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Supreme Court of India

BANSI LALversusSTATE OF HARYANA

Citation
2011 INSC 120
Decided
14 February 2011
Disposal
Dismissed

Holding

The demand for a scooter was proven to be consistent and in close proximity to the death, establishing cruelty, and the suicide note was inadmissible; therefore, the presumption under Section 1138 applied and the conviction was upheld.

Summary

Bansi Lal was convicted under Sections 498-A, 304-B and 306 of the IPC for the suicide of his wife Sarla, who had left the matrimonial home after a year of marriage, stayed with her parents for 14 months, and returned following a panchayat assurance. The prosecution proved a consistent demand for a scooter by the accused, establishing cruelty in close proximity to her death. The defence relied on a purported suicide note alleging a love affair, but the Supreme Court held the note inadmissible as its authorship was not proved. Applying Section 1138 of the Evidence Act, the Court affirmed the presumption that the accused caused the dowry death and found the appellant failed to discharge the shifted burden of proof. Consequently, the conviction was upheld and the appeal dismissed.

Issues considered

  • The existence and timing of a dowry demand (scooter) establishing cruelty under Section 498-A.
  • The admissibility and evidentiary value of the alleged suicide note.
  • The operation of the presumption under Section 1138 of the Evidence Act and the burden of proof on the accused.
  • The propriety of upholding convictions under Sections 498-A, 304-B and 306 IPC.

Legislation cited

Subjects

dowry deathSection 498Asuicide notepresumption under Evidence Actcrueltydowry demandcriminal appeal

Judgment

                         12011) 1 S.C.R. 724                         .....

A                            BANSI LAL
                                  V.
                       STATE OF HARYANA
                (Criminal Appeal No. 1322 of 2004)
                     .   JANUARY 14, 2011
B
        [P. SATHASIVAM AND DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, JJ.]

        Penal Code, 1860:

C        s.498A - Suicide by married woman - A/legation of
    maltreatment and cruelty against husband on account of
    demand of dowry - Victim-deceased had left matrimonial
    home just after one year of marriage and stayed with her
    parents for 14 months continuously - She r.ejoined
D   matrimonial home only at the assurance givt;Jn in the
    panchayat by accused and his family members that she would
    not be humiliated and subjected to cruelty - Three years after
    marriage, she committed suicide - Conviction of husband u/
    s.498A - Challenged - Held: While considering the case u/
E   s.498-A, cruelty has to be proved during the close proximity
    of time of death and should be continuous making life of the
    deceased miserable forcing her to commit suicide - Jn the
    instant case, there was demand of scooter by the accused in
    the close proximity of the death - The demand was consistent
F   and persistent as the father and the brother of the deceased
    had specifically deposed that the demand was only in respect
    of scooter and nothing else - Both these witnesses were
    subjected to long cross-examination, however, nothing could
    be elicited from them to show that the a/legations made by
G   the prosecution could be false - Conviction upheld -
    Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 1138.

        Evidence Act, 1872:

        s. 113A and s. 1138 - Distinction between.
H                              724
-             BANSI LAL v. STATE OF HARYANA                 725

         s. 1138 - Necessary ingredients ...., Discussed.         A

         Evidence:

          Suicide note - Evidentiary value of - On facts, held: The
      authorship of the suicide note was not proved by producing .
      witnesses nor the said document was sent to handwriting 8
     expert along with the admitted signature of the deceased for
      comparison - Prosecution could not establish nexus of the
      deceased with the said note - Onus was on the accused to
    ·establish his defence by sufficient evidence to rebut
      presumption that he had caused the dowry death, which he C
     failed to discharge - Courts below were right iQ ignoring the
      said note - Penal Code, 1860 - ss.3048, 498A.

