Holding

The dying declaration was properly recorded and admissible, and the High Court erred in altering the conviction to Section 304 Part II; the conviction under Section 302 IPC is upheld.

Summary

The deceased, married to the brother of the appellant, was allegedly poured with kerosene and set alight by the appellant and her mother. She escaped the house, was rescued by neighbours, and later died from extensive burns. While in the hospital, a dying declaration was recorded by a Munsif Magistrate with the assistance of a doctor who translated the questions from Hindi to English and the answers back to Hindi; the declaration was read back and the deceased affirmed its truth. The trial court convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC (murder) and sentenced her to life imprisonment. The Andhra Pradesh High Court reduced the conviction to Section 304 Part II IPC, citing a possibility that the death resulted from improper medical treatment, and sentenced her to four years’ rigorous imprisonment. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the dying declaration was fairly recorded and admissible under Section 32 of the Evidence Act, and that the High Court’s reduction of the charge was unwarranted as it contradicted Explanation 2 to Section 299 IPC; consequently, the conviction under Section 302 IPC stands and the appeal is dismissed.

Issues considered

The admissibility of the dying declaration recorded in a translated form under Section 32 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
Whether the High Court was justified in reducing the conviction from murder (Section 302 IPC) to culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Section 304 Part II IPC) on the ground of alleged medical negligence.
Whether the prosecution proved the motive and the accused's participation beyond reasonable doubt.

Legislation cited

Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 32
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 299, s. 302, s. 304 Part II, s. 307, s. 498A

Subjects

dying declarationtranslationadmissibilitymurderculpable homicideSection 302 IPCSection 304 Part II IPCmedical negligenceEvidence Actmotive

Judgment

A B. SHASHIKALA i '.
v.
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

JANUARY 22, 2004

B [DORAISWAMY RAJU AND S.S. SINHA, JJ.]

Criminal Law:

Evidence Act, 1872-Section 32(/)-Dying Declaration-Recording of
C in translated form-Statement being recorded by Muns if Magistrate in the
presence of a doctor who translated the questions put by the Magistrate into
Hindi and translated the answers given by deceased into English-Statement
being so recorded was read over and explained to deceased by the doctor
which she admitted to be true and correct-Admissibility of-Held, the dying
·D declaration was recorded fairly and correctly, and there was no infirmity
therein-What was necessary in such situation was working knowledge in
Hindi-Munsif Magistrate and the doctor may not be able to speak or write
chaste Hindi but evidently they understood the statement of the deceased in
Hindi.

E Evidence-Appreciation of -

Bride burning-Sister-in-law and mother-in-law setting the bride afire--
Contention that the deceased suffered injury as a result of an accident and
there being an endorsement to that effect-Held, the likelihood of such a
statement having been recorded at the instance of accused-appellant cannot
F be ruled out-Had it been a case of suicide and not homicide, deceased would
not have rushed out of the door with flames on her person-Record showing
only the neighbours coming to her rescue and putting out the fire-Accused
not making any attempt to save the deceased although they were present at
the scene of occurrence-No infirmity found in the conviction of the accused-
G Penal Code, S. 302.

Penal Code, 1860-Sections 299, Explanation 2; 302; 304, Part I; 307;
498A-A woman set on fire by her sister-in-law and mother-in-law resulting
in her death-Conviction by Trial Court under Section 302-High Court
altering the conviction and sentence to Section 304 Part II on the ground that
H 940
B. SHASHIKALA v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 941

•1 it was possible that the deceased might have died due to untime and improper A
medicines given by doctors in the hospital in the absence of any explanation
that the deceased was treated by an able doctor during her stay in the hospital-
Held such an approach is wholly unwarranted being contrmy to Explanation
2 appended to Section 299-Such findings of High Court being based on
surmises and conjeclllres and not on any materials . on record-However, in
~

the absence of any appeal by State, the same not interfered with-Practice
B
and Procedure.

