BALJEET SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. AND OTHERS ETC. ETC.versusSTATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS

646                       [2019]
               SUPREME COURT     11 S.C.R. 646
                              REPORTS                    [2019] 11 S.C.R.


A                BALJEET SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. AND
                          OTHERS ETC. ETC.
                                            v.
                           STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS
B               (Special Leave Petition (C) Nos.30404–30442 of 2017)
                                  AUGUST 08, 2019
                    [ARUN MISHRA, ABDUL NAZEER AND
                           M. R. SHAH, JJ.]
            Delay/laches: Delay in filing Special Leave Petitions –
C
      Condonation of – On facts, SLP’s filed with regard to inadequacy
      of compensation awarded by the High Court in 1996, claiming parity
      in compensation awarded to their co-villagers in a different location
      – Inordinate delay of 21 years in filing SLPs challenging the order
      passed by the High Court – Applications seeking condonation of
D     delay –Held: Petitioners miserably failed to make out a case to
      condone the huge delay of 21 years – No sufficient cause has been
      shown – Only explanation in approaching this Court is given in the
      application that it was only in December 2016, the claimants
      pertaining to village Kasana got enhanced compensation of Rs.
      65/- per sq. yard from this Court – Nothing on record that after the
E
      impugned order of the High Court, the petitioners made any
      grievance/objection with respect to inadequacy of the compensation
      determined by the High Court – On the contrary, they accepted the
      compensation awarded – Even if the petitioners are denied the
      interest and/or the other statutory benefits for the delayed period,
F     to direct the State/acquiring body to pay the enhanced amount of
      compensation after 21 years would be unreasonable and would
      have a financial burden upon them and it would be very difficult
      for them to recover the same from the allottees – Thus, the huge
      delay in filing the special leave petitions cannot be condoned and
      the applications for condonation are dismissed.
G
            Jurisprudence: Non-exercise of right for a long time – Effect
      of – Held: Right becomes non-existent – In cases where there is no
      limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain
      proceedings, the courts on the basis of doctrine of laches and delay
      as well as doctrine of acquiescence, have non-suited the litigants
H
                                      646
  BALJEET SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. AND OTHERS                                647
        ETC. ETC. v. STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS

who approached the court belatedly without any justifiable                    A
explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay – In
cases where the action is not brought within that prescribed period,
the aggrieved party loses remedy and cannot enforce his legal right
after the period of limitation is over – However, if there is a justifiable
explanation for bringing the action after the prescribed period of
                                                                              B
limitation is over and sufficient cause is shown, the court may allow
the prayer for condonation of delay – If the aggrieved party does
not initiate the proceedings within the period of limitation without
any sufficient cause, he can be denied the relief on the ground of
unexplained laches and delay and on the presumption that such
person has waived his right or acquiesced with the order.                     C
      Dismissing the Special Leave Petitions, the Court
      HELD: 1.1 The petitioners have miserably failed to make
out a case to condone the huge delay of approximately 21 years.
No sufficient cause has been shown to condone the huge delay of
approximately 21 years. In the application itself it is submitted             D
by the petitioners there is an inordinate delay in approaching
this Court. The only explanation in approaching this Court after
about 21 years is given in paragraph 3 of the application that it
was only in December 2016, the claimants pertaining to village
Kasana got the enhanced compensation from this Hon’ble Court                  E
to the tune of Rs. 65/- per sq yard. [Para 7][655-F-H; 656-A]
       1.2 The petitioners have stated that though there is a
reasonable case made out by the petitioners to get the enhanced
compensation to the tune of Rs.65/- per square yard, but fairly
enough in order to balance the equity, this Court may not grant               F
interest from the date of the judgment of the High Court till the
filing of the special leave petitions before this Court. Except the
explanation in paragraph 3, there is no other explanation
whatsoever explaining the huge delay of approximately 21 years.
Neither any poverty is pleaded nor any financial difficulty is
pleaded. Nothing is on record that after the impugned common                  G
judgment and order is passed by the High Court, the petitioners
made any grievance/objection with respect to inadequacy of the
compensation determined by the High Court. On the contrary,

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648            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2019] 11 S.C.R.


