BALWANT SINGH (DEAD)versusJAGDISH SINGH & ORS.

                     [2010] 8 S.C.R. 597


                  BALWANT SINGH (DEAD)                               A
                                v.
                  JAGDISH SINGH & ORS.
               (Civil Appeal No. 1166 of 2006)

                        JULY 08, 2010
                                                                     B
  [DR. B. S. CHAUHAN AND SWATANTER KUMAR, JJ.]

       Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order 22, rules 3 and
9; s. 151 read with s.5 of Limitation Act, 1963 - Death of
 appellant during pendency of appeal before Supreme Court            C
- Application filed after long delay of 778 days for bringing
the legal representatives of deceased appellant on record
 accompanied by application for condonation of delay - Held:
 Such applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and
even in a routine manner - They should be rejected unless            D
 sufficient cause is shown for condonation of delay- On facts,
except for a vague averment that the legal representatives
 were not aware of the pendency of the appeal, no other
fu.stifiable rf)ason was stated by the applicants - The
 ~pplication's also a~d not contain correct and true facts, thus,    E
 want of,15ona fides is imputable to the applicants - No reason
nor suffiCient cause was shown as to why immediate steps
were not taken.., by. the applicants, even after they admittedly
came to know ·af the pendency of the appeal - The conduct
of the applicants was abnormal - They acted irresponsibly
                                                                     F
and even with negligence, and miserably failed in ~hawing any
 'sufficient cause' for condonation of the long delay of 778 days
- Applications accordingly dismissed - Resultantly, the
 appeal, having already abated, also dismissed.

     Limitation - The law of limitation is a substantive law and     G
has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a
party-: Once a valuable right is accrued in favour of one party
as a result
)..    . -
            of
             ,
               the failure of the other party to explain the delay
by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be
                 .              597                                  H
    598       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 8 S.C.R.


A un<easonable to take away that right on the mere asking of
    the applicant, particularly, when the delay is directly a result
    of negligence, default or inaction of that party.

          Interpretation of Statutes:

B         Liberal construction - Purpose of - Held: The purpose
    of liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of
    'reasonableness' as it is understood in its general connotation
    - However, liberal construction -:;annot be equated with doing
    injustice to the other party.
c
         Purposive construction - Held: No provision can be
    treated to have been enacted purposelessly - The Court
    should not give such an interpretation to a provision which
    would render it ineffective or otiose.
D       Words and Phrases - "Sufficient cause" (for not filing an
    application within the prescribed period of limitation) -
    Meaning of - Discussed.

     · The landlord-appellant filed a petition for ejectment
E of the tenant-respondent on the ground of non-payment
  of rent. The petition was allowed by the Rent controller
  under Section 15 of the Haryana Urban Rent (Control of
  Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973. The order was affirmed by
  the Appellate Authority. The High Court, however, set
F aside the concurrent judgments of the Appellate
  Authority and the Rent Controller.

       During the pendency of the appeal before the
  Supreme Court, the landlord-appellant died on 28th
  November, 2007. On 15th April, 2010, the legal
G representatives of the deceased landlord filed an
  application for bringing them on record (I.A. No. 1 of 2010)
  alongwith an application for condonation of the long
  delay in filing such application (I.A. No. 2 of 2010) pleading
  that I. A. No. 1 of 2010 be treated as an application under
H
  BALWANT SINGH (DEAD) v. JAGDISH SINGH &               599
                   ORS.
Order 22 Rule 3 read with Section 151, of CPC while I. A.      A
No. 2 of 2010 be treated as an application under Order
22 Rule 9 CPC read with Sectio.n 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963. It was submitted by the applicants that they were
not aware of the pendency of the appeal before the Court
and came to know of the same only in March, 2010 from          B
their counsel.

    Dismissing the applications and, consequently, the
appeal, the Court

     HELD: 1.1. The delay in filing the application I.A. No.   C
1 of 2010 is considerable and it cannot be disputed that
the onus to show that sufficient cause exists for
condonation of delay lies upon the applic·ant. It is
obligatory upon the applicant to show sufficient cause
due to which he was prevented from continuing to               D
prosecute the proceedings in the suit or before the
higher Court. From a bare reading of the application for
condonation of delay, it is clear that the applicants were
totally callous about pursuing their appeal. They have
acted irrespbnsibly and even with negligence. Besides          E
this, they have not approached the Court with clean
hands. The applicant, who seeks aid of the Court for
exercising its discretionary_ power for condoning the
delay, is expected to state correct facts and not state lies
before the Court. Approaching the Court with unclean
                                                               F
hands itself, is a ground for rejection of such application.
[Paras 4, 5 and 6] [608-E-H; 609-E-F]

      1.2. In para 2 of the I.A. No. 1 of 2010, it has been
shown that all the legal representatives of the deceased
are residents of Ambala City, (Haryana) and that there are     G
no other legal heirs of the deceased. However, in para 4
of the I.A. No. 2 of 2010, it has been stated that the LRs
'of the deceased were in service and were not aware of
the pendency of the appeal, implying that they were living
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    600    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2010] 8 S.C.R.


A at different places and the letter of the lawyer was
  received at their residential address of Ambala. The stand
  taken in one application contradicts the stand taken in the
  other application. [Para 6] [609-G-H; 610-A]
                                                       11
       1.3. Furthermore, it is stated that the applicants were
8
  not aware of the pendency of the appeal. This, again
  does not appear to be correct inasmuch as one of the
  legal representatives of the deceased, was examined in
  the trial court as AW4, who is the son of the deceased. It
  is difficult for the court to believe that the person who has
C been examined as a witness did not even take steps to
  find out the proceedings pending before the highest
  Court of the land. [Para 6] [610-B-C]

       1.4. Even the letter, alleged to have been written by
D the counsel, has not been placed on record and the
  application ex facie lacks bona fide. There is not
  explanation on record as to why the application was not
  filed immediately in March 2010, as the applicants had
  come to know that the appeal was to be listed for hearing
E in the month of May, and still, till 15th April, 2010, no steps
  were taken to file the application. [Para 6] [610-C-D]

