Holding

Termination under Section 35(3) is invalid without a prior enquiry and notice, as the statutory power is conditional upon such procedural safeguards, violating natural justice and Article 14.

Summary

Basudeo Tiwary, a lecturer appointed in 1978 at an affiliated college that later became a constituent unit of Sido Kanhu University, was re‑appointed on a temporary basis in 1986. The Vice‑Chancellor terminated his services, invoking Section 35(3) of the Bihar State Universities Act, 1976, on the ground that his appointment was illegal. Tiwary challenged the termination, arguing that he was denied a hearing, violating natural justice and Article 14. The Supreme Court held that Section 35(3) can be invoked only after a proper enquiry and notice establishing that the appointment was indeed contrary to the Act; such procedural safeguards were absent. Consequently, the termination order was declared invalid, the appeal was allowed, and the university was directed to pay arrears of salary to Tiwary’s legal representatives.

Issues considered

The validity of termination under Section 35(3) of the Bihar State Universities Act, 1976 without providing the employee an opportunity of hearing.
Whether Section 35(3) implicitly requires a prior enquiry and notice before termination.
Whether the appellant's appointment was contrary to the Act, justifying termination.
The applicability of natural justice and Article 14 principles in public employment termination.

Legislation cited

Bihar State Universities Act, 1976s. 35(3), s. 4(14)

Subjects

natural justiceaudi alteram partemArticle 14public employmenttermination of serviceprocedural fairnessBihar State Universities Actappointment irregularitycivil appeal

Judgment

BASUDEO TIWARY A
·v.
SIDO KANHU UNIVERSITY AND ORS.

SEPTEMBER 17, 1998

(DR. AS. ANAND AND S. RAJENDRA BABU, JJ.) B

Bilzar State Universities Act, 1976: Section 4( 14) and 35(3).

Service Law--U11iversity-Affiliated college under private 111a11age-
111e11t-Appoi11tment of lectllre~Take over of college as a co11stitue11t
u11it-Re-appoi11t111e11t of lecture~laim for regularisation from initial
c
date-Rejection of-Tem1i11ati011 011 the ground that lzis appointment was
co11trwy to law-Clwlle11ge to tenni11atio11 order-Held tenni11atio11 was illegal
as 110 oppoltlmity was afforded to employee.

Service law--Employe~o11fem1ent of absolute power to tenninate D
~·ervice--Legality o.f.

Natural justice-Sta/lite-Silence as to requirement of natural jus-
tice-Need to read such rcquirement--When arises.

Constitwion of India, 1950 : Anicle 14. E
Equality--Non-arbitrminess is essential facet of A1ticle 14-Audi al-
teram partem facet of 11atural justice is also a requireme11t of Anicle
14---Public employment-Employer's action against employee must be fair
and reasonable.
F
The appellant was appointed as a Lecturer in History on 25.1.1978
in the S.R.T College, Dhamri which was an affiliated college under private
management. Subsequently this college was taken over as a constituent
unit of"the University. Pm:-suant to a resolution passed by the University
syndicate an order dated 4.2.1986 was passed re-appointing the appellant
and he was posted to Godda College. His re-presentation for regularisa- G
tion of his services with effect from 25.1.1978 was rejected by Vice- Chan-
cellor of the University. On the other hand his services were terminated
on the ground that his appointment was not lawful in asmuch as he should
have been appointed to a post in the service of the University purely on
temporary basis not exceeding a period of 6 months. Since he had been H
633
634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19981 SUPP.1 S.C.R.

