BANKA SNEHA SHEELAversusTHE STATE OF TELANGANA & ORS.

978                      [2021]REPORTS
               SUPREME COURT    8 S.C.R. 978                 [2021] 8 S.C.R.


A                          BANKA SNEHA SHEELA
                                         v.
                    THE STATE OF TELANGANA & ORS.
                        (Criminal Appeal No. 733 of 2021)
B                               AUGUST 02, 2021
             [R. F. NARIMAN AND HRISHIKESH ROY, JJ.]
             Preventive detention: Telangana Prevention of Dangerous
      Activities of Boot-leggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas,
      Immoral Traffic Offenders Land-Grabbers, Spurious Seed
C
      Offenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertiliser Offenders, Food
      Adulteration Offenders, Fake Document Offenders, Scheduled
      Commodities Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders,
      Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, Arms Offenders,
      Cyber Crime Offenders and White Collar or Financial Offenders
D     Act, 1986 – s. 3(2) – Preventive detention under – On facts, detenu
      accused of cheating many people to the tune of more than Rs. 50.00
      lakhs in the guise of providing good profit through investment in
      share market – Five FIRs filed against detenu, being u/s. 420, 406
      and 506 IPC – Detention order passed nine months after the filing
      of the last FIR – Writ petition challenging order of preventive
E
      detention – Dismissed by the High Court – On appeal, held: Mere
      contravention of law such as indulging in cheating or criminal breach
      of trust certainly affects ‘law and order’ but to affect ‘public order’,
      it must affect the community or the public at large – Allegation in
      the FIRs pertain to the realm of ‘law and order’ wherein various
F     acts of cheating are ascribed to the detenu punishable under IPC –
      Possible apprehension of breach of law and order can be said to
      be made out – This may be a ground to appeal against the bail
      orders granted and/or to cancel bail but not for a recourse to
      preventive detention statute – Thus, the detention order is quashed
      and the impugned judgment is set aside.
G
            s. 2(a) explanation – Public order – Explained.
            Allowing the appeal, the Court
             HELD: 1.1 On the facts of the instant case, it is clear that
      at the highest, a possible apprehension of breach of law and order
H
                                        978
 BANKA SNEHA SHEELA v. THE STATE OF TELANGANA &                          979
                      ORS.

can be said to be made out if it is apprehended that the Detenu, if      A
set free, will continue to cheat gullible persons. This may be a
good ground to appeal against the bail orders granted and/or to
cancel bail but certainly cannot provide the springboard to move
under a preventive detention statute. Therefore, the detention
order is quashed on this ground. The impugned judgment is set
                                                                         B
aside and the Detenu is ordered to be freed forthwith. [Para
24][1005-D-F]
      1.2 While it cannot seriously be disputed that the Detenu
may be a “white collar offender” as defined under Section 2(x) of
the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, yet a
Preventive Detention Order can only be passed if his activities          C
adversely affect or are likely to adversely affect the maintenance
of public order. Public order is defined in the Explanation to
Section 2(a) of the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities
Act to be a harm, danger or alarm or a feeling of insecurity among
the general public or any section thereof or a grave widespread          D
danger to life or public health. As is well-known, the expressions
‘law and order’, ‘public order’, and ‘security of state’ are different
from one another. [Para 11, 12][988-G-H; 989-A-B]
       1.3 There can be no doubt that for ‘public order’ to be
disturbed, there must in turn be public disorder. Mere                   E
contravention of law such as indulging in cheating or criminal
breach of trust certainly affects ‘law and order’ but before it can
be said to affect ‘public order’, it must affect the community or
the public at large. There can be no doubt that what is alleged in
the five FIRs pertain to the realm of ‘law and order’ in that various
acts of cheating are ascribed to the Detenu which are punishable         F
under the three sections of the Indian Penal Code set out in the
five FIRs. A close reading of the Detention Order would make it
clear that the reason for the said Order is not any apprehension
of widespread public harm, danger or alarm but is only because
the Detenu was successful in obtaining anticipatory bail/bail from       G
the Courts in each of the five FIRs. If a person is granted
anticipatory bail/bail wrongly, there are well-known remedies in
the ordinary law to take care of the situation. The State can always
appeal against the bail order granted and/or apply for cancellation
of bail. The mere successful obtaining of anticipatory bail/bail
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980            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2021] 8 S.C.R.


A     orders being the real ground for detaining the Detenu, there can
      be no doubt that the harm, danger or alarm or feeling of security
      among the general public spoken of in Section 2(a) of the
      Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act is make believe
      and totally absent in the facts of the instant case. [Para 13, 14][991-
      G-H; 992-A-C]
B
            1.4 When a person is preventively detained, it is Article 21
      and 22 that are attracted and not Article 19. Further, preventive
      detention must fall within the four corners of Article 21 read with
      Article 22 and the statute in question. To therefore argue that a
      liberal meaning must be given to the expression ‘public order’ in
C     the context of a preventive detention statute is wholly inapposite
      and incorrect. On the contrary, considering that preventive
      detention is a necessary evil only to prevent public disorder, the
      Court must ensure that the facts brought before it directly and
      inevitably lead to a harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity
D     among the general public or any section thereof at large. [Para
      17][994-C-E]
            Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate (1970) 3
            SCC 746 – held inapplicable.
            Subramanian v. State of Tamil Nadu (2012) 4 SCC 699
E           : [2012] 1 SCR 985 – distinguished.
            Commissioner of Police v. C. Sunita (2004) 7 SCC 467
            : [2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 701 ; R. Kalavathi v. State of
            Tamil Nadu (2006) 6 SCC 14 : [2006] 3 Suppl. SCR
            74; Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar [1966] 1 SCR
F           709; Frances Coralie Mullin v. W.C. Khambra [1980]
            2 SCR 1095; Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar
            (1984) 3 SCC 14 : [1984] 3 SCR 435; Union of India
            v. Yumnam Anand (2007) 10 SCC 190 : [2007] 5 SCR
            60; Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2011) 5 SCC 244 :
G           [2011] 4 SCR 740; Haradhan Saha v. The State of West
            Bengal (1975) 3 SCC 198 : [1975] 1 SCR 778; Yumman
            Ongbi Lembi Leima v. State of Manipur (2012) 2 SCC
            176 : [2012] 1 SCR 1; Mungala Yadamma v. State of
            A.P. (2012) 2 SCC 386 : [2012] 1 SCR 26 – referred
            to.
H
 BANKA SNEHA SHEELA v. THE STATE OF TELANGANA &                         981
                      ORS.

