Supreme Court of India
BANSI LAL & ORS.versusLAXMAN SINGH
- Citation
- 1986 INSC 135
- Decided
- 15 July 1986
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- V BALAKRISHNA ERADI
Holding
The High Court transgressed the limits of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 439(4) CrPC; an order of acquittal cannot be set aside without manifest illegality, and the appeal is allowed.
Summary
The appellants Bansi Lal and others were acquitted by an Additional Sessions Judge in a murder case. The victim's son filed a criminal revision under Sections 397 and 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and the Delhi High Court Single Judge set aside the acquittal and ordered a retrial. The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court exceeded its revisional jurisdiction by re‑appreciating the evidence. The Supreme Court held that under Section 439(4) of the CrPC the High Court may interfere with an acquittal only in rare cases of manifest illegality, perverse findings, or miscarriage of justice, none of which were present. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the High Court's order was set aside, and the trial court's acquittal was restored.
Issues considered
- Whether a High Court, in revision under Sections 397/401 CrPC, can set aside an order of acquittal and direct a retrial absent manifest illegality.
- Scope and limits of the revisional jurisdiction conferred by Section 439(4) CrPC with respect to acquittal orders.
- Whether re‑appreciation of evidence by the High Court in a revision is permissible.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 397, s. 401, s. 439(4)
Subjects
murderacquittalrevisionCriminal Procedure CodeSection 439high court jurisdictionmiscarriage of justicebenefit of doubtre‑trial
Judgment
A
BANSI LAL & ORS.
v.
LAXMAN SINGH
B
JULY 15, 1986
[V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI AND M.M DUTT, JJ.)
\ Criminal Procedure Code, 1973-S. 439-High Court-Revi-
' sional Jurisdiction-When entitled to set' aside order of acquittal of Trial
Court and order re-trial.
c
The appellants, after trial by the Court of Additional Sesssions
Judge on a charge of murder under s. 302 read withs. 34 of the Indian
Penal Code, were acquitted giving them the benefit of donbt.
D
The respondent, a son of the deceased victim, preferred a crimi-
nal revision petition before the High Court nnder s. 397/401 Cr. P.C.
challenglng the order of acquittal. A Single Judge allowed the revision
petition, set aside the acquittal of the appellants and remitted the case to
the trial Court for re-trial.
E
The appellants appealed to this Court, inter alia, contending that
the Single Judge of the High Court has transgressed the bounds of his
revisional jurisdiction in reappreciating the evidence and setting aside
their acquittal.
-I
Allowing the appeal, F
HELD: 1. The High Court has clearly transgressed the limits of
its revisional jurisdiction under s. 439(4) of Cr. P.C. in setting aside the
order of acquittal passed by the Additional Sessions Jndge and directing
a re-trial of the case. I197F I
G
2. Even in an appeal against an order of acquittal no interference
will be made with the jndgment of the trial Court except in rare and
exceptional cases where there has been some manifest illegality in the
approach to the case or in the appreciation of the evidence or where the
conclnsion of fact recorded by the Trial Judge is wholly unreasonable so
as to be liable to be characterised as perverse and there has been a H
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11986] 3 S.C.R.
A resultant miscarriage of justice. The revisional jurisdiction of the High
Court while dealing with an order of acquittal passed by the trial court
is more narrow in its scope. It is only in glaring cases of injustice
resulting from some violation of fundamental principles of law by the
trial court, that the High Court is empowered to set aside the order of
B the acquittal and direct a re-trial of the acquitted accused. From the
very nature of this power it should be exercised sparingly and with
great care and caution. I195A-C I
K.C. Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [1963] 3 SCR 412; D.
Stenbens v. Nosibolla, 11951] SCR 284; Jogendranath Jha v. Polailal
Biswas, 11951] SCR 676; Akalu Ahir and Ors. v. Ramdeo Ram, [1974]
c 1 SCR 130; Amar Chand Aggarwal v. Shanti Bose, AIR 1973 SC 799;
and Satyendra Nath Dutta and Anr. v. Ram Narain, [1975] 2 SCR 743
followed.