        The prosecution case was that the victim-deceased
    was married to the appellant on 4th April, 1988. After one o
    year of marrii:tge, the deceased came and stayed with her
    parents for about 14 months and after convening a
    panchayat of close relatives, she returned to her
    matrimonial home. On 25th June, 1991, the father of the
    deceased lodged an FIR that the deceased had E
    committed suicide, making allegations that the deceased
    was consistently harassed by the appellant and was .
    maltreated and harassed for bringing dowry. The trial
    court convicted the appellant and his Q'lOther under
    Sections 498-A, 304-B and 306, IPC. The High Court
    acquitted appellant's mother but dismissed the appeal of F
    the appellant.

         In the instant appeal, the defence raised by the
     appellant was that there was no demand of scooter or
     dowry and that the deceased wal!!ed to marry some other      G
     person and her marriage with the appellant was .~gainst
     her will, due to which she felt suffocated and committed
     suicide, leaving a suicide note (Ex P-2) to that effect.

         Dismissing the appeal, the Court                         H
    726     SUPREME COURr REPORTS               [2011] 1 S.C.R      -
A        HELQ: 1. The theory of love affair of the deceased
    was disbelieved by the courts below. Ex.P-2, the note
    allegedly recovered by the Investigating Officer was
    t~lly rejected from consideration in ev.idence for the
    simple reason that no nexus of the deceased could be
B   established with this document. There was no evidence
    worth the name from the side of the prosecution or from
    the defence to indicate that the writing Ex.P-2 was, in fact,
    in the hand of the deceased. The father and the brother
    of the deceased when stepped into the witness-box did
c   not say even a word that the document Ex.P-2 was
    written in the hand of the deceased. Even the defence
    counsel did not put any specific question/suggestion to
    these witnesses about authorship of this document,
    knowing very well that the Investigating Officer had taken
    it into possession from the almirah of their house. The
0
    Investigating Officer (PW6) in his cross-examination
    stated that the diary, letter and ball-pen were lying in the
    room and he enquired about the author of the said letter
    Ex.P-2 and it was revealed that the same was written by
    the deceased. This statement could be termed as a hear
E   say evidence, having no legal sanctity when the main
    witnesses were not asked about the authorship thereof.
    A mere suggestion was put to the father and the brother
    of the deceased to the effect that the deceased had left a
    suicide note regarding her relations with some o.ther
F   person. The authorship of this letter could be proved
    either by producing some witness who had seen the
    deceased writing and signing or the said document could
    be sent to some handwriting expert alongwith the
    admitted Writing of the deceased for comparison. Both the
G   situations were missing. Even the Investigating Officer
    did not say a word as to from whom he had verified about
    authorship of the said letter. In case t_his document is
    taken to be a proved one, this would amount to bye-
    passing the provisions of the Evidence Act. The
H
          BANSI LAL·v. STATE OF HARYANA                727

  witnesses of panchnama of recovery of this letter were A
  not examined. The father and the brother of the deceased
  both had denied the suggestion of recovery of any such
  letter nor th'e letters had been shown to them for
  identifying the handwriting of the deceased. More so,
· there was nothing on record to show that she was . B
  educated. The lnvestigatin.g Officer had not stated
' anywhere that he knew the handwriting of the deceased
  ~or he has disclosed on whose information he ha~~:
  inferred that the letter had been written by the deceased'.
  In such a fact situation, the recovery of such letter is to c
  be disbelieved and the letter is required to be ignored
  totally. More so, it has no probative value because it is
  no body's case that the alleged suicide note is in the
  handwriting of the deceased. Evidently, the suicide note,
  Ext.P-2 purported to have been written by the deceased 0
  had been taken by appellant as his defence while making
  his statement under section_ 313 Cr.P.C. Therefore, the
  onus was on him to estab'h~h his defence by leading
  sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that he has
  caused the dowry death. The appellant miserably failed E
  to discharge that onus. The defence of the appellant,
  thus, was very weak and fragile. In view of that, there is
   no cogent reason to take a view contrary to the view
  taken by the courts below that Ex.P2, the suicide note
  was not worth consideration. [Paras 11, 12, 13, 19] ] [734-
  H; 735-G-H; 736-A-H-; 737-A-F-H; 738-A-B]                   F

