Holding

The Court held that Directive Principles are not justiciable and Article 32 does not provide a remedy for enforcing them, so the petition was dismissed.

Summary

B. Krishna Bhat filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking a direction to the State of Karnataka to enforce total prohibition and to declare a clause of the Karnataka Excise Rules, which grants a monopoly on liquor distribution to a state‑specified company, unconstitutional. He argued that Article 47, a Directive Principle, obliges the State to bring about prohibition and that the State’s failure to do so violated his rights. The Supreme Court held that Directive Principles, including Article 47, are not enforceable by courts and that Article 32 only protects fundamental rights, not policy preferences. No fundamental right was found to be infringed by the rule, and the Court declined to entertain the petition. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether a writ petition under Article 32 can be entertained to enforce the Directive Principle of State Policy contained in Article 47.
Whether clause (b) of sub‑rule 11 of Rule 3 of the Karnataka Excise (Sale of Indian and Foreign Liquors) Rules, 1968, conferring a monopoly on liquor distribution, is constitutionally valid.
Whether the non‑implementation of total prohibition by the State of Karnataka violates any fundamental right of the petitioner.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 32, s. Article 37, s. Article 47
Karnataka Excise (Sale of Indian and Foreign Liquors) Rules, 1968 (as amended 1989)s. Rule 3(11)(b)

Subjects

Article 32Directive PrinciplesArticle 47ProhibitionExcise lawFundamental rightsWrit petitionConstitutional validityState monopolyLiquor licensing

Judgment

B. KRISHNA BHAT
v. A
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

- +·' MARCH 19, 1990

[SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, C.J. AND M.M. PUNCHHI, J.] B

Constitution of•lndia, 1950: Articles 32 & 37-,Writ Petition for
direction to State of Karnataka to enforce total prohibition-Whether

•0'
r maintainable.

Karnataka Excise (Sale of Indian and Foreign Liquors) Rules,
c
-- 1968: Rule 3( 11) (b) as amended by Amendment Rules, 1989-Distri-
butor licence-Monopoly conferred on State-Whether constitutionally
valid-Writ Petition under Art. 32 Df Constitution for enforcement of
policy ofprohibition. Whether maintainable.
>·· Clause (b) of sub-rule (11) rule 3 of the Karnataka Excise (Sale of D
Indian and Foreign Liquors) Rules, 1968 as amended by the Amend-
ment Rules, 1989, requires the State Government lo issue distributor
licence only lo such company owned or controlled by it as may be
specified.

The petitioner assailed the constitutional validity of clause (b) on E
I the ground that the policy of-prohibition was not being implemented as
~- enjoined by Article 47 of the Constitution inasmuch as the . State. of
Karnataka instead of bringing total prohibition in the)'tate, had

--
evinced interest in laking up the responsibility of selling liquors to the
general public, and sought a direction to the Union and other State
·Governments to enforce the policy of total prohibition. F
~

Dismissing the writ petition, the Court,
)--·
HELD: I. There is no direct or casual violation of any funda-
mental right of which the petitioner can legi'timately daim enforce-
ment. G

.Z. Article 47 is in Part IV of. the Constituliml which contains
Directive Principles of State Policy. Article 37 enjoins that the provi-
sions of this part shall not be enforceable by any court. Article 32 gives
)- the Supreme Court the power to enforce rights which are fundamental
rights. Fundamental rights-are justiciable, Directive Principles are not. H

1
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R.

Directive Principles are aillled at securing certain valnes or enforcing
A
certain attitndes in the law making and in the administration of law.
Directive Principles cannot in the very nature of things be enforced in a
court of law.

Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh v. Union of India,
B (1981] 1 SCC 246, referred to.

3. Whether a law should be made embodying the principles of
Directive Principles depends on the legislative will of the legislature. In \
the instant case, what the petitioner sought ~o achieve by his application .,.
was to inject a sense of_priority_ and urgency in that legislative will.
C Determining the choice of priorities and formulating perspective
thereof, is a matter of policy. Article 32 is not the machinery through
which policy preferences or priorities are determined. It is not the nest
for all the bees in the bonnet of 'public spirited persons'.

Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, (1970] 3 SCR 550,
D referred to.

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No.
42 of 1990.