3. The mere circumstance that a finding of fact recorded by the
D trial court may in the opinion of the High Court be wrong, will not
justify the setting aside of the order of acquittal and directing a re-trial
oftheaccused. ll97C]
In the instant case, the High Court did not keep in mind the
principles regarding the limits of its revisional powers while dealing
with the order of acquittal passed by the Additional Sessions Judge,
E
which did not suffer from any manifest illegality. The dominant justifi-
cation of the order of acquittal recorded by the trial court is the view it
took of the evidence of the two eye-withnesses. Having carefully gone
through the records of the case, this Court is satisfied that it was a
possible view and it cannot be characterised as illegal or perverse. It
F may well be that the Single Judge of the High Court was not inclined to
agree with the trial Court's finding on the basis of his independent
scrutiny and appreciation of the evidence adduced in the case but that
would not furnish any justification for interference in revision with the
order of acquittal passed by the Additional Sessions Judge. Even in an
appeal the Appellate Court would not have been justified in interfering
with an acquittal merely because it was inclined to differ from the
G
findings of fact reached by the trial court on the appreciation of the
evidence. The revisional power of the High Court is much more re-
stricted in its scope. I197B-F]
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
H No. 320 of 1986
BANS! LAL v. LAXMAN SINGH [ERADI, J.J 193
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.11.1984 of the Delhi A
High Court in Crl. Revision No. 228 of 1982.
S. Rangarajan, Miss Asha Rani Jain and Sanjay Parikh, for th~
Appellant.
B
K.N. Chitkara and R.C. Verma for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BALAKRISHNA ERADI, J. Special leave granted. Heard both
sides.
c
The five appellants were tried by the court of Additional Ses-
sions Judge, Delhi on a charge of murder under Section 302 read with
Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. After a very detailed considera-
tion of the evidence adduced in the case, the learned.Additional Ses-
sions Judge acquitted the appellants giving them the ·benefit of doubt. D
The respondent herein, who is a son of the deceased victim of the
murder preferred a criminal revision petition before the High Court of
Delhi under Section 397/401 Cr. P.C. challenging the order of acqui-
ttal passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. A learned Single
Judge of the High Court allowed that revision petition, set aside the
acquittal of the appellants and remitted the case to the trial court for E
re-trial.
Aggrieved by the said judgment of the High Court the appellants
have come up to this Court with this appeal and the main contention
raised by them is that the learned Single Judge of the High Court has
transgressed the bounds of his revisional jurisdiction in reappreciating
F
the evidence and setting aside their acquittal.
After hearing counsel appearing on both sides we have un-
hesitatingly come to the conclusion that the aforesaid contention of the
appellants is well founded and has to be upheld.
G
Briefly stated, the prosecution case was that on the mid-night of
3rd and 4th June, 1980 while LaJ<IIlan Singh (P.W. 1) was sleeping on
the terrace of his house in the DESU Colony, Delhi along with his
cousin Moti Lal (P. W. 7), they heard the noise of a quarrel and loud
shouting from the lane below and on looking down from the terrace
they found that deceased Ram Chander was being beaten by accused H
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19861 3 S.C.R.
A Nos. 1 and 4 (Appellant Nos. 1 and 4 ). Thereupon they rushed to the
place of the incident. One Babu Lal who was residing in the adjoining •'
t~
I
quarter also came there and when all the three tried to intervene and
separate deceased Ram Chander and the two accused, the first accused
called out to Bhagwat (second accused), who was looking down from
his adjacent quarter asking him why he was just watching while Ram
B
Chander was assaulting them. In response to the said call it is alleged
that Bhagwat along with the remaining accused came there carrying
lathis in their hands. There appears to have been a free for all fight. It
is said that Ram Chander wielding an iron handle of a hand-pump was
giving blows to the accused and he in tum was being beaten by lathis
by the remaining persons. It is the case of the prosecution that Ram
c Chander was administered lathi blows on his head by accused Nos. 1
and 2, as a result of which he foll down bleeding and died on the spot.