      Sama Aruna v. State of Telangana (2018) 12 SCC 150                A
      : [2017] 4 SCR 52; Collector & District Magistrate v.
      Sangala Kondamma (2005) 3 SCC 666 – cited.
                       Case Law Reference
(1970) 3 SCC 746                  held inapplicable    Para 7           B
[2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 701           referred to          Para 7
[2006] 3 Suppl. SCR 74            referred to          Para 7
[1966] 1 SCR 709                  referred to          Para 12
                                                                        C
[1980] 2 SCR 1095                 referred to          Para 18
[1984] 3 SCR 435                  referred to          Para 18
[2007] 5 SCR 60                   referred to          Para 19
[2011] 4 SCR 740                  referred to          Para 20          D

[1975] 1 SCR 778                  referred to          Para 20
[2012] 1 SCR 985                  distinguished        Para 21
[2012] 1 SCR 1                    referred to          Para 22          E
[2012] 1 SCR 26                   referred to          Para 22
[2017] 4 SCR 52                   cited                Para 23
(2005) 3 SCC 666                  cited                Para 23
                                                                        F
      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
733 of 2021.
       From the Judgment and Order dated 31.03.2021 of the High Court
of Telangana at Hyderbad in Writ Petition No. 20146 of 2020.
                                                                        G
      Gaurav Agrawal, Venkateshwar Rao Anumolu, Shashwat Goel,
Vijay Babu, Advs. for the Appellant.
      Ranjit Kumar, Sr. Adv., S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, Ms. Sweena Nair,
Advs. for the Respondents.
                                                                        H
982            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2021] 8 S.C.R.


A           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            R. F. NARIMAN, J
            1. Leave granted.
            2. The present appeal arises out of a judgment dated 31.03.2021,
B     passed by the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad, by
      which a Writ Petition filed by the Petitioner challenging a Preventive
      Detention Order [hereinafter referred to as “Detention Order”] passed
      against the Petitioner’s husband [hereinafter referred to as “the Detenu”]
      under Section 3(2) of the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities
      of Boot-leggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic
C     Offenders Land-Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide
      Offenders, Fertiliser Offenders, Food Adulteration Offenders, Fake
      Document Offenders, Scheduled Commodities Offenders, Forest
      Offenders, Gaming Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances
      Offenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders and White Collar
D     or Financial Offenders Act, 1986 [hereinafter referred to as “Telangana
      Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act”], was dismissed.
             3. The Detention Order under the provisions of the Telangana
      Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act is dated 28.09.2020. It refers to
      five FIRs that have been filed against the Detenu, all the said FIRs being
E     under Sections 420, 406 and 506 of the IPC. The facts contained in the
      FIRs range from October, 2017 to December, 2019 and are similar. We
      may set out the facts contained in FIR No.705 of 2019 as a sample of
      similar FIRs filed against the Detenu as follows [This narration of the
      FIR is to be found in the Detention Order itself]:

F           “On 12.12.2019 at 1200 hours a complaint was received from Sri
            Kommu Naveen Kumar S/o Veeraswamy, aged about 24 years,
            Occ: Car Mechanic, R/o H.No. 2-32, Yadaran Village, Shamirpet
            Mandal stating that he has been running a Garage near main road
            at Muraharipally village for the past one year. One Banka
            Ravikanth, aged about 35 years used to come to his garage for
G           two to three times in a month for his car servicing. In the month
            of March, 2019 the said Ravikanth introduced himself as a High
            Court advocate and he would invest money in newly upcoming
            companies and insisted the complainant to invest money for 100%
            return. He also informed that they are three advocates, of them
            one is CA (Chartered Accountant) and another is CS (Company
H
 BANKA SNEHA SHEELA v. THE STATE OF TELANGANA &                               983
              ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J]

      Secretary) by name Chandramouli, aged about 65 years. On                A
      believing his words, he transferred Rs.50,000/- through Phone-
      pay to his Indian Bank, Shamirpet branch vide A/c No. 6714073306.
      Again on 28.05.2019 he transferred Rs. 1,00,000/- through Phone-
      pay as second investment and on 20.06.2019 he deposited Rs.
      1,00,000/- from his Indian Bank, Gachibowli Branch account to
                                                                              B
      his account besides giving net cash of Rs. 2,00,000/- by hand.
      While sending Rs. 1 lakh through phone pay in presence of one
      Prasad, Banka Ravikanth assured the complainant that in the 2nd
      investment he would give him Rs. 41,000/- per month throughout
      the year and he will take Rs. 3,000/- towards his commission. On
      12.12.2019 when the complainant asked him to return his money,          C
      he threatened with dire consequences. The complainant stated
      that the said Ravikanth has cheated him by saying that he would
      get more return. On the strength of the complainant, police
      registered a case and investigation into.”
      Following upon the narration of the 5 FIRs comes this important         D
paragraph:
      “Due to above incidents, the complainants, victims and other young
      aspirants, who want to invest money in stock/share market and
      derive benefits became scared and feeling insecure. These
      incidents have also caused loss of faith and trust among investors      E
      in stock trading fearing similar cheating towards them by the people
      like you. They are hesitated to consult any consultancies or persons
      fearing similar cheating by the unknown persons in the guise of
      providing good profits. These prejudicial activities have also caused
      disturbance in the public.”
                                                                              F
      4. The Detention Order then refers to the ‘Modus Operandi’ of
the Detenu as follows:
      “You are a native of Karimnagar district. You completed graduation
      (B.Com) in 2011 and LLB in 2019 and have been doing trading in
      stock market. You have introduced yourselves to the victims as a
                                                                              G
      High Court Advocate and you have a team consisting of one CA
      (Chartered Accountant) and CS (Company Secretary) and three
      advocates. Your CS has an expertise and links in Central and
      State governments. You have knowledgeable persons in share
      marketing and used to invest money in upcoming companies which
                                                                              H
984             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2021] 8 S.C.R.


A            ensure return of 100%. You would lure the innocent public in the
             guise of providing good profit by investing their money in share
             marketing. You used to contact your known persons and lure them
             to invest their money in share market to get good profits assuring
             the profit 100% within a short period. Further you used to give
             blank cheques and ask commission from the victims to gain their
B
             confidence. As per plan, you collected amount from the victims
             through Phone-pe which is linked to your bank account and net-
             banking and in-person. When you received money to your bank
             account, immediately you had transfer the received amount to
             your wife’s bank account. When the victims contact you over
C            phone, you first start avoiding them and then diverting their calls
             and finally cheating them. Later, you changed your residential
             address in order to conceal your where-abouts from the victims.
             You have cheated so many people to the tune of more than Rs.
             50.00 lakhs in the guise of providing good profit through investment
             in share market.
D
             You are involved in Cr.No.34/2020 u/s 406, 420 IPC of Malkajgiri
             Police Station in the limits of Rachakonda Police Commissionerate
             which referred by way of your antecedent criminal background
             the same is not relied upon for your detention.”
             5. Thereafter, the Detention Order narrates that anticipatory bail/
E     bail has been granted to the Detenu in all the aforesaid FIRs, the last
      such relief granted being on 10.08.2020. The Detention Order then
      narrates:
             “Having regard to your involvement in series of criminal activities
             such as cheating in the guise of providing good profit by investing
F            their money in stock market and collected huge amounts to the
             tune of more than Rs. 50 lakhs from them in an organized way
             and in view of the bail petitions moved by you and granted in the
             aforesaid cases and later releasing on conditional bail, I am satisfied
             that free movement of such an offender like you is not safe in the
             interest of the society as there is an imminent possibility of you
G
             indulging in similar prejudicial activities with another set of innocent
             youth and cheat them on the pretext of providing good profit by
             investing their money in stock market, which are detrimental to
             public order, unless you were prevented from doing so by an
             appropriate order of detention.
H            xxx xxx xxx
 BANKA SNEHA SHEELA v. THE STATE OF TELANGANA &                               985
              ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J]

