Supreme Court of India
BAIJNATH & OTHERSversusSTATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
- Citation
- 2016 INSC 1040
- Decided
- 18 November 2016
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- DIPAK MISRA
Holding
The statutory presumption under Section 113B, Evidence Act, is operable only when the prosecution establishes, beyond reasonable doubt, that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with a dowry demand; absent such proof, the presumption cannot be invoked and conviction cannot stand.
Summary
The deceased Saroj Bai was found hanging in her matrimonial home within seven years of marriage. The State alleged that her husband’s family demanded a motorcycle as dowry, subjecting her to cruelty and harassment, thereby invoking Sections 304B and 498A of the IPC and the statutory presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act. The trial court acquitted the accused due to lack of proof of cruelty, harassment, and the cause of death. The High Court reversed the acquittal, relying on the presumption. The Supreme Court held that the presumption can be invoked only when the prosecution first proves, beyond reasonable doubt, that the woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with a dowry demand; the prosecution failed to do so, and the cause of death remained uncertain. Consequently, the conviction was set aside and the appellants were discharged.
Issues considered
- The prosecution proved the essential ingredient of cruelty or harassment in connection with a dowry demand required to invoke the statutory presumption under Section 113B, Evidence Act.
- Whether a conviction under Sections 304B and 498A IPC can be sustained solely on the basis of the presumption without direct proof of cruelty/harassment.
- Whether the cause of death was established sufficiently to support a dowry‑death charge.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313
- Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961s. 2
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 113B
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 201, s. 302, s. 304B, s. 34, s. 498A
Subjects
dowry deathstatutory presumptionSection 113BIPC 304BIPC 498Aburden of proofcause of deathmatrimonial homeacquittalappeal
Judgment
[2016] 11 S.C.R. 764
A BAIJNATH & OTHERS
v.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
(Criminal Appeal No.I 097 of 2016)
B
NOVEMBER 18,2016
[DIPAK MISRA AND AMITAVAROY, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860:
ss. 304-B, 498-A and ss. 302, 201 and 34 - Dowry death -
c Statutory presumption of, u/s.113-B, Evidence Act, 1872 - When
cannot be invoked - Deceased died in matrimonial home by hanging
from the fan -Appellant-in laws acquitted by trial court-Acquittal
reversed by High Court placing reliance on statutory presumption
u/s. JJ3B - Held: The presumption as to dowry death gets activated
D only upon the proof ofthe fact that the deceased lady was subjected
to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand for
dowry by the accused and that too in the reasonable contiguity of
death -Ifthe prosecution fails to prove such fact by cogent, coherent
and persuasive evidence, the person accused u/ss. 304-B, 498-A
E cannot be held guilty by taking refuge only of the presumption u/
s.113-B to cover up the shortfall in proof- On facts, prosecution
failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt, cruelty or harassment to
the deceased, for or in connection with any demand for dow1y -
The alleged demand centered around a motorcycle, which even as
per prosecution witnesses did not surface at the time of the
F
marriage - To the contrary, the evidence of defence witnesses was
consistent to the effect that no demand as imputed was ever made as
the family of the husband was adequately well-off - Further, the
prosecution also failed to prove the precise cause of the death of
the deceased - It is not clear as to whether the death was suicidal
G or homicidal - Appellants entitled to benefit of doubt - Dow1y
Prohibition Act, 1961 - s.2 - CrPC-s. 313.
ss.304-B, 498-A - Offences under - Common ingredients -
Held: Cruelty or harassment of the lady by her husband or his
relative for or in connection with any demand for dow1y is the
H
764
BAIJNATH & OTHERS v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 765
common constituent of both the offences - The factum of unnatural A
death in matrimonial home within seven years of marriage is ipso
facto not sufficient to bring home the charges ulss. 304B and
498A - Prosecution has to prove cruelty or harassment by the
husband or his relative or the person charged, to invoke the statutory
presumption u!s.113-B, Evidence Act- Evidence Act, 1872-s. JJ 3-B. B
Criminal Law-ss.304-B, !PC and 113-B, Evidence Act, 1872-
Scope and purport of - "soon before death" - Reiterated.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 Cruelty or harassment of the lady by her husband
or his relative for or in connection with any demand for any c
property or valuable security as a demand for dowry or in
connection therewith is the common constituent of the offences
under Sections 304B and 498A, IPC. The expression "dowry" is
ordained to have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961. The expression "cruelty", contains in its D
expanse, apart from the conduct of the tormentor, the
consequences precipitated thereby qua the lady subjected thereto.
[Paras 29, 30] [775-G-H, 776-A]
1.2 Noticeably, the presumption under Section 113-B as
well is founded on the proof of cruelty or harassment of the woman E
dead for or in connection with any demand for dowry by the person
charged with the offence. The presumption as to dowry death
thus would get activated only upon the proof of the fact that the
deceased lady had been subjected to cruelty or harassment for or
in connection with any demand for dowry by the accused and that F
too in the reasonable contiguity of death. Such a proof is thus the
legislatively mandated prerequisite to invoke the otherwise
statutorily ordained presumption of commission of the offence of
dowry death by the person charged therewith.[Para 32] [776-E-F]
1.3 A conjoint reading of Sections 304-B, 498-A, IPC and G
113-B, Evidence Act thus predicate the burden of the prosecution
to unassailably substantiate the ingredients of the two offences
by direct and convincing evidence so as to avail the presumption
engrafted in Section 113B against the accused. Proof of cruelty
or harassment by the husband or his relative or the person charged
H
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS r20l6l 11 S.C.R.
A is thus the sine qua non to inspirit the statutory presumption, to
draw the person charged within the coils thereof. If the prosecution
fails to demonstrate by cogent, coherent and persuasive evidence
to prove such fact, the person accused of either of the above
referred offences cannot be held guilty by taking refuge only of
B the presumption to cover up the shortfall in proof. [Para 33] [776-
G-H; 777-A]
1.4 The legislative primaturc of relieving the prosecution
of the rigour of the proof of the often practically inaccessible
recesses of life within the guarded confines of a matrimonial home
C and of replenishing the consequential void, by according a
presumption against the person charged, cannot be overeased to
gloss-over and condone its failure to prove credibly, the basic
facts enumerated in the Sections involved, lest justice is the
casualty. [Para 34] [777-B]
D Rajeev Kumar v. State of Haryana (2013) 16 SCC 640:
2013 (12) SCR 2~1; K. Premo S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa
Rao (2003) 1 SCC 217: 2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 339-
relied on.
Shindo Alias Sawinder Kaur and another v. State of
E Punjab (2011) 11 SCC 517 : 2011 (4) SCR 117 -
referred to.
1.5 This Court while often dwelling on the scope and purport
of Section 304-B and Section 113-B of Evidence Act, has
propounded that the presumption under Section 113-B is
F contingent on the fact that the prosecution first spell out the
ingredients of the offence under Section 304-B, namely that the
woman was subjected to cruelty by the accused in connection
with demand for dowry soon before her death. [Para 35] [777-C,
F]
G 1.6 Tested on these judicially adumbrated parameters as
above, it is clear that the prosecution had failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt, cruelty or harassment to the deceased for or
in connection with any demand for dowry as contemplated in either
of the two provisions of IPC, disentitling itself to the benefit of
H statutory presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act.
BAIJNATH & OTHERS v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 767
The factum of unnatural death in the matrimonial home and that A
too within seven years of marriage therefore is thus ipso facto not
sufficient to bring home the charge under Sections 304B and 498A
of IPC against appellants.[Paras 36, 38, 40] [777-G; 778-G-H;
779-C-D]
2.1 Noticeably, the alleged demand centers around a B
motorcycle, which as the evidence of the prosecution witnesses
would evince, admittedly did not surface at the time of finalization
of the marriage. PW-5, the mother of the deceased had even
conceded that there was no dowry demand at that stage. Even if
it is accepted to be true that there was any demand for the c
motorcycle, as alleged, yet admittedly, no complaint was made to
anyone, far less the police. Apart from the general allegations in
the same tone ingeminated with parrot like similarity by the
prosecution witnesses, the allegation of cruelty a~d harassment
to the deceased is founded on the confidential communications D
by her to her parents in particular and is not supported by any
other quarter. [Para 36] [777-H; 778-A-C]
2.2 To the contrary, the evidence of the defence witnesses
is consistent to the effect that no demand as imputed had ever
been made as the family of the husband was adequately well-off. E
According to them there was no occasion for any quarrel/
confrontation or unpleasantness in the family qua this issue.
Significant is also the testimony ofDW-3, the sister-in-law of the
deceased who indicated abandonment of the matrimonial home
by deceased with the son of the Sarpanch of the village for which F
she understandably had incurred the displeasure of the in-laws.
DW-4, the father of DW-3 who had given his daughter in marriage
in the same family had deposed that he did not ever encounter
any demand for dowry. The testimony of the prosecution witnesses
PW-3 and PW-7 fully consolidate the defence version. Further, G
the prosecution had also failed to prove, the precise cause of the
death of the deceased. It is not clear as to whether the death has
been suicidal or homicidal. It is also not proved beyond doubt,
the origin and cause of the external injuries. Though the obscurity
of the causative factors is due to the putrefaction of the body, the
H
768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS r2o 161 11 s.c.R.
A benefit of the deficiency in proof, logically would be available to
the persons charged. [Paras 37, 38, 39] [778-D-F, G; 779-A-B]
Case Law Reference
2011 (4) SCR 117 referred to Para35
B 2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 339 referred to Para35
2013 (12) SCR 251 relied on Para 35
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 1097 of2016.
From the Order dated 25.09.2014 by the High Court ofM.P. at
C Gwalior in CRLA No. 325 of200 I.
Siddhartha Dave, R. K. Singh, Kumar Gourav, B. N. Dubey,
Ramesh war Prasad Goyal, Advs., for the Appellants.
Naveen Sharma, Arjun Garg, Advs. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D
AMITAVA ROY, J. I. The appellants, the in-laws of the
deceased Saroj Bai, being aggrieved by the conversion of their acquittal
into conviction by the High Court under Sections 498A and 3048 of the
Indian Penal Code (for short hereinafter referred to as the "Code") seek
defeasance of this verdict in the present appeal.
E
2. Heard Mr. Siddhartha Dave, learned counsel for the appellants
and Mr. Naveen Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent.
3. The genesis ofthe prosecution case lies in the info1mation lodged
by appellant Baijnath, the elder brother ofthe appellant No.2, Shivraj, the
F father-in-law of the deceased. The information disclosed that on
09.06. I 996 at about 8 p.m. the family had dinner together and after
watching television, retired to the respective rooms for the night. The
deceased was married to Rakesh, son ofappellant No.2. According to
the informant, in the next morning she was found dead, hanging from the
G fan by a ligature.
4. On this information Merg No.20/1996 was registered with the
Chanderi Police Station and on the completion ofthe investigation charge-
sheet was laid against the appellants together with Rakesh, husband of
the deceased and Prem Bai, wife of the appellant No. I under Sections
H 302, 304B, 498A, 201 read with Section 34 of the Code. According to
BAIJNATH & OTHERS v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 769
[AMITAVAROY,J.]
the prosecution, the investigation revealed that the husband ofthe deceased A
along with the appellants had been demanding dowry and in pursuit thereof
had subjected the deceased to harassment and torture in the proximate
past of the incident.
5. At the trial, the learned Additional Sessions Judge concerned
framed charges against the accused persons under Sections 3048 and B
498A ofthe Code, which were denied by the accused persons. Subsequent
thereto Rakesh committed suicide on 09 .06.1998 by consuming poison
and therefore he was deleted from the array of the persons indicted.
6. The prosecution at the trial examined 12 witnesses including
the Investigating Officer and the Doctor who had performed the
c
postmortem examination. The defence, after the recording of the
statements of the appellants under Section 313 Cr.P.C., examined 4
witnesses.
7. The Trial Court on an exhaustive assessment of the evidence D
adduced, acquitted the accused persons of the charges against which
the respondent/State preferred appeal before the High Court. The
impugned decision has been rendered thereby upturning the acquittal.
8. The learned Trial Court while recording the admitted fact of
marriage between the deceased and Rakesh and also that the incident E
had occurred in the matrimonial home of the wife within 7 years of the
alliance, dismissed the evidence with regard to demand of motorcycle in
dowry and the imputation oftorture, cruelty and harassment as projected
by the prosecution and thus exonerated the accused persons of the
charges levelled holding that in the attendant materials on record, the F
statutory presumption as envisaged in Section 1138 ofthe Evidence Act,
I 872 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act, I 872") was not available for
invocation.
9. The High Court however being ofthe opinion that the deceased
had died an unnatural death in suspicious circumstances in her matrimonial G
home within 7 years of marriage and that the same was preceded by
persistent demands for a motorcycle as dowry in marriage accompanied
by cruelty, returned the finding of guilt against the appellants but
exonerated Prem Bai, the wife of appellant No. I i.e. Baijnath. It accepted
the evidence adduced by the prosecution qua the charge ofdowry demand, H
770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016) 11 S.C.R.
A harassment and cruelty in connection therewith and applied the deeming
prescription/statutory presumption contained in Section 3048 of the Code
and Section 1138 ofAct, 1872.
I 0. The learned counsel for the appellants has in this backdrop
insistently urged that the evidence in suppoti of the charge of demand
B for a motorcycle as dowry in marriage by the husband and his family
members being patently inadequate and unconvincing to furnish the
ingredient relating thereto qua the charges levelled against the appellants,
their conviction is utterly unsustainable and ifallowed to stand would
amount to travesty ofjustice. According to Mr. Dave, the imperative
c essentials ofSections 498A and 3048 ofthe Code not having been proved,
the High Court had fallen in error in applying the deeming edict/statutory
presumption mandated by Section 3048 of the Code and Section 1138
of Act, 1872 in convetiing their acquittal to conviction. The learned
counsel contended that as the medical evidence as well did not disclose
D with certainty the cause of death-homicidal or suicidal, there was as
such no incriminating evidence on record to prove the culpability of the
appellants. As not only the testimony of the prosecution witnesses with
regard to demand for a motorcycle as dowry in marriage is visibly
inconsistent, mutilating each other, the defence evidence to the contrary
E formidably establish the falsity of this charge, he urged. According to
Mr. Dave the analysis of the evidence on record by the High Court has
been erroneous leading to findings not borne out by the materials on
record and thus are indefensible in any view of the matter warranting
the acquittal of the appellants.
F 11. In emphatic refutation, the learned counsel for the respondent
has argued that as admittedly the unfortunate incident had occurred within
seven years of marriage in the matrimonial home and that too in suspicious
circumstances, all the prerequisites of the offences under Sections 498A
and 3048 were proved beyond reasonable doubt and thus the impugned
0 decision does not merit interference. The learned Trial Court did err in
evaluating the evidence in the borrect perspectives and the High Court
having undertaken a painstaking review thereof, the findings arrived at
by it, following a proper appreciation of the materials on record are not
only valid in law but also in the exigent espousal of the cause ofjustice.
H 12. After outlining the rival submissions as above, it is considered
BAIJNATH & OTHERS v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 771
[AMITAVAROY,J.]
expedient next to take a synopsised stock of the evidence adduced by A
the parties, so as to facilitate a better comprehension of the facets of the
!is and the desired adjudication.
13. PW-I Kundan Singh, the uncle of the deceased, deposed that
the families of the accused persons were joint and that at the marriage,
cash and other valuables were gifted to the in-laws of the deceased and B
that the ceremony was solemnized without any hassle. The witness
however referred to a grievance being expressed later on by the deceased
alleging that she was being harassed by her husband Rakesh and the
appellants as well as Prem Bai, the wife ofappellant No. I relating to the
demand of motorcycle in dowry. The witness also referred to another c
occasion where a similar complaint had been made by the deceased to
him. He claimed to have seen the dead body of the deceased hanging
from the fan.
14. In cross-examination, this witness deposed about a demand
for motorcycle at the time of marriage but however conceded that no D
complaint was made to the police for such demand at any point of time.
He denied the suggestion that the deceased had committed suicide as
because her fidelity to her husband was being questioned in the face of
her love affairs with the son of one Thoran Singh, the Sarpanch of the
village. E
15. PW-2 Jahar Singh, the father of the deceased mentioned about
the demand for a motorcycle by the husband and the in-laws of the
deceased at the time ofthe marriage and also the harassment in connection
therewith suffered by the deceased as reported by her to him. The witness
also referred to the same demand by the husband in the year 1996 on the F
occasion of Chowk Vidai, a ritual, whereupon he was assured that as
and when it would be financially feasible, the same would be arranged.
This witness as well stated that though the demand for the motorcycle
was being made since the time of marriage in the year 1994, no complaint
was made by him with regard thereto to anybody. When confronted with G
his statement in course of the investigation, he admitted ofthe omission
in the disclosure that the deceased had confided in him about such demand
during her limited stay at the matrimonial home and the harassment and
mal-treatment in connection therewith. He denied the suggestion that
the deceased had eloped with the son of Thoran Singh and that as a H
"""'
772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 12016] 11 S.C.R.
A result there was a confrontation between him with the family ofThoran
Singh. He also denied the suggestion that in view of this episode there
was unpleasantness in the family of the in-laws of the deceased for
which they had some reservation in accommodating her in the nuptial
house.
B 16. PW-3 Jhulla, who at the relevant time was the Sarpanch of
the village deposed that the deceased had committed suicide and that
when he visited the spot, he did not see any injury on her body.
17. In cross-examination, he clarified that the appellant No. I was
Jiving separately from the in-laws of the deceased from before the
c marriage. He also mentioned that the accused persons were held in high
esteem in the village and used to behave decently with their daughter-in-
law. He also stated that he had not heard about any demand of dowry
made by the accused persons.
D 18. PW-4 Narayan Singh, a neighbour did mention about the demand
ofa motorcycle in dowry atthe time of marriage and that the deceased
had disclosed to her father about harassment meted out to her by the
appellants and Prem Bai in connection therewith. In cross-examination
the witness testified that there was no demand for dowry before the
marriage and that there was no report with regard thereto to the police.
E
19. PW-5 Prembai, the mother of the deceased testified that no
dowry was fixed before the marriage and no demand was made by the
accused persons but they still offered Rs. I lac to them. She stated that
her son-in-law while dining made a demand for motorcycle which
F according to the witness was assured as and when the finances would
be available. This witness deposed that even after two years ofmaiTiage,
the appellants repeated the said demand to which a similar assurance
~as !!gain given.
20. In cross-examination, this witness admitted that before the
G marriage no demand for motorcycle had been made as dowry, though
she mentioned about the complaints made by the deceased to her about
harassment by the accused persons for not providing the bike. She
admitted that no complaint in this regard was ever made and the relations
as well were not informed about the treatment suffered by the deceased.
H
BAIJNATH & OTHERS v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 773
[AMITAVAROY,J.]
21. PW-7 Jahar Singh did state about a demand of motorcycle A
made by Rakesh, the husband of the deceased.
22. PW-8 Gyasibai, a neighbour deposed that the deceased had
committed suicide and that when she visited the place of occurrence,
she did not notice any injury mark on her body. In cross-examination the
witness stated that the deceased did never speak to her about the demand B
and testified that the in-laws did treat her properly and that there was no
confrontation at any point of time.
23. PW- I I Manish Kapuria~the Investigating Officer narrated
the steps taken by him in course ofthe inquisition and mentioned amongst
others about the preparation ofthe panchnama ofthe dead body. Though
c
this witness stated that the whole exercise was videographed, he admitted
that the same had not been produced as evidence. He claimed to have
seen two ligature marks 011 the neck of the deceased.
24. PW-12 Dr. R.P. Sharma, who had performed the postmortem D
examination, stated to have identified contusion on the right cheek, middle
ofleft side ofneck and middle ofleft parietal region in the dead body.
According to him, the ligature mark was found to be ante-mortem in
nature. He also mentioned that the 3 contusions were ante-mortem but
opined that the ligature mark was postmortem in occurrence. On an
E
overall assessment however, the witness stated that as at the time of
autopsy the body had started putrefying, no opinion as to the cause of
death could be given. In cross-examination the witness admitted that the
dead body did not wear any other injury other than tho.se mentioned.
25. The witnesses of the defence, namely, DW-1 Gaya Prasad, F
DW-2 Munna, DW-3 Har Kunwar Bai and DW-4 Simam Singh in unison
testified that there was no demand for dowry or motorcycle ever made
by the husband of the deceased or her in-laws. They further stated that
the appellant No.1 Baijnath had been residing separately from the in-
laws of the deceased from before the marriage. According to them, the
G
family of the in-laws of the deceased was sufficiently well-off and did
enjoy appreciable reputation in the society. These witnesses were all
neighbours of the appellants.
26. DW-3 Har Kunwar Bai, in addition stated that the deceased
had during her marriage eloped with the son of Pradhan of the Village
H
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 11 S.C.R.
A Chitara and that in the night of the incident she was with her, watching
television before they parted for their respective rooms to sleep. This
witness is the daughter-in-law of appellant No.2 and asserted that neither
she nor the deceased had ever been harassed in the family.
27. The evidence on record and the competing arguments have
B received our required attention. As the prosecution is on the charge of
the offences envisaged in Sections 304B and 498A of the Code, the
provisions for reference are extracted hereunder:
"304B. Dowry death.-( 1) Where the death of a woman is
caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than
c under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage
and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to
cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her
husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such
. death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative
D shall be deemed to have caused her death.
Explanation. - For the purpose of this sub-section, "dowry"
shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 196 f (28of1961 ).
E (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with
imprisonment for a tenn which shall not be less than seven years
but which may extend to imprisonment for life.
498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman
sub.iecting her to cruelty.-Whoever, being the husband or
F the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to
cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which
may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.-For the purpose of this section, "cruelty"
means-
G
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to
drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury
or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical)
of the woman; or
H
t
BAIJNATH & OTHERS v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 775
[AMITAVAROY,J.]
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a A
view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any
unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is
on account of failure by her or any person related to her to
meet such demand.
28. Whereas in the offence of dowry death defined by Section B
304B of the Code, the ingredients thereof are:
(i) death of the woman concerned is by any burns or bodily
injury or by any cause other than in normal circumstances
and
c
(ii) is within seven years of her marriage and
(iii) that soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or
harassment by her husband or any relative of the husb:md
for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry.
D
the offence under Section 498A of the Code is attracted qua the
husband or his relative if she is subjected to cruelty. The
explanation to this Section exposits "cruelty" as:
(i) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to
drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury E
or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical)
or
(ii) harassment of the woman, where such har,assment is with a
view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet
any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security F
or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her
to meet such demand.
29. Patently thus, cruelty or harassment ofthe lady by her husband
or his relative for or in connection with any demand for any property or
valuable security as a demand for dowry or in connection therewith is G
the common constituent of both the offences.
30. The expression "dowry" is ordained to have the same meaning
as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The expression
"'cruelty", as explained, contains in its expanse, apart from the conduct
H
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS r10161 11 S.C.R.
A of the tormentor, the consequences precipitated thereby qua the lady
subjected thereto. Be that as it may, cruelty or harassment by the husband
or any relative of his for or in connection with any demand of dowry w
reiterate is the gravamen of the two ot1ences.
31. Section 1138 of the Act enjoins a statutory presumption as to
B dowry death in the following tem1s:
"113B. Presumption as to dowry death. - When the question
is whether a person has committed the dowry death ofa woman
and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been
subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in
c connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume
that such person had caused the dowry death.
Explanation. - For the purpose of this section, "dowry death"
shall have the same meaning as in section 3048 of the Indian
D Penal Code (45 ofl 860)"
32. Noticeably this presumption as well is founded on the proof of
cruelty or harassment of the woman dead for or in connection with any
demand for dowry by the person charged with the offence. The
presumption as to dowry death thus would get activated only upon the
E proof of the fact that the deceased lady had been subjected to cruelty or
harassment for or in connection with any demand for dowry by the
accused and that too in the reasonable contiguity of death.
Such a proofis thus the legislatively mandated prerequisite to invoke
the otherwise statutorily ordained presumption of commission of the
F offence of dowry death by the person charged therewith.
33. A conjoint reading of these three provisions, thus predicate the
burden of the prosecution to unassailably substantiate the ingredients of
the two offences by direct and convincing evidence so as to avail the
presumption en grafted in Section 1138 of the Act against the accused.
G Proof of cruelty or harassment by the husband or his relative or the
person charged is thus the sine qua non to inspirit the statutory
presumption, to draw the person charged within the coils thereof. Ifthe
prosecution fails to demonstrate by cogent coherent and persuasive
evidence to prove such fact, the person accused of either of the above
H
8AIJNATH & OTHERS v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 777
[AMITAVA ROY, J.]
referred offences cannot be held guilty by taking refuge only of the A
presumption to cover up the shortfall in proof.
34. The legislative primature of relieving the prosecution of the
rigour of the proof of the often practically inaccessible recesses of life
within the guarded confines of a matrimonial home and of replenishing
the consequential void, by according a presumption against the person 8
charged, cannot be overeased to gloss-over and condone its failure to
prove credibly, the basic facts enumerated in the Sections involved, lest
justice is the casualty.
35. This Court while often dwelling on the scope and purport of
Section 3048 of the Code and Section l 138 of the Act have propounded
c
that the presumption is contingent on the fact that the prosecution first
spell out the ingredients of the offence of Section 3048 as in Shindo
Alias Sawinder Kaur and another Vs. State of Punjab - (2011) 11
. SCC 517 and echoed inRajeevKumar Vs. StateofHaryana-(2013)
16 SCC 640. In the latter pronouncement, this Court propounded that D
one of the essential ingredients of dowry death under Section 3048 of
the Code is that the accused must have subjected the woman to cruelty
in connection with demand for dowry soon before her death and that this
ingredient has to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt
and only then the Court will presume that the accused has committed the E
offence of dowry death under Section 113 B of the Act. It referred to
with approval, the earlier decision of this Court in K. Prema S. Rao Vs.
Yadla Srinivasa Rao - (2003) I SCC 217 to the effect that to attract
the provision ofSection 3048 of the Code, one of the main ingredients of
the offence which is required to be established is that "soon before her F
death" she was subjected to cruelty and harassment "in connection with
the demand for dowry".
36. Tested on the judicially adumbrated parameters as above, we
are of the unhesitant opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt, cruelty or harassmentto the deceased for or G
in connection with any demand for dowry as contemplated in either of
the two provisions of the Code under which the accused persons had
been charged. Noticeably, the alleged demand centers around a
motorcycle, which as the evidence of the prosecution witnesses would
H
778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS f2016] 11 S.C.R.
A evince, admittedly did not surface at the time of finalization of the
marriage. PW-5, the mother of the deceased has even conceded that
there was no dowry demand at that stage. According to her, when the
husband (who is dead) had insisted for a motorcycle thereafter he was
assured that he would be provided with the same, finances permitting.
B Noticeably again, the demand, as sought to be projected by the
prosecution, if accepted to be true had lingered for almost two years. Yet
admittedly, no complaint was made thereof to anyone, far less the police.
Apart from the general allegations in the same tone ingeminated with
parrot like similarity by the prosecution witnesses, the allegation ofcruelty
c and harassment to the deceased is founded on the confidential
communications by her to her parents in particular and is not supported
by any other quarter.
3 7. To the contrary, the evidence of the defence witnesses is
consistent to the effect that no demand as imputed had ever been made
D as the family of the husband was adequately well-off and further the
appellant No. I Baijnath had been living separately from before the
marriage. According to them there was no occasion for any quarrel/
confrontation or unpleasantness in the family qua this issue. Significant
is also the testimony ofDW-3, the sister-in-law of the deceased who
E indicated abandonment of the matrimonial home by her with the son of
Thoran Singh, the Sarpanch of the village for which she understandably
had incurred the displeasure of the in-laws. DW-4, the father of DW-3
who had given his daughter in marriage in the same family had deposed
that he did not ever encounter any demand for dowry. The testimony of
the prosecution witnesses PW-3 and PW-7 fully consolidate the defence
F
version.
38. A cumulative consideration of the overall evidence on the facet
of dowry, leaves us unconvinced about the truthfulness of the charge
qua the accused persons. The prosecution in our estimate, has failed to
G prove this indispensable component of the two offences beyond
reasonable doubt. The factum ofunnatural death in the matrimonial home
and that too within seven years of marriage therefore is thus ipso facto
not sufficient to bring home the charge under Sections 304B and 498A
of the Code against them.
H
BAIJNATH & OTHERS v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 779
[AMITAVA ROY, J.]
39. The predicament of the prosecution is compounded further by A
its failure to prove, the precise cause of the death of the deceased. It is
not clear as to whether the death has been suicidal or homicidal. It is also
not proved beyond doubt, the origin and cause of the external injuries.
Though the obscurity of the causative factors is due to the putrefaction
of the body, the benefit of the deficiency in proof, logically would be B
available to the persons charged.
40. In all, tested on the overall scrutiny ofthe evidence as a whole,
in our comprehension, the conviction of the accused persons including
the appellants herein on the basis of the materials on record would not be
out of risk. To reiterate, the prosecution has failed to prove the crucial c
ingredient of cruelty and harassment by direct and cogent evidence
thereby disentitling itself to the benefit of the statutory presumption
available under Section 1138 of the Act.
41. Whereas the analysis of the evidence by the Trial Court, in our
view, has been in the proper perspectives, factual and legal and thus the D
findings recorded by it are valid, the High Court based its determination
substantially on presumptive inferences taking the aid of Section 113 B of
the Act, divorced from the attendant facts and the evidence with regard
thereto. We are thus of the opinion, that the conclusions of the High
Court do not constitute a plausible view on the materials on record and E
cannot be sustained.
42. The appellants thus in view ofthe evaluation made hereinabove
are entitled to the benefit of doubt. The appeal is allowed. The impugned
judgment and order is set-aside. The appellants are hereby ordered to be
set at liberty forthwith if not wanted in connection with any other case. F
Let the records ofthe Trial Court be remitted immediately for the needful.
Divya Pandey Appeal allowed.
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