Deceased was married to PW 2 about 8 months prior to the incident.
She was abused and harassed by the sister and mother of her husband.
The deceased and her husband started residing separately from the rest
of the family in the same house about three months prior to the death of
c
the deceased. On the date of occurrence, appellant and her mother entered
into the room of the deceased in the afternoon. Appellant poured kerosene
on the deceased and her mother closed her mouth whereafter the deceased
was set on fire. The deceased rushed outside with flames on her person
shouting for help. Two neighbours came to her help and doused the flames D
by pouring water and took her to the Railway ,Hospital. The doctor who
.
y
attended upon her found 85% burns in total with charring seen all over
the body.

While the deceased was in the Railway Hospital, her statement was
recorded by the Head Constable of the concerned Police station on the
E
basis of which a case under Sections 498-A and 307 IPC, 1860 was
registered. Dying Declaration of the deceased was also recorded by an
Additional Sub-Judge with the help of the doctor treating the deceased
who translated the questions put by him into Hindi and translated the
answers given by the deceased into English. The victim succumbed to her F
>· injuries. Thereafter a charge under Section 302 IPC was framed against
I.he appellant and accused no.3 as in the meanwhile, accused no. I i.e.
mother of appellant died. The appellant was held guilty of charges under
Section 302 IPC by the Sessions J.udge, while accused no.3 was acquitted.
On appeal, the High Court altered the conviction and sentence from one
under Section 302 to Section 304 Part II IPC on the ground that it was
G
possible that the deceased might have died due to untime and improper
y medicines given by the doctors in the hospital in the absence of any
explanation that the deceased was treated by an able doctor during her
stay in the hospital.
H
942 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) I S.C.R.

A The present appeal was filed by appellant challenging her conviction .{. •
and sentence by High Court.

On behalf of the appellant, it was submitted that the so-called dying
declaration being not admissible in evidence could not ·have been relied
upon in as much as the Magistrate who recorded the same did not know
B Hindi nor the person who translated the same was acquainted with the
said language; and that the Sessions Judge and the High Court committed
an error in passing the judgment of conviction and sentence against the
appellant in as much as the prosecution had fai!ed to prove the motive
for commission of the crime.
c Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: I. The dying declaration of the deceased had been recorded
fairly and correctly and there is no infirmity therein. PW 8 the Munsif
Magistrate who recorded the dying declaration has categorically deposed
D that the victim did not know Telugu or English, and the doctor, PW 4,
treating the deceased, translated the question put by him into Hindi and
translated the answers given by declarant into English. The statement so
recorded was read over and explained to her by the doctor and she
admitted the same to be true and correct. PW 8 in his deposition clearly
E stated that he can understand Hindi. The witness categorically stated that
'he was satisfied that the doctor had translated and what all the deceased
had been telling about was correct' and recorded the same. What was
necessary in a situation of this nature is working knowledge in Hindi. PW
4 and PW 8 may not be able to speak or write chaste Hindi but evidently
they understood the statement of the deceased in Hindi. The evidence of
F PW 8 is absolutely clear and unambiguous as regard the manner in which
he recorded the statement of the deceased with the help of PW 4.
Furthermore, he had the opportunity of recording the statement of the
deceased upon noticing her gesture. The Court in a situation of this nature
is also entitled to take into consideration the circumstances which were
G prevailing at the time of recording the statement of the deceased. If the
Court is satisfied that the statement made by a person who is now dead is
relevant, the same becomes admissible in terms of Sub-Section (I) of
Section 32 of the Evidence Act. Any possibility of her making any tutored '(
statement is ruled out as there was no person other than her husband at
the hospital. 1946-C-F; 947-E-F, H; 948-B]
H
B. SHASHlKALA v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 943
• j P. V. Radhakrishna v. State of Karnataka, 120031 6 SCC 44"3, referred A
to.