     2.1. The demand of scooter had been consistent and
 persistent as the father and. the brother of the deceased
 had specifically deposed that the derriand was only in
 respect of scooter and nothing else. Had this allegation    G
 been false, the said witnesses could have also mentioned
 other articles purported to have been demanded. by the
 appellant or his other family members. Therefore, the
 veracity of the evidence. of these two witnesses on this
 issue cannot be doubted. Both the witnesses were            H
     728    .SUPREME COURT REPORTS            · [2011] 1 S.C.R.

'A subjected to long cross- examination at the behest of the
   appellant, however, nothing could be elicited from them
   to the extent that the allegations made by the prosecution
   co_uld be false. [Para 14) [737-G-H; 738-A-B]

       2.2. While considering the case under Section 498-
 8
   A, IPC, cruelty has to be proved during the close
   proximity of time of death and it should be continuous
   and such continuous harassment, physical or mentali by
   the accused should make life of the deceased miserable
 C which may force her to commit suicide. In the instant
   case, the conduct of the accused forced the deceased to
   leave her matrimonial home just after one yGar of
   marriage and stay with her parents for 14 months
   continuously. It was only at the assurance given by the
   panchayat that the accused or his family;members would
 D not humiliate or subject the deceased .~ith cruelty, that
   she rejoined: her matrimonial home· It was specific
   evidence of ttie brother of the decease(! that just few days
   before her death, when he went to see· his sister, there
   was a dema~d of scooter by the appellant. In such a fact
 E situation, it cannot said that there wali .no demand of
   scooter in fhe close proximity of the deatti./[Paras 15]
   [738-B-E]

         2.3. In the provision of Section 1:138 of the Evidence
 F Act, 1872, the legislature in its wisdom has used the word
    "shall" thus, making a mandatory application on the part
•I
    of the court to presume that death had been committed
    by the person who had subjected her to cruelty or
    harassment in connection with or demand of dowry. It is
 G unlike the provisions of Section 113A of the Evidence Act
    where a discretion has been conferred upon the court
    wherein it had been provided that court may presume to
    abatement of suicide by a married woman. Therefore,
    onus lies on the accused to rebut the presumption and
    in case of Section 1138 relatable to Section 3048 IPC, the
  H
                           BANSI LAL v. STATE OF HARYANA                 729


                  onus to prove shifts exclusively and heavily on the            A
                  accused. The only requirement is that death of a woman
                  has been caused by means other than any natural
                  circumstances; that death has been caused or occurred
                  within 7 years of her marriage; and such woman had
                  been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband         B
                  or any relative of her husband in connection with any
                  demand of dowry. Therefore, in case the essential
    t      ~      ingredientS of such death have been established by the
                  prosecution, it is the duty of the court to raise a
                  presumption that the accused· has caused the dowry             c
                  death. The expression shown before her death has not
                  be'en defined in either of the statutes. Therefore, in each
                  case, the court has to analyse the facts and
                  circumstances leading to the death .of the victim and
                  decide if there is any proximate connection between the        0
                  demand of dowry and act of cruelty or harassment and
                  the death. [Paras 16 to 18] (738-F-H; 739-A-G]

                      T. Aruntperunjothi v. State through S.H. 0., Rondicherry
                  AIR 2006 SC 2475; Devi Lal v, State of Rajasthan AIR 2008
                  SC 332; State of Rajasthan v. Jaggu Ram AIR 2008 SC 982;       E
                  Anand Kumar v. State of M.P., AIR 2009 SC 2155; Undavalli
                  Narayana Rao v. State of An'dhra Pradesh, AIR 2010- SC
0
    ·   -+        3708 - referred to.
                                      Case Law Reference:.                       F
                       AIR 2006 SC 2475        referred to         Para 18
                       AIR 2008 SC 332         referred to         Para 18
                       AIR 2008 SC 982         referred to         Para 18
                                                                                 G
        .......        AIR 2009 SC 2155        referred to         Para 18
                       AIR'2010 SC 3708        referred to         Para 18
                  _·    CRIMINAL APP ELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
                  lilo. 1322 of 2004.                                            H
    730      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 1 S.C.R.

