Supreme Court of India
AYAAUBKHAN NOORKHAN PATHANversusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
- Citation
- 2012 INSC 512
- Decided
- 8 November 2012
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- B S CHAUHAN
Holding
Only a person with a legally enforceable right can invoke writ jurisdiction; consequently, respondent No.5, lacking such right, cannot challenge the caste certificate, and the Scrutiny Committee must allow the appellant to cross‑examine witnesses before finalising its report, with the respondent restrained from further participation.
Summary
The appellant, Aymubkhan Noorkhan Pathan, was appointed as a senior clerk in the Aurangabad Municipal Corporation under a Scheduled Tribe reservation based on a caste certificate that declared him a member of the Bhil Tadvi tribe. Respondent No.5, a general‑category citizen, alleged that the appellant, being a Muslim, could not belong to a Scheduled Tribe and sought to have the certificate recalled; the Scrutiny Committee rejected the complaint, and the High Court directed a de novo inquiry. The appellant contended that the respondent lacked locus standi and that the Scrutiny Committee had violated natural justice by denying him the opportunity to cross‑examine witnesses. The Supreme Court held that only a person with a legally enforceable right can invoke writ jurisdiction, thus the respondent could not challenge the certificate, but the appellant must be given a fair chance to cross‑examine witnesses before any further decision, and the respondent was barred from further intervening and ordered to pay costs. The appeal was disposed of with directions to the Scrutiny Committee to comply with the principles of natural justice.
Issues considered
- A person who does not belong to the Scheduled Tribe category has locus standi to challenge a caste certificate issued to another person.
- Whether the Scrutiny Committee’s earlier inquiry complied with the principles of natural justice, particularly the right to cross‑examination.
- Whether a caste certificate issued after a proper statutory enquiry requires further verification by the Scrutiny Committee.
- Whether an affidavit can be treated as evidence under Section 3 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
- Whether the High Court erred in directing the Scrutiny Committee to entertain the complaint of respondent No.5.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order XIX
- Constitution of Indias. Article 226
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 114, s. 3
- Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De‑Notified Tribes, Vimukta Jatis, Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Category (Regulation of Issuance and Verification of Caste Certificate) Act, 2000
- Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De‑Notified Tribes, Vimukta Jatis, Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Category (Regulation of Issuance and Verification of Caste Certificate) Act, 2001
Subjects
caste certificatereservationscheduled tribelocus standinatural justicecross‑examinationpublic interest litigationEvidence ActArticle 226employment lawscrutiny committee
Judgment
[2012) 10 S.C.R. 994
A AYMUBKHAN NOORKHAN PATHAN
v.
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 7728 of 2012)
NOVEMBER 8, 2012
B
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND JAGDISH
SINGH KHEHAR, JJ.]
Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De-
c Notified Tribes, (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other
Backward Category (Regulation of Issuance and Verification
of) Caste Certificate Act, 2000:
Caste certificate - Appellant given employment on the
0 basis of a caste certificate showing that he belonged to Bhil
Tadvi (Scheduled Tribe) - Validity certificate issued by Caste
Scrutinity Committee - Complaint by respondent no. 5 that
appellant obtained employment by misrepresentation - High
Court, in writ petition, directing Scrutinity Committee to hold
E de novo inquiry with respect to appellant's caste certificate -
Held: Caste certificates issued by holding proper enquiry, in
accordance with duly prescribed procedure, would not require
any further verification by the Scrutiny Committee - However,
in the instant case, considering the seriousness of the
allegations, as the Scrutiny Committee has already
F conducted an inquiry and the only grievance of the appellant
is that there has been non-compliance with the principles of
natural justice, it is directed that before the submission of any
report by the Scrutiny Committee, application of appellant for
calling the witnesses for cross-examination must be disposed
G of, and he must be given a fair opportunity to cross-examine
the witnesses, who have been examined before the Committee
- Further, as respondent no. 5 has not been pursuing the
matter in a bonafide manner, and has not raised any public
H 994
AYAAUBKHAN NOORKHAN PATHAN v. STATE OF 995
MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
interest, rather he abused the process of the court only to A
harass the appellant, he is restrained from intervening in the
matter any further, and also from remaining a party to it, and
he is also liable to pay costs to the tune of Rs. one lakh -
Evidence Act, 1872 - s.114, l/ustration(e) - Maxim "Omnia
praesumuntur rite esse actan. B
Constitution of India, 1950:
Art. 226 - Writ petition in public interest - Maintainaility
of - Held: There must be a judicially enforceable right
available for enforcement, on the basis of which writ jurisdiction C
is resorted to - The legal right that can be enforced must
ordinarily be the right of the petitioner himself, who complains
of infraction of such right and approaches the co,urt -
Whenever any public interest is invoked, the court must
examine the case to ensure that there is, in fact, genuine D
public interest involved - Court must maintain strict vigHance
to ensure that there is no abuse of the process of court -
Supreme Court has consistently held that filing· of public
interest litigation is not permissible so far as service matters
are concerned - In the instant case, respondent no.5 does E
not belong to Scheduled Tribes category, but he has been
pursuing the matter from one court to another - His conduct
is found to be reprehensible, and without any sense of
responsibility - Therefore, the Court is highly doubtful as
regards his bonafides - He has, therefore, disentitled himself F
from appearing before any court, or Committee, so far as the
instant matter is concerned - Locus standi - Party - "Person
aggrieved"- Public interest litigation - Service law.
Evidence Act, 1872:
G
s.3 - 'Evidence' - Affidavit - Held: An affidavit is not
evidence within the meaning of s. 3 and the same can be used
as "evidence" only if, for sufficient reasons, court passes an
order undar 0. 19 CPC- Thus, the filing of an affidavit of one's
own statement, in one's own favour, cannot be regarded as H
996 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 10 S.C.R.
A sufficient evidence for any court or tribunal, on the basis of
which it can come to a conclusion as regards a particular fact-
situation - Code of Civil Procedure," 1908 - 0.19 and 0. 18,
n: 4 and 5 - Affidavits.
Natural Justice:
8
Cross-examination - Held: Is part of principles of natural
justice - Not only should the opportunity of cross-examination
be made available, but it should be one of effective cross-
examination, so as to meet the requirement of principles of
C natural justice.
The appellant was appointed in 1990 as a Senior
Clerk in the Municipal Corporation against the vacancy
reserved for Scheduled Tribes, on the basis of a caste
0 certificate issued by the competent authority in his favour
that he belonged to Bhil Tadvi (Scheduled Tribe). The sad
caste certificate was referred to the Caste Certificate
Scrutiny Committee, which issued a validity certificate
stating that the appellant belonged to Bhil Tadvi
E (Scheduled Tribe). In 2009, respondent no. 5 filed a
complaint before the Scrutiny Committee for recalling the
validity certificate on the ground that the appellant
professed the religion of Islam and, as such, he could not
be a Scheduled Tribe and he obtained the employment
by way of misrepresentation. The Scrutiny Committee
F rejected the application by order dated 13.3.2009
observing that it had no power to recall or review a caste
validity certificate. Respondent no. 5 filed a writ petition
before the High Court seeking to quash the order dated
13.3.2009 and to direct the Scrutiny Committee to hold de
G novo inquiry with respect to appellant's caste certificate.
The High Court set aside the order dated 13.3.2009
passed by Scrutiny Committee and remitted the matter to
it.
H
AYAAUBKHAN NOORKHAN PATHAN v. STATE OF 997
MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
In the instant appeal, it was contended for the A
appellant that respondent no. 5, being member of General
category, had no locus to challenge appellant's caste
certificate and, therefore, the High Court erred in directing
the Scrutiny Committee to entertain the complaint of
respondent no. 5; that despite the directions given by the B
Supreme Court, the Scrutiny Committee failed to comply
with the principles of natural justice, as the appellant was
denied the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
and no order was passed on his application for recalling
the witnesses for the purpose of cross-examination. c
Disposing of the appeal, the Court
HELD:
'Person aggrieved:' D
1.1. A writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution
is maintainable either for the purpose of enforcing a
statutory or legal right, or when there is a complaint by
the petitioner that there has been a breach of statutory
duty on the part of the Authorities. Therefore, there must E
be a judicially enforceable right available for enforcement,
on the basis of which writ jurisdiction is resorted to.
Court can of course, enforce the performance of a
statutory duty by a public body, using its writ jurisdiction
at the behest of a person, provided that such person F
satisfies the court that he has a legal right to insist on
such performance. The existence of such right is a
condition precedent for invoking the writ jurisdiction of
the courts. It is implicit in the exercise of such
extraordinary jurisdiction that the relief prayed for must G
be one to enforce a legal right. lnfact, the existence of
such right is the foundation of the exercise of the said
jurisdiction by the court. The legal right that can be
enforced must ordinarily be the right of the petitioner
himself, who complains of infraction of such right and H
998 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012) 10 S.C.R.
A approaches the court for relief as regards the same.
[para 7] [1013-A-E]
State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, 1952 SCR 28 =
AIR 1952 SC 12; Saghir Ahmad & Anr. v. State of U.P., 1955
B SCR 707 = AIR 1954 SC 728; Calcutta Gas Company
(Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal & Ors., 1962 Suppl.