2.1. So far as the contention of the appellant that an endorsement
has been made by deceased to the effect that she suffered the injury as a
result of an accident, is concerned the likelihood of such a statement having
been recorded at the instance of appellant herself cannot be ruled out. Had B
it been a case of suicide and not homicide, she would not have rushed out
of the door with flames on her person. There is nothing on records to show
that the appellant or her mother, although they were present in the house
at the relevant time, made any attempt to save her. It is borne out from
the records that only the neighbours poured water on her, put out the fire c
and changed her saree. The Investigating Officer, in his evidence stated
that he did not notice any marks of burning on the floor or the cot inside
the house. In these circumstances, a case of stove burst must be ruled out.
1949-F-H; 950-A-B; DI

2.2. Together with the dying declaration, if the letters written by the D
deceased to her mother and sister are considered, it will be evident that
.... she had constantly been complaining about the ill-treatment meted out to
~
her. In all the letters she has expressed her helpless condition. The husband
of the deceased deposed that a different mess was created at least three
months prior to the death of his wife in the same house. It is further evident
E
from the record that the marriage took place against the wishes of the
other members of the family and the same had not been attended by the
accused persons. It defies any logic as to why the deceased would go to
the extent of falsely implicating the accused persons.
1948-G-H; 949-A, D-EI
F
> 3. The High Court, despite holding that the trial court was justified
in convicting the accused, errl'd in converting the conviction of the
appellant from one under Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part-II IPC. The
High Court proceeded on the ground that it was possible that the deceased
might have died due to untime and improper medicines given by the
doctors in the hospital in the absence of any explanation that the deceased
G
was treated by an able doctor during her stay in the hospital. Such an
y approach is wholly unwarranted being contrary to Explanation 2
appended to Section 299 of the Indian Penal Code. There is nothing on
record to show that the deceased had not been given any medical care and
attention. The findings of the High Court that the deceased might have H
944 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] I S.C.R.

A died due to untime and improper medicines given by the doctor is based
on surmise and conjectures and not on any materials on record. But, since
the State has not filed any appeal in this regard, the same is not being
interfered with. 1950-H; 951-A-BI

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
B 985 of 1997.
From the Judgment and Order dated I 0.9.96 of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in Crl. A.No. 606 of 1996.

Anil Kumar for Rajesh Prasad Singh for the Appellant.
c
Ms. T. Anamika for G. Prabhakar for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.B. SINHA, J. This appeal by the appellant herein arises out of a
D judgment of conviction and sentence passed by a Division Bench of the
Andhra Pradesh High Court in Cri111inal Appeal No. 606/96 whereby and
whereunder the judgment passed by Additional Session Judge, Ranga Reddy
District dated 21.6.1996 in S.C. No. 47/93 convicting the appellant herein for
co111mission of an offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and
sentencing her to undergo life imprisonment was modified to one under
E Section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing her to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for 4 years.

The basic facts of the matter shortly stated are as under :

The deceased was 111arried to Radha Krishna, PW 2, brother of the
F appellant herein on or about 15.5.1990. The appellant and her mother
Heeramani (since deceased) and one B. Harikrishna had been abusing and
harassing the deceased for compelling her to bring T. V. and other articles.
Radha Krishna, the husband of the deceased having regard thereof decided
to reside separately in the same house alongwith his wife. On 23.1.1991 at
G about 1.00 p.m., the appellant and her mother entered into the room of the
deceased. She was then reading a book. The appellant poured kerosene on
her and her mother closed the deceased's 111outh whereafter fire was set on
her by the accused No. 1. Thereafter she rushed outside with flames on her
person shouting for help. Two neighbours, Ch. Susheela and Smt. N. Yadamma
attracted by her shouts came and poured water. Her dress was changed and
H she was taken to the Railway Hospital by them followed by one Sri G.
B. SHASHIKALA '"STATE OF ANDI-IRA PRADESH [SINHA, J.] 945
, Venugopal, another neighbour. A
> ~

While she was in the Railway Hospital, the Head Constable of Malkajgiri
police station recorded her statement at about 7.30 p.m. on 23.1.1991 on the
basis whereof a case under Sections 498-A and 307 !PC was registered. She
later on died. The brother of the appellant, (the husband of the deceased)
supported the prosecution case fully at the investigation stage. A charge B
under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code was framed against the appellant
and the accused No. 3, as in the meanwhile the accused No. I died.