A appoirited for a period longer than six months it Wds not open to the
University to do so without the express sanction of the Government.
Consequently appellant's appointment was made contrary to the
provisions of the Bihar State Universities Act, 1976. The appellant
preferred a writ petition before the High Court which held that his ap-
pointment was illegal and consequently upheld the termination order. The
B High Court did not examine the question of observance of rule of audi
alteram partem. Section 35(3) of the Bihar State Universities Act, 1976
provides that "Any appointment or promotion made contrary to the
provisions of the Act, statutes, rule or regulations or in any irregular of
unauthorised manner shall be terminated at any time without notice."
c
In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant
that the order made by the Vice-Chancellor was contrary to the principles
of natural justice because it was passed without affording any opportunity
of hearing to the appellant.

D Allowing the appeal and setting aside the order of High Court, this
Court

HELD : 1. In this case no notice has been given to the appellant
before holding that his appointment is irregular or unauthorised. Conse-
E quently, the order terminating his services cannot be sustained. [641-B-C]

2. The condition precedent for exercise of power u/s. 35(3) of the
Bihar State Universities Act, 1976 is that an appointment had been made
contrary to Act, Rules, Statutes and Regulations or otherwise. In order to
F arrive at such a conclusion a finding has to be recorded and unless such
a finding is recorded, termination cannot be made. To arrive at such a
conclusion necessarily an enquiry will have to be mad_e as to whether such
appointment was contrary to the provisions of the Act etc. If in a given
case such exercise is absent, the condition precedent stands unfulfilled. To
arrive at such a finding necessarily enquiry will have to be held and in
G holding such an enquiry, notice to the person whose appointment is under
enquiry will have to be issued. If notice is not given to him then it is like
playing Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark, that is, if the employee
concerned whose rights are affected, is not given notice of such a proceed-
ing and a conclusion is drawn in his absence, such a conclusion would not
H be just, fair or reasonable. [640-F-G-H]

-
B. TIWARY v. SIDO KANHU UNNERSITY 635

Delhi Transport Corporation v. D. T. C. Mazdoor Congress, AIR (1991) A
SC 101, relied on.

3. The appellant has since demised during the pendency of these
proceedings, no further direction either as to further inquiry or reinstate-
.- ment can be given. Consequently it would be deemed that he had died in
harness. His legal Representatives would be entitled to the payment of B
arrears of salary from the date of termination of appellant's services upto
the date of his death on the basis of last pay drawn by him. [641-C-D}

4. Non-arbitrariness is an essential facet of Article 14 pervading the
entire realm of State action governed by Article 14. The audi alteram partem C
facet of natural justice is also a requirement of Article 14, for, natural
justice is the antithesis of arbitrariness. In the sphere of public employ-
ment, it is well settled that any action taken by the employer against au
employee must be fair, just and reasonable which are components of fair
treatment. The conferment of absolute power to terminate the services of
an employee is antithesis to fair, just and reasonable treatment. [639-F-G] D

Delhi Tra11sporl C01poratio11 v. D. T.C. Mazdoor Congress, AIR (1991)
SC 101, referred to.

5. Ju order to impose procedural safeguards the requirement of
natural justice has to he read in many situations when the statute is silent
E
on this point. Omission to impose the hearing requirement in the statute
under which the impugned action is being taken does not exclude hearing
- it may be implied from the nature of the power - particularly when the
right of a party is affected adversely. The justification for reading such a
requirement is that the Court merely supplies omission of the legislature F

-
except in case of direct legislative negation or implied exclusion. [640-A-B]

Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. v. 17ze Chief Election Commissioner &
Ors., AIR (1978) SC 851 and SL Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., AIR (1981)
SC 136, relied on.
G
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4858 of
1998.

From the Judgment and Order dated 3.11.95 of the Patna High Court
in C.W.J.C. No. 13221 of 1993. H
636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A Sudhir Chandra and Jayant Bhushan for the Appellant.

Akhilesh Kumar Pandey for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

B RAJENDRA BABU, J. Leave granted.
I

The appellant having died during the pendency of the proceedings
1s now represented by his Legal Representatives. However, for the
purpose of convenience we shall refer to him as appellant in the course
C of this order.

