Holding

Sanction under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code was not required because the alleged misappropriation was not committed while the appellants were acting in discharge of their official duties.

Summary

The appellants, customs officers, were accused of dishonest misappropriation of goods they had seized and were holding in trust. The Sub‑Divisional Magistrate found a prima facie case under Sections 120B and 409 IPC and summoned the appellants, who sought discharge on the ground that prosecution required prior sanction under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The High Court held that no sanction was needed, reasoning that the alleged misappropriation was not done in the discharge of official duty. The Supreme Court examined whether Section 197 applies to offences committed by public servants when the act is not directly connected to their official functions. It held that the alleged conversion of seized goods was a separate act not performed in the discharge of official duty, and therefore sanction under Section 197 was not required. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether prosecution of public servants for offences under Sections 120B/409 IPC requires prior sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. when the alleged act is alleged to have been committed after seizure of goods.
Whether the alleged misappropriation of seized goods constitutes an act done in the discharge of official duty.
Whether the question of sanction under Section 197 can be raised at any stage of the proceedings.

Legislation cited

Criminal Procedure Code, 1898s. 197
Customs Act, 1962s. 155
Import and Export (Control) Acts. 5
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120B, s. 166, s. 409
Sea Customs Acts. 117(81)

Subjects

Section 197sanctionpublic servantcriminal breach of trustmisappropriationcustomsIPC 409IPC 120Bcriminal procedurepreliminary enquiryjurisdiction

Judgment

111

B. SAHA AND ORS. A
v.
M. S. KOCHAR
•
July 27, 1979
J
[R. S. SARKARIA, P. N. SHINGHAL AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.] B
Criminal Procedure Code 1898, Sec. 197-Scope of.

Theact complained of is dishonest misappropriation or conversion of goods
by the appellants wl1ich they had setlzed and as such were holding in trust
to be dealt with in accordance with law. This gave a bona fide apprehension
to the fC!POndent that the goods have been criminally mis-appropriated C
by the appellants. The S.D'.M. conducted a preliminary enquiry and found a
prima facie case under S. 120B/409 IPC against the appellants. The S.D.M.
summoned the appellr:tnts vihO appeared before him and prayed for their in1me-
diate discharge, which was accepted on the ground that he bad no jurisdiction
and he discharged the appellants. A .revision petition before the Addl. Sessions
Judge was dismissed on the ground that since the shortage of the goods was
discovered at the time when they were produced before the Customs House, D
there was absolutely nothing to show that the shorta-ge, if any, was due to the
act of the appellants. The respondent went in further revision to the High
Court which v.•as allo ..ved on the ground that no sanction was required for
the prosecution of the accused~appellants because they were certainly not acting
in the discharge of their official duties, when they misappropriated these goods.

It wa; argued on behalf of the appellants that- E
(0 lt had been falsely alleged in the complaint that ·when the S.D.M.
inspected the goods and noticed the condition thereof, it was found
that the Eeals of the four boxes were broken v"hilc the ren1ainiriJi
three packa-ges were completely empty but sealed; that the inventory
itself, prepared by the S.D.M. falsified the prosecution allegation;
(ii) That it was not alleged in the complaint with particularly as to what F
goods had disappeared or were removed, nor that the disappearance
of some of the goods, if a-ny, occurred after their seizure and before
their deposit in the Customs House by the appellant;
(iii) That even if for the sake of argument it is assumed that some of
the goods were removed and set apart by the appellants after seizure,
then also sanction for prosecution u/s 197 Cr.P .C. ,Vas absolutCly G
necessary because, the seizure and removal being integrally connected
with each other, the all~ed act constituting the offence of criminal
n1is·appropriation/criminal breach of trust could but reasonably be
vie\vcd as an act which includes dereliction of duty-done or purport-
ing to be done in the»discharge of their official duty by the
appellants;
(iv) That section 197 Cr.P.C. cannot he construed too narrowly, in the H
sense that since the commission of offence is never a part of the
official duty of a public servant, an act constituting an offence can
112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 1 S.C.R.