      Thus you have indulged in the acts of White Collar offences by          A
      committing offences such as cheating so many people by collecting
      more than Rs. 50 lakhs from them through Phone Pay and online
      banking and sometimes in person in the guise of providing more
      profit in the limits of Cyberabad Police Commissionerate. Further
      your acts have been adversely affecting the maintenance of public
                                                                              B
      order and creating feeling of insecurity among young people, thus
      disturbing peace and tranquillity in the area.
      It is imperative to prevent you from acting in any manner prejudicial
      to the maintenance of public order. I feel that recourse to normal
      law may not be effective deterrent-in preventing you from
      indulging in such further activities prejudicial to the maintenance     C
      of public order in the area, unless you were detained by invoking
      the provisions under the “Telangana Prevention of Dangerous
      Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas,
      Immoral Traffic Offenders, Land-Grabbers, Spurious Seed
      Offenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertiliser Offenders, Food            D
      Adulteration Offenders, Fake Document Offenders, Scheduled
      Commodities Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders,
      Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, Arms
      Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders and White Collar or Financial
      Offenders Act, 1986, (Act No. 01 of 1986)”.”
                                                                              E
       6. As a result thereof, the Detenu was preventively detained from
the date of the Detention Order itself. A representation dated 31.10.2020
was made by the Petitioner herein to the Commissioner of Police,
Cyberabad Commissionerate [Respondent No. 2] which was considered
by the Advisory Board, who by its Order 11.11.2020 found that there
was sufficient cause to continue the Detention Order. Vide the Order of       F
the State of Telangana dated 17.12.2020, the Detention Order was
confirmed and the period of detention was directed to be for a period of
one year from 05.10.2020.
      7. The impugned judgment, after narrating the facts and the
arguments made by counsel on behalf of the Petitioner as well as counsel      G
on behalf of the State, then held:
      “9. In the instant case, a perusal of the material placed on record
      reveals that the detenu was granted bail by the Courts concerned
      in all the five cases relied upon by the detaining authority for
                                                                              H
986            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 8 S.C.R.


A           preventively detaining him. Under these circumstances, the
            contention of the respondents that the illegal activities of the detenu
            would disturb the even tempo of life of the community which
            makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order and
            there is imminent possibility of the detenu again indulging in similar
            prejudicial activities, cannot be brushed aside.”
B
           The judgment then referred to the decisions of this Court in Madhu
      Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate (1970) 3 SCC 746,
      Commissioner of Police v. C. Sunita (2004) 7 SCC 467 and R.
      Kalavathi v. State of Tamil Nadu (2006) 6 SCC 14, and then concluded:
C           “The modus operandi of the detenu in the alleged offences which
            were committed in quick succession would certainly disturb the
            public peace and tranquillity. So it is imperative upon the officers
            concerned to pass the order of detention, since the acts of the
            detenu are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The
            illegal activities of the detenu were of such a reach and extent,
D           that they would certainly affect the even tempo of life and were
            prejudicial to the public order. The detaining authority had sufficient
            material to record subjective satisfaction that the detention of the
            detenu was necessary to maintain public order and even tempo of
            life of the community. The order of detention does not suffer from
E           any illegality. The grounds of detention, as indicated in the impugned
            order, are found to be relevant and in tune with the provisions of
            the P.D.Act. Since the detenu got bail in all the five cases relied
            upon by the detaining authority, there is nothing wrong on the part
            of the detaining authority in raising an apprehension that there is
            every possibility of the detenu committing similar offences, which
F           would again certainly affect the public order. The quick succession
            of commission of alleged offences by the detenu makes it amply
            clear that there is every possibility of detenu committing similar
            offences in future, which are prejudicial to the maintenance of
            public order.”
G            8. Shri Gaurav Agarwal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
      the Petitioner has raised three points before us. First and foremost, he
      said there is no proximate or live connection between the acts complained
      of and the date of the Detention Order, as the last act that was complained
      of, which is discernible from the first 3 FIRs [FIRs dated 12.12.2019,
H     12.12.2019 and 14.12.2019], was in December 2019 whereas the
 BANKA SNEHA SHEELA v. THE STATE OF TELANGANA &                             987
              ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J]

Detention Order was passed 9 months later on 28.09.2020. He then            A
argued, without conceding, that at best only a ‘law and order’ problem if
at all would arise on the facts of these cases and not a ‘public order’
problem, and referred to certain judgments of this court to buttress the
same. He also argued that the Detention Order was totally perverse in
that it was passed only because anticipatory bail/bail applications were
                                                                            B
granted. The correct course of action would have been for the State to
move to cancel the bail that has been granted if any further untoward
incident were to take place.
      9. Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf
of the State of Telangana, reiterated the grounds contained in the
Detention Order and argued that the Detenu was a habitual fraudster         C
who had therefore created fear amongst the gullible public, and since he
was likely to commit similar offences in future, it was important to
preventively detain him, as the ordinary law had no deterrent effect on
him. Further, there is no doubt that he had infringed ‘public order’ as
defined by the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act and         D
had disturbed the even tempo of life of persons who were cheated by
him and were likely to be cheated by him.
      10. Having heard learned counsel for both parties, it is first
important to set out the important provisions of the Act as follows:
      “2. Definitions                                                       E

      In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,
      (a) “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public
      order” means when a bootlegger, a dacoit, a drug-offender, a
      goonda, an immoral traffic offender, Land-Grabber, a Spurious         F
      Seed Offender, an Insecticide Offender, a Fertiliser Offender, a
      Food Adulteration Offender, a Fake Document Offender, a
      Scheduled Commodities Offender, a Forest Offender, a Gaming
      Offender, a Sexual Offender, an Explosive Substances Offender,
      an Arms Offender, a Cyber Crime Offender and a White Collar
      or Financial Offender is engaged or is making preparations for        G
      engaging, in any of his activities as such, which affect adversely,
      or are likely to affect adversely, the maintenance of public order:
      Explanation:- For the purpose of this clause public order shall be
      deemed to have been affected adversely or shall be deemed likely
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988            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                               [2021] 8 S.C.R.


