Holding

Section 4(e) of the Agriculturists Relief Act excludes the Bank of India’s debt because the Banking Companies Act is a "special Indian law", so the Act’s scaling‑down provisions do not apply.

Summary

The Bank of India sued Vijay Transport and its partners to recover a cash‑credit loan of Rs.18,14,817.91, claiming mortgages over several properties. The Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938 provides that debts of agriculturists may be "scaled down" under section 13, but section 4(e) excludes debts owed to any corporation formed under a "special Indian law". The High Court allowed the suit but ordered the debt to be scaled down, prompting the Bank to appeal. The Supreme Court examined whether the Banking Companies Act, under which the Bank was nationalised, qualifies as a "special Indian law" and whether the exclusion in s.4(e) therefore applies. Relying on the definition of "Indian law" in the General Clauses Act, the Court held that the Banking Companies Act is indeed a special Indian law, so the exclusion in s.4(e) applies and the Agriculturists Relief Act does not govern the Bank’s claim. Consequently, the debt need not be scaled down and the Bank may recover the full amount. The appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

The meaning of "special Indian law" in section 4(e) of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938
Whether the Banking Companies Act, 1970 qualifies as a "special Indian law"
Whether the exclusion in s.4(e) bars the application of the Act’s scaling‑down provisions to the Bank of India’s debt
The relevance of the distinction between a corporation formed "in pursuance of" versus "by or under" a law

Legislation cited

Subjects

debt recoveryscaling downAgriculturists Relief Actspecial Indian lawstatutory interpretationBanking Companies Actnationalisationequitable mortgagecorporate definition

Judgment

BANK OF INDIA
A
v.
VIJAY TRANSPORT AND OTHERS

NOVEMBER 11, 1987

[MURARI MOHON DUTT AND M.H. KANIA, JJ.] B

Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938:
Sec. 4(e)-'Debt'-Due to Bank-Scaling down of debt-Whether
permissible.

st Banking Companies Act: Validity of-Act whether a special C
Indian law.

Statutory Interpretation: Duty of court-To look at the setting in
which words are used and circumstances in which the law came to be
passed.
D
The appellant-Bank filed a suit against respondents including res-
pondent firm and its partners, who were agriculturists, for recovery of
a sum of Rs.18,14,817.91 being balance of three principal amounts
severally advanced by the Bank to the firm under cash-credit account
on three different dates. The last loan was advanced by the Bank after
its nationalisation on July 7, 1969. The Bank alleged that, to secure E
. repayment of the aforesaid amount of loan, in addition to bypothecation
made in its favour of the properties in 'A' and 'B' Schedules of the
plaint, equitable mortgage of properties in Schedule 'C', 'D' and 'E'
was also created in its favour by respondent No. 2, respondent No. 3
and bis deceased father. The appellant-Bank prayed for the sale of the
said properties for the recovery of the amounts claimed_by it. F

The respondents, including the firm, and Respondents No. 4 to
12, who were alienees, denied creation of any equitable mortgage in
favour of the appellant-Bank. The respondent firm and its partners,
namely, third respondent'~ deceased father and the second respondent
also filed counter claim against the appellant-Bank. G

