B. MANMAD REDDY & ORS.versusCHANDRA PRAKASH REDDY & ORS.

                       (2010] 2 S.C.R. 860


A                 B. MANMAD REDDY & ORS.
                                 V.
              CHANDRA PRAKASH REDDY & ORS.
             (Civil Appeal Nos. 933-935 of 2004 etc.)
                       FEBRUARY 17, 2010
B
         ~MARKANDEY KATJU AND         T.S. THAKUR, JJ.]

        Service Law:

c      Andhra Pradesh Education Service Rules - r. 3 Note 6
  - Classification of officers, drawn from different sources and
  integrated into one class I cadre I category, into separate
  categories for the purpose of promotion - Propriety of - Held:
  Such classification is unjustified and discriminatory - Note 6
D to r. 3 is unconstitutional - Constitution of India, 1950 -
  Article 14.

      The question for consideration in the instant cases
  was whether persons drawn from different sources and
  integrated into one class I cadre I category, can be
E classified into separate categories for purposes of
  promotion on the basis of the source from which they
  were drawn, as provided under Note 6 to Rule 3 of
  Andhra Pradesh Education Service Rules.

F       Dismissing the appeals, the Court

       HELD: 1. Tribunal and the High Court were justified
  in holding that Note 6 to Rule 3 of Andhra Pradesh
  Education Service Rules, was unconstitutional inasmuch
  as the same classified officers eligible for appointment
G against class II category 1 posts depending upon whether
  they were direct recruits or promotees. Such a
  classification based on the birth mark that stood
  obliterated after integration of officers coming from
  different source into a common cadre/category would be
H                              860
      B. MANMAD REDDY & ORS. v. CHANDRA                  861
            PRAKASH REDDY & ORS.

wholly unjustified and discriminatory. [Para 12] [870-C-D]     A

     2. Any imbalance among those eligible for
appointment against class II category 1 posts coming
from different sources and categories would itself not
justify a classification like the one made in Note 6. There
                                                                8
is no gainsaying that classification must rest on a
reasonable and intelligible basis and the same must bear
a nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the
statute. By its very nature, classification can and is often
fraught with the danger of resulting in artificial
inequalities which make it necessary to subject the power C
to classify to restraints lest the guarantee of equality
becomes illusory on account of classifications being
fanciful instead of fair, intelligible or reasonable. [Para 13]
[870-E-G]
                                                               D
    The State of Jammu and Kashmir vs. Shri Triloki Nath
Khosa and Ors. 1974 (1) SCC 19; Roshan Lal Tandon vs.
Union of India 1968 (1) SCR 185, relied on
                     Case Law Reference:
                                                               E
    1968 (1) SCR 185            Relied on          Para 9
    1974 (1) sec 19            Relied on           Para 10
    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICITION : Civil Appeal Nos.
933-935 of 2004.                                               F

     From the Judgment & Order dated 10.1.2003 of the High
Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Writ Petition Nos.
537, 2073 and 2075 of 2002.

                            WITH                               G

C.A. Nos. 937-939 of 2004

    Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, A. Mariarputham, I. Venkatanarayan,
D. Rama Krishna Reddy (for D. Bharathi Reddy) T. Anamica,      H
    862      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 2 S.C.R.


A   Chandra Mohan Anisetty, Manoj Saxena, Mayank Nigam (for
    T.V. George), D. Bharat Kumar, Balasubrahmanyam Kamarsu
    (for Abhijit Sengupta) for the appearing parties.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B       T.S. THAKUR, J. 1. These appeals by special leave arise
  out of a common order passed by the High Court of Andhra
  ?radesh whereby Writ Petition Nos.537, 2073, 2075, 7234 and
  11033 of 2002 have been partly allowed, and the order passed
  by Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal set aside to the
C extent the same had declared Note 1(i) to Rule 3 of the Andhra
  Pradesh Educational Service Rules to be unconstitutional. To
  the extent the Tribunal had declared Note 6 to Rule 3 of the
  Rules aforementioned to be ultra vires the High Court has
  affirmed the view taken by the Tribunal and dismissed the writ
D petitions. It is noteworthy that the State of Andhra Pradesh has
  not assailed the judgment delivered by the High Court of Andhra
  Pradesh. The present appeals have been preferred by the direct
  recruits to the Andhra Pradesh State Educational Service wh·o
  contend that the Tribunal and the High Court fell in error in
E declaring Note 6 to Rule 3 of the Rules in question to be
  unconstitutional.

