Holding

The Supreme Court held that the Commissioner erred in rejecting the waiver of interest; the order of the High Court is set aside and the matter is remitted to the Commissioner for fresh consideration.

Summary

B.M. Malani, a money‑lender who also traded in shares, had shares and a demand draft seized during a raid. He offered to pay his tax liability by selling the seized shares and requested the Income‑Tax Authority to dispose of them, but the request was ignored. The Department later levied interest under s.220(2) of the Income Tax Act for non‑payment of tax and Malani’s application for waiver of that interest under s.220(2‑A) was rejected by the Commissioner and upheld by the High Court. The Supreme Court held that the term “genuine hardship” must be interpreted purposively and that the Commissioner failed to consider whether the default was due to circumstances beyond Malani’s control, nor did he act on the voluntary offer to sell the seized assets. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court’s order and remitted the matter to the Commissioner for fresh consideration of the waiver application.

Issues considered

The proper interpretation of ‘genuine hardship’ under s.220(2‑A) of the Income Tax Act.
Whether the Commissioner correctly exercised his discretionary power in refusing the waiver of interest.
Whether the Commissioner considered the appellant’s claim that the default was due to circumstances beyond his control.
Whether the statutory authority was obliged to act on the appellant’s request to sell seized shares and securities.
Whether the presumption of ownership of a seized demand draft can be rebutted in the context of interest waiver.

Legislation cited

Income Tax Act, 1961s. 132(4), s. 132(4A), s. 148, s. 220(2), s. 220(2-A), s. 226(3), s. 245C(1), s. 245E

Subjects

Income Taxwaiver of interestgenuine hardshipSection 220(2-A)discretionary powerseizure of assetstax assessmentpurposive constructionstatutory interpretation

Judgment

[2008] 14 S.C.R. 63

\ B.M. MALANI A
v.
COMMR. OF INCOME TAX & ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 5950 of 2008)
OCTOBER 01, 2008
B
[S.B. SINHA AND CYRIAC JOSEPH, JJ]
).
Income Tax Act, 1961 - s. 220 (2-A) - Waiver of interest
payable by assessee - Non-deposit of tax by assessee - Levy
of interest for non-payment of dues - Request by assessee to c
the Authority to dispose of shares and securities seized from
his premises to appropriate sale proceeds towards taxes but
request not met with - Application for waiver of interest - Re-
jection of, by Commissioner of Income Tax as also High Court
- On appeal, held: Statutory Authority on receipt of request of
D
assessee to sell his shares and securities should have taken
some action - Compulsion to pay any unjust dues per se
would cause hardship - Commissioner and High Court did
not consider in its proper perspective whether default in pay-
ment of amount due to circumstances beyond control of as-
sessee - However, said ground not available to assessee in E
respect of demand draft seized as he did not make any re-
quest- Thus, in the interests of justice order of High Court set
aside and matter remitted to Commissioner for fresh consid-
eration.
F
'Genuine hardship' - Interpretation of - Held: 'Genuine
hardship' means genuine difficulty - Principle of purposive
construction is to be applied for determining whether any hard"'
ship had been caused or not.
Appellant was engaged in money lending business G
-{ and was trading in shares and securities. Raid was con-
ducted in his residential premises and shares and secu-
rities worth market value of Rs. 61.38 lakhs and a demand
draft of Rs. 10 lakhs in the name of P company were seized.
63 H
64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

