AVINASH SADASHIV BHOSALE (D) THR. LRS.versusUNION OF INDIA & ORS.

                         [2012] 9 S.C.R. 86


A        AVINASH SADASHIV BHOSALE (D) THR. LRS.
                                  v.
                     UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

                  (Civil Appeal No. 7005 of 2012)

B                     SEPTEMBER 25, 2012

    [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR AND H.L. GOKHALE, JJ.]

        Service Law - Dismissal - On grounds of misconduct -
C . Appellant, Bank Manager, alleged to have been involved in
  fraudulent transactions - Prosecuted ulss. 120B, 420, 467,
  468, 471 ;;ind 201 /PC alongwith three account holders -
  However, subsequently appellant and the other co-accused
  acquitted of all the charges by the criminal court -
o Simultaneous to the criminal proceedings, respondent bank
  had initiated departmental proceedings against the appellant
  which led to his dismissal from service - Order of dismissal
  in challenge - Plea of appellant that the departmental
  proceedings conducted against him were vitiated as he had
E been acquitted by the criminal court and continuation of
  departmental proceedings after the appellant was acquitted
  in the criminal trial was in violation of the principle underlying
  Article 20(2) of the Constitution - Held: Departmental
  proceedings can go on simultaneously to the criminal trial,
F except where both the proceedings are based on the same
  set of facts and the evidence in both the proceedings is
  common - The instant case did not fall within the said
  exception as the departmental proceedings herein and the
  criminal case were not grounded upon the same set of facts
  and evidence - The basic charge against the appellant in the
G departmental proceedings was that he failed to discharge his
  duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence
  to ensure and protect the interest of the Bank and acted in a
  manner unbecoming of a Bank Officer - Said charge had

H                                 86
  AVINASH SADASHIV BHOSALE (D) THR. LRS. v.               87
              UNION OF INDIA
nothing to do with any criminal liability attaching to such A
conduct - Failure of the prosecution in producing necessary
evidence before the criminal cowt cannot have any adverse
impact on the evidentiary value of the material produced by
the Bank before the Inquiry Officer in the departmental
proceedings - Before the Inquiry Officer, the Bank had placed B
on record all the relevant documents which clearly establish
that appellant had exceeded his discretionary powers in
purchasing cheques and issuing demand drafts to show
undue favour to three construction companies - Appellant
failed to maintain the high standards of integrity as required c
of the Bank officials and acted in violation of the Service
Rules - Order of dismissal also not vitiated by non-
application of mind - There was no breach of the rule of
natural justice - Order of dismissal accordingly not interfered
with - State Bank of India Officers Service Rules, 1992 -
                                                                0
rr.50(4), 67(j) and 68(2)(iii) - Penal Code, 1860 - ss.120B,
420, 467, 468, 471 and 201.

     Service Law - Departmental proceedings - If can be
conducted simultaneously to criminal trial - Legal position
discussed - Held: Departmental proceedings can be E
conducted simultaneously to criminal trial - The only valid
ground for claiming that the disciplinary proceedings may be
stayed would be to ensure that the defence of the employee
in the criminal case may not be prejudiced - But even such
grounds would be available only in cases involving complex F
questions of facts and law - Such defence ought not to be
permitted to unnecessarily delay the departmental
proceedings - Interest of the delinquent officer as well as the
emplc;iyer clearly lies in a prompt conclusion of the
disciplinary proceedings - Departmental proceedings can go G
on simultaneously to the criminal trial, except where both the
proceedings are based on the same set of facts and the
evidence in both the proceedings is common.

    Service Law - Conduct - Bank officials - Standard of
                                                               H
    88       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A   integrity required of them - Held: Bank officials act as trustees
    of funds deposited by the public with the Bank - They have
    an obligation to earn the trust and confidence of not only the
    account holders but also the general public - High standards
    of integrity is required of the Bank officials, particularly the
B   cashiers, accountants, auditors and the Management at all
    levels - They must be above suspicion.

       The appellant, a Branch Manager in the State Bank
  of India, was alleged to have been involved in fraudulent
C transactions to the tune of Rs. 12 crores. After completion
  of investigation by the police, the appellant was
  prosecuted for having committed offences punishable
  under Sections 120B, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 201 IPC
  alongwith three account holders. However, subsequently
  the appellant and the other co-accused were acquitted of
D all the charges.

       Simultaneous to the criminal proceedings, the
  respondent bank had initiated departmental proceedings
  against the appellant. He was served a charge sheet
E containing articles of charge and statement of imputation
  of misconduct in terms of Rule 68(2)(iii) of the State Bank
  of India Officers Service Rules, 1992. It was alleged that
  the appellant failed to discharge his duty with utmost
  integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence to ensure and
F protect the interest of the Bank and acted in a manner in
  violation of Rule 50(4) of the 1992 Rules. The Inquiry
  Officer submitted report, whereby it was held that all the
  charges were proved against the appellant.
  Consequently, the Disciplinary Authority dismissed the
G appellant from service in terms of Rule 67(j) of the 1992
  Rules. Against the order of dismissal, the appellant
  preferred a statutor}t appeal which was dismissed. The
  appellant thereafter filed writ petition in the High Court.
  The writ petition was dismissed in limine and therefore
  the instant appeal.
H
  AVINASH SADASHIV BHOSALE (0) THR. LRS. v.             89
              UNION OF INDIA

    It was inter a/ia contended before this Court on          A
behalf of the appellant that the disciplinary proceedings
conducted against him were vitiated as he had been
acquitted by the Criminal Court; and that continuation of
departmental proceedings after the appellant was
acquitted in the criminal trial was in violation of the       B
principle underlying Article 20(2) of the Constitution.

    Dismissing the appeal, the Court

     HELD: 1.1. Departmental proceedings can be
conducted simultaneously to the criminal trial. There is      C
no legal bar for both proceedings to go on
simultaneously. The only valid ground for claiming that
the disciplinary proceedings may be stayed would be to
ensure that the defence of the employee in the criminal
case may not be prejudiced. But even such grounds             D
would be available only in cases involving complex
questions of facts and law. Such defence ought not to
be permitted to unnecessarily delay the departmental
proceedings. The interest of the delinquent officer as well
as the employer clearly lies in a prompt conclusion of the    E
disciplinary proceedings. Departmental proceedings can
go on simultaneously to the criminal trial, except where
both the proceedings are based on the same set of facts
and the evidence in both the proceedings is c.ommon.
[Para 44] [121-E-H; 122-A-C]                                  F