         2. The short question that falls for consideration and that
   was argued at considerable length before us by learned counsel
   for the parties is whether persons drawn from different sources
 F and integrated into one class/cadre/category can be classified
   into separate categories for purposes of promotion on the basis
   of the source from which they were drawn. The question is, in
   our opinion, squarely covered by the decisions of this Court to
   which we shall presently refer but before we do so, we may
.G briefly set out the factual backdrop in which controversy arises.

        3.ln exercise of the powers vested in it under Sections 78
    and 99 of the Andhra Pradesh Education Act, 1982 and in
    suppression of the earlier rules, the Government of Andhra
H



                     ...
       B. MANMAD REDDY & ORS. v. CHANDRA                       863
      PRAKASH REDDY & ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]

Pradesh framed what are known as ·"Andhra Pradesh                     A
Educational Service Rules". Rule 2 of the said Rules provides
for the composition of the service which broadly speaking
comprises four distinct classes of employees enumerated
under the said Rules. Each one of these classes in turn
comprises different category of officers enlisted therein. For        B
instance in Class-I there are in all three category of officers. In
class II there are seven category of officers; while in class Ill
there are 13 category of officers. So also in class IV there are
four category of officers. Rule 3 of the said Rules prescribes
the method of appointment and specifies the appointing                c
authority for different category of posts. Since we are concerned
only with promotions to class II category I posts, we may extract
Rule 3 to the extent the same regulates promotion for that class
and category:

      "3. Method of Appointment and Appointing Authority:- The        D
      Method of appointment and appointing authority for
      different categories of posts of service shall be as follows:

 Class Category        Method of Appointment       Appointing
                                                   Authority          E
          1.           xxxx                        :xxx
 I        1(a)         xxxx                        :xxx
          2.           xxxx                        :xxx
          3.           xxxx                        :xxx               F
 II       1            By promotion from           Government
                       Categories1 ,2,3,4,5,8,
                       10, 11 and 12 of
                       Class Ill
 xx            xxx     xxxx                        xxX'               G

    4. Under Rule 3 are placed Notes 1 to 9 which govern
several aspects relating to preparation of seniority lists and the
method of recruitment to be adopted for different posts as also
the academic qualifications required for such promotions.             H
     864          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (201 O] 2 S.C.R.


.A         5. The High Court has, as noticed earlier, declared Note
     1 to be intra vires to which finding there is no challenge before
     us. It is the validity of Note 6 to Rule 3 which prescribes a roster
     for promotion to the post of District Educational Officer and
     Deputy Director comprising category 1 of Class II, that is under
B    attack before us. The Note reads:

          "NOTE 6 : for the purpose of promotion to category 1 of
     class II, the following 12 point cycle shall be followed from the
     feeder categories:
c          1.       A.O., G.A.O, and A.P.O.

           2. ·     Direct recruit Dy.E.O./Gazetted Head Master
                    Grade-I, Lecturer IASE/CTE/SCERT, Senior
                    Lecturer DIET and Special Officer (OS)
D
           3.       Promotee Dy.E.O./Gazetted Head Master Gr.I and
                    P.E.O.

           4.       Promotee Lecture IASE/CTE/SCERT, Senior
                    Lecturer DIET and A.O. (NFE)
E
           5.       Direct Recruit Dy.E.O./Gazetted Head Master Gr.I;
                    Lecturer IASE/CTE/SCERT, Senior Lecturer DIET
                    and Special Officer (O.S.)