A     all the petitioners have accepted the compensation as per the
      judgment and award passed by the reference Court determining
      the compensation at the rate of Rs. 30/- per square yard. It appears
      that with respect to some of the land owners even the execution
      petitions are pending with respect to recovery of the differential
      amount of compensation, determined by the reference Court and
B
      the High Court as by the impugned common judgment and order
      the High Court has reduced the compensation from Rs.30/- per
      sq. yard to Rs. 22/- per sq. yard. The fact remains that after the
      impugned common judgment and order is passed by the High
      Court, no grievance at all is made by the petitioners with respect
C     to inadequacy of the compensation determined by the High Court.
      Thus, it can be said that for a period of approximately 21 years no
      grievance was made by the petitioners. Therefore, considering
      the terms of doctrine of acquiescence, the petitioners lose their
      right to complain. This principle is based on the doctrine of
      acquiescence implying that in such a case the party who did not
D
      make any objection acquiesced into the alleged wrongful act of
      the other party and therefore has no right to complain against
      that alleged wrong. [Para 7.1][656-C-H; 657-A-B]
            1.3 It is a very recognised principle of jurisprudence that a
      right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Even when
E     there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to
      certain proceedings, in such cases, courts have coined the
      doctrine of laches and delay as well as doctrine of acquiescence
      and non-suited the litigants who approached the court belatedly
      without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after
F     unreasonable delay. In those cases, where the period of limitation
      is prescribed within which the action is to be brought before the
      court, if the action is not brought within that prescribed period,
      the aggrieved party loses remedy and cannot enforce his legal
      right after the period of limitation is over, however, subject to
      the prayer for condonation of delay and if there is a justifiable
G     explanation for bringing the action after the prescribed period of
      limitation is over and sufficient cause is shown, the court may
      condone the delay. Therefore, in a case where the period of
      limitation is prescribed and the action is not brought within the

H
  BALJEET SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. AND OTHERS                           649
        ETC. ETC. v. STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS

period of limitation and subsequently proceedings are initiated          A
after the period of limitation along with the prayer for condonation
of delay, in that case, the applicant has to make out a sufficient
cause and justify the cause for delay with a proper explanation. It
is not that in each and every case despite the sufficient cause is
not shown and the delay is not properly explained, the court may
                                                                         B
condone the delay. To make out a case for condonation of delay,
the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause/reason which
prevented him in initiating the proceedings within the period of
limitation. Otherwise, he will be accused of gross negligence. If
the aggrieved party does not initiate the proceedings within the
period of limitation without any sufficient cause, he can be denied      C
the relief on the ground of unexplained laches and delay and on
the presumption that such person has waived his right or
acquiesced with the order. These principles are based on the
principles relatable to sound public policy that if a person does
not exercise his right for a long time then such right is non-
                                                                         D
existent. [Para 8][657-C-H; 658-A]
      1.4 In the instant case, lands were acquired as far back as
in the year 1985 and the award by the Special Land Acquisition
Officer was declared in the year 1988. The reference Court
enhanced the amount of compensation to Rs.30/- per square yard,
which came to be reduced by the High Court by the impugned               E
common judgment and order in the year 1996. The lands were
acquired for Industrial development purposes. That after the
acquisition, the land has been developed, infrastructure and
amenities are laid and the developed land has been allotted
approximately before 30 years. It is the specific case on behalf of      F
the respondents that the rate of allotment was based on the cost
of acquisition and the amount spent on development, laying out
the infrastructure. Therefore, if the cost of acquisition is increased
now and the State/acquiring body is directed to pay enhanced
compensation, in that case, it would be very difficult to recover
the difference of amount of compensation from the allottees after        G
decades of allotment. The acquiring body will have to make
additional budgetary provision and it would be very difficult for
the acquiring body to recover the difference of compensation from

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650            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 11 S.C.R.