A never be said to have been done or purportedly done in the discharge
of official duty, as such a narrow construction, will render the section
entirely otiose.

Dismissing the appeal,

HEW : The question of sMJ.ction u/s 197 Crin1inal ProceJ ure Co<le ca11
be raised and considered at any stage of the proceedings. [116H, 117AJ
B
The \VOrcfs "Any olience alleged to have been comn1ittcd by hin1 whik:
acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty'' in section 197(1)
of the· Code, are capable of a narrow as well as wide interpretation. If these
words are constrl.Y.:'d too nar;owly, the section will be rendered altogether stefile,
for it is no part ot an official duty to commit an offence, and never can
be. In the Wider sense, these words will take under their umbrella every 'act
c constituting an offence, comn1itted in the course of the same transaction in
v;hich the official duty is performed or purports to be pcrforn1eJ. 'fhe riglrt
approach to the import of these words lies bet\veen these ty,'o extremes. \.'Vhile
it is not every offence committed by a public servant while engaged in the
performance of his official duty, which is entitled to the protection of sec. 197(1),
an act constituting an cffence directly and reasonably connected with an official
dllty will require sanction for prosecution under the said provision. The
D sine qua non for the applicability of this section is that the offence charged,
be it one of commifsion or omission, must be one which has been committed
by the public sen:-int either in his official capr.city or under colour of the
office held my him. [l !8D-H, U9A]

In the instant case, there was som'e foundation for the allegation that the
goods in question had been misappropriated by the appellants someti1ne after
E their seizure and l,efore their deposit in the Customs House. There can be
no dispute that the seizure of the goods by the wppellants and their being
thus entrusted with the. goods or having dominion over the1n, was an act
comn1itted by thenl \Vhi1e acting in the discharge of their official duty. But
the act con1plai11ed of is subsequent dishonest, misappropriation or conversion
of th05e goods by the appellants, which is the second nece.sso.ry clement of the
offence of crin1inal breach of trust under section 409, Indian Penal Code. It
F could not b:.· .<:a.id that the act of dishonest, misappropdation or conversion
co1nplained of bore such an integral relation to the duty of the appellant~ that
they could genuinely claim that they committed it in the cour5e of the preforrrl3nCe
of their official duty. [119E-H-120A]
There is nothing ir1 the nature or quality of the act complained of -which
attt1ches to or r<nt:ikcs of the official character of the appellants who allegedly -.
G
did it. Nor could the alleged act of misappropriation or conversion be reasonably •
said to be imbued with tbe colour of the office held by the appeilants. 'Therefore,
on the facts of th~ present case, the aUeged act of criminal misappropriation
con1piained of was not committed by them "'·hile they were acting or purpo11ing
to act in the discharge of their official duty, the commission of the offence
having no direct connection or inseparable link with their duties as public
servant. At the most, the official status of the a.ppellants furnished them with
an opportunity or ocrasion to commit the alleged criminal act. Sanction of
H the appropriate Government was therefore not necessary for the protection of
the appellants for an offence under section 409 /120B Tndian Penal Code.
[120A-B, 121D-F]
B. SAHA AND ORS v. M. s. KOCHAR (Sarkaria, J.) 113

· On1 I'arkash v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1957, S.C.R. 423, An1rik SinRh v. A
' The State of Pepsu, [1955] 1 SCR 1302i Shreekantiah Ramrnayya Munipalli and
Ors. v, Stale of B~mbay, A.I.R. 1955, S.C.R. 187; distinguished.

Baiinath v. Stale of Madhya Prade"/1, A.l.R. 1966, S.C. 220 at page 222 and
Hariha-r V. -State of IJihar, [1972] 3. S.C.R. 89; referred to.