DiSmissing the suit against respondent Nos. 4· 12, the Subordinate
Judge held that no equitable mortgage was created in favour of the
appellant-Bank and that the clailll of the appellant-Bank, except to the
extent of Rs.1,00,418.55, was barred by limitation. The counter claim
against the Bank was decreed. · H
961
962 SliPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] I S.C.R.
A Setting aside the Judgment and decrees of the Subordinate Judge,
the High Court, in appeal, decreed the suit instituted by the appellant,
but held that the Bank was entitled to recover the amount claimed by it,
only after scaling down the debt in accordance with the provisions of the
Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Agriculturists Relief Act IV of 1938.
B
In the appeal by special leave, it was submitted on behalf of the
appellant-Bank that in view ofs. 4(e) of the Act, the provisions of the Act
were not 11pplicable to the appellant-Bank and as such, it was entitled to
recover the entire amount without the same being scaled down as pro-
vided in s. 13 of the Act, and that the words "special Indian Law" in
s. 4{e) referred to and related to law made by an Indian Legislature.
c
On behalf of the respondents, it was contended that the words
"special Indian law" meant a special Indian Law enacted by the Parlia-
ment of the United Kingdom, that even assuming that the expression
"special Indian law" meant a law enacted by the Indian Legislature
0 and that the Banking Act was such a law, still the provision of s. 4{e) of
the Act did not apply inasmuch as the appellant-Bank was not formed in
pursuance· of "special Indian law", but by or under "special Indian
law", that is, the Banking Companies Act, and as such, it was not a
Corporation within the meaning of s. 4(e) of the Act, that as the
appellant-Bank was nationalised and/or created under Ordinance VUI
IE of 1969 promulgated on July 19, 1969 and the Banking Companies Act
only ratified the already created bank under the said Ordinance, it was
not formed or created under any 'special Indian Law' and that since a ·
major part of the loan was contracted before the nationalisation of the
appellant Bank, the provision of s. 4(e) was not applicable,

F Allowing the appeal,

HELD: 1. The provisions of the Act are not applicable, to the
appellant Bank, and there is no question of scaling down the debt due to
the Bank by the respondents. [972E]

G In the instant case, the amounts of loan were advanced by the
Bank to the firm under the cash-credit account opened in favour of the
firm. Normally, the advances that are made from the cash-credit
account are repaid and thereafter fresh advances are made. It is not
known what was the actual balance on the date the Bank was nationali-
sed, and whether the first two amounts were repaid by the firm and,
H thereafter fresh advances were taken on the cash credit account. 1971B·Dl
BANK OF INDIA v. VUAY TRANSPORT 963

2.1 The Banking Companies Act is a special Indian law and the A
provision of s. 4(e) Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Act IV of 1938 is
applicable to the appellant Bank. [969G I

2.2 In interpreting the words of the provision of a statute, while it
may sometimes be necessary to take Into consideration the setting in
which such words are placed, that is not the only and the surest method B
of interpretation, and when such words convey a clear meaning, a
different interpretation or meaning need not be given to them because
of the setting. [9680]

R.L. Arora v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1964] 6 SCR 784, referred
to.
c
In the instant case the expression 'special Indian law' has a clear
and unambiguous meaning. There is no reasonable justification to think
that the expression must be an enactment of the. British Parliament
since there were in existence Indian Legislatures, including a Legisla-
ture at the Centre. [968E] D

Section 3(27)(a) of the General Clauses Act, as it stood on the day
the Act was passed, defines 'Indian Law' as meaning any Indian law
enacted by the Indian Legislature. The expression 'special Indian law'
therefore, means a special Indian law enacted by the Indian Legis-
lature. [968F-G] E

Indian Bank, Alamuru v. Krishna Murthy, AIR 1983 Andhra
Pradesh 347, over-ruled.

2.3 Inasmuch as the words 'any special Indian law' in s. 4(e) of
the Act refer and relate to a law made by the Indian Legislature and not F
by the British Parliament, the Banking Companies Act is quite legal
and valid. [972C-D]

2.4 Theoretically, there may be a distinction between the words
'in pursuance of' and the words 'by or under' but by using the expres-
sion 'in pursuance of' iu s. 4(e), the Legislature has not meant that the G
corporation, in question, should be formed by a third party in pur-
suance of the law and not by the law itself in order to come within the
purview of s. 4(e) of the Act. The intention of the Legislature is very
clear in that the provision of s. 4(e) would apply to a corporation which
is the creature of a special Indian law, whether it is created in pur-
suance of or by or under the special Indian law. There is no difference H
964 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1988) 1 S.C.R.