A     the allottees after so many years. Even if the petitioners are
      denied the interest and/or the other statutory benefits for the
      delayed period as requested by the counsel for the petitioners,
      in that case also, to direct the State/acquiring body to pay the
      enhanced amount of compensation after number of years (21
      years) would be unreasonable and would have a financial burden
B
      upon them and it would be very difficult for the State/acquiring
      body to recover the same from the allottees. [Para 9][658-E-H;
      659-A-C]
           1.5 The huge delay of 7534, 7542 and 7886 days
      respectively in filing the special leave petitions cannot be
C     condoned and the applications for condonation are dismissed.
      [Para 10][659-D]
            Market Committee, Hodal v. Krishan Murari (1996) 1
            SCC 311; Dhiraj Singh v. State of Haryana (2014) 14
            SCC 127; K. Subbarayudu v. Special Deputy Collector
D           (Land Acquisition) (2017) 12 SCC 840 – held
            inapplicable.
                              Case Law Reference
      (1996) 1 SCC 311            held inapplicable              Para 9
      (2014) 14 SCC 127           held inapplicable              Para 9
E
      (2017) 12 SCC 840           held inapplicable              Para 9
             CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition
      (Civil) Nos. 30404-30442 of 2017
            With
F
           Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 30455-30460 of 2017, 23522-
      23530 of 2018.
            From the Judgment and Order dated 02.04.1996 of the High Court
      of Judicature at Allahabad in First Appeal Nos. 919, 887, 843, 839, 837,
      857, 829, 865, 851, 867, 842, 838, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 965, 942, 859,
G     860, 940, 892, 840, 875, 831, 869, 929 and 833 of 1993
             Rishi Malhotra, Utkarsh Singh, Prem Malhotra, Advs. for the
      Petitioners.
            Akshay Amritanshu, Anuvrat Sharma, Ravindra Kumar, Miss
H     Tulika Prakash, Advs. for the Respondents.
   BALJEET SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. AND OTHERS                                   651
         ETC. ETC. v. STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS

       The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                                 A
       M. R. SHAH, J.
      1. Delay of 193, 224 and 142 days respectively in refiling the
special leave petitions is condoned.
       2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the common impugned             B
judgment and order dated 2.4.1996 passed by the High Court of Judicature
at Allahabad in First Appeal No. 919/1993 and other allied first appeals,
the respective original claimants – land owners have preferred the present
special leave petitions.
       3. At the outset, it is required to be noted that there is an inordinate   C
delay of 7534, 7542 and 7886 days respectively (approximately 21 years)
in preferring the special leave petitions before this Court challenging the
impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court. There
is a further delay of 193, 224 and 142 days respectively in refiling the
special leave petitions.
                                                                                  D
        3.1. The application/applications for condonation of delay is/are
vehemently opposed by the respondents herein. Therefore, this Court is
first required to consider and decide the application/applications submitted
by the petitioners/applicants praying to condone the huge delay of 7534,
7542 and 7886 days respectively in preferring the special leave petitions.
                                                                                  E
        4. Shri Rishi Malhotra, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of
the respective petitioners has vehemently submitted that the lands of the
respective petitioners have been compulsorily acquired under the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, and therefore, they are entitled
to the fair compensation for the lands acquired. It is submitted that the
dispute is with respect to the lands acquired of village Gulsitapur and           F
Tilpta which are only 4 kms. away from village Kasna. It is submitted
that the location wise the lands of village Gulsitapur and Tilpta were
better located and were abutting the national highway, i.e, Noida – Dadri
Road. It is submitted that village Kasna is 4 kms. behind village Gulsitapur.
It is submitted that for the lands acquired of village Kasna, Section 4
                                                                                  G
notification was issued on 1.3.1989 and the compensation was awarded
@ Rs.65/- per square yard, which has been confirmed by this Court
vide order dated 05.12.2016. It is submitted that therefore the respective
petitioners are entitled to the fair compensation for the lands acquired of
village Gulsitapur and Tilpta at par with the land owners of village Kasna,
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652            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 11 S.C.R.