SCR 1 = AIR 1962 SC 1044; Rajendra Singh v. State of
Madhya Pradesh, 1996 (4) Suppl. SCR 393 =AIR 1996 SC
2736; and Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare
C Association (2) v. S.C. Sekar & Ors., 2008 (17 ) SCR 85 = '
(2009) 2 sec 784 - referred to.
1.2. The expression, "person aggrieved" does not
include a person who suffers from a psychological or an
imaginary injury; a person aggrieved must, therefore,
D necessarily be one, whose right or interest has been
adversely affected or jeopardised. It is a settled legal
proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted to meddle
in any proceeding, unless he satisfies the Authority/Court
that he falls within the category of aggrieved persons.
E Only a person who has suffered, or suffers from legal
injury can challenge the act/action/order etc. in a court of
law. [para 7-8] [1012-G-H; 1013-G-HJ
Shanti Kumar R. Chanji v. Home Insurance Co. of New
York, 1975 (1) SCR 550 =AIR 1974 SC 1719; and State of
F Rajasthan & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., 1978 (1) SCR 1 =
AIR 1977 SC 1361; Anand Sharadchandra Oka v. University
of Mumbai, 2008 (2) SCR 297 = AIR 2008 SC 1289;
Subhash Babu v. State of A. P. 2011 (9) SCR 453 =AIR
2011 SC 3031; Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India
G & Ors., 1950 SCR 869 =AIR 1951 SC 41; Sunil Batra (JI) v.
Delhi Administration, 1980 (2) SCR 557 = AIR 1980 SC
1579; Mn:-. Neelima Priyadarshini v. State of Bihar, AIR 1987
SC 2021; Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India, 1992
Suppl. SCR 592 = AIR 1993 SC 280; Karamjeet Singh v.
H Union of India, 1992 (1) Suppl. SCR 898 = AIR 1993 SC'
AYAAUBKHAN NOORKHAN PATHAN v. STATE OF 999
MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
284; and Kishore Samrite v. State of U.P. & Ors., JT (2012) A
10 SC 393 - referred to.
1.3. Whenever any public interest is invoked, the
court must examine the case to ensure that there is, in
fact, genuine public interest involved. The court must
8
maintain strict vigilance to ensure that there is no abuse
of the process of court, and should make an earnest
endeavour to take up those cases, where the subjective
purpose of the lis justifies the need for it. Even as regards
the filing of a public interest litigation, this Court has C
consistently held that such a course of action is not
permissible so far as service matters are concerned. In
view of the decisions of the Court, the law on the point
can be summarised to the effect that a person who raises
a grievance, must show how he has suffered legal injury.
Generally, a stranger having no right whatsoever to any D
post or property, cannot be permitted to intervene in the
affairs of others.[para 12-13 and 15) (1015-B-E; 1016-D]
P.S.R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam & Anr., 2009 (16)
SCR 111 = AIR 1980 SC 856; Dafip Singh v. State of U.P. & E
Ors., 2011 (6) SCR 403 = (2010) 2 SCC 114; State of
Uttarancha/ v. Ba/want Singh Chaufa/ & Ors., 2010 (1)
SCR 678 = (2010) 3 SCC 402; Amar Singh v. Union of India
& Ors. 2011 (6) SCR 403 = (2011) 7 SCC 69; Dr. Duryodhan
Sahu & Ors. v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra & Ors., 1998 (1) Suppl. F
SCR 77 =AIR 1999 SC'114; Dattaraj Natthuji Thaware v.
State of Maharashtra, 2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 900 = AIR 2005 .
SC 540; Neetu v. State of Punjab & Ora., 2007 (1) SCR 223 =
AIR 2007 SC 758; and Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal &
Ors., 2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 504 = (2002) 1 SCC 33 - referred G
to.
Locus standi:
2.1. It is evident that under ordinary circumstances,
a third person, having no concern with the case _at hand, H
1000 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 10 S.C.R.
A cannot claim to have any /ocus-standi to raise any
grievance whatsoever. However, in the exceptional
circumstances if the actual persons aggrieved, because
of ignorance, illiteracy, inarticulation or poverty, are
unable to approach the court, and a public spirited
B person approaches the court, then the court may
examine the issue and even if his bonafides are doubted,
but the issue raised by him, in the opinion of the court,
requires consideration, the court may proceed suo-motu,
in such respect. [para 22] [1019-C-E]
c =
Vinoy Kumar v. State of U.P., 2001 (2) SCR 1196 AIR
2001 SC 1739; Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. District Collector,
Raigad & Ors., (2012) 4 SCC 407; K. Manjusree v. State of
=
Andhra Pradesh & Anr., 2008 (2) SCR 1025 (2008) 3 SCC
512 - relied on
D
Balbir Kaur & Anr. v. Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education
Services Selection Board, Allahabad & Ors., 2008 (9)
SCR 130 = (2008) 12 SCC 1; Raju Ramsingh Vasave v.
Mahesh Deorao Bhiavapurkar & Ors., 2008 (12 ) SCR 992
E = (2008) 9 SCC 54; and Manohar Joshi v. State of
Maharashtra & Ors., (2012) 3 SCC 619 - referred to.
2.2. In the instant case, as respondent no.5 does not
belong to the Scheduled Tribes category, the garb
adopted by him, of serving the cause of Scheduled Tribes
F candidates who might have been deprived of their
legitimate right to be considered for the post, must be
considered in order to oetermine whether he is, in fact,
in a legitimate position to lay any claim before any forum,
whatsoever. The conduct of respondent no. 5, who has
G been pursuing the said matter from one court to another,
is found to be reprehensible, and without any sense of
responsibility, as he could not submit any satisfactory
response to the directions issued by this Court on
29.10.2012. Therefore, this Court is highly doubtful as
H
AYAAUBKHAN NOORKHAN PATHAN v. STATE OF 1001
MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
re_gards his bonafides. He has, therefore, disentitled A
himself from appearing either before this Court, or any
other court, or Committee, so far as the instant case is
concerned. [para 16. and 44] [1016-E-F; 1031-B-D]
Cross-examination as part of the principles of natural 8
justice:
3.1. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Chintaman
Sadashiva Vaishampayan's case, held that the rules of
natural justice, require that a party must be given the
opportunity to adduce all relevant evidence upon which C
he relies and further that the evidence of the opposite
party should be taken in his presence, and that he should
be given the opportunity of cross-examining the
witnesses examined by that party. Not providing the said
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, would violate D
the principles of natural justice. This Court is of the
considered opinion that the right of cross-examination is
an integral part of the principles of natural justice. [para
23 and 25) [1019-G-H; 1020-A, HJ
E
State of M.P. v. Chintaman Sadashiva Vaishampayan,
AIR 1961 SC 1623; Union of India v. T.R. Varma,
1958 SCR 499 =AIR 1957 SC 882; Meenglas Tea Estate v.
Workmen, 1964 SCR 165 = AIR 1963 SC 1719; Mis.
Kesoram Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Gangadhar & Ors., 1964 SCR
809 =AIR 1964 SC 708; New India Assurance Company Ltd F
. v. Nusli Neville Wadia and Anr., 2007 (13) SCR 598 =AIR
2008 SC 876; Rachpal Singh & Ors. v. Gurrnit Singh & Ors.,
AIR 2009 SC 2448; Biecco Lawrie & Anr. v. State of West
Bengal & Anr., 2009 (11) SCR 972 =AIR 2010 SC 142;
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, 2010 (2) G
SCR 326 = AIR 2010 SC 3131; and Lakshman Exports Ltd.
v. Collector of Central Excise (2005) 10 SCC 634 - relied on
K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India & Ors., AIR 1984 SC
273; Union of India v. P.K. Roy AIR 1968 SC 850; and H
1002 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 10 S.C.R.
A Channabasappa Basappa Happali v. State of Mysore, AIR
1972 SC 32; Transmission Corpn. of A.P. Ltd. v. Sri Rama
Krishna Rice Miff, AIR 2006 SC 1445 ; Rajiv Arora v. Union
of India & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 1100 - referred to.
3.2. In the instant case, the appellant raised the
8
grievance that, the evidence of a large number of persons
had been recorded by the Scrutiny Committee behind his
back, and that he had not been given an opportunity to
cross-examine the witnesses that were examined by the
C other side and, therefore, he was unable to lead a proper
defence. He filed an application for the purpose of
recalling 3 witnesses named therein so that he may
cross-examine them. He ·also filed another application on
the same day, seeking a period of 30 days time, to file his
reply as is required within the provisions of r.12(8) of the
D Rules 2003, and yet another application for the purpose
of calling of records from the office of the Tehsildar, to
ascertain the genuineness of the certificate impugned.