       1.5. The cumulative effect of the conduct of the legal
  representatives of the sole deceased, appellant clearly
  shows that they have acted with callousness,
F irresponsibly and have not even stated true facts in the
  application for condonation of delay. [Para 6] [610-D-E]

      1.6. Moreover, it will be difficult for the Court to
  exercise its discretionary power in favour of the
G applicants. There is not even a whisper in the entire
  application as to why, right from the death of the
  deceased in November, 2007, the applicants did not take
  any steps whatsoever till 15th April, 2010 to inform their
  counsel about the death of the deceased and to bring the
H legal representatives on record. [Para 6] [610-E-F]
   BALWANT SINGH (DEAD) v. JAGDISH SINGH &               601
                    ORS.
     2.1. A right accrued in favour of the respondents in       A
appeal and it will be unfair and unjust to take away their
vested right on such flimsy and baseless grounds a:s
pleaded by the legal representatives of the deceased
landlord. It is a settled position of law that a suit or an
appeal abates automatically if the legal representatives,       B
particularly, of the sole plaintiff or appellant, are not
brought on record within the stipulated period. Order 22
Rule 3, CPC prescribes that where the plaintiff dies and
the right to sue has survived, then an application could
be filed to bring the legal representatives of the deceased     c
plaintiff I appellant on record within the time specified (90
days). Once the proceedings have abated, the suit
essentially has to come to an end, except when the
abatement is set aside and the legal representatives are
ordered to be brought on record by the court of                 D
competent jurisdiction in terms of Order 22 Rule 9(3),
CPC. Order 22 Rule 9(3) of the CPC contemplates that
provisions of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963
shall apply to an application filed under Sub-Rule (2) of
Rule 9 of Order 22, CPC. Thus, an application for setting
                                                                E
aside the abatement has to be treated at par and the
principles enunciated for condonation of delay under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act are to apply in para
materia. [Para 7] [611 ~B-G]

     2.2. Section 3 of the Limitation Act requires that suits   F
or proceedings instituted after the prescribed period of
limitation shall be dismissed. However, in terms of
Section 5, the discretion is vested in the Court to admit
an appeal or an application, after the expiry of the
prescribed period of limitation, if the appellant shows         G
'sufficient cause' for not preferring the application within
the prescribed time. The expression 'sufficient cause'
commonly appears in the provisions of Order 22 Rule
9(2), CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, thus
categorically demonstrating that they are to be decided         H
   602      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010] 8 S.C.R.


A on similar grounds. The decision of such an application
  has to be guided by similar precepts. [Para 7] [611-G-H;
  612-A-C]

        2.3. Liberal construction cannot be equated with
8 doing injustice to the other party. Delay should be
  condoned to do substantial justice without resulting in
  injustice to the other party. This balance has to be kept
  in mind by the Court while deciding such applications.
  Even if the term 'sufficient cause' has to receive liberal
C construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of
  reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned
  party. The purpose of introducing liberal construction
  normally      is to      introduce the         concept of
  'reasonableness'as it is understood in its general
  connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law
D and has definite consequences on the right and
  obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be
  adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the
  facts and circumstances of a given case. [Para 13] [618-
  G-H; 619-A-B]
E
        2.4. Once a valuable right is accrued in favour of one
  party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain
  the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own
  conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right
F on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly, when the
  delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction
  of that party. Justice must be done to both parties
  equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved.
  If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing
G its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive
  the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it
  in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. The applications
  filed by the applicants lack in details. Even the averments
  made are not correct and ex-facie lack bona fide. The
H explanation has to be reasonable or plausible, so as to
  persuade the Court to believe that the explanation
  BALWANT SINGH (DEAD) v. JAGDISH SINGH &                 603
                   ORS.
rendered is not only true, but is worthy of exercising           A
judicial discretion in favour of the applicant. If it does not
specify any of the enunciated ingredients of judicial
pronouncements, then the application should be
dismissed. (Para 13] (619-B-E]
                                                                 B
     2.5. Whenever a law is enacted by the legislature, it
is intended to be enforced in its proper perspective. Also
the provisions of a statute, including every word, have to
be given full effect, keeping the legislative intent in mind,
in order to ensure that the projected object is achieved.
No provision can be treated to have been enacted                 C
purposelessly. Furthermore, it is also a well settled
cannot of interpretative jurisprudence that the Court
should not give such an interpretation to provisions
which would render the provision ineffective or otiose.
Once the legislature has enacted the provisions of Order         D
22, with particular reference to Rule 9, and the provisions
of the Limitation Act are applied to the entertainment of
such /an application, all these provisions have to be given
their true and correct meaning and must be applied
wherever called for. [Para 14] (621-E-H; 622-A]                  E

     2.6. Liberal construction of the expression 'sufficient
cause' is intended to advance substantial justice which
itself presupposes no negligence or inaction on the part
of the applicant, to whom want of bona fide is imputable.        F
There can be instances where the Court should condone
the delay; equally there would be cases where the Court
must exercise its discretion against the applicant for want
of any of these ingredients or where it does not reflect
'sufficient cause' as understood in law. The expression          G
'sufficient cause' implies the presence of legal and
adequate reasons. The words 'sufficient' means
adequate enough, as much as may be necessary to
answer the purpose intended. It embraces no more than

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    604      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2010] 8 S.C.R.


A that which provides a plentitude which, when done,
  suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the light
  of existing circumstances and when viewed from the
  reasonable standard of practical and cautious men. The
  sufficient cause sllould be such as it would persuade the
B Court, in exercise of its judicial discretion, to treat the
  delay as an excusable one. These provisions give the
  Courts enough power and discretion to apply a law in a
  meaningful manner, while assuring that the purpose of
  enacting such a law does not stand frustrated. The party
c should show that besides acting bona fide, it had taken
  all possible steps within its power and control and had
  approached the Court without any unnecessary delay.
  The test is whether or not a cause is sufficient to see
  whether it could have been avoided by the party by the
  exercise of due care and attention. (Para 14] [622-C-H;
0
  623-A]                                                 .

          Ram Sumiran v. D. D. C. (1985) 1 SCC 431, held
    inapplicable

E         State of Bihar v. Karneshwar Prasad Singh (2000) 9 SCC
    94, distinguished.