A     i.e., at Rs.65/- per square yard. It is submitted that therefore the
      agriculturists/farmers are entitled to the fair compensation for the lands
      acquired. It is submitted that for the lands compulsorily acquired, the
      delay should not defeat the valuable rights of the petitioners to get fair
      compensation. It is submitted that the petitioners may not be awarded
      the interest and other statutory benefits under the Land Acquisition Act
B
      for the period of delay.
            4.1 Making the above submissions and relying upon the decisions
                of this Court in the cases of Market Committee, Hodal v.
                Krishan Murari reported in (1996) 1 SCC 311; Dhiraj
                Singh v. State of Haryana reported in (2014) 14 SCC 127;
C               and K. Subbarayudu v. Special Deputy Collector (Land
                Acquisition) reported in (2017) 12 SCC 840, it is prayed to
                condone the delay and consider the special leave petitions on
                merits.
             5. All these applications are vehemently opposed by the learned
D     Advocates appearing on behalf of respondent no.3 – Uttar Pradesh State
      Industrial Development Corporation (UPSIDC) and on behalf of
      respondent no.4 – Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority.
      Counter affidavits are filed on behalf of respondent nos. 3 and 4 opposing
      the present applications for condonation of delay.
E           5.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing
                 on behalf of the respondents that there is an inordinate delay
                 of approximately 21 years in preferring the special leave
                 petitions. It is submitted that at no point of time earlier the
                 respective petitioners made any grievance with respect to
F                inadequacy of the compensation as awarded by the High Court.
            5.2 It is further submittedby the learned counsel appearing on
                behalf of the respondents that as such no sufficient cause has
                been shown explaining the huge delay of approximately 21
                years. It is submitted that merely because in view of the
G               subsequent decision in the case of lands acquired of another
                village, relying upon which the petitioners have preferred the
                present petitions, huge delay of approximately 21 years may
                not be condoned.
            5.3 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing for
                the respondents that even otherwise the reliance placed upon
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 BALJEET SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. AND OTHERS                                653
ETC. ETC. v. STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS [M. R. SHAH, J.]

       the decisions of the High Court and this Court is with respect        A
       to entirely different village, i.e., village Kasna and that too in
       respect of the land which was acquired after about four years
       of acquisition of the petitioners’ land. It is submitted that
       therefore the lands acquired of village Kasna are not
       comparable at all with respect to the lands acquired of village
                                                                             B
       Gulsitapur and Tilpta.
   5.4 It is further submitted that so far as the impugned common
       judgment and order dated 2.4.1996 is concerned, as such, the
       same has attained finality. It is submitted that not only the
       petitioners accepted the compensation but after the said
       judgment was delivered by the High Court no special leave             C
       petition has been filed by the present petitioners all these years.
       It is submitted that therefore they have acquiesced with the
       impugned common judgment and order of the High Court.
   5.5 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
       behalf of the respondents that any attempt by the present             D
       petitioners to reopen the judgment shall lead to a cascading
       effect where every one whose land has been acquired by the
       said notification with respect to the land acquired at village
       Gulsitapur and Tilpta would start demanding enhanced
       compensation @ Rs.65/- per square yard. It is submitted               E
       that similarly the other land owners whose land has been
       acquired though at different villages between the years 1985-
       1989, too start demanding the same rate of compensation.
   5.6 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
       behalf of the respondents that after the acquisition, the land is     F
       developed, infrastructure and amenities are laid. They are
       maintained. The developed land has been allotted decades
       ago. It is submitted that the rate of allotment is based on the
       cost of acquisition and the amounts spent on development,
       laying out the infrastructure. It is submitted that if the cost of
       acquisition is increased, then how this cost would now be             G
       recovered from the allottees after decades of allotment. It is
       submitted therefore that to entertain the present petitions now
       after a period of approximately 21 years and to increase the
       amount of compensation would have a cascading effect.
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654            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2019] 11 S.C.R.


