BASAWARAJ & ANR.versusTHE SPL. LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER

                      [2013] 8 S.C.R. 227


                     BASAWARAJ & ANR.                                  A
                                v.
          THE SPL. LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER
              (Civil Appeal No. 6974 of 2013)
                       AUGUST 22, 2013
                                                                       B
       [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND S.A .. BOBDE, JJ.)

      Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - s. 54 - Time barred appeal
- Appeals under - Dismissal of, by High Court .on ground of
limitation, after dismissal of applications for condonation of C
delay - Justification - Held: Justified - Condonation of delay
is to be based on sound legal parameters - In the instant
case, there was a delay of 5-112 years in filing the appeals u/
s.54 before the High Court - The only explanation offered for
approaching the court at such a belated stage was that one D
of the appellants had taken ill -No "sufficient cause" given by
the appellants which prevented them to approach the High
court within limitation - No court could be justified in condoning
such an inordinate delay - Limitation Act, 1963 - s.5.
                                                                       E
     Limitation - Statute of - Aim and rationale - Public policy
- To secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and
perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression - Held:
Limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may
have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment
or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction,                  F
negligence' or /aches - The law of limitation may harshly affect
a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when
the statute so prescribes - The Court has no power to extend
the period of limitation on equitable grounds - Maxims -
Maxim "dura Jex sed Jex"                                               G

      Constitution of India, 1950 -Article 14 - Scope of - Held:
It is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud, even by
extending the wrong decisions made in other cases - The said
                               227                                     H
    228       SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A provision does not envisage negative equality but has only
  a positive aspect - If an illegality and irregularity has been
  committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals
  or a wrong order has been passed by a Judicial forum, others
  cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior court
B for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality
  or for passing a similarly wrong order - Doctrines - Doctrine
  of equality.

          Words and Phrases - "Sufficient cause" - Meaning of

C     The land of the appellants was acquired in pursuance
  of notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition
  Act, 1894. Thereafter, an award under Section 11 of the
  Act was made fixing the market value of the land. The
  appellants preferred references under Section 18(1) of the
D Act whereupon the reference court passed award dated
  28-2-2002.

       Aggrieved, the appellants filed appeals under Section
  54 of the Act before the High Court on 16.8.2007 with
E applications for condonation of delay. The applications
  for condonation of delay stood rejected as the High Court
  did not find any sufficient cause to condone the delay,
  and dismissed the appeals on the ground of limitation.
  Hence, these appeals.

F         Dismissing the appeals, the Court

       HELD: 1. Article 14 of the Constitution is not meant
  to perpetuate illegality or fraud, even by extending the
  wrong decisions made in other cases. The said provision
G does not envisage negative equality but has only a
  positive aspect. Thus, if some other similarly situated
  persons have been granted some relief/ benefit
  inadvertently or by mistake, such an order does not
  confer any legal right on others to get the same relief as
H well. If a wrong is committed in an earlier case, it cannot
  BASAWARAJ & ANR. v. SPL. LAND ACQUISITION              229
                 OFFICER
be perpetuated. Equality is a trite, which cannot be            A
claimed in illegality and therefore, cannot be enforced by
a citizen or court in a negative manner. If an illegality and
irregularity has been committed in favour of an individual
or a group of individuals or a wrong order has been
passed by a Judicial forum, others cannot invoke the            B
jurisdiction of the higher or superior court for repeating
or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for
passing a similarly wrong order. A wrong order/decision
in favour of any particular party does not entitle any other
party to claim benefits on the basis of the wrong decision.     c
Even otherwise, Article 14 cannot be stretched too far for
otherwise it would make functioning of administration
impossible. [Para 8] [236-D-H]

     Chandigarh Administration & Anr. v. Jagjit Singh & Anr.
AIR 1995 SC 705: 1995 (1) SCR 126 Mis. Anand Button Ltd.        D
v. State of Haryana & Ors. AIR 2005 SC 565: 2005 (9) SCC
164; K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P. & Ors. AIR 2006 SC 898:
2006 (1) SCR 342; Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab AIR 2010
SC 1937: 2010 (7) SCR 317 - relied on.
                                                                E
     2.1. Sufficient cause is the cause for which defendant
could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the
word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch
as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended.
Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than          F
that which provides a platitude, which when the act done
suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts
and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined
from the view point of a reasonable standard of a
cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means         G
that the party should not have acted in a negligent
manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in
view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot
be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or
"remained inactive". However, the facts and
                                                                H
   230      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013) 8 S.C.R.


A circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground
  to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for
  the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion,
  it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must
  satisfy the Court that he was prev.ented by any
B "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless
  a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should
  not allow the application for condonation of delay. The
  court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or
  was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. [Para
c 9] [2~7 -8-F]
       2.2. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given
  a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is
  done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of
  bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned,
D whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can
  be decided on the facts of a particular case and no
  straitjacket formula is possible. [Para 11] [238-8-C]

       Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. v.
E Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors. AIR 1964 SC 1336: 1964 SCR
  495; Lala Matadin v. A. Narayanan AIR 1970 SC 1953: 1970
  (2) SCR 90; Parimal v. Veena @ Bharti AIR 2011 SC 1150:
  2011 (2) SCR 648; Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal
  Corporation of Brihan Mumbai AIR 2012 SC 1629: 2012 (5)
F SCC 157; Madan/a/ v. Shyamlal AIR 2002 SC 100: 2001 (5)
  Suppl. SCR 252; Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors.
  v. Gobardhan Sao & Ors. AIR 2002 SC 1201: 2002 (2) SCR
  77 - relied on.

     Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar AIR 1964 SC 993: 1964
G SCR 946 - referred to.

      3.1. The law of limitation may harshly affect a
  particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour
  when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power
H to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.
 BASAWARAJ & ANR. v. SPL. LAND ACQUISITION              231
                OFFICER
"A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an       A
evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to
relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its
operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship
or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has
no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same.    B
The legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" which means "the law
is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a
situation. It has consistently been held that,
"inconvenience is not"· a decisive factor to be considered
while interpreting a statute. [Para 12) [238-D-F]              c
     3.2. The Statute of Limitation is founded on public
policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community,
to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and
to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past
which have not been agitated unexplainably and have            D
from lapse of time become stale. [Para 13] [238-G-H]

    3.3. An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of
insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation
prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have           E
been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or
what may have been lost by a party's own inaction,
negligence' or laches. [Para 13) [239-C-D]

     Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff   F
Assn. (2005) 7 SCC 510: 2005 (2) Suppl. SCR 1030;
Rajendar Singh & Ors. v. Santa Singh & Ors. AIR 1973 SC
2537: 1974 (1) SCR 381; Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Executive
Engineer, Ja/gaon Medium Project (2008) 17 SCC 448: 2008
(15) SCR 135 ·relied on.
                                                               G
    P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Kamataka AIR 2002
SC 1856: 2002 (4) SCC 578; A. R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak
AIR 1992 SC 1701: 1991 (3) Suppl. SCR 325 • referred to.

    4.1. Where a case has been presented in the court          H
    232       SUPREME COURT REPORTS             (2013] 8 S.C.R.


A beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court
  as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an
  adequate and enough reason which prevented him to
  approach the court within limitation. In case a party is
  found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part
B in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to
  have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there
  cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No
  court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate
  delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The
c application is to be decided only within the parameters
  laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of
  delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a
  litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay
  without any justification, putting any condition
  whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of
0
  the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing
  utter disregard to the legislature. [Para 15] [239-G-H; 240-
  A-B]
       4.2. In the instant case, admittedly, there was a delay
E of 5-112 years in filing the appeals under Section 54 of the
  Act before the High Court. The only explanation offered
  for approaching the court at such a belated stage has
  been that one of the appellants had taken ill. In view of
  above, no interference is required with impugned
F judgment and order of the High Court. [Paras 6, 16] [236-
  A-B; 240-C]
          Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 24, p. 181 - referred
    to.

G                        Case Law Reference:
          1995 (1) SCR 126          relied on         Para 8
          2005 (9) sec 164          relied on         Para 8
          2006 (1) SCR 342          relied on         Para 8
H         2010 (7) SCR 317          relied on         Para 8
 BASAWARAJ & ANR. v. SPL. LAND ACQUISITION             233
                OFFICER
    1964 SCR 495                 relied on        Para 9     A
    1970 (2) SCR 90              relied on        Para 9
    2011 (2) SCR 648             relied on        Para 9
    2012 (5) sec 157             relied on        Para 9     B
    1964 SCR 946                 referred to      Para 10
    2001 (5) Suppl. SCR 252 relied on             Para 11
    2002 (2) SCR .77             relied on        Para 11
                                                             c
    2005 (2) Suppl. SCR 1030relied on             Para 13
    1974 (1) SCR 381             relied on        Para 13
    2008 (15) SCR 135            relied on        Para 13
    2002 (4) sec 578             referred to      Para 14    D

    1991 (3) Suppl. SCR 325 referred to           Para 14
    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
6974 of 2013.
                                                             E
    From the Judgment and Order dated 10.06.2011 of the
High Court of Karnataka at Gulbarga in MFA No. 10766 of
2007.

                             WITH                            F
Civil Appeal No. 6975 of 2013.

   Basava Prabhu S. Patil, D. Basu, B.S. Prasad (for R.D.
Upadhaya) for the Appellants.
                                                             G
    Naveen R. Nath, Darpan K.M., Hetu Arora Sethi for the
Respondent.