           6.       Promotee Lecture IASE/CTE/SCERT, Senior
F                   Lecturer DIET and A.O. (NFE)

           7.      A.O., G.A.O, and A.P.O.

           8.       Direct recruit Dy.E.O./Gazetted Head Master
                    Grade-I, Lecturer IASE/CTE/SCERT, Senior
G
                    Lecturer DIET and Special Officer (OS)

           9.       Promotee Dy.E.O./Gazetted Head Master Gr.I and
                    P.E.O.

H
     B. MANMAD REDDY & ORS. v. CHANDRA                        865
    PRAKASH REDDY & ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]

      10.    Promotee Lecturer IASE/CTE/SCERT,. Senior                A
             Lecturer DIET and A.O. (NFE)

      11.   Direct Recruit Dy.E.O./Gazetted Head Master Gr.I,
            Lecturer IASE/CTE/SCERT, Senior Lecturer DIET
            and Special Officer (O.S.)                                B

      12.    Promotee Lecturer IASE/CTE/SCERT, Senior
             Lecturer DIET and A.O. (NFE)"

      6. A careful reading of Rule 3 (supra) would show that for
 posts in Class II category (1) comprising District Educational      c
 Officer and Deputy Director, officers comprising categories 1
 to 5, 8, 10, 11 and 12 of class Ill are eligible for appointment.
This implies that vacancies in category 1 of class 11 shall be
filled up in terms of the 12 point cycle stipulated in Note 6
 (supra). A closer reading of Note 6 and the roster for o
appointment prescrib~d1herein would indicate that
appointments against vacancies in class II category 1 would,
 inter alia, depend upon whether the eligible officer is a direct
 recruit or a promotee. For instance, a vacancy at roster Point
2 would go to a direct recruit Deputy Educational Officer or a E
direct recruit Gazetted Head Master Grade I or Lecturer IASE/
CTE/SCERT or a direct recruit Senior Lecturer DIET or a
Special Officer (OS). In contradiction, a promotee Deputy
Educational Officer or a promotee gazetted Head Master
Grade I will not be eligible for consideration against a vacancy
                                                                       F
falling at roster Point 2. Similarly, a promotee Lecturer IASE/
CTE/SCERT or promotee senior Lecturer DIET even when he
or she is a member of the same class as their direct recruit
counterparts in that category shall have to wait for a vacancy
to occur at roster Point 4. Suffice it to say that while roster Points
2, 5, 8 and 11 have been allotted to direct recruits, the G
promotees have been treated differently and can be considered
for vacancies at roster points 4, 6, 10 and 12 only. This
classification of persons drawn from different sources who
stand integrated into one class for the purpose of promotion is
what was assailed on behalf of the promotee officers before . H
    866      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 2 S.C.R.


A   the Tribunal primarily on the ground that direct recruits and the
    promotees may have come from different sources but once they
    are integrated into one class, there can be no classification as
    between them on the basis of their birth marks. The integration
    of promotees and direct recruits into one class would wipe out
8   their birth marks with the result that the same can not be made
    a basis for a valid classification. Any such classification would
    amount to classifying equals in the matter of further promotion
    based solely on the source from which they were drawn.
    Relying upon the decisions of this Court, the Tribunal and the
c   High Court have held that inasmuch as Note 6 to Rule 3
    classifies the promotees and direct recruits for the purpose of
    future promotion, even after their integration into one cadre the
    same was discriminatory hence ultra vires of Articles 14 and
    16 of the Constitution.
D         7. Appearing for the appellants Dr. Rajeev Dhavan,
  learned senior counsel argued that in The State of Jammu and
  Kashmir Vs. Shri Tri/oki Nath Khosa and Ors. 1974 (1) SCC
  19, this Court has recognised that a classification based .on
  higher educational qualifications was permissible even when
E those for whom the classification was made were integrated'·
  into one class. He· urged that the decision of this Court in
  Roshan Lal Tandon Vs. Union of India 1968 (1) SCR 185,
  reliance whereupon was placed by the Tribunal as also by the
  High Court in support of the view taken by them stood diluted
F to that extent implying thereby that the law declared in Roshan
  Lal Tandon's case (supra) could admit of exceptions, one of
  which based on higher qualifications was recognised in Triloki
  Nath's case (supr?). Dr. Dhavan strenuously argued that this
  Court could recognise the need for correcting imbalance, if any,
G in the filling up of posts by persons drawn from different
  categories as yet another exception to the Rule stated in
  Roshan Lal Tandon's case (supra). He contended that the
  Government had reserved to itself the power to review the roster
  from time to time, which power of review would, according to
H Dr. Dhawan, enable the Government to ensure a fair distribution
     B. MANMAD REDDY & ORS. v. CHANDRA                         867
    PRAKASH REDDY & ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]

of vacancies among all those eligible for appointment against         A
the same, but who came from different sources.