A           5.7 It is further submitted that it is disputed and denied that the
                land in village Gulsitapur is superior to the land in village Kasna.
                It is submitted that the correct fact is that village Kasna is
                located on the main road, which connects Greater Noida to
                Sikanderabad, District Bulandshar, unlike the land of village
                Gulsitapur which is in the interiors.
B
            5.8 Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decisions of this
                Court by the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the
                petitioners, referred to hereinabove, is concerned, it is
                vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
                behalf of the respondents that none of the aforesaid decisions
C               of this Court shall be applicable to the facts of the case on
                hand. It is submitted that in the present case there is an
                inordinate delay of approximately 21 years. It is submitted
                that in the present case the petitioners have failed to make
                out a sufficient cause to condone the huge delay of
D               approximately 21 years in preferring the special leave petitions.
                It is submitted that in the relied upon cases this Court was
                satisfied on the sufficient cause for delay. It is submitted that
                in the relied upon cases the parity was claimed with respect
                to the land acquired under the very notification and it was
                pointed out that due to poverty and financial difficulty some
E               of the land owners whose land was acquired under the same
                notification could not prefer the appeals earlier and they
                preferred the appeals subsequently and claimed parity of
                compensation at par with the lands acquired under the very
                notification. It is submitted that in the present case the
F               petitioners are claiming the parity in compensation with respect
                to the land acquired of another village and that too the land in
                the said village was acquired after a period of four years and
                location wise etc.the lands are different. It is submitted that
                therefore on facts the same shall not be applicable to the
                facts of the case on hand.
G
            5.9 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss the
                present applications for condonation of delay and consequently
                dismiss the special leave petitions as barred by limitation.
             6. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective
H     parties at length.
  BALJEET SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. AND OTHERS                                 655
 ETC. ETC. v. STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS [M. R. SHAH, J.]

      6.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted that as such there is an   A
          inordinate delay of approximately 21 years in preferring the
          special leave petitions before this Court challenging the
          impugned common judgment and order passed by the High
          Court which has been passed in the year 1996. It is required
          to be noted that the notification under Section 4 of the Land
                                                                               B
          Acquisition Act with respect to the land situated in village
          Gulsitapur and Tilpta was issued in the year 1985; possession
          was taken over in the month of January, 1987; the Land
          Acquisition Officer declared the award in the year 1988
          awarding compensation at the rate of Rs.8-10 per square yard.
          At the instance of the petitioners herein - the original land        C
          owners, reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition
          Act was made to the reference Court. By judgment and
          award dated 22.3.1993, the reference Court enhanced the
          compensation to Rs.30/- per square yard. However, on
          appeals and considering the material on record, by the
                                                                               D
          impugned common judgment and order, the High Court reduced
          the amount of compensation to Rs. 22-20 per square yard.
          That thereafter, after a period of approximately 21 years, now
          the petitioners have preferred the present petitions claiming
          compensation at par with the compensation awarded for the
          land owners of another village Kasna. It is required to be           E
          noted that so far as the land acquisition of village Kasna is
          concerned, notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition
          Act was issued in the year 1989, i.e., after a gap of four
          years and it appears that in between certain developments
          have also taken place.
                                                                               F
       7. Having considered the averments made in the application/
applications for condonation of delay, we are of the opinion that as such
the petitioners have miserably failed to make out a case to condone the
huge delay of approximately 21 years. No sufficient cause has been
shown to condone the huge delay of approximately 21 years. It is required
to be noted that as such in the application itself it is submitted by the      G
petitioners that there is an inordinate delay in approaching this Court.
The only explanation in approaching this Court after about 21 years is
given in paragraph 3 of the application, which reads as under:

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656      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 11 S.C.R.