Thereafter all the five accused are said to have run away from the
scene with their lathis.
In support of the prosecution story, three ·persons were exa-
D
mined as eye-witnesses namely, P.W. 1, P.W. 2 and P.W. 7. P.W. 2,
however, turned hostile and did not support the prosecution version in
his deposition before the trial 1:ourt. The learned Additional Sessions
Judge discussed at length the te:stimony given by P. W. 1 and P. W. 7 as
well as the medical evidence adduced in the case. He found that there
were serious discrepancies and glaring inconsistencies between the
E
versions spoken by P.W. 1 and P.W. 7 and that the medical evidence
also did not support their version of the incident. In the result he found
that the testimony of these eye-witnesses could not be safely relied on
and the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt.
F
The learned Single Judge of the High Court has thought it fit to
re-appreciate the evidence of the two eye-witnesses as well as the
testimony given by the medical doctor who conducted the post-
mortem on the body of the deceased Ram Chander. By such a process
of elaborate re-examination of the evidence the learned Single Judge
was inclined to reach a conclusion different from that recorded by the
G
learned Additional Sessions Judge regarding the acceptability of the
testimony of P.W. 1 and P.W. 7. It is on this basis that the learned
Judge has proceeded to set aside the acquittal of the appellants and
order a retrial of the case after virtually recording findings in regard to
the credibility of the evidence given by the witnesses relied on by the
H prosecution.
BANS! LAL v. LAXMAN SINGH [ERADI, J.[ 195
A
Even in an appeal against an order of acquittal no interference
will be made with the judgment of the trial court except in rare and
exceptional cases where there has been some manifest illegality in the
approach to the case or the appreciation of the evidence or where the
conclusion of fact-recorded by the Trial Judge is wholly unreasonable
so as to be liable to be characterised as perverse and there has been a B
resultant miscarriage of justice. The revisional jurisdiction of the High
Court while dealing with an order of acquittal passed by the trial court
is more narrow in its scope. It is only in glaring cases of injustice
resulting from some violation of fundamental principles of law by the
trial court, that the High Court is empowered to set aside the order of
the acquittal and direct a retrial of the acquitted accused. From the c
very nature of this power it should be exercised sparingly and with
great care and caution. In K.C. Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh,
[ 1963] 3 S.C.R. 412, this Court had occasion to consider the scope of
the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court in relation to
orders of acquittal passed by the trial court and after referring to two
earlier decisions of this Court reported in D. Stenbens v. Nosibolla, D
[1951] S.C.R. 284 and Jogendranath Jha v. Polailal Biswas, [1951]
S.C.R. 676 the legal position was explained thus:
"These two cases clearly lay down the limits of the High
Court's jurisdiction to interfere with an order of acquittal
E
in revision; in particular, Jogendranath Jha's case stresses
that it is not open to a High Court to convert a finding of
acquittal into one of conviction in view of the provisions of
s. 439(4) and that the High Court cannot do this even indi-
I
rectly by ordering re-trial. What had happened in that case
I
was that the High Court reversed pure findings of facts
F
based on the trial court's appreciation of evidence but for-
mally complied with sub-s. (4) by directing only a re-trial of
the appellants without convicting them, and warned that
\he court retrying the case should not be influenced by any
expression of opinion contained in the judgment of the
High Court. In that connection this Court observed that
G
there could be little doubt that the dice was loaded against
the appellants of that case and it might prove difficult for
any subordinate judicial officer dealing with the case to put
aside altogether the strong views expressed in the judgment
as to the credibility of the prosecution witness and the
circumstances of the case in general." H
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 3 S.C.R.
