BASANT KUMAR ETC.versusUNION OF INDIA ETC.

                         BASANT KUMAR ETC.                                       A
                                      v.
                         UNION OF INDIA ETC.

                          SEPTEMBER 12, 1996

 [K. RAMASWAMY, FAIZAN UDDIN AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.]                            B

      La11d Acquisition Act, 1894 :

        Compensation-Award-All lands can11ot a11d should 11ot be classified
as possessed of same market value-Burde11 on claimant to prove market            C
value-Cowts should adopt realistic standards a11d pragmatic approach in
evaluation of the evidence-Doctline of equality i11 detenni11ation a11d pay-
me11t of same compensation for all claimants involved in the same 11otifica-
tioit is not good plinciple-Deductio11 towards providing amenities like roads,
pad:s, electlicity, sewages water facilities etc.-High Cozat not justified in
adopting ad-hoc pli11ciple-Claima11ts e11titled to e11ha11ced compensation,      D
interest on enhanced compensatio11 at the rate of 6% per annum and 15%
solatiwn on the enhanced compensation from the date of taking possession
till the date of deposit into Cowt.

     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4327 of                     E
1991 Etc. Etc.

      From the Judgment and Order dated 8.7.91 of the Delhi High Court
in L.P.A. No. 97 of 1980.

      P.C." Jain, N.K. Jain and Ms. Sheela Goal for the Appellants.              F
      The following Order of the Court was delivered :

      These appeals by special leave arise from the judgment of the
Division Bertch of the High ~ourtof Delhi made on July 8, 1996.in Letters
Patent Appeal No. 97/80 and other cases.                                         G

       Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1
of 1894) (for short, the 'Act') was published on October 24, 1961 acquiring
a larg.: extent of 1669 bighas 18 biswas of land for the planried development
of Delhi. The said lands are situated in revenue estate of Posangipur. The H
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    232                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A   Land Acquisition Officer categorised the lands into two blocks - Block A
    and Block B. He assessed the compensation at the rate of Rs. 1400 per
    bigha for Block A and Rs. 1200 per bigha for Block B. On reference under        ;.-
    Section 18, the Additional District Judge by his award and decree dated
    March 8, 1968 enhanced the compensation to Rs. 3050 per bigha. On
B   Regular First Appeal, the learned Single Judge dismissed the appeal
    confirming the award of the reference Court. When the LPA was filed, the
    Division Bench held that the LPA did not lie.

           In Balbir Singh v. Union of India, in RFA No. 214/68 by judgment
    dated may 14, 1980, the sanie was taken on merits in the appeal. Similar
c   is the case in SLP (C) No. 17055/92 relating to Chhajju in RFA No. 65/69
    of the even number dated May 14, 1980. Thus, these appeal by special
    leave.

          The extent of the land involved in Basant KumaT's case, viz., CA No.
D   4327/91 is not clear as no one is appearing for the appellant. But as regards
    the appeal of Chhajju, his lands are of an extent of 37 bighas 10 biswas in
    which his share is 01ie-half. As regards Balbir Singh's lands, he has 66
    bighas, 10 biswas in which he has l/3rd share. The question for considera-
    tion is : what will be the reasonable compensation which the lands under
E   acquisition were capable to secure as on the date of the notification?

           Shri N.C. Jain, the learned senior counse:l appearing for the appel-
    lants, contended that in RFA No. 55/70 Raghuvir Singh v. Union of India,
    arising out of the same notification, another Division Bench of the High
    Court had determined the compensation at the rate of Rs. 8700 per bigha
F   and less Rs. 500 per bigha for the notified lands; and similar was the view
    taken by another Bench of that Court in LPA No. 137/80 and batch decided
    on April 19, 1991 titled Chet Ram & Ors. v. Union of India, all these lands
    being situated in the same village, the appellants are also entitled to the
    same rate of compensation. The Union of India has not filed any appeals
G   against those cases. The lands are possessed of same potential value and,
    therefore, the appellants are entitled to the same compensation. We had
    adjourned the case on the last occasion, as no one appeared for the Union
    of India; Since, even today, no one is appearing for the Union of India, we
    have taken assistance of Shri Jain and have waded through the entire
H   material evidence. The question is : whether the appellants are entitled to
                          BASANTKR. v. U.0.1.                         233

the same compensation as was determined by the High Court in the A
appeals arising out of Raghuvir Singh's and Chet Ram's case? It has been
firmly settled law by beed role of decisions of this Court that the Judge
determining the compensation under Section 23(1) should sit in the arm
chair of a willing prudent purchaser in an open market and see whether
he would offer the same amount proposed to be fixed as market value as B
a willing and prudent buyer for the same or similar land, i.e., land possess-
ing all the advantageous features and to the same extent. This test should
always be kept in view and answered affirmatively, taking into considera-
tion all relevant facts and circumstances. If feats of imagination are allowed
to sway, he out steps his domain or judicial decision and lands in miscon- C
duct amenable to disciplinary law. We have gone through the record and
judgment in Chet Ram case and Raghuvir Singh case decided by the two
division Benches. The learned Judges have adopted the principle that the
entire lands in the village shall be treated as one unit and the compensation
shall uniformly be determined on that basis. The principle is wholly unsus- D
tainable in law and cannot be a valid ground for determination of compen-
sation. It is common knowledge that even in the same village, no two lands
command same market value. The lands abutting main road or national
highway command higher market value and as the location goes backward,
market value of interior land would be less even for same kind of lands. It
is a settled legal position that the lands possessed of only similar poten- E
tiality or the value with similar advantages offer comparable parity of the
value; It is common ·knowledge that the lands in the village spread over the
vast extent. In this case, it is seen that land is as vast as admeasuring 1669
bighas, 18 biswas of land in the village. So, all lands cannot and should not
be classified as possessed of same market value. Burden is always on the F
claimant to prove the market value and the Court should adopt realistic
standards and pragmatic approach in evaluation of the evidence. No doubt,
each individual had different parcels of the land out of the vast land. If that
principle is accepted, as propounded by the High Court, irrespective of the
quality of the land, all will be entitled to the same compensation. That G
principle is not the correct approach in law. The doctrine of equality
in determination and payment of same compensation for all claimants
involved in the same notification is not good principle acceptable for
the aforestated reasons. When both the lands are proved to be possessed
of same advantages, features etc., the only equal compensation is permis- H