     1.2. The departmental proceedings herein and the
criminal case were not grounded upon the same set of
facts and evidence. It cannot be said that because the
appellant had been prosecuted, the departmental
proceedings could not have been continued                     G
simultaneously. The charges against the appellant in the
criminal trial related to the commission of criminal
offences under Sections 120(8), 420, 467, 468, 471 and
201 of IPC. The proof of criminal charges depended upon
prosecution producing proof beyond reasonable doubt           H
    90      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A   relating to the culpability of the appellant alongwith other
    persons. In the departmental proceedings, the basic
    charge was that appellant whilst posted as a Branch
    Manager, failed to discharge his duties with utmost
    integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence to ensure and
B   protect the interest of the Bank and acted in a manner
    unbecoming of a Bank Officer. The aforesaid charge
    clearly related to the manner in which the appellant
    performed the duties as the Manager of the Branch of
    the Bank. It had nothing to do with any criminal liability
    attaching to such conduct. Bank officials act as trustees
c
    of funds deposited by the public with the Bank. They
    have an obligation to earn the trust and confidence of
    not only the account holders but also the general public.
    The standard of integrity required of the Bank officials,
    particularly the cashiers, accountants, auditors and the
D   Management at all levels, is like the Caesar's wife, they
    must be above suspicion. The appellant failed to maintain
    such high standards of integrity. He therefore, acted in
    violation of Rule 50(4) of the 1992 Rules. [Para 45] [122-
    D-H; 123-A]
E
       1.3. The conduct of the criminal trial was in the
  hands of the prosecuting agency. Having registered the
  First Information Report, the Bank had little or no role to
  play, apart from rendering assistance to the prosecuting
  agencies. The failure of the prosecution in producing the
F
  necessary evidence before the trial court cannot have
  any adverse impact on the evidentiary value of the
  material produced by the Bank before the Inquiry Officer
  in the departmental proceedings. Before the Inquiry
  Officer, the Bank had placed on the record all the
G relevant documents which clearly establish that the
  appellant had exceeded his discretionary powers in
  purchasing the cheques and issuing demand drafts to
  show undue favour to the three construction companies
  named in the charge sheet. In view of the above, the
H findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer cannot be said
  AVINASH SADASHIV BHOSALE (D) THR. LRS. v.               91
              UNION OF INDIA
to be based on no evidence. It is a settled proposition         A
of law that the findings of Inquiry Officer cannot be
nullified so long as there is some relevant evidence in
support of the conclusions recorded by the Inquiry
Officer. In the present case, all the relevant documents
were produced in the Inquiry to establish the charges           B
levelled against the appellant. It is a matter of record that
the appellant did not doubt the authenticity of the
documents produced by the Bank. He merely stated that
the signature on the documents were not his. The
aforesaid statement of the appellant was nullified by           C
PW7, who appeared as a witness for the Bank. He clearly
stated that he recognized the signature of the appellant
as he had been working as his subordinate. In the
circumstances of the case, the appellant cannot take any
advantage of the findings of innocence recorded by the
criminal court. The 'clean chit' given by the Magistrate        D
was influenced by the failure of the prosecution to lead
the necessary evidence. No advantage of the same can
be taken by the appellant in the departmental
proceedings. [Paras 46, 47] [123-B-H; 124-A-B]
                                                             E
     1.4. Also it cannot be said that the order by the
Disciplinary Authority was vitiated by non-application of
mind. The Disciplinary Authority was alive to all the
submissions made by the appellant and had taken into
consideration all the relevant material and only then F
concluded that the charges have been duly proved
against the appellant. Furthermore, it is a matter of record
that the appellant was duly supplied a copy of the Inquiry
Report and he had submitted detailed objections to the
same. These objections were placed before the G
Disciplinary Authority together with the Inquiry Report.
Therefore, the appellant cannot possibly claim that there
has been a breach of rule of natural justice. Similarly, the
Appellate Authority has also given cogent reasons in
support of its conclusion. This is also apparent from the H
    92      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A   extract of the order of the Appellate Authority. [Paras 48,
    49) [124-A-F]

         G.M. Tank vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. (2006) 5 SCC 446:
    2006 (2) Suppl. SCR 253; Union of India & Ors. vs. Naman
B   Singh Shekhawat (2008) 4 SCC 1: 2008 (5) SCR 137 and
    Pritam Singh & Anr. vs. State of Punjab AIR 1956 SC 415 -
    distinguished.

        Ajit Kumar Nag vs. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil
    Corpn. Ltd., Haldia & Ors. (2005) 7 SCC 764: 2005 (3) Suppl.
C   SCR 314 and Depot Manager, A.P. State Road Transport
    Corporation vs. Mohd. Yousuf Miya & Ors. (1997) 2 SCC 699:
    1996 (8) Suppl. SCR 941 - held applicable.

        Divisional Controller, Karnataka State Road Transport
D   Corporation vs. M. G. Vittal Rao. (2012) 1 SCC 442: 2011 (14)
    SCR 1089 - relied on.                                  ·

        Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank & Ors.
    (2009) 2 SCC 570: 2008 (17) SCR 1476; Calcutta Dock
    Labour Board & Ors. vs. Jaffar Imam 1965 3 SCR 453;
E   Subhash Chand vs. State of Rajasthan (2002) 1 SCC 702:
    2001 (4) Suppl. SCR 163; Omar Salay Mohd Sait vs.
    Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras AIR 1959 SC 1238;
    Union of India vs. H.C. Goel AIR 1964 SC 364: 1964 SCR
    718; Narinder Mohan Arya vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.
F   & Ors. (2006) 4 SCC 713: 2006 (3) SCR 932; Capt. M. Paul
    Anthony vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. & Anr. (1999) 3 SCC 679:
    1999 (2) SCR 257 and Sawai Singh vs. State of Rajasthan
    (1986) 3 SCC 454: 1986 (2) SCR 957 - referred to.

                         Case Law Reference:
G
      2008 (17) SCR 1476           referred to      Para 29,34
      1965 3 SCR 453               referred to      Para 29, 35

      2001 (4) Suppl. SCR 163      referred to      Para 29, 36
H
  AVINASH SADASHIV BHOSALE (D) THR. LRS. v.               93
              UNION OF INDIA

  AIR 1959 SC 1238             referred to     Para 29, 37     A

  1964 SCR 718                 referred to     Para 29

  2006 (3) SCR 932             referred to     Para 29

  2006 (2) Suppl. SCR 253      distinguished Para 29,39        B
  ~008 (5) SCR 137             distinguished Para 29

  1999 (2) SCR 257             referred to     Para 29

  1986 (2) SCR 957             referred to     Para 29
                                                               c
  AIR 1956 SC 415              distinguished Para 29

  2011 (14) SCR 1089           relied on       Para 30

  2006 (3) SCR 932             referred to     Para 38

  2005 (3) Suppl. SCR 314                                      D
                               held applicable Para 39
  1996 (8) Suppl. SCR 941      held applicable Para 39

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
7005 of 2012.
                                                               .E
    From the Judgment & Order dated 30.03.2005 of the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No. 8606 of
2004.

    Sushil Kumar Jain, Dr. M. Shah Alam Khan, Sarad Kumar      F
Singhania for the Appellant.