None of the said applications have been decided. In
pursuance of the order of this Court, the original record
E was produced, but it does not indicate that the appellant
was, in fact, given an opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses, or that all the said witnesses were examined
in the presence of the appellant. [para 40 and 42] [1029-
B-E-G-H]
F
Affidavit - whether evidence within the meaning of
Section 3 of the Evidence Act, 1872:
4.1. It is a settled legal proposition that an affidavit is
not evidence within the meaning of s. 3 of the Evidence
G Act, 1872. Affidavits are, therefore, not included within the
purview of the definition of "evidence" as has been given
in s.3 of the Evidence Act, and the same can be used as
"evidence" only if, for sufficient reasons, the court passes
an order under Order XIX of the Code of Civil Procedure,
H 1908. Thus, the filing of an affidavit.of one's own
AYAAUBKHAN NOORKHAN PATHAN v.'STATE OF 1003
MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
statement, in one's own favour, cannot be regarded as A
sufficient evidence for any court or tribunal, on the basis
of which it can come to a conclusion as regards a
particular fact-situation. [para 31) [1023-B-D]
Sudha Devi v. M.P. Narayanan & Ors., 1988 ( 3) SCR
B
756 = AIR 1988 SC 1381; and Range Forest Officer v. S. T.
Hadimani, 2002 (1) SCR 1080 = AIR 2002 SC 1147; Mis
Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. The Workmen & Ors.,
1972 (1) SCR 241 = AIR 1972 SC 330; Needle Industries
(India) Ltd. & Ors. v. N./.N.l.H. Ltd. & Ors., 1981 (3) SCR 698 C
=AIR 1981 SC 1298; Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram, AIR
1992 SC 700; Standard Chartered Bank v. Andhra Bank
Financial Services Ltd. & Ors., 2006 (2) Suppl. SCR 1 =
(2006) 6 sec 94 - referred to
4.2. However, in a case where the deponent is D
available for cross-examination, and opp9rtunity is given
to the other side to cross-examine him, the affidavit can
be relied upon. Such view stands fully affirmed
particularly, in view of the amended provisions of Order
XVIII, Rules 4 and 5 CPC. In certain other circumstances, E
in order to avoid technicalities of procedure, the
legislature, or a court/tribunal, can even lay down a
procedure to meet the requirement of compliance with
the principles of natural justice and, thus, the case will
be examined in the light of those statutory rules etc. [para F
36) [1025-D-F]
5.1. It is evident from the judgment in Daya Ram, that
the purpose of issuing directions in Km. Madhuri Patil,
was only to examine those cases, where caste certificates
had been issued without conducting any prior enquiry, G
on the basis of self- affidavits regarding one's caste
alone, and that the said directions were not at all
applicable where a legislation governing or regulating the
grant of caste certificates exists, and where caste
H
1004 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 10 S.C.R.
A certificates are issued after due and proper enquiry. Caste
certificates issued by holding proper enquiry, in
accordance with duly prescribed procedure, would not
require any further verification by the scrutiny committee.
[para 39] [1028-F-H; 1029-A]
8
Km. Madhuri Patil v. Addi. Commissioner, Tribal
Development, 1994 (3) Suppl. SCR 50 =
(1994) 6 SCC
241; and Daya Ram v. Sudhir Batham & Ors., (2012) 1 SCC
333 - referred to.
C 5.2. In the instant case, the Scrutiny Committee in
ordinary circumstances examined the matter and after
investigation through its Vigilance Cell and considering
all the documentary evidence on record and after being
satisfied, granted the caste verification certificate in 2000.
D Section 114 111.(e) of the Evidence Act provided for the
court to pronounce that the decision taken by the
Scrutiny Committee has been done in regular course and
the caste certificate has been issued after due verification.
Such a presumption is based on legal maxim "Omnia
E praesumuntur rite esse acta" i.e. all acts are presumed to
have rightly and regularly been done, and it can be
rebutted by adducing appropriate evidence. Mere
statement made in the written statement/petition is not
enough to rebut the presumption. The onus of rebuttal
F li~s upon the person who alleges that the act had not
been regularly performed or the procedure required
under the law had not been followed. A very strong
material/evidence is required to rebut the presumption.
Once respondent no. 5 had challenged the caste
G certificate, he must have acted seriously and brought the
material before the Scrutiny Committee to show that the
earlier decision was improbable or factually incorrect.
[para 45] [1031-D-H; 1032-A-B]
Gopa/ Narain v. State of UP. & Anr., 1964 SCR 869 =
H
AYAAUBKHAN NOORKHAN PATHAN v."STATE OF 1003
MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
statement, in one's own favour, cannot be regarded as A
sufficient evidence for any court or tribunal, on the basis
of which it can come to a conclusion as regards a
particular fact-situation. [para 31] (1023-B-D]
Sudha Devi v. M.P. Narayanan & Ors., 1988 ( 3) SCR
8
756 =AIR 1988 SC 1381; and Range Forest Officer v. S. T.
Hadimani, 2002 (1) SCR 1080 = AIR 2002 SC 1147; Mis
Bareil/y Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. The Workmen & Ors.,
1972 (1) SCR 241 = AIR 1972 SC 330; Needle Industries
(India) Ltd. & Ors. v. N.l.N.l.H. Ltd. & Ors., 1981 (3) SCR 698 C
=AIR 1981 SC 1298; Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram, AIR
1992 SC 700; Standard Chartered Bank v. Andhra Bank
Financial Services Ltd. & Ors., 2006 (2) Suppl. SCR 1 =
(2006) 6 sec 94 - referred to
4.2. However, in a case where the deponent is D
available for cross-examination, and opp9rtunity is given
to the other side to cross-examine him, the affidavit can
be relied upon. Such view stands fully affirmed
particularly, in view of the amended provisions of Order
XVIII, Rules 4 and 5 CPC. In certain other circumstances, E
in order to avoid technicalities of procedure, the
legislature, or a court/tribunal, can even lay down a
procedure to meet the requirement of compliance with
the principles of natural justice and, thus, the case will
be examined In the light of those statutory rules etc. (para F
36] [1025-D-F]
5.1. It is evident from the judgment in Daya Ram, that
the purpose of issuing directions in Km. Madhuri Patil,
was only to examine those cases, where caste certificates
had been issued without conducting any prior enquiry, G
on the basis of self- affidavits regarding one's caste
alone, and that the said directions were not at all
applicable where a legislation governing or regulating the
grant of caste certificates exists, and where caste
H
1004 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 10 S.C.R.
A certificates are issued after due and proper enquiry. Caste
certificates issued by holding proper enquiry, in
accordance with duly prescribed procedure, would not
require any further verification by the scrutiny committee.
[para 39] [1028-F-H; 1029-A]
B
Km. Madhuri Patil v. Addi. Commissioner, Tribal
Development, 1994 (3) Suppl. SCR 50 =
(1994) 6 SCC
241; and Daya Ram v. Sudhir Batham & Ors., (2012) 1 SCC
333 - referred to.
C 5.2. In the instant case, the Scrutiny Committee in
ordinary circumstances examined the matter and after
investigation through its Vigilance Cell and considering
all the documentary evidence on record and after being
satisfied, granted the caste verification certificate in 2000.
D Section 114 111.(e) of the Evidence Act provided for the
court to pronounce that the decision taken by the
Scrutiny Committee has been done in regular course and
the caste certificate has been issued after due verification.
Such a presumption is based on legal maxim "Omnia
E praesumuntur rite esse acta" i.e. all acts are presumed to
have rightly and regularly been done, and it can be
rebutted by adducing appropriate evidence. Mere
statement made in the written statement/petition is not
enough to rebut the presumption. The onus of rebuttal
F li~s upon the person who alleges that the act had not
been regularly performed or the procedure required
under the law had not been followed. A very strong
material/evidence is required to rebut the presumption.
Once respondent no. 5 had challenged the caste
G certificate, he must have acted seriously and brought the
material before the Scrutiny Committee to show that the
earlier decision was improbable or factually incorrect.
[para 45] [1031-D-H; 1032-A-B]
Gopal Narain v. State of U.P. & Anr., 1964 SCR 869 =
H
AYAAUBKHAN NOORKHAN PATHAN v. STATE OF 1005
MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
AIR 1964 SC 370; Narayan Govind Gavate & Ors. v. State A
of Maharashtra & Ors., 1977 (1) SCR 763 =AIR 1977 SC
183; Karewwa & Ors.v. Hussensab Khansaheb Wajantri &
Ors., AIR 2002 SC 504; Engineering Kamgar Union v.
Electro Steels Castings Ltd. & Anr., 2004 (1) Suppl.
SCR 301 = (2004) 6 SCC 36; Mohd. Shahabuddin v. State B
of Bihar, 2010 (3) SCR 911 = (2010) 4 SCC 653; Punjab
State Electricity Board & Anr. v. Ashwani Kumar, 201 O (7)
SCR 1158 = (2010) 7 SCC 569; M. Chandra v. M.
Thangmuthu & Anr., AIR 2010 (11) SCR 38 = 2011 SC 146;
and R. Ramachandran Nair v. Deputy Superintendent, c
Vigilance Police 2011 (3) SCR 1054 = (2011) 4 SCC 395 -
referred to.
