AVTAR SINGH AND ORSversusSTATE OF PUNJAB

A                            AVTAR SINGH AND ORS
                                           v.
                                STATE OF PUNJAB                                    •
                               SEPTEMBER 18, 2002

B      . [S. RAJENDRA BABU AND P. VENKATARAMA REDD!, JJ.]


         Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985-Sections 15,
    35 and 54-Accused found travelling at odd hour in a vehicle containing
C   poppy husk-Conviction by courts below on presumption as to possession--
    Correctness of-Held, in the absence of proof presumption as to possession
    cannot be drawn, hence conviction and sentence set aside-Evidence Act,
    1872, Section 114.

          Words and Phrases :
D
          'Possession '-Meaning of

           According to the prosecution appellant No.3 was driving a vehicle
    containing poppy husk bags at odd hour. Appellant Nos. I and 2 were sitting
    at the back on the bags. Appellants were apprehended and bags of poppy husk
E   were recovered. Trial Court convicted the appellants under Section 15 of the
    Narcotic Drugs and fsychotropic Substances Act, 1985 invoking presumption
    under section 54. High Court resorted to presumption under section 35 and
    confirmed the order of trial court Hence the present appeal.

         Appellants contended that the possession, much less conscious
F   possession of the bags of poppy husk has not been established and also the
    accused were not questioned about it.

          Allowing the appeal, the Court

G          HELD: 1.1. It is difficult to reach the conclusion beyond reasonable doubt
    that the three appellants one of whom was driving the vehicle and the other
    two sitting on the back were having custody or control of the goods. It
    transpires from evidence that the appellants were not the only occupants of
    the vehicle. One of the persons who was sitting in the cabin and another person
    sitting at the back of the truck made themselves scarce after seeing the police
H
                                          482
                    AVT AR SINGH v. STA TE OF PUNJAB                        483

and the prosecution could not establish their identity. It is quite probable that   A
one of them could be the custodian of goods whether or not he was the
proprietor. The persons who were merely sitting on the bags, in the absence
of proof of anything more, cannot be presumed to be in possession of the goods.
True, their silence and failure to explain the circumstances in which they
were travelling in the vehicle at the odd hours, is one strong circumstance         B
that can be put against them. A case of drawing presumption under Section
114 of the Evidence Act could perhaps be made out then to prove the possession
of the accused, but, the fact remains that in the course of examination under
Section 313 Cr.P.C., not even a question was asked that they were the persons
in possession of poppy husk placed in the vehicle. The object of examination
under Section 313, it is well known, is to afford an opportunity to the accused     C
to explain the circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. It is
unfortunate that no question was asked about the possession of goods. Having
regard to the charge of which appellants were accused, the failure to elicit
their answer on such a crucial aspect as possession, is quite significant. In
this state of things, it is not proper to raise a presumption under Section 114
of Evidence Act. (486-G, H; 487-A-E(                                                D
      1.2. High Court resorted to presumption under Section 35 of the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 which relates to
culpable state 'of mind, without considering the aspect of possession. Trial
court invoked the presumption under S.54 of the Act without addressing itself       E
to the question of possession. The approach of both the courts is erroneous
in law. They rested their conclusion on the fact that the accused failed to give
satisfactory explanation for travelling in the vehicle containing poppy husk
at odd hour. But, the other relevant aspects as pointed out were neither adverted
to nor taken into account by trial court and High Court. Thus non-application
of mind to the material factors has vitiated the judgment under appeal. Inc/er      F
Sein v. State of Punjab, (1973) 2 sec 372, referred to. (487-E-G)

      1.3. Third appellant would have been charged alternatively for
transporting the offensive goods without permit or authorization as required
by law; but, such a charge was not laid and there was not even reference to
Section 8 of the Act. As a result third appellant goes scot-free. Thus the          Q
conviction and sentence of all the appellants is set aside. (487-H; 488-A(              .,
       2. The word 'possession' no doubt has different shades of meaning and
it is quite elastic in its connotation. Possession and ownership need not always
go together but the minimum requisite element which has to be satisfied is          H
        484                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

    A custody or control over the goods.1486-EI
              CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 2082
        of 1996.

              From the Judgment and Order dated 26.3.1996 of the Punjab and Haryana
    B High Court in Crl. A. No. 375of1995.
              P.N. Lekhi and M.K. Garg, for the Appellants.

              Bimal Roy jad and Ms. Sunita, for the Respondent.