Before the learned Session Judge, 21 prosecution witnesses were
examined including the brother of the appellant as also the neighbours.
c
The learned Session Judge having regard to the materials on records
held the appellant guilty of charges under Section 302 of the Indian Penal
Code. The Accused No. 3, however, was acquitted. On appeal, the High
Com1 although substantially affirmed the findings of the learned Session
Judge but altered the conviction and sentence from one under Section 302 to
D
Section 304 Part-II of the Indian Penal Code stating:

" ... Till her death what type of medicines were given to save her from
t the burn injuries are not produced before the Com1. It is also not
explained by the prosecution that during the deceased's stay in the
hospital, she was treated by the able doctor. In the absence of such E
explanation, it is also possible to believe that the deceased might
have died due to untime and improper medicines given by the doctors
in the hospital. In view of the circumstances explained, the submission
made by Sri Ramanadham that it was not the intention of A-2 to kill
the deceased is correct. Therefore, the appeal deserves to be allowed
.. in part and accordingly it is allowed in part. However, the conviction F
>-
under Section 302 IPC and the sentence of life imprisonment are set
aside and it is now ordered that A-2 is convicted for the offence
under Section 304 Part-II !PC and sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for 4 years, in view of her young age and .other special
circumstances pointed out by Sri Ramanadham regarding sentence. G
This shall not be the precedent for other cases."

")' This appeal has been filed questioning the aforementioned judgment of
conviction and sentence.

Mr. T. Anil Kumar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant
H
946 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] I S.C.R.
A would' submit that the learned Session Judge and the High Court comniitted ...' .
an error in passing the judgment of conviction and sentence against the
appellant inasmuch as the prosecution has failed to prove the motive for
commission of the crime. The learned counsel would contend that the so-
called dying declaration being not admissible in evidence could not have
been relied upon inasmuch as the Magistrate who recorded the same did not
B know Hindi nor the person who translated the same was acquainted with the
said language.

The learned counsel would urge that from the deposition of the mother
of the deceased it cannot be said that any case of demand of dowry has been
made out.
c
It is not in dispute that PW 8 B. Surendra Reddy, the I Additional Sub-
Judge working in Kakinada at the relevant time was posted as Munsif
Magistrate, Hyderabad, West and South. The said witness in his deposition
categorically stated that on receiving a requisition containing a request to
D record the dying declaration of the deceased, he went to the hospital and
recorded the same. It is also not in dispute that the doctor treating the deceased
declared that she was 'conscious, coherent and in a fit condition to give
evidence'. As she did not know Telugu or English, the doctor translated the 1
question put by him into Hindi and translated the answers given by declarant
into English. The statement so recorded was read over and explained to her
E by the doctor and she admitted the same to be true and correct. An endorsement
to that effect was also made by the doctor. PW 8 in his deposition clearly
stated that he can understand Hindi as having worked as Munsif Magistrate,
Hyderabad West and South as also Ill Metropolitan Magistrate and II
Additional Rent Controller for three years, 'he had occasions to examine
F various witnesses who used to speak in Hindi and advocates used to translate ....,
the deposition in English and according to the said witness he used to follow
the witnesses as to whether advocates were translating the same correctly or
not'. The witness categorically stated that 'he was satisfied that the doctor
had translated and what all the deceased had been telling about was corTect'
and recorded the same.
G
It may be true, as has been pointed out by the learned counsel, that the
doctor Dr. K. Prahlad PW 4 examining himself as a witness could not convey
the meaning of 'sasur' and 'sas' but he clarified that he knew Hindi to some
1
extent only. But he clarified that as the deceased was although speaking in
Hindi but here and there she also used English words and as such he could
H
B. SHASHIKALA v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [SINHA, J.1 947

understand the terms of the same. A
What was necessary in a situation of this nature is working knowledge
in Hindi. PW 4 and PW 8 may not be able to speak or write chaste Hindi but
evidently they understood the statement of.the deceased in Hindi.