5.3. Considering the seriousness of the allegations,
as the Scrutiny Committee has already conducted an
inquiry in relation to this matter, and the only grievance D
of the appellant is that there has been non-compliance
with the principles of natural justice, and the fact that the
applications filed by him, were not decided upon, it is
directed that before the submission of any report by the
Scrutiny Committee, the application filed by the appellant E
for calling the witnesses for cross-examination must be
disposed of, and he must be given a fair opportunity to
cross-examine the witnesses, who have been examined
before the Committee. The Scrutiny Committee is further
directed to pass appropriate orders in accordance with F
the law thereafter. In case, the Scrutiny Committee has
already taken a decision, the same being violative of the
principles of natural justice, would stand vitiated. [para
46] [1032-E-G]
G
5.4. However, considering the fact that respondent
no. 5 has not been pursuing the matter in a bonafide
manner, and has not raised any public interest, rather he
abused the process of the court only to harass the
appellant, he is restrained from intervening in the matter H
1006 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 10 S.C.R.
A any further, and also from remaining a party to it, and he
is also liable to pay costs to the tune of Rs. one lakh, to
the District Collector, who would deposit the said amount
in the account of the Supreme Court Legal Services
Committee. [para 47] [1032-H; 1033-A-C]
B
Case Law Reference:
1952 SCR 28 referred to para 7
1955 SCR 707 referred to para 7
c 1962 Suppl. SCR 1 referred to para 7
1996 (4) Suppl. SCR 393 referred to para 7
2008 (17) SCR 85 referred to para 7
D 1975 (1) SCR 550 referred to para 8
1978 (1) SCR 1 referred to para 8
2008 (2) SCR 297 referred to para 9
2011 (9) SCR 453 referred to para 10
E
1950 SCR 869 referred to para 11
1980 (2) SCR 557 referred to para 11
AIR 1987 SC 2021 referred to para 11
F 1992 Suppl. SCR 592 referred to para 11
1992 (1) Suppl. SCR 898 referred to para 11
2012 (10) JT 393 referred to para 11
G AIR 1980 SC 856 referred to para 12
2009 (16) SCR 111 referred to para 12
2010 (1) SCR 678 referred to para 12
2011 (6) SCR 403 referred to para 12
H
AYAAUBKHAN NOORKHAN PATHAN v. STATE OF 1007
MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
1998 (1) Suppl. SCR77 referred to para 13 A
2004 (6) Suppl. SCR900 referred to para 13
2007 (1) SCR 223 referred to para 13
2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 504 referred to para 14
8
(2012) 4 sec 407 referred to para 16
2008 (2) SCR 1025 relied on para 18
2008 (9) SCR 130 referred to para 19
c
2008 (12) SCR 992 referred to para 20
(2012) 3 sec 619 referred to para 20
2001 (2) SCR 1196 relied on para 21
AIR 1961 SC 1623 relied on para 23 D
1958 SCR 499 relied on para 23
1964 SCR 809 relied on para 23
1964SCR165 relied on para 23 E
2009 AIR 2448 relied on para 23
2009 (11) SCR 972 relied on para23
2010 (2) SCR 326 relied on para 23
F
2005 (1 O) sec 634 relied on para 24
2007 (13) SCR 598 relied on para 25
AIR 1984 SC 273 referred to para 26
G
AIR 1968 SC 850 referred to para 26
AIR 1972 SC 32 referred to para 26
AIR 2006 SC 1445 referred to para 27
AIR 2009 SC 1100 referred to para 29 H
1008 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 10 S.C.R.
A 1988 (3) SCR 756 referred to para 31
2002 (1) SCR 1080 referred to para 31
1972 (1) SCR 241 referred to para 32
1981 (3) SCR 698 referred to para 33
B
1992 AIR 700 referred to para 34
2006 (2) Suppl. SCR 1 referred to para 35
1994 (3) Suppl. SCR 50 referred to para 37
c
(2012) 1 sec 333 referred to para 38
1964 SCR 869 referred to para 45
1977 (1) SCR 763 referred to para 45
D 2002 AIR 504 referred to para 45
2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 301 referred to para 45
2010 (3) SCR 911 referred to para 45
E 2010 (7) SCR 1158 referred to para 45
2010 (11) SCR38 referred to para 45
2011 (3) SCR 1054 referred to para 45
F CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
7728 of 2012.
From the Judgment & Order dated 22.09.2009 of the High
Court of Judicature of Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad in Writ
Petition No. 3129 of 2009.
G
A;V. Savant, Sudhanshu S. Choudhari, Mahesh
Deshmukh, Rajshri Dubey for the Appellant.
Anant Bhushan Kanade, Kailash Pandey, Dharam Bir Raj
Vohra, Shankar Chillarge, Asha Gopalan Nair, Aniruddha P.
H
AYAAUBKHAN NOORKHAN PATHAN v. STATE OF 1009
MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
Mayee, Charudatta M., Lawyer's Knit & Co. for the A
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred
against the impugned judgment and order dated 22.9.2009, B
passed by the High Court of Bombay (Aurangabad Bench) in
Writ Petition No.3129 of 2009, filed by respondent no.5,
challenging the caste certificate of the appellant.
2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal c
are as follows:
A. The competent authority in the present case, issued a
caste certificate dated 19.10.1989, after following due
procedure, in favour of the appellant stating that he does in fact,
0
belong to Bhil Tadvi (Scheduled Tribes). On the basis of the said
certificate, the appellant was appointed as Senior Clerk in the
Municipal Corporation of Aurangabad (hereinafter referred to
as the, 'Corporation') on 6.2.1990, against the vacancy
reserved for persons under the Scheduled Tribes category. The
Corporation referred the caste certificate of the appellant for E
the purpose of verification, to the Caste Certificate Scrutiny
Committee (hereinafter referred to as the, "Scrutiny
Committee"). The Vigilance Cell attached to the Scrutiny
Committee, upon conducting vigilance enquiry, vide order
dated 29.12.1998, found that the appellant did, in fact, belong F
to Bhil Tadvi (Scheduled Tribes) and thus, the said certificate
was verified. The Scrutiny Committee, on the basis of the said
report and also other documents filed by the appellant in
support of his case, issued a validity certificate, dated
23.5.2000 to the appellant belonging to Bhil Tadvi (Scheduled G
Tribes). After the lapse of a period of 9 years, respondent no.5
filed complaint dated 9.1.2009, through an advocate before the
Scrutiny Committee, for the purpose of recalling the said validity
certificate, on the ground that the appellant had obtained
employment by way of misrepresentation, and that he does not H
1010 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 10 S.C.R.
A actually belong to the Scheduled Tribes category. In fact, the
appellant professed the religion of Islam and therefore, could
not be a Scheduled Tribe.
B. The Scrutiny Committee rejected the said application
B vide order dated 13.3.2009, observing that it had no power to
recall or to review a caste validity certificate, as there is no
statutory provision that provides for the same.
C. Aggrieved, respondent no.5 challenged the order dated
13.3.2009, by filing Writ Petition No.3129 of 2009 before the
C High Court of Bombay (Aurangabad Bench), praying for
quashing of the order dated 13.3.2009, and directing the
Scrutiny Committee to hold de novo enquiry, with respect to
the appellant's caste certificate. The appellant contested the
said petition, denying all the allegations made by respondent
D no.5. Vide its impugned judgment and order dated 22.9.2009,
the High Court disposed of the said writ petition without going
into the merits of the case. However, while doing so, the High
Court set aside the order dated 13.3.2009, and remitted the
matter to the Scrutiny Committee, directing it to hear all the
E parties concerned in accordance with law, as regards the
allegations made by respondent no.5 in the complaint. It further
directed the Committee to decide the said matter within a
period of 6 months.
Hence, this present appeal.
F
3. Before proceeding further, it may also be pertinent to
refer to certain subsequent developments.
During the pendency of this appeal, this Court vide order
G dated 20.11.2009, granted a stay with respect to the operation
of the aforementioned impugned judgment. Vide order dated
6.1.2012, the said interim order was modifieq, to the extent that
the Scrutiny Committee would re-examine the case on merit,
without being influenced by earlier proceedings before it, and
H by giving adequate opportunity to the parties to lead evidence
AYAAUBKHAN NOORKHAN PATHAN v. STATE OF 1011
MAHARASHTRA & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
in support of their respective cases after which, the Scrutiny A
Committee would submit its report to this Court within a period
of 3 months.
4. Shri A.V. Savant, learned Senior counsel, appearing for
the appellant has submitted that respondent no.5 does not
8
belong to any reserved category, infact, he belongs to the
General category, and hence, he has no right or locus standi,
to challenge the appellant's certificate. Thus, the High Court
committed an error by directing the Scrutiny Committee to
entertain the complaint filed by respondent no.5. It has further
been submitted that, despite the directions given by this Court, C
the Scrutiny Committee failed to ensure compliance with the
principles of natural justice, as the appellant was denied the
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, and no order was
passed with respect to his application for recalling such
witnesses for the purpose of cross-examination, which has no D
doubt, resulted in the grave miscarriage of justice. The affidavit
filed by the Scrutiny Committee did not clarify, or make any
specific statement with respect to whether or not the appellant
was permitted to cross-examine witnesses. It further, did not
clarify whether the application dated 28.2.2012, filed by the E
appellant to re-call witnesses for the purpose of cross-
examination, has been disposed of. Moreover, the procedure
adopted by the Scrutiny Committee is in contravention of the
statutory requirements, as have been specified under the
Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De-Notified F
Tribes, (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward
Category (Regulation of Issuance and Verification of) Caste
Certificate Act, 2000 (Maharashtra Act No. XXlll of 2001
(hereinafter referred to as the, 'Act 2001'), and the Rules, 2003
which are framed under the Act 2001 and therefore, all G
proceedings hereby stand vitiated. The appellant placed
reliance upon several documents which are all very old and
therefore, their authenticity should not have been doubted. The
earlier report submitted by the Vigilance Cell dated
29.12.1998, clearly stated that the traits and characteristics of H
1012 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 10 S.C.R.