    Rakesh Dwivedi, Sanjay Kapur, Ashmi Mohan, Priyanka
Das, Anmol Chandan for the Respondents.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                 G

    SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J. 1. Leave granted.

    2. This appeal by special leave is directed against the
judgment and order dated 30th March, 2005 passed in the Writ
                                                               H
    94       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A Petition No. 8606 of 2004 by the High Court of Bombay, by
  which the writ petition against the order of dismissal of the
  petitioner from service dated 19th July, 2003 and the order
  passed by the Appellate Authority on 27th July, 2004 affirming
  the said order of the dismissal was dismissed in limine.
B
       3. Before adverting to the facts leading to the filing of the
  present appeal, we must notice that the petitioner Mr. Avinash
  Sadashiv Bhosale died during the pendency of this appeal. His
  legal heirs have been brought on record, in his place. However,
C for the sake of convenience, he shall be referred to as Mr.
  Bhosale or as the appellant whichever is appropriate.

      4. It appears that Mr. Bhosale joined the services of
  respondent No.2 Bank as a Probationary Officer on 31st July,
  1975. He was confirmed as an Officer in Junior Management
D Grade Scale-I on 31st July, 1977. In course of time, he was
  promoted to Middle Management Scale-II (August, 1984).
  Thereafter, he was further promoted as Officer in Middle
  Management Scale-Ill in August, 1994. In course of time, he
  was posted as the Branch Manager at Washi Turbhe branch
E on 31st January, 1998 and was officiating in the Senior
  Management Scale-IV.

        5. Whilst he was working at Washi Turbhe branch, it was
  discovered that the branch had indulged in fraudulent
  transactions to the tune of Rs. 12 crores. Ori 8th July, 1998, the
F appellant was relieved from the branch of the aforesaid bank,
  presumably due to his alleged involvement in the said
  transactions. On 16th July, 1998, he apparently reported the
  fraud to the Crime Branch, CBD, Belapur, Navi Mumbai. The
  A.G.M. in charge of the Region IV, State Bank of India, Zonal
G Office, Mumbai was also informed. In the complaint made to
  the police, he had requested that the culprits who are involved
  in the fraud be identified. He had also asked the police to
  initiate suitable action against the culprits in accordance with
  law.
H
  AVINASH SADASHIV BHOSALE (D) THR. LRS. v.                    95
   UNION OF !NOIA [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
     6. It is claimed by Mr. Bhosale that instead of taking action   A
on the complaint submitted by him, the A.G.M. on 22nd July,
1998 wrote to the police indicating that the appellant had no
locus standi to file the complaint. It was stated that Mr. Bhosale
"is not an authorised person to lodge a complaint on behalf of
the Bank, since he himself is involved in the alleged offence in     B
the above matter." As noticed earlier, the appellant was relieved
from the Branch on 8th July, 1998. He had protested that he
had an excellent and unblemished service record in the Bank
for the past 23 years. He maintained that he was entirely
innocent and did not commit any breach of the service                c
regulations of the bank. He pointed out that he proceeded on
leave on account of sickness on 26th March 1998 and also that
he was mostly either on leave or on some outdoor assignment
duties during the period immediately preceding the detection
of the said fraudulent transactions. Further, it has been claimed
                                                                     0
that certain officials in the Bank in connivance with each other
committed fraud by purchasing cheques without his knowledge.

      7. The appellant was suspended from service on 23rd July,
1998 alongwith one Mr. Yadneshwar Choudhary. However, the
latter was soon reinstated in service as he was not made a co-       E
accused in the criminal proceedings initiated against Mr.
Bhosale and three other co-accused.

      8. It appears that after completion of investigation by the
police, the appellant was prosecuted for having committed the        F
offences punishable under Sections 120(B), 420, 467, 468,
4 71 and 201 of Indian Penal Code alongwith three others who
were the account holders. By judgment dated 4th December,
2001, Mr. Bhosale and the other co-accused were acquitted
of all the charges.
                                                                     G
    9. Simultaneously to the criminal proceedings, the
respondent bank had initiated departmental proceedings
against Mr. Bhosale. He was served a charge sheet dated 14th
January, 2000 containing articles of charge and statement of
imputation of misconduct in terms of Rule 68(2)(iii) of the State    H
    96       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A   Bank of India Officers Service Rules, 1992 (hereinafter referred
    to as the "1992 Rules"). In the aforesaid charge sheet certain
    specific and serious allegations have been made against Mr.
    Bhosale. The statement of imputation alleges that after his
    transfer at Washi Turbhe Branch on 31st January, 1998 from
B   Rabala Trans Thane Creek Branch, he permitted M/s Kalgindar
    Construction Company Pvt. Ltd. to open a current account at
    Washi Turbhe Branch without completing the required
    formalities. Further, the account was allegedly opened with a
    view to accommodate the said construction company at a later
c   date by executing the fictitious Demand Draft (D.D.) purchase
    transactions. The statement of imputation thereafter tabulates
    the departure from established norms which are to be observed
    by the Bank for DD purchase. It is alleged that Mr. Bhosale
    indiscriminately and without any justification authorised D.D.
    purchase of 11 cheques aggregating to Rs.5,51,51,070/- drawn
0
    in favour of M/s Kalgindar Construction Company Pvt. Ltd. and
    presented by it for credit of proceeds thereof to its Current
    Account. All the cheques so discounted except one for Rs.5 lacs
    were beyond the discretionary powers vested in Mr. Bhosale.
    While allowing D.D. purchases, no D.D. purchase limit was
E   fixed for the said construction company, nor was the
     genuineness of the transactions or credentials of the parties
     ascertained by Mr. Bhosale. All the D.D. purchase transactions
     in question were also not reported to the Controllers. The high
    value cheques were allowed to be handed over to the
F    representative of the said construction Company, instead of
     dispatching them to the Bank's branch located at the centre by
     Regd. A.O. Post. This deliberate action of Mr. Bhosale
     facilitated the said construction company to perpetrate a fraud
     on the Bank as the said cheques did not reach the drawee
G    Banks.