      Union of India v. Ram Charan; AIR 1964 SC 215; P. K.
  Ramachandran v. State of Kera/a; (1997) 7 SCC 556; Katari
  Suryanarayana v. Koppisetti Subba Rao AIR 2009 SC 2907;
F Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom v. Bhargavi Amma (2008) 8
  SCC 321; Ram/al and Others v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR
  1962 SC 361; Union oflndia v. Tata Yodogawa Ltd. 1988 (38)
  Excise Law Times 739 (SC) Collector of Central Excise,
  Madras v. A. MO. Bilal & Co. 1999 (108) Excise Law Times
G 331 (SC), relied on.

          Mithailal Dalsangar Singh v. Annabai Devram Kini;
  (2003) 10 SCC 691 and Ganeshprasad Badrinarayan Lahoti
  v. Sanjeevprasad Jamnaprasad Chourasiya (2004) 7 SCC
H 482, referred to.
   BALWANT SINGH (DEAD) v. JAGDISH SINGH &            605
                    ORS.

   , Advanced Law Lexicon, by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 2nd        A
Edition, 1997 and 3rd Edition,· 2005, referred to.

     3. The explained delay should be clearly understood
in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained delay.
Delay in just one of the ingredients which has to be         B
considered by the Court. In addition to. this, the Court
must also take into account the conduct of the parties,
bona fide reasons for condonation of delay and whether
such delay ~ould easily be avoided, by the applicant
acting with normal care and caution. The statutory
provisions mandate that applications for condonation of      C
delay and applications belatedly filed beyond the
prescribed period of lfmitation for bringing the legal
representatives on record, should be rejected un!~ss
sufficient cause is shown for condonation of delay. It is
the requirement of law that these applications cannot be     0
allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine
manner. [Para 16] [624-G-H; 625-A-C]

     4. As regards the· merits of the application in hand,
except for a vague. averment that the legal                  E
representatives were .not aware ,of the pende!lCY of the
appeal before this Court, there is no other justifiable
reason stated in the one page application. The
application does not contain correct and true facts. Thus,
want of bona fides is imputable to the applicant. There
                                                             F
is no reason or sufficient cause shown as to whatsteps
were taken during this period and why immediate steps
were not taken by the applicant, even after they
admittedly came to know of the pendency of the appeal
before this Court. It is the abnormal conduct on the part
of the applicants, particularly one of them who had          G
appeared as AW4 in the trial court and was fully aware
of the proceedings, but still did not inform the counsel
of the death of his father. The cumulative effect of all

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    606     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 8 S.C.R.


A   these circumstances is that the applicants have
    miserably failed in showing any 'sufficient cause' for
    condonation of delay of 778 days in filing the application
    in question. [Para 17) [625-D-H]
                         Case Law Reference:
B
     (1985) 1 sec 431            held inapplicable Para 7

     (2003) 1o sec 691           referred to      Para 7

     (2004) 7 sec 482            referred to      Para 7
c    AIR 1964 SC 215             relied on        Para 7

     (1997) 7 sec 556            relied on        Para 8

     AIR 2009 SC 2907            relied on        Para 10
D    (2008) 8 sec 321            relied on        Para 10
     (2000) 9 sec 94             distinguished Para 13
     AIR 1962 SC 361             relied on        Para 1

E    1988 (38) ELT 739 (SC)      relied on        Para 1

     1999 (108) E LT 331 (SC) relied on           Para 1

        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    1166 of 2006.
F
        From the Judgment & Order dated 21.05.2003 of the High
    Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Revision No.
    295 of 2002.
      Nagendra Rai, Rishi Malhotra, Prem Malhotra for the
G Appellant.

         Pardeep Gupta, Arvind Bansal, Suresh Bharti, Laxmibai
    Leithanthem, Eklavya Gupta, K.K. Mohan for the Respondents.


H
  BALWANT SINGH (DEAD) v. JAGDISH SINGH &                    607
                   ORS.
    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                       A

     SWATANTER KUMAR, J. 1. The Learned Single Judge
of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh vide
its Judgment dated 21st May, 2003 set aside the concurrent
Judgment passed by the Appellate Authority, Ambala, dated
                                                                     B
11th December, 2001 and that of the Rent Controller dated 27th
September, 2000, passing an order of ejectment against the
respondents in exercise of the powers conferred under Section
15 of the Haryana Urban Rent (Control of Rent and Eviction)
Act, 1973 (for short 'the Act'). The petition had been instituted    C
by the landlord against the tenant on the ground of non-payment
of rent. The tenant had denied the relationship of landlord and
tenant and even claimed title to the said property on the basis
of an agreement dated 21st November, 1953 entered into
between the predecessor in interest of the petitioner. The
ground taken for ejectment of the tenant in the eviction petition    D
was non-payment of rent which was only Rs. 200/- per month.
As already noticed, the judgment of the Appellate Authority was
set aside by the High Court vide its judgment dated 21st May,
2003 and it is this judgment of the High Court which has been
assailed by way of a Special Leave Petition before this Court.       E
The leave to appeal was granted by the Court vide order dated
13th February, 2006.

     2. During the pendency of the appeal on 28th November,
2007, the sole petitioner died. From the record, it appears that     F
no steps were taken to bring on record the legal representatives
of the deceased appellant for a considerable period of time on
record. Somewhere on 15th April, 2010, I.A. No. 1 of 2010 has
been filed along with I.A. No. 2 of 2010 praying for condonation
of delay in filing the application for bringing the legal heirs on   G
record. As is evident from the above narrated facts, the
appellant died on 28th November, 2007 while the present
applications have been filed on or about 15th April, 2010. Thus,
there is delay of 778 days in filing these applications. The
application for condonation of delay was seriously contested
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    608      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 8 S.C.R.


A   on behalf of the non-applicants. It was argued that no sufficient
    cause or even a reasonable cause has been shown for
    condoning the delay of more than two years and the appeal has
    already abated. The application, besides being vague at the
    face of it, contains untrue averments. As such, it is prayed that
B   the application should be dismissed and consequently, the
    appeal would not survive for consideration.