      8. Mr. A Mariarputham, learned senior counsel appearing
for the contesting respondents, on the other hand, submitted
that the view taken by the Tribunal and the High Court of Andhra      B
Pradesh declaring Note 6 to Rule 3 was legally
unexceptionable inasmuch as the said note was on the face
of it discriminatory in so far as the same classified those
integrated into a particular category based not on their
educational or other qualification but whether they were              C
promotees or direct recruits. The legal position, argued the
learned counsel, was much too well settled by the decisions of
this Court to admit of any doubt or call for any reconsideration.
It was also not, according to the learned counsel, possible to
carve out an exception to the well settled legal position
governing permissible classifications based on an assumed             D
imbalance in the filling up of vacancies from out of officers
drawn from different sources.

     9. In Roshan Lal Tandon's case (supra), one of the
questions that fell for consideration was whether the promotees       E
and direct recruits who formed one class in Grade 'D' could
thereafter be classified again depending upon the source from
which they were drawn for the purpose of promotion to the next
higher Grade 'C'. This Court observed:
                                                                      F
    "In our opinion, the constitutional objection taken by the
    petitioner to this part of the notification is well-founded and
    must be accepted as correct. At the time when the
    petitioner and the direct recruits were appointed to Grade
    'D', there was one class in Grade 'D' formed of direct
    recruits and the promotees from the grade of artisans. The        G
    recruits from both the sources to Grade 'D' were integrated
    into one class and no discrimination could thereafter be
    made in favour of recruits from one source as against the
    recruits from the other source in the matter of promotion
    to Grade 'C'. To put it differently, once the direct recruits     H
    868       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [201 O] 2 S.C.R.


A         and promotees are absorbed in one cadre, they form one
          class and they cannot be discriminated for the purpose of
          further promotion to the higher Grade 'C' ."

           10. The above decision was noticed by the Constitution
    Bench of this C9urt in Triloki Nath's case (supra). In that case
8
    diploma ho'lder engineers had challenged the validity of certain
    service rules, inter alia, on the ground that inasmuch as the said
    Rules made a distinction between Degree Holder members of
    the Engineering service and Diploma Holders for purposes of
    promotion to the post of Executive Engineers the same was
C   unconstitutional being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the
    Constitution. The Rules in that case provided for promotion of
    only such of the Assistant Engineers as possessed a
    bachelor's degree in engineering or qualification of AM.LE.
    and as had put in seven years of service in the J & K
D   Engineering Service. The High Court had allowed the petitions
    of Diploma Holders and struck down the Rule as
    unconstitutional, holding that the Diploma Holders and the
    Degree Holders having been integrated into one category, no
    distinction or clas~ification based on educational qualification
E   c<;>uld thereafter be made between them. In an appeal to this
    Court that view was reversed. This Court held that a
    classification must be truly founded on substantial differences
    that distinguish persons grouped together from those left out
    of the group and such differential attributes must bear a just and
F   rational relation to the object sought to be achieved. Having said
    so, this Court observed:

          "33. Judged from this point of view, it seems to us
          impossible to accept the respondents' submission that the
          classification of Assistant Engineers into degree-holders
G
          and diploma-holders rests on any unreal or unreasonable-
          basis. The classification, according to the appellants, was
          made with a view to achieving administrative efficiency in
          the Engineering services. If this be the object, the
          classification is Clearly co-related to it, for higher
H
     B. MANMAD REDDY & ORS. v. CHANDRA                     869
    PRAKASH REDDY & ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]

    educational qualifications are at least presumptive           A
    evidence of a higher mental equipment. This is not to
    suggest that administrative efficiency can be achieved only
    through the medium of those possessing comparatively
    higher educational qualifications but that is beside the
    point. What is relevant is that the object to be achieved     B
    here is not a mere pretence for an indiscriminate
    imposition of inequalities and the classification cannot be
    characterized as arbitrary or absurd. That is the farthest
    that judicial scrutiny can extend."