A           to be affected adversely inter alia, if any of the activities of any of
            the persons referred to in this clause directly, or indirectly, is causing
            or calculated to cause any harm, danger or alarm or a feeling of
            insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a
            grave wide-spread danger to life or public health;
B           xxx xxx xxxx
            (x) “White collar offender” or “Financial Offender” means a
            person who commits or abets the commission of offences
            punishable under the Telangana Protection of Depositors of
            Financial Establishment Act, 1999 (Act 17 of 1999) or under sections
C           406 to 409 or 417 to 420 or under Chapter XVIII of the Indian
            Penal Code, 1860.”
            “Section 3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons
            (1) The Government may, if satisfied with respect to any bootlegger,
            dacoit, drug-offender, goonda, immoral traffic offender, Land-
D           Grabber, Spurious Seed Offender, Insecticide Offender, Fertilizer
            Offender, Food Adulteration Offender, Fake Document Offender,
            Scheduled Commodities Offender, Forest Offender, Gaming
            Offender, Sexual Offender, Explosive Substances Offender, Arms
            Offender, Cyber Crime Offender and White Collar or Financial
E           Offender that with a view to preventing him from acting in any
            manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is
            necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be
            detained.”
            “Section 13. Maximum period of detention
F           The maximum period for which any person may be detained, in
            pursuance of any detention order made under this Act which has
            been confirmed under section 12, shall be twelve months from
            the date of detention.”
            11. While it cannot seriously be disputed that the Detenu may be
G     a “white collar offender” as defined under Section 2(x) of the Telangana
      Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, yet a Preventive Detention Order
      can only be passed if his activities adversely affect or are likely to
      adversely affect the maintenance of public order. Public order is defined
      in the Explanation to Section 2(a) of the Telangana Prevention of
      Dangerous Activities Act to be a harm, danger or alarm or a feeling of
H
 BANKA SNEHA SHEELA v. THE STATE OF TELANGANA &                              989
              ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J]

insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave        A
widespread danger to life or public health.
      12. As is well-known, the expressions ‘law and order’, ‘public
order’, and ‘security of state’ are different from one another. In Ram
Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar (1966) 1 SCR 709 the question before
this Court arose under a Preventive Detention Order made under Rule          B
30 of the Defence of India Rules, which permits apprehension and
detention of a person likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order. This Court set out the distinction between
a mere law and order disturbance and a public order disturbance as
follows:
                                                                             C
      “The Defence of India Act and the Rules speak of the conditions
      under which preventive detention under the Act can be ordered.
      In its long title and the preamble the Defence of India Act speaks
      of the necessity to provide for special measures to ensure public
      safety and interest, the defence of India and civil defence. The
      expression public safety and interest between them indicate the        D
      range of action for maintaining security peace and tranquillity of
      India whereas the expressions defence of India and civil defence
      connote defence of India and its people against aggression from
      outside and action of persons within the country. These generic
      terms were used because the Act seeks to provide for a congeries       E
      of action of which preventive detention is just a small part. In
      conferring power to make rules, Section 3 of the Defence of India
      Act enlarges upon the terms of the preamble by specification of
      details. It speaks of defence of India and civil defence and public
      safety without change but it expands the idea of public interest
      into maintenance of public order, the efficient conduct of military    F
      operations and maintaining of supplies and services essential to
      the life of the community. Then it mentions by way of illustration
      in clause (15) of the same section the power of apprehension and
      detention in custody of any person whom the authority empowered
      by the rules to apprehend or detain (the authority empowered to        G
      detain not being lower in rank than that of a District Magistrate),
      suspects, on grounds appearing to that authority to be reasonable—
      (a) of being of hostile origin; or
      (b) of having acted, acting or being about to act or being likely to
      act in a manner prejudicial to—                                        H
990      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                               [2021] 8 S.C.R.


A     (i) the defence of India and civil defence;
      (ii) the security of the State;
      (iii) the public safety or interest:
      (iv) the maintenance of public order;
B     (v) India’s relations with foreign states:
      (vi) the maintenance of peaceful conditions in any part or area of
      India: or
      (vii) the efficient conduct of military operations.
C     It will thus appear that security of the state, public safety or interest,
      maintenance of public order and the maintenance of peaceful
      conditions in any part or area of India may be viewed separately
      even though strictly one clause may have an effect or bearing on
      another. Then follows Rule 30, which repeats the above conditions
      and permits detention of any person with a view to preventing
D
      him from acting in any of the above ways. The argument of Dr
      Lohia that the conditions are to be cumulatively applied is clearly
      untenable. It is not necessary to analyse Rule 30 which we quoted
      earlier and which follows the scheme of Section 3(15). The
      question is whether by taking power to prevent Dr Lohia from
E     acting to the prejudice of “law and order” as against “public order”
      the District Magistrate went outside his powers.
      [page 738-739]
      xxx xxx xxx

F     We have here a case of detention under Rule 30 of the Defence
      of India Rules which permits apprehension and detention of a
      person likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of
      public order. It follows that if such a person is not detained public
      disorder is the apprehended result. Disorder is no doubt prevented
      by the maintenance of law and order also but disorder is a broad
G     spectrum which includes at one end small disturbances and at the
      other the most serious and cataclysmic happenings. Does the
      expression “public order” take in every kind of disorders or only
      some of them? The answer to this serves to distinguish “public
      order” from “law and order” because the latter undoubtedly takes
H     in all of them. Public order if disturbed, must lead to public disorder.
 BANKA SNEHA SHEELA v. THE STATE OF TELANGANA &                                991
              ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J]

      Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. When         A
      two drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public
      disorder. They can be dealt with under the powers to maintain
      law and order but cannot be detained on the ground that they
      were disturbing public order. Suppose that the two fighters were
      of rival communities and one of them tried to raise communal
                                                                               B
      passions. The problem is still one of law and order but it raises the
      apprehension of public disorder. Other examples can be imagined.
      The contravention of law always affects order but before if can
      be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the
      public at large. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to
      disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the         C
      Defence of India Act but disturbances which subvert the public
      order are. A District Magistrate is entitled to take action under
      Rule 30(1)(b) to prevent subversion of public order but not in aid
      of maintenance of law and order under ordinary circumstances.
      It will thus appear that just as “public order” in the rulings of this   D
      Court (earlier cited) was said to comprehend disorders of less
      gravity than those affecting “security of State”, “law and order”
      also comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting
      “public order”. One has to imagine three concentric circles. Law
      and order represents the largest circle within which is the next
      circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents      E
      security of State. It is then easy to see that an act may affect law
      and order but not public order just as an act may affect public
      order but not security of the State. By using the expression
      “maintenance of law and order” the District Magistrate was
      widening his own field of action and was adding a clause to the          F
      Defence of India Rules.”
                                                           [page 745-746]
       13. There can be no doubt that for ‘public order’ to be disturbed,
there must in turn be public disorder. Mere contravention of law such as
indulging in cheating or criminal breach of trust certainly affects ‘law       G
and order’ but before it can be said to affect ‘public order’, it must
affect the community or the public at large.
      14. There can be no doubt that what is alleged in the five FIRs
pertain to the realm of ‘law and order’ in that various acts of cheating
                                                                               H
992            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 8 S.C.R.