       3. Firstly, we have to deal with I.A. No. 2 of 2010, which is
  an application for condonation of delay in filing the application
C for bringing the legal representatives on record. The Learned
  Counsel appearing for the applicant stated that though no
  specific provision had been stated in the headings of any of
  the applications, I.A. No. 1 of 2010 should be treated as an
  application under Order 22 Rule 3 read with Section 151, of
  Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'CPC') while
D I.A. No. 2 of 2010 should be treated as an application under
  Order 22 Rule 9 read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1962.

         4. At the very outset, we may notice that the delay in filing
    the application I.A. No. 1 of 2010 is considerable and it cannot
E   be disputed that the onus to show that sufficient cause exists
    for condonation of delay lies 'upon the applicant.

        5. It is obligatory upon the applicant to show sufficient
  cause due to which he was prevented from continuing to
F prosecute the proceedings in the suit or before the higher Court.
  Here there is admittedly, a delay of 778 days in filing the
  application for bringing the legal representative on record. To
  explain this delay, the applicant has filed a one page application
  stating that they were not aware of the pendency of the appeal
  before the Court and came to know, only in March, 2010 from
G their counsel that the case would be listed for final disposal
  during the vacations in May, 2010. Then the applications, as
  already noticed, were filed on 15th April, 2010. In order to
  examine the reliability and worthiness of the alleged sufficient
  cause for condonation of delay, it will be appropriate to refer
H
   BALWANT SINGH (DEAD) v. JAGDISH SINGH &                  609
         ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

to paragraph 2 of the application which is the only relevant       A
paragraph out of the four paragraph application:

    "That the LRs. of the applicants are residing on different
    addresses because the LRs. of the appellanUdeceased
    are in service and they were not aware of the pendency 8
    of any appeal before this Hon'ble Court. However, when
    the letter from the counsel for Sh. Balwant Singh were
    received at home at Ambala that the appeal is being listed
    for final hearing during vacation in the month of May, 2010
    then these LRs. came to know about the pendency of the C
    appeal. Thereafter these LRs: contacted the counsel in the
    month of March, 2010 to find out the position of the case.
    When they contacted the counsel at New Delhi these LRs.
    the counsel was told about the death of Sh. Balwant Singh
    which had taken place in November, 2007. It was further
    pointed out to the counsel that the LRs. were not aware D
    about the pendency of the appeal in this Court or about
    the requirement of law to bring the LRs. on record after the
    death of Balwant Singh. It is now they have come to know
    that the LRs. of Balwant Singh are required to be brought
    on record otherwise the appeal would abate."                 E

     6. It is clear from the bare reading of the above paragraph
that the applicants were totally callous about pursuing their
appeal. They have acted irresponsibly and even with
negligence. Besides this, they have not approached the Court F
with clean hands. The applicant, who seeks aid of the Court
for exercising its discretionary power for condoning the delay,
is expected to state correct facts and not state lies before the
Court. Approaching the Court with unclean hands itself, is a
ground for rejection of such application. In para 2 of the I.A. NO. G
1 of 2010, it has been shown that all the legal representatives
of the deceased are residents of 9050/5, Naya Bas, Ambala
City, (Haryana) and that there are no other legal heirs of the
deceased. However, in para 4 of the I.A. No. 2 of 2010, it has
been stated that the LRs. of the deceased were in service and
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    610      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2010] 8 S.C.R.


A   were not aware of the pendency of the appeal, implying that
    they were living at different places and the letter of the lawyer
    was received at their residential address of Ambala. The stand
    taken in one application contradicts the stand taken in the other
    application. Furthermore, it is stated that they were not aware
B   of the pendency of the appeal. This, again, does not appear to
    be correct inasmuch as one of the legal representatives of the
    deceased, namely Har-lnder Singh was examined in the Trial
    Court as AW4, who is the son of the deceased. It is difficult for
    the Court to believe that the person who has been examined
c   as a witness did not even take steps to find out the proceedings
    pending before the highest Court of the land. Eve.n the letter,
    alleged to have been written by the counsel, has not been
    placed on record and the application ex facie lacks bona fide.
    There is no explanation on record as to why the application was
0   not filed immediately in March 2010, as they had come to know
    that the appeal was to be listed for hearing in the month of May,
    and still, till 15th April, 2010, no steps were taken to file the
    application. The cumulative effect of the above conduct of the
    legal representatives of the sole deceased, appellant clearly
    shows that they have acted with callousness, irresponsibly and
E   have not even stated true facts in the application for condonation
    of delay. The approach and conduct of the applicants certainly
    would invite criticism. Moreover, it will be difficult for the Court
    to exercise its discretionary power in favour of the applicants.
    There is not even a whisper in the entire application as to why,
F   right from the death of the deceased in November, 2007, the
    appellant did not take any steps whatsoever till 15th April, 2010
    to inform their counsel about the death of the deceased and to
    bring the legal representatives on record.

G        7. The counsel appearing for the applicant, while relying
    upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Ram Sumiran
    v. D.D. C. [( 1985) 1 SCC 431 ], Mithailal Dalsangar Singh v.
    Annabai Devram Kini, [(2003) 10 SCC 691] and
    Ganeshprasad Badrinarayan Lahoti v. Sanjeevprasad
H   Jamnaprasad Chourasiya [(2004) 7 SCC 482] argued that this
   BALWANT SINGH (DEAD) v. JAGDISH SINGH &                  611
         ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
Court should take a liberal view and should condone the delay, A
irrespective of the above facts and in all these judgments the
delay has been condoned by the Court. As per contra, the
submission of the counsel for the non-applicants is that the
appeal has abated and no ca~se, much less sufficient, has
been shown for setting aside the abatement. A right accrues B
in favour of the respondents in appeal and it will be unfair and
unjust to take away their ves_ted right on such flimsy and
baseless grounds. It is a settled position of law that a suit or
an appeal abates automatically if the legal representatives,
particularly of the sole plaintiff or appellant, are not brought onc
record within the stipulated period. Rule 1 of Order 22, CPC
mandates that the death of a defendant or a plaintiff shall not
cause the suit to abate if the right to sue survives. In other words,
in the event of death of a party, where the right to sue does not
survive, the suit shall abate and come to an end. In the event D
the rightto sue survives, the concerned party is expected to take
steps in accordance with provisions of this Order. Order 22 Rule
3, CPC therefore, prescribes that where the plaintiff dies and
the right to sue has survived, then an application could be filed
to bring the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff/
appellant on record within the time specified (90 days). Once E
the proceedings have abated, the suit essentially has to come
to an end, except when the abatement is set aside and the legal
representatives are ordered to be brought on record by the
Court of Competent jurisdiction in terms of Order 22 Rule 9 (3),
CPC. Order 22 Rule 9 (3) of the CPC contemplates that F
provisions of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 shall
apply to an application filed under Sub Rule 2 of Rule 9 of Order
22, CPC. In other words, an application for setting aside the
abatement has to be treated at par and the principles
enunciated for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the G
Limitation Act are to apply para materia. Section 3 of the
Limitation Act requires that suits or proceedings instituted after
the prescribed period of limitation shall be dismissed. However,
in terms of Section 5, the discretion is vested in the Court to
                                                                   H
    612      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2010] 8 S.C.R.