A     “That the primary reason in not approaching this Hon’ble Court in
      time was the fact that it was only in December, 2016, the claimants
      pertaining to village Kasana got the enhanced compensation from
      this Hon’ble Court to the tune of Rs.65/- per sq. yard. The
      petitioners herein came to know about the said fact in the month
      of January, 2017 causing not only lots of heartburn but spelling
B
      miseries over them. It took not only lots of courage in mustering
      support from number of affected families but also it took time for
      the petitioners to collectively file the instant special leave petition
      claiming not only the enhanced compensation but also parity with
      regard to the compensation awarded to their co-villagers at village
C     Kasana.”
      7.1 That thereafter the petitioners have stated that though there is
      a reasonable case made out by the petitioners to get the enhanced
      compensation to the tune of Rs.65/- per square yard, but fairly
      enough in order to balance the equity, this Court may not grant
D     interest from the date of the judgment of the High Court i.e.,
      2.4.1996 till the filing of the special leave petitions before this
      Court. Except the explanation in paragraph 3, reproduced
      hereinabove, there is no other explanation whatsoever explaining
      the huge delay of approximately 21 years. Neither any poverty is
      pleaded nor any financial difficulty is pleaded. Nothing is on record
E     that after the impugned common judgment and order is passed by
      the High Court, the petitioners made any grievance/objection with
      respect to inadequacy of the compensation determined by the
      High Court. On the contrary, all the petitioners have accepted
      the compensation as per the judgment and award passed by the
F     reference Court determining the compensation at the rate of Rs.30/
      - per square yard. It appears that with respect to some of the
      land owners even the execution petitions are pending with respect
      to recovery of the differential amount of compensation, determined
      by the reference Court and the High Court as by the impugned
      common judgment and order the High Court has reduced the
G     compensation from Rs.30-/ per sq. yard to Rs.22/- per sq. yard.
      Be that as it may, the fact remains that after the impugned common
      judgment and order is passed by the High Court, no grievance at
      all is made by the petitioners with respect to inadequacy of the

H
  BALJEET SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. AND OTHERS                                    657
 ETC. ETC. v. STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS [M. R. SHAH, J.]

       compensation determined by the High Court. Thus, it can be said            A
       that for a period of approximately 21 years no grievance was
       made by the petitioners. Therefore, considering the terms of
       doctrine of acquiescence, the petitioners lose their right to complain.
       This principle is based on the doctrine of acquiescence implying
       that in such a case the party who did not make any objection
                                                                                  B
       acquiesced into the alleged wrongful act of the other party and
       therefore has no right to complain against that alleged wrong.
       8. The matter requires examination from another aspect, viz.,
laches and delay. It is a very recognised principle of jurisprudence that
a right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Even when there is
no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain                C
proceedings, in such cases, courts have coined the doctrine of laches
and delay as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the litigants
who approached the court belatedly without any justifiable explanation
for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. In those cases, where
the period of limitation is prescribed within which the action is to be           D
brought before the court, if the action is not brought within that prescribed
period, the aggrieved party losesremedy and cannot enforce his legal
right after the period of limitation is over, however, subject to the prayer
for condonation of delay and if there is a justifiable explanation for bringing
the action after the prescribed period of limitation is over and sufficient
cause is shown, the court may condone the delay. Therefore, in a case             E
where the period of limitation is prescribed and the action is not brought
within the period of limitation and subsequently proceedings are initiated
after the period of limitation along with the prayer for condonation of
delay, in that case, the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause and
justify the cause for delay with a proper explanation. It is not that in          F
each and every case despite the sufficient cause is not shown and the
delay is not properly explained, the court may condone the delay. To
make out a case for condonation of delay, the applicant has to make out
a sufficient cause/reason which prevented him in initiating the proceedings
within the period of limitation. Otherwise, he will be accused of gross
negligence. If the aggrieved party does not initiate the proceedings within       G
the period of limitation without any sufficient cause, he can be denied
the relief on the ground of unexplained laches and delay and on the
presumption that such person has waived his right or acquiesced with

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658            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 11 S.C.R.