       10. Charge No.2 narrates a similar incident where Mr.
  Bhosale allowed M/s. Kumar Constructions Company, a
  proprietory firm, to open a current account on 15th June, 1998
H without making enquiries of antecedents of the proprietor and
  AVINASH SADASHIV BHOSALE (0) THR. LRS. v.                        97
   UNION OF INDIA [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]

completing the other required formalities with a malafide                A
intention to accommodate the aforesaid company at a later
date by allowing fictitious D.D. purchase of cheques.
Thereafter, the actual details of the D.D. purchase are
tabulated.
                                                                         B
      11. The third Charge in the list of allegation relates to
 M/s. Kalani Builders and Developers Pvt. Ltd., dealing in
 construction business. The aforesaid company submitted a
 proposal prepared by a Chartered Accountant for being
 extended credit facilities. Based on the aforesaid proposal, Mr.        C
 Bhosale sanctioned cash credit limit of Rs.20 lacs (fund based)
 and Rs.20 lacs (non-fund based). All this was done by him
without making independent enquiries, carrying out pre-
 sanction survey, arranging visits by the field officer or by himself,
 properly scrutinizing and appraising the proposal, compiling an
 opinion report on the borrowers and the guarantors and                  D
 obtaining recommendations of the field officer. Mr. Bhosale,
 within a period of one month from the date of sanction of cash
 credit limit on 1st June, 1998 permitted D.D. purchase of a high
value cheque for Rs.31,00,980/-, which was beyond his
discretionary powers. He had not ascertained the genuineness             E
of the large value D.D. purchase transaction nor made enquiries
about the credentials of the drawer of the cheque. He also
allowed cash withdrawals of Rs.30 lacs. Further, he directed
the Dispatch Clerk to hand over the said purchased cheque to
the representative of the said company for dispatching it to the         F
drawee Bank instead of dispatching it by Regd. A.O. Post.
Charge No. 3(iii) alleges that on 9th May, 1998, Mr. Bhosale
issued a Letter of Credit for Rs.19,87;000/- on behalf of Mis.
Kalani Builders Pvt. Ltd., without proper scrutiny/assessment
of the required particulars. Even the counter guarantee was not          G
obtained, nor was it ensured that obligations of- the said
company would be met on due date. Due to his reckless
financing and allowing D.D. purchase to M/s. Kalani Builders
and Developers Pvt. Ltd., the Bank suffered a huge financial
loss to the extent of Rs.70 lacs. He wanted to conceal the facts         H
    98       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A of his irregular financing and, therefore, he did not obtain prior
  sanction of the Controllers or reported for post facto
  confirmation of the Controllers.

        12. Charge No.4 alleges that Mr. Bhosale indiscriminately
B sanctioned loan aggregating to Rs.56.43 lacs to 19 borrowers
  under "Big Buy Scheme for purchase of vehicles during 30th
  April, 1998 to 1st June, 1998." In these transactions, quantum
  of loans was to be related to the income of the borrowers.
  However, this basic factor was totally neglected.

C      13. Charge No. 5 points to the expenditure of Rs. 4.35 lacs
  incurred by Mr. Bhosale during the period from March, 1998
  to June, 1998 for carrying out repairs to Bank's Property and
  providing furniture at the Branch. This was done without inviting
  any competitive quotations and without seeking approval from
D the Controlling Authority.

       14. Charge No.6 relates to 86 bills of stationery items
  amounting to Rs.1.16 lacs. Here again, the expenditure was
  incurred without seeking sanction from the Controlling Authority.
E On the basis of the aforesaid allegations, it was held that Mr.
  Bhosale failed to discharge his duty with utmost integrity,
  honesty, devotion and diligence to ensure and protect the
  interest of the Bank and acted in a manner in violation of Rule
  50(4) of the 1992 Rules.

F      15. Thereafter, the enquiry proceedings were initiated
  against Mr. Bhosale. Mr. P.P. Thomas, Officer, Senior
  Management Grade Scale-V was appointed as the Inquiry
  Officer on 30th June, 2000. The preliminary hearings of the
  inquiry were scheduled to be held on 7th September, 2001 and
G 25th September, 2001, none of which were attended by Mr.
  Bhosale, despite being reminded in advance by the Inquiry
  Officer. Consequently, the preliminary hearing proceedings
  were held ex-parte. The regular hearing of the inquiry was
  scheduled for 17th January, 2002. Again, Mr. Bhosale
H expressed his inability to attend the same on account of
  AVINASH SADASHIV BHOSALE (0) THR. LRS. v.                      99
   UNION OF INDIA [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
sickness. The hearing of the inquiry was, therefore, postponed         A
to 18th March, 2002, whereupon the regular hearing was
conducted by the Inquiry Officer, in the presence of the
presenting officer Mr. D.R. Bapat and Mr. Bhosale. The entire
evidence, including the statement of Mr. Suresh Mahadeva
Mahale was recorded in the presence of Mr. Bhosale. Mr.                B
Mahale was working as a dispatcher at Washi Turbhe Branch
during the period when the irregularities were committed
thereat. Further, both Mr. Bhosale and the presenting officer
were directed to submit their respective written briefs.
Consequently, the presenting officer submitted a brief on 8th          c
April, 2002, whereas Mr. Bhosale submitted his brief on 6th
June, 2002.

     16. Finally, the Inquiry Officer submitted his report on 19th
August, 2002, whereby it was held that all the charges have
been proved against Mr. Bhosale. A copy of the Inquiry Officer's       D
report was made available to Mr. Bhosale for his submissions.
It appears from the record that Mr. Bhosale had submitted a
detailed defence to the findings of the Inquiry Officer. Ultimately,
the Disciplinary Authority in its Order dated 19th July 2003
rejected all the pleas raised in defence by the appellant. Upon        E
careful examination of the entire material on record, the
disciplinary authority passed the following effective order:-

     "The C.O. has also contended that the I.A. has not taken
     into consideration the acquittal of the C.O. in the criminal      F
     case as a sufficient and judicial proof of there being no
     misconduct on his part. He has further stated that the I.A.
     has not considered the fact finding reports compiled by the
     Bank officials S/S. Vasant Karve and Mukand Joshi, which
     have not implicated the C.O. for the lapses mentioned in          <3
     the charge sheet served on him.

     The Court has acquitted the C.O. of offences punishable
     under Indian Penal Code, whereas the departmental action
     is for his misconduct in terms of Rules 66 of the SBIOSR.
                                                                       H
    100       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A         The above submissions have no relevance to the
          allegations inasmuch as the allegations levelled against the
          C.O. have been inquired by the I.A. in the departmental
          enquiry as per the procedures adopted I in-vogue in
          departmental enquiry. Reasonable opportunity was given
B         to the C.O. to put up his defence before the I.A. After
          evaluating the evidence brought before the inquiry, the I.A.
          has held the allegations as proved.

          On a careful examination and consideration, the
          submissions of the C.O. are found to be not convincing and
c         hence not acceptable. I, therefore, considering the case
          in its entirety in my capacity as the Disciplinary and
          Appointing Authority, hold all the allegations and the charge
          as a whole as "Proved" on sufficient and acceptable
          evidence. The proven allegations are very serious in nature
D         which have exposed the Bank to substantial financial loss.
          The proven misconduct evidently speaks of lack of honesty
          and integrity on the part of the Charged Officer.
          Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, I
          am of the view that retaining the officer in the Bank's
E         Service is fraught with grave risks. I, therefore, consider
          that imposition of penalty of "Dismissal" under rule 670) of
          the State Bank of India Officers Service Rules on Shri A.
          S. Bhosale, Officer, MMGS Ill (under suspension), would
          meet the ends of justice, treating the period of suspension
F         undergone by the official, as such. I order accordingly.