A     are ascribed to the Detenu which are punishable under the three sections
      of the Indian Penal Code set out in the five FIRs. A close reading of the
      Detention Order would make it clear that the reason for the said Order
      is not any apprehension of widespread public harm, danger or alarm but
      is only because the Detenu was successful in obtaining anticipatory bail/
      bail from the Courts in each of the five FIRs. If a person is granted
B
      anticipatory bail/bail wrongly, there are well-known remedies in the
      ordinary law to take care of the situation. The State can always appeal
      against the bail order granted and/or apply for cancellation of bail. The
      mere successful obtaining of anticipatory bail/bail orders being the real
      ground for detaining the Detenu, there can be no doubt that the harm,
C     danger or alarm or feeling of security among the general public spoken
      of in Section 2(a) of the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities
      Act is make believe and totally absent in the facts of the present case.
            15. At this stage, it is important to advert to the counter affidavit
      dated 17.07.2021 filed by the State of Telangana. Paragraph 18 of the
D     counter affidavit refers to the granting of bail by Courts in all the five
      FIRs, which is the real reason for the passing of the Detention Order, as
      follows:
            “18. It is submitted that in the instant case, the decision to detain
            the detenu herein is based on the perusal of the material on records
E           which revealed that the detenu was granted bail by the Courts
            concerned in all the five cases relied upon by the detaining authority
            for preventively detaining him. The Respondent No. 2 herein
            recorded his satisfaction that the activities of the detenu are
            prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, and that ordinary
            law may not be an effective deterrent to prevent the detenu from
F           indulging in further prejudicial activities. Furthermore, the materials
            relied upon and circumstances show that subjective satisfaction
            of the detaining authority is not tainted or illegal on any account.
            Therefore the passing of the detention order is justified considering
            that the illegal activities of the detenu would disturb the even tempo
G           of life of the community, which makes it prejudicial to the
            maintenance of the public order and there is imminent possibility
            of the detenu again indulging in similar prejudicial activities.”
            Paragraph 21 of the counter affidavit then states as follows:
            “21. It is submitted that in the acts which disturb public tranquillity
H           or are breaches of the peace should not be given a narrow meaning,
 BANKA SNEHA SHEELA v. THE STATE OF TELANGANA &                                 993
              ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J]

      but should be given a liberal interpretation and the expression ‘in       A
      the interest of public order’ is very wide amplitude as held by this
      Hon’ble Court in Madhu Limaye Versus Sub Division
      Magistrate reported in AIR 1971 SC 2486. Therefore the
      Respondent No. 2, before passing the said detention order
      considered the crucial issues as to whether the activities of the
                                                                                B
      detenu were prejudicial to public and as to whether public order
      could be affected by only such contravention which affects the
      community or the public at large.”
       16. The reference to Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional
Magistrate (supra) is wholly inapposite. This judgment dealt with the
scope of the expression “in the interests of public order” which occurs         C
in Article 19(2) to 19(4) of the Constitution of India. The observations
made by this judgment were in the context of a challenge to Section 144
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Importantly, this Court referred to
the judgment in Ram Manohar Lohia (supra) and then opined:
      “19. Adopting this test we may say that the State is at the centre        D
      and society surrounds it. Disturbances of society go in a broad
      spectrum from more disturbance of the serenity of life to jeopardy
      of the State. The acts become graver as we journey from the
      periphery of the largest circle towards the centre. In this journey
      we travel first though public tranquillity, then through public order     E
      and lastly to the security of the State.
      20. In dealing with the phrase “maintenance of public order” in
      the context of preventive detention, we confined the expression
      in the relevant Act to what was included in the second circle and
      left out that which was in the largest circle. But that consideration     F
      need not always apply because small local disturbances of the
      even tempo of life, may in a sense be said to effect “public order”
      in a different sense, namely, in the sense of a state of law
      abidingness vis-a-vis the safety of others. In our judgment the
      expression “in the interest of public order” in the Constitution is
      capable of taking within itself not only those acts which disturb         G
      the security of the State or act within ordre publique as described
      but also certain acts which disturb public tranquillity or are breaches
      of the peace. It is not necessary to give the expression a narrow
      meaning because, as has been observed, the expression “in the
      interest of public order” is very wide. Whatever may be said of           H
994             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 8 S.C.R.


A           “maintenance of public order” in the context of special laws
            entailing detention of persons without a trial on the pure subjective
            determination of the Executive cannot be said in other
            circumstances. In the former case this Court confined the meaning
            to graver episodes not involving cases of law and order which are
            not disturbances of public tranquillity but of ordre publique.”
B
             17. To tear these observations out of context would be fraught
      with great danger when it comes to the liberty of a citizen under Article
      21 of the Constitution of India. The reason for not adopting a narrow
      meaning of ‘public order’ in that case was because of the expression “in
      the interests of” which occurs to Article 19(2) to 19(4) and which is
C     pressed into service only when a law is challenged as being
      unconstitutional for being violative of Article 19 of the Constitution. When
      a person is preventively detained, it is Article 21 and 22 that are attracted
      and not Article 19. Further, preventive detention must fall within the four
      corners of Article 21 read with Article 22 and the statute in question. To
D     therefore argue that a liberal meaning must be given to the expression
      ‘public order’ in the context of a preventive detention statute is wholly
      inapposite and incorrect. On the contrary, considering that preventive
      detention is a necessary evil only to prevent public disorder, the Court
      must ensure that the facts brought before it directly and inevitably lead
      to a harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the general
E     public or any section thereof at large.
             18. Several judgments of this Court have reminded us about the
      role of the High Courts and this Court in cases of preventive detention.
      Thus, in Frances Coralie Mullin v. W.C. Khambra (1980) 2 SCR
      1095, a Division Bench of this Court held:
F
            “We have no doubt in our minds about the role of the court in
            cases of preventive detention: it has to be one of eternal vigilance.
            No freedom is higher than personal freedom and no duty higher
            than to maintain it unimpaired. The Court’s writ is the ultimate
            insurance against illegal detention. The Constitution enjoins
G           conformance with the provisions of Article 22 and the Court exacts
            compliance. Article 22(5) vests in the detenu the right to be provided
            with an opportunity to make a representation. Here the Law
            Reports tell a story and teach a lesson. It is that the principal
            enemy of the detenu and his right to make a representation is
H           neither high-handedness nor mean-mindedness but the casual
 BANKA SNEHA SHEELA v. THE STATE OF TELANGANA &                                 995
              ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J]

      indifference, the mindless insensibility, the routine and the red tape    A
      of the bureaucratic machine.”
      Likewise, in Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar (1984) 3 SCC
14, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court (in which A.P. Sen,J. dissented),
Venkataramiah, J., speaking for the majority, reminds us:
      “32. …It is well settled that the law of preventive detention is a        B
      hard law and therefore it should be strictly construed. Care should
      be taken that the liberty of a person is not jeopardised unless his
      case falls squarely within the four corners of the relevant law.
      The law of preventive detention should not be used merely to clip
      the wings of an accused who is involved in a criminal prosecution.        C
      It is not intended for the purpose of keeping a man under detention
      when under ordinary criminal law it may not be possible to resist
      the issue of orders of bail, unless the material available is such as
      would satisfy the requirements of the legal provisions authorising
      such detention. When a person is enlarged on bail by a competent
      criminal court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinising         D
      the validity of an order of preventive detention which is based on
      the very same charge which is to be tried by the criminal court.”
                                                       [emphasis supplied]
       O. Chinappa Reddy, J., in a short concurring judgment also sets          E
out the constitutional fundamentals qua preventive detention as follows:
      “I entirely agree with my brother Venkataramiah, J. both on the
      question of interpretation of the provisions of the Bihar Control of
      Crimes Act, 1981 and on the question of the effect of the order of
      grant of bail in the criminal proceeding arising out of the incident      F
      constituting one of the grounds of detention. It is really unnecessary
      for me to add anything to what has been said by Venkataramiah,
      J., .but my brother Sen, J. has taken a different view and out of
      respect to him, I propose to add a few lines. I am unable to agree
      with my brother Sen, J. on several of the views expressed by him
      in his dissent. In particular, I do not agree with the view that “those   G
      who are responsible for the national security or for the maintenance
      of public order must be the sole judges of what the national security
      or public order requires” It is too perilous a proposition. Our
      Constitution does not give a carte blanche to any organ of the
      State to be the sole arbiter in such matters. Preventive detention
                                                                                H
996           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 8 S.C.R.