B
CRIMINAL ArrELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. '.!l
of 1973.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
3-5-1972 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Revision No. 450/69.
ID. Mukherjee, S. K. Dholakia and R. C. Bhatia for the Appellants. C
Respondent ill person.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
·SARKARIA, J. This appeal by special leave directed against a
judgment, dated May 3, 1962, of the Delhi High Court, arises out of D
these circumstances :
M. S. Kochar, the respondent herein, filed a complaint in the
Court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Delhi, alleging that the appel-
lants herein, who arc officers of the Customs Department, had com-
mitted offences under Sections 120B/166/409, Indian Penal Code. It
was stated in the complaint as follows : E

The complainant was the sole representative in India of various
manufacturing concerns in West Germany, and was carrying on busi-
ness under the style of "House of German Machinery". He imported
certain items of machinery from the German firms for displaying them
in the International Industries Fair held in New Delhi in November, F
1961. In spite of the fact that he had obtained a val'd Customs
Clearance Permit for the import of these items of machinery, the
Customs Authorities prevented him from clearing the goods from the
Railway Station. Ultimately, the complainant was able to clear the
goods by obtaining the necessary permission from the Government.
G
He was allowed to retain the imported goods with him till the first of
June, 1962. The goods were to be re-exported from India, thereafter.
The respondent applied for extension of the period, but his request was
declined.
On June 16, 1962, the accused (appellants) raided the premises of
the complainant at 30, Pusa Road, New Delhi, and seized some of those H
imported goods which were meant for display in the International
Industries Fair. The appellants also seized certain other goods kept by
114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 1 S.C.R.

the complainant at the site of the Fair, itself. Inventories of the goods /
were prepared by the appellants at the time of their seizure. The goods
were then packed in boxes and sealed by the appellants with their own
seals which were signed by the complainant as well as the appellants.
One copy of the inventories, duly signed by the appellants and the com-
plainant, also was handed over to him.
8
On November 20, 1963, the complainant made an application before
the 1iub-Divisional Magistrate, praying that the goods seized by the
appellants be handed over to him on Superdari as they were likely to
deteriorate unless kept safely under proper conditions. The Sub-Divi-
sional Magistrate, on January 22, 1964, made an order directing that
all the goods seized by the appellants be handed over to the com-
plainant on Superdari.

The Customs, however, felt aggrieved by this order of the Magis-
trate and went in revision against it before the Additional Sessions
Judge, Delhi, who, on February 7, 1964, passed an order staying
delivery of possession. Subsequently, by order dated April 3, 1965,
the Additional Sessions Judge dismissed the revision-petition and
vacated the stay order. In spite of the order of the Magistrate, con-
firmed by the Additional Sessions Judge, the Customs handed over to
the complainant on Superdari only a part of the goods seized, and in
respect of the remaining goods, the Customs Authorities went in
E
further revision to the High Court and obtained an interim stay of the
order of the Additional Sessions Judge.

Subsequently, on August 22, 1966, the High Court made an order
directing that all the goods which had been seized by the Customs
Authorities from the complainant, including those which had been
F returned to him on Superdari, should be produced before the Sub-
Divisional Magistrate, who was seized of a case under Section 5 of
the Import and Export (Control) Act and Section 166(81) of the
Sea Customs Act, regarding the goods, pending against the com-
plainant. Accordingly, Shri H. L. Sikka, Sub-Divisional Magistrate,
prepared two inventories of these goods on November 16, 1966 and
thereafter. The boxes were opened before Shri Sikka, who got inven-
tories of the goods found therein prepared, and after noting the condi-
tion of those goods, he got the sameTepacked and sealed in proper
boxes in the presence of the parties with a seal of the Court. Before
resealing, the Magistrate noted down the condition of the four packages
which were produced before him by the appellants and which remained
'" in their possession since the seizure (16-6-1962). "It was then found
by the Magistrate that the seals of these boxes were tampered. One
B. SAHA AND ORS v. M. s. KOCHAR (Sarkaria, !.) 115