          The C.O. may, if he so desires, prefer an appeal against
          this order to the Appellate Authority within 45 days from
          tbe date of receipt thereof in terms of Rule 69(1) and (2)
          ibid."
G
       17. Against the aforesaid order of dismissal, Mr. Bhosale
  preferred a statutory appeal on 19th August, 2003 under the
  1992 Rules. Upon consideration of the submissions made by
  Mr. Bhosale in the appeal by Order dated 27th February, 2004,
H the Appellate Authority (Chief General Manager) dismissed the
 AVINASH SADASHIV BHOSALE (0) THR. LRS. v.                   101
  UNION OF INDIA [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]

same. The relevant observations made by the Appellate               A
Authority are as under:-

   "I have examined the entire reco(ds of the case and on
   the basis thereof observe as under, seriatim:

     (i)    The contentions of the appellant are without basis.     B
            The entire inquiry process has been correctly
            followed and fair opportunity has been provided to
            the appellant to defend himself.

     (ii)   The Inquiry Authority in his report has unequivocally   c
            stated that the preliminary hearing, which was to be
            held on 17th August, 2001 was postponed to the
            7th September, 2001, due to the charged official's
            absence. Later the hearing scheduled for 7th
            September, 2001 was also postponed to 25th              D
            September, 2001, for the same reasons. The
            appellant's submission that the Inquiring Authority
            was biased therefore has no basis.

    (iii)   The appellant's contention seems to be an after
            thought since in the Regular hearing on the 18th        E
            March, 2002, the appellant did not raise objections
            on this count. Moreover, during the hearing, the
            appellant confirmed having received these
            documents (presenting Officer's exhibits).
                                                                    F
    (iv)    It is apparent from the inquiry proceedings that the
            defence was provided a fair opportunity to defend
            itself. The appellant's attempt to cry foul at this
            juncture is therefore not valid.
                                                                    G
    (v)     This argument of the appellant does not have any
            basis. The charge sheet had clearly outlined these
            details.

    (vi)    The process followed in a departmental inquiry is
                                                                    H
    102           SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A                  distinctly different from that followed in a
                   proceedings before the court. The appellant's
                   ~ontention is therefore not acceptable.

          (vii)    The appellant cannot disclaim responsibility on this
                   count. As the head of the Branch, he should have
B
                   ensured that the Bank's instruction relating to
                   dispatch of instruments (DD Purchased) should
                   have been meticulously followed. Moreover, PW-1
                   (the dispatch clerk) has confirmed in the
                   proceedings held on 18th March, 2002 that the
c                  covers containing the instruments were delivered at
                   the behest of the appellant.

          (viii) The Inquiring Authority's conclusion that the initials
                 on the Demand Liability Register were those of the
D                appellant is supported by reasoned logic. The
                 Inquiring Authority has lucidly portrayed as to how
                 he reached such a conclusion.

          (ix)     al   Allegation 1 (i) & (ii) :

E                  The appellant cannot disown the fact that cheques
                   were purchased for large amounts. He further
                   cannot disassociate himself by stating that other
                   officers permitted the withdrawals in the account.
                   Moreover, the officials who permitted these
F                  withdrawals had done so, on the basis of the credit
                   balance available in the account(s).

                   (b) Allegation 1(iii) :

                   In addition to stating that the cheques were
G                  delivered to the beneficiary at the instructions of
                   Shri Balkawade, the witness had affirmed that
                   these were also delivered at the behest of the
                   appellant. His contention that the prosecution did
                   not introduce key witness is irrelevant.
H
AVINASH SADASHIV BHOSALE (D) THR. LRS. v.                103
 UNION OF INDIA [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
       (c) Allegation 1(iv) :                                    A

       The submission of the appellant has no basis.

       (d) Allegation 2(i) and (ii) :

       It has been proved in the inquiry that DD Purchases       B
       were authorised by the appellant. His attempt to
       pass the responsibility to officials who passed the
       withdrawals in the account is not appreciated.
       Further, it is a fact that tee account was not properly
       introduced.                                               c
       (e) Allegation2(iii), (iv) and (v) :

       The appellant is merely trying to raise vague issues.
       As already stated earlier, the Inquiry Authority has
       very aptly concluded that the initials in the Demand      D
       Liability Register were that of the appellant.

        (f) Allegation 3 :

       By merely stating that the documents were in the
       custody of the Field Officer, the appellant cannot        E
       disclaim responsibility. It was also open to the
       appellant to produce the field Officer as a defence
       witness.

       (g) Allegation 4:                                         F
       The allegation have been proved based on the
       documentary evidence produced by the Presenting
       Officer in the course of the inquiry proceeding. The
       appellant has during the regular hearing held on          G
       18th March, 2002 confirmed having verified the
       documents. His contention that no document was
       produced in the ihquiry is therefore incorrect.

        (h) Allegation 5 :
    104          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A                 The allegation has been proved based on
                  documentary evidence. Splitting of Bills has been
                  proved from the fact that 111 bills were paid in
                  respect of 7 items of expenditure.

                  (i) Allegation 6 :
B
                  The allegation was proved based on documentary
                  evidence. From the evidence brought out in the
                  inquiry it is apparent that the appellant split bills
                  pertaining to stationery items, in order to ensure that
c                 the amount of the split bills falls within his
                  discretionary powers.

          (x)     Although there has been some delay in the issuance
                  of the charge sheet, the appellant's claim that it had
D                 amounted to denial of opportunity to establish his
                  innocence is not maintainable.

          (xi)    The Honourable Court had acquitted the appellant
                  on the subject matter of criminal conspiracy. The
                  appellant cannot draw a parallel between the
E                 findings of the departmental proceedings and the
                  Court's verdict.

                  Having so considered the various points brought
                  out in the appeal, I am of the view that the appellant
F                 has not been able to put forth any convincing point
                  of merit. The appellant has committed serious and
                  grave irregularities. There is therefore no scope for
                  modification of the penalty imposed on him. I
                  therefore reject the appeal and order accordingly."
G        18. Mr. Bhosale challenged the orders passed by the
    Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority by filing
    Writ Petition No. 8606 of 2004 in the High Court of Judicature
    at Bombay by Order dated 30th March, 2005. The writ petition
    was dismissed by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court
H
  AVINASH SADASHIV BHOSALE (D) THR. LRS. v.                       105
   UNION OF INDIA [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
in limine. The aforesaid Order of the High Court is challenged            A
by Mr. Bhosale in this appeal.

     19. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at
length.