(-
A The appellant-assessee was to pay tax. He requested the
Income Tax Authorities to dispose of the s•eized shares
and securities expeditiously and appropriate the sale pro-
ceeds towards taxes but the request was not met with.
The Income Tax Department recovered Rs.40 lakhs from
B the appellant. The Settlement Commission did not accept
the income declared by the ,appellant and 1enhanced the
amount of taxable income. Appellant filed application u/s.
245C(1) of the Income Tax Act. The Settlement Commis-
sion passed an order dated 2.12.1999. The Department
c encashed the demand draft which was seized. Thereaf-
ter, it levjed interest for a sum of Rs. 31,41,106/ for non-
payment of the dues u/s.220 (2) of the Act. The said
t,
amount was rectified to the extent of Rs.24,36,352/-. Ap-
pellant filed application u/s. 220 (2-A) for waiver of inter-
D est but the same were rejected. The Commissioner of In-
come Tax held that the appellant did not satisfy the con-
ditions required for allowing waiver application; and that
the levy of interest did not cause genuine hardship to the .
appellant. Writ petition filed thereagainst was also dis-
missed. Hence the present appeal.
E
Allowing the appeal and remitting the matter, the
Court ·
HELD: 1.1 For interpretation of term genuine hard-
ship, the principle of purposive construction should be
F resorted to. Levy of interest although is statutory in na-
ture, inter alia for re-compensating the revenue from loss
suffered by non-deposit of tax by the assessee within the
time specified therefor. The said principle should also be
applied for the purpose of determining as to whether any
G hardship had been caused or not. A genuine hardship
would, inter alia, mean a. genuine difficulty. That per se
would not lead to a conclusion that a person having large
assets would never be in difficulty as he can ~ell those
assets and pay the amount of interest levied. [Para 8] [7 4-
H B-C]
B.M. MALANI v. COMMR. OF INCOME 65
TAX &ANR.
-\ New Collins Concise English Dictionary - referred to. A
1.2 The ingredients of genuine hardship must be de-
termined keeping in view the dictionary meaning thereof
and the legal conspectus attending thereto. For the said
purpose, the well-known principle, namely, a person can-
not take advantage of his own wrong, may also have to B
) be borne in mind. The said principle should be applied
even in a case of this nature. A statutory authority despite
receipt of such a request could have kept mum. It should
.... have taken some action. It should have responded to the
" prayer of the appellant to sell his shares and securities. c
[Para 8] [7 4-D-F]
Priyanka Overseas Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India &
Ors. 1991 Suppl. (1) SCC 102; Union oflndia & Ors. v. Major
General Madan Lal Yadav (Retd.) (1996) 4 SCC 127; Ashok
D
~
Kapil v. Sana Ullah (dead) & Ors. (1996) 6 SCC 342; Sushi/
Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar (2003) 8 SCC 673; Kusheshwar
Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar & Ors. (2007) 11 SCC 447 -
referred to.
1.3 A statutory authority must act within the four cor- E
ners of the statute. Indisputably, the Commissioner has
the discretion not to accede to the request of the asses-
see, but that discretion must be judiciously exercised. He
has to arrive at a satisfaction that the three conditions laid
\ down therein have been fulfilled before passing an order F
waiving interest. [Para 8] [75-AB]
1.4 Compulsion to pay any unjust dues per se would
cause hardship. Whether the default in payment of the
amount was due to circumstances beyond the control of
the assessee, was not considered by the Commissioner G
__., and the High Court in its proper perspective. The Depart-
ment took the plea that unless the amount of tax due was
ascertainable, the securities could not have been sold and
the demand draft could not have been encashed. The
same logic would apply to the case of the assessee in H
66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A regard to levy of interest also. It is one thing to say that f'
the levy of interest on the ground of non-payment of cor-
rect amount of tax by itself can be a ground for non-ac-
ceding to the request of the assessee as the levy is a statu-
tory one but it is another thing to say that the said factor
s .shall not be taken into consideration at all for the purpose
of exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction on the part of
the Commissioner. [Para 8] [75 8-E] ,_
1.5 It was not even a case where section 226(3) of
the Act was resorted to. As. the offer was voluntary, the ,
/
C authorities of the Department subject to any statutory in-
terdict could have considered the request of the appel-
. lant. It was probably in the interest of the revenue itself to
realize its dues. Whether this could be done in law or not
has not been gone into. The same ground, however, was
D not available to the appellant in respect of the demand
draft, as in relation thereto no such request was made.
The demand draft was in the name of a Company. When
any document is.seized, a presumption is raised that the
same belongs to the person from whose possession or
E control it was seized as is laid down in sub-Section (4A)
of Section 132 of the Act, but such a presumption is a re-
buttable one .. In the absence of any request made by the
Assessee himself, probably at that point of time, the same
could not have been encashed. Appellant did not own the
F same in law. He did not make any request for its ,
enchashment. Whether such a presumption should be
raised or not was the subject matter of consideration by
the Assessing Officer at the time of making its final as-
sessment as the appellant himself filed an application
G befor:_e the Settlement Commission in terms of Section
245C(1) of the Act. [Para 9] [75-F-H, 76-A-C]
1.6 The interests of justice would be subserved if the
impugned judgment is set aside and the matter is remit-
ted to the Commissioner of Income Tax for consideration
H of the matter afresh. [Para 1O] [76-D]
B.M. MALAN! v. COMMR. OF INCOME 67
TAX & ANR.