A admit an appeal or an application, after the expiry of the
  prescribed period of limitation, if the appellant shows 'sufficient
  cause' for not preferring the application within the prescribed
  time. The expression 'sufficient cause' commonly appears in
  the provisions of Order 22 Rule 9 (2), CPC and Section 5 of
B the Limitation Act, thus categorically demonstrating that they are
  to be decided on similar grounds. The decision of such an
  application has to be guided by similar precepts. It will be
  appropriate for us to trace the law enunciated by this Court
  while referring, both the provision" of Order 22 Rule 9, CPC
c and Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In the case of Union of India
   v. Ram Charan, [AIR 1964 SC 215], a three Judge Bench of
  this Court was concerned with an application filed under Order
  22 Rule 9, CPC for bringing the legal representatives of the
  deceased on record beyond the prescribed period of limitation.
  The Court expressed the view that mere allegations about
0
  belated knowledge of death of the opposite party would not be
  sufficient. The Court applied the principle of 'reasonable time'
  even to such situations. While stating that the Court was not to
   invoke its inherent powers under Section 151, C.P.C. it
E expressed the view that the provisions of Order 22 Rule 9, CPC
   should be applied. The Court held as under:

          "8. There is no question of construing the expression
          'sufficient cause' liberally either because the party in default
          is the Government or because the question arises in
F         connection with the impleading of the legal representatives
          of the deceased respondent. The provisions of the Code
          are with a view to advance the cause of justice. Of course,
          the Court, in considering whether the appellant has
          established sufficient cause for his not continuing the suit
G         in time or for not applying for the setting aside of the
          abatement within time, need not be over-strict in expecting
          such proof of the suggested cause as it would accept for
          holding certain fact established, both because the question
          does not relate to the merits of the dispute between the
H         parties and because if the abatement is set aside, the
BALWANT SINGH (DEAD) v. JAGDISH SINGH &                  613
      ORS. ($WATANTER KUMAR, J.]
merits of the dispute can be determined while, if the            A
abatement is not set aside, the appellant is deprived of his
proving his claim on account of his culpable negligence or
lack of vigilance. This, however, does not mean that the
Court should readily accept whatever the appellant alleges
to explain away his default. It has to scrutinize it and would   B
be fully justified in considering the merits of the evidence
led to establish the cause for the appellant's default in
applying within time for the impleading of the legal
representatives of the deceased or for setting aside the
ab~eme~.                                                         c
      xxx                     xxx               xxx
10 .... The procedure, requires an application for the
making of the legal representatives of the deceased
plaintiff or defendant a party to the suit. It does not say who D
is to present the application. Ordinarily it would be the
plaintiff as by the abatement of the suit the defendant
stands to gain. However, an application is necessary to be
made for the purpose. If no such application is made within
the time allowed by law, the suit abates so far as the E
deceased ·plaintiff is concerned or as against the
deceased defendant. The effect of such an abatement on
the suit of the surviving plaintiffs or the suit against the
suNiving defendants depends on other considerations as
held by this Court in State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram, [AIR F
1962 SC 89 and Jhanda Singh v. Gurmukh Singh, C.A.
No. 344 of 1956, D/- 10-4-1962 (SC). Any way, that
question does not arise in this case as the sole respondent
had died.

      xxx                    xxx                xxx              G

12 .... The legislature further seems to have taken into
account that there may be cases where the plaintiff may
not know of the death of the defendant as ordinarily
expected and, therefore, not only provided a further period      H
    614       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 8 S.C.R.


A         of two months under Art. 171 for an application to set aside
          the abatement of the suit, but also made the provisions of
          Section 5 of the Limitation Act applicable to such
          applications. Thus the plaintiff is allowed sufficient time to
          make an application to set aside the abatement which, if
B         exceeding five months, be considered justified by the Court
          in the proved circumstances of the case. It would be futile
          to lay down precisely as to what considerations would
          constitute 'sufficient cause' for setting aside the abatement
          or for the plaintiff's not applying to bring the legal
c         representatives of the deceased defendant on the record
          or would be held to be sufficient cause for not making an
          application to set aside the abatement within the time
          prescribed. But it can be said that the delay in the making
          of such applications should not be for reasons which
          indicate the plaintiffs negligence in not taking certain steps
D
          which he could have and should have taken. What would
          be such necessary steps would again depend on the
          circumstances of a particular case and each case will have
          to be decided by the court on the facts and circumstances
          of the case. Any statement of illustrative circumstances or
E         facts can tend to be a curb on the free exercise of its mind
           by the Court in determining whether the facts and
          circumstances of a particular case amount to 'sufficient
           cause' or not. Courts have to use their discretion in the
           matter soundly in the interests of justice."
F
          8. In the case of P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kera/a,
    [(1997) 7 sec 556] where there was delay of 565 days in filing
    the first appeal by the State, and the High Court had observed,
    "taking into consideration the averments contained in the
G   affidavit filed in support of the petition to condone the delay,
    we are inclined to allow the petition". While setting aside this
    order, this Court found that the explanation rendered for
    condonation of delay was neither reasonable nor satisfactory
    and held as under:
H
BALWANT SINGH (DEAD) v. JAGDISH SINGH &                   615
      ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
       "3. It would be noticed from a perusal of the impugned     A
 order that the court has not recorded any satisfaction that
 the explanation for delay was either reasonable or
 satisfactory, which is an essential prerequisite to
 condonation of delay.
                                                                  B
       4. That apart, we find that in the application filed by
 the respondent seeking condonation of delay, the thrust in
 explaining the delay after 12.5.1995 is:

 " ..... at that time the Advocate General's office was fed up
 with so many arbitration matters (sic) equally important to      C
 this case were pending for consideration as per the
 directions of the Advocate General on 2.9.1995."

