Holding

A demand for dowry includes any demand for property or valuable security, irrespective of an agreement at marriage, and the proximity of the harassment to the death satisfies the "soon before" test, thus upholding the conviction.

Summary

Baldev Singh was convicted under Section 304‑B IPC for the death of his wife Satwant Kaur, who died by poisoning within two years of marriage. The prosecution proved that she was repeatedly harassed for dowry, including demands for a fridge, TV and a cash amount, in addition to a claim on her share of ancestral property. The trial court sentenced both Baldev Singh and his mother to ten years' rigorous imprisonment; the High Court upheld Baldev Singh's conviction but acquitted the mother. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that a dowry demand need not be tied to an agreement at marriage and includes any demand for property or valuable security; the evidence satisfied the "soon before" requirement through a proximity test, and circumstantial evidence was sufficient for conviction. The Court affirmed the conviction but reduced the sentence to the statutory minimum of seven years.

Issues considered

Whether a demand for a share in ancestral property can be treated as a dowry demand under Section 304‑B IPC and the Dowry Prohibition Act.
Whether the "soon before" requirement for dowry death is satisfied and how the term should be interpreted.
Whether conviction can be sustained on circumstantial evidence without proof of an explicit dowry agreement.
Whether the ten‑year custodial sentence imposed was appropriate under the law.

Legislation cited

Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961s. 2, s. 3, s. 4
Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 113-B, s. 114
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 304-B, s. 498A

Subjects

dowry deathSection 304-B IPC"soon before" testproximity testdowry demandcircumstantial evidencecustodial sentenceDowry Prohibition Act

Judgment

I-
[2008] 11 S.C.R. 828 I

~....-'
A BALDEV SINGH I

v.
STATE OF PUNJAB
(Criminal Appeal No. 1214 of 2008) r
AUGUST 4, 2008
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND HARJIT SINGH BEDI, JJ.]
'1

Penal Code, 1860 - s. 3048:
Dowry death - Proximity test - Held: There must be ma-
c terial to show that "soon before" death, the victim was subjected fl

to cruelty or harassment- Prosecution has to rule out the pos-
sibility of natural or accidental death so as to bring it within
purview of 'death occurring otherwise than in normal circum-
stances' - On facts, demand for wife's share in estate of her
D late father did not amount to dowry demand, but other demands
and documentary evidence clearly established demand for
dowry - Conviction of husband as recorded by Courts below '<(
~,

sustained - Custodial sentence of 7 years - Evidence Act,
1872 - ss.113-8 and 114.
E Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 - s.2:
Demand of dowry - Held: The demand neither conceives
nor would conceive of any agreement - If for convicting any of-
fender, agreement for dowry is to be proved, hardly any offender
F would come under the clutches of Jaw - "Dowry" definition is to be
interpreted with the other provisions of the Act including S. 3. Words
and Phrases- "soon before" - Meaning of- In context to s.3048, ..
/PC and s. 1138 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
The wife of the appellant died within two years of mar-
G riage allegedly in unnatural circumstances. According to
the prosecution, deceased was being harassed for not
bringing adequate dowry and though some of the de-
mands were satisfied by relatives of the deceased, the 'YA
demands persisted and on account of such persistent de-
H 828
BALDEV SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 829

mands, the deceased felt harassed and consumed poi- A
son and ultimately died as a result thereof.
The evidence of PW4 (brother of the deceased) and
PW5 was to the effect that the demand of dowry was made
just before the deceased committed suicide.
Trial Court, by placing reliance upon the evidence 'of
PWs 4 and 5, held Appellant and his mother guilty. On
appeal, High Court upheld the conviction of Appellant but
directed acquittal of his mother.
In appeal before this Court, Appellant contended that C
that there has to be an agreement at the time of the mar-
riage for dowry, and in absence of any such evidence it
would not constitute to be a dowry. He contended that
his wife was deprived of her legitimate share in the estate
of her late father and because of this, she was in mental D
depression, leading her to committing suicide and that if
Appellant on behalf of his wife had asked for her legiti-
mate share in such estate that does not amount to dowry
demand. Additionally, it was submitted that custodial sen-
tence of 10 years as imposed upon him was harsh. E
Disposing of the appeal, the Court
HELD:1.1.The offence alleged against the accused
is under Section 304-B IPC which makes "demand of
dowry" itself punishable. Demand neither conceives nor F
would conceive of any agreement. If for convicting any
offender, agreement for dowry is to be proved, hardly any
offenders would come under the clutches of law. When
Section 304-B refers to "demand of dowry", it refers to
the demand of property or valuable security as referred G
to in the definition of "dowry" under the Dowry Prohibi-
tion Act, 1961. The argument that there is no demand of
dowry, in the instant case, has no force. In cases of dowry
deaths and suicides, circumstantial evidence plays an
important role and inferences can be drawn on the basis H
830 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.