Pursuant to a Resolution made by the Syndicate on 24.1.1986. an
order No. G.A. 13/86 dated 4th February, 1986 was made appointing the
appellant as a lecturer who was hitherto working as lecturer, Department
of History, S.R.T. College, Dhamri and was posted to Godda College. He
D made representation to the Vice-Chancellor for regularisation of his ser-
vices in terms of the relevant statutes of the University and on the basis
that he had been working as lecturer in an affiliated college under private
management before the same was taken over as a constituent unit of the
University. The appellant was informed by a letter sent on 75.1993 that his
E representation had been turned down by the Vice Chancellor. By another
communication he was informed that the Vice Chancellor had directed for
the termination of the services of the appellant on the ground that on
24.1.1986, the Syndicate had no power to make appointment of the lecturer
and therefore his appointment was not lawful. Challenging this action of
F the respondent- University, the appellant preferred a writ petition and
sought for a direction to the University authorities to regularise his service
with effect from 25.1.1978 when he was first appointed in the affiliated
college which was at that time under the management of a private organisa-
tion and subsequently become a constituent unit of the University.
-
G The brief facts leading to this situation are that the appellant was
working as a lecturer in a post sanctioned by the Government in the S.R.T.
College at Dhamri as a lecturer in History. Though he continued to work
as a lecturer in University at the time of take over of the said college by
the University, the Principal wanted his brother to be appointed as a
H lecturer of History in the college. On account of machinations adopted by

r
B. TIWARY v. SIDO KANHU UNIVERSITY [RAJENDRA BABU, J.] 637

the Principal though the appellant had been appointed earlier, he wa5 A
relegated to the second position and thereafter his name was not even
disclosed to the University after its take over. On 14.10.1982 an agreement
was signed between the University and the Governing body of the college
in terms of which the college was taken over as its constituent Unit. The
inspection team had visited the college and submitted a report on
23.9.1981. In that report the appellant's name did not figure. As stated
B
earlier it was because of the manipulation of the Principal that his name
was not shown. Thereafter representations were made by him to the Vice
chancellor putting forth his grievance and the representations were placed
before the Syndicate of the University which by a resolution made on
20.1.1985 constituted a Sub-Committee to enquire into his grievance. By a c
resolution passed on 20.1.1985, the Sub-Committee after enquiry made a
report in the following te!ms :

"From the analyses of above stated facts, it seems that the appoint-
ment of Shri Tiwaii is effective from 25.1.78. Prior to acquisition D
that is from 25.1.78 to 23.9.81 (leaving the period 26.1.79to10.11.79
as he has not submitted any reliable certificate for this period)
certificates of Secretaries cannot be relied. He was certainly work-
ing in the college. On visiting college and on enquiry information
received and as per the said information it is known that as Shri
Tiwari was working since 25.1.78 therefore he desired he should E
be treated on first post because Shri. Vipin Bihari Pandey was
appointed oil 11.11.79. The second party wanted that he should
remain on second post which was not accepted by him. bi this
period, tussle al5o continued between Secretary and Principal. He
was of the group of Secretary, therefore, it is possible that he might F
not get the protection of Principal. As a result of this struggle, his
name wa5 neither given to Enquiry Committee and nor he was
allowed to enter in the college after acquisition on 14.10.82. Pos-
sibly, he was not allowed to enter the college from 23.9.81. The
certificate issued by Secretary Smt. Parbha Devi for his working
upto 14.10.82 does not appear very much reliable and in such G
circumstance, after approximately three years service and legally
valid appointment, he has been removed which does not appear
to be proper whereas one post of hi5tory is still lying vacant there.
Two posts in History Department are sanctioned chere (Letter No.
B/111-17 dated 13.6.68 of University created on 11.5.69 and second H
638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A post vide letter No. 1541 dated l.9.81 of Education Department of
Bihar Government. Because one post is still lying vacant, therefore,
if it is considered appropriate Syndicate can take decision for his
working in the post there."