\ CASE LAW REFERENCE A
1991 Suppl. (1) SCC 102 Referred to. Para 8
(1996) 4 sec 121 Referred to. Para 8
(1996) 6 sec 342 Referred to. Para 8
(2003) a sec 673 Referred to. Para 8 B

..) (2007) 11 sec 447 Referred to. Para 8
CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5950
of 2008
From the final Judgment and Order dated 27.7.2006 of
c
the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad
in Writ Petition No. 2672 of 2003
M.L. Verma and J.C. Gupta, Rajesh for the Appellant.
Rajni 0. Lal and B.V. Balaram Das for the Respondents. D
·'
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order E
dated 27.7.2006 passed by the High Court of Judicature of
Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Writ Petition No. 2672 of 2003
whereby and whereunder the Writ Petition filed by the appellant
herein against an order dated 26.11.2002 passed by the Com-
'\l missioner of Income Tax rejecting the application filed by the
F
appellant herein under Section 220 (2-A) of the Income Tax Act,
was dismissed.
3. Appellant had been carrying on money-lending business
and trading in shares and securities. On or about 4 .9 .1994, a
raid was conducted in his residential premises by the authori- G
ties in exercise of their power under Section 132 of the Income
-1
Tax Act (for short, "the Act"). Amongst others, shares worth mar-
ket value of Rs. 61.38 lakhs and a demand draft worth Rs. 10
lakhs in the name of PAN Clothing Company Limited were
seized. By a letter dated 15.12.1994, a declaration was made H
68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A by the appellant in terms of sub-Section (4) of Section 132 of /-
the Act, by reason whereof he opted to pay taxes from out of the
seized shares and securities stating that the shares be expedi-
tiously disposed of and the sale proceeds therefrom be appro-
priated towards taxes.
B The said letter dated 15.12.1994 reads as under :
"Please refer to your letter cited in reference above in the \...
matter of payment of taxes. I had made declaration U/s.
132(4) of the Act and pursuant declaration opted to pay
c taxes from out of the assets namely shares and securities
under seizure, as I have no further funds. I have therefore
delivered my consent and requested the Asst. Director of
Income Tax (Inv.) Unit-2(3), to dispose of the shares as
expeditiously as possible for appropriating the proceeds
towards taxes and advance tax. In the above circumstances
D
I request you sir to arrange for sale of Shares, Securities
under seizure to meet the tax liabilities and oblige."
Indisputably, the said request of the appellant was not ac-
ceded to. However, the fact that such an offer had been made
E by the appellant is not denied or disputed. It is furthermore not
disputed that the Income Tax Department demanded and re-
covered a sum of Rs.40 lakhs in between the period January
and March 1995, the details whereof are as under:
"Assessment Year Date of Payment Amount (Rs.)
F r
1993-94 17.01.1995 7,50,000/-
1994-95 17.01.1995 7,50,000/-
1992-93 18.01.1995 50,000/-
G 1991-92 20.03.1995 10,00,000/-
}-
1991-92 24.03.1995 10,00,000/-

Total 40,00,000/-"

Indisputably, the appellant filed an application in terms of
H
B.M. MALANI v. COMMR. OF INCOME 69
TAX & ANR. [S.S. SINHA, J.]
·\ sub-Section (1) of Section 245C before the Settlement Com- A
-- mission on 2.1.1996 whereupon an order was passed by the
Settlement Commission on 2.12.1999.
The demand draft drawn in the name of PAN Clothing
Company Limited worth Rs. 10 lakhs which was seized during
the course of search was encashed by the Income Tax Depart- B