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)
E
N .D .R: Ramachandra Rao and Vineet Kumar for the petitioner.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, C.[._ This is a petition under '-
F article 32 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner claims to be ...a
public spirited individual". He further claims to be a person aggrieved
and seeks to assail the constitutional validity of the State of Kamataka ----<
and the Union of India not promoting, enforcing and carrying out the
policy of prohibition i.e. manufacturing, sale and consumption of
intoxicating drinks and drug~ throughout the country-India-Bharat,
G and also assails the constitutional validity of clause (b) of sub-rule
11 qf rule 3 of the Kamataka Excise (Sale of Indian- and Foreign
Liquors) Rules, 1968 as amended by the Kamataka Excise (Sale of
Indian and Foreign Liquors) (Amendment) Rules, 1989 which came --¥
into fore on 10th September, 1989.

H The petitioner refers to the Preamble to the Constitution which,
B.K. v. BHATrn.O.I. [MUKHARJI, CJ.] 3

according to him, explains the general purpose behind the general
provisions of the Constitution. He refers to Mahatma Gandhi and his A
commitment to prohibition. According to the petitioner, manufacture,
sale and consumption of intoxicating drinks and drugs have become a
stumbling block and a dangerous dragon to the progress and stability
of the nation as a whole. The petitioner states that unless this dragon is
completely destroyed the country could never think of achieving the B
objects of the Constitution and justice-social, economic and politi-
cal. People are flouting the laws of this country, therefore, the
petitioner objects that the State should take upon the business of
selling liquors. He has asserted that the State of Karnataka instead of
bringing total prohibition in the State, has evinced interest in taking up
the responsibility of selling liquors to the general public. Hence, it is
bad and contrary to the Constitution, and he challenges the amend- c
ment which prescribes the licence for sale shall be issued to only such
company owned or controlled by the State Government as the State
Govt. may specify. According to the petitioner, such a rule is uncon-
stitutional. He draws our attention to Article 47 of the Constitution of
India which indicates directive principles. D

In the aforesaid view of the matter he claims that this Court
should direct the Union of India and other State Governments to
enforce the policy of total prohibition throughout the country includ-
ing the State of Karnataka and to impose restrictions on manufacture,
sale and consumption of intoxicating drinks and to declare rule 3 of the E .
these rules as void and unconstitutional.
0

We are unable to entertain this writ petition under article 32 of
the Constitution. The petition of the petitioner is that the policy of
prohibition is not being implemented as enjoined by article 47 of the
Constitution. In our opinion, it is not entertainable. Article 47 of the F
Constitution, which is part of our Directive Principles of State Policy
en joins that the State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition
and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public
health as among its primary duties and, in particular, the State shall
endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption except for
medicinal purposes of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are G
injurious to health. Article 47 is in Part IV of the Constitution which
contains Directive Principles of State Policy. Article 37 enjoins that
the provisions of this Part shall not be enforceable by any court, but
the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the
governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to. apply
· these principles in making laws. It has to be borne in mind that Article H
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1990] 2 S.C.R.

A 32 of the Constitution gives the Supreme Court the power to enforce
rights which are fundamental rights. Fundamental rights are justici-
able, Directive Principles are not. Directive Principles are aimed at
securing certain values or enforcing certain attitudes in the law making
and in the administration of law. Directive Prii)ciples cannot in· the
very nature of things be enforced in a court of law. See in this connec-
B tion the observations of this Court in Akhil Bharatiya Soshit
Karamchari Sangh v. Union of India, [1981] 1 SCC 246. Whether a law
should be made embodying the principles of Directive Principles
depends on the legislative will of the legislature. What the petitioner ··-......:·
\
seeks to achieve by this application is to inject a sense of priority and
urgency in that ,legislative will. Determining the choice of priorities "
c and formulating perspective thereof, is a matter of policy. Article 32 is
not the machinery through which policy preferences or priorities are
determined and this Court is not the forum where the conflicting
claims of policies or priorities should be debated. See the observations
of this Court in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, [1970] 3
SCR 530 at p. 584.
D
We find no direct or casual violation of any fundamental right of
which the petitioner can legitimately claim enforcement in this applica-
tion. To make the State accept a particular policy, desirable and neces-
sary as the policy might be is not the function of Article 32 of the
Constitution. Article 32 of the Indian Constitution is not the nest for
E all the bees in the bonnet of 'public spirited persons'.

In the aforesaid view of the matter, we decline to entertain this
application and the same is accordingly dismissed.

P.S.S. Petition dismissed.
i