Holding

The Accountant General, having been vested with the power to appoint Accounts Officers, is the appropriate authority to order compulsory retirement, but the order was invalid because it was not based on relevant material and failed to satisfy the public interest requirement.

Summary

Baldev Raj, an Accounts Officer appointed by the Comptroller and Auditor General, was compulsorily retired on 27 August 1975 under F.R. 56(j)(i) by the Accountant General in the name of public interest. He challenged the retirement, arguing that the Accountant General was not the "appropriate authority" and that the decision was not based on relevant material. The Supreme Court held that, pursuant to a 1972 Finance Ministry notification, the Accountant General had been vested with the power to appoint Accounts Officers and therefore was the appropriate authority for retirement. However, the Court found that the order ignored vital recent service records and relied on obsolete adverse remarks, rendering the decision unreasonable and not truly in public interest. Consequently, the order of compulsory retirement was quashed and the appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

Whether the Accountant General is the 'appropriate authority' under F.R. 56(j)(i) to order compulsory retirement of an Accounts Officer.
Whether the compulsory retirement order was made in public interest and based on relevant material.
Whether the power to retire under F.R. 56(j)(i) violates Article 311 of the Constitution.
Whether the recommendations of the Reviewing Committee affect the validity of the retirement order.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 311
Fundamental Ruless. 56(j)(i)

Subjects

compulsory retirementappropriate authoritypublic interestFundamental Rulescivil serviceadministrative lawArticle 311judicial review

Judgment

430
I

BALDEV RAJ CHADHA

UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
August 18, 1980.
[ V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ. ].

F. R. Rule 56(j)(i)-·Compu[sory retirement-·Officer with continuous service of
14 years and crossing efficiency bar whether can be compulsorily retired-Appropriate
authority-Retiring authority-Meaning of.
The appellant, an accounts officer, was promoted and appointed by the
Comptroller and Auditor General of India. He was compulsorily retired . on 27
August, 1975 in the public interest under F. R. Ruic 56[i] [i] by the Accountant
General. The appellant chellenged his premature retirement in the High Court
by a Writ Petition which was dismissed in limine. In his appeal by Special
Leave, the appellant challenged the order of retirement and argued that (i) the.
Accountant General is not "appropriate· authority" within the meaning of the rule
and (ii) the retirement was not in the public interest. The respondent contended
that (i) the power of the appropriate authority in respect of accounts officers like
the appellant . was vested in the Auditor General by Notification of the Ministry of
Finance dated 19-1-1972 and (ii) the impugned order of compulsory retirement was made
by the Accountant General on the basis of the recommendations dated 23-8-1975 of the
Reviewing Committee.
Allowing the appeal ,

HELD : An officer with continuous service for 14 years crossing the efficiency bar
ani re1ching the maximum salary in the scale and with no adverse entries at least for five
·years immediately before the compulsory retirement cannot be cashiered on the score that
Jong )ears ago, his performance had been poor, although his superiors had allowed him
to cross the efficiency bar without qualms. The order of compulsory retirement fails because
vital material, relevant to the ~decision, had been :ignored and obsolete material, Jess
relevent to the decision, has influenced the decision.
Any .order which materially suffers from the blemish of overlooking or ignoring
wilfully or otherwise vital facts bearing on the decision is bad i.n Jaw. Likewise, any
action irrationally digs up obsolete circumstances and obsessively reaches a decision
based thereon cannot be sustained.
The Fundamental Rules govern the Central Civil Services and ensure the career
security which is the sine qua non of contended service. But potential compulsory retire-
ment under F. R. 56(j)(i) haunting the afternoon of official life injects an awesome uncer-
tainty which makes even the honesi afraid, .the efficient tremble and almost everyone
genuflect, and is not a happy prospeet for a Civil Servant too young to sit idle and too old
to get a new job. A jetsam has no option but to become driftwood or join the other pro-
fe'5i:>n where every:me, de>irable an:l undesirable, has a· chance. This deleterious latency
BALDEV RAJ v. UNION 431