A          is considered so treacherous and such an anathema to civilised
           thought and democratic polity that safeguards against undue
           exercise of the power to detain without trial, have been built into
           the Constitution itself and incorporated as Fundamental Rights.
           There are two sentinels, one at either end. The Legislature is
           required to make the law circumscribing the limits within which
B
           persons may be preventively detained and providing for the
           safeguards prescribed by the Constitution and the courts are
           required to examine, when demanded, whether there has been
           any excessive detention, that is whether the limits set by the
           Constitution and the Legislature have been transgressed.
C          Preventive detention is not beyond judicial scrutiny. While adequacy
           or sufficiency may not be a ground of challenge, relevancy and
           proximity are certainly grounds of challenge. Nor is it for the court
           to put itself in the position of the detaining authority and to satisfy
           itself that the untested facts reveal a path of crime. I agree with
           my brother Sen,, J. when he says, “It has always been the view of
D
           this Court that the detention of individuals without trials for any
           length of time, however short, is wholly inconsistent with the basic
           ideas of our Government and the gravity of the evil to the
           community resulting from anti-social activities can never furnish
           an adequate reason for invading the personal liberty of the citizen
E          except in accordance with the procedure established by law.”
            19. In Union of India v. Yumnam Anand (2007) 10 SCC 190,
      this Court reiterated some of these principles as follows:
           “8. In case of preventive detention no offence is proved, nor any
           charge is formulated and the justification of such detention is
F          suspicion or reasonability and there is no criminal conviction which
           can only be warranted by legal evidence. Preventive justice requires
           an action to be taken to prevent apprehended objectionable
           activities. (See R. v. Halliday [1917 AC 260 : (1916-17) All ER
           Rep Ext 1284 : 86 LJ KB 116 : 116 LT 417 (HL)] and Kubic
G          Darusz v. Union of India [(1990) 1 SCC 568 : 1990 SCC (Cri)
           227 : AIR 1990 SC 605] .) But at the same time, a person’s greatest
           of human freedoms i.e. personal liberty is deprived, and, therefore,
           the laws of preventive detention are strictly construed, and a
           meticulous compliance with the procedural safeguard, however
           technical, is mandatory. The compulsions of the primordial need
H
 BANKA SNEHA SHEELA v. THE STATE OF TELANGANA &                                997
              ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J]

      to maintain order in society, without which enjoyment of all rights,     A
      including the right of personal liberty would lose all their meanings,
      are the true justifications for the laws of preventive detention.
      This jurisdiction has been described as a “jurisdiction of suspicion”,
      and the compulsions to preserve the values of freedom of a
      democratic society and social order sometimes merit the
                                                                               B
      curtailment of the individual liberty. (See Ayya v. State of
      U.P. [(1989) 1 SCC 374 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 153 : AIR 1989 SC
      364] ) To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to the written
      law, said Thomas Jefferson, would be to lose the law, absurdly
      sacrificing the end to the means. No law is an end itself and the
      curtailment of liberty for reasons of State’s security and national      C
      economic discipline as a necessary evil has to be administered
      under strict constitutional restrictions. No carte blanche is given
      to any organ of the State to be the sole arbiter in such matters.”
      20. In Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2011) 5 SCC 244,
a 3-Judge Bench of this Court spoke of the interplay between Articles          D
21 and 22 as follows:
      “13. In our opinion, Article 22(3)(b) of the Constitution of India
      which permits preventive detention is only an exception to Article
      21 of the Constitution. An exception is an exception, and cannot
      ordinarily nullify the full force of the main rule, which is the right   E
      to liberty in Article 21 of the Constitution. Fundamental rights are
      meant for protecting the civil liberties of the people, and not to put
      them in jail for a long period without recourse to a lawyer and
      without a trial. As observed in R. v. Secy. of State for the Home
      Deptt., ex p Stafford [(1998) 1 WLR 503 (CA)] : (WLR p. 518
      F-G)                                                                     F

         “ … The imposition of what is in effect a substantial term of
         imprisonment by the exercise of executive discretion, without
         trial, lies uneasily with ordinary concepts of the rule of law.”
      Article 22, hence, cannot be read in isolation but must be read as       G
      an exception to Article 21. An exception can apply only in rare
      and exceptional cases, and it cannot override the main rule.
      14. Article 21 is the most important of the fundamental rights
      guaranteed by the Constitution of India. Liberty of a citizen is a
      most important right won by our forefathers after long, historical
                                                                               H
998            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 8 S.C.R.


A           and arduous struggles. Our Founding Fathers realised its value
            because they had seen during the freedom struggle civil liberties
            of our countrymen being trampled upon by foreigners, and that is
            why they were determined that the right to individual liberty would
            be placed on the highest pedestal along with the right to life as the
            basic right of the people of India.
B
            xxx xxx xxx
            17. Article 22(1) of the Constitution makes it a fundamental right
            of a person detained to consult and be defended by a lawyer of
            his choice. But Article 22(3) specifically excludes the applicability
C           of clause (1) of Article 22 to cases of preventive detention.
            Therefore, we must confine the power of preventive detention to
            very narrow limits, otherwise the great right to liberty won by our
            Founding Fathers, who were also freedom fighters, after long,
            arduous and historical struggles, will become nugatory.”

D            This Court went on to discuss, in some detail, the conceptual nature
      of preventive detention law as follows:
            “29. Preventive detention is, by nature, repugnant to democratic
            ideas and an anathema to the rule of law. No such law exists in
            the USA and in England (except during war time). Since, however,
E           Article 22(3)(b) of the Constitution of India permits preventive
            detention, we cannot hold it illegal but we must confine the power
            of preventive detention within very narrow limits, otherwise we
            will be taking away the great right to liberty guaranteed by Article
            21 of the Constitution of India which was won after long, arduous
            and historic struggles. It follows, therefore, that if the ordinary
F           law of the land (the Penal Code and other penal statutes) can
            deal with a situation, recourse to a preventive detention law will
            be illegal.
            30. Whenever an order under a preventive detention law is
            challenged one of the questions the court must ask in deciding its
G           legality is: was the ordinary law of the land sufficient to deal with
            the situation? If the answer is in the affirmative, the detention
            order will be illegal. In the present case, the charge against the
            detenu was of selling expired drugs after changing their labels.
            Surely the relevant provisions in the Penal Code and the Drugs
            and Cosmetics Act were sufficient to deal with this situation.
H
 BANKA SNEHA SHEELA v. THE STATE OF TELANGANA &                                   999
              ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J]