     20. Mr. Sushil Kumar Jain, learned counsel appearing for             8
the appellant submits that the disciplinary proceedings
conducted against Mr. Bhosale are vitiated as he was acquitted
by the Criminal Court. All the offences for which Mr. Bhosale
was tried, and then acquitted by the criminal court, were
founded on the facts which form the basis of the departmental             C
enquiry. It has been emphasized that the departmental
proceedings ought to have been stayed during the pendency
of the criminal trial. Once the appellant had been acquitted by
the trial court in its judgment dated 4th December, 2001, the
appellant ought to have been reinstated forthwith.                        D

       21. Mr. Jain submits that continuation of departmental
proceedings after the appellant was acquitted in the criminal
trial is in violation of the principle underlying Article 20(2) of the
Constitution of India. He argues that the statement of                    E
imputations of misconduct clearly show that the foundational
facts on which the criminal charges were based are also the
facts forming the basis of the charges levelled against the
appellant. The learned counsel made a detailed and elaborate
reference to the findings recorded by the learned Magistrate,
                                                                          F
in support of the submissions that there was clearly no evidence
against the appellant on the basis of which the charges could
be said to have been proved.

    22. He pointed out that the learned trial court after
considering the entire evidence on record has held and                    G
observed as under:-

     "18 ............ If at all any foul play was played at the time of
     purchasing the cheques, persons like witness no.12
     Yadneshwar Choudhary and others were responsible for                 H
    106        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A         it who were passing the cheques and putting their
          signatures. Instead of prosecuting such persons,
          prosecution has made them witnesses. In this way, when
          these persons are themselves at fault in the episode,
          naturally they will try to save their own skin when entered
B         in the witness box therefore their evidence carries least
          evidentiary value.

          23 ........ Sufficient evidence has come on record that
          d,uring the period of transactions effected in between
          accused Nos.1, 3 and 4 with the aggrieved bank, all these
c         bank officers were working in the bank and were taking
          active participation. If really any guilt is committed why all
          these persons are left at liberty by the prosecution and how
          they can be believed in the court. It has come on record
          that P.W. No.12 Yadneshwar Choudhary is suspended
D         from his service only because of this case. Neither the
          Bank Officers nor the police is coming forward to make
          such a person accused in the case.

          28 ........... Mr. Bhave is very specific in stating that if the
E         despatch clerk fails to follow this practice, he is personally
          liable for the breach. Admittedly, the accused No.2 never
          issued any direction in writing to the despatch clerk to give
          the cheques by hand delivery.

          30 ......... Witness No.7 Suresh Mahadik who is despatch
F         clerk himself is responsible and faulty in discharging his
          _duty.

          Witness No.1 O Vinayak Kadam, witness No.11 Arun
          Balakawade, witness No.12 Yadneshwar Choudhary are
G         all employees of the same bank where the incident has
          taken place. Not only this, but they actively participated in
          the transaction in question. Therefore to save their own
          skin, they may blame the Branch Manager. As such their
          evidence cannot be believed."
H
  AVINASH SADASHIV BHOSALE (D) THR. LRS. v.                   107
   UNION OF INDIA [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
     23. Relying on the aforesaid observations, Mr. Jain              A
submitted that the entire departmental proceedings are vitiated
as the appellant has been made scapegoat for the misconduct
committed by other employees of the bank who were acting in
connivance with each other. According to Mr. Jain, the fraud
could not have been committed unless there was connivance             B
at every level from the Clerk to the Deputy Manager. It is for
this reason that Yadneshwar Chaudhary was reinstated in
service and then used as a witness against the appellant. Mr.
Jain emphasised that inspite of efforts made by the respondent-
Bank the learned Judicial Magistrate had clearly held that there      C
is no evidence of criminal conspiracy against the appellant.
Hence, he was acquitted of the offences punishable under
Section 120-B IPC with the following observations :-

          "In the result, I come to a firm conclusion that the
     accused are entitled to get clean chit in the matter".           D

      24. Mr. Jain also pointed out to certain other observations
made by the learned Magistrate to demonstrate that the enquiry
proceedings are vitiated by legal mala-fides as the same were
initiated and conducted against the appellant with the oblique        E
purpose of shielding the real culprits. He points out to the
observations made by the trial court to demonstrate that there
was no breach of the service regulations. It is pointed out by
the learned trial court that the bank had failed to place on record
any rule which would show that the appellant was empowered
                                                                      F
to purchase a cheque only to the extent of Rs.6 lacs. The trial
court further pointed out that the bank had also not placed on
record any document or resolution to prove that there was a
limit of Rs.6 lacs for purchase of cheques by the appellant. The
trial court further observed that:-
                                                                      G
     "If there was really any such rule then how all the bank
     officers actively participated in the process of purchasing
     cheques against or contrary to such so-called rule. Even
     the bank officers who have stepped in the witness Box did
                                                                      H
    108       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A         not feel shy to state that they are not fully conversant with
          banking rules."

        25. The learned trial court also adverted to the evidence
    of Witness No.16 as follows:-

B         "20. Witness No.16 Vinay Bhave who is Senior Officer of
          the bank working as a Regional Manager. He also in his
          examination-in-chief itself stated that he used to receive
          weekly reports of all the branches on every Friday including
          the branch in question, and he used to scrutinize the
C         reports. If this gentleman was scrutinizing the reports on
          every Friday, how and why he kept mum when the cheques
          of more than Rupees 6,00,000/- were purchased in the
          concerned bank. This witness has tried to shift
          responsibility upon another bank officer named Shri
o         Karve."

        26. The learned trial court further pointed out that the Bank
  rules were not known even to the other Senior Officers. Mr. Jain
  has made a reference to the observations made by the learned
  trial court whilst considering the evidence of PW-11, Arun
E Balkawade, who was a Senior Officer of the bank. In fact, he
  was next in the designation to the Chief Manager of Washi
  Turbhe branch at the material time. Even this witness admitted
  that he does not know fully all the rules and regulations
  regarding 0.0. purchase of cheques. Learned trial court also
F concluded that since the other bank employee had actively
  participated in the fraudulent transactions, their statements
  could not be relied upon. Summing up the entire evidence,
  learned trial court had come to a firm conclusion that the
  accused are entitled to get "clean chit" in the matter. Relying
G on the aforesaid observations, Mr. Jain submitted that the
  acquittal of the appellant is proof of the total inability of the bank
  to produce any evidence in the trial. The appellant was
  acquitted as there was no evidence of culpability against him.