A the appellant's family, matched with those of Bhil Tadvi
(Scheduled Tribes). The action of respondent no.5 is therefore,
completely malifide and is intended, solely to harass the
appellant, and the High Court committed grave error in not
deciding the issue related to the locus standi of respondent no.5
B in relation to him filing a complaint in the first place, as the said
issue was specifically raised by the appellant. Therefore, the
present appeal deserves to be allowed.
5. Per contra, Shri Shankar Chillarge, learned counsel
appearing for the Scrutiny Committee, has made elaborate
C submissions, in support of the impugned judgment and
subsequent proceedings. Mr. Udaya Kumar Sagar and Ms.
Bina Madhavan, learned counsel appearing for respondent
no.5, have also supported the impugned judgment of the High
Court and has further submitted that even though respondent
D no.5, does not belong to the Scheduled Tribes category, he
most certainly could file a complaint against the appellant, at
such a belated stage, as the appellant had obtained
employment in 1989, by way of mis-representation and fraud.
Respondent no.5, being a public spirited person has espoused
E the cause of the real persons who have been deprived of their
right to be considered for the said post occupied by the
appellant. Respondent No. 5 has also filed affidavits of relevant
persons before the Scrutiny Committee, to prove his
allegations. Thus, the present appeal lacks merit and is liable
F to be dismissed.
6. We have considered the rival submissions made by
learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
Person aggrieved :
G
7. It is a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot
be permitted to meddle in any proceeding, unless he satisfies
the Authority/Court, that he falls within the category of aggrieved
persons.
H
AYAAUBKHAN NOORKHAN PATHAN v. STATE OF 1013
MAHARASHTRA & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
Only a person who has suffered, or suffers from legal A
injury can challenge the acVaction/order etc. in a court of law.
A writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is
maintainable either for the purpose of enforcing a statutory or
legal right, or when there is a complaint by the appellant that
there has been a breach of statutory duty on the part of the B
Authorities. Therefore, there must be a judicially enforceable
right available for enforcement, on the basis of which writ
jurisdiction is resorted to. The Court can of course, enforce the
performance of a statutory duty by a public body, using its writ
jurisdiction at the behest of a person, provided that such person c
satisfies the Court that he has a legal right to insist on such
performance. The existence of such right is a condition
precedent for invoking the writ jurisdiction of the courts. It is
implicit in the exercise of such extraordinary jurisdiction that,
the relief prayed for must be one to enforce a legal right. 0
lnfact, the existence of such right, is the foundation of the
exercise of the said jurisdiction by the Court. The legal
right that can be enforced must ordinarily be the right of the
appellant himself, who complains of infraction of such right and
approaches the Court for relief as regards the same. {Vide :
E
State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12;
Saghir Ahmad & Anr. v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 728;
Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West
Bengal & Ors., AIR 1962 SC 1044; Rajendra Singh v. State
of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 2736; and Tami/nad
Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare Association (2) v. S. C. F
Sekar & Ors., (2009) 2 SCC 784).
8. A "legal rig hf, means an entitlement arising out of legal
rules. Thus, it may be defined as an advantage, or a benefit
conferred upon a person by the rule of law. The expression, G
"person aggrieved" does not include a person who suffers from
a psychological or an imaginary injury; a person aggrieved must
therefore, necessarily be one, whose right or interest has been
adversely affected or jeopardised. (Vide: Shanti Kumar R.
Chanji v. Home Insurance Co. of New York, AIR 1974 SC H
1014 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 10 S.C.R.
A 1719; and State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.,
AIR 1977 SC 1361).
9. In Anand Sharadchandra Oka v. University of Mumbai,
AIR 2008 SC 1289, a similar view was taken by this Court,
8 observing that, if a person claiming relief is not eligible as per
requirement, then he cannot be said to be a person aggrieved
regarding the election or the selection of other persons.
10. In A. Subhash Babu v. State of A. P., AIR 2011 SC
3031, this Court held:
c
"The expression 'aggrieved person' denotes an elastic
and an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the
bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition.
• Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable
0 factors such as the content and intent of the statute of
which contravention is alleged, the specific
circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of
complainant's interest and the nature and the extent of
the prejudice or injury suffered by the complainant."
E 11. This Court, even as regards the filing of a habeas
corpus petition, has explained that the expression, 'next friend'
means a person who is not a total stranger. Such a petition
cannot be filed by one who is a complete stranger to the person
who is in alleged illegal custody. (Vide: Charanjit Lal
F Chowdhury v. The Union of India & Ors., AIR 1951 SC 41;
Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1980 SC 1579;
Mrs. Neelima Priyadarshini v. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC
2021; Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC
280; Karamjeet Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 284;
G and Kishore Samrite v. State of U.P. & Ors., JT (2012) 10 SC
393).
12. This Court has consistently cautioned the courts against
entertaining public interest litigation filed by unscrupulous
H persons, as such meddlers do not hesitate to abuse the
AYAAUBKHAN NOORKHAN PATHAN v. STATE OF 1015
MAHARASHTRA & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
process of the court. The right of effective access to justice, A
which has emerged with the new social rights regime, must be
used to serve basic human rights, which purport to guarantee
legal rights and, therefore, a workable remedy within the
framework of the judicial system must be provided. Whenever
any public interest is invoked, the court must examine the case B
to ensure that there is in fact, genuine public interest involved.
The court must maintain strict vigilance to ensure that there is
no abuse of the process of court and that, "ordinarily
meddlesome bystanders are not granted a Visa". Many societal
pollutants create new problems of non-redressed grievances, c
and the court should make an earnest endeavour to take up
those cases, where the subjective purpose of the lis justifies
the need for it. (Vide: P.S.R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam
& Anr., AIR 1980 SC 856; Dalip Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors.,
(2010) 2 SCC 114; State of Uttarancha/ v. Ba/want Singh D
Chaufal & Ors., (2010) 3 SCC 402; and Amar Singh v. Union
of India & Ors., (2011) 7 SCC 69)
13. Even as regards the filing of a Public Interest Litigation,
this Court has consistently held that such a course of action is
not permissible so far as service matters are concerned. (Vide: E
Dr. Duryodhan Sahu & Ors. v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra & Ors.,
AIR 1999 SC 114; Dattaraj Natthuji Thaware v. State of
Maharashtra, AIR 2005 SC 540; and Neetu v. State of Punjab
& Ors., AIR 2007 SC 758)
F
14. In Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal & Ors., (2002) 1
SCC 33, this Court considered a similar issue and observed
as under:-
"There is no dispute regarding the legal proposition that
the rights under Article 226 of the Constitution of India G
can be enforced only by an aggrieved person except in
the case where the writ prayed for is for habeas corpus
or quo warranto. Another exception in the general rule is
the filing of a writ petition in public interest. The existence
of the legal right of the petitioner which is alleged to have H
1016 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 10 S.C.R.
A been violated is the foundation for invoking the
jurisdiction of the High Court under the aforesaid article.
The orthodox rule of interpretation regarding the
locus standi of a person to reach the Court has
undergone a sea change with the development of
B constitutional law in our country and the constitutional
Courts have been adopting a liberal approach in dealing
with the cases or dislodging the claim of a litigant merely
on hyper-technical grounds. In other words, if the
person is found to be not merely a stranger having no
c right whatsoever to any post or property, he cannot be
non-suited on the ground of his not having the locus
standi." (Emphasis added)
15. In view of the above, the law on the said point can be
summarised to the effect that a person who raises a grievance,
D must show how he has suffered legal injury. Generally, a
stranger having no right whatsoever.to any post or property,
cannot be permitted to intervene in the affairs of others.
Locus standi of respondent no.5 :
E
16. As respondent no.5 does not belong to the Scheduled
Tribes category, the garb adopted by him, of serving the cause
of Scheduled Tribes candidates who might have been deprived
of their legitimate right to be considered for the post, must be
considered by this Court in order to determine whether
F respondent no. 5, is in fact, in a legitimate position to lay any
claim before any forum, whatsoever.
17. This Court in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. District Collector,
Raigad & Ors., (2012) 4 SCC 407, held as under:
G
"Shri Chintaman Raghunath Gharat, ex-President was the
complainant, thus, at the most, he could lead evidence
as a witness. He could not claim the status of an
adversarial litigant. The complainant cannot be the party
to the /is. A legal right is an averment of entitlement
H
AYMUBKHAN NOORKHAN PATHAN v. STATE OF 1017
MAHARASHTRA & ORS. [DR. 8.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
arising out of Jaw. In fact, it is a benefit conferred upon a A
person by the rule of law. Thus, a person who suffers from
legal injury can only challenge the act or omission.