    C         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

            P. VENKAT ARAMA REDDI, J. Five persons including the three
      appellants herein were charged under Section 15 of the Narcotic Drugs &
      Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act') for having
      conscious possession of 640 Kgs. of poppy husk on 7.8.1989 without valid
    D permit or licence. According to the prosecution case, they were all travelling
      in a truck belonging to accused No.5 in the small hours of 7.8.1989. The
      vehicle was checked at canal bridge near the village Dhange at about 1.30
      A.M. by PW 2 ASI who was on the patrolling duty along with PW 4 (Head
      Constable) and two other constables. The vehicle was carrying 16 bags of
    E poppy husk. Balbir Chand appellant No.3 herein was driving the vehicle. One
      person who was sitting in the front seat by the side of the driver and another
      person sitting on the back side of the truck ran away leaving the vehicle.
      These two persons are said to be Swarna Ram Accused No.3 and Swatantra
      Kumar (since deceased). The other two sitting at the back i.e., appellants I
      and 2 and the driver of the vehicle -Appellant No.3 were apprehended on the
    F spot. 16 gunny bags of poppy husk were recovered. 250 gms was taken out
      as sample from each bag and sealed. The remaining bags were weighed after
      sealing and each bag was found to contain 39 Kgs and 750 gms. The sealed
      bags and sample were sent to the concerned Police Station. On the search
      of person of each of the accused, nothing incriminating was found. PW 5,
      who was SHO at Police Station Goraya, made further investigation. According
      to him, AS! Darbari Lal (PW 2) produced the three appellants herein along
c     with the case property of 16 bags of poppy husk and 16 samples when he
      was at the bus stand Goraya for patrolling. He affixed the seals on the bags
      and sent the samples to the chemical examiner. The report of the chemical
      examiner is Ex. P X, according to which the contents are 'Poppy head'
    H containing morphine. The sealed bags were produced in court.
     AVT AR SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [VENKATARAMA REDDI, J.] 485

           The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jallandhar, acquitted Swarna A
    Ram for the reason that his identity was not established and also acquitted
    Amrik Singh the owner of the vehicle on the ground that there was no proof
    that he knowingly allowed the vehicle to carry the offensive stuff. Each of
    the appellants was convicted under Section 15 and sentenced to undergo RI
    for a period of I 0 years and to pay a fine of Rs.I lakh and in default to B
    undergo RI for a further period of two years. On appeal, the High Court
    confirmed the verdict of the trial court. The contention that Section 50 (I) of
    the Act has not been complied with was rightly negatived by both the courts
    on the facts of the case and no contention has been advanced before us in
    th is regard. The contention that independent witnesses were not examined
    was also negatived holding that at that hour and place, it was difficult to C
    expect any independent witness to be present there.

           The more important contention raised before the High Court was that
i   from the mere fact that the appellants were sitting in the truck, it cannot be
    held that they were in possession of poppy husk. The High Court observed D
    that the appellants did not come forward with the case that they were merely
    passengers and that they were unaware of what was contained in the bags.
    The reason for travelling at that odd hour with the offending goods was not
    stated by any of the accused. Therefore, the High Court concluded that "their
    close connection of being in possession of the poppy husk must be held to
    have been established". The High Court also pressed into service the E
    presumption under S. 35 of the Act.

           In this appeal, the learned senior counsel, apart from commenting on the
    artificiality of the prosecution case and the discrepancies in the evidence
    regarding the police officer to whom the seized bags were handed over, mainly p
    concentrated on the point that the possession, much less conscious

r   possession, of the bags of poppy husk, has not been established and the
    accused were not even questioned about it. We find force in the contention
    of the learned counsel.

          Section 15 provides for punishment if any person in contravention of G
    any provision of the Act or any rule or order made or condition of a licence
    granted thereunder, produces, possesses, transports, imports inter-State,
    exports inter-State sells, purchases, uses or omits to warehouse poppy straw
    or removes or does any act in respect of warehoused poppy straw. Section
    8 enacts a prohibition against production, manufacture, possession, sale, H
    486                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A purchase, transport, warehousing, use, consumption, import and export or
  transshipment of any narcotic drug or psychotr9pic substance except for
  medical or scientific purposes and to the extent and in the manner pennitted
  by the provision of the Act or Rules or Orders made thereunder or in
  accordance with the term of licence or permit, if any. We are here concerned
B with possession and transportation. However, the charge is confined to
  possession in the instant case.