..J ment in July 2000 after the same was got revalidated .
By an order dated 8.3.2002, the Income Tax Officer, Ward
10(1 ), Hyderabad levied interest for a sum of Rs. 31,41, 106/-
under Section 220(2) of the Act for the assessment years 1990- c
91 to 1995-96.
Appellant thereafter filed an application for waiver of inter-
est on diverse dates i.e. 3.4.2002, 14.5.2002 and 16.9.2002.
The same was rejected by the Commissioner of Income Tax
reason of an order dated 26.11.2002 opining that the appellant D
' did not satisfy all the three conditions which were required for
allowing a waiver petition. It was, however, accepted that the
appellant cooperated with the Department. So far as the re-
quest of the appellant to sell the shares and securities is con-
cerned, it was opined that the levy of interest did not cause any E
genuine hardship fo him and the default in payment of the amount
of tax on which interest has been paid or was payable under
Section 220(2A) was due to circumstances beyond his control.
It was furthermore opined that the dues as against the appellant
\ could be crystallized only after passing of the order of the Settle- F
ment Commission 2.12.1999.
The Commissioner held:
"Further, as per the enquiry report dated 22.11.2002,
obtained from the Income Tax Officer Ward-10 (1),
G
indicates that Sri B.M.Malani has been residing in a house
"i bearing No. 1-11-219, Begumpet, Hyderabad. The
property is located in posh area near Airport in Begum pet.
The area of the property is about 6000 sq. yds., and value
will be around Rs. 2 crores. Thus, property as referred
H
70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A above belongs to HUF and the assessments under f-
consideration were passed in the status of HUF. From the
details gathered by the Department, it was revealed that
the assessee possesses good resources and he is
financially sound and it will not cause any hardship in
B discharging legitimate tax liability which is in the form of
interest u/s 220 (2A) and the tax liability that would have
arisen out of his inordinate delay in liquidation of taxes." l--
By reason of the impugned judgment, the High Court opined:

c "The hardship claimed by the petitioner is on account of
lack of resources either moveable or immoveable. Even
after the conclusion of this Court that the finding of the 1st
respondent regarding the property at Begumpet is justified,
the fact remains that the petitioner had assets by way of
units in the Unit Trust of India by t.he date of the Settlement
D
Commission determined his liability of tax. The fact that a
distress sale conducted by the Unit Trust fetched a lower ·"-
rate in our view does not make any difference for the
consideration of the application of the petitioner for the
waiver of interest. The UTI did not follow according to the
E Division Bench of this Court the requisite procedure in
resorting to distress sale. That is a different matter. But,
nothing prevented the petitioner from encashing the said
units and pay the tax liability in time. The submission of
the learned counsel for the petitioner that such a premature
F sale of the units would result in a financial loss to the r
petitioner is irrelevant in the context of the application for
waiver of interest. If the petitioner is already found liable
and due to pay tax under the Income Tax Act, the petitioner
cannot choose the time for encashing the assets he had
G to get the post price for the asset and still complain that
the levy of interest would cause undue hardship to him. '1---
Apart from that by virtue of the Division Bench judgment
of this Court, the UTI is already directed to make good the
loss suffered by the petitioner by virtue of the distress sale
H undertaken by the UTI."
B.M. MALANI v. COMMR. OF INCOME 71
TAX & ANR. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

Applicability of the second condition specified in Section A
220(2A) of the Act was not gone into on the premise that the
appellant had not been able to establish that payment of inter-
est would cause any genuine hardship to him.
4. Before adverting to the contentions raised by the par-
8
ties, however, we may notice that the Settlement Commission
did not accept the incomes declared by the appellant in his re-
turns filed on 1.1.1996 under Section 148 of the Act and en-
hanced the amount of taxable income. It also estimated the in-
come for earlier Assessment Year 1989-90 in terms of Section
245-E of the Act, although, his application did not cover that C
Assessment Year, the details whereof are as under:

"Assessment Income admitted Income determined
Year by petitioner by Settlement
(in Rs.) Commission (in Rs.) D
> 1988-89 8,090 26,21,090
1990-91 10,75,310 33,51,574
1991-92 28,67,040 29,92,880
E
1992-93 13,62, 100 56,35,038
1993-94 64,505 11,27,964
1994-95 56,880 1,52,880
1995-96 52,880 9,27,880 F
Total 54,82,805 1,68,09,306"