There may be some harm or loss that may not be
wrongful in the eye of the law because it may not result
in injury to a legal right or legally protected interest of the B
complainant but juridically harm of this description is
called damnum sine injuria.
The complainant has to establish that he has been
deprived of or denied of a legal right and he has C
sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In case
he has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on,
he cannot be heard as a party in a /is. A fanciful or
sentimental grievance may not be sufficient to confer a
locus standi to sue upon the individual. There must be
injuria or a legal grievance which can be appreciated and D
not a stat pro ratione voluntas reasons i.e. a claim devoid
of reasons.
Under the garb of being a necessary party, a
person cannot be permitted to make a case as that of E
general public interest. A person having a remote interest
cannot be permitted to become a party in the /is, as the
person who wants to become a party in a case, has to
establish that he has a proprietary right which has been
or is threatened to be violated, for the reason that a legal F
injury creates a remedial right in the injured person. A
person cannot be heard as a party unless he answers the
description of aggrieved ptJrty. •
18. A similar view has been re-iterated by this Court in K.
Manjusree v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr., (2008) 3 SCC G
512, wherein it was held that, the applicant before the High
Court could not challenge the appointment of a person as she
was in no way aggrieved, for she herself could not have been
selected by adopting either method. Morever, the appointment
cannot be challenged at a belated stage and, hence, the petition H
1018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 10 S.C.R.
A should have been rejected by the High Court, on the grounds
of delay and non-maintainability, alone.
19. In Balbir Kaur & Anr. v. Uttar Pradesh Secondary
Education Services Selection Board, Allahabad & Ors., (2008)
8 12 sec 1, it has been held that a violation of the equality
clauses, enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, or
discrimination in any form, can be alleged, provided that, the
writ petitioner demonstrates a certain appreciable
disadvantage qua other similarly situated persons.
c 20. While dealing with the similar issue, this Court in Raju
Ramsingh Vasave v. Mahesh Deorao Bhiavapurkar & Ors.,
(2008) 9 sec 54 held:
"We must now deal with the question of locus standi. A
D special leave petition ordinarily would not have been
entertained at the instance of the appellant. Validity of
appointment or otherwise on the basis of a caste
certificate granted by a committee is ordinarily a matter
between the employer and the employee. This Court,
however, when a question is raised, can take cognizance
E
of a matter of such grave importance suo motu. It may
not treat the special leave petition as a public interest
litigation, but, as a public law litigation. It is, in a
proceeding of that nature, permissible for the court to
make a detailed enquiry with regard to the broader
F aspects of the matter although it was initiated at the
instance of a person having a private interest. A deeper
scrutiny can be made so as to enable the court to find
out as to whether a party to a /is is guilty of commission
of fraud on the Constitution. If such an enquiry subserves
G the greater public interest and has a far-reaching effect
on the society, in our opinion, this Court will not shirk its
responsibilities from doing so."
(See also: Manohar Joshi v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.,
H (2012) 3 sec 619)
AYAAUBKHAN NOORKHAN PATHAN v. STATE OF 1019
MAHARASHTRA & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
21. In Vinoy Kumar v. State of U.P., AIR 2001 SC 1739, A
this Court held:
"Even in cases filed in public interest, the court can
exercise the writ jurisdiction at the instance of a third party
only when it is shown that the legal wrong or legal injury
8
or illegal burden is threatened and such person or
determined class of person is by reason of poverty,
helplessness or disability or socially or economically
disadvantaged position, unable to approach the court for
relief.•
c
22. Thus, from the above it is evident that under ordinary
circumstances, a third person, having no concern with the case
at hand, cannot claim to have any locus-standi to raise any
grievance whatsoever. However, in the exceptional
circumstances as referred to above, if the actual persons D
aggrieved, because of ignorance, illiteracy, inarticulation or
poverty, are unable to approach the court, and a person, who
has no personal agenda, or object, in relation to which, he can
grind his own axe, approaches the court, then the court may
examine the issue and in exceptional circumstances, even if E
his bonafides are doubted, but the issue raised by him, in the
opinion of the court, requires consideration, the court may
proceed suo-motu, in such respect.
Cross-examination is one part of the principles of natural
justice: F
23. A Constitution Bench of this Court in State of M.P. v.
Chintaman Sadashiva Vaishampayan, AIR 1961 SC 1623,
held that the rules of natural justice, require that a party must
be given the opportunity to adduce all relevant evidence upon G
which he relies, and further that, the evidence of the opposite
party should be taken in his presence, and that he should be
given the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses
examined by that party. Not providing the said opportunity to
cross-examine witnesses, would violate the principles of natural H
1020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 10 S.C.R.
A justice. (See also: Union of/ndia v. T.R. Varma, AIR 1957 SC
882; Meenglas Tea Estate v. Workmen, AIR 1963 SC 1719;
Mis. Kesoram Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Gangadhar & Ors., AIR 1964
SC 708; New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Nusli Neville
Wadia and Anr., AIR 2008 SC 876; Rachpal Singh & Ors. v.
8 Gurmit Singh & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 2448; Biecco Lawrie & Anr.
v. State of West Bengal & Anr., AIR 2010 SC 142; and State
of Uttar Pradesh v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, AIR 2010 SC 3131).
24. In Lakshman Exports Ltd. v. Collector of Central
Excise, (2005) 10 SCC 634, this Court, while dealing with a
C case under the Central Excise Act, 1944, considered a similar
issue i.e. permission with respect to the cross-examination of
a witness. In the said case, the assessee had specifically asked
to be allowed to cross-examine the representatives of the firms
concern, to establish that the goods in question had been
D accounted for in their books of accounts, and that excise duty
had been paid. The Court held that such a request could not
be turned down, as the denial of the right to cross-examine,
would amount to a denial of the right to be heard i.e. audi
alteram partem.
E
25. In New India Assurance Company Ltd., v. Nus/i
Neville Wadia & Anr., AIR 2008 SC 876; this Court considered
a case under the Public Premises ( Eviction of Unauthorised
Occupants) Act, 1971 and held as follows :-
F "If some facts are to be proved by the landlord, indisputably
the occupant should get an opportunity to cross-examine.
The witness who intends to prove the said fact has the
right to cross-examine the witness. This may not be
provided by under the statute, but it being a part of the
G principle of natural justice should be held to be indefeasible
right." (Emphasis added)
In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that
the right of cross-examination is an integral part of the principles
H of natural justice.
AYAAUBKHAN NOORKHAN PATHAN v. STATE OF 1021
MAHARASHTRA & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
26. In K.L. Tripathiv. State Bankoflndia & Ors., AIR 1984 A
SC 273, this Court held that, in order to sustain a complaint of
the violation of the principles of natural justice on the ground of
absence of opportunity of cross-examination, it must be
established that some prejudice has been caused to the
appellant by the procedure followed. A party, who does not want B
to controvert the veracity of the evidence on record, or of the
testimony gathered behind his back, cannot expect to succeed
in any subsequent grievance raised by him, stating that no
opportunity of cross-examination was provided to him, specially
when the same was not requested, and there was no dispute c
regarding the veracity of the statement. (See also: Union of
India v. P.K. Roy, AIR 1968 SC 850; and Channabasappa
Basappa Happali v. State of Mysore, AIR 1972 SC 32).
27. In Transmission Corpn. of A.P. Ltd. v. Sri Rama
Krishna Rice Mill, AIR 2006 SC 1445, this Court held: D
"In order to establish that the cross-examination is
necessary, the consumer has to make out a case for the
same. Merely stating that the statement of an officer is
being utilised for the purpose of adjudication would not E
be sufficient in all cases. If an application is made
requesting for grant of an opportunity to cross-examine
any official, the same has to be considered by the
adjudicating authority who shall have to either grant the
request or pass a reasoned order if he chooses to reject F
the application. In that event an adjudication being
concluded, it shall be certainly open to the consumer to
establish before the Appellate Authority as to how he has
been prejudiced by the refusal to grant an opportunity to
cross-examine any official".
G
28. The meaning of providing a reasonable opportunity to
show cause against an action proposed to be taken by the
government, is that the government servant is afforded a
reasonable opportunity to defend himself against the charges,
on the basis of which an inquiry is held. The government H
1022 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 10 S.C.R.
A servant should be given an opportunity to deny his guilt and
establish his innocence. He can do so only when he is told what
the charges against him are. He can therefore, do so by
cross-examining the witnesses produced against him.
The object of supplying statements is that, the government
B servant will be able to refer to the previous statements of the
witnesses proposed to be examined against him. Unless the
said statements are provided to the government servant, he will
not be able to conduct an effective and useful cross-
examination.
c 29. In Rajiv Arora v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2009 SC
1100, this Court held:
"Effective cross-examination could have been done as
regards the correctness or otherwise of the report, if the
D contents of them were proved. The principles analogous
to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act as also
the principles of natural justice demand that the maker of
the report should be examined, save and except in cases
where the facts are admitted or the witnesses are not
E available for cross-examination or similar situation. The
High Court in its impugned judgment proceeded to
consider the issue on a technical plea, namely, no
prejudice has been caused to the appellant by such non-
examination. If the basic principles of law have not been
F complied with or there has been a f!!OSS violation of
the principles of natural justice, the High Court should
have exercised its jurisdiction of judicial review."