      Hence, in our opinion, for this reason also the detention order in          A
      question was illegal.”                        [emphasis supplied]
      In an important passage, this Court then dealt with certain general
observations made by the Constitution Bench in Haradhan Saha v. The
State of West Bengal (1975) 3 SCC 198 as follows:
      “33. No doubt it has been held in the Constitution Bench decision           B
      in Haradhan Saha case [(1975) 3 SCC 198 : 1974 SCC (Cri)
      816] that even if a person is liable to be tried in a criminal court
      for commission of a criminal offence, or is actually being so tried,
      that does not debar the authorities from passing a detention order
      under a preventive detention law. This observation, to be understood        C
      correctly, must, however, be construed in the background of the
      constitutional scheme in Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution
      (which we have already explained). Article 22(3)(b) is only an
      exception to Article 21 and it is not itself a fundamental right.
      It is Article 21 which is central to the whole chapter on fundamental
      rights in our Constitution. The right to liberty means that before          D
      sending a person to prison a trial must ordinarily be held giving
      him an opportunity of placing his defence through his lawyer. It
      follows that if a person is liable to be tried, or is actually being
      tried, for a criminal offence, but the ordinary criminal law (the
      Penal Code or other penal statutes) will not be able to deal with           E
      the situation, then, and only then, can the preventive detention law
      be taken recourse to.
      34. Hence, the observation in SCC para 34 in Haradhan Saha
      case [(1975) 3 SCC 198 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 816] cannot be regarded
      as an unqualified statement that in every case where a person is            F
      liable to be tried, or is actually being tried, for a crime in a criminal
      court a detention order can also be passed under a preventive
      detention law.
      35. It must be remembered that in cases of preventive detention
      no offence is proved and the justification of such detention is             G
      suspicion or reasonable probability, and there is no conviction which
      can only be warranted by legal evidence. Preventive detention is
      often described as a “jurisdiction of suspicion” (vide State of
      Maharashtra v. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande [(2008) 3 SCC
      613 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 128], SCC para 63). The detaining
                                                                                  H
1000      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 8 S.C.R.


 A     authority passes the order of detention on subjective satisfaction.
       Since clause (3) of Article 22 specifically excludes the applicability
       of clauses (1) and (2), the detenu is not entitled to a lawyer or the
       right to be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours of arrest.
       To prevent misuse of this potentially dangerous power the law of
       preventive detention has to be strictly construed and meticulous
 B
       compliance with the procedural safeguards, however technical,
       is, in our opinion, mandatory and vital.
       36. It has been held that the history of liberty is the history of
       procedural safeguards. (See Kamleshkumar Ishwardas
       Patel v. Union of India [(1995) 4 SCC 51 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 643]
 C     vide para 49.) These procedural safeguards are required to be
       zealously watched and enforced by the court and their rigour
       cannot be allowed to be diluted on the basis of the nature of the
       alleged activities of the detenu. As observed in Rattan
       Singh v. State of Punjab [(1981) 4 SCC 481 : 1981 SCC (Cri)
 D     853] : (SCC p. 483, para 4)
               “4. … May be that the detenu is a smuggler whose tribe
       (and how their numbers increase!) deserves no sympathy since
       its activities have paralysed the Indian economy. But the laws of
       preventive detention afford only a modicum of safeguards to
 E     persons detained under them, and if freedom and liberty are to
       have any meaning in our democratic set up, it is essential that at
       least those safeguards are not denied to the detenus.”
       xxx xxx xxx
       39. Personal liberty protected under Article 21 is so sacrosanct
 F     and so high in the scale of constitutional values that it is the
       obligation of the detaining authority to show that the impugned
       detention meticulously accords with the procedure established by
       law. The stringency and concern of judicial vigilance that is needed
       was aptly described in the following words in Thomas Pelham
 G     Dale case [(1881) 6 QBD 376 (CA)] : (QBD p. 461)
       “Then comes the question upon the habeas corpus. It is a general
       rule, which has always been acted upon by the courts of England,
       that if any person procures the imprisonment of another he must
       take care to do so by steps, all of which are entirely regular, and
 H
 BANKA SNEHA SHEELA v. THE STATE OF TELANGANA &                                1001
              ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J]

      that if he fails to follow every step in the process with extreme        A
      regularity the court will not allow the imprisonment to continue.””
                                                      [emphasis supplied]
       21. Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf
of the State of Telangana relied strongly upon Subramanian v. State of
Tamil Nadu (2012) 4 SCC 699, and in particular upon paragraphs 14              B
and 15 which read as follows:
      “14. It is well settled that the court does not interfere with the
      subjective satisfaction reached by the detaining authority except
      in exceptional and extremely limited grounds. The court cannot
      substitute its own opinion for that of the detaining authority when      C
      the grounds of detention are precise, pertinent, proximate and
      relevant, that sufficiency of grounds is not for the court but for
      the detaining authority for the formation of subjective satisfaction
      that the detention of a person with a view to preventing him from
      acting in any manner prejudicial to public order is required and         D
      that such satisfaction is subjective and not objective. The object
      of the law of preventive detention is not punitive but only preventive
      and further that the action of the executive in detaining a person
      being only precautionary, normally, the matter has necessarily to
      be left to the discretion of the executive authority. It is not
      practicable to lay down objective rules of conduct in an exhaustive      E
      manner. The satisfaction of the detaining authority, therefore, is
      considered to be of primary importance with certain latitude in
      the exercise of its discretion.
      15. The next contention on behalf of the detenu, assailing the
      detention order on the plea that there is a difference between           F
      “law and order” and “public order” cannot also be sustained since
      this Court in a series of decisions recognised that public order is
      the even tempo of life of the community taking the country as a
      whole or even a specified locality. [Vide Pushpadevi M.
      Jatia v. M.L. Wadhawan [(1987) 3 SCC 367 : 1987 SCC (Cri)                G
      526], SCC paras 11 & 14; Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of
      Bihar [AIR 1966 SC 740 : 1966 Cri LJ 608 : (1966) 1 SCR 709]
      ; Union of India v. Arvind Shergill [(2000) 7 SCC 601 : 2000
      SCC (Cri) 1422], SCC paras 4 & 6; Sunil Fulchand
      Shah v. Union of India [(2000) 3 SCC 409 : 2000 SCC (Cri)
                                                                               H
1002            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 8 S.C.R.