A     the order. These principles are based on the principles relatable to sound
      public policy that if a person does not exercise his right for a long time
      then such right is non-existent.
             9. Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decisions of this
      Court in the cases of Market Committee, Hodal(supra); Dhiraj Singh
B     (supra); and K. Subbarayudu (supra), relied upon by the learned
      Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners is concerned, having
      gone through the said decisions, we are of the opinion that none of the
      said decisions shall be applicable to the facts of the case on hand and/or
      the said decisions shall be of any assistance to the petitioners. First of
      all, in the relied upon cases, there was no such inordinate delay of
C     approximately 21 years. In the relied upon cases, this Court was satisfied
      on the sufficient cause for delay. In the relied upon cases, parity was
      claimed with respect to the land acquired under the very notification and
      it was pointed out that due to poverty and financial difficulty some of the
      land owners whose land was acquired under the same notification could
D     not prefer the appeals earlier and thereafter they preferred the appeals
      subsequently and claimed parity of compensation at par with the land
      acquired under the same notification. It is also required to be noted that
      as such in none of the aforesaid decisions, this Court had dealt with and/
      or considered the adverse impact/effect on the State/acquiring body if
      after inordinate delay/laches the State/acquiring body is directed to pay
E     the enhanced amount of compensation. In the present case, lands were
      acquired as far back as in the year 1985 and the award by the Special
      Land Acquisition Officer was declared in the year 1988. The reference
      Court enhanced the amount of compensation to Rs.30/- per square yard,
      which came to be reduced by the High Court by the impugned common
F     judgment and order in the year 1996.It is required to be noted that the
      lands were acquired for Industrial development purposes. That after the
      acquisition, the land has been developed, infrastructure and amenities
      are laid and the developed land has been allotted approximately before
      30 years. It is the specific case on behalf of the respondents that the
      rate of allotment was based on the cost of acquisition and the amount
G     spent on development, laying out the infrastructure. Therefore, if the
      cost of acquisition is increased now and the State/acquiring body is
      directed to pay enhanced compensation, in that case, it would be very
      difficult to recover the difference of amount of compensation from the
      allottees after decades of allotment. The acquiring body will have to
H
   BALJEET SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. AND OTHERS                                 659
  ETC. ETC. v. STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS [M. R. SHAH, J.]

make additional budgetary provision and as observed hereinabove it would        A
be very difficult for the acquiring body to recover the difference of
compensation from the allottees after so many years. All these aspects
and the cascading effect on the State/acquiring body if they are directed
to pay the additional compensation after number of years, have not been
considered by this Court in the aforesaid decisions relied upon by the
                                                                                B
learned Advocate for the petitioners. Even if the petitioners are denied
the interest and/or the other statutory benefits for the delayed period as
requested by the learned counsel for the petitioners, in that case also, to
direct the State/acquiring body to pay the enhanced amount of
compensation after number of years (21 years) would be unreasonable
and would have a financial burden upon them and as observed hereinabove         C
it would be very difficult for the State/acquiring body to recover the
same from the allottees. Under the circumstances, none of the aforesaid
decisions shall be applicable to the facts of the case on hand and/or the
same shall not be of any assistance to the petitioners.
       10. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, we            D
refuse to condone the huge delay of 7534, 7542 and 7886 days
respectively in filing the special leave petitions. Accordingly, the
applications for condonation of delay stand dismissed. Consequently, all
these special leave petitions are dismissed on the ground of limitation.
However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no
order as to costs.                                                              E


Nidhi Jain                                                    SLPs dismissed.



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