of F.R. 56GJ(i) is stressed to underscore the unwitting harm· to public interest A
it does in the name of public interest. Judicial monitoring becomes an un-
pleasant necessity where power may be humour and a career may be a victim.
[432 E-GT
The order to retire must be passed only by the appropriate authority.
That authority must form the· requisite opinion-not subjective satisfaction but
-0bjective and bona fide and based on releva,nt material. The requisite opinion
is that the retirement of the victim is in public interest not personal political B
-or other interest but solely governed by the int~rest, of public service. The
Tight to retire is not absolutely, though so worded. [433 C-D]
Since the A. G. has been clothed, from 29-11-1972 with power to appoint
·substantively Accounts Officers, he has become the appropriate authority for
compulsory retirement even though the appellant had been appointed by the
C & AG prior to 29-11-1972. In the light of the note which is part of the
rule, read ·with the notification delegating the power to the A.G., there is no
c
Haw in the order impugned. [434 A-BJ
Ordinarily the appointing authority is also the dismissing authority but the
position may be different where retirement alone is ordered. The specific provi-
sion in the Note to FR 56 must bold good and Art. 311 is not violated
either. Nor is there any discrimination, because retirement is a category different
from the punishment covered by Art. 311. [434 CJ D
Security of tenure is the condition of efficiency of service. The Admini-
stration, to be competent, must have servants who are not plagued by un-
certainty about tomorrow. At the age of 50, your experience, accomplishment
and fulness of fitness become an asset to the Administration, if any only if
you are not harried or worried. These considerations become all the more
important in departments where functional independence, fearless scrutiny, and
· freedom t.o expose evil or error in high places is the task. And the Ombuds- E
manic tasks of the office of audit vested in the C & AG and the entire army
of monitors and minions under him are too strategic for the nation's financial
health and discipline that immunity from subtle threats and oblique over-
aweing is very much in public interest. Under the guise of public interest
if unlimited discretion is regarded acceptable for making an order of premature
retirement, it will be the surest menace of public interest and must fail for
unreasonableness, arbitrariness and disguised dismissal. The exercise of power F
must be bona fide and promote publie interest. [434 F-H, 435 A-BJ
Judges cannot substitute their judgment for that of the Administrator but
they are not absolved from the minimal review well-settled in administrative
law and founded on constitutional obligations. Administration, •o. be efficient,
must not be manned by drones, do-nothings, incompetents and unworthies. It
is in public interest to retire a never-do-well, but to juggle with confidential
reports when ,a man's career is at stake is a confidence trick contrary tu public G
interest. Confidential reports are often subjective, impressionistic and must
receive sedulous checking as basis for decisio!il making. [435 D, E-GJ
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1390/1978.
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment & Order, dated
26-3-1976 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition
No. 506/76. H
Baldev Raj in person.
CJ. R. Lalit and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent.
,-~
Ill.·

432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [198ll 1 S.C.R.

A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KRISHNA IYER, J.-The appellant, an Accounts Officer compul-
sorily retired betimes, appearing in person, has painstakingly and
proficiently presented his case which calls for inercy, if not justice.
Obsession with one's own case and inability to see things in perspec-
B tive are often a fraility of a party who spends the enormity and
anguish of his superannuated leisure on the main pursuit of his litiga-
tive points, and this makes for prolixity and subjectivity of submis-
sions, which are not the persuasive but the provocative part of the
art of advocacy. Even so, we have listened with sympahy to the
studious orality and read with patience the manuscript arguments
c emanating from the appellant. He was an Accounts Officer since
December 30, 1961, having been so promoted and appointed by the
Comptroller and Auditor General of India (C & AG). The story of ·
his career was snapped when he was compulsorily retired 'in the
public interest' on August 27, f975 under F. R. 56(j)(i) by the Accoun-
tant General (A.G.). Had he run his full course, his continuance
D until April 1980 would have been sure. Finding himself an uneasy
casualty when the easy axe of F.R. 56(j)(i) fell on him, the appellant
challenged the premature retirement in the .High Court only to be
greeted with a dismissal in limine. Here he has arrived by special
leave and argued before us that his forced retirement is dubious and
violative, in many ways, of F. R. 56(j)(i).
E
The Fundamental Rules govern the Central Civil Services and
ensure the career security which is the sine q1ia non of contended
service. But potential compulsory retirement under F.R. 56(j)(i)
haunting the afternoon of official life injects an awesome uncertainty
which makes even the honest afraid, the efficient tremble and almost
F everyone genuflecrt-not a happy prospect for a civil servant too young
to sit idle and too old to get a new job. A jets~m has no option but
to become driftwood or join the other profession where everyone~
desirable and undesirable, has a chance. We stress his deleterious
latency of F:R. 56(j)(i) to underscore the unwitting harm to public
interest it does in the name of public interest. Judicial monitoring
G becomes an unpleasant necessity where power may be humour and a
career may be a victim ..
The grounds on which the order of retirement has been challeng-
ed by the appellarut may be formulated immediately after·quoting the
rule itself :
··H 56(j): Notwithstanding anything contained in this rule the
appropriate authority shalJ, 1Y it if of ~he opini~n that ~t i~ in tifie
public interest to do so have the , absolute right to retire any
, I
:BALDEV RAJ v. UNION (Krishna Iyer, J.) 433

