BABY DEVASSY CHULLY @ BOBBYversusUNION OF INDIA & ORS.

                      [2012] 9 S.C.R. 515


            BABY DEVASSY CHULLY @ BOBBY                              A
                                v.
                   UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
              (Criminal Appeal No. 866 of 2008)

                     OCTOBER 12, 2012
                                                                     B
       [P. SATHASIVAM AND RANJAN GOGOi, JJ.]

     Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of
Smuggling Acitivties Act, 1974 - s. 3(1) - Arrest of detenu
under Customs Act - Granted bail in the case - But did not           C
avail of the same - While in jail, detention order under
COFEPOSA - Writ Petition challenging detention order -
High Court dismissing the petition - On appeal, held:
Detention order was necessary in view of the facts of the case
- Detenu was having bail order and thus there was possibility        D
of his coming out and indulge in prejudicial activities - It is
subjective satisfaction of Determining Authority to invoke order
of detention - Customs Act, 1962.

     Res Judicata - Petition u/Art. 226 challenging detention        E
order - Earlier petition u/Art. 32 challenging the same
detention dismissed - Whether petition u/Art. 226 barred by
res judicata - Held: Doctrine of res judicata would be
inapplicable to cases where the two forums have separate
and independent jurisdictions - Res Judicata also not
applicable in the instant case because in the petition u!Art.        F
226, additional grounds were raised.

     Practice and Procedure - Preventive detention for one
year - Petition challenging the detention - High Court
reserving the order and pronouncing the same after 5 months          G
- Held: In a matter affecting personal liberty of a citizen, it is
duty of the courts to take all endeavours and efforts for an
early decision - Courts to give priority for disposal of the
matters relating to personal liberty.
                              515                                    H
    516      SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A     Appellant-accused and five co-accused were
  arrested in respect of smuggling of diesel oil on the basis
  of the statements of the co-accused. The co-accused
  subsequently retracted from their statements. The
  appellant-accused was granted bail on 12.4.2005, but he
B did not avail of the same. On 3.5.2005 detention order was
  passed against him u/s. 3(1) of the Conservation of
  Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling
  Activities Act, 1974. Appellant-accused filed writ petition
  under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the
c detention order. The petition was dismissed by High
  Court.

       In appeal to this Court, the appellant (detenu)
  contended that there was no compelling reason to detain
  him as on the date of detention order, he was in jail; that
D reliance on the retraction statement of the co-accused by
  the Detaining Authority without adverting to their
  confessional statement, vitiates the detention order.

      Detaining Authority contended that the writ petition
E under Article 226 was barred by res judicata as the same
  detention was challenged in a writ petition under Article
  32 and the same was dismissed by this Court.

          Dismissing the appeal, the Court

F       HELD: 1. The right to liberty is guaranteed by Article
  21 of the Constitution of India. At the same time, Article
  22(3)(b) of the Constitution permits preventive detention.
  It is the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority
  whether a person has to be detained for a particular
G period of time or not. In the impugned grounds of
  detention, the Detaining Authority has narrated all the
  reasons for passing the detention order detaining the
  appellant with a view to prevent him from abetting the
  smuggling of goods in future. [Paras 7 and 8] [524-B-D]
H
  BABY DEVASSY CHULLY @ BOBBY v. UNION OF 517
                INDIA & ORS.
    Rekha vs. State of Tamil Nadu Through Secretary to           A
Governmentand Anr. (2011) 5 SCC 244: 2011 (4) SCR 740
- referred to.

      2. The Detaining Authority was conscious of all
relevant aspects and passed the impugned order of
                                                            8
detention in order to prevent the appellant from abetting
the smuggling of goods in future. It is true that though
the detenu was granted bail on 12.04.2005, for the
reasons best known to him, he did not avail such benefit
and continued to be in jail on the date of the detention, C
i.e., 03.05.2005. It is true that this aspect has not been
mentioned in the detention order, however, on the other
hand, it is not in dispute that the grounds of detention
which forms part of the Detention Order clearly mention
the details about the bail order dated 12.04.2005 and non-
availing of the same on the date of detention order. [Paras D
9 and 10] [524-F-H; 526-B]

     3. If a person concerned is in custody and there is
no imminent possibility of his being released, the rule is
that the power of preventive detention should not be             E
exercised. But, in the present case, it is not in dispute that
on 12.04.2005 itself, the competent Court has granted bail
but the appellant did not avail such benefit. In other
words, on the date of the detention order, i.e., 03.05.2005,
by virtue of the order granting bail even on 12.04.2005, it      F
would be possible for the detenu to come out without
any difficulty. In such circumstances, it is presumed that
at any moment, it would be possible for him to come out
and indulge in prejudicial activities. [Para 10] [525-F-H]

     Binod Singh vs. District Magistrate, Ohanbad, Bihar and     G
Ors. (1986) 4 SCC 416: 1986 (3) SCR 906 - distinguished.