A or distinction whatsoever between the corporation formed in pursuance
of, and a corporation by or under a special Indian law. [969E·FI

2.5 An Ordinance is as much a law as an enactment of Parliament
or Legislature. Therefore, it must be held that the bank was created
under a special Indian law even assuming that the bank was created
B under the Ordinance VIII of 1969 and not under the Banking Companies
Act. It is also manifestly clear from sub-section (1) of section 3 of the
Banking Companies Act which provides that on the commencement of
the Banking Companies Act there shall be constituted such correspond·
ing new Banks as are specified in the first Schedule, that the appellant·
Bank, which is mentioned in the first Schedule, has been created under
C the provisions of the Banking Companies Act with effect from July 19,
1969. [970C, E-F]

R. C. Cooper v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 564 and Life Insu·
ranee Corporation of India v. Kata Ramabrahmam, AIR 1977 SC
1704, referred to.
D
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 465
of 1985.

From the Judgment and Order dated 20.9.1983 of the Andhra y-.
Pradesh High Court in Appeal No. 858 of 1976.
E
G. Ramaswamy, Additional Solicitor-General and P.H. Parekh
for the Appellant. ._

T.V.S.N. Chari, Ms. Vrinda Grover, Charanjeet, V.D. Miracee
and B.P. Maheshwari for the Respondents.
F
The Judgment of the· Court was delivered by

DUTT, J. This appeal by special leave is at the instance of the
appellant, the Bank of India, a nationalised Bank, and is directed
against the judgment and decree of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in
G so far as they direct that the appellant is entitled to recover the
amounts claimed by it against the respondent firm only after the scal-
ing down of the debt in accordance with the provisions of the Madras r
Agriculturists Relief Act IV of 1938 which, after the creation of the
State of Andhra Pradesh, was made applicable to that State as the
Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Agriculturists Relief Act IV of 1938,
H hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'.
~
I
BANK OF INDIA v. VUAY TRANSPORT [DUTT, J.] 965

The appellant Bank filed a suit being O.S. No. 12 of 1979 in the A
Sub-Court, Eluru, on February 10, 1975 against the respondents
including the respondent firm and its partners to recover a sum of
Rs.18, 14,817.91 being the balance (inclusive of interest) of three
principal amounts of Rs.3,00,000, Rs.7,00,000 and Rs.80,000 severally
advanced by the Bank to the firm under cash credit account on 28-11-1967,
3-4-1968 and 17-2-1972 respectively. It may be noticed here that B
the Bank was nationalised on July 7, 1969 under the Banking Com-
panies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act V of 1970,
c hereinafter referred to as 'the Banking Companies Act'. The sum of
Rs.80,000 was admittedly advanced by way of loan by the Bank after
its nationalisation.

The respondent firm owns certain motor vehicles which are
c
mentioned in A and B Schedules to the plaint of the said suit. The firm
was carrying on its business at Madras as fleet owners and gasolene
carriers. It had two partners, namely, one S. Doranna Choudhury,
since deceased, the father of the respondent No. 3 and the respondent
No. 2, Sunkavali Rajlaxmi. The case of the Bank was that in addition D
to the hypothecation of the A and B Schedule properties made in its
favour to secure the repayment of the aforesaid amounts of loan, the
other partner, the respondent No. 2, created an equitable mortgage in
favour of the Bank on December 22, 1969 in respect of C-Schedule
properties of the plaint. S. Doranna Choudhury, since deceased, also
created an equitable mortgage in favour of the Bank on February 28, E
1970 in respect of D-Schedule properties of the plaint. The respondent
No. 3 also created another equitable mortgage on September 6, 1974
in respect of E-Schedule properties of the plaint. The respondents
Nos. 4 to 12 are alienees of the mortgaged properties. In the suit the
Bank prayed for the sale of the said properties for the recovery of the
amounts claimed by it on account of the loan together with interest due F
thereon.