Government servant by giving him notice of not less than three A
months in writing or three months' pay and allowances in lieu of
\
such notice.

(i) If he is in Class· I or Class II service or post and had
entered Government service before attaining the age of thirty-five
years after he has attained the age of fifty'-years. B

Note 1 : Appropriate authority, means the authority which

1
,~ ~
.-.I
has the power to make substantive appointment to the post or
servioe from which the Government servants is required or· wants
1o retire.
/

c
A break-down of the provision brings out the basic components.
The order to retire must be passed only by 'the appropriate authority'.
That authority must form the requisite opinion-not subjective satis-
faction but objective and bona fide and based on relevant material.
The requisite opinion is that the retirement of the victim is 'in public
interest'-not personal, political or other interest but solely governed D
by "the interest of public service. The right to retire is not absolute,
though so worded. Absolute power is anathema under our constitu-
tional order. 'Absolute' merely means wide, not more .. Naked and
arbitrary exercise of power is bad in law. These ·essentials" once
grasped, the appellant's submissions become self-evident.
E
His principal contentions, not all the secondary details, alone need
detain us. His first challenge is to the competence of the Accountant
General compulsorily to retire him because, according to the appellant,
\ he is not ·the 'appropriate authority' within the meaning of the rule.
The appointing authority who actually appointed the appellant was the
F
C & AG, but the A.G. retired him on the assumption that he had the
requisite power. Article 311(1) insists that a civil servant shall not
be dismissed or removed by an authority "subordinate to that by
which he was appointed". The appellant, by parity of reasoning,
argues that the A.G., ·being subordinate to the C & AG, has no power
·to retire him. The fallacy in the argument lies in the confusion G
between 'dismissal' and 'compulsory retirement'. The. two cannot be
equated and the constitutional bar cannot be operntive. Therefore,
we have to find, on an indepedent enquiry, as to who is the appro-
priate authority under r. 56(j)(i). Under Note 1 to F. R. 56, the
authority entitled to make substantive appointments is' the appro-
priate authority to re!ire government servants under the said rules.
From this Note, which "is virtually a part of the rule, the respondents
contend that the power of the appropriate authority in respect of
434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19811 1 S.C.R.

A Accounts Officers like the appellant has been vested in the A.G. by
Notification of the Ministry of Finance dated 29-11-1972. Since the
A.G. has been clothed, from that date, with power to appoint subs-
tantively Accounts Officers, he has become the appropriate authority
for compulsory retirement even though the appellant Accounts Officer
had been appoin1ed by the C & AG prior to 29-11-1972. In the light
B of the note which is part of the rule, read with the notification dele-
gating the power to the A.G., we see no flaw in the order impugned.

No doubt, ordinarily the appointing authority is also the dismis-
sing authority but the position may be different where retirement
alone is ordered. There, the specific provision in the Note. to FR 56
c must hold good and Art. 311 is not violated either. Nor is there any
discrimination, as contended for, because retirement is a category
different ftom the punishments covered by Art. 311.