30. The aforesaid discussion makes it evident that, not
only should the opportunity of cross-examination be made
G available, but it should be one of effective cross-examination,
so as to meet the requirement of the principles of natural justice.
In the absence of such an opportunity, it cannot be held that the
matter has been decided in accordance with law, as cross-
examination is an integral part and parcel of the principles of
H natural justice.
AYAAUBKHAN NOORKHAN PATHAN v. STATE OF 1023
MAHARASHTRA & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
31. Affidavit - whether evidence within the meaning A
of Section 3 of the Evidence Act, 1872:
It is a settled legal proposition that an affidavit is not
evidence within the meaning of Section 3 of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Evidence Act').
B
Affidavits are therefore, not included within the purview of
the definition of "evidence" as has been given in Section 3 of
the Evidence Act, and the same can be used as •evidence"
only if, for sufficient reasons, the Court passes an order under
Order XIX of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter C
referred to as the 'CPC'). Thus, the filing of an affidavit of one's
own statement, in one's own favour, cannot be regarded as
sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal, on the basis of
which it can come to a conclusion as regards a particular fact-
situation. (Vide: Sudha Devi v. M.P. Narayanan & Ors., AIR D
1988 SC 1381; and Range Forest Officer v. S. T. Hadimani,
AIR 2002 SC 1147).
32. While examining a case under the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, this Court, in Mis Barei/ly E
Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. The Workmen & Ors., AIR 1972
SC 330, considered the application of Order XIX, Rules 1 and
2 CPC, and observed as under:-
"But the application of principles of natural justice does
not imply that what is not evidence, can be acted upon. F
On the other hand, what it means is that no material can
be relied upon to establish a contested fact which are not
spoken to by the persons who are competent to speak
about them and are subject to cross-examination by the
party against whom they are sought to be used. When a G
document is produced in a Court or a Tribunal, the
question that naturally arises is: is it a genuine document,
what are its contents and are the statements contained
therein true...... If a letter or other document is produced
to establish some fact which is relevant to the inquiry, the H
1024 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 10 S.C.R.
A writer must be produced or his affidavit in respect thereof
be filed and opportunity afforded to the opposite party who
challenges this fact. This is both in accordance with the
principles of natural justice as also according to the
procedure under 0. 19 of the Code and the Evidence Act,
8 both of which incorporate the general principles."
33. In Needle Industries (India) Ltd. & Ors. v. N.l.N.l.H.
Ltd. & Ors., AIR 1981 SC 1298, this Court considered a case
under the Indian Companies Act, and observed that, "it is
generally unsatisfactory to record a finding involving grave
C consequences with respect to a person, on the basis of
affidavits and documents alone, without asking that person to
submit to cross-examination''. However, the conduct of the
parties may be an important factor, with regard to determining
whether they showed their willingness to get the said issue
D determined on the basis of affidavits, correspondence and other
documents, on the basis of which proper and necessary
inferences can safely and legitimately be drawn.
34. In Ramesh Kumar v. Kesha Ram, AIR 1992 SC 700,
E this Court considered the scope of application of the provisions
of 0. XIX, Rr. 1 and 2 CPC in a Rent Control matter, observing
as under:-
"The Court may also treat any affidavit filed in support of
the pleadings itself as one under the said provisions and
F call upon the opposite side to traverse it. The Court, if it
finds that having regard to the nature of the a/legations,
it is necessary to record oral evidence tested by oral
cross-examination, may have recourse to that
procedure. n
G
35. In Standard Chartered Bank v. Andhra Bank Financial
Services Ltd. & Ors., (2006) 6 SCC 94, this Court while dealing
with a case under the provisions of Companies Act, 1956,
while considering complex issues regarding the Markets,
H
AYAAUBKHAN NOORKHAN PATHAN v. STATE OF 1025
MAHARASHTRA & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
Exchanges and Securities, and the procedure to be followed A
by special Tribunals, held as under :
"While it may be true that the Special Court has been
given a certain amount of latitude in the matter of
procedure, it surely cannot fly away from established legal 8
principles while deciding the cases before it. As to what
inference arises from a document, is always a matter of
evidence unless the document is self-explanatory ....... ln
the absence of any such explanation, it was not open to
the Special Court to come up with its own explanations
and decide the fate of the suit on the basis of its inference C
based on such assumed explanations."
36. Therefore, affidavits in the light of the aforesaid
discussion are not considered to be evidence, within the
meaning of Section 3 of the Evidence Act. However, in a case D
where the deponent is available for cross-examination, and
opportunity is given to the other side to cross-examine him, the
same can be relied upon. Such view, stands fully affirmed
particularly, in view of the amended provisions of Order XVIII,
Rules 4 & 5 CPC. In certain other circumstances, in order to E
avoid technicalities of procedure, the legislature, or a court/
tribunal, can even lay down a procedure to meet the
requirement of compliance with the principles of natural justice,
and thus, the case will be examined in the light of those statutory
rules etc. as framed by the aforementioned authorities. F
37. The instant case is required to be examined in the light
of the aforesaid legal propositions. This Court examined this
matter in detail in Km. Madhuri Patil v. Addi. Commissioner,
Tribal Development, {1994) 6 SCC 241, and upo·n realising
that spurious tribes and persons not belonging to the Scheduled G
Tribes category, were snatching away the reservation benefits
that have been made available to genuine tribals, and that they
were being wrongly deprived of their rights on the basis of false
caste certificates, and that further, at a subsequent stage such
unscrupulous persons, after getting admission/employment, H
1026 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 10 S.C.R.
A were adopting dilatory tactics, the court issued a large number
of directions to investigate such cases of false claims. The
directions inter-alia included:
(1) Each Directorate should constitute a vigilance cell
consisting of Senior Deputy Superintendent of Police in
B
over all charge and such number of Police Inspectors to
investigate into the social status claims.
(2) The Director concerned, on receipt of the report from
the vigilance officer if he found the claim for social status
c to be "not genuine" or "doubtful" or spurious or falsely or
wrongly claimed, the Director concerned should issue
show cause notice supplying a copy of the report of the
vigilance officer to the candidate by a registered post with
acknowledgement due or through the head of the
D concerned educational institution in which the candidate
is studying or employed ........... After giving such
opportunity either in person or through counsel, the
Committee may make such inquiry as it deems expedient
and consider the claims vis-a-vis the objections raised by
E the candidate or opponent and pass an appropriate order
with brief reasons in support thereof.
(3) In case the report is in favour of the candidate and
found to be genuine and true, no further action need be
taken except where the report or the particulars given are
F
procured or found to be false or fraudulently obtained and
in the latter event the same procedure as is envisaged in
para 6 be followed.
(4) The inquiry should be completed as expeditiously as
G possible preferably by day-to-day proceedings within such
period not exceeding two months. If after inquiry, the caste
Scrutiny Committee finds the claim to be false or spurious,
they should pass an order cancelling the certificate issued
and confiscate the same. It should communicate within one
H month from the date of the conclusion of the proceedings
AYAAUBKHAN NOORKHAN PATHAN v. STATE OF 1027
MAHARASHTRA & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
the result of enquiry to the parenUguardian and the A
applicant.
(5) In case, the certificate obtained or social status claimed
is found to be false, the parenUguardian/the candidate
should be prosecuted for making false claim. If the B
prosecution ends in a conviction and sentence of the
accused, it could be regarded as an offence involving
moral turpitude, disqualification for elective posts or offices
under the State or the Union or elections to any local body,
legislature or the Parliament.
c
(6) As soon as the finding is recorded by· the Scrutiny
Committee holding that the certificate obtained was false,
on its cancellation and confiscation simultaneously, it
should be communicated to the concerned educational
institution or the appointing authority by registered post with D
acknowledgement due with a request to cancel the
admission or the appointment. The principal etc. of the
educational institution responsible for making the
admission or the appointing authority, should cancel the
admission/appointment without any further notice to the E
candidate and debar the candidate for further study or
continue in office in a post.
The court further issued directions to all States to give
effect to the aforesaid directions, in order to ensure that the
F
constitutional objectives that were intended for the benefit and
the advancement of persons genuinely belonging to the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes category, are not
defeated by such unscrupulous persons.
The Act 2000 and the Rules 2003 are based on the G
directions issued by this Court in Km. Madhuri Patil (supra)
as the same have been incorporated therein.
38. The correctness of the said judgment in Km. Madhuri
Patil (supra), was doubted, and the matter was referred to and H
1028 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 10 S.C.R.