A       From the Judgment & Order dated 05.04.2004 of the High
    Court of P~mjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Crl. Appeal No.
    708-SB of 1998.

        Mahabir Singh, Rishi Malhotra, Prem Malhotra for the
    Appellant.
B
       Manjit Singh, AAG, Rao Ranjit, Harikesh Singh, Kamal
    Mohan Gupta for the -Respondent.
                                                                      _,4_   <

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c
       DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. This criminal appeal has been
  preferred against the judgment and order of the Punjab and
  Haryana High Court at Chandigarh dated 5th May, 2004 in
  Criminal Appeal No. 708-SB of 1998, by which the conviction
  of the appellant by Additional Sessions Judge, Gurgaon, vide
D judgment and order dated 22nd August, 1998 and 25th August,
  1998 for offences under Sections 498-A, 304-B and 306 of
  Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred as 'IPC') and
  awarding the sentence to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
  two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default of
E payment of fine to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for
  two months, has been upheld. However, for the offence under
  Section 304-B IPC sentence to undergo for ten years and pay
  a fine of Rs.2,000/- in default of payment of fine, to further       ......
  undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months, has been
F reduced to seven years with fine.

      2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that
  the appellant was married to Sarla (deceased) on 4th April,
  1988. An FIR was lodged by Shyam Lal (PW.4) father of Sarla
G (deceased)   on 25th June, 1991 making allegations that the
  appellant, his mother, brother and sister-in-law had consistently   >-
  harassed his daughter Sarla (deceased) by making dowry
  demand i.e. a scooter. She had been maltreated by them. After
  one year of marriage, Sarla (deceased) came and stayed with
H
                            BANSI LAL v. STATE OF HARYANA                       731
                                [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
                  her family for about 14 months. It was only after convening a         A
                  panchayat of close relatives, she had returned to her
                  matrimonial home. Again they maltreated and insisted for the
                  demand of a scooter, thus, she had been subjected to cruelty,
                  harassment by demand of dowry to the extent that she
                  committed suicide on 25th June, 1991, at her matrimonial              B
                  home.

    .    ......         3. After investigation of the case, the prosecution filed the
                  chargesheet against the appellant and his mother Smt. Shanti
                  Devi and charges were framed against them under Sections
                  498-A, 304-B and 306 IPC. The said two accused pleaded not            c
                  guilty, thus, they were put on trial. It was on 17th May, 1995,
                  that in view of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, the
                  learned Sessions Judge in exercise of his. power under
                  Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
     -.,,,.-      (hereinafter called Cr.P.C.) summoned the other two accused           D
                  Ashok Kumar, brother and Smt. Shakuntala, sister-in-law of the
                  appellant. and charges were reframed against all the four
                  accused under Sections 498-A, 304-B and 306 IPC vide order
                  dated 6th July, 1995.
                                                                                        E
                      4. In order to substantiate its case, the prosecution
                  examined several witnesses including complainant Shyam Lal
    ·~
)
                  (PW.4), Gulshan (PW:5), brother of Sarla (deceased), Dr. B.B.
                  Agarwal (PW.1 ), Shri Arjun Singh Yadav, ASI, (PW.6),
                  Constable Jai Pal (PW.2), Shri Mool Chand Punia, Draftsman·           F
                  (PW.3), and other formal witnesses.

                       5. While making their statement under Section 313
                  Cr.P.C., the accused persons denied all the allegations against .