 A           659] , SCC para 28 (Constitution Bench); Commr. of Police v. C.
             Anita [(2004) 7 SCC 467 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1944] , SCC paras 5,
             7 & 13.]”
              The statement made by this Court in paragraphs 14 and 15 were
       on facts which were completely different from the facts of the present
 B     case as reflected in paragraphs 16 and 17 thereof which read as follows:
             “16. We have already extracted the discussion, analysis and the
             ultimate decision of the detaining authority with reference to the
             ground case dated 18-7-2011. It is clear that the detenu, armed
             with “aruval”, along with his associates, armed with “katta” came
 C           to the place of the complainant. The detenu abused the complainant
             in filthy language and threatened to murder him. His associates
             also threatened him. The detenu not only threatened the
             complainant with weapon like “aruval” but also damaged the
             properties available in the shop. When the complainant questioned
             the detenu and his associates, the detenu slapped him on his face.
 D           When the complainant raised an alarm for rescue, on the arrival
             of general public in and around, they were also threatened by the
             detenu and his associates that they will kill them.
             17. It is also seen from the grounds of detention that because of
             the threat by the detenu and his associates by showing weapons,
 E           the nearby shopkeepers closed their shops out of fear and auto
             drivers took their autos from their stand and left the place.
             According to the detaining authority, the above scene created a
             panic among the public. In such circumstances, the scene created
             by the detenu and his associates cannot be termed as only law
 F           and order problem but it is public order as assessed by the detaining
             authority who is supposed to safeguard and protect the interest of
             public. Accordingly, we reject the contention raised by the learned
             Senior Counsel for the appellant.”
              This was obviously a case in which ‘public order’ was directly
 G     affected and not a case in which ‘law and order’ alone was affected
       and is thus distinguishable, on facts, from the present case.
             22. In Yumman Ongbi Lembi Leima v. State of Manipur (2012)
       2 SCC 176, this Court specifically adverted to when a preventive detention
       order would be bad, as recourse to the ordinary law would be sufficient
 H
 BANKA SNEHA SHEELA v. THE STATE OF TELANGANA &                                 1003
              ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J]

in the facts of a given case, with particular regard being had to bail          A
having been granted. This Court held:
      “23. Having carefully considered the submissions made on behalf
      of the respective parties, we are inclined to hold that the
      (sic exercise of) extraordinary powers of detaining an individual
      in contravention of the provisions of Article 22(2) of the Constitution   B
      was not warranted in the instant case, where the grounds of
      detention do not disclose any material which was before the
      detaining authority, other than the fact that there was every
      likelihood of Yumman Somendro being released on bail in
      connection with the cases in respect of which he had been arrested,
      to support the order of detention.                                        C

      24. Article 21 of the Constitution enjoins that:
             “21. Protection of life and personal liberty.—No person
      shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to
      procedure established by law.”                                            D
      In the instant case, although the power is vested with the authorities
      concerned, unless the same are invoked and implemented in a
      justifiable manner, such action of the detaining authority cannot
      be sustained, inasmuch as, such a detention order is an exception
      to the provisions of Articles 21 and 22(2) of the Constitution.           E
      25. When the courts thought it fit to release the appellant’s husband
      on bail in connection with the cases in respect of which he had
      been arrested, the mere apprehension that he was likely to be
      released on bail as a ground of his detention, is not justified.
      xxx xxx xxx                                                               F
      27. As has been observed in various cases of similar nature by
      this Court, the personal liberty of an individual is the most precious
      and prized right guaranteed under the Constitution in Part III
      thereof. The State has been granted the power to curb such rights
      under criminal laws as also under the laws of preventive detention,       G
      which, therefore, are required to be exercised with due caution as
      well as upon a proper appreciation of the facts as to whether
      such acts are in any way prejudicial to the interest and the security
      of the State and its citizens, or seek to disturb public law and
      order, warranting the issuance of such an order. An individual
                                                                                H
1004           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 8 S.C.R.


 A          incident of an offence under the Penal Code, however heinous, is
            insufficient to make out a case for issuance of an order of
            preventive detention.”
             This judgment was followed in Mungala Yadamma v. State of
       A.P. (2012) 2 SCC 386, as follows:
 B          “7. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of the
            respective parties, we are unable to accept the submissions made
            on behalf of the State in view of the fact that the decision in Rekha
            case [(2011) 5 SCC 244 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 596] , in our view,
            clearly covers the facts of this case as well. The offences
 C          complained of against the appellant are of a nature which can be
            dealt with under the ordinary law of the land. Taking recourse to
            the provisions of preventive detention is contrary to the
            constitutional guarantees enshrined in Articles 19 and 21 of the
            Constitution and sufficient grounds have to be made out by the
            detaining authorities to invoke such provisions.
 D
            8. In fact, recently, in Yumman Ongbi Lembi Leima v. State of
            Manipur [(2012) 2 SCC 176] we had occasion to consider the
            same issue and the three-Judge Bench had held that the personal
            liberty of an individual is the most precious and prized right
            guaranteed under the Constitution in Part III thereof. The State
 E          has been granted the power to curb such rights under criminal
            laws, as also under the laws of preventive detention, which,
            therefore, are required to be exercised with due caution as well
            as upon a proper appreciation of the facts as to whether such
            acts are in any way prejudicial to the interest and the security of
 F          the State and its citizens, or seek to disturb public law and order,
            warranting the issuance of such an order.
            9. No doubt, the offences alleged to have been committed by the
            appellant are such as to attract punishment under the Andhra
            Pradesh Prohibition Act, but that in our view has to be done under
 G          the said laws and taking recourse to preventive detention laws
            would not be warranted. Preventive detention involves detaining
            of a person without trial in order to prevent him/her from committing
            certain types of offences. But such detention cannot be made a
            substitute for the ordinary law and absolve the investigating
            authorities of their normal functions of investigating crimes which
 H
  BANKA SNEHA SHEELA v. THE STATE OF TELANGANA &                               1005
               ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J]

        the detenu may have committed. After all, preventive detention in      A
        most cases is for a year only and cannot be used as an instrument
        to keep a person in perpetual custody without trial. Accordingly,
        while following the three-Judge Bench decision in Rekha
        case [(2011) 5 SCC 244 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 596] we allow the
        appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court dated
                                                                               B
        20-7-2011 [ The High Court dismissed the same vide Munagala
        Yadamma v. State of A.P., WP (Cri) No. 13313 of 2011, order
        dated 20-7-2011 (AP)] and also quash the detention order dated
        15-2-2011, issued by the Collector and District Magistrate, Ranga
        Reddy District, Andhra Pradesh.”
       23. Shri Gaurav Agrawal and Shri Ranjit Kumar also cited the            C
judgments of this Court in Sama Aruna v. State of Telangana (2018)
12 SCC 150 and Collector & District Magistrate v. Sangala
Kondamma (2005) 3 SCC 666 respectively. Since we are not going
into other grounds raised by the Petitioner, it is unnecessary to discuss
the law laid down in these judgments.                                          D
        24. On the facts of this case, as has been pointed out by us, it is
clear that at the highest, a possible apprehension of breach of law and
order can be said to be made out if it is apprehended that the Detenu, if
set free, will continue to cheat gullible persons. This may be a good
ground to appeal against the bail orders granted and/or to cancel bail but     E
certainly cannot provide the springboard to move under a preventive
detention statute. We, therefore, quash the detention order on this ground.
Consequently, it is unnecessary to go into any of the other grounds argued
by the learned counsel on behalf of the Petitioner. The impugned judgment
is set aside and the Detenu is ordered to be freed forthwith. Accordingly,
the appeal is allowed.                                                         F


Nidhi Jain                                                   Appeal allowed.


                                                                               G




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