In the dying declaration, PW 4 made the following endorsement: B
"It is certified that the patient is conscious, coherent and in a fit state
of mind throughout the statement and I solemnly affirm and state that
I translated the questions put by the 1-lon'ble Magistrate in English,
into Hindi and translated the address given by the patient in Hindi
into English and I made the true translation of the same." C

Another statement was also made by PW 8 stating :

"It is ce11ified that the declarant is conscious, coherent and in a fit
state of mind throughout the proceedings, that the Doctor translated
my questions into Hindi and the answers given by the declarant in D
Hindi into English as the declarant do not know Telugu and unable
to give answers in English and that the Doctor read over and explained
her statement in Hindi and she admitted the same to be true and
correct and signed the same and that I recorded the statement in the
presence of Dr. K. !rahalad on this 23rd day of January, 1991."
E
The evidence of PW 8 is absolutely clear and unambiguous as regard
the manner in which he recorded the statement of the deceased with the help
of PW 4. It is also evident that he has also knowledge of Hindi although he
may not be able to read and write or speak in the said language. His evidence
also shows that he has taken all precautions and care while recording the F
/.- statement. Furthennore, he had the opportunity of recording the statement of
the deceased upon noticing her gesture. The Court in a situation of this nature
is also entitled to take into consideration the circumstances which were
- prevailing at the time of recording the statement of the deceased.

The learned Session Judge keeping in view the evidence of PW 8 who G
was a judicial officer was satisfied that the dying dee laration of the deceased
had been recorded fairly and correctly. Keeping in view the materials on
record, we do not find any infirmity therein.

It is also relevant to note that the statement of the deceased was recorded
prior to the coming of PW 10 and PW 11 to Hyderabad from Pune. In that H
948 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004) I S.C.R.

A view of the matter, any possibility of her making any tutored statement is i
ruled out as there was no person other than her husband at the hospital.

Under sub-Section (I) of Section 32 of the Evidence Act, any statement,
written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who
cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose
B attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which,
under the circumstances of the case, appears to the Court unreasonable, would
constitute relevant facts. If as a result thereof, the Court is satisfied that the
statement made by a person who is now dead is relevant, the same becomes
admissible in terms of Sub-Section (I) of Section 32 of the Evidence Act.
c It is not necessary that the dying declaration would be admissible in
evidence only when a statement is made in expectation of a death. The law
does not say so.

Section 32 of the Evidence Act is an exception to hearsay rule.
D In P. V. Radhakrishna v. State of Karnataka, (2003] 6 SCC 443, this
Court laid down ten principles governing dying declaration and held :

"13. In the light of the above principles, the acceptability of the
alleged dying declaration in the instant case has to be considered. The
dying declaration is only a piece of untested evidence and must, like
E any other evidence, satisfy the court that what is stated therein is the
unaLJoyed truth and that it is absolutely safe to act upon it. If after
careful scrutiny, the court is satisfied that it is true and free from any
effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is
coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make
F it the basis of conviction, even if there is no coIToboration. See
Gangotri Singh v. State of U.P., (1993] Supp.I SCC 327, Goverdhan
\Raoji Ghyare v. State of Maharashtra, [ 1993] Supp. 4 SCC 316,
Meesala Ramakrishan v. State of A.P., [1994] 4 SCC 182 and State
of Rajasthan V. Kishore, [1996] 8 sec 217.

G 14. There is no material to show that the dying declaration was the
result or product of imagination, tutoring or prompting. On the
contrary, the same appears to have been made by the deceased
voluntarily. It is trustworthy and has credibility."

Together with the dying declaration, if we consider the letters written
H by the deceased to her mother and sister which have been marked as Exs.
B. SHASHIKALA v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [SINHA, J.) 949
PIO to P1'3, it will be evident that she had constantly been complaining about A
the ill-treatment meted out to her by the accused No. I and 2. She in Ex. Pl 0
go to the extent of saying that unless something is done and her mother
comes immediately, that letter should be treated as a last one. In all the letters
she has expressed her helpless condition.