 5. This can hardly be said to be a reasonable, satisfactory
 or even a proper explanation for seeking condonation of D
 delay. In the reply filed to the application seeking
 condonation of delay by the appellant in the High Court, it
 is asserted that after the judgment and decree was
 pronounced by the learned Sub-Judge, Kollam on 30-10-
 1993, the scope for filing of the appeal was examined by E
 the District Government Pleader, Special Law Officer, Law
 Secretary and the Advocate General and in accordance
 with their opinion, it was decided that there was no scope
 for filing the appeal but later on, despite the opinion
 referred to above, the appeal was filed as late as on
 18.1.1996 without disclosing why it was being filed. The F
 High Court does not appear to have examined the reply
 filed by the appellant as reference to the same is
 conspicuous by its absence from the order. We are not
 satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of this case,
 any explanation, much less a reasonable or satisfactory G
 one had been offered by the respondent-State for
 condonation of the inordinate delay of 565 days.

 6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but
 it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so     H
    616      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2010] 8 S.C.R.


A         prescribed and the courts have no power to extend the
          period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion
          exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor
          judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be
          sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the
B         impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application
          for condonation of delay filed in the High Court would stand
          rejected and the miscellaneous first appeal shall stand
          dismissed as barred by time. No costs."

C        9. In the case of Mithai/al Dalsangar Singh (supra), a
    Bench of this Court had occasion to deal with the provisions
    of Order 22 Rule 9, CPC and while enunciating the principles
    controlling the application of and exercising of discretion under
    these provisions, the Court reiterated the principle that the
    abatement is automatic and not even a specific order is
D   required to be passed by the Court in that behalf. It would be
    useful to reproduce paragraph 8 of the said judgment which has
    a bearing on the matter in controversy before us:

          "8. Inasmuch as the abatement results in denial of hearing
E         on the merits of the case, the provision of abatement has
          to be construed strictly. On the other hand, the prayer for
          setting aside an abatement and the dismissal consequent
          upon an abatement, have to be considered liberally. A
          simple prayer for bringing the legal representatives on
F         record without specifically praying for setting aside of an
          abatement may in substance be construed as a prayer for
          setting aside the abatement. So also a prayer for setting
          aside abatement as regards one of the plaintiffs can be
          construed as a prayer for setting aside the abatement of
          the suit in its entirety. Abatement of suit for failure to move
G
          an application for bringing the legal representatives on
          record within the prescribed period of limitation is
          automatic and specific order dismissing the suit as abated
          is not called for. Once the suit has abated as a matter of
          law, though there may not have been passed on record a
H
   BALWANT SINGH (DEAD) v. JAGDISH SINGH &                  617
         ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

    specific order dismissing the suit as abated, yet the legal     A
    representatives proposing to be brought on record or any
    other applicant proposing to bring the legal representatives
    of the deceased party on record would seek the setting
    aside of an abatement. A prayer for bringing the legal
    representatives on record, if allowed, would have the effect    B
    of setting aside the abatement as the relief of setting aside
    abatement though not asked for in so many words is in
    effect being actually asked for and is necessarily implied.
    Too technical or pedantic an approach in such cases is
    not called for."                                                c
     10. Another Bench of this Court in a recent judgment of
Katari Suryanarayana v. Koppisetti Subba Rao, [AIR 2009 SC
2907] again had an occasion to construe the ambit, scope and
application of the expression 'sufficient cause'. The application
for setting aside the abatement and bringing the legal heirs of     D
the deceased on record was filed in that case after a
considerable delay. The explanation rendered regarding the
delay of 2381 days in filing the application for condonation of
delay and 2601 days in bringing the legal representatives on
record was not found to be satisfactory. Declining the              E
application for condonation of delay, the Court, while discussing
the case of Perumon Bhagvathy Oevaswom v. Bhargavi
Amma ((2008) 8 SCC 321] in its para 9 held as under:

    "11. The words "sufficient cause for not making the             F
    application within the period of limitation" should be
    understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic,
    practical and liberal manner, depending upon the facts and
    circumstances of the case, and the type of case. The
    words 'sufficient cause' in Section 5 of Limitation Act         G
    should receive a liberal construction so as to advance
    substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any
    dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate inaction or
    negligence on the part of the appellant."

    11. The Learned Counsel appearing for the applicant,            H
    618      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (2010] 8 S.C.R.


A while relying upon the cases of Ram Sumiran, Mithaila/
  Dalsangar Singh and Ganeshprasad Badrinarayan Lahoti
  (supra), contended that the Court should adopt a very liberal
  approach and the delay should be condoned on the mere
  asking by the applicant. Firstly, none of these cases is of much
B help to the applicant. Secondly, in the case of Ram Sumiran
  (supra), the Court has not recorded any reasons or enunciated
  any principle of law for exercising the discretion. The Court,
  being satisfied with the facts averred in the application and
  particularly giving benefit to the applicant on account of illiteracy
c and ignorance, condoned the delay of six years in filing the
  application. This judgment cannot be treated as a precedent
  in the eyes of the law. In fact, it was a judgment on its own facts.

        12. In the case of Ganeshprasad Badrinarayan Lahoti
  (supra), the High Court had rejected the application, primarily,
D on the ground that no separate application had been filed for
  substitution and for setting aside the abatement. The Court held
  that the principles of res judicata were not applicable and the
  application could be filed at a subsequent stage. Thus, the
  delay was condoned. We must notice here that the earlier
E judgments of the equi benches and even that of larger benches
  (three Judge Bench) in the case of Ram Charan (supra) were
  not brought to the notice of the Court. Resultantly, the principles
  of law stated by this Court in its earlier judgments were not
  considered by the Bench dealing with the case of
F Ganeshprasad Badrinarayan Lahoti (supra).