   . The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. These appeals have been          H
    234       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013) 8 S.C.R.


A   preferred against the common impugned judgment and order
    dated 10.6.2011 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at
    Gulbarga in MFA Nos.10765 and 10766 of 2007 by which the
    appeals of the appellants under Section 54 of the Land
    Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') have
s   been dismissed on the ground of limitation.

        2. For the purpose of convenience, the facts of C.A. No.
    6974 of 2013 are taken, which are as under:

       A. The land of the appellants in Survey No.417/2
C admeasuring 4 acres and Survey No.418 admeasuring 23
  acres, 1 guntha; and 5 acres, 23 gunthas of phut kharab
  situated in the revenue estate of village Mahagaon, Tehsil and
  Distt. Gulbarga was acquired in pursuance of notification dated
  23.4.1994 under Section 4(1) of the Act.
b
       B. After completing the formalities as required under the
  Act, an award under Section 11 of the Act was made on
  23.10.1997 fixing the market value of the land at the rate of
  Rs.11,500/- per acre and Rs.100/- per acre in respect of phut
E kharab land.

         C. The appellants preferred references under Section
    18(1) of the Act for enhancement of compensation and the
    reference court vide award dated 28.2.2002 fixed the market
    value of the land from Rs.31,500/- to Rs. 70,000/- per acre
F   depending upon the quality and geographical situation of the
    land. For phut kharab land, assessment was made at the rate
    of Rs.1,000/- per acre.

       D. Aggrieved, the appellants filed appeals under Section
G 54 of the Act before the High Court on 16.8.2007 with
  applications for condonation of delay. The applications for
  condonation of delay stood rejected as the High Court did not
  find any sufficient cause to condone the delay.

          Hence, these appeals.
H
   BASAWARAJ & ANR. v. SPL. LAND ACQUISITION                  235
        OFFICER {DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
      3. Shri Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned senior counsel          A
 appearing on behalf of the appellants, has submitted that the
 High Court committed an error in not condoning the delay as
 there was sufficient cause for not approaching the High Court
 within time. One of the appellants was suffering from ailments
 and it was in itself a good ground for condonation of delay. The     B
 High Court ought to have kept in view that in a large number of
 identical matters, huge delays had been condoned on the
 condition that the claimant would not be entitled for interest of
 the delay period, thus, the High Court itself has given
 discriminatory and contradictory verdicts which itself is a good     c
 g~o~~~~~~'.nterference by this Court. The appeals,deserve to


       4. Per contra, Shri Naveen R. Nath, learned counsel
  appearing on behalf of the respondent, has opposed the
  appeal contending that the delay can be condoned keeping in         D
  mind the provisions contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
  1963 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act 1963'). The order of
  condonation of delay is to be based on sound legal parameters
  laid down by this Court. No condition can be imposed while
  condoning the delay. The question whether a claimant should         E
  be awarded interest or not would arise at the time of final
  hearing of the appeal and such condition cannot be imposed
  for admitting a time barred appeal. If the High Court has
  committed such a grave error in other cases, that cannot be a
  ground for interference by this Court as it is a settled legal      F
  proposition that doctrine of equality does not apply for
  perpetuating an illegal and erroneous order. The appeals
  before the High Court were hopelessly time barred as the
  same had been preferred after about 5-1/2 years and no
  satisfactory explanation could be furnished in the applications     G
  for condonation of delay for not approaching the court in time.
i Thus, the appeals lack merit and are liable to be dismissed.


      5. We have considered the rival submissions made by the
 learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
                                                                      H
    236      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A        6. Admittedly, there was a delay of 5-1/2 years in filing the
    said appeals under Section 54 of the Act before the High Court.
    The only explanation offered for approaching the court at such
    a belated stage has been that one of the appellants had taken
    ill.
B
         7. Shri Patil, learned senior counsel, has taken us through
    a large number of judgments of the High Court wherein delay
    had been condoned without considering the most relevant
    factor i.e. "sufficient cause" only on the condition that applicants
    would be deprived of interest for the delay period. These kinds
C   of judgments cannot be approved. The High Court while
    passing such unwarranted and uncalled for orders, failed to
    appreciate that it was deciding the appeals under the Act and
    not a writ petition where this kind of order in exceptional
    circumstances perhaps could be justified.
D
         8. It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the
    Constitution is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud, even
    by extending the wrong decisions made in other cases. The
    said provision does not envisage negative equality but has only
E   a positive aspect. Thus, if some other similarly situated persons
    have been granted some relief/ benefit inadvertently or by
    mistake, such an order does not confer any legal right on others
    to get the same relief as well. If a wrong is committed in an
    earlier case, it cannot be perpetuated. Equality is a trite, which
    cannot be claimed in illegality and therefore, cannot be enforced
F
    by a citizen or court in a negative manner. If an illegality and
    irregularity has been committed in favour of an individual or a
    group of individuals or a wrong order has been passed by a
    Judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher
    or superior court for repeating or multiplying the same
G   irregularity or illegality or for passing a similarly wrong order.
    A wrong order/decision in favour of any particular party does
    not entitle any other party to claim benefits on the basis of the
    wrong decision. Even otherwise, Article 14 cannot be stretched
    too far for otherwise it would make functioning of administration
H   impossible.
  BASAWARAJ & ANR. v. SPL. LAND ACQUISITION                  237
       OFFICER [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