wooden box was broken and the seal on it was also broken; while the A
remaining three packages were completely empty but sealed".
' The goods of Consignment No. 1 of M/s. Gebr. Ruhstrat, concern-
ing the complaint filed by the Assistant Collector of Customs under
Section 5 of the Import & Export (Control) Act, and Section 117(81)
of the Sea Customs Act, which were also seized by appellant No. 1, who
had obtained their delivery from the Railway Station, were not produced
before Shri H. L. Sikka, Magistrate, along with the other goods when
the inventories were prepared. This gives "a bona fide apprehension
to the complainant that the said goods have been criminally mis-
appropriated by the accused."
"The accused by their act in illegally tampering and breaking the
c
seals of the consignment seized by them and removing some of these
goods and further abusing their positions and seizing some of the
personal articles of the complainant under the colour of search warrant
issued by the S.D.M. Karol Bagh and illegally holding those goods of
the complainant uptil ......... have committed offences under Sections D
120B/166/409 IPC."
The Sub-Divisional Magistrate before whom the complaint had
been filed, examined the complainant under Section 200 and further
held a preliminary enquiry under Section 202, Cr.P .C., in the course of
which, he examined Shri H. L. Sikka, Magistrate, also. After con- E
sidering the statements recorded in the preliminary enquiry, and the
documents produced by the complainant, the Magistrate found a prima
facie case under Sections 120B/409, I.P.C. against the three appellants.
He, therefore, directed that the accused (appellants herein) be
summoned.
On receiving the summons, the appellants appeared befoce the
F
Magistrate and made an application praying for their immediate dis-
charge, inter alia, on the ground that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction
. ~' to take cognizance of the complaint in the absence of sanction under
Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and under
Section 155 of the Customs Act, 1962, for prosecution of the appellants. G
The Magistrate accepted this objection and held that in the absence
of sanction for the prosecution of the present appellants, he had nci
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint. He purportedly relied
on the decision of this Court in Shreekantiah Rammayya Munipalli &
Anr. v. State of Bombay('). In the result, he discharged the accused
H
(appellants, herein).
(I) A.I.R. 1955 SC 187; [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1177.
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (J 980] 1 S.C.R.

A Aggrieved, the complainant filed a revision petition which was dis-
missed by the Additional Sessions Judge, on December 6, 1968, on the
ground that since the shortage of goods was discovered at the time when
they were produced before the Customs House, and there was absolutely
nothing to show that the goods in question remained in the personal
B
custody of the appellants, "it was difficult to hold that the shortage, if
•any, was due to the act of the accused."
•
The complainant went in further revision to the High Court, which
was heard and allowed by a learned Judge by his judgment now under
appeal before us. After an elaborate discussion, the learned Judge ha'
held that no sanction was required for the prosecution of the accused-
c appellants for-an offence under Sections 120B/409, Indian Penal Code.
because "they were certainly not acting in the discharge of their official
duties, when they misappropriated these goods".
The first contention of Mr. Mukerjee, learned Counsel for the appel-
lants is that the complainant has falsely alleged in the complaint that
when the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Shri Sikka, in compliance with the
D
order of the High Court, inspected the goods and noted the condition
thereof, "it was found that the seals of four boxes were broken, while
the remaining three packages were completely empty but sealed". It is
maintained that the inventory itself, prepared by Shri Sikka, falsifies this
allegation. It is further pointed out that in the complaint it is not
E alleged with particularity as to what goods disappeared or were remov-
ed; nor that the disappearance of some of the goods, if any, occurred
after their seizure and before their deposit in the Customs House by the
appellants, and that the allegation made by the complainant during
arguments before the High Court, to the effect, that the goods in ques-
tion were misappropriated sometime after seizure and before their
F deposit in the Customs House, was not based on any facts or circums-
tances appearing in the statements of the complainant and Shri Sikka
recorded during the preliminary enquiry. Learned counsel also
repeatedly urged that the allegations regarding the commission of the
offence of criminal breach of trust by the appellants, were false and
groundless. For this purpose, it is stressed, the Court should not con-
G line itself to the allegations in the complaint but also consider all the
evidential material on the record including that brought on the record
by the appellanJs. In support of the contention that the question or
sanction can be raised from stage to stage, Mr. Mukherjee relied on
certain observations of this Court in Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bari(').
H We have no quarrel with the proposition that the question of saric-
tion under Section 197, Cr.P.C. can be raised and considered at any
(I) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 925.
B. SAHA AND ORS v. M. s. KOCHAR (Sarkar;a, J.) 117