     4. In view of the various grounds/details/materials
adverted to in the impugned order it cannot be claimed
that there was no compelling necessity to pass the order         H
    518      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A of detention. It is the subjective satisfaction of the
  Detaining Authority whether the order of detention is to
  be invoked or not. [Para 11) [526-C-D]

       5. All the documents which are relevant, which have
  bearing on the issue, which are likely to affect the mind
8 of the Detaining Authority should be placed before it. But
  a document which has no link with the issue cannot be
  construed as relevant. In the present case what the
  Detaining Authority has stated in paragraph 10 of the
  grounds of detention is a mere reference and no reliance
C can be based on the same. However, it is not in dispute
  that the appellant-detenu was supplied even the retraction
  statement referred to in paragraph 10 along with the
  grounds of detention. In such circumstance, it cannot be
  said that without adverting to the confessional statement
D of the co-accused, reliance based upon retraction
  statement is not maintainable. [Para 12) [526-E-F; 527-E-
  F]

      A. Sowkath Ali vs. Union of India and Ors. (2000) 7 SCC
E 148: 2000 (2) Suppl. SCR 48 - referred to.
         6. The doctrine of res judicata would be inapplicable
    to cases where the two forums have separate and
    independent jursidctions. In view of the same and in the
    light of the additional grounds raised and also of the fact
F   that the issue relates to personal liberty of a citizen, the
    present appeal cannot be dismissed on the grounds of
    res judicata. [Para 13) [529-A-B]

          Kirit Kumar Chaman Lal Kundaliya vs. Union of India and
G Ors. (1981) 2 sec 436 - relied on.

        7. In the present case writ petition under Article 226
    of the Constitution of India was filed before the High
    Court on 02.06.2005 immediately after passing of the
    detention order ie. On 3.5.2005. The High Court reserved
H
  BABY DEVASSY CHULLY @ BOBBY v. UNION OF                 519
                INDIA & ORS.
its orders on 24.10.2005 and pronounced its orders only          A
on 16.03.2006, i.e., nearly after a period of 5 months. He
pointed out that because of the same, the detenu could
not know the fate of his petition for a period of 5 months
when the detention period was for one year. All the High
Courts are reminded that in a matter of this nature              B
affecting the personal liberty of a citizen, it is the duty of
the Courts to take all endeavours and efforts for an early
decision. In the present case keeping the writ petition
pending after hearing the parties and compelling the
detenu to wait for 5 months to know the result of his            c
petition, cannot be accepted. All the High Courts are
requested to give priority for the disposal of the matters
relating to personal liberty of a citizen, particularly, when
the detention period is for one year or less than a year
and, more so, after hearing the parties, the decision must       0
be known to the affected party without unreasonable
delay. [Paras 14 and 15] [529-C-F]
                     Case Law Reference:
    2011 (4) SCR 740            Referred to        Para 7        E
    1986 (3) SCR 906            Distinguished      Para 9
    2000 (2) Suppl. SCR 48 Referred to             Para 12
    (1981) 2 sec 436            Relied on          Para 13
                                                                 F
    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 866 of 2008.

    From the Judgment & Order dated 16.3.2005 of the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Writ Petition No.      G
1500 of 2005.

     K.K. Mani, Abhishek Krishna, Prakash Kumar Singh,
Satish Pandey for the Appellant.

                                                                 H
    520       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A       K. Swami, B. Krishna Prasad, A.K. Sharma, Rashmi
    Malhotra, Asha Gopalan Nair for the Respodents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        P. SATHASIVAM, J. 1. This appeal is directed against
B the final judgment and order dated 16.03.2006 passed by the
  High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Writ Petition
  No. 1500 of 2005 whereby the High Court dismissed the petition
  filed by the appellant herein.

c         2. Brief facts:

          (a) According to the appellant, the Directorate of Revenue
    Intelligence (ORI), Mumbai Zonal Unit, Mumbai, received an
    intelligence that one sea-faring vessel by name M.T. AL
    SHAHABA (a motor tanker) carrying approximately 700 metric
D   tons (MT) of Diesel Oil of foreign origin is arriving into Indian
    Customs Waters on or around 2oth or 21st December, 2004
    and the said diesel oil would be smuggled into India. The
    officers of the ORI, Mumbai, therefore, kept surveillance in that
    area and on 21.12.2004, the officers spotted the said vessel.
E   They noticed two self propelled barges and two dumb barges
    each towed by a tow boat were around the said vessel. They
    also noticed that pipes were attached from the said vessel to
    the barges and oil was being pumped into the barges from the
    vessel. The officers of the ORI boarded the said vessel and took
F   control of the same. The vessel and barges were found to be
    of Mumbai coast within the Indian territorial waters. When the
    officers made enquiry with the Captain of the vessel - Fouad
    Ahmed Al Manie, he informed that the vessel was carrying High
    Speed Diesel (HSD) from Muscat. The Captain was not holding
G   any legal documents for import of the said diesel oil into India.
    The Captain informed the officers that he has already
    discharged around 250 MTs of oil from the vessel into three
    barges before they boarded the vessel. The officers, therefore,
    brought the said vessel and barges to the P and V Anchorage
H   of Port Trust, Mumbai. Two independent panchas were brought
  BABY DEVASSY CHULLY @ BOBBY v. UNION OF                       521
        INDIA & ORS. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

and detailed inventory was prepared and after conducting               A
search of the said vessel and barges, panchnamas were drawn.
The officers of the ORI seized the said diesel oil weighing about
770 MTs, worth Rs. 2 crores, under the Customs Act, 1962.

     (b) During the course of investigation, the officers came
                                                                       8
to know the name of the appellant-detenu and one Chand as
the persons behind the said smuggling. On 22/23.12.2004, the
statement of the Captain of the vessel was recorded wherein
he stated that he was asked by his master to take the vessel
to the Indian Coast and to deliver the consignment to one
Bobby-the detenu in India. On the same day, the statement of           C
Sayyed Hussain Madar @ Chand was also recorded wherein
he, inter alia, stated that he was to purchase the said Diesel
Oil brought by Bobby in India and sell the same.

      (c) During the course of follow-up action of the said seizure    D
of the vessel, the officers of the ORI, Mumbai seized about
5.127 MTs of previously smuggled diesel oil stored in two
barges at Reti Sunder, Belapur and arrested Chand, Captain
Fouad Ahmed Al Manie, Shaikh Ahmedali, Murugan
Murugeshan and Sadiq Anwar under Section 104 of the                    E
Customs Act, 1962 on 23.12.2004 and were produced before
the Addi. CMM, Esplanade, Mumbai on 24.12.2004 and were
later released on bail on 09.02.2005. However, subsequently,
all of them retracted their statements. On 04.03.2005,
residential premises of the appellant-Bobby were searched and          F
finally he was traced on 14.03.2005. On the same day, he
moved an anticipatory bail application in the Sessions Court,
Mumbai which was rejected on 24.03.2005. On 24.03.2005, the
statement of Bobby was recorded under Section 108 of the
Customs Act, 1962. On the basis of his statement, the officers         G
arrested the appellant on 25.03.2005. On 12.04.2005, he was
granted bail by the Addi. CMM, Mumbai but he did not avail of
the same. On 03.05.2005, the Joint Secretary to the
Government of India, after considering the appellant's high
propensity and potentiality to indulge in prejudicial activities and
                                                                       H
    522      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A   with a view to prevent him from abetting the smuggling of goods
    in future, passed the detention order against him under Section
    3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention
    of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as "the
    COFEPOSA Act").
B
         (d) Being aggrieved by the said order, on 02.06.2005, the
    appellant filed Criminal Writ Petition No. 1500 of 2005 before
    the Bombay High Court. The High Court, finding no substance
    in the writ petition, by impugned judgment dated 16.03.2006,
    dismissed the same.
c
         (e) Aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellant has filed
    this appeal by way of special leave before this Court. On
    09.05.2008, leave was granted.

D        3. Heard Mr. K.K. Mani, learned counsel for the appellant,
    Mr. K. Swami, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 & 2 and
    Ms. Asha Gopalan Nair, learned counsel for Respondent No.4-
    State.

       4. Mr. K.K. Mani, learned counsel for the appellant, after
E taking us through the detention order dated 03.05.2005 and the
  grounds of detention as well as the impugned order of the High
  Court dismissing the writ petition raised the following
  contentions:

F        (i) inasmuch as on the date of passing of the detention
    order, i.e., 03.05.2005, the appellant was in jail, in that event
    there is no compelling necessity to detain him under the
    provisions of the COFEPOSA Act ;

       (ii) the Detaining Authority failed to take note of relevant
G aspect, i.e., the detenu was in custody, hence, the Detention
  Order is liable to be quashed on the ground of non-application
  of mind; and

          (iii) the Detaining Authority relied upon the retraction
H
 BABY DEVASSY CHULLY @ BOBBY v. UNION OF                      523
       INDIA & ORS. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

statement of co-accused without adverting to their confessional      A
statement which vitiates the detention order.

    5. Mr. K. Swami, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1
& 2-Detaining Authority, submitted as under:-

    (i) taking note of prejudicial activities and with a view to     B
prevent the appellant from involving/abetting the smuggling of
goods, the Detaining Authority rightly invoked the provisions of
the COFEPOSA Act;

     (ii) all the procedural safeguards have been strictly adhered   C
to by the Detaining Authority; and

      (iii) all the points raised by the learned counsel for the
appellant before this Court had already been considered and
negatived by the High Court, hence, there is no ground for
                                                                     0
interference.

    6. We have carefully considered the rival contentions,
perused the detention order, grounds of detention and all the
connected materials.
                                                                     E
    7. At th; foremost, Mr. K.K. Mani, learned counsel for the
appellant pressed into service the decision of this Court in
Rekha vs. State of Tamil Nadu Through Secretary to
Government and Anr., (2011) 5 SCC 244. He very much relied
on paragraph 29 of the said decision which reads as under:
                                                                     F
          "29. Preventive detention is, by nature, repugnant to
    democratic ideas and an anathema to the rule of law. No
    such law exists in the USA and in England (except during
    war time). Since, however, Article 22(3)(b) of the
    Constitution of India permits preventive detention, we           G
    cannot hold it illegal but we must confine the power of
    preventive detention within very narrow limits, otherwise
    we will be taking away the great right to liberty guaranteed
    by Article 21 of the Constitution of India which was won
    after long, arduous and historic struggles. It follows,          H
    524       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A         therefore, that if the ordinary law of the land (the Penal
          Code and other penal statutes) can deal with a situation,
          recourse to a preventive detention law will be illegal."

        We are conscious of the fact mat the right to liberty is
    guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. At the
8
    same time, Article 22(3)(b) of the Constitution permits
    preventive detention. Keeping the above principles in mind, let
    us consider whether the impugned detention order is
    sustainable in law or not.

C      8. In a series of decisions, this Court has held that it is the
  subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority whether a
  person has to be detained for a particular period of time or not.
  In the impugned grounds of detention, the Detaining Authority
  has narrated all the reasons for passing the detention order
D detaining the appellant with a view to prevent him from abetting
  the smuggling of goods in future.

         9. With regard to non-application of mind, Mr. K.K. Mani_,
    learned counsel for the appellant pointed out that on the date
E   of passing of the detention order, i.e., 03.05.2005, the detenu
    was in prison though he was granted bail on 12.04.2005, he
    had not availed the same and continued in prison on the date
    of order. According to him, this aspect was not reflected in the
    detention order which, according to him, vitiates the detention
F   on the principle of non-application of mind. It is true that though
    the detenu was granted bail on 12.04.2005, for the reasons
    best known to him, he did not avail such benefit and continued
    to be in jail on the date of the detention, i.e., 03.05.2005. It is
    true that this aspect has not been mentioned in the detention
    order, however, on the other hand, it is not in dispute that the
G   grounds of detention which forms part of the Detention Order
    dated 03.05.2005 clearly mention the details about the bail
    order dated 12.04.2005 and non-availing of the same on the
    date of detention order, i.e., 03.05.2005. In this regard, learned
    counsel for the appellant relied on a decision of this Court in
H   Binod Singh vs. District Magistrate, Dhanbad, Bihar & Ors .
  BABY DEVASSY CHULLY @ BOBBY v. UNION OF                     525
        INDIA & ORS. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
(1986) 4 SCC 416 wherein the contention of the petitioner            A
therein was that the order of preventive detention could only be
justified against a person in detention if the Detaining Authority
was satisfied that his release from detention was imminent and
the order of detention was necessary for putting him back in
jail. He also contented that the service of order of detention on    B
the petitioner while he was in jail was futile and useless since
such an order had no application under Section 3(2) of the
National Security Act, 1980. While considering the said claim,
this Court, in paragraph 7, held as under:

            "7. It is well settled in our constitutional framework   C
     that the power of directing preventive detention given to
     the appropriate authorities must be exercised in
     exceptional cases as contemplated by the various
     provisions of the different statutes dealing with preventive
     detention and should be used with great deal of                 D
     circumspection. There must be awareness of the facts
     necessitating preventive custody of a person for social
     defence. If a man is in custody and there is no imminent
     possibility of his being released, the power of preventive
     detention should not be exercised ........ "                    E

     10. It is clear that if a person concerned is in custody and
there is no imminent possibility of his being released, the rule
is that the power of preventive detention should not be
exercised. In the case on band, it is not in dispute that on         F
12.04.2005 itself, the competent Court has granted bail but the
appellant did not avail such benefit. In other words, on the date
of the detention order, i.e., 03.05.2005, by virtue of the order
granting bail even on 12.04.2005, it would be possible for the
detenu to come out without any difficulty. In such circumstances,    G
while reiterating the principle of this Court enunciated in the
above decision and in view of the fact that the detenu was
having the order of bail in his hand, it is presumed that at any
moment, it would be possible for him to come out and indulge
in prejudicial activities, hence, the said decision is not helpful   H
    526      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 9 S.C.R.

A to the case of the appellant. In view of the above circumstances
  and of the fact that the Detaining Authority was aware of the
  grant of bail and clearly stated the same in the grounds of
  detention, we reject the contra arguments made by the learned
  counsel for the appellant. On the other hand, we hold that the
B Detaining Authority was conscious of all relevant aspects and
  passed the impugned order of detention in order to prevent the
  appellant from abetting the smuggling of goods in future.

        11. For the same reason, the other contention, namely, that
  no compelling necessity to pass the order of detention is to be
C rejected. As a matter of fact, learned counsel for the Detaining
  Authority took us through various grounds/details/materials
  adverted to in the impugned order and we are satisfied that it
  cannot be claimed that there was no compelling necessity to
  pass the order of detention. We have already pointed out that
D it is the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority
  whether the order of detention is to be invoked or not.
  Accordingly, we reject the above contention also.

        12. The next contention, namely, the Detaining Authority
E relied on the retraction statement of co-accused without looking
  into their confession, it is argued by the learned counsel for the
  appellant that without adverting to confessional statement of the
  co-accused, reliance based upon the retraction statement is not
  maintainable. It is true that in paragraph 10 of the grounds of
F detention, the Detaining Authority has stated as under:-

                 "Chand, Capt. Fouad Ahmed and Sadruddin B.
          Khan have retracted their statements after arrest before
          the Magistrate. However, a rebuttal to these retractions was
          filed before the Magistrate. No correspondence has been
G         received from the said persons or the Advocate's on the
          rebuttal filed by ORI."

       It is equally true that there is no reference to confessional
  statement of the co-accused. As rightly pointed out by the
H learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 & 2 that what the
  BABY DEVASSY CHULLY@ BOBBY v. UNION OF                      527
        INDIA & ORS. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

Detaining Authority has stated in paragraph 10, extracted            A
above, is only mere reference or narration of fact for completion
of the proceedings. In other words, we are satisfied that it is
not relied upon statemenUdocument as claimed by the learned
counsel for the appellant. No doubt, by drawing our attention
to the decision in A. Sowkath Ali vs. Union of India & Ors.,         B
(2000) 7 SCC 148, Mr. K.K. Mani, learned counsel for the
appellant contended that both the confessional and retraction
statements ought to have been placed and furnished to the
appellant. In the said decision, this Court has held that the
confessional statement and the retraction statement both             c
constituting a composite relevant fact should have been placed.
It was further held that if any one of the two documents alone is
placed, without the other, it would affect the subjective
satisfaction of the Detaining Authority. Therefore, it was held
that non-placement of the retraction affects the subjective          D
satisfaction of the Detaining Authority. There is no quarrel as
to the proposition, in fact, the sponsoring authority has to place
all the relevant documents before the Detaining Authority. We
reiterate that all the documents which are relevant, which have
bearing on the issue, which are likely to affect the mind of the     E.
Detaining Authority should be placed before it. Further, a
document which has no link with the issue cannot be construed
as relevant. In the case on hand, we have already observed that
what the Detaining Authority has stated in paragraph 10 of the
grounds is only a mere reference and no reliance can be
based on the same. However, it is not in dispute that the            F
appellant-detenu was supplied even the retraction statement
referred to in paragraph 10 along with the grounds of detention.
In such circumstance, this contention is also rejected.

     13. Learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 1 &           G
2 has brought to our notice that on earlier occasion, i.e.,
27.02.2006, the present appellant challenged the very same
detention order by way of filing a writ petition being W.P.(Crl.)
No. D-5620 of 2006 under Article 32 of the Constitution before
this Court. By order dated 06.03.2006, this Court dismissed          H
    528       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A the said petition, hence, according to the learned counsel for
  the respondents, the appellant is debarred from filing the
  present appeal against the dismissal of the writ petition by the
  High Court of Bombay. Similar issue was considered by this
  Court relating to filing of Habeas Corpus petition under Article
B 32 of the Constitution of India in Kirit Kumar Chaman Lal
  Kundaliya vs. Union of India & Ors. (1981) 2 SCC 436 wherein
  this Court held in paragraph 10 as under:

                 "10 .................... The doctrine of finality of
          judgment or the principles of res judicata are founded on
c         the basic principle that where a Court of competent
          jurisdiction has decided an issue, the same ought not
          allowed to be agitated again and again. Such a doctrine
          would be wholly inapplicable to cases where the two
          forums have separate and independent jurisdictions. In the
D         instant case, the High Court decided the petition of the
          detenu under Article 226 which was a discretionary
          jurisdiction whereas the jurisdiction to grant relief in a
          petition under Article 32 filed in the Supreme Court is
           guaranteed by the Constitution and once the court finds that.
E         there has been a violation of Article 22(5) of the
           Constitution, then it has no discretion in the matter but is
           bound to grant the relief to the detenu by setting aside the
           order of detention. The doctrine of res judicata or the
           principles of finality of judgment cannot be allowed to
F         whittle down or override the express constitutional
           mandate to the Supreme Court enshrined in Article 32 of
           the Constitution. In a recent decision in the case of
           Santosh Anand v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 420 this
           Court has pointed out that the concept of liberty has now
G          been widened by Maneka Gandhi case (1978) 1 SCC
           248 where Article 21 as construed by this Court has added
           new dimensions to the various features and concepts of
           liberty as enshrined in Articles 21 and 22 of the
           Constitution. For these reasons, therefore, we overruled the
H          preliminary objection taken by the respondents."
  BABY DEVASSY CHULLY@ BOBBY v. UNION OF                        529
        INDIA & ORS. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
In view of the same and in the light of the additional grounds          A
raised and also of the fact that the issue relates to personal
liberty of a citizen, we reject the objection of the respondents
and hold that the present appeal cannot be dismissed on the
grounds of res judicata.
                                                                        B
      14. Before winding up, it is our duty to refer one factual
aspect pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant. It
is seen that immediately after passing of the detention order
on 03.05.2005, a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India was filed before the High Court of Bombay         C
on 02.06.2005. It is the claim of the appellant that after hearing
all the parties, the High Court reserved its orders on 24.10.2005
and according to the learned counsel for the appellant, the High
Court pronounced its orders only on 16.03.2006, i.e., nearly
after a period of 5 months. He pointed out that because of the
same, the detenu could not know the fate of his petition for a          D
period of 5 months when the detention period was for one year.

       15. By this appeal, we remind all the High Courts that in a
matter of this nature affecting the personal liberty of a citizen,
it is the duty of the Courts to take all endeavours and efforts         E
for an early decision. In the case on hand, we feel that keeping
the writ petition pending after hearing the parties and compelling
the detenu to wait for 5 months to know the result of his petition,
cannot be accepted. We request all the High Courts to give
priority for the disposal of the matters relating to personal liberty   F
of a citizen, particularly, when the detention period is for one
year or less than a year and, more so, after hearing the parties,
the decision must be known to the affected party without
unreasonable delay.

    16. In the light of the above discussion, we are unable to          G
accept any of the contentions raised by the appellant.
Consequently, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed.

K.K.T.                                        Appeal dismissed.
                                                                        H