    (Vide: Chandigarh Administration & Anr. v. Jagjit Singh          A
& Anr., AIR 1995 SC 705, Mis. Anand Button Ltd. v. State of
Haryana & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 565; K.K. Bhalla v. State of
M.P. & Ors., AIR 2006 SC 898; and Fuljit Kaur v. State of
Punjab, AIR 2010 SC 1937).
                                                                     B
      9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which defendant could
not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word
"sufficient" is "adequate" or ;''enough", inasmuch as may be
necessary to answer the purp9se intended. Therefore, the word
"sufficient" embraces no m6re than that which provides a             C
platitude, which when the act qone suffices to accomplish the
purpose intended in the facts ah_? circumstances existing in a
case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable
standard of a cautious man. In thiS context, "sufficient cause"
means that the party should not have acted in a negligent
manner or there was a want of bona. fide on its part in view of      D
the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged
that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive".
However, the facts and circumstances- of each case must afford
sufficient ground to enable the Coatt concerned to exercise
discretion for thEj reason that wherf~ver the Court exercises        E
discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must
satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient
cause" from prosecuting his cas~ and unless a satisfc;ictory
explanation is                       .
                . furnished, the Court should not allow the
application for condonation of delay_, The court has to examine      F
whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to
cover an ulterior purpose. (See: Manindra Land and Building
Corporation Ltd. v. Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC
1336; Lala Matadin v. A. Narayanan, AIR 1970 SC 1953;
Parimal v. Veen a @ Bharti Al R 2011 SC 1150; and Maniben            G
Devraj Shah v. Municipal Cqrpertafion of Brihan Mumbai AIR
2012 SC 1629.)                      .

     10. In Arjun Singh v. Mahindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993
this Court explained the difference between a "good cause" and
                                                                     H
    238       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 8 S.C.R


A   a "sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient cause"
    is a good cause ard vice versa. However, if any differen·ce
    exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is
    complied with on a lesser degree of proof that that of "sufficient
    cause".
B
        11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a
  liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done,
  but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona tides
  cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not
  sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts
C of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible.
  (Vide: Madan/al v. Shyamlal, AIR 2002 SC 100; and Ram
  Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. v. Gobardhan Sao & Ors.,
  AIR 2002 SC 1201.)                                       ,

D         12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may
    harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all
    its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no
    power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.
    "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A
E   Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it
    considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory
    provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular
    party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full
    effect to the same. The legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" which
F   means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in
    such a situation. It has consistently been held that,
    "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while
    interpreting a statute.

        13. The Statute of Limitation. is founded on public policy,
G its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress
  fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent
  oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not
  been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time
  become stale.
H
  BASAWARAJ & ANR. v. SPL. LAND ACQUISITION                 239
       OFFICER [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
    According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 24, p. 181:       A

    "330. Policy of Limitation Acts. The courts have
    expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the
    existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long
    dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them,
                                                                    8
    (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to
    disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good
    causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable
    diligence".

     An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity    C
and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance
or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and
justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a
party's own inaction, negligence' or laches.
                                                                    D
     (See: Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India
Staff Assn. (2005) 7 SCC 510; Rajendar Singh & Ors. v.
Santa Singh & Ors., AIR 1973 SC 2537; and Pundlik Jalam
Patil v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008)
11 sec 448).
                                                                    E
     14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Kamataka, AIR
2002 SC 1856, this Court held that judicially engrafting
principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in
the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in AR.
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, AIR 1992 SC 1701.                            F
      15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect
that where a case has been presented in the court beyond
limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was
the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough           G
reason which prevented him to approach the court within
limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want
of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the
case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive,
there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No
                                                                    H
    240      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A   court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay
    by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be
    decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in
    regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no
    sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on
8   time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any
    condition whatsoever, arriounts· to passing an order in violation
    of the. statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter
    disregard to the legislature.

       16. In view of above, no interference is required with
C impugned judgment and order of the High Court. The appeals
  lack merit and are, accordingly, dismissed.

    8.8.8.                                     Appeals dismissed.