        Possession is the core ingredient to be established before the accused
  in the instant case are subjected to the punishment under Section 15. If the
  accused are found to be in possession of poppy straw which is a narcotic
C drug within the meaning of Clause (xiv) of S. 2, it is for them to account for
  such possession satisfactorily; if not, the presumption under Section 54
  comes into play. We need not go into the aspect whether the possession must
  be conscious possession. Perhaps taking clue from the decision of this Court
  in lnder Sain v. State of Punjab, (1973] 2 SCC 372 arising under the Opium
D Act, the learned trial Judge charged the accused of having conscious
  possession of poppy husk. Assuming that poppy husk comes within the
  expression poppy straw, the question, however, remains whether the
  prosecution satisfactorily proved the fact that the accused were in possession
  of poppy husk. Accepting the evidence of PW 4 the Head constable, it is
  seen that appellant No.3 (Accused No.4) was driving the vehicle loaded with
E bags of poppy husk. Appellants I and 2 (Accused Nos. I and 2) were sitting
  on the bags placed in the truck. As soon as the vehicle was stopped by A~l
  (PW 2), one person sitting in the cabin by the side of the driver and another
  person sitting in the back of the truck fled. No investigation has been directed
  to ascertain the role played by each of the accused and the nexus between
F the accused and the offending goods. The word 'possession' no doubt has
  different shades of meaning and it is quite elastic in its connotation. Possession
  and ownership need not aiways go together but the minimum requisite element
  which has to be satisfied is custody or control over the goods. Can it be said,
  on the basis of the evidence available on record, that the three appellants one
G of whom was driving the vehicle and other two sitting on the bags, were
  having such custody or control? It is difficult to reach such conclusion
  beyond reasonable doubt. It transpires from evidence that the appellants were
  not the only occupants of the vehicle. One of the persons who was sitting
  in the cabin and another person sitting at the bi:lck of the truck made themselves
  scarce after seeing the police and the prosecution could not establish their
H identity. It is quite probable that one of them could be the custodian of goods
      AVT AR SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [VENKATARAMA REDD!, J.) 487

     whether or not he was the proprietor. The persons who were merely sitting          A
     on the bags, in the absence of proof of anything more, cannot be presumed
     to be in possession of the goods. For instance, if they are labourers engaged
     merely for loading and unloading purposes and there is nothing to show that
     the goods were at least in their temporary custody, conviction under Section
     15 may not be warranted. At best, they may be abettors, but, there is no such      B
     charge here. True, their silence and failure to explain the circumstances in
     which they were traveling in the vehicle at the odd hours, is one strong
     circumstance that can be put against them. A case of drawing presumption
     under Section 114 of the Evidence Act could perhaps be made out then to
     prove the possession of the accused, but, the fact remains that in the course
     of examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C, not even a question was asked that        C
     they were the persons in possession of poppy husk placed in the vehicle. The
     only question put to them was that as per the prosecution evidence, they
     were sitting on the bags of poppy husk. Strangely enough, ·even the driver

!    was questioned on the same lines. The object of examination under S.313, it
     is well known, is to afford an opportunity to the accused to explain the           D
     circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. It is unfortunate that
     no question was asked about the possession of goods. Having regard to the
     charge of which appellants were accused, the failure to elicit their answer on
     such a crucial . aspect as possession, is quite significant. In this state of
     things, it is not proper to raise a presumption under Section 114 of Evidence      E
     Act nor is it safe to conclude that the prosecution established beyond
     reasonable doubt that the appellants were in possession of poppy husk
     which was being carried by the vehicle. The High Court resorted to the
     presumption under Section 35 which relates to culpable state of mind, without
     considering the aspect of possession. The trial court invoked the presumption
     unde'r S.54 of the Act without addressing itself to the question of possession.    F
     The approach of both the courts is erroneous in law. Both the courts rested
     their conclusion on the fact 1that the accused failed to give satisfactory
'r   explanation for travelling in the vehicle containing poppy husk at an odd
'
     hour. But, the other relevant aspects pointed out above were neither adverted
     to nor taken into account by the trial court and the High Court. Non-application   G
     of mind to the material factors has thus vitiated the judgment under appeal.

           Coming to the case of the third appellant who was driving the vehicle,
     there is one more infirmity in the prosecution case. He would have been
     charged alternatively for transporting the offensive goods without permit or
     authorization as required by law; but, such a charge was not laid. There was       H
    488                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A not even reference to Section 8 of the Act. The result is, he too goes scot
    free.

           For the above reasons, we set aside the conviction and sentence of the
    appellants and allow the appeal. The appellants shall be set at liberty forthwith,
    if they are in jail.
B
    N.J.                                                            Appeal allowed.




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