       13. As held by this Court in the case of Mithailal Dalsangar
  Singh (supra), the abatement results in the denial of hearing
  on the merits of the case, the provision of abatement has to
G be construed strictly. On the other hand, the prayer for setting
  aside an abatement and the dismissal consequent upon an
  abatement, have to be construed liberally. We may state that
  even if the term 'sufficient cause' has to receive liberal
  construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of
  reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party.
H
   BALWANT SINGH (DEAD) v. JAGDISH SINGH &                       619
         ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to           A
introduce the concept of 'reasonableness' as it is understood
in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive
law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation
of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and
applied appropriately depending on the facts and                         8
circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right. as
accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the
other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and
its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right
on the mere asking of the applicant. particularly when the delay         C
is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party.
Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the
ends of Justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly
negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be
equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that
has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. The       D
application filed by the applicants lack in details. Even the
averments made are not correct and ex-facie lack bona fide.
The explanation has to be reasonable or plausible, so as to
persuade the Court to believe that the explanation rendered is
not only true, but is worthy of exercising judicial discretion in        E
favour of the applicant. If it does not specify any of the
enunciated ingredients of judicial pronouncements, then the
application should be dismissed. On the other hand, if the
application is bona fide and based upon true and plausible
explanations, as well as reflect normal behaviour of a common            F
prudent person on the part of the applicant, the Court would
normally tilt the judicial discretion in favour of such an applicant.
Liberal construction cannot be equated with doing injustice to
the other party. In the case of State of Bihar v. Kameshwar
Prasad Singh [(2000) 9 SCC 94], this Court had taken a liberal           G
approach for condoning the delay in cases of the Government,
to do substantial justice. Facts of that case were entirely
different as that was the case of fixation of seniority of 400
officers and the facts were required to be verified. But what we
                                                                         H
    620      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     (2010] 8 S.C.R.

A   are impressing upon is that delay should be condoned to do
    substantial justice without resulting in injustice to the other party.
    This balance has to be kept in mind by the Court while deciding
    such applications. In the case of Ram/a/ and Others v. Rewa
    Coalfields Ltd., (AIR 1962 SC 361] this Court took the view:
B                "7. In construing Section 5 it is 1·elevant to bear in
          mind two important considerations. The first consideration
          is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed
          for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the
          decree holder to treat the decree as binding between the
c         parties. In other words, when the period of limitation
          prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a
          benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as
          beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued
          to the decree holder by lapse of time should not be light
D         heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot
          be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is
          shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay
          and admit the appeal. This discretion has been
          deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial
E         power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised
          to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by
          the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan, ILR 13
          Mad 269.

                 It is however, necessary to emphasize that even
F
          after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled
          to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right.
          The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent
          for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in
          the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved
G         nothing further has to be done; the application for
          condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone.
          If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire
          whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This
          aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration
H
    BALWANT SINGH (DEAD) v. JAGDISH SINGH &                       621
         . ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

     of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of      A
     the party or its bona tides may fall for consideration; ... "

      14. In the case of Union of India v. Tata Yodogawa Ltd.,
[1988 (38) Excise Law Times 739 (SC)], this Court while
granting some latitude to the Government in relation to                   8
condonation of delay, still held that there must be some way or
attempt to explain the cause for such delay and as there was
no whisper to explain what legal problems occurred in filing the
Special Leave Petition, the application for condonation of delay
was dismissed. Similarly, in the case of Collector of Central             C
Excise, Madras v. A.MD. Bilal & Co., [1999 (108) Excise Law
Times 3~1 (SC}], the Supreme Court .declined to condone the
delay of 502 days in filing the appeal because there was no
satisfactory or reasonable explanation rendered for condonation
of delay. The provisions of Order 22 Rule 9, CPC has been the
subject matter of judicial scrutiny for considerable time now.            D
Sometimes the Courts have taken a view that delay should be
condoned with a liberal attitude, while on certain occasions the
Courts have taken a stricter view and wherever the explanation
was not satisfactory, have dismissed the application for
condonation of delay. Thus, it is evident that it is difficult to state   E
any straight-jacket formula which can uniformly be applied to all
cases without reference to the peculiar facts and circumstances
of a given case. It must be kept in mind that whenever a law is
enacted by the legislature, it is intended to be enforced in its
proper perspective. It is an equally settled principle of law that        F
the provisions of a statute, including every word, have to be given
full effect, keeping the legislative intent in mind, in order to
ensure that the projected object is achieved. In other words, no
provisions can be treated to have been enacted purposelessly.
Furthermore, it is also a well settled canon of interpretative            G
jurisprudence that the Court should not give such an
interpretation to provisions which would render the provision
ineffective or odious. Once the legislature has enacted the
provisions of Order 22, with particular reference to Rule 9, and
the provisions of the Limitation Act are applied to the                   H
    622      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (201 OJ 8 S.C.R.