    ....          them and set up the defence as under:

                       "Sarla was in love with some other person. She was forced
                                                                                        G

                       to marry with accused Bansi Lal against het will, due to
                       which she felt suffocated and committed suicide, ·leaving
                       a suicide. note to that effect. There was no demand of
                       Scooter.n                                                        H
    732      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011) 1 S.C.R.


A        Further, accused Ashok Kumar (A.3) and Shakuntala (A.4)
    pleaded that they had been living separately from the appellant
    and his mother and they had no involvement so far as tihe
    demand of dowry was concerned. In defence only three
    witnesses i.e. Bal Kishan, an official of HSEB (DW.1 ), Vidya
B   Nand, an Inspector of Food and Supplies Department (DW.2)
    and Surender Singh, Sarpanch of the village Gram Panchayat
    (DW.3) were examined only to prove that accused Ashok
    Kumar (A.3) and Shakuntala (A.4) were living separately from ,..._ •
    the appellant and his mother Smt. Shanti Devi.
c         6. After considering the entire evidence on record and the
    submissions made by the prosecution as well as defence, the
    trial court convicted the appellant and.his mother Smt. Shanti
    Devi under Sections 498-A, 304-B and 306 IPC and awarded
    the sentences as referred to hereinabove. The court acquitted
D   Ashok Kumar and Shakuntala of all the charges against them.        -r
    The Trial Court did not award any separate sentence under
    Section 306 IPC.

         7. Being aggrieved, the appellant and his mother Smt.
E   Shanti Devi preferred Criminal Appeal No. 708-SB of 1998
    which has been disposed of by the impugned judgment and
    order dated 5th May, 2004, acquitting Smt. Shanti Devi, -not
    being beneficiary ofthe demand of dowry, as only scooter had
                                                                       .....
    been demanded but dismissed the appeal so far as the present
F   appellant is concerned. However, considering the facts and
    circumstances of the case, the sentence under Section 304-B
    IPC has been reduced from 10 years to 7 years. Hence, this
    appeal.

        8. Shri Mahabir Singh, learned senior counsel appearing
G for the appellant, has submitted that no charge could be brought
  home against the appellant under any of the penal provisions
  as there was no demand of dowry by the appellant. The ·
  harassment was not in close proximity of time of death. The
  prosecution itself had submitted that Sarla (deceased) wanted
H to marry one Shiv Parkash Singh and thus, she was not happf'
                           BANSI LAL v. STATE OF HARYANA                   733
                               [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
             with the appellant. She had left a suicide note to that effect and   A
             the said note had been exhibited before the tri~I court as Ex.P2.
             Thus, the appeal deserves to be allowed.

               9. On the contrary, Shri Rao Ranjit, learned advocate
           appearing for the State, has vehemently opposed the appeal             8
           contending that the facts and circumstances of the case do not
           warrant interference with the concurrent finding of facts
           recorded by the courts below. The suicide note Ex.P2 has to
 • -i- be ignored as it has not been proved as per requirement of
           law. No witness has been examined for comparing the                    C
           hand~iting of the deceased nor it has been signed by the
           deceased. It had not even been shown to father of the
           deceased i.e. Shyam Lal (PW.4), complainant or her brother
           Gulshan (PW.5). More so,· it had been the defence of the
           appellant while making his statement under Section 313
           Cr.P.C. Thus, he should have led evidence to substantiate the          D
  .....,.- defence. Thus, the appeal lacks merit and is liable to
           dismissed.

                  10. We have considered the rival submissions made by
             the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material         E·
             on record.                             ·

                  The admitted facts of the case remain as under:
)_ ....!;.
                   (i)      There was no demand of scooter at the initial stage
                            of marriage in 1988.                                  F

                   (ii)      Complainant Shyam Lal (PW.4) and Gulshan
                            (PW.5) had deposed that there had been consistent
                            and persistent demand of scooter by the appellant.