Who is the retiring authority on a given date? This is answered
by the Note which, in substance, says that he who is empowered to
D
appoint the Accounts Officer is also the appropriate authority to retire
compulsorily, on thdt date. In this view, we cannot nullify the retire-
ment of the appellant for want of competence.

This takes us to the meat of the matter, viz., whether the appel-
lant was retired because and only because it was necessary in the public
E
intere.slt so to do. It is an affirmative action, not a negative disposition,
a positive conclusion, not a neutral attitude. It is a terminal step to
justify which the onus is on the Administrat1on, not a marter where
the victim must make out the contrary. Security of tenure is the condi- '\ '"''
tion of efficiency of service. The Administration, to be competent, JI'
I
F must have servants who are not plagued by uncertainty about '·
tomorrow. At the age of 50 when you have family responsibility and
the sombre problems of one's own life's evening,, your experience.
accomplishments and fullness of fitness become an asset to the
Administration, if and only if you are not harried or worried by 'what
will happen to me and my family?' 'Where will I go if cashiered?''
.G 'How will I survive when I am 100 old to be newly employed and
too young to be superannuated?' These considerations become all
the more important in departments where functional independence,
fearless scrutiny, and freedom to expose evil or error in high places
is the task. And the Ombudsmanic tasks of the office of audit vested
in the C & AG and the entire army of ~onitors and minions under·
H . him are too strategic for the nation's financial health and discipline
that immunity from subtle threats and oblique over-aweing is very
much in public interest. So it is that we must emphatically state that

...
:t -·-· .-:,-{ +'"""""'" -<.-~~.-;·1-1-
!

BALDEV RAJ v. UNION (Krishna Iyer, J.)
.
4 35

" A
under the guise of 'public interest' if unlimited discretion is regarded
acceptable for making an order of premature retirement, it will be the
surest menace to public interest and must fail for unreasonableness,
· arbitrariness and disguised dismissal. To constitutionalise the rule,
we mus.t so read it as to free it from the potential for 1:he mischiefs
we have just projected. The exercise of power must be bona fide and
promote public interest. There is no demonstrable ground to infer B
mala fides here and the only infirmity alleged which deserves serious.
notice is as to whether the order has been made in public interest.
When an order is challenged and its valid1ty depends on its being
supported by public interest the State must disclose the material so
that the court may be satisfied that the order is ·not bad for want of
any material whatever which, to a reasonable man reasonably instruc- c
ted in the law, is sufficient to sustain ,\he grounds of 'public interest'
justifying forced retirement of the public servant. Judges cannot subs-
titute their judgment for that of the Administrator but .they are not
absolved from the minimal review well-settled in administrative law
D
and founded on constitutional obligations. The limitations on judicial
power in this area are well-known and we are confined to an examina-
tion of the material merely to see whether a rational mind may con-
ceivably be satisfied that the compulsory retirement of the officer
concerned is necessary in public interest.
We will consider this question to the extent disclosed by the
record and in the light of the submissions made by both the parties.
The whole purpose of the rule is to weed out the worthless without
the. punitive extreme~ covered by Art. 311 of the Constitution. After
all, administration, to be efficient, must not be manned by drones, do-
nothings, incompetents and unworthies. They may not be delinquent
who must be punished but may be a burden on the Administration if F
by insensitive, insouciant, unintelligent or dubious conduct impede the
flow or promote stagnation, in a country where speed, sensitivity,
probity, and non-irritative public relations and enthusiastic creativity
are urgently needed but paper-logged processes and callous cadres are
the besetting sin of the Administration. It is in public interest to
retire a never-do-well, but to juggle with confidential reports when a
G
man's career is at stake is a confidence trick contrary to public interest.
Moreover, confidential reports are often. subjective, impressionistic and
must receive sedulous checking as bas.is for decision-making. The
appropriate authority, not the court, makes the decision, but, even
so. 'l caveat is necessary to avoid misuse
We are inclined to ignore the case that the appellant was retired H
because he had declined ·'to proceed on leave ·forcibly in September
1974'. While it is reprehensible for Government or any in the higher
436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19811 1 S.C.R.