The respondents including the firm contested the suit by filing
written statements, inter alia, denying the creation of any equitable
mortgage by the deceased partner and the respondents Nos. 2 & 3 in
favour of the Bank. The respondents Nos. 4 to 12, the alienees, while G
denying the creation of the mortgages contended that they were bona
fide purchasers for valuable consideration and the Bank was bound by
the alienations and transfers made in their favour of the properties
alleged to be under mortgage. The firm and its partners, namely, the
said S. Doranna and the respondent No. 2 also filed a counter-claim
against the Bank for a sum of Rs.34,48, 799. It is not necessary for us to H
966 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] I S.C.R.

state in details the respective cases of the parties including the case of
A the firm and its partners in making the counter claim against the Bank,
inasmuch as the scope of this appeal is limited to the consideration of
the question as to whether the High Court was justified in decreeing
the Bank's claim only after the scaling down of the debt in accordance
with the provisions of the Act.

Be that as it may, the learned Subordinate Judge held that no
equitable mortgage was created in favour of the Bank and, accord-
ingly, dismissed the suit against the respondents Nos. 4 to 12 and
refused to direct sale of the properties alleged to have been mortgaged
to .the Bank. The learned Subordinate Judge also found that the claim
of the Bank, except to the extent of Rs.1,00,418.55, was barred by
C limitation. The counter-claim of the firm and its partners for the sum
of Rs.34,48, 799 was decreed and the Bank was directed to pay the
same to the firm and its partners.

Being dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the learned
o Subordinate Judge, the Bank preferred an appeal to the High Court.
The High Court, after elaborately considering the facts and circums-
tances of the case and the evidence adduced by the parties, set aside
the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge including
the decree allowing the counter-claim of the firm and its partners and
decreed the suit instituted by the Bank. In decreeing the suit, the High
E Court held that the Bank was entitled to recover the amount claimed
by it only after the scaling down of the debt in accordance with the
provisions of the Act. Hence this appeal. ....
The Act contains provisions granting reliefs to indebted agri-
culturists. One of such reliefs is that as contained in section 13 of the
p Act providing for the scaling down of the debt of an agriculturist. It is
not disputed that the partners of the respondent firm are agriculturists.

Mr. G. Ramaswamy, learned Additional Solicitor General
appearing on behalf of the appellant Bank, submits that in view of
section 4(e) of the Act, the provisions of the Act were not applicable
G to the Bank and, as such, the Bank was entitled to recover the entire
amount without the same being scaled down as provided in section 13
of the Act. Before the High Court also the Bank placed reliance on the
provision of section 4( e) of the Act, but the High Court negatived the
contention relying upon a Division Bench decision in Indian Bank,
Alamuru v. Krishna Murthy, AIR 1983 Andhra Pradesh 347. We shall
H presently refer to that decision, but before we do that it is necessary to
BANK OF INDIA v. VUAY TRANSPORT (DUTT. !.I 967

•--{ refer to the provision of section 4(e) of the Act, which is extracted A
below:-

"S. 4. Nothing in this Act shall affect debts and liabilities
of an agriculturist falling under the fo([owing heads:-

B

(e) any liability in respect of any sum due to any co-
operative society, including a land mortgage bank,
registered or deemed to be registered under the
Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Co-operative
Societies Act, 1932, or any debt due to any corpora- c
tion formed in pursuance of an Act of Parliament of
the Unit~d Kingdom or of any special Indian law or
Royal Charter-or Letters Patent."

In view of section 4(e), the provisions of the Act will be inappli- D
cable to any debt due to any corporation formed in pursuance of an
Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom or any special Indian law or
Royal Charter or Letters Patent. The question is whether the Banking
Companies Act by or under which the appeHant Bank was constituted,
is a 'special Indian law' or not. It is submitted on behalf of the Bank
that the words 'special Indian law' in section 4( e) of the Act refers and E
relates to law made by an Indian Legislature. It is not disputed that the
Banking Companies Act is a special law enacted by the Indian
Parliament.

It has, however, been urged by Mr. Mirasee, learned Counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondents, that the said words mean a F
special Indian law enacted by the Parliament of the United Kingdom.
Indeed, in Krishna Murthy's case (supra), it has been held by the
Andhra Pradesh High Court that section 4( e) while speaking of any
special Indian law, is only speaking of special Indian law made by the
British Parliament as different from any Act enacted by the British
Parliament that might have application to India also in common with G
the rest of the British colonies. The learned Counsel, while placing
strong reliance upon the said interpretation of the words 'special
Indian law' as made in Krishna Murthy's case (supra), also submits
that the expression should be interpreted in the light of the setting of
the same in the words of the provision of section 4( e). In support of the
contention, the learned Counsel has drawn our attention to an obser- H
968 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988) 1 S.C.R.