The Report of the Sub-Committee was placed before the Syndicate
B for its consideration in the meeting held on 9.5.85. The Syndicate accepted
the report submitted by the Sub-Committee and thereafter in its meeting
on 27th July, 1985 directed the implementation of its resolution. Finally on
24.1.1986 it took decision that the appellant should be re-appointed on a
temporary basis. He was posted to Godda College and was working as such
C in that capacity. Thereafter new Universities had been constituted in the
Stale of Bihar. Both the Dhamri college where the appellant was working
formerly and the Godda college where the appellant was posted in terms
of the order dated 4.2.1986 fell within the jill-isdiction of Sido Kanhu
University, Dumka. At that stage appellant made a representation for
D regularisation of his service with effect from 25.1.78 from which date he
claimed to have been appointed which was not accepted, but, on the other
hand, the Vice Chancellor decided to terminate his services.

Mr. Sudhir Chandra, learned Senior Advocate for the appellant
submitted that the University had the necessary jurisdiction to enter into
E agreement with private institutions for promoting the purpose of t.he Act:
to assume the·management of any institution under its jurisdiction; to take
a decision a~ to whether or not the appellant was lawfully employed at
Dhamri College at the time of take over; and to decide the dispute between
appellant and other candidates as to who was legally appointed to the
F sanctioned post of lecturer in History in terms of Section 4 (14) of the
Bihar University Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act''). He further
contended on the basis of this provision that appointment~ made in the
colleges and direct the appointment of the appellant. He submitted that in
this background appellant having been appointed, it was not at all open to
-
the Vice Chancellor to have treated such appointment as not having been
G validly made and to terminate the services of the appellant. He further
~-
submitted that at any rate the order made by the Vice Chancellor was
contrary to the principles of natural justice inasmuch as the appellant had
been appointed to a post in the University and he was holding the same
and \vithout giving any opportunity of hearing to the appellant, the order
H in question could not have been passed.
B. TIWARY v. SIDO KANHU UNIVERSITY (RAJENDRA BABU, J.] 639

Shri Akhilesh Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the respondent A
submitted that the appointment made by the University was not at all
proper inasmuch as the appellant should have been appointed to a post in
the service of the University purely on temporary basis not exceeding a
period of 6 months. Since the appellant had been appointed for a period
longer than that, it was not open to the University to do so without the B
express sanction of the Government. In this situation it was certainly open
to the Vice Chancellor to treat the appointment made as contrary to the
provisions of the Act or statutes or rules or regulations or in any other
manner irregular. If that was so, it was certainly not necessary for the
Univer\ity to have afforded an opportunity of being heard to the appellant.
He relied upon Section 35(3) of the Act which was introduced into the
c
enactment by an amendment made by Bihar Act 17 of 1993 which came
into effect from 22.8.93.

Several contentions have been addressed by learned counsel on
either side. However, for the purpose of disposal of this appeal, it is suffice D
to consider only one aspect of the matter and that is, whether the appellant
had been given an opporrnnity of being heard before terminating his
services and in the absence of the same whether such termination is valid.
The High Court took the view that the appointment of the appellant made
by the Syndicate of the University by its resolution dated 24.1.86 is illegal E
and on that basis took the view that the termination of the services was in
order but did not examine the aspect with which we are concerned in the
present case as to the non-observance of rule of Audi Altcram Panem.