A This decision was subsequently followed by this Court in Akalu Ahir
and Others v. Ramdeo Ram, [1974] 1 S.C.R. 130 where this Court
observed:
"The unrestricted right of appeal from acquittal is specifi-
cally conferred only on the State and a private complainani
B
is given this right only when the criminal prosecution was
instituted on his complaint and then also subject to special
leave by the High Court. It is further provided ins. 439(5),
Cr. P.C. that where no appeal is brought in a case in which
an appeal is provided, no proceedings by way of revision )
would be entertained at the instance of the party who could
c have appealed. TI1e State Government, therefore, having
failed to appeal, cannot apply for revision of an order of
acquittal. Again on revision, the High Court is expressly
prohibited from converting an acquittal into a conviction.
Considering the problem facing the Court in this case in the
background of this scheme, the High Court when approa-
D
ched by a private party for exercising its power of revision
from an order of acquittal, should appropriately refrain
from interfering except when there is a glaring legal defect
of a serious nature which has resulted in grave failure of
justice. It is not expected to act under ss. 435/439, Cr. P.C.
as if it is a hearing on appeal in spite of the wide language
E
under s. 435 which empowers it to satisfy itself as to the
correctness, legality or propriety of a finding, sentence or
order and as to the regularity of any proceeding and also in
spite of the fact that under s. 439 it can exercise inter alia \
the power conferred on a court of appeal under s. 423, Cr. \
P.C. The power being discretionary, it has to be exercised
F
judiciously, and not arbitrarily. Judicial discretion, as has
often been said, means a discretion which is informed by
tradition, methodised by analogy and disciplined by sys-
tem. In Amar Chand Aggarwal v. Shanti Bose, A.LR.
1973 S.C. 799, this Court said that normally the jurisdic-
tion of the High Court under section 439, Cr. P.C. is to be
G
exercised only in exceptional cases when there is a glaring
defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on point
of law and there has consequently been flagrant miscar-
riage of justice. In the background of the position just
stated a private complainant can only claim a right, in com-
mon with all aggrieved parties in a criminal proceedings, to
BANS! LAL v. LAXMAN SINGH [ERADI, J.[ 197
invok.e the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court for A
redress against miscarriage of justice arising from an er-
roneous order of acquittal."
The same position has been reiterated by this Court in Satyendra Nath
DuttaandAnr. v. Ram Narain, l1975]2S.C.R. 743.
B
,..,
It is unfortunate that the High Court did not keep in mind the
principles laid down in the aforesaid rulings regarding the limits of its
revisional powers while dealings with an order of acquittal passed by
\
the subordinate court. The mere circumstance that a finding of fact
recorded by the trial court may in the opinion of the High Court be
wrong, will not justify the setting aside the order of acquittal and c
directing a re-trial of the accused. ln the present case the iudgment of
- the learned Additional Sessions Judge did not suffer from any manifest
illegality. The dominant justification of the order of acquittal recorded
by the trial court is the view it took of the evidence of the two eye-
witnesses. Having carefully gone through the records of the case we
D
are satisfied that it was a possible view and it cannot be characterised
is illegal or perverse. It may well be that the learned Single Judge of
the High Court was not inclined to agree with the said view on the
basis of his independent scrutiny and appreciation of the evidence
adduced in the case but that would not furnish any justification for
~ interference in revision with the order of acquittal passed by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge. Even in an appeal the Appellate E
Court would not have been justified in interfering with art acquittal
merely because it was inclined to differ from the findings of fact
reached by the trial court on the appreciation of the evidence. The
I ' revisional power of the High Court is much more restricted in its
scope. We accordingly hold that the High Court has clearly transgres-
p
sed the limits of.its revisional jurisdiction under Section 439(4) of Cr.
P .C. in setting aside the order of acquittal passed by the Additional
"" Sessions Judge and directing a re-trial of the case.
The appeal is therefore allowed, the judgment of the High Court
is set aside and the order of the acquittal passed by the trial court will
stand restored. G
~ A.P.J. Appeal allowed.
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