of land or otherwise, or in one or more of such
capacities ;

and the expression 'to hold. land' shall be cos.trued accordingly.

c Exalanation :-Where the same land· is held by one
person in one capacity and by another person in. any ·other
capacity, such land shall be included .in the holding of
both such persons."

D D;aling with the expressions 'hek!' the Court observed :
I
''The word 'held' is not defined in the Act. We have,
therefore, to go by the dictionary meaning of the term.
According to Oxford Dictionary 'held' means : to possess
to be the owner or holder or tena.nt of; keep possession
E of; occupy. Thus, 'held' connotes both ownership as well
as possession. And in the context of the definition it is
· not possible to interpret the term 'held' only in the
sense of possession. For example, if a land is held by an
owner
. '~
and
. . .-
also by a tenant or by
I
a person in' possession
.
F pursuant to a contract for sale, the holding will be taken
to be the holding of all such· persons. It obviously means
that an owner who is not an actual poss.ession will also be
tl\~e)l. to b~ a holder of the land. If there 'Yas any doubt
in this. behalf, the same has been dispelled by the explana-
tion attach~d to the definition of the term. 'holding'. The
G explan.ation clearly contemplates that. the same land .ca-,;
be th~· holding of two diff~rent persons holding the land in
two different capacities. The respondent in view of the
definition 9erta\nly is holding as an owner, although he is
not in possession."
H
Shri Phadke, however, contends that s. ~(il. of the Andhra
Pradesh Act being unreasonable is ultra vires because the same land
, il.B. RAJU v. ARDHRA PRADE_SH (Misra, J.) 717

cannot be the land of the transferor as well as of the transferee and
that Mohd. Ashrafuddin's case (supra) requires reconsideration. That
case has taken into consideration the various relevant provisions of
the Act. and the Court came to the conclusion the same land can be
the land of the transferor as well as the transferee in view of the
definition of the term 'holding' i_n s. 3(i) of the Andhra Pradesh Act
.,. and in our opinion the view taken in that case is fully warranted by
the provisions of the Act. We are not persuaded to accept the
B
'
contention that the case requires re-consideration.

This leads us to the last point but not the least in importance,
in that the petitioners have been deprived of a substantial portion of
their holding in the form of surplus-land and thereby they have been c
deprived of their livelihood affecting their right to live, which is
)'. violative of Art. 21 of the Constitution. In support of this i:onten-
tio11 ·strong relia nee was placed on the case of Maneka Gandhi v.
Union of India(') which has given a new dimension to Art. 21 of the
Constitution. It was held in that case that right to live is not
D
merely confined to physical existence, but it includes within its ambit
the right to live with basic human dignity and the State cannot
deprive anyone of this valuable right. It was further submitted that
·1 s. 3(f) of the Andhra Pradesh Act with the explanation added to it
is destructive of Art. 21 and, therefore, violative of the basic structure
of the Constitution. This point is also covered by two decisions of E
this Court. In re Sar:t Ram(') dealing with Art. 21 of the Consti· ·
tution a Bench of Five Judges of this Court held :

"The argument that the word "life" in Art. 21 of the .
Constitution includes "livelihood" Iias only · to be stated
to be rejected."

"The same view was reiterated by a Bench of three Judges in A. V.
'
Nac!,ane v. Union of India('). In that case the validity of the Life
Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 (I of 1981) and the
Life Insurance Corporation of India .Class III and Class IV Emp- G

- I
loyees (Bonus and.Dearness Allowance) Rules, 1981, were challenged
on several grounds including Art. 21 of the Constitution and the
Court dealing with this aspect of the matter quoted with approval
the case of Sant Ram (supra) in the following words :
H
(1) [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621.
(2) [1960] 3 S.C.R. 499.
(3) [198211 s,c.c 206.
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983j 3 s.c.R.

"As rega_rds Article 21, the first premise of the argu·
A ment that the word 'life' in that Article includes
livelihood was considered and rejected in In re Sant Ram,''

Shri Phadke, however, brushed these cases aside on the simple ground
that they are not relevant for the decision of the question whether
B the right to live includes the right to Jive with human dignity, and
the decision on Maneka Gandhi's case (supra) must be deemed to be
the correct exposition of the Jaw on the subject. The contention
that life includes livelihood within the meaning of. Art. 21 of the
Constitution was repelled in these two cases and Maneka Gandhi's
case did not take into consideration the case of Sant Ram (supra).
c These cases, therefore, still hold the field.

Besid~s, the petitioners have been deprived of their holding in
the form of surplus land but it ·was only for the purpose of giving
relief to ~he downtrodden and the roor agricultural labourers. The
D surplus land would vest in the State and the State in its turn would
give it to the poor and the downtrodden and thus such a deprivation
will be protected under Art. 39 of Directive Principles. The case of
Maneka Gandhi (supra), in our opinion, is not relevant for the
decision of the point under consideration.

E The counsel for the petitioners in other cases adopted the same
argument of Shri Phadke.

Having given our best consideration to the questions involved
in the cases we find no· infirmity in any of the provisions of the
Andhra Pradesh Act.
F
'
For the foregoing discussion all the special leave petitions and
the writ petitions must fail. They are accordingly dissmissed.

S.R. Petitions dismissed.
G

-