A echelons to compel a civil servant to go on leave on pain of being
suspended, retired or transferred to a far-off place or indifferent
post-and the court may readily infer ma/a /ides in the subsequent
order if there is proof of antecedent pressure to take forced leave-
we cannot judge th.e legality of a compulsory retirement on suspicions
and apprehension.s invariably urged even by deserving victims.

Let us look at the facts1 from these broad lines of Law. The
A.G. ha_s, in vindication of his action. submitted that "the impugned
order of compulsory retirement was made by the Accountant General
on the basis of the recommendations dated 23-8-1975 of the Reviewing
c Committe~ constituting the following officers:

1. Accountant General

2. Senior Deputy Accountant General (IC)

D 3. Senior Deputy Accountant General (Administration) Punjab

4. Deputy Accountant General (Administration) Office of the
Accountant General, Haryana.

The said Committee reviewed the service record of the appellant and
found adverse entries in various confidential reports, and inter-a!ia,
E held that the appellant was unable to perform his duty efficiently and
effectively in the post held by hi°m and recommended. compulsory
retirement under FR 56(j)(i). The appellant was accordingly retired
by the Accountant General on 27-8-1975".

F We are not inclined to agree with the appellant that the Review-
ing Committee is an illegal body and taking its recommendations into
consideration vitiates the A.G.'s order. On the othet hand, it is
clear that the decision to retire is surely that of the A.G., and the
Reviewing Committee's presence is persuasive, not decisive, and
prevents the opinionatedness of one by the collective recommendations
G of a few.

Now we will enter the substantive dispute and search for the
presence of public interest as the basis of the impugned order. The
A.G., Mr. Khanna has, in h}s affidavit in this court, sworn:
H In this connection I respectfully submit that the Petitioner's
work was found to be below average and that fact was noted
by the appropriate authority in the confidential reports of the
BALDEV RAJ v. UNION (Krishna Iyer, J.) 437

petitioner as per details given below : A

Period of Adverse Remarks Date of
Report Co.mmunication

1961-62 Yes, An Average Officer. Though te
did try. to tackle the arrears in the B
GAD section under his charge, I was
unhappy to observe that he was trying
to shield those who shirked work. I
also noticed that while he was anxious
to bring to my notice persons who did
their duties well, he was willing to
play down the lapse on their part, if
any, without adequate justification.
5. 12. 1962 c
14. 12. 64 A mediocrity who should take more
·to 20. 3. 65 Adverse
interest in the work.
remarks
noted on
15.1.66
D
29. 7. 69 Industry and application. Poor
:to 15. 1. 70