A decided by a larger bench of this Court in Daya Ram v. Sudhir:
Batham & Ors., (2012) 1 SCC 333, wherein, while deciding
the various issues involved, including the competence of this
Court to legislate in this regard, it was held as under:
"The scrutiny committee is not an adjudicating authority
B
like a Court or Tribunal, but an administrative body which
verifies the facts, investigates into a specific claim (of
caste status) and ascertains whether the caste/tribal status
claimed is co"ect or not......
c Having regard to the scheme for verification formulated
by this Court in Madhuri Patil, the scrutiny committees
carry out verification of caste certificates issued without
prior enquiry, as for example the caste certificates issued
by Tehsildars or other officers of the departments of
D Revenue/Social Welfare/Tribal Welfare, without any
enquiry or on the basis of self- affidavits about caste. If
there were to be a legislation governing or regulating
grant of caste certificates, and if caste certificates are
issued after due and proper inquiry, such caste
E certificates will not call for verification by the scrutiny
committees. Madhuri Patil provides for verification only
to avoid false and bogus claims ..... "
(Emphasis added)
F 39. Thus, it is evident from the aforesaid judgment in Daya
Ram (supra), that the purpose of issuing directions in Km.
Madhuri Patil (supra), was only to examine those cases, where
caste certificates had been issued without conducting any prior
enquiry, on the basis of self- affidavits regarding one's caste
G alone, and that the said directions were not at all applicable,
where a legislation governing or regulating the grant of caste
certificates exists, and where caste certificates are issued after
due and proper enquiry. Caste certificates issued by holding
proper enquiry, in accordance with duly prescribed procedure,
H
I
AYAAUBKHAN NOORKHAN PATHAN v. STATE OF 1029
MAHARASHTRA & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
would not require any further verification by the scrutiny A
committee.
40. In pursuance of the said order issued by the High Court,
the Scrutiny Committee examined the case of the parties.
However, with respect to this, the appellant raised the grievance 8
that, the evidence of a large number of persons had been
recorded by the Scrutiny Committee behind his back, and that
he had· not been given an opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses that were examined by the other side and therefore,
he was unable to lead a proper defence. The appellant filed
an application dated 28.2.2012, for the purpose of recalling 3 C
witnesses, namely, Sikandar Guiab Tadvi, Bhagchand
Ganpatsing Pardeshi and Bahiidursing Mukhtarsing Patil, so
that he may cross-examine them. The appellant also filed
another application on the same day, seeking a period of 30
days time, to file his reply as is required within the provisions D
of Rule 12(8) of the Rules 2003, and also another application
for the purpose of calling of records from the office of the
Tehsildar, to ascertain the genuineness of the certificate
impugned. None of the said applications have been decided
till now. E
41. In view thereof, this Court vide order dated 11.5.2012,
directed the learned counsel appearing for the Scrutiny
Committee, to produce the original record of the matter and to
file an affidavit with respect to whether the appellant had been F
given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses that were
examined by the other side, and also with respect to whether
the other applications filed by the appellant, were decided upon.
42. In pursuance of the said order, the original record was
produced. However, the learned counsel remained unable to G
point out from the original record, any proceeding or event, by
way of which, it could be ascertained that the appellant was in
fact, given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, or
to show that all the said witnesses were examined in the
presence of the appellant. Further, he was also unable to satisfy H
1030 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 10 S.C.R.
A this Court, with respect to the circumstances under which, the
applications filed by the appellant on 28.2.2012, including the
one to recall witnesses and permit him to cross-examine them,
have been kept pending, without passing any order in relation
to either one of them.
B
43. In order to determine the genuineness and sincerity of
respondent no. 5, this Court on 29.10.2012 adjourned the
matter until 5.11.2012, directing respondent no. 5 to act as
under:
c •Meanwhile, respondent No. 5 may file the affidavit as on
what date he appeared before the Scrutiny Committee
and what was the material produced by him and as to
whether on that petitioner had a notice of his appearance
before the Scrutiny Committee and whether the
D Committee has allowed the petitioner to cross examine
the respondent No. 5."
In response to the said order, respondent no. 5 filed an
affidavit in Court on 5.11.2012. The contents of the affidavit
E reveal that respondent no.5 claims that his occupation is that
of a social worker. The allegations against the appellant
stating that he obtained the said caste certificate fraudulently,
have been repeated. Respondent no. 5 has not mentioned in
the affidavit, the date on which he appeared before the Scrutiny
F Committee, nor has he responded to the query raised with
respect to whether he had produced any evidence to support
his allegations, or whether the appellant was allowed to cross-
examine any of the witnesses, or if in fact, he simply examined
all of them himself.
G The relevant part of the abovementioned affidavit, has
been re-produced hereunder:
·rhat it is submitted that on 28.2.2012 the Respondent
No. 5 submitted copy of Affidavit of Mr. Supdu Musa
Tadvi and by way of an application prayed for personal
H
AYAAUBKHAN NOORKHAN PATHAN v. STATE OF 1031
MAHARASHTRA & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
presence of Mr. Supdu Musa Tadvi. Scrutiny Committee A
finding contradictions in the two statement of Mr. Supdu
Musa Tadvi, issued notice to him requesting his personal
presence on 17.3.2012. However, Mr. Supdu Musa Tadri
never appeared before the Committee. n
B
44. The affidavit of Mr. Supdu Musa Tadri referred to
hereinabove cannot be relied upon, as the said deponent never
appeared before the Scrutiny Committee. The conduct of
respondent no. 5, who has been pursuing the said matter from
one court to another, is found to be reprehensible, and without
any sense of responsibility whatsoever, as he could not submit C
any satisfactory response to the directions issued by this Court
on 29.10.2012. In view of the above, we are highly doubtful as
regards his bonafides. He has therefore, disentitled himself
from appearing either before this Court, or any other court, or
Committee, so far as the instant case is concerned. D
45. The Scrutiny Committee in ordinary circumstances
examined the matter and after investigation through its Vigilance
Cell and considering all the documentary evidence on record
and after being satisfied, granted the caste verification E
certificate in 2000. Section 114 111.(e) of the Evidence Act
provided for the court to pronounce that the deci$ion taken by
the Scrutiny Committee has been done in regular course and
the caste certificate has been issued after due verification. A
very strong material/evidence is required to rebut the F
presumption. In fact, respondent no. 5 has no legal peg for a
justifiable claim to hang upon. Once the respondent no. 5, for
the reasons best known to him, had challenged caste certificate
under the garb of acting as a public spirited person espousing
the cause of legitimate persons who had been deprived of their G
right of being considered for appointment, the respondent no.
5 must have acted seriously and brought the material before
the Scrutiny Committee to show that the earlier decision was
improbable or factually incorrect. Such a view stands fortified
by a catena of decisions rendered by this Court where it has
been held that presumption is based on legal maxim "Omnia H
1032 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 10 S.C.R.
A praesumuntur rite esse acta" i.e. all acts are presumed to have
rightly and regularly been done.
Such a presumption can be rebutted by adducing
appropriate evidence. Mere statement made in the written
B statemenUpetition is not enough to rebut the presumption. The
onus of rebuttal lies upon the person who alleges that the act
had not been regularly performed or the procedure required
under the law had not been followed. (Vide: Gopal Narain v.
State of U.P. & Anr., AIR 1964 SC 370; Narayan Govind
Gavate & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 1977 SC
C 183; Karewwa & Ors. v. Hussensab Khansaheb Wajantri &
Ors., AIR 2002 SC 504; Engineering Kamgar Union v. Electro
Steels Castings Ltd. & Anr., (2004) 6 SCC 36; Mohd.
Shahabuddin v. State of Bihar, (2010) 4 SCC 653; Punjab
State Electricity Board & Anr. v. Ashwani Kumar, (2010) 7
D SCC 569; M. Chandra v. M. Thangmuthu & Anr., AIR 2011
SC 146; and R. Ramachandran Nair v. Deputy
Superintendent, Vigilance Police, (2011) 4 SCC 395)
46. In view of the above discussion and considering the
E seriousness of the allegations, as the Scrutiny Committee has
already conducted an inquiry in relation to this matter, and the
only grievance of the appellant is that there has been non-
compliance with the principles of natural justice, and the fact
that the applications filed by him, were not decided upon, we
F direct that before the submission of any report by the Scrutiny
Committee, his application for calling the witnesses for cross-
examination must be disposed of, and appellant must be given
a fair opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, who have
been examined before the Committee. We further direct the
G Scrutiny Committee to pass appropriate orders in accordance
with the law thereafter. In case, the Scrutiny Committee has
already taken a decision, the same being violative of the
principles of natural justice, would stand vitiated.
47. The appeal is disposed of accordingly, however,
H considering the fact that respondent no. 5 has not been
AYMUBKHAN NOORKHAN PATHAN v. STATE OF 1033
MAHARASHTRA & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
pursuing the matter in a bonafide manner, and has not raised A
any public interest, rather he abused the process of the court
only to harass the appellant, the respondent no. 5 is restrained
from intervening in the matter any further, and also from
remaining a party to it, and he is also liable to pay costs to the
tune of Rs. one lakh, within a period of 4 weeks to the District B
Collector, Aurangabad. The District Collector, Aurangabad,
would deposit the said amount in the account of the Supreme
Court Legal Services Committee. In the event that, the cost
imposed is not deposited by respondent no. 5 within the period
stipulated, we request the District Collector, Aurangabad, to c
recover the same as arrears of land revenue and deposit the
same, accordingly.
A copy of the judgment be sent by the Registry of this Court
to the District Collector, Aurangabad (Maharashtra) for
compliance. D
R.P. Appeal disposed of.
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