A vation made by this Court in R.L. Arora v. State of Uttar Pradesh,
[1964) 6 SCR 784 that a literal interpretation is not always the only
interpretation of a provision in a statute and the court has to look at
the setting in which the words are used and the circumstances in which
the law came to be passed to decide whether there is something imp-
licit behind the words actually used which would control the literal
B meaning of the words used. Accordingly, it is submitted by the learned
Counsel that as the words 'special Indian law' are placed after the
words 'an Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom' and before the
words 'Royal Charter or Letters Patent', it must be held in view of the )
setting that the expression 'special Indian law' refers or relates to a
special law enacted by an Act of British Parliament for India.
c
We are unable to accept the contention. It may be that in in-
terpreting the words of the provision of a statute, the setting in which
such words are placed may be taken into consideration, but that does
not mean that even though the words which are to be interpreted
D convey a clear meaning, still a different interpretation or meaning
should be given to them because of the setting. In other words, while
the setting of the words may sometimes be necessary for the interpre-
tation of the words of the statute, but that has not been ruled by this
Court to be the only and the surest method of interpretation. In the
instant case, the expression 'special Indian law' has a clear and unam-
E biguous meaning and there is no need for its interpretation. There is
no reasonable justification to think that the expression 'special Indian
law' must be an enactment of the British Parliament. If, on the date
the Act was passed, there was no Indian Legislature, such an interpre-
tation might be justified, but when there were existence of Indian
Legislatures including a Legislature at the Centre, it would be quite
F unreasonable to think that 'special Indian Law' must be a law enacted
by the British Parliament. In this connection, we may refer to section
3(27)(a) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which defined 'Indian law'
as meaning any Indian law enacted by the Indian Legislature. In view
of the said definition, the expression 'special Indian law' means a
special Indian law enacted by the Indian Legislature. In the face of the
G provision of section 3{27)(a) of the General Clauses Act, as it stood on
the day the Act was passed, we do not think that there is any justifica-
tion for laying down that the expression 'special Indian law' in section
4( e) of the Act means a law enacted by the British Parliament specially
for India. We are, therefore, unable to accept the view of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in Krishna Murthy's case (supra) and also the
H contention of the respondents made in that regard, which is rejected.
BANK OF INDIA v. VUAY TRANSPORT [DUTT, J.] 969

The next contention made on behalf of the respondents is that A
even assuming that the expression 'special Indian law' means a law
enacted by the Indian Legislature and that the Banking Companies
Act is such a law, still the provision of section 4( e) of the Act will not
applf inasmuch as the appellant Bank was not formed in pursuance of
any 'special Indian law', but by or under a 'special Indian law', that is,
the Banking Companies Act. It is submitted that there is a good deal of B
distinction between the formation of a corporation 'in pursuance of'
and 'by or under', a special Indian law. It is urged as the appellant
Bank has been formed by or under and not in pursuance of the Bank-
. ing companies Act, it is not a corporation within the meaning of sec-
\, tion 4(e) of the Act. In support of this contention, the respondents
,J\"" have placed reliance on Krishna Murthy's decision where it has been C
' observed that the words 'in pursuance of' refer to the action taken
under the law and not by the law itself, and that the phrase 'formed in
pursuance of' in section 4( e) signifies a process of formation of a
corporation under the law and not by the law itself. Further, it has
been observed that the words 'in pursuance of' can be said to have
been used appropriately by the Legislature only to signify the activity D
or formation of a corporation carried on by an intermediary third party
acting under a law as different from an activity of formation carried on
by that law itself. We are afraid, such a narrow and technical interpre-
-· ~ ta ti on of the words "in pursuance of' is contrary to the intention of the
Legislature. Although, theoretically, there may be a distinction bet-
ween the words 'in pursuance of' and the wo~'by or under', but by E
using the expression 'in pursuance of' in section 4(e) the Legislature,
in our opinion, has not meant that the corporation in question should
be formed by a third party in pursuance of the law and not by the law
itself in order to come within the purview of section 4(e) of the Act.
The intention of the Legislature is very clear in that the provision of
b..- section 4( e) would apply to a corporation wi)ich is the creature of a F
T special Indian law, whether it is created in pursuance of or by or under
the special Indian law. There is no difference or distinction whatsoever
• between the corporation formed in pursuance of a special Indian law
and a corporation formed by or under a special Indian Jaw. It will be
highly unreasonable and illogical to think that as a corporation has
been formed by or under a special Indian Jaw and not in pursuance of G
such a law, it will not come within the purview of section 4( e) of the
-( Act. Accordingly, we hold that the Banking Companies Act is a spe-
cial Indian law and the provision of section 4( e) is applicable to the
appellant Bank.