          27. Relying on a number of judgments of this Court, Mr.
H
  AVINASH SADASHIV BHOSALE (0) THR. LRS. v.                   109
   UNION OF INDIA [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
Jain has submitted that the submissions made by the appellant         A
before the Disciplinary Authority have been totally ignored
without any basis. According to Mr. Jain, the Departmental
Enquiry conducted against the appellant was an eye wash. In
the Departmental Enquiry, the bank examined only one witness
PW-7, Suresh Mahadik, who has been disbelieved by the                 B
criminal court. Such a witness who has been proved to be not
truthful could not have been relied upon, in the departmental
enquiry. He points out that the criminal court recorded a
categorical finding that there is no evidence to connect any
particular officer with the non-completion of the proper              c
documentation. In the face of such a finding, the Inquiry Officer,
without any basis recorded the finding that the charge was
proved against the appellant. Similarly, the evidence of Suresh
Mahadik having been ignored by the learned trial court, no
reliance could have been placed on the same by the Inquiry            D
officer. Mr. Jain further pointed out that in the departmental
enquiry, the bank had failed to produce any document or
evidence by leading oral evidence. All the documents were
merely placed on record by an employee of the bank. Mr. Jain
further pointed out that the bias of the inquiry officer as well as   E
the bank is obvious from the fact that all the employees involved
in the completion of the transactions were neither prosecuted
nor proceeded against departmentally. On the other hand, these
individuals have been examined as prosecution witnesses.
Having been acquitted, there was no justification for the bank
to hold a departmental enquiry on the same facts and on the           F
basis of same evidence.

     28. Mr. Jain then submitted that the order passed by the
appellate authority is vitiated as it has been passed with a
closed mind. None of the submissions made by the appellant            G
in the written submissions have been considered by the
appellate authority. Further more, the submissions which have
been considered have not been considered on the basis of the
relevant material which was placed before the appellate
authority.                                                            H
    110         SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A      29. In support of these submissions, Mr. Jain relied on
    some judgments of this Court which are as follows:-

        Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank & Ors.1,
  Calcutta Dock Labour Board & Ors. Vs. Jaffar lmam 2 ,
                                          3
8 Subhash Chand Vs. State of Rajasthan , Omar Salay4
                                                         Mohd
  Sait Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras , Union of
  India Vs. H. C. Goe/5, Narinder Mohan Arya Vs. United India
  Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. 6, G.M. Tank Vs. State of Gujarat &
  Ors. 7, Union of India & Ors. Vs. Naman Singh Shekhawat, 8
  Capt. M. Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. & Anr. 9 ,
C Sawai Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan10 , and Pritam Singh &
  Anr. Vs. State of Punjab 11 .

        30. Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel appearing
  for respondent Nos. 2 to 5 has submitted that acquittal in a
D criminal case is not a bar for holding departmental proceedings
  against the bank official. Learned counsel pointed out that the
  proceedings before the criminal trial are different in nature to
  the proceedings in a Departmental Enquiry. Whereas
  prosecution had to prove the guilt of the accused in the criminal
E trial beyond reasonable doubt, in the departmental enquiry, the
  standard of proof is only preponderance of probabilities. Mr.
  Dwivedi further submitted that the appellant cannot take any
  advantage of non-production of the relevant evidence by the

    1.   (2009) 2 sec 510.
F
    2.   1965 2 SCR 453.
    3.   (2002) 1 sec 102.
    4.   AIR 1959 SC 1238.
    5.   AIR 1964 SC 364.

G 6.     (2006) 4 sec 713.
  7.     (2006) 5 sec 446.
    8.   (2008) 4 sec 1.
    9.   (1999) 3 sec 679.
    1o. (1986) 3 sec 454.
H 11. AIR 1956 SC 415.
 AVINASH SADASHIV BHOSALE (D) THR. LRS. v.                   111
  UNION OF INDIA [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
prosecution in the trial. The lapse committed by the prosecuting    A
agency cannot be attributed to the bank. Further more, in the
prosecution, the emphasis was on the involvement of
individuals in a criminal conspiracy to defraud the bank. In the
departmental proceedings, charges levelled against the
appellant are that he has failed to maintain absolute devotion      B
to duty. The charges were that he had disregarded the
provisions of the bank regulations. Therefore, two proceedings
cannot be placed in the same category. Mr. Dwivedi pointed
out that, at the relevant time, the hierarchy in the Branch put
the Branch Manager at the top. Below him were the Field             C
Officer, Accountant, Cashier, Dispatch Clerk and a Peon. As
a Branch Manager, the appellant was the controller of all the
affairs of the branch. He had to ensure that all necessary
precautions had been taken to prevent any loss being caused
to the bank. The learned senior counsel pointed out that the
appellant was in-charge of a small branch. Therefore, had he        D
exercised due care and caution, such a massive fraud could
not have taken place. Therefore, there was no overlap between
the criminal proceedings and the departmental proceedings.
In the criminal trial, the prosecution had to prove that the
appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt that he had            E
conspired with the other officials of the Bank to commit the
offences with which he had been charged. In the departmental
proceedings, the enquiry was to investigate as to whether the
appellant had performed his duties as a Branch Manager in
strict adherence to the procedural rules/regulations of the Bank.   F
He, therefore, refutes the submission of Mr. Jain that there is
any infringement of any principle underlying Article 20(2) of the
Constitution of India. In support of his submissions, Mr. Rakesh
Dwivedi relied on the judgment of this Court in Divisional
Controller, Kamataka State Road Transport Corporation Vs.           G
M. G. Vittal Rao12 .
    31.Answering the objections raised by Mr. Jain with
regard to the conduct of the departmental enquiry, Mr. Dwivedi
12. (2012) 1 sec 442.                                               H
    112       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A  pointed out that all documents were duly produced and proved
   during the enquiry proceedings. The prosecution had failed to
   produce the relevant documents during the criminal trial. During
   the Departmental Enquiry, the appellant was asked to verify
   about the authenticity of the documents. At no stage, the
B appellant complained about their lack of authenticity. The
   appellant only made one statement during the departmental
   enquiry that his initials for purchase of the demand drafts had
   not been proved. Mr. Dwivedi pointed out to the procedural
   lapses committed by the appellant. The authenticity of the
c  documents produced in the enquiry not having been doubted
   by the appellant, the findings of the Inquiry Officer can not be
   said to be based on no evidence. The appellant was aware that
   his limit for purchase of a cheque was Rs.6 lacs. Any purchase
  above Rs.6 lacs could only be done with the prior approval of
D the higher authorities. The appellant failed to take any prior
  approval from the higher authorities. In fact, the appellant never
  informed the higher authorities even after the transactions had
   been completed. Mr. Dwivedi pointed out that the transactions
  involved were so heavy, the appellant could not have failed to
E notice the irregularities. This would lead to a clear inference that
  either the appellant was acting in connivance with the account
  holders who were benefitted or he was grossly negligent in
  performance of his duties. Mr. Dwivedi then pointed out that
  once the appellant knew that the whole fraud has been exposed,
  he rushed to make a complaint to the police. Since by that time
F the higher officials had suspicion with regard to the conduct of
  the appellant, the police was informed not to act upon the
  complaint made by him. The actions of the appellant were in
  violation of Rules 48(4), 48(9), 66 and 67.

G        32. We have considered the submissions made by the
    learned counsel for the parties. We are not at all impressed by
    the submissions made by Mr. Jain.