The law is settled that non-arbitrariness is an essential facet of
Article 14 pervading the entire realm of state action governed by Article F
14. It has come to be established, as a further corollary, that the audi
-- altcram pancm facet of natural justice is also the requirement of Article 14,
for, natural justice the antithesis of arbitrariness. In the sphere of public
empolyment, it is well se~tled that any action'taken by the employer against
an employee must be fair, just and reasonable which are components of G -
fair treatment. The conferment of absolute power to terminate the services
of an employee i' antithesis to fair, just and reasonable treatment. This
aspect was exhaush vely considered by a Constitution Bench of this Court
in DeUii Transport Corporatio11 v. D.TC. Mazdoor Co11gress, reported in
AIR (1991) SC 101. H

•
640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A In order to impose procedural safeguards, this Court has read the
requirement of natural justice in many situations when the statute is silent
on this point. The approach of this Court in this regard is that omission to
impose the hearing requirement in the statute under which the impugned
action is being taken does not exclude hearing - it may be implied from the
nature· of the power - particularly when the right of a party is affected
B adversely. The justification for reading such a requirement is that the Court
merely supplies omission of the legislature. (vide Mohinder Singh Gill &
A11r. v. Tile Chief Election Commissioner & Ors., AIR (1978) SC 851) and
except in case of direct legislative negation or implied exclusion. (vide S.L.
Kapoor v. Jagnwhan & Ors., AIR (1981) SC 136.
c
In the light of these principles of law, we have lo examine the scope
of provision of Section 35(3) which reads a~ follows :

"35(3) Any appointment or promotion made contrary to the
provisions of the Act, Statutes, rules or regulations or in any
D
irregular or unauthorised manner shall be terminated at any time
\vithout notice.

The said provision provides that an appointment could be termin_ated
at any time without notice if the same had been made contrary to the
E provisions of the Act, statutes, rules or regulations or in any irregular or
unauthorised manner. The condition precedent for exercise of this power
i~ that an appointment had been made contrary to Act, Rules, Statutes and
Regulations or otherwise. In order to arrive at a conclusion that an ap-
pointment is contrary to the provisions of the Act, statutes, rules or
F regulations etc. a finding has to be recorded and unless such a finding is
recorded, the termination cannot be made but to arrive at such a con-
clusion necessarily an enquiry \viii have to be made as to whether such
appointment was contrary to the provisions of the Act etc. If in a given
case such exercise is absent, the condition precedent stands unfulfilled. To
--

-
arrive at such a finding necessarily enquiry \viii have to be held and in
G holding such an enquiry the person whose appointment is under enquiry
will have to be issued to him. If notice is not given to him then it is like
playing Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark, that is, if the employee
concerned whose rights are affected, is not given notice of such a proceed-
ing and a conclusion is drawn in his absence, such a conclusion would not
H be just, fair or reasonable as noticed by this Court in D.T.C. Mazdoor
B. TIWARYv. SIDOKANHUUNIVERSITY[RAJENDRABABU,J.] 641

Sabha's case'. In such an event, we have to hold that in the provision there A
is an implied requirement of hearing for the purpose of arriving at a
conclusion that an appoi.1tment had been made contrary to the Act, statute,
rule or regulation etc. and it is only on such a conclusion being drawn, the
services of the person could be terminated without further notice. That is
how Section 35(3) in this case will have to be read.
B
Admittedly in this case notice has not been given to the appellant
before holding that his appointment is irregular or unauthorised and
ordering termination of his service. Hence the impugned order terminating
the sevices of the appellant cannot be sustained.

The appellant has since demised during the pendency of these c
proceedings, no further direction either as to further inquiry or reinstate-
ment can be given. We declare that the termination of the appellant by the
respondent as per the notification referred to by us is invalid. Consequent-
ly, it would be deemed that the appellant had died in harness. Needless to
say that the appellant would become entitled to the payment of arrears of D
salary from tlie date of termination of his services upto the date of his death
on the basis of last pay drawn by him. Let Respondent take action within
a period of three montlis from today to work out the arrears due to the
appellant from the date of his termination till his deatli and pay the same
to his legal representatives.
E
In the result, we allow the appeal in the terms stated above, set aside
the order made by the High Court and allow the writ petition quashing the
notification as stated earlier. However, in the circumstan,ces of the case the
parties are directed to bear their own costs.

T.N.A. Appeal allowed. F