A entertainment of such an application, all these provisions have
  to be given their true and correct meaning and must be applied
  wherever called for. If we accept the contention of the Learned
  Counsel appearing for the applicant that the Court should take
  a very liberal approach and interpret these provisions (Order
B 22 Rule 9 of the CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act) in
  such a manner and so liberally, irrespective of the period of
  delay, it would 'amount to practically rendering all these
  provisions redundant and inoperative. Such approach or
  interpretation would hardly be permissible in law. Liberal
c co.nstruction of the expression 'sufficient cause' is intended to
  advance substantial justice which itself presupposes no
  ne'gligence or inaction on the part of the applicant, to whom
  want of bona fide is imputable. There can be instances where
  the· Court should condone the delay; equally there would be
D cases   where the C9urt must exercise its discretion against the
  appNcant for want of any of these ingredients or where it does
  not reflect 'sufficient cause' as understood in law. [Advanced
   Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 2nd Edition, 1997] The
  expression 'sufficient cause' implies the presence of legal and
   adequate reasons. The word 'sufficient' means adequate
E
   enough, as much as may be necessary to answer the purpose
   intended. It embraces no more than that which provides a
   plentitude which, when done, suffices to accomplish the
   purpose intended in the light of existing circumstances and
   when viewed from the reasonable standard of practical and
F cautious men. The sufficient cause should be such as it would
   persuade the Court, in exercise of its judicial discretion, to treat
   the delay as an excusable one. These provisions give the
   Courts enough power and discretion to apply a law in a
   me~ningful manner, while assuring that the purpose of enacting
G such a law does not stand frustrated. We find it unnecessary
   to discuss the instances which would fall under either of these
   classes of cases. The party should show that besides acting
   bona fide, it had taken all possible steps within its power and
   control and had approached the Court without any unnecessary
H delay. The test is whether or not a cause is sufficient to see
    BALWANT SINGH (DEAD) v. JAGDISH SINGH &                     623
          ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
 whether it could have been avoided by the party by the exercise        A
 of due care and attention. [Advanced Law Lexicon, P.
 Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edition, 2005]

       15: We feel that it would be useful to make a reference to
  the judgment of this Court in Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom
                                                                        8
  (supra). In this case, the Court, after discussing a number of
  judgments of this Court as well as that of the High Courts,
  enunciated the principles which need to be kept in mind while
  dealing,with applications filed under the provisions of Order 22,
  CPC along with an application under Section 5, Limitation Act
  for condonation of delay in filing the application for bringing the   C
. legal representatives on record. In paragraph 13 of the
  judgment, the Court held as under:-

             "13 (i) The words "sufficient cause for not making the
      application within the period of limitation" should be            D
      understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic,
      practical and liberal manner, depending upon the facts and
      circumstances of the case, and the type of case. The
      words 'sufficient cause' in Section 5 of the Limitation Act
      should receive a liberal construction so as to advance            E
      substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any
      dilatory tactics, want of bona tides, deliberate inaction or
      negligence on the part of the appellant."

             (ii) In considering the reasons for condonation of         F
      delay, the courts are more liberal with reference to
      applications for setting aside abatement, than other cases.
      While the court will have to keep in view that a valuable
      right accrues to the legal representatives of the deceased
      respondent when the appeal abates, it will not punish an
      appellant with foreclosure of the appeal, for unintended          G
      lapses. The courts tend to set aside abatement and
      decided the matter on merits. The courts tend to set aside
      abatement and decide the matter on merits, rather than
      terminate the appeal on the ground of abatement.
                                                                        H
    624      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2010] 8 S.C.R.

A               (iii) The decisive factor in condonation of delay, is
          not the length of delay, but sufficiency of a satisfactory
          explanation.

                (iv) The extent or degree of leniency to be shown by
          a court depends on the nature of application and facts and
B
          circumstances of the case. For example, courts view
          delays in making applications in a pending appeal more
          leniently than delays in the institution of an appeal. The
          courts view applications relating to lawyer's lapses more
          leniently than applications relating to litigant's lapses. The
c         classic example is the difference in approach of courts to
          applications for condonation of delay in filing an appeal
          and applications for condonation of delay in re-filing the
          appeal after rectification of defects.

D               (v) Want of "diligence" or "inaction" can be attributed
          to an appellant only when something required to be done
          by him, is not done. When nothing is required to be done,
          courts do not expect the appellant to be diligent. Where
          an appeal is admitted by the High Court and is not
E         expected to be listed for final hearing for a few years, an
          appellant is not expected to visit the court or his lawyer
          every few weeks to ascertain the position nor keep
          checking whether the contesting respondent is alive. He
          merely awaits the call or information from his counsel
F         about the listing of the appeal.

          We may also notice here that this judgment had been
    followed with <approval by an equi-bench of this Court in the case
    of Katari Suryanarayana (supra)

G      16. Above are the principles which should control the
  exercise of judicial discretion vested in the Court under these
  provisions. The explained delay should be clearly understood
  in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained delay. Delay is just
  one of the ingredients which has to be considered by the Court.
H In addition to this, the Court must also take into account the
   BALWANT SINGH (DEAD) v. JAGDISH SINGH &                 625
         ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
conduct of the parties, bona fide reasons for condonation of A
delay and whether such delay could easily be avoided by the
applicant acting with normal care and caution. The statutory
provisions mandate that applications for condonation of delay
and applications belatedly filed beyond the prescribed period
of limitation for bringing the legal representatives on record, B
should be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown for
condonation of delay. The larger benches as well as equi-
benches of this Court have consistently followed these
principles and have either allowed or declined to condone the
delay in filing such applications. Thus, it is the requirement of c
law that these applications cannot be allowed as a matter of
right and even in a routine manner. An applicant must essentially
satisfy the above stated ingredients; then alone the Court would
be inclined to condone the delay in the filing of such
applications.
                                                                  D
      17. On an analysis of the above principles, we now revert
to the merits of the application in hand. As already noticed,
except for a vague averment that the legal representatives were
not aware of the pendency of the appeal before this Court, there
is no other justifiable reason stated in the one page application. E
We have already held that the application does not contain
correct and true facts. Thus, want of bona fides is imputable to
the applicant. There is no reason or sufficient cause shown as
to what steps were taken during this period and why immediate
steps were not taken by the applicant, even after they admittedly F
came to know of the pendency of the app~al before this Court.
It is the abnormal conduct on the part of the applicants,
particularly Har-lnder Singh, who had appeared as AW4 in the
trial and was fully aware of the proceedings, but still did not
inform the counsel of the death of his father. The cumulative G
effect of all these circumstances is that the applicants have
miserably failed in showing any 'sufficient cause' for
condonation of delay of 778 days in filing the application in
question.
                                                                  H
    626      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010] 8 S.C.R.


A        18. Thus, we have no hesitation in dismissing l.A.No.2 of
    2010 and consequently, l.A.No.1 of 2010 does not survive for
    consideration and is also dismissed. Resultantly, the appeal
    having already abated also stands dismissed. However, in the
    facts of the case, there shall be no orders as to costs.
B
    B.B.B.                                    Appeal dismissed.