The submission of the learned counsel to the effect that in none of the B
letter, it was revealed that she was asked to bring any dowry by her in-laws,
although may be correct but it was not expected that everything would be
written in those letters. The letters written by the deceased clearly indicate
that she had again and again been asking all of them to come and sec her
pitiable condition. In one of the letters, Ex. P 13 it has been stated that even C
the accused persons had been questioning the character of her mother which
she could not tolerate. Even in that letter she had beseeched that the same be
treated as a telegram. PW IO Chandravathi in her evidence also stated that
after her marriage the deceased was allowed to come to her house only twice.
PW 2 the husband of the deceased although in his statement initially supported
the case of the prosecution but in his examination before the Court, resiled D
from his earlier statement and was declared hostile. The cause of the death
of deceased, however, was not disputed by him. He further deposed that a
different mess was created at least three months prior to the death of his wife
in the same house. The reason for the same is obvious. Had the relationship
between the deceased and the accused persons been cordial, they would not E
have run a separate mess. It is further evident from the record that the marriage
took place against the wishes of the other members of the family and the
same had not been attended by the accused persons. It defies any logic as to
why the deceased would go to the extent of falsely implicating the accused
persons. We may notice that before the learned Session Judge a submission
was made to the effect that the dying declaration was recorded at the instance F
.i. of PW 2 with a view to get himself exculpated. Such a suggestion surprisingly
had not been given to the investigating officer.

So far as the contention of the appellant to the effect that in Ex. P4 an
endorsement has been made to the effect that she suffered the injury as a
result of an accident, is concerned the likelihood of such a statement having G
been recorded at the instance of appellant herself cannot be ruled out. The ·
incident took place when the accused Nos. I and 2 were in the House. Their
presence in the house had clearly been mentioned in the dying declaration.
PW3 and PW 12 who were neighbours of the deceased had also made the
said statement. It is not in dispute that the appellant herein together with the H
950 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] I S.C.R.

, A neighbour accompanied the deceased to the hospital. Had it been a case of
suicide and not homicide, she would not have rushed out of the door with
flames on her person. There is nothing on records to show that the appellant ----
or her mother, although they were residing in the same house and were
present at the relevant time, made any attempt to save her. It is borne out
B from the records that only the lady neighbours poured water on her, put out
the fire and changed her saree. It is also relevant to notice the opinion of PW
9, the Medical Officer as recorded on 26.1.1991. He found on external
examination a dermoepidermal burns with charring seen all over the body
except small portion of ambelicus and portion of back and some portion of
below half of the left leg and also some portion around over the left upper
C arm. The burns were ante-mortem in nature and were about 85% in total.

PW 5 Nallagunta Simhadri in his evidence also categorically stated
"The room was smelling kerosene" which is indicative of the fact that the fire
took place because of kerosene.

D The Investigating Officer, PW 13 in his evidence stated that he found
a pump stove and a plastic kerosene tin with I/4th litre of kerosene. He did
not seize the kerosene jar. He did not notice any marks of burning on the
floor of the room or cot inside the house. Food had also been prepared. In
these circumstances, a case of stove burst must be ruled out. To the
aforementioned extent, the evidence of PW 13 has also been corroborated by
E PW 5.

We, therefore, do not find any infirmity in the findings of the learned
Session Judge as also the High Cou11. The High Court in its judgment observed:

" ... On a careful consideration of the entire evidence, we find that the
F trial court was justified in convicting the accused as the case of the
prosecution is supported by both dying declaration and corroborated
by the other evidence. Since the correctness of the dying declaration,
Ex. P-8 is not discredited, the other evidence discloses that the
conviction is based on the dying declaration. In this case not only
G motive has been proved, but the role played by the accused has been
established by a reasonable doubt. The findings given by the trial
court are just and proper. The deceased was subjected to burn injuries.
She was taken to the Government hospital and kept there ... "

The High Court, however, despite.arriving at the aforementioned finding
H converted the conviction of the appellant from one under Section 302 IPC to
B. SHASHIKALA '"STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [SINHA. J.] 951
Section 304 Part-II !PC on the grounds stated hereinbefore. Such an approach, A
in our opinion, is wholly unwarranted being contrary to Explanation 2
appended to Section 299 of the Indian Penal Code. But, since the State has
not filed any appeal in this regard, we desist from interfering with the same.
In the instant case, there is nothing on record to show that the deceased had
not been given any medical care and attention. The findings of the High B
Court that the deceased might have died due to untime and improper medicines
given by the doctor is based on surmises and conjectures and not on any
materials on record.

For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that no case has
been made out for interference with the impugned judgment and the appellant C
already escaped with higher punishment in view of the alteration of the
nature of offence, unjustifiably. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

M.P. Appeal dismissed.