The learned Counsel for the respondents has drawn our atten- H
970 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1988] 1 S.C.R.
\...j
A lion to the fact that the Banking Companies Act was first formed or r-
created by the Ordinance VIII of 1969 promulgated on July 19, 1969.
The Ordinance was replaced by an Act of Parliament being Act XXII
of 1969 with certain modifications. This Court, however in R.C. ""'
Cooper v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 564 struck down the Act XXII
of 1969 as unconstitutional. Thereafter, a fresh Ordinance being Ordi-
B nance No. III of 1970 was promulgated on February 14, 1970 with
certain further modifications and, thereafter, replaced by the present i
Banking Companies Act. It is submitted that as the appellant Bank
was nationalised and 'or created under the Ordinance VIII of 1969 'Jlillll
promulgated on July 19, 1969 and the present Banking Companies Act
only ratifies the already created Bank under the said Ordinance, the j
appellant Bank was not, therefore, formed or created under any spe- rf\, •
C cial Indian law. This contention is devoid of any merit and fit to be ' ·
rejected on the face of it. Even assuming that the Bank was created
under the Ordinance VIII of 1969 and not under the Banking Com-
panies Act, still it must be held that it was created under a special
Indian law, for an ordinance is as much a law as an enactment of
o Parliament or Legislature. In this connection, it may also be pointed
out that under sub-section (2) of section 1 of the Banking Companies
Act, the provisions of the Banking Companies Act (except section 21
which shall come into fvrce on the appointed day) shall be deemed to
have come into force on July 19, 1969. Sub-section (1) of section 3 of ).r" ·
the Banking Companies Act provides that on the commencement of
~
E the Banking Companies Act, there shall be constituted such corres- ..,.
i.
J""'
ponding new Banks as are specifiea in the First Schedule. Therefore, it.
is manifestly clear that the appellant Bank, which is mentioned in the ....
First Schedule, has been created under the provisions of the Banking "!'
Companies Act with effect from July 19, 1969. The contention of the
respondents that the Bank has been nationalised or formed under the
F Ordinance VIII of 1969 is without any substance whatsoever and is ~
rejected.
4---
We may refer to a decision of this Court in Life Insurance Corpo-
ration of India v. Kota Ramabrahmam, AIR 1977 SC 1704 Gupta J.
while delivering the judgment of the Court, observes that there is no
G dispute that the corporation established under the Life Insurance
Corporation Act, 1956 is a corporation as contemplated by section
4( e) of the Act. This decision has been strongly relied upon by the r
respondents in. support of their contention that as the major part of the
loan, that is to say, a sum of Rs.10,00,000, was contracted before the
nationalisation of the appellant Bank, the provision of section 4(e) is
H not applicable. In Life Insurance Corporation's case the loans were
,__
BANK OF INDIA v. VIJAY TRANSPORT (DUTT, J.I 971