- stage of the proceedings. We will further concede that in considering A
the question whether or not sanction for prosecution was required, it is
not necessary for the Court to confine itself to the allegations in the
complaint, and it can take into account all the material on the record
at the time when the question is raised and falls for consideration. Now,
in paragraph 20 of the complaint, it was clearly alleged that the Sub-
Divisional Magistrate, Shri H. L. Sikka found that the seals of four B
boxes had been tampered with and one of the boxes broken, while the
remaining three packages "were completely empty but sealed". Mr.
Mukherjee has not read out or referred to any portion of the statement
of Shri H. L Sikka recorded under Section 202, Cr.P.C., to show that
the same contradicts or falsifies the allegations in paragraphs 19, 20 and
ll of the complaint. Indeed, no copy of the statements of the com-
c
plainant and Shri Sikka recorded in proceedings preliminary to the .
issue of process, has been furnished for our perusal. It is true that the
precise time and manner or the misappropriation and the detailed parti-
culars of the items of goods alleged to have been misappropriated, are
not given in the complaint. But it seems that some foundation for the D
allegation that the goods in question had been misappropriated by the
appellants sometime after their seizure and before their deposit in the
Customs House, had been laid during the preliminary enquiry made by
the Magistrate. This allegation was made not only before the High
Court, but has been reiterated by the complainant in paragraph 12 of
his counter-affidavit that he had filed in this Court in opposition to the E
special leave petition of the appellants. For this avennent, he relied
on a certain letter/notice dated January 30, 1963 addressed to him by
the Customs Authority.

Thus, the material brought on the record upto the stage when the
question of want of sanction was raised by the appellants, contained a F
clear allegation against the appellants about the commission of an
offence under Section 409, I.P.C. To elaborate, it was substantially
alleged that the appellants had seized the goods and were holding them
in trust in the discharge of their official duty, for being dealt with or
disposed of in accordance with law, but in dishonest breach of that trust,
G
they criminally misappropriated or converted those goods. Whether
". this allegation or charge is true or false is not to be gone into at this
stage. In considering the question whether sanction for prosecution

.,.
.
was or was not necessary, these criminal acts attributed to the accused
are to be taken as alleged .
H
For these reasons, we overrule the first contention canvassed on
behalf of the appellants.
.
118 SUPREME COURT RE·PORTS (1980] 1 S.C.R.

A The second contention advanced by Mr. Mukherjee is in the alter-
native. It is submitted that even if for the sake of argument, it is ,._
assumed that some of the goods were removed and set apart by the ,.
appellants after seizure, then also, the seizure and the removal being

