BALDEV KRISHANversusSATYA NARAIN
- Citation
- 2013 INSC 573
- Decided
- 27 August 2013
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
Holding
The death of the landlord's wife does not per se defeat the bonafide requirement where the landlord himself and his dependents also have a legitimate need, and the appeal is allowed with the settlement terms enforced.
Summary
Baldev Krishan, the landlord, filed an eviction suit under s.13(1)(h) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, claiming bonafide need for himself, his wife and family. The trial court and the first appellate court decreed in his favour, but during the pendency the landlord's wife died. The High Court set aside the decree, holding that the ground of bonafide requirement ceased to exist after the wife's death. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the death of the spouse defeats the landlord's claim of bonafide need and considered earlier precedents. It held that the landlord’s own need and that of his dependents could sustain the claim despite the wife's demise. The parties subsequently reached a settlement: rent increased to Rs.1500 per month and the tenant allowed to occupy the premises for three more years, subject to vacating on his own death or failure to pay arrears. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court judgment and gave effect to the settlement.
Issues considered
- Does the death of the landlord's wife extinguish the ground of bonafide requirement under s.13(1)(h) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950?
- Can the landlord still claim bonafide need for himself and his dependents after the spouse's demise?
- What is the effect of events occurring after the filing of an eviction suit on the validity of the decree?
Legislation cited
Subjects
Judgment
[2013) 8 S.C.R. 551
BALDEV KRISHAN A
v.
SATYA NARAIN
(Civil Appeal No. 7163 of 2013)
AUGUST 27, 2013
B
rr.s. THAKUR AND VIKRAMAJIT SEN, JJ.]
Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act,
1950- s. 13(1)(h) - Eviction suit- On the ground of bonafide
requirement of the wife of landlord, landlord himself and his C
family - Decreed by trial court and first appellate court -
During pendency of the case, demise of wife of the landlord
- High Court set aside the decree holding that the ground of
bonafide requirement did not survive due to demise of
landlord's wife - In appeal to this Court, the parties reached o
settlement, agreeing that tenants could occupy the tenanted
premises for a further period of three years and the rent shall
stand increased.
Appellant-respondent filed a suit u/s.13(1 )(h) of
Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, E
1950 on the ground of bonafide requirement for himself
and his family stating that his wife wanted to start
business and premises was needed for the sake of
business as well as for residence. Trial court as well as
first appellate court decreed the suit. In the meantime, F
wife of the landlord died. High Court, in second appeal,
held that due to death of the wife of landlord, ground for
bonafide requirement did not survive. Hence the present
appeal was filed. Parties entered into settlement.
G
Allowing the appeal, in view of the settlement
between the parties, the Court
HELD: The parties arrived at a settlement before this
551 H
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 8 S.C.R.
A Court. It has been agreed that the rent shall stand
increased to Rs.1500/- per month and that the
Respondent-tenant shall be permitted to continue to
occupy the tenanted premises for a further period of
three years. However, the Respondent-tenant is directed
B to hand over peaceful and vacant possession to the
landlord or his legal heirs in the event of his demise on
or before 31st August 2016, provided the tenant pays all
the arrears of rent till date (if any); and with effect from
September 2013 pays a sum of Rs.1500/- per month
C towards damages for use and occupation. [Para 9] [557-
F-H]
Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu vs. The Motor and General
Traders (1975) 1 SCC770: 1975 (3) SCR 958; Phool Rani
vs. Naubat Rai Ahluwalia (1973) 1 SCC688: 1973 (3) SCR
D 679; Shanti/al Thakordas vs. Chimanlal Magan/al Telwa/a
(1976) 4 SCC 417: 1977 (1) SCR 341; Hasmat Rai vs.
RaghunathPrasad (1981) 3 SCC 103: 1981 (3) SCR 605;
Shakunta/a Bai vs. Narayan Das (2004) 5 SCC 772: 2004
(2) Suppl. SCR 114; Sheshamba/ vs. Che/ur Corporation
E (2010) 3 SCC 470: 2010 (2) SCR 960 - referred to.
Case Law Reference:
1975 (3) SCR 958 referred to Para 5
F 1973 (3) SCR 679 referred to Para 5
1977 (1) SCR 341 referred to Para 5
1981 (3) SCR 605 referred to Para 5
2004 (2) Suppl. SCR 114 referred to ·Para 5
G
2010 (2) SCR 960 referred to Para 7
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
7163 of 2013
H From the Judgment and Order dated 11.03.2011 of the
BALDEV KRISHAN v. SATYA NARAIN 553
High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur in S.B. Civil A
Regular Second Appeal No. 216 of 2010.
Puneet Jain, Ms. Pratibha Jain, for the Appellant.
Aishwarya Bhati, Sanjoli Mittal, Amit Verma, Dr.
Prikhshayat Singh, for the Respondent. B
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J. 1. Leave granted. We have heard
learned counsel for the parties in great detail, at the end of which
a settlement was arrived at between them, the terms of which C
we shall spell out later.
2. The Appeal assails the order of the learned Single Judge
of the High Court of Rajasthan in Second Appeal No.216 of
2010 dated 11.3.2011 which in turn related to the legal propriety D
of the decree of eviction passed by the First Appellate Court
being the District Judge, Churu. The landlord/Appellant had filed
a Suit for the eviction of the tenant/Respondent on sundry
grounds out of which we are presently concerned only with that
under Section 13(1 )(h) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of E
Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, which envisages the eviction of
a tenant on the predication of the landlord, "that the premises
are required reasonably and bonafide by the landlord (i) for the
use or occupation of himself or his family, .... .".
3. We have perused the Plaint, the salient averments of F
which are that "in order to solve his financial problem the plaintiff
wants to start a business of Paapad, Badi and spices in the
disputed shop to be looked after by his wife. The wife of the
plaintiff also wants to do the same and the plaintiff after his
retirement himself wants to pursue and continue this industry G
and business and keep up his source of income. In these
situations since the plaintiff and his wife and children will also
require place for their residence for which he wants to vacate
and utilise two rooms, store and varandah as are built on the
H
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201.3] 8 S.C.R.
A first f!uor which is presently with Jaiprakash on rent. The plaintiff
and his wife also need rooms built at the second floor of the
house for the business and industry of Paapad, Badi etc., and
for their residential purposes and for other needs. In this way,
the plaintiff has legitimate, reasonable and bonafide need of
B the disputed shop and room which is at second floor for himself
and his family members ....... ". After a perusal of these
averments, it seems to us that it cannot be concluded that the
eviction suit pleaded the bonafide need of only the subsequently
deceased wife, either for commercial or residential
C requirement; the claimed need was of the plaintiff and his family.
4. The Trial Court, by its order dated 4.9.2003, decreed
the Suit in favour of the Appellant-landlord which, as already
indicated above, was upheld in appeal by the District Judge,
Churu, by judgment dated 8.11.2010. However, in that duration,
D the Appellant-landlord's wife had passed away in 2007. In the
impugned judgment, the High Court repelled the contention of
the landlord that concurrent finding of fact ought not to be upset
by the High Court in the Second Appeal. After doing so, the
High Court did not view the claim of bonafide requirement of
E the tenanted premises favourably. This has resulted in the filing
of the present appeal before us.
5. The discussion of the law should properly start with the
three-Judge Bench decision in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v.
F The Motor & General Traders (1975) 1 SCC 770. Our research
reveals that the question in hand has not received the attention
of any larger Bench and hence if the ratio decidendi of
Pasupu/eti is to be varied, it per force has to be done by a
larger Bench. In these circumstances, Pasupuleti holds the field
G on the question of the consideration to be given to events which
have occurred subsequent to the institution of a suit and the
disposal of any statutory appeal. Pasupuleti requires the Court
to "take cautious cognisance of events and developments
subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the
rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed." After
H
BALDEV KRISHAN v. SATYA NARAIN 555
[VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
laying down these propositions the decision was to the effect A
that the recovery of another accommodation by the landlord
during the pendency of the case, had material bearing on the
right to evict since that right would be defeated by the statutory
provisions itself. Pasupuleti did not have the occasion to
consider Phoo/ Rani v. Naubat Rai Ahluwalia (1973) 1 SCC B
688; counsel were clearly remiss in not bringing this decision
to the Court's notice. Close upon the heels of this decision is
Shanti/a/ Thakordas v. Chimanlal Magan/al Te/wa/a (1976)
4 SCC 417 also rendered by a three-Judge Bench. Phoo/ Rani
was cited and overruled in Shanti/al and, therefore, the former c
ought not to be cited or considered any further. The tenor of
Shanti/a/ is in consonance with and not contrary to Pasupu/eti,
as it necessarily must be. What has been held is that if the
requirement of the Plaintiff as well as his heirs is in issue before
the Court, the passing away of the Plaintiff will not defeat the 0
/is. Another three-Judge Bench in Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath
Prasad (1981) 3 SCC 103 has followed Pasupu/eti, again as
it was precendentially bound to. The plurality was of the view
that a decree or order does not become final till the appeal filed
against it is finally disposed of. In his dissenting note, Pathak.J
E
emphasised upon the fact that it was only in the course of the
Second Appeal that the tenant endeavoured to draw the
attention of the court to the demise of the landlord. Accordingly,
Pathak,J was of the opinion that since there were concurrent
findings of fact rendered by the Trial Court as well as the first
Appellate Court, the demise of the Plaintiff-landlord in the F
course of the Second Appeal would not have any detrimental
legal consequences to his claim. We may add here, by way of
emphasis, that a Second Appeal would not entail the
determination of questions of fact but must conform to the
discipline of only considering question of law of substantial G
importance. Shakuntala Bai v. Narayan Das (2004) 5 SCC
772 is a decision of a two-Judge Bench and, therefore, need
not detain us in view of the ratio decidendi of larger Benches.
Significantly, it was not brought to the notice of the Court that
H
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 8 S.C.R.
A Phool Rani had already been overruled by two larger Benches.
However, the distinguishing feature in this case was that
consequent upon the death of the original landlord-plaintiff his
legal heirs had been allowed to be impleaded and the case
progressed from that stage, not in the appellate court but before
B the Trial Court. It has been duly noted at the final hearing of the
eviction Suit by the Trial Court, all the Plaintiff's sons had
specifically set up their own bonafide needs.
6. We have briefly considered the previous precedents
C since disparate decisions inexorably lead to a vexed and a split
exposition of the law. Our objective is to insulate the
subordinate courts from choosing between decisions of the
Apex Court by presenting only one opinion of the law.
7. We must immediately refer t.o the decision of this Court,
D in the nature of a re-statement of the law, in Sheshambal v.
Che/ur Corporation (2010) 3 SCC 470 in which my learned
and esteemed brother Thakur J. had perspicuously yet
concisely considered the plethora of precedents pertaining to
the legal consequences of the demise of the landlord whose
E bonafide need was the substance of the eviction action, during
the pendency of an appeal. After analysing several previous
decisions, it has been held that events which transpired
subsequent to filing of the eviction petition could and must be
kept in perspective if they would have the effect of dislodging
F the very plinth or substratum of the claim. In Sheshambal, the
bonafide need that had been pleaded pertained only to the
landlord and his wife. It will be relevant to record that the claim
had been concurrently rejected by the courts below, before
whom the landlord-husband had passed away. The widow,
G whose bonafide need had also been set up, unfortunately, also
passed away during the pendency of the appeal in this Court.
In those circumstances, it was held that the bonafide need, even
assuming that it existed at the time of filing of the eviction action,
had thereafter lapsed altogether on the death of the petitioning
H protagonists. It seems to us that it is arguable that the position
BALDEV KRISHAN v. SATYA NARAIN 557
[VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
may change had there been a favourable verdict during their A
lifetime. Premium should not be placed on the filing of appeals
merely to defeat a favourable decision on the unfair speculation
that the endemic delay in disposal of appeals may result in
defeating a decree because of the death of the landlord. It had .
been clarified in Sheshambal that "if the deceased landlord B
had any dependent member of the family, we may have even
in the absence of a pleading assumed that the requirement
pleaded extended also to the dependent member of their family.
That unfortunately for the Appellant is neither the case set up
nor the position on facts". The second aspect of the decision C
which needs to be recounted is that the rent had been
increased by the High Court to Rs.10,000/- per month with
effect from 1.11.2003 and thereafter by this Court to Rs.25,000/
- per month with effect from 1.1.2009.
8. Returning to the pleadings before us, we are not seized D
of an eviction action in which the bonafide need of only the
deceased wife of the Appellant had been pleaded. It is for this
reason that we have extracted above the relevant parts of the
Plaint. Therefore, it required our careful cogitation as to whether
the landlord could still claim bonafide need for himself as well E
as his dependents.
9. In these circumstances, mindful of the uncertainty of
which manner we may decide, the parties through their counsel
have arrived at a settlement before us. It has been agreed that
F
the rent shall stand increased to Rs.1500/- per month and that
the Respondent-tenant shall be permitted to continue to occupy
the tenanted premises for a further period of three years. The
Appeal is accordingly allowed. The judgment of the High Court
is set aside. However, the Respondent-tenant shall hand over
peaceful and vacant possession to the landlord or his legal heirs G
in the event of his demise on or before 31st August 2016
provided the Respondent pays all the arrears of rent till date (if
any); and with effect from September 2013 pays a sum of
Rs.1500/- per month towards damages for use and occupation.
H
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 8 S.C.R.
A The usual undertaking to abide by these terms must be filed
within four weeks from today failing which he shall be liable to
be evicted/ej~cted forthwith.
10. Parties shall bear their respective costs.
B K.K.T. Appeal allowed in view of the
Settlement between the Parties.
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.