The amount of tax quantified by the Assessing Officer in
terms of the order of the Settlement Commission for different
Assessment Years were as under: G

"Assessment Year Tax demand payable
(in Rs.)
1988-89 13,54,284
H
72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A 1990-91 37,29,992
1991-92 33,68,567
1992-93 61,39,448

B 1993-94 7,21,192
1994.,95 65, 145
1995-96 3,99,023
Total 1,57,77,651"
c
Demand notices were issued accordingly. Taxes were pay-
able in terms thereof on or before 1.4.2000. All amounts paid
by the appellant before the said date were adjusted'. The appel-
lant had deposited· a total amount of Rs.1,60,66,947/- on or
before 8.3.2002. The amount of interest calculated at a sum of
D Rs.31,41 ,.106/- was levied for non-payment of the dues as on
8.3.2002 for Assessment Years 1990-91, 1991-92, 1992-93
and 1995-96. The amount so determined, however, stood rec-
tified for the four Assessment Years to the extent of Rs.24,36,352/
- in stead and place of Rs.31,41,106/- as would appear from
E the following chart.
"Assessment Tax demand Levied Int. Demand paid/
Year payable U/s. 220(2) recovered till
(Rs.) (Rs.) 8.3.2000 (Rs.)
1988-89 13,54,284 NIL 13,54,284
F
1990-91 37,29,992 1,91,996 37,27,992
1991-92 33,68,546 4,58,463 33,68,546
1992-93 61,39,448 16,53,560 64,30,765
G 1993-94 7,21, 192 NIL 7,21,192
1994-95 65,145 NIL 65,192
1995-96 3,99,023 1,32,333 3,99,023

Total 1,57,77,630 24,36,352 1,60,66,947"
H J
B.M. MALAN! v. COMMR. OF INCOME 73
TAX & ANR. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
-\ 5. Section 220(2A) of the Act contains a na.n-obstante A
clause. It confers a jurisdiction upon the Chief Commissioner
or Commissioner to reduce or waive the amount of interest paid
or payable by an assessee thereunder, if he is satisfied that:
(i) Payment of such amount has caused or would cause
genuine hardship to the assessee; B

) (ii) Default in the payment of amount on which interest
has been paid or was payable under the said sub-
section was due to circumstances beyond the control
of the assessee; and c
(iii) Assessee has co-operated in any inquiry relating to
the assessment or any proceeding for the recovery
of any amount due from him.
6. The submission of Mr. Verma is that non encashment of
D
demand draft worth Rs. 10 lakhs as also non-selling of the shares
>-
and securities as prayed for by the appellant caused genuine
hardship to the assessee, in support whereof reliance has been
placed on the New Collins Concise English Dictionary, Words
.
~
and Phrases Permanent Edition Vol. 18 and Black's Law Die-
tionary. E

It was furthermore submitted that had the shares and se-
curities been sold when the request therefor was made, which
was worth Rs. 30 lakhs at the relevant time, the tax burden of
"'· the appellant would have been reduced; particularly when after F
adjusting the amount of Rs.117 .04 lakhs deposited by the ap-
pellant, only a sum of Rs. 40. 73 lakhs remained due.

7. Ms. Rajni Ohri Lal, learned counsel appearing on be-
half of the respondents, however, drew our attention to the na-
tu re of the business, the appellant had been carrying on and the G
-{ magnitude thereof to contend that the appellant did not suffer
any genuine hardship.

8. The term 'genuine' as per the New Collins Concise En-
glish Dictionary is defined as under:
H
74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A 'Genuine' means not fake or counterfeit, real, not r··
I