'
integrally connected with each other the alleged act constituting the
offence of criminal misappropriation/ criminal breach of trust could
B but reasonably be viewed as an act which includes dereliction of duty- r.
done or purporting to be done in the discharge of their official duty
by the appellants. It is argued that S. 197, Cr. P. C. cannot be
construed too narrowly, in the sense that since the commission of
offence is never a part of the official duty of a public servant, an act
constituting an offence can never be said to have been done or pur-
c portedly done in the dilScharge of official duty. Such a narrow cons-
truction, it is submitted, will render the Section entirely otiose. For
law on the point, the learned counsel referred to several decisions of
this Court. He took us through the relevant passages of the judgment
in Matajog's case (supra), and strongly relied on the ratio of Shree-
D kantiah Rammayya's case (ibid) and Amrik Singh v. The State of
Pepsu(').
The words "any offence alleged to have been committed by him
while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty"
employed in Section 197(1) of the Code, are capable of a narrow as
well as a wide interpretation. If these words are construed too
E narrowly, the Section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, "it is no
part of an official duty to commit an offence, and never can be". In
the wider sense, these words will take under their umbrella every act
constituting an offence, committed in the course of the same trans-
action in which the official duty is performed or purports to be per-
formed. The right approach to the import of these words lies between
F these two extremes. While on the one hand, it is not every offence
committed by a public servant while engaged in the performance of
his official duty, which is entitled to the protection of Section 197 ( 1),
an act constituting an offenoe, directly and reasonably connected with
.his official duty will require sanction for prosecution under the said
provision. As pointed out by Ramaswami J. in Baijnath v. State of
G
M.P. (2) "it is the quality of the act that is important, and if it falls
within the scope and range of his official duties, the protection contem-
plated by Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code will be attrac-
...,
ted."
In sum, the sine qua non for the applicability of this Section is .,,.
H that the offence charged, be it one of commission or omission, must
(1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1302.
(2) A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 220 at p. 222.
B. SAHA AND ORS v. M. s. KOCHAR (Sarkaria, J.) 119

~ be one which has been committed by the public servant either in his A

~'.l " official capacity or under colour of the office held by him.
While the question whether an offence was commitvod in the course
>
' of ollicial duty or under colour of office, cannot be answered hypo-
•>
-;
.I
thetically, and depends on the facts of each ca&o, one broad test for
this pnrpose, first deduced by Varadachariar J. of the Federal Conrt B
• in Hori Ram v. Emperor, (') is generally applied with advantage.
.... After referring with approval to those observations of Varadachariar
J., Lord Simonds in H.H.B. Gill v. The King.(') tersely reiterated that
the "test may well be whether the public servant, if challenged, can
l'casonably claim, that what he does, he does in virtue of his office."
c
Speaking for the Constitution Bench of this Court, Chandrasekhar
Aiyer J., restated the same principle, thus :
" ...... in the matter of grant of sanction under Section 197, the
offence all•=ged to have been committed by the accused must have
something to do, or must be related in some manner, with the dis-
D
charge of official duty ...... there must be a reasonable con.~ection
between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear
such relat;on to the duty that the accused could kiy a reasonable
ciaim, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the
cou.rse of the performance of his duty".
(Emphasis supplied) E
Let us now apply this broad test to the facts of the case as alleged
cmd songht to be proved by the complainant.

The allegation against the appellants is about the commissio'n of
offences under Sections 409/120B, Indian Penal Code. To be more
precise, the act complained of is dishonest misappropriation or con- F
version of the goods by the appellants, which they had seized and
I as such, were holding in trust to be dealt with in accordance with
law. There can be no dispute that the seizure of the goods by the
appellants and their being thus entrusted with the goods or dominion
over them, was an act committed by them while acting in the discharge
G
"f
•• of their official duty. But the act complained of is subsequent dis-
honest misappropriation or conversion of those goods by the appel-
lants, which is the second necessary element of the offence of criminal
breach of trust under S~ction 409, Indian Penal Code. Could it be
said, that the act of dishonest misappropriation or conversion com-
plained of bore such an integral relation to the duty of the appellants
H
(l) [1939] F.C.R. 159.
(2) A.LR. 1948 P.C. 128.
9 -475SCil79
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 1 $.C.R.

A that they could genuinely claim that they committed it in the course ·.:
of the performance of their official duty ? In the facts of the instant
,
case, the answer cannot but be in the negatiw. There is nothing in
the nature or quality of the act complained of which attaches to or
partakes of the official character of the appellants who alleg~dly did .." ~

it. Nor cou:d the alleged act of misappropriatio'n or conversion, be
B reasonably said to be imbued with the colour of the office hdd by the •
appellants. ,,"'-."'