        33. We may, however, briefly notice the ratio of the
H   judgments relied upon by the learned counsel.
  AVINASH SADASHIV BHOSALE (D) THR. LRS. v.                     113
   UNION OF INDIA [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]

       34. In Roop Singh Negi's case (supra), this Court has           A
reiterated the well known principle of law that findings of the
Enquiry Officer have to be based on some relevant evidence.
It is further re-stated that the orders passed by the disciplinary
authority and the appellate authority, must also be supported
by relevant reasons. The principles are stated thus :                  B

     "23. Furthermore, the order of the disciplinary authority as
     also the appellate authority are not supported by any
     reason. As the orders passed by them have severe civil
     consequences, appropriate reasons should have been                C
     assigned. If the enquiry officer had relied upon the
     confession made by the appellant, there was no reason
     as to why the order of discharge passed by the criminal
     court on the basis of selfsame evidence should not have
     been taken into consideration. The materials brought on
     record pointing out the guilt are required to be proved. A        0
     decision must be arrived at on some evidence, which is
     legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence Act may
     not be applicable in a departmental proceeding but the
     principles of natural justice are. As the report of the enquiry
     officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also surmises           E
     and conjectures, the same could not have been sustained.
     The inferences drawn by the enquiry officer apparently
     were not supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as is well
     known, however high may be, can under no circumstances
     be held to be a substitute for legal proof."                      F

     35. Similarly in Calcutta Dock Labour Board (supra) this
Court has emphasised the principle that suspicion, however
strong, cannot take the place bf prQof. The observations are
as under:-                                                             G
     "We are, therefore, satisfied that the Court of Appeal was
     right in taking the view that in a departmental enquiry which
     the appellant held against the respondents it was not open
     to the appellant to act on suspicion, inasmuch as the
     appellant's decision is clearly based upon the detention          H
    114        SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A         orders and nothing else, there can be little doubt that, in
          substance, the said conclusion is based on suspicion and
          nothing more".

         36. In the case of Subhash Chand (supra), it is
    emphasised that in order to avoid any innocent individual being
8
    picked up and branded as a culprit, the conclusions ought not
    to be based on doubtful or dubious circumstances treating them
    as of "beyond doubt" evidentiary value.

         37. Similarly in Omar Salay Mohd Sait's case (supra), this
C   Court again emphasised that the conclusions ought to be
    recorded by the disciplinary authority on the basis of cogent
    evidence.

         38. Mr. Jain then cited Union of India Vs. H.C. Goel
0   (supra). Here again, the Constitution Bench of this Court
    emphasised that the suspicion, however, strong cannot be
    treated as proof against the accused in a criminal trial or a
    delinquent officer in domestic enquiry. Mr. Jain also relied upon
    the judgment in the case of Narinder Mohan Arya Vs. United
E   India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors 13. In paragraph 44 of this
    judgment, it is observed by this Court as under:-

          ''The evidence adduced on behalf of the management must
          have nexus with the charges. The enquiry officer cannot
          base his findings on mere hypothesis. Mere ipse dixit on
F         his part cannot be a substitute of evidence."

         39. In G.M. Tank's case (supra), this Court was considering
    the case of an appellant, who had been acquitted by the Criminal
    Court. He had been prosecuted for having committed the
G   offence under Section 5(1)(e) read with Section 5(2) of the
    Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. Upon examination of the
    facts and the evidence, it was observed by this Court that there
    is not an iota of evidence against the appellant to hold that he
    is guilty of having committed the offences under the Prevention
H   13. c2006) 4 sec 713.
  AVINASH SADASHIV BHOSALE (D) THR. LRS. v.                 115
   UNION OF INDIA [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
of Corruption Act. It was further observed that the departmental    A
proceedings in the criminal case are based on identical and
similar (verbatim), set of facts and evidence. It is further
observed that in fact, respondents did not produce any evidence
in support of and/or about the alleged charges involved against
the appellant. The criminal proceedings were initiated against      B
the appellant for the offences under the Prevention of Corruption
Act on the same set of facts and evidence. which was the basis
of the departmental proceedings. The Court noticed the
observations made in the case of Ajit Kumar Nag Vs. General
Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., Haldia & Ors. 14, which       c
were as follows:-

     "11. As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal court
     is concerned, in our opinion, the said order does not
     preclude the Corporation from taking an action if it is
     otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the law is fairly well D
     settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an
     employer from exercising power in accordance with the
     Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings,
     criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They
     operate in different fields and have different objectives. E
     Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate·
     punishment on the offender, the purpose of enquiry
     proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally
     and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules.
     In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the F
     accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers
     is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of
     evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental
     proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to
     order a conviction is different from the degree of proof G
     necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The
     rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two
     proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of
     proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is
14. (2005) 7 sec 764.                                               H
    116       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A         able to prove the guilt of the accused "beyond reasonable
          doubt", he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a
          departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be
          imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded
          on the basis of "preponderance of probability". Acquittal
B         of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does
          not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the
          disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We are,
          therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the appellant
          that since he was acquitted by a criminal court, the
c         impugned order dismissing him from service deserves to
          be quashed and set aside."

          The Court further noticed the observations of this Court in
    Depot Manager, A.P. State Road Transport Corporation Vs.
    Mohd. Yousuf Miya & Ors., 15 wherein this Court observed as
D follows:-

         "8 ................... The purpose of departmental enquiry and
         of prosecution are two different and distinct aspects. The
         criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for violation
E        of a duty, the offender owes to the society or for breach of
         which law has provided that the offender shall make
         satisfaction to the public. So crime is an act of
         commission in violation of law or of omission of public duty.
         The departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline in the
F        service and efficiency of public service. It would, therefore,
         be expedient that the disciplinary proceedings are
         conducted and completed as expeditiously as possible. It
         is not, therefore, desirable to lay down any guidelines as
         inflexible rules in which the departmental proceedings may
         or may not be stayed pending trial in criminal case against
G        the delinquent officer. Each case requires to be considered
         in the backdrop of its own facts and circumstances. There
         would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with
         departmental enquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the
H   1s. (1997) 2 sec 699.
AVINASH SADASHIV BHOSALE (D) THR. LRS. v.                 117
 UNION OF INDIA [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
  charge in the criminal trial is of grave nature involving A
  complicated questions of fact and law. Offence generally
  implies infringement of public (sic duty), as distinguished
  from mere private rights punishable under criminal law.
  When trial for criminal offence is conducted it should be
  in accordance with proof of the offence as per the B
  evidence defined under the provisions of the Evidence Act.
  Converse is the case of departmental enquiry. The enquiry
  in a departmental proceedings relates to conduct or
  breach of duty of the delinquent officer to punish him for
  his misconduct defined under the relevant statutory rules     c
  or law. That the strict standard of proof or applicability of
  the Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal
  position. The enquiry in the departmental proceedings
  relates to the conduct of the delinquent officer and proof
  in that behalf is not as high as in an offence in criminal
                                                                  0
  charge. It is seen that invariably the departmental enquiry
   has to be conducted expeditiously so as to effