BABUBHAI BHIMABHAI BOKHIRIA & ANR.versusSTATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.

                       [2013] 1 S.C.R. 665


          BABUBHAI BHIMABHAI BOKHIRIA & ANR.                          A
                                 v.
              STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
  -(CRLMP NO. 20502 OF 2008 AND NO. 24292 OF 2011)
                                in
           Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.)                B
                        No. 9184 of 2008

                       JANUARY 30, 2013

           [T.S. THAKUR AND FAKKIR MOHAMED
                  IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, JJ.]                             C

      CONSTITUTION OF IND/A, 1950:

       Art. 21 read with s. 319 CrPC - Right to speedy trial -
  SLP of newly added ccused, referred to Constitution Bench           0
. - Court granting stay - Prayer by one of the accused seeking
  vacation of stay order/grant of bail - Held: Stay order modified
  to the effect that while stay of trial of newly added accused
  shall continue qua him only, trial court shall be free to proceed
  with trial qua other accused persons - Constitution of India,
                                                                      E
  1950 - Art. 21.

      CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973:

      s. 319 -Power to proceed against other persons
 appearing to be guilty of offence - Held: The words "could be        F
 tried together with the accused" ins. 319(1) appear to be only
 directory- "Could be" cannot under the circumstances be held
 to be "must be" and the opinion formed by court on the basis
 of evidence would not be nullified - Even if addition of new
 accused is ultimately held to be justified, mere fact that trial     G
 of remaining accused had already concluded would not
 prevent prosecution of newly added accused for offences for
 which he has been summoned by trial court.
      The petition for special leave to appeal arising out of
                             665                                      H
    666     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2013] 1 S.C.R.


A the order adding the petitioner as a co-accused in a case
  pending before the Court of Session for offences
  punishable u/ss 302, 201 read with s.34 and ss. 120-B,
  465, 468 and 471 IPC, s.25 of Arms Act and s.135 of
  Bombay Police Act, was referred to a Constitution Bench.
B In Crl. Misc. Petition No. 20502 of 2008 filed in the SLP,
  the Supreme Court, by order dated 17.12.2008 granted
  stay. Crl. Misc. Petition No. 24292 of 2011 was filed by one
  of the co-accused seeking to add himself as a party to
  the instant proceedings and for vacation of the order
c dated 17.12.2008 by which further steps in the case were
  stayed. In the alternative the applicant prayed for bail. By
  order dated 8.12.2011, a three-Judge Bench allowed the
  prayer for impleadment and directed that grant of bail be
  considered by the regular Bench. Accordingly, Crl. Misc.
  Petition No. 20502 of 2008 and Crl. Misc. Petition No.
0
  24292 of 2011 came to be listed before the instant Bench.
        Allowing the criminal miscellaneous petitions in part,
    the Court
E      HELD: 1.1. A perusal of the order dated 17.12.2008
  makes it evident that while the prayer was simply for stay
  of operation of the High Court's order, the direction
  issued by this Court stayed further steps in the case.
  "Further steps" would mean not only stay of the addition
F of the petitioner but also stay of any further action in
  relation to the trial which had by that time concluded
  before the trial court. So long as the petitioner is not tried,
  pursuant to the order passed against him, he had no
  objection to the trial court concluding the proceedings
G against the remaining accused persons. If the petitioner
  as dominus litis has no objection to the continuance and
  conclusion of the trial in his absence qua other accused
  persons and is not, therefore, asking for stay of the trial
  qua everybody, there is no justification for granting him
  a relief larger than what is prayed for. [para 11) (673-E-F,
H G-H; 674-A-B]
  BABUBHAI BHIMABHAI BOKHIRIA v. STATE OF                667
                 GUJARAT
     1.2. Besides, prosecution has already examined as A
many as 134 witnesses at the trial. With the addition of
the petitioner as accused, all those witnesses shall have
to be recalled for a fresh examination and the trial would
go on for a few more years. This would in turn mean that
the right of the accused to a speedy trial will be in serious B
jeopardy on account of the entire process being resumed
de novo. The essence of Art. 21 lies not only in ensuring
that no citizen is deprived of his life or personal liberty
except according to procedure established by law, but
also that such procedure ensures both fairness and an· c
expeditious conclusion of the trial. [para 16 and 18] [676-
E-G; 677-G-H]

     Hussainara Khatoon and Ors. v. Home Secretary, State
of Bihar, Patna (1980) 1 SCC 91; A. R. Antulay v. R. S. Na yak
1991 (3) Suppl. SCR 325 = (1992) 1 sec 225; and Sher             D
Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 2 SCC 344; Javed Ahmed
Abdul Hamid Pawala v. State of Maharashtra 1985 (2)
SCR 8 = (1985) 1 SCC 275 and Triveni Ben v. State of
Gujarat 1989 (1) SCR 509 = (1989) 1 SCC 678; Biswanath
Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 97 and         E
Mahendra Lal Das v. State of Bihar and Ors. 2001 (4) Suppl.
SCR 157 = (2002) 1 SCC 149 - referred to.

     1.3. As regards the expression "could be tried
together' appearing in s.319 Cr.P.C., so as to infer that        F
the newly added accused must be tried along with the
accused already sent up for trial, the issue is no longer
res integra. This Court in Shashikant Singh's case held
that the words "could be tried together with the accused"
in s. 319(1) appear to be only directory. "Could be"             G
cannot under the circumstances be held to be "must be"
and the opinion formed by the court on the basis of the
evidence would not be nullified. Even if the addition of
the petitioner is ultimately held to be justified by the
Constitution Bench of this Court, the mere fact that the
                                                                 H
    668    SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2013) 1 S.C.R.


A   trial of the remaining accused has already concluded,
    would not prevent the prosecution of the petitioner for the
    offences for which he has been summoned by the trial
    court. (para 12 and 15] [674-C-D; 675-A-B-C; 676-C-D]

         Shashikant Singh v. Tarkeshwar Singh and Anr. 2002
8   (3) SCR 400 = (2002) 5 SCC 738; and Rajendra Singh v.
    State of U.P. & Anr. 2001 (8) SCR 834 = (2007) 7  sec
                                                        378
    - relied on

        Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi
C   1983 (1) SCR 884 = (1983) 1 SCC 1 and Michael Machado
    v. Central Bureau of Investigation 2000 (1) SCR 981 = (2000)
    3 sec 262 - distinguished

         1.4. In the totality of the circumstances, the order
    dated 17.12.2008 is modified. It is made clear that while
0
    the stay of the trial against the petitioner shall continue
    qua the said petitioner, the trial court shall be free to
    proceed with the trial qua the other accused persons.
    [para 19] [678-C-D]

E       Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab 2008 (15) SCR 735
    =AIR 2009 SC 483; Shashikant Singh v. Tarkeshwar Singh
    and Anr. 2002 (3) SCR 400 = (2002) 5 SCC 738, Michael
    Machado and Anr. v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr.
    2000 (1) SCR 981 = (2000) 3 SCC 262 and Rajendra Singh
F   v. State of U.P. & Anr. 2007 (8) SCR 834 = (2007) 7 SCC
    378 - cited.
                        Case Law Reference:
     2008 (15) SCR 735             cited             para 4
G
     2002 (3) SCR 400              cited             para 6
     2000 (1) SCR 981              cited             para 6
     2007 (8) SCR 834              cited              para 6
H    2002 (3) SCR 400              relied on         para 12
       BABUBHAI BHIMABHAI BOKHIRIA v. STATE OF                669
                      GUJARAT
     1983 (1) SCR 884               distinguished      para 13       A
"
     2000 (1) SCR 981               distinguished      para 13
     2007 (8) SCR 834               relied on          para 14
     (1980) 1 sec 91                referred to        para 16
                                                                     B
     1991 (3) Suppl. SCR 325        referred to        para 16
                                                                         I
     1983 (2) sec 344               referred to        para 16

     1985 (2) SCR 8                 referred to        para 17

     1989 (1) SCR 509               referred to        para 17
                                                                     c
     1994 Supp. (3) SCC 97          referred to        para 17

     2001 (4) Suppl. SCR 157        referred to        para 17

        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Crl. M.P. No.              D
    20502 of 2008 ,& Crl. M.P. No. 24292 of 2011.
                                    IN
    SLP (Criminal) No. 9184 of 2008

        From the Judgment & Order dated 11.12.2008 of the High       E
    Court of Gujarat at Ahmadabad in Special Criminal Application
    No. 638 of 2008.

         Uday U. Lalit, A.M. Singhvi, Shubhraushu Padhi, Virat
    Popat, Peetibhe Jain, Aniruddha P. Mayee, Huzefa Ahmadi,         F
    N.D. Nanavati, B.M. Mangukiya, V.H. Kanara, Mrigank
    Prabhakar, Ejaz Maqbool, He!_11antika Wahi, Jesal, Nandini
    Gupta, Meenakshi Arora, Pratibha Jain for the appearing
    parties.
                                                                     G
        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

         T.S. THAKUR, J. 1. This special leave petition arises out
    of an order dated 11th December, 2008 passed by the High
    Court of Gujarat at Ahmadabad whereby Special Criminal
                                                                     H
•   670      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 1 S.C.R.


A Application No.638 of 2008 filed by the petitioner-Babubhai
  Bhimabhai Bokhiria has been dismissed and order dated 29th
  March, 2008 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge,
  Porbandar affirmed. The Additional Sessions Judge,
  Porbandar had by the said order summoned the petitioner as
B an accused person in exercise of his power under Section 319
  of the Cr.P.C. in Sessions Case No.5 of 2007 for offences
  punishable under Sections 302, 201 read with Sections 34,
  120-B, 465, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, Section
  25 of the Arms Act and Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act.

C         2". The incident that provides the genesis of the case
  aforementioned took place on 16th November, 2005 in which
  one Mulubhai Modhwadiya was gunned down resulting in
  registration of Criminal Case No.I 170 of 2005 at Kamlabaug
  Police Station, Porbandar for the offences mentioned earlier.
D Upon completion of the investigation, the jurisdictional police
  filed a charge sheet on 15th Febr1_1ary, 2006 before a Magistrate
  who committed the same to the Sessions Court to be
  registered as Case No.5 of 2007.

E       3. The police charge-sheet cited a large number of
  witnesses out of whom as many as 134 have been examined
  by the prosecution. It was, at this stage, that an application was
  filed by the son of the deceased on 17th March, 2008 in which
  the applicant prayed for adding the petitioner-Babubhai
F Bhimabhai Bokhiria as an accused in exercise of the Courts
  power under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. The Sessions Judge
  allowed the said application and added the said Shri Babubhai
  Bhimabhai Bokhiria as a co-accused in the case vide order
  dated 29th March, 2008. Aggrieved by his addition as an
  accused the petitioner preferred Special Criminal Application
G No.638 of 2008 before the High Court of Gujarat which, as
  noticed earlier, has been dismissed by the High Court in terms
  of the order impugned in this special leave petition.

      4. When the special leave petition came up before a
H Bench comprising of P. Sathasivam and H.L. Dattu, JJ., this
    BABUBHAI BHIMABHAI BOKHIRIA v. STATE OF                 671
           GUJARAT [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
. Court referred the matter to a larger Bench in view of a similar A
  reference made in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR
  2009 SC 483). The Court at the same time granted permission
  to the accused persons to move an application for bail before
  the competent Court. The matter then came up before a Bench
  of three Judges who formulated five different questions and B
  referred the same to a Constitution Bench, for an authoritative
  pronouncement.

      5. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.24292 of 2011 was
 at that stage filed by the applicant-Veja Prabhat Bhutiya in C
 which he prayed for his addition as a party to the present
 proceedings and for vacation of order dated 17th December,
 2008 by which further steps in the case were stayed. In the
 alternative the applicant prayed for grant of bail to him. By an
 order dated 8th December, 2011 a three-Judge Bench of this
 Court allowed the prayer for impleadment but directed that the D
 prayer for grant of bail be considered by the regular Bench. That
 is precisely how Criminal Miscellaneous No.24292 of 2011
 seeking vacation of the stay order and/or grant of bail and
 Criminal Miscellaneous No.20502 of 2008 filed by the petitioner
 in the special leave petition has come up before us for hearing. E
       6. Appearing for the applicant Mr. U.U. Lalit, learned
 Senior Counsel, strenuously argued that the applicant has been
 in custody for over six years. Even so there are no prospects
 of the Constitution Bench taking up the reference in the near F
 future which implies that unless this Court either vacates the
 said order passed on 17th December, 2008 or grants bail to
 the applicant, there is no chance of the applicant or other
 persons who are similarly languishing in jail for years seeing
 the end of their trial and resultant agony. It was also urged that G
 although the special leave petition has been filed on behalf of
 the petitioner in the main petition only and although the prayer
 for stay made in Criminal Miscellaneous No.20502 of 2008, he
 had simply asked for stay of the judgment and final order
 passed by the High Court. The order passed by this Court on H
    .
        672   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 1 S.C.R.

A 17th December, 2008 was, however, understood as though the
  trial itself was stayed in toto. This was, according to Mr. Lalit,
  not only depriving the applicant of his fundamental right of a
  speedy trial but also depriving him of his personal liberty with
  hardly any chances of an early conclusion of the trial in the near
B future. He submitted that even if the order passed by the trial
  Court and affirmed by the High Court was eventually upheld and
  the addition of the petitioner in the special leave petition was
  declared to be justified, the said petitioner could be tried
  separately as there was no legal bar to such a trial. Reliance
c in support was placed by learned Counsel upon the decisions
  of this Court in Shashikant Singh v. Tarkeshwar Singh and
  Anr. (2002) 5 SCC 738, Michael Machado and Anr. v. Central
  Bureau of Investigation & Anr. (2000) 3 SCC 262 and
  Rajendra Singh v. State of U.P. & Anr. (2007) 7 SCC 378.
D       7. On behalf of the respondents, Mr. A.M. Singhvi, Senior
  Advocate, argued that the vacation or modification of the stay
  granted by this Court would have the effect of splitting the trial
  of those who have been accused in the charge-sheet and the
  petitioner Babubhai Bhimabhai Bokhiria the newly added
E accused which was legally impermissible. Mr. Singhvi made a
  strenuous effort to distinguish the decisions relied upon by Mr.
  Lalit and argued that they were different fact situations and
  could not be said to be laying down a binding principle of law
  that splitting of the trial, was permissible. Relian·ce was, in that
F regard, placed by learned counsel to the expression "could be
  tried togethet" appearing in Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. It was
  also submitted by Mr. Singhvi that the applicant could have
  approached the trial Court for grant of bail, if so advised, and
  that the present application seeking enlargement on bail
G pending disposal of the reference before the Constitution Bench
  was incompetent.
        8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner in the special leave
  petition argued that the. petitioners had not asked for stay of
H the trial. All that his application prayed for was a stay of the
  operation of the impugned judgment of the High Court which
   BABUBHAI BHIMABHAI BOKHIRIA v. STATE OF                  673
          GUJARAT [T.S. THAKUR, J.]

implied that the addition of the applicant as an accused could      A
remain stayed pending disposal of the special leave petition
by this Court.

     9. In CRLMP No.20502 of 2008 filed by the petitioners,
the petitioners had made the following prayer :                     8
     "1. That this Hon'ble Court be pleased to stay the
     impugned judgment and final order dated 11.12.2008
     passed by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in
     Special Criminal Application No. 638 of 2008 during the
     pendency of the Special Leave petition; and                    C

     2. Pass any other order (s) and or directions as this
     Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper."

    10. This Court had upon consideration of the said prayer        D
passed the following order on 17th December, 2008:

     "List on 5.1.2009'.

     Further steps in the case are stayed till then."

      11. It is evident from the above that while the prayer was
                                                                    E
simply for stay of the operation of the High Court's order, the
direction issued by this Court stayed further steps in this case.
 "Further steps" would mean not only stay of the addition of the
petitioner Babl:lbhai Bhimabhai Bokhiria but also stay of any
further action in relation to the trial which had by that time      F
concluded before the trial Court. Be that as it may, learned
counsel for the petitioner had no objection to the order passed
by this Court being modified so as to confine its operation to
the petitioner-Babubhai Bhimabhai Bokhiria only. So long as
the petitioner was not tried, pursuant to the order passed          G
against him, he had no objection to the trial Court proceeding
to conclude the proceedings against the remaining accused
persons. Such being the position, we see no reason why order
dated 17th December, 2008, even assuming the same was
intended to suspend further proceedings before the trial Court,     H
    674       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 1 S.C.R.

A should not be modified so as to limit the effect thereof to the
  addition of the petitioner only. We say so because if the
  petitioner as dominus litis has no objection to the continuance
  and conclusion of the trial in his absence qua other accused
  persons and is not, therefore, asking for stay of the trial qua
B everybody; there is no justification for granting to him a relief
  larger than what is being prayed for by the petitioner.

        12. Time now to deal with the contention urged by Mr.
  Singhvi, that the expression "could be tried together' appearing
  in Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. means that the newly added
C accused must be tried along with the accused already sent up
  for trial. The question is no longer res integra in the light of the
  judgment of this Court in Shashikant Singh v. Tarkeshwar
  Singh and Anr. (2002) 5 SCC 738, where this Court was
  examining a similar contention that failed to impress this Court
D and was rejected in the following words:
          "9. The intention of the provision here is that where in the
          course of any enquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it
          appears to the court from the evidence that any person
E         not being the accused has committed any offence, the
          court may proceed against him for the offence which he
          appears to have committed. At that stage, the court would
          consider that such a person could be tried together with
          the accused who is already before the court facing the trial.
F         The safeguard provided in respect of such person is that,
          the proceedings right from the beginning have
          mandatorily to be commenced afresh and the witnesses
          reheard. In short, there has to be a de novo trial against
          him. The provision of de novo trial is mandatory. It vitally
          affects the rights of a person so brought before the court.
G
          It would not be sufficient to only tender the witnesses for
          the cross-examination of such a person. They have to be
          examined afresh. Fresh examination-in-chief and not
          only their presentation for the purpose of the cross-
          examination of the newly added accused is the mandate
H
  BABUBHAI BHIMABHAI BOKHIRIA v. STATE OF                675
         GUJARAT [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
   of Section 319(4). The words "could be tried together with A
   the accused" in Section 319(1), appear to be only
   directory. "Could be" cannot under these circumstances
   be held to be "must be". The provision cannot be
   interpreted to mean that since the trial in respect of a
   person who was before the court has concluded with the B
   result that the newly added person cannot be tried
   together with the accused who was before the court when
   order under Section 319(1) was passed, the order would
   become ineffective and inoperative, nullifying the opinion
   earlier formed by the court on the basis of the evidence c
   before it that the newly added person appears to have
   committed the offence resulting in an order for his being
   brought before the court. n

    13. The Court distinguished the earlier decisions rendered
in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi D
(1983) 1 SCC 1 and Michael Machado v. Central Bureau of
Investigation (2000) 3 SCC 262 in the following words:
   "13. Reliance by learned counsel for Respondent 1 has
   been placed on Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Ram Kishan E
   Rohtagi in support of the contention that Respondent 1
   could be tried only with Chandra Shekhar Singh and his
   trial having concluded, Respondent 1 cannot be now tried
   pursuant to order under Section 319(1) of the Code. This
   Court in the cited decision was not concerned with the F
   issue which has fallen for consideration before us. The
   same is the position in respect of Michael Machado v.
   Central Bureau of Investigation. There this Court
   considered the scope of the provision as to the
   circumstances under which the court may proceed to G
   make an order under Section 319 and not the question
   as to the effect of the conclusion of the trial after passing
   an order under Section 319(1). None of these decisions
   have any relevance for determining the point in issue.•
   14. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in       H
    676      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 1 S.C.R.

A   Rajendra Singh v. State of UP. & Anr. (2007) 7 SCC 378,
    where too a similar question arose for consideration. Relying
    upon the decision of this Court in Shashikant Singh's case
    (supra) this Court held:

          "11.. .. The mere fact that trial of co-accused Daya Singh
B
          has concluded cannot have the effect of nullifying or
          making the order passed by learned Sessions Judge on
          26.5.2005 infructuous".

        15. In the light of the above two decisions rendered by co-
C ordinate Benches of this Court, we have no hesitation in holding
  that even if the addition of the petitioner Babubhai Bhimabhai
  Bokhiria is held to be justified by the Constitution Bench of this
  Court, the mere fact that the trial of the remaining accused has
  already concluded, would not prevent the prosecution of the
D petitioner for the offences for which he has been summoned
  by the trial Court.
        16. There is another angle from which the matter can and
  must be examined. The prosecution has already examined as
  many as 134 witnesses at the trial. In terms of the ratio of the
E direction of this Court in Shashikant Singh's case (supra) with
  the addition of the petitioner as accused all those witnesses
  shall have to be recalled for a fresh examination. If that be so,
  the trial would go on for a few more years having regard to the
  number of witnesses that have to be examined. This would in
F turn mean that the right of the accused to a speedy trial, that
  they have laboured to complete within six years or so, will be
  in serious jeopardy on account of the entire process being
  resumed de novo. Such a result is manifestly unjust and unfair
  and would be perilously close to being in violation of the
G fundamental rights guaranteed to the accused persons who
  cannot be subjected to the tyranny of a legal process, that goes
  on endlessly for no fault of theirs. This Court has in several
  pronouncements emphasised the need for speedy trials in
  criminal cases and recognised the same as an integral part of
H the right to life itself. In Hussainara Khatoon and Ors. v. Home
    BABUBHAI BHIMABHAI BOKHIRIA v. STATE OF                     677
           GUJARAT [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna (1980) 1 SCC 91, this Court           A
held that an expeditious trial is an integral and essential part
of the f1.mdamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article
21 of the Constitution. In AR. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1992) 1
SCC 225, this Court declared that speedy trial is not only the
right of the accused but is also in public interest and that the       B
right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all
the stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial,
appeal, revision and retrial. In Sher Singh v. State of Punjab
(1983) 2 sec 344, this Court sounded the following note of
caution against delay of criminal trials:                              c
     "16... The essence of the matter is that all procedure, no
     matter what the stage, must be fair, just and
     reasonable ... Article 21 stands like a sentinel over human
     misery... It reverberates through all stages-the trial, the
     sentence, the incarceration and finally, the execution of         D
     the sentence."

       17. To the same effect are the decisions of this Court in
Javed Ahmed Abdul Hamid Pawala v. State of Maharashtra
(1985) 1 SCC 275 and Triveni Ben v. State of Gujarat (1989)            E
1 sec 678. Even in cases where the accused had been
enlarged on bail the right to a speedy trial was held to be a
part of the fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution.
The decisions of this Court in Biswanath Prasad Singh v. State
of Bihar 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 97 and Mahendra Lal Das v.                 F
State of Bihar and Ors. (2002) 1 SCC 149 may be referred to
in this regard.

     18. It is in the light of the settled legal position no longer
possible to question the legitimacy of the right to speedy trial
as a part of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution.   G
The essence of Article 21 of the Constitution lies not only in
ensuring that no citizen is deprived of his life or personal liberty
except according to procedure established by law, but also that
such procedure ensures both fairness and an expeditious
conclusion of the trial. It is in that backdrop not possible to        H
   678       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 1 S.C.R.


A countenance a situation where addition of Babubhai Bhimabhai
  Bokhiria as an accused to the case at hand would lead to an
  indefinite suspension of trial and eventual recall of 134
  witnesses already examined against the applicant who has
  been in jail for over six years now. There is, therefore, no
B reason for a blanket stay against the progress of the trial before
  the courts below qua other accused persons.

       19. In the totality of the above circumstances, therefore, we
  are inclined to modify our order dated 17th December, 2008
  by which further proceedings before the trial Court were brought
C to a halt. We make it clear that while the stay of the trial against
  Babubhai Bhimabhai Bokhiria the petitioner in SLP No.9184
  of 2008 shall continue qua the said petitioner, the trial court
  shall be free to proceed with the trial qua the other accused
  persons. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition Nos.20502 of 2008
D and 24292 of 2011 are allowed in part and to the above extent.

    R.P.                   Criminal Misc. Petitions partly allowed.