pretending (not bogus or merely a ruse)"
For interpretation of the aforementioned provision, the prin-
ciple of purposive construction should be resorted to. Levy of
interest although is statutory in nature, inter alia for re-compen-
B sating the revenue from loss suffered by non-deposit of tax by
the assessee within the time specified therefor. The said prin-
ciple should also be applied for the purpose of determining as
to whether any hardship had been caused or not. A genuine
hardship would, inter alia, mean a genuine difficulty. That per se
C would not lead to a concl,usion that a person having large as-
.sets would never be in difficulty as he can sell those assets and
pay the amount of interest levied.
The ingredients of genuine hardship must be determined
keeping in view the dictionary meaning thereof and the legal
0
conspectus attending thereto. For the said purpose, another .."'-
well-known principle, namely, a person cannot take advantage
of his own wrong, may also have to be borne in mind. The said
principle, it is conceded, has not been applied by the courts
below in this case, but we may take note of a few precedents
E operating in the field to highlight the aforementioned proposi-
tion of law. [See Priyanka Overseas Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of
India & ors. 1991 Suppl. (1) SCC 102, para 39, Union of India
& ors. v. Major General Madan Lal Yadav (Retd.) (1996) 4
SCC 127 ·at 142, paras 28 and 29, Ashok Kapil v. Sana Ullah
F (dead) & ors. (1996) 6 SCC 342 at 345, para 7, Sushi/ Kumar
v. Rakesh Kumar (2003) 8 SCC 673 at 692, para 65, first sen-
tence, Kusheshwar Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar & ors. (2007)
11 sec 447, paras 13, 14 and 16).
G Thus, the said principle, in our opinion, should be applied
even in a case of this nature. A statutory authority despite re-
ceipt of such a request could not have kept mum. It should have
taken some action. It should have responded to the prayer of
the appellant.
H However, another principle should also be borne in mind,
B.M. MALANI v. COMMR. OF INCOME 75
.. TAX & ANR. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
-~
namely, that a statutory authority must act within the four corners A
of the statute. Indisputably, the Commissioner has the discre-
tion not to accede to the reque~t of the assessee, but that dis-
cretion must be judiciously exercised. He has to arrive at a sat-
isfaction that the three conditions laid down therein have been
fulfilled before passing an order waiving interest. B
Compulsion to pay any unjust dues per se would cause
..)
hardship. But a question, however, would further arise as to
whether the default in payment of the amount was due to cir-
cumstances beyond the control of the assessee.
c
( / Unfortunately, this aspect of the matter has not been con-
sidered by the learned Commissioner and the High Court in its
proper perspective. The Department had taken the plea that
unless the amount of tax due was ascertainable, the securities
could not have been sold and the demand draft could not have
D
been encashed. The same logic would apply to the case of the
assessee in regard to levy of interest also. It is one thing to say
that the levy of interest on the ground of non-payment of correct
amount of tax by itself can be a ground for non-acceding to the
request of the assessee as the levy is a statutory one but it is
...
....
another thing to say that the said factor shall not be taken into E
consideration at all for the purpose of exercise of the discre-
tionary jurisdiction on the part of the Commissioner. Appellant
volunteered that the securities be sold. Why the said request of
the appellant could not be acceded to has not been explained.
\ F
It was a voluntary act on the part of the appellant.
It was not even a case where sub-Section (3) of Section
226 of the Act was resorted to. As the offer was voluntary, the
authorities of the Department subject to any statutory interdict
cou Id have considered the request of the appellant. It was prob-
G
ably in the interest of the revenue itself to realize its dues.
-i Whether this could be done in law or not has not been gone
into.

9. The same ground, however, was not available to the
appellant in respect of the demand draft, as in relation thereto H
76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.
y

A no such request was made. The demand draft was in the name f-'
of a Company. It may be true that when any document is seized,
a presumption is raised that the same belongs to the person
II
from whose possession or control it was seized as is laid down
in sub- Section (4A) of Section 132 of the Act, but such a pre- ~
~

B sumption is a rebuttable one. In the absence of any request made ,1-c
by the Assessee himself, prob(ilbly at that point of time, the same
could not have been encashed. Appellant did not own the same .___
\
,.
'-
I

in law. He did not make any request for its enchashment.
Whether such a presumption should be raised or not was
c the subject matter of consideration by the Assessing Officer at
the time of making its final assessment as the appellant himself
filed an application.before the Settlement Commission in terms
of Section 245C(1) of the Act.
~
I
10. We are, therefore, of the opinion that interests of jus-
D
tice would be subserved if the impugned judgment is set aside
......
and the matter is remitted to the Commissioner of Income Tax
for consideration of the matter afresh.
11. The appeal is allowed accordingly to the aforemen-
tioned extent. No costs.
E
N.J. Appeal allowed.
...
t