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    234                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A   sible.

           It is then to be seen that the learned Judges have further pointed out
    that when the amount claimed in the High Court in appeal under Section
    54 was more them what was determined by the reference Court; to what
    extent of the said amount, as claimed in appeal, could be granted was the
B   test laid down. It is also opyicmsly on illegal principal. What has to be
    determined under Section 23(1) 'is the market value prevailing as on the
    date of notification published under Section 4(1) but not what was claimed
    by the parties even pursuant to notice under Section 10 or its reference
    under Section 18 or grounds of appeal under Section 54. Prior to Amend-
C   ment Act 68/84 under Section 22(1), the Court had no power to grant
    higher than was claimed under notice in Section 9 and 10. But now it stood
    deleted. Even the estimate of the market value given by the claimant is not
    decisive. Therefore, the principle laid down by the Court in the said two
    cases is obviously illegal and cannot form a legal basis. Though these
D   judgments became final, we cannot repeat, on principle of parity, the same
    illegality.

         It is true, as pointed out by the High Court and also stressed v~ry
  vehemently by Shri Jain, that compensation cannot be determined on the
E basis of the face of the claimants or the status of the claimants. Compen-
  sation requires to be determined for the land acquired and not on the basis
  of the status of the person from whom the land was acquired. In Raghbir
  Singh's case as the lands acquired were developed ones, Rs. 9,000 and Rs.
  8700 per bigha were determined. It is settled legal position that if the land
  is already developed then what has to be seen is the nature of development
F and money expanded by the developer and as to what was the market value
  prevailing on that basis as on the date of notification, and what was the
  situation of the acquired land on that date; all these and other relevant
  facts have to be taken into consideration and then market value should be
  determined. Merely because a land is developed or developing land, it
G would not be that some compensation is to be adopted to determine the
  market value for the entire land. as a ·developed land. If it is to be
  developed, it is settled legal position that at least l/3rd of the compensation
  has to be deducted towards providing amenities, like roads, parks,
  electricity, sewage, water facilities etc. This Court had upheld deduction of
H even 60% towards development charges. The High Court, therefore, was
                          BASANTKR.v. U.0.1.                         235

also not right in adopting ad hoc principle.                               A

       The question then is : what would be the reasonable compensation
which the lands of appellants were capable to secure as on the date of
notification? It is seen that the appellants have produced two sale
transactions; in respect of land acquired in September 1961 the market B
price fetched was not more than Rs. 3250 per bigha; for land acquired
in the year 1958 the market value fetched was about Rs. 5000 per bigha.
We do not have any material indicating as to what were the reasons
behind the sale in respect of those sale deeds and the nature and situation
of that land. Under these circumstances, the reference Court rightly had C
not placed reliance on the 1958 sale transactions since the appellants have
not produced any evider.ce on record to show whether the lands of the
appellants were developed and fit for construction of the houses. There-
fore, what we have to consider is that the lands are agricultural lands
and possess potential for being used for building pl,lrposes only in future D
which is not relevant. Therefore, since the lands as on the date of
notification were agricultural lands, the value has rightly been determined
on the bigha basis instead of yards basis. Since the appellants have
produced sale deeds indicating the maximum which was secured, viz., Rs.
3,250 per bigha, necessarily, the appellants would be entitled to the E
maximum rate of Rs. 3, 250 per bigha.


      The next question is : whether the LPA would lie against the judg-
ment of the learned single Judge? It is settled legal position that under
Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, the appeal would lie to the High
                                                                          F
Court; when the appeal on the basis of the pecuniary value was decided by
a single Judge necessarily, it being the judgment of the single Judge, an
appeal would lie to the same Court in the form of LPA to Division Bench.
The Division Bench was not right in holding that the LPA would not lie to
the High Court against the judgment of the single Judge. To that extent, G
the view of the High Court is not correct. The judgment in cases of Chet
Ram and R,aghbir Singh proceeded on wrong principles of law and deter-
mined the compensation. We do not approve of the views as correct and,
therefore, we cannot base the same market value to be the market value
for the lands under consideration.                                        H



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    236                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A         The appellants are entitled to the enhanced compensation at the rate
    of Rs. 3,250 per bigha and interest on enhanced compensation at the rate
    of 6% per annum from the date of taking possession till the date of deposit
    into court. They are ai.so entitled to 15% solatium on the enhanced com-
    pensation from the date of taking possession till the date of deposit.
B        The appeals are accordingly allowed, but in the circumstances,
    without costs.

    G.N.                                                     Appeals allowed.




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