advanced by the Andhra Insurance Company of Masulipatanam and
A
by Nagpur Pioneer Insurance Company Limited, Bombay, admittedly,
before the creation of the Corporation under the Life Insurance Cor-
poration Act, 1956 and it was held by this Court that the debts due to
the insurers in these two cases were liable to be scaled down in accor-
dance with the provisions of the Act.
B
In the instant case, the amounts of loan were advanced by the
Bank to the firm under the cash credit account opened in favour of the
firm. Normally, the advances that are made from the cash credit
account are repaid and, thereafter, fresh advances are made. It is not
.\. _ known what was the actual balance on the date the Bank was nationali-
,J ~ sed. It is true that in the judgment of the High Court it has been stated
that the principal amounts of Rs.3,00,000, Rs.7,00,000 and Rs.80,000
c
were severally advanced by the Bank to the firm under the cash credit
account on 28-11-1967, 3-4-1968 and 17-2-1972 respectively. But, there
is no further statement whether the first two amounts were repaid by
the firm and, thereafter, fresh advances were taken out of the cash
credit account. The respondents did not advance any such contention D
either in their written statements or in the arguments before the Trial
Court and the High Court. It is for the first time before this Court that
such a plea is raised in the argument of the learned Counsel for the
- '-{ respondents. The contention involves a question of fact which has to
be pleaded and proved. In the absence of any such pleading, we are
unable to allow the respondents to raise such a contention for the first E

-- time in argument before this Court.

At this s\age, it may be stated that in Krishna Murthy's case
(supra) it has been held by the Division Bench that the latter part of
section 4( e) of the Act containing the words 'any debt due to any
·'(- Corporation formed in pursuance of an Act of Parliament of the F
United Kingdom or any special Indian law or Royal Charter or Letters
Patent' is offensive to Article 14 of the Constitution and, accordingly,
void. The learned Counsel for the respondents submits that in view of
the decision in Krishna Murthy's case, this Court should declare the
latter part of section 4( e) of the Act to be void as offending Article 14
of the Constitution, although no such point has ever been taken by the G
respondents up to this Court. On the other hand, it is submitted by the
__, learned Additional Solicitor General that the said finding of the Divi-
sion_ Bench in Krishna Murthy's case to the effect that the latter part of
secl!on 4( e) of the Act is void, is erroneous.

The reasons given by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh H
972 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] I S.C.R.

A High Court in Krishna Murthy 's case for holding the latter part of
section 4( e) of the Act as void, are that section 4( e) of the Act was
enacted to protect the British economic interests and although such a
law could permissibly be enacted under the Constitutional Scheme of
the 1953 Government of India Act, that law after the inauguration of
B our Sovereign Democratic Republic cannot but be held to have be-
come void as making invidious discrimination in favour of the British
Corporation offending against the equality clause under Article 14 of
the Constitution. Before declaring the same as void, the Division
Bench took the view that the words 'any special Indian law' could not
have been intended to refer to any law made by any Legislature of our
country, but to a law made by the British Imperial Parliament as a
C piece of special legislation applicable to India. It has already been
discussed by us that the words 'any special Indian law' refers and
relates to a law made by the Indian Legislature and not by the British
Parliament. In that view of the matter, the reasons given by the Divi-
sion Bench for holding the latter part of section 4( e) to be void as
D making a discrimination in favour of corporations created by British
Parliament, will not apply to corporations formed or created by any
special Indian law which, in the instant case, is the Banking Com-
panies Act. In our opinion, therefore, the Banking Companies Act is
quite legal and valid. No other point has been urged by either party in
this appeal.
E
In view of the discussion made above, we hold that the provi-
sions of the Act are not applicable to the appellant Bank and, there-
fore, there is no question of scaling down the debt due to the Bank by
the respondents.

For the reasons aforesaid, the judgment and decree of the High
F Court in so far· as the same direct the scaling down of the debts due to ~
the Bank by the respondents, are set aside. The Bank will be entitled '
to realise the amount decreed in its favour by the High Court without
any scaling down of the same under the provisions of the Act.

The appeal is allowed. There will, however, be no order as to
G costs in this Court.

N.P.V. Appeal allowed. 'r-