As pointed out by Varadachariar J. in Hori Ram (supra), gene-
rally, in a case under Section 409, Indian Penal Code, "the official
capacity is material only in connection with the 'entrustment' and does
c 'not necessarily enter into the later act of misappropriation or conver-
sion, which is the act complained of."
This, however, should not be understood as an invariable proposi-
tion of law. The question, as already explained, depends on the facts
·--..
of each case. Cases are conceivable where on their special facts it
can be said that the act of criminal misappropriation or conversio'n
D
complained of is inseparably intertwined with the performance of the
official duty of the accused and thereforn, sanction under Section
197 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for prosecution of the
accused for an offence under Sectio'n 409, Indian Penal Code was
necessary.
E Shreekantiah Rammayya (supra) was a case of that kind. The
act complarned of against the second accused in that case was, dis-
honest disposal of the goods. The peculiarity of the act was that from
its very nature, in the circumstances of that case, it could not have
b~en done lawfully or otherwise by the accused save by an act done
or purporti'ng to be done in an official capacity. In other words, the
F very charge, was the dishonest doing of an official act by the accused.
Whether the act was dishonest or lawful, it remained an official act
becaus.~ the accused could not dispose of the goods save by the doing
of an official act, namely, officially permitting their disposal; and that
he did. It was in view of these special facts of the case, it was held
that the offence under Section 409, Indian Penal Code was committed T
G •
or purported to be committed by the accused in the discharge of his
official duty, and, as such, sanction under Section 197(1) Cr. P.C.
was a prerequisite for his pros·~cution. The facts of the case before
ns are entirely different. The ratio of Shreekantiah Rammayya has
therefore, no application to ·the facts of the case b~fore us.
H In Amrik Singh v. The State of Pepsu, ( 1) it was hid down that
whether sanction is necessary to prosecute a public servant on a charge
(1) (19551 I S.C.R. 1302.
B. SAHA AND ORS v. M. s. KOCHAR (Sarkaria, J.) 121

of criminal misappropriation, will cfopend on whether the acts com- A
plained of hinge on his duties as a public servant. If they do, then
~anction is requisite. But if they are unconnected with such duties,
then no sanction is necessary. Amrik Singh's case also stands on its
own facts, which w"re materially different from those of the present
case. The correctness of that decision was doubted in Baijnath v.
Staff of Madhya Pradesh (supra), and its authority appears to have B
bee'n badly shaken. In any _case, its ratio must be confined to its
own peculiar facts.
Th"re are several decisions of this Court, such as, Om Parkash
Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh,(') Baijnath v. State of Madhya
Pradesh (supra), Marihar Prasad v. State of Bihar,( 2 ) wherein it has c
been held that sanction under Section 197, Criminal Procedure Code
._, for prosecution for an offence under Section 409, Indian Penal Code
was not necessary. In Om Parkash Gupta's ease (ibid) it was held
that a public servant committing criminal breach of trust does not
normally act in his capacity as a public servant. Since this rule is
not absolute, the question being depmdent on the facts of each case, D
we do not think it necessary to burden this judgment with a survey
of all those cases.
In the light of all that has been said above, we are of opinion that
on the facts of the present case, sanction of the appropriate Govern-
ment was not necessary for the prosecution of t!J," appellants for an E
offence under Sections 409/120-B, Indian Penal Code, because the
alleged act of criminal misappropriation complained of was not com-
mitted by them while they were acting or purporting to act in the
discharge of their official duty, the commission of the offence having
no direct connection or inseparable link with their duties as public
~ervants. At the moot, the official status of the appellants furnished F
them with a'n opportunity or occasion to commit the alleged criminal
act.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.

G
'• N.K.A. Appeal dismissed.

(1) [1957] S.C.R. 423.
(2) [1972] 3 S.C.R. 89.