   _._             (iii)     After one year of the marriage, when Sarla           G
                            (deceased) came to the house of her parents, she
                            stayed with them. for a period of 14 months.

                   (iv)     During this period of 14 months, no attempt had
                            been mad~ by the appellant to call her newly          H
    734         SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2011) 1 S.C.R.

A                 wedded wife back to the matrimonial home.

          (v)     A Pancha"yat of very close relatives was convened
                  and they had assured the parents and family
                  members of Sarla (deceased) that appellant and
                  his other family members would behave properly
B
                  with Sarla (deceased) and she would not be
                  maltreated or humiliated or subjected to any kind
                  of cruelty for demand of dowry.

          (vi)    It was on this assurance that Sarla (deceased)
                                                                        ...._   .
c                 came back to stay with the appellant at her
                  matrimonial home.

          (vii)   Sarla committed suicide by hanging herself on 25th
                  June, 1991.
D         (viii) The appellant or any of his family members did not
                 inform Shyam Lal, (PW.4), complainant or any of         r
                 his family members about the death of Sarla
                 (deceased).

E         (ix)    Shyam Lal (PW.4) and Gulshan (PW.5) reached her
                  matrimonial home alongwith others getting
                  information from other persons.
                                                                          ~-
          (x)     Shyam Lal (PW.4) immediately lodged the FIR
                  against the appellant and other family members
F
                  and, set the law in motion.

          (xi)    Sarla (deceased) was found dead at her
                  matrimonial home when she stayed with the
                  appellant and other family members. They had not
G                 furnished any satisfactory explanation as for which
                  reason and under what circumstances she had           >- -
                  committed suicide.

       11. So far as the theory of love affair of Sarla (deceased)
H is concerned, it has been disbelieved by the courts below. The
                   BANSI LAL v. STATE OF HARYANA                       735
                       [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
        ; Trial Court dealt with the issued observing as under : .            A

              "If the husband was doubting her fidelity towards him there
              was no reason for him to have come with his father and
              other relatives to the parents of the deceased to take her
              back after 14 months of her stay with her parents. It also
                                                                          B
             .cannot be said that the deceased was not having any liking
              for her husband and was frustrated because she allegedly
              could not marry the person of her choice. Rather the
·+            circumstances are otherwise. Had she developed hatred
              for her husband, there was no reason for her to join him
              after 14 months of her staying away from the matrimonial
                                                                          c
              home. There was every reason for her to believe the
              husband and his relatives that demand of dowry and other
              torture and maltreatment would not be there. Better sense
              definitely, after such a lapse of time, was naturally to be
              expected to have dawned on them. Parents of the D
              deceased also did not create any hassles as they felt
              satisfied from the assurance of the accused on this score.
              At any rate melodramatic story -of her love affairs with
              some one and her frustration in her married life with
              accused Bansi Lal can hardly be taken as genuine. If it .E
              was so, she could not have continued to wait to die for her
              alleged lover for three long years, having consummated the
'-<           marriage with her husband and having cohabited with him
              all-through she was with him in the matrimonial home.•
                                                                          F
              12. Again, the High Court has dealt with the issue
         _elaborately and recorded the following findings:

              "Much has be.en said by the learned counsel about Ex.P-
              2, the note allegedly recovered by the Investigating Officer.
-   ~         In my considered view, this document has to be totally          G
              rejected from conside_ration in evidence for the simple
              reason that no nexus of the deceased has been
              established with this document. There is no evidence worth
              the name from the side of the prosecution or from the
              defence, which may _indicate that the writing Ex.P-2 was •.     H
     736      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2011] 1 S.C.R.