A of such evidence. That could be either direct or indirect.
Significantly, Section 4 of the Act was also amended, un-
der which it is an offence to demand dowry dir.ectly or
indirectly from the parents or other relatives or guardian
of a bride. The word "agreement" referred to in s.2 of the
B said Act has to be inferred on the facts and circumstances
of each case. The interpretation that the accused seek,
that conviction can only be if there is agreement for dowry,
is misconceived. This would be. contrary to the mandate
and object of the Act. "Dowry" definition is to be inter-
C preted with the other provisions of the Act including Sec-
tion 3,· which refers to giving or taking dowry, and Sec-
tion 4 which deals with a penalty for demanding dowry,
under the Act and the IPC. This makes it clear that,even
demand of dowry on other ingredients being satisfied is
punishable. It is not always necessary that there be any
D agreement for dowry. [Para· 111 [839 D,E,F,G,H, 840 A,B]
1.2. As per the definition of 'dowry death' in Section
304-B IPC and the wording in the presump~ive Section
113-B of the Evidence Act, one of the essential ingredi-
E ents, amongst others, in both the provisions is that the
concerned woman must have been "soon before her
death" subjected to cruelty or harassment "for or in con-
nection with the demand of dowry". Presumption under
Section 113-B is a presumption of law. On proof of the
F essentials mentioned therein, it becomes obligatory on
the Court to raise.a presumption that the accused caused
the dowry death. The presumption shall .be raised only
on proof of the following essentials: (1) The question be-
fore the Court must Qe whether the ac.cused has commit-
G ted the dowry death of a woman. (This means that the
presumption can be raised only ,if the accused is being
tried for the offence under Section 304-B IPC); (2) The
woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment. bY ~er
husband or his relatives; .(3) Such cruelty or harassment
was for, or in connection with any demand for dowry and
H
BALDEV SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 831

(4) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death. A
[Para 12 ] [840 H, 841 A,B,C,D,E]
1.3. A conjoint reading of Section 113-B of the Evi-
dence Act and Section 304-B IPC shows that there must
be material to show that soon before her death the victim
was subjected to cruelty or harassment. Prosecution has 8
to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death
so as to bring it ~ithin the purview of the 'death occur-
ring otherwise than in normal circumstances'. The expres-
sion 'soon before' is very relevant where Section 113-B
of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC are pressed C
into service. Prosecution is obliged to show that soon
before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment
and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in
that regard has to be led by prosecution. 'Soon before' is
a relative term and it would depend upon circumstances D
of each case and no strait-jacket formula can be laid down
as to what would constitute a period of soon before the
occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed
period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity
test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as E
well as for raising a presumption under Section 113-B of
the Evidence Act. [Para 13] [841 E,F,G,H 842 A,B]
1.4. The expression 'soon before her death' used in
.the substantive Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of
the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. F
No definite period has been indicated and the expression
'soon before' is not defined. The determination of the pe-
riod which can come within the term 'soon before' is left
to be determined by the Courts, depending upon facts
and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to in- G
dicate that the expression 'soon before' would normally
imply that the interval should not be much between the
concerned cruelty or harassment and the death in ques-
tion. There must be existence of a proximate and five-link
between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and H
I

832 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.

1( _,..,.
A the concerned death. If alleged incident of cruelty is re-
mote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb
mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be
of no consequence. [Para 13] [842 A,B,C,D,E]
1.5. It is true that demanding of share of Appellant's
B wife in the ancestral property will ~not amount to a dowry
demand, but the evidence of PW.4 and PW.5 shows de- -f
mands in addition to demand for her share in the ances-
trai property. Certain letters which were brought on record
clearly establish the demand for dowry. The c9nviction
c as recorded by the Trial Court and upheld by High Court
does not warrant any interference. However, the custo-
dial sentence appears to be on the higher side. The same
is reduced to the minimum prescribed i.e. 7 years. [Para
14] [842 F,G,H]
·o
Pawan Kumar and Ors. v. State of Haryana (1998 (3) SCC
. 309).:. referred to.
Case Law Reference " '"
1998 (3) sec 309 referred to Para to
E
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 1214 of 2008
From the final Judgment and Order dated 29.3.2007 of
the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Crimi-
F nal Appeal No. 486-SB of 1994
Sanjay Jain for the Appellant.
.... ""'
A.K. Mehta, Bhumika Tandon and Kuldip Singh for the Re-
spondent.
G
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1'. Leave granted.
_,,,,.--
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the Judgment of a learned
Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismi~s-
H
BALDEV SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 833
~ ')I [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

ing the appeal filed by the appellant, while directing acquittal of A
the co-accused. Learned Sessions Judge, Amritsar, had con-
victed both, the present appellant and Surjit Kaur for the offence
punishable under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(in short "IPC") and had sentenced each of them to undergo rig-
orous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- B
in default of payment of fine to further undergo rigorous imprison-
ment for three months. It is to be noted that Narinder Kaur had
faced trial along with the appellant Baldev Singh and Surjit Kaur
but was acquitted of the charges by the trial court.
3. The case of the prosecution is as under:- c
Satwant Kaur @ Bholi was the sister of Rachhpal Singh
(PW-4) and was married with Baldev Singh accused on
8.6.1991. Within about a month of their marriage, differences
cropped up between the deceased and her husband as the
D
mother-in-law and husband of the deceased started demand-
ing a fridge and a T.V. Within three days.of the marriage, the
mother of Bholi had died, at the anniversary of their mother's
death, Rachhpal Singh (PW-4) had collected a sum of
Rs.12,000/- from the sale of paddy and Rs.8,000/- after
encashing the National Saving Certificates and had given an E
amount of Rs.20,000/- to Baldev Singh. According to the com-
plainant, for two months, after the payment there was no quar-
rel, but thereafter accused Baldev Singh, his mother Surjit Kaur
and sister Narinder Kaur again started saying that at the time of
~

~ the marriage adequate jewellery had not been given. The result F
was that the witness had again collected a sum of Rs.20,000/-
by encashing the Fixed Deposit Receipt and paid the amount
to Baldev Singh. In the month of October, 1992, accused Baldev
Singh had fixed a date for the marriage of his younger brother
and as the father of Rachhpal Singh (PW-4) and Satwant Kaur G
had died, Baldev Singh accused started asking for his share in
_._,_ .)'- the estate of his father-in-law. In view of this, Rachhpal Singh
and his brothers Nirmal Singh and Avtar Singh had gone to the
house of Satwant Kaur and there they tried to persuade the
accused and other members of the family not to harass Satwant H
834 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.

A Kaur @ Bholi and assured them that in due course they would
meet whatever was demanded by him. At this time Baldev Singh
and the members of his family had told that they were not de-
manding any specific piece of land and that they would be sat-
isfied in case an amount of Rs.1,00,000/-was given. Rachhpal
s Singh (PW-4) had then told accused Baldev Singh that they had
decided to hol.d the anniversary of his father's death on 13th
September, 1992 and they would pay the accused the amount
of Rs.1,00,000/- on that day. The details regarding the harass-
ment that was being faced by Satwant Kaur were communi-
C cated by her to her brother Rachhpal Singh from time to time in
various letters that were1written by her. In these letters, (Ex. PW-
4/A to Ex. PW-4/D) Satwant Kaur had given the details of the
demands by her husband and in-laws and she had also been
apprising her brothers of the treatment given to her by her
mother-in-law, sister-in-law and the husband whenever she met
0
them. On 2.9.1992 Rachhpal Singh had received a letter writ-
ten by Satwant Kaur. This letter had been brought from Amritsar
to Chandigarh by the wife of Amrik Singh, who in turn, had taken
it to Pinjore to deliver the same to Rachhpal Singh. After going
through the letter Rachhpal Singh had become very upset and
E had left for Amritsar and reached there about 7-8 P.M. During
the night, he had stayed at the house of his second sister and in
the morning of 3.9.1992 he had gone to the house of Satwant
Kaur along with his brother-in-law Narinder Singh. On reaching
the house, he found that Satwant Kaur was lying on a cot while
F her husband, sister-in-law and mother-in-law were standing
nearby. On seeing him, Satwant Kaur had again indicated that
the accused had harassed and beaten her regarding her in-
ability to bring more money. She had also told Rachhpal Singh
(PW-4) that she had consumed some poisonous substance as
G a result of which, she would die and requested him to ensure
that the accused did not escape the rigours of law. At this point
of time, Rachhpal Singh found the attitude of the accused very
hostile and had told Narinder Singh that they should try to move
out of the house and come back with some more relatives.
H Thereafter Rachhpal Singh and Narinder Singh had gone away
BALDEV SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 835
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
~. --,.
from the house of the accused and with some relatives returned A
there at about 9.30 A.M. When they reached the house, they
found that none of the accused was present in the house and
even Satwant Kaur was not present there. On enquiry, it tran-
spired that Satwant Kaur had been removed by the accused
but the neighbourers were not certain whether Satwant Kaur B
was dead or alive. Fearing that.the accused may try to burn the
dead body, the witness first went to the cremation ground and
thereafter to various doctors. At about 6/6.15 P. M. they reached
Guru Nanak Dev Hospital and found ASI Amrik Singh going in-
side and before him Rachhpal Singh made statement Ex. PW- c
4/A, which was reduced into writing and signed by the witness.
He then accompanied the police to the mortuary, where he saw
the-dead body of Satwant Kaur.
Assistant Sub Inspector Amrik Singh (PW-7) had gone to
Guru Nanak Dev Hospital, Amritsar after receipt of information D

, ., regarding the death of Satwant Kaur and on reaching the hospi-
tal, had met Rachhpal Singh (PW-4) and recorded his statement.
He thereafter made his endorsement thereon and sent the same
to the police station for recording the formal FIR, Ex. PW-7/B. He
had gone to the mortuary, prepared inquest report Ex. PW-1/B E
and got done the post-mortem on the dead body. Dr. R.K. Gorea
(Pw-1) conducted the post mortem examination on 4.9.1992 at
5.00 P.M., who gave his opinion that the cause of death in this
case was due to poisoning with organo phosphorus group of in-
secticide, which was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary F
j_
course of nature. The Investigating Officer recorded the state-
ments of the witnesses and prepared rough site plan. On comple-
tion of necessary investigation, accused were sent up for trial.
After the charge sheet was filed under Section 304-B IPC,
trial was held as the accused persons pleaded innocence. In G
order to prove its case, the prosecution examined 7 witnesses.
In the statements recorded under Section 313 of the Code of
--. ~ Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short 'Cr.P.C.'), accused persons
took the stand that they were falsely implicated in this case.
H
836 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R. le

'
~--
A The trial court relied upon the evidence of PW.4 and PW.5
and found that their evidence was clear and cogent to the effect
that the deceased was being harassed for not bringing adequate
dowry and though some of the demands were satisfied by the
relatives, the demands persisted. On account of such persis-
B tent demands, the deceased felt harassed and consumed poi-
son and had ultimately died as a result thereof. With reference
to the evidence of Dr. R.K. Gorea, PW.1, it was noted that the
death of the deceased was as a result of consuming organo
phosphorus group of insecticide and the death was unnatural
c and had taken place within 7 years of the date of marriage. The
trial court, accordingly, found the appellant and Surjit Kaur guilty
while directing acquittal of Narinder Kaur.
In appeal, the stand taken by the appellant was that with a
view to falsely implicate the accused persons, the case was
D lodged. It was submitted that the deceased was deprived of
her legitimate share in the ancestral property and because of
this she was in mental depression leading to her committing ~

suicide. It was pointed out that if the appellant on behalf of the
deceased had asked for her legitimate share in the ancestral
E property that does not amount to dowry demand. The prosecu-
tion, on the other hand, relied on the evidence of PW.4 and PW.5
to show that the demand was not restricted only to the share in
the ancestral properties but also to the other demands which
were nothing but dowry demands. The High Court found sub-
F stance in the plea of the prosecution and upheld the conviction.
_._
4. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant
submitted that the evidence of PW.4 and PW.5 should not have
been relied upon. The stand taken before the High Court that the
demand related to the share in the ancestral property and cannot
G be termed as dowry demand was reiterated. Additionally, it was
submitted that custodial sentence of 10 years as imposed is harsh.
5. Learned counsel for the Respondent-State, on the other ....----
hand, supported the judgment of the trial court as upheld by the
High Court qua the appellant.
H
BALDEV SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 837
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

6. In order to attract Section 3048 IPC, the following in- A
gredients are to be ~atisfied.
i) The death of a woman must have been caused by
burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal
circumstances.
B
~ ii) Such death must have occurred within 7 years of the
marriage.
iii) Soon before her death, the woman must have been
subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband
or any relative of her husband; and c
iv) Such cruelty or harassment must be in connection
with the demand of dowry.
7. In the instant case the marriage took place on 8.6.1991
and the death took place on 3.9.1992 other than in normal cir- 0
cumstances within 7 years of the marriage. The evidence of
1 PW.4 and PW.5 were to the effect that the demand of dowry
was made just before the deceased committed suicide.
8. Sections 3048 and Section 498A read as follows:
"304-8. Dowry Death- (1) Where the death of a woman is E
caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise
than under normal circumstances within seven years of
her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death
she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband
or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with any F
,. t. demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death"
and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have
caused her death.
Explanation - For the purpose of this sub-section 'dowry'
shall have same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry G
Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961 ).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven
years but which may extend to imprisonment for life." H·
838 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.

~
A "498-A: Husband or relative of husband of a woman
subjecting her to cruelty- Whoever, being the husband or
the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such
woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for
a term which may extend to three years and shall also be
B liable to fine.
Explanation - For the purpose of this section 'cruelty'
means -
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely
to drive the wbrnan to commit suicide or to cause grave ·
c injury or danger to life, limb or hea'lth (whether mental or
physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is
with a view to Qoercing her or any person related to her to
D meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable
security or is on account of failure by her or any person
related to her to meet such demand." .
9. The term "dowry" has been defined in Section 2 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (in short 'Dowry Act') as under:-
E
"Section 2. Definition of 'dowry: - In this Act, 'dowry' means
any property or valuable security given or agreed to be
given either directly or indirectly -
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to
F the marriage; or
Ji
(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by
any other person, to either party to the marriage or
to any other person,

G at or before or any time after the marriage in connection
with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include
dower or mehr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim
personal law (Shariat) applies. ~

Explanation !- For the removal of doubts, it is hereby
H declared that any presents made at the time of a marriage
BALDEV SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 839
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
"' y
to either party to the marriage in the form of cash, ornaments, A
clothes or other articles, shall not be deemed to be dowry
within the meaning of this section, unless they are made as
consideration for the marriage of the said parties.
Explanation II- The expression 'valuable security' has the
same meaning in Section 30 of the Indian Penal Code B
(45 of 1860)."
10. Explanation to Section 304-B refers te dowry "as hav-
ing the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Act", the question
is : what is the periphery of the dowry as defined therein ? The
argument is, there has to be an agreement at the time of the
c
marriage in view of the words "agreed to be given" occurring
therein, and in the absence of any such evidence it would not
constitute to be a dowry. It is noticeable, as this definition by
amendment includes not only the period before and at the mar-
riage but also the period subsequent to the marriage. This po- 0
)'
sition was highlighted in Pawan Kumar and Ors. v. State of
Haryana (1998 (3) SCC 309).
11. The offence alleged against the accused is· under Sec-
tion 304-B IPC which makes "demand of dowry" itself punish-
able. Demand neither conceives nor would conceive of any E
agreement. If for convicting any offender, agreement for dowry
is to be proved, hardly any offenders would come under the
clutches of law. When Section 304-B refers to "demand of
dowry", it refers to the demand of property or valuable security
as referred to in the definition of "dowry" under the Act. The ar- F
)l
gument that there is no demand of dowry, in the present case,
has no force. In cases of dowry deaths and suicides, circum-
stantial evidence plays an important role and inferences can be
drawn on the basis of such evidence. That could be either di-
rect or indirect. It is significant that Section 4 of the Act, was G
also amended by means of Act 63of1984, under which it is an
offence to demand dowry directly or indirectly from the parents
~ r or other relatives or guardian of a bride. The word "agreement"
referred to in Section 2 has to be inferred on the facts and cir-
cumstances of each case. The interpretation that the accused
H
840 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.
>( -
A seek-, that conviction can only be if there is agreement for dowry,
is misconceived. This would be contrary to the mandate and
object of the Act. "Dowry" definition is to be interpreted with the
other provisions of the Act including Section 3, which refers to
giving .or taking dowry and Section 4 which deals with a penalty
B fordemanding
.•
dowry, under the Act and the IPC. This makes it
clear that even demand of dowry on other ingredients being
satisfied is punishable. It is not always necessary that there be
any agreement for dowry.
}
12. Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is also relevant for
c the case at hand. Both Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B
of the Evidence Act were inserted as noted earlier by the Dowry
P.rohibition (Amendment) Act 43 of 1986 with a view to combat
the increasing menace of dowry deaths. Section 113-B reads·
as follows:-
D "113-8: Presumption as to dowry death- When the
Cluestion is whether a person has committed the dowry
death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her "'
death. such woman has been subjected by such person to
cruelty .or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand
E for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had
caused the dowry death.
Explanation - For the purposes of this section 'dowry
death' shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B
of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)."
F
. The necessity for insertion of the two provisions has been Ji.
amply analysed by the Law Commission of India in its 21s1 Re-
port dated 1Qth August, 1988 on 'Dowry Deaths and Law Re-
form'. Keeping in view the impediment in the pre-existing law in
securing evidence to prove dowry related deaths, legislature
G thought it wise to insert a provision relating to presumption of
dowry death on proof of certain essentials. It is in this back- ....
ground presumptive Section 113-B in the Evidence Act has been -"'( _,_.
inserted. As per the definition of 'dowry death' in Section 304-B
IPC and the wording in the presumptive Section 113-B of the
H Evidence Act, one of the essential ingredients, amongst oth-
BALDEV SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 841
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
~ ,..
ers, in both the provisions is that the concerned woman must A
have been "soon before her death" subjected to cruelty or ha-
rassment "for or in connection with the demand of dowry". Pre-
sumption under Section 113-B is a presumption of law. On proof
of the essentials mentioned therein, it becomes obligatory on
the Court to raise a presumption that the accused cause9 the B
r dowry death. The presumption shall be raise~ only on proof of
the following essentials:

(1) The question before the Court must be whether the
accused has committed the dowry death of a woman.
(This means that the presumption can be raised only c
if the accused is being tried for the offence under
Section 304-B IPC).
(2) The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment
by her husband or his relatives.
D
(3) Such cruelty or harassment was for, or in connection
-\
)' with any demand for dowry.
(4) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her
death.
E
13. A conjoint reading of Section 113-B of the Evidence
Act and Section 304-B IPC shows· that there must be material
to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to
cruelty or harassment. Prosecution has to rule out the possibil-
.
ll
ity of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the F
l
~
purview of the 'death occurring otherwise than in normal cir-
J
cumstances'. The expression 'soon before' is very relevant
where Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B
IPC are pressed into service. Prosecution is obliged to show
that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harass-
G
ment and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in
that regard has to be led by prosecution. 'Soon before' is a
,_ relative term and it would depend upon circumstances of each
r
case and no strait-jacket formula can be laid down as to what
would constitute a period of soon before the occurrence. It would
H
842 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R. ~

y .~

A be hazardous to indicate any fixed period, and that brings in the
imp.ortance of a proximity test both for_the proof of an offence of
dowry death as well as for raising a presumption under Section
113-B of the Evidence Act. The. expression 'soon before her
death' used in the substantive Section 304-B IPC and Section
B 113-B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity ,
~

test. No definite. period has been indicated and the expression '1
'soon before' is not defined. A reference to expression 'soon
before' used in Section 114. Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act
is relevant. It lays down that a Court may presume that a man
c who is in the possession of goods 'soon after the theft, is either
the thief has received the goods knowing them to be stolen,
unless he can account for his possession. The determination of
the period which can come within the term 'soon before' is left
to be determined by the Courts, depending upon facts and cir-
cumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the
D
expression 'soon before' would normally imply that the interval
should not be much between the concerned cruelty or harass- t"
~ •
ment and the death in question. There must be existence of a
proximate and live-link between the effect of cruelty based on
dowry demand and the concerned death. If alleged incident of
E cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to
disturb mental equilibrium -of the woman concerned, it would be
of no consequence.
14. It is true that demanding of her share in the ancestral
F property will not amount to a dowry demand, but the evidence ~
of PW.4 and PW.5 shows that the demands were in addition to .J
J(
the demand for her share in the ancestral property. Certain let-
ters which were brought on record clearly establish the demand
for dowry. The conviction as recorded by the trial court and up-
held by the High Court does not warrant any interference. How-
G
ever, the custodial sentence appears to be on the higher side.
The same is reduced to the minimum prescribed i.e. 7 years. In
· the ultimate result, with the modification of sentence, the ap- _,,..;
peal stands disposed of.

H B.B.B. Appeal disposed of.