    .11. The Court also observed that the classification made     C
on the basis of educational qualifications with a view to
achieving administrative efficiency can not be said to rest on
any fortuitous circumstance and that one has always to bear in
mind the facts and circumstances of the case in order to judge
the validity of a classification. The ratio of the decision in    D
Roshan Lal Tandon's case (supra) was reiterated by their
Lordship in the following words:

    "44. The key words of the judgment are: "The recruits from
    both the sources to Grade 'D' were integrated into one        E
    class and no discrimination could thereafter be made in
    favour of recruits from one source as against the recruits
    from the other source in the matter of promotion to Grade
    'C', (emphasis supplied). By this was meant that in the
    matter of promotional opportunities to Grade 'C', no          F
    discrimination could be made between promotees and
    direct recruits by reference to the source from which they
    were drawn. That is to say, if apprentice train examiners
    who were recruited directly to Grade 'D' as train examiners
    formed one common class with skilled artisans who were        G
    promoted to Grade 'D' as train examiners, no favoured
    treatment could be given to the former merely because they
    were directly recruited .as train examiners and no
    discrimination could be made as against the latter merely
    because they were promotees. This is the true meaning
                                                                  H
    870       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 2 S.C.R.


A         of the observation extracted above and no more than this
          can be read into the sentence next following: "To put it
          differently, once the direct recruits and promotees are
          absorbed into one cadre, they form one class and they
          cannot be discriminated for the purpose of further
B         promotion to the higher Grade 'C'." In terms, this was just
          a different way of putting what had preceded."

       12. In the light of the above pronouncements, the Tribunal
  and the High Court were, in our view, justified in holding that
  Note 6 to Rule 3 was unconstitutional inasmuch as the same
C classified officers eligible for appointment against class II
  category 1 ·posts depending upon whether they were direct
  recruits or promotees. Such a classification based on the birth
  mark that stood obliterated after integration of officers coming
  from different source into a common cadre/category would be
D wholly unjustified and discriminatory.

         13. That leaves us with the question whether any imbalance
  among those eligible for appointment against class II category
  1 posts coming from different sources and categories would
E itself justify a classification like the one made in Note 6. Our
  answer is in the negative. There is no gainsaying that
  classification must rest on a reasonable and intelligible basis
  and the same must bear a nexus to the object sought to be
  achieved by the statute. By its very nature classification can and
F is often fraught with the danger of resulting in artif.icial
  inequalities which make it necessary to subject the power to
  classify to restraints lest the guarantee of equality becomes
  illusory on account of classifications being fanciful instead of
  fair, intelligible or reasonable. We may gainfully extract the note
G of caution sounded by Krishna Iyer J. in his Lordship's separate
  but concurring judgment in Triloki Nath's case (supra) :

          "........ The dilemma of democracy is as to how to avoid
          validating the abolition of the difference between the good
          and the bad in the name of equality and putting to sleep
H
      B. MANMAD REDDY & ORS. v. CHANDRA                      871
     PRAKASH REDDY & ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]

    the constitutional command for expanding the areas of A
    equal treatment for the weaker ones with the dope of
    "special qualifications" measured by expensive and exotic
    degrees. These are perhaps meta-judicial matters left to
    the other branches of Government, but the Court must hold
    the Executive within the leading strings of egalitarian B
    constitutionalism and correct, by judicial review, episodes
    of subtle and shady classification grossly violative of equal
    justice. That is the heart of the matter. That is the note that
    rings through the first three fundamental rights the people
    have given to themselves."                                      ·C

      14. In the result we find no merit in these appeals which
fail and are hereby dismissed but without any order as to costs.

K.K.T.                                     Appeals dismissed.
                                                                    D