A         in fact, in the hand of Sarra deceased. Shyam Lal and
          Gulshan PWs when stepped into the witness-box do not
          say even a word that the document Ex.P-2 is written in the
          hand of Sarla deceased. Even the defence counsel did not
          putl any specific question/suggestion to these witnesses
B         about authorship of this document, knowing very well that
          ASI Arjun Singh Yadav, Investigating Officer had taken it
          into possession from the almirah of their house. The
          Investigating Officer (PW6) in his cross examination has
          stated that the diary, letter and ball-pen were lying in the    +·
c         room and he enquired about the author of the said letter
          Ex.P-2 and it was revealed that the same was written by
          the deceased. This statement can be termed as a hear
          say evidence, having no legal sanctity when the main
          witnesses were not asked about the authorship thereof. A
          mere suggestion put to Shyam Lal and Gulshan PWs to
 D
          the effect that Sari~ had left a suicide note regarding her
          relations with some other person, takes us no where. The
          authorship of this letter could be proved either by producing
          some witness who had seen the deceased writing and
          signing or the said document could be sent to some
 E        handwriting expert alongwith the admitted writing of Sarla
          deceased for comparison. Both the situations are missing.
          Even the Investigating Officer does not say a word as to
          from whom he had verified about authorship of the said          >-   f



          letter. In case this document is taken to be a proved one,
-F        this would amount to bye-passing the provisions of the
          Evidence Act. The Investigating Officer cannot be all and
          all. The irresistible conclusion, thus, is that the document
          Ex.P-2, the so-called suicide note has to be taken out of
        . the zone of consideration. The defence of the Bansi Lal
 G        appella)1t thus becomes very weak and fragile."
                                                                          ~
          13. In view of the above, we do not see any cogent reason
     to take a view contrary to the view taken by the coljrts below
     that Ex.P2, the suicide note was not worth consideration. It
 H
                  ·aANSI LAL v. STATE OF HARYANA                     737
                       '[DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
         has Jightly been held by the courts below that it was to be         A
  ~-     ignored.
              Ext.P.2, the so-called suicide note disclosing that Sarla
         (deceased} committed suicide as she developed love affair
         with Shiv Parkash has been referred to by the Investigating         B
         Officer Arjun Singh, ASI (PW.6} where in his cross~xamim:1tion
         he has stated a$ under:-
,+           •1'fle diary, letter, and ball pen were lying irr-a window of
             the room. He had enquired.about the author of the letter
             Ext.P.2 and it was revealed that it is written by Sar/a,        c
             deceased.n
               The witnesses of panchnama of recovery of this letter had
         not been examined though they had been Mahabir Singh,
         Chowkidar of village Shiwari and Hoshiar Singh, Ex. Sarpanch D
         of Shiwari. Shyam Lal (PW.4) and Gulshan (PW.5) both have
         denied the suggestion of recovery of any such letter nor the
         letters had been shown to them for identifying the handwriting .
         of Sarla (deceased}. More so, there is nothing on record to
         show that she was educated. Arjun Singh, ASI (PW.6} has not E
         stated anywhere that he knew the handwriting of Sarla
         (deceased} nor he has disclosed on whose information ·he
"--'._   had inferred that the letter had been written by Sarla
         (deceased}. In such a fact situation, the recovery of such letter
         is to be disbelieved and the letter is required to be ignored
                                                                           F
         totally. More so, it has no probative value because it is no
         body's ease that the alleged suicide note is in th~ handwriting
         of Sarla (deceased}.
               14. T~ demand of scooter had been consistent and
  ~-     persistent as Shyam Lal (PW.4} and Gulshan (PW.5} had G
         specifically deposed that the demand was only in respect of
         scooter and nothing else. Had this allegation be false, the
         sa.id witnesses could also mention other articles purported to
         have been demanded by the appellant or his other family
         members. Therefore, the v~racity of the evidence of these two H
    738      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2011] 1 S.C.R.