Ability to organise and rr.anage sec- Poor. Adverse
tions competently. remarks
communicated,
E
on 29th May
1970.
General Assessment: An average offi-
cer who would do better if he
showed more initiative and
resourcefulness.
F
1. 4. 70
I. Technical ability: Below average
'to 9. 12. 70 3(a) Ability to organise and manage
sections competently
Poor
(b) Ability to control subordi-
• nates and get the best out poor
of them G
10. General Assessment: Below Ave- Adverse
rage. My remarks against J;3(a){b) remarks
and 10 may be seen. The performa- communicatd,
nee of Shri Chad;Jha as the officer- on 29th Sept.
in charge of the Account Current 1971.
sections was not upto the mark H
and consequently he had to be given
a change. This officer is definitely
below averege. ·
438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS fl98ll 1 S.C.R.
A The aforementioned adverse remarks in the confidential
reports of the petitioner were communicated in all the cases to
the Petitioner and the Petitioner made representation which was
rejected by the competent authority after due .consideration. At
the time of the review of the retention of the petitioner and other·
accounts officers, a Committee consisting of Accountant General •.
B Senior neputy Accountant General (JC), Senior Deputy Accoun-
tant General, (Admn.), Office of the Accountant General, Haryana
was constituted to review the cases of the Accounts Officers for·
their retention, on their attaining the age of 50 years. The said
Committee was cons[ituted on 23-8-1975. The said Committee
after careful assessment of the performance of the employees
c concerned depicted in their confidential reports found that the
persons including the Petitioner who were not able to perform
their duty efficiently and effectively in the posts held by them at
that time and the Committee ·therefore recommended to retire·
the Petitioner among others under F.R. 56(j)(i). A copy of the
D minutes of the meeting held is annexed herewith as Annexure Y.
The Reviewing Committee report runs thus:
"The Committee after a careful ac'1Sessment of the per-
formance of the employees concerned as depicted in their confi-
dential reports have come ,to ·the conclusion that the persons
mentioned below are not able to perform efficiently and effectively-
E the duties of the posts held by them.
(1) Shri Baldev Raj Chadda, Accounts Officer."
A bare glance at the confidential reports of the appellant brings -
out the striking fact that they relate to 1961-62 to the end of 1970.
F The appellant was promoted only in 1961 and was regularly
drawing increment for well over a decade, without let or hinderancc.
What is far more significant is, the further fact that the Reviewing.
Committee and the A.G. appear to have ignored entries in yearly /half-
yearly reports in the seventies. The appellant states categorically:
"A perusal of the extract from the Confid~ntial reports would'
G show that there were no adverse remarks in the Confidential '
Reports of the Appellant for the year 1971-72, 1972-73, 1973-74,_
J974-75 and 1975-76 till' the date of his retirement from service
on 27-8-75."
He f~rther rightly points out that the stand of the A.G. before the
H , High Court was that the impugned order was not· grounded on the-.
adverse en tries : 1

Since the adverse entries in the Confidential Reports of the-
petitioner were not, in terms, stated to be the ground for exer- .

:~
BALDEV RAJ v. UNION (Krishna Iyer, J.) 439
I

cising the powers under F.R. 56(j), it was not necessary for the N..
Respondent· to deal with the various allegations levelled by the
petitioner against the higher authorities in this regard .
......._
1
We must read these materials against the further background set out
by the appellant:

If I was constldered to. be unsuitable to continue to officiate
as Accounts Officer even after 14 years of continuous ser\lice
without break and after I reached the maximum of the scale both
old/revised wi~hout being held up or even delayed at E.B. or for
increment, then the proper course open to the authorities · was-
to .take action against me under C.C.S. (C.C.A.) Rules 1965 to
revert me and not to retire me by taking shelter under F.R. 56(jXi)
to avoid initiating disciplinary action. This is thus a clear case
of vindictive misuse of powers by the Appointing Authority under
F.R. 56(j).

One wonders how an, officer whose continuous service f~r 14 year:s D
cros1sing the efficiency bar and reaching the maximum salary an the
scale and with no adverse entries at least for five years immediately
bef01t? the compulsory retiremerlt, could be cashiered on the score that
long years ago, his performance had been poor, although his superiors
had allowed him to cross the effickncy bar without qualms. A short
cut may often be a wrong cut. The order of compulsory retirement fails E
because vital material, relevant to the decision, has been ignored and
obsojete material, less relevant to the decision, has influenced the
decision. Any order which materially suffers from the blemish of
overlooking or ignoring, wilfully or otherwise, vital facts bearing on
the decision is bad in law. Likewise, any action which irrationally
digs up obselete circumstances and obsessively reaches a decision based F
thereon, cannot be sustained. Legality depends on regard or the
totality of material facts1 viewed in a holistic perspective. For these
reasons, the order challenged is obviously bad and we quash it. It is,
however, open to the A.G. to take a fresh decision based on legal
material and guided by legal principles. The appellant has, by now,
reached the age of superannuation in the normal course. The result G
is that the consequence of any fresh order may only be financial. It is
for the A.G. to consider whether in the circumstances, a fresh evalua-
tion for the purpose of compulsory_retirement is called for. We merely
allow the appeal, quash the order of compulsory retirement and leave
the law "o take its course. The appellant will be entitled to costs which
H
·/we quantify at ·Rs. 2,000.

N.K.A. Appeal 11/lowed.

.-.-._._..;,,;;.;