A witnesses on this issue cannot be doubted. Both the witnesses
  had been subjected to long cross examination at the behest
  of the appellant, however, nothing could be elicited from them
  to the extent that the allegations made by the prosecution could
  be false.
B
        1'5. While considering the case under Section 498-A,
  cruelty has to be proved during the close proximity of time of
  death and it should be continuous and such continuous
  harassment, physical or mental, by the accused should make              +·
  life of the deceased miserable which may force her to commit
C suicide. In the instant case, the conduct of the accused forced
  the deceased Sarla to leave her matrimonial home just after
  one year of marriage and stay with her parents for 14 months
  continuously. It was only at the assurance given by the
  panchayat that the accused or his family members would not
D humiliate or subject the deceased Sarla with cruelty, that she
  rejoined her matrimonial home. It is specific evidence of
  Gulshan (PW.5) that just few days before her death, when he
  went to see her sister, there was a demand of scooter by the
  appellant. In such a fact situation, we do not find any foooe in
E the submission made on behalf of the appellant that there was
  no demand of scooter in the close proximity of the death.

         16. In such a fact situation, the provisions of Section 1138 .
    of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 providing for presumption
F that accused is responsible for dowry death, have to be
  . pressed in service. The said provisions read as under:-

          "Presumption as to dowry death.-When the question is
          whether a person has committed the dowry death of a
          woman and it is shown that soon before her death such
G         woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or
          harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for
          dowry, the court shall presume that such person had
          caused the dowry death. n (emphasis supplied)

H         It may be mentioned herein that the legislature in its
                 BANSI LAL v. STATE OF HARYANA                     739
                     [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN" J.]
            wisdom has used the word "shall" thus, making a A
            mandatory application on the part of the court to presume
            that death had been committed by the person who had
            subjected her to cruelty or harassment in connection with .
            or demand of dowry. It is unlike the provislOns of Section .
            113A of the Evidence Act where a discretion has been B
            conferred upon the court wherein it had been provided that
            court may presume to abetment of suicide by a married
• -+        woman. Therefore, in view of the above, onus lies on the
            accused to rebut the presumption and in case of Section
            1138 relatable to Section 304 IPC, the onus to prove shifts c
            exclusively and heavily on the accused.
             17. The only requirement is that death of a woman has
        been caused by means other than any natural circumstances;
        that death has been caused or occurred within 7years of her
        marriage; and such woman had been subjected to cruelty or          D
        harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband in
        connection with any demand of dowry.
            . 18. Therefore, in case the essential ingredients of such
        death hav~been established by the. prosecution, it is the duty E
        of the court to raise a presumption that the accused has caused
        the dowry death. It may also be pertinent to mention herein .
'__,(   that the expression shown before her death has not been
        defined in either of the statutes. Therefore, in each case, the
        court·has to analyse ti-- facts and circumstances leading to
                                                                        F
        the death of the victim and decide if there is any proximate
        connection between the demand of dowry and act of cruelty or
        harassment and the death. (vide: T. Aruntperunjothi v. State
        through S.H.O., Pondicherry, AIR 2006 SC 2475; Devi Lal v.
        State of Rajasthan, AIR 2008 SC 332; State of Rajasthan v.
 ~.     Jaggu Ram, AIR 2008 SC 982; Anand Kumar v. State of G
        M.P., AIR 2009 SC 2155; and Undaval/i Narayana Rao v.
        State of Andhra Pradesh,. AIR 2010 SC,3708).

            19. In the instant case, evidently, the suicide note, Ext.P-
                                                                           H
    740      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2011) 1 S.C.R.


/A 2 purported to have been written by Sarla (deceased) had
   been taken by appellant as his defence while making his
   statement under section 313 Cr.P.C. Therefore, the onus was
   on him to establish his defence by leading sufficient evidence
   t'o rebut the presumption that he has caused the dowry death.
 8 The appellantmiserably failed to discharge that onus.
        20. In view of the above, the submissions advanced on
    behalf of the appellant ~re rejected. The appeal does nQt have    + .
    any special features warranting interference by this court. The
    appeal lacks merit and stands dismissed.
c
    D.G.                                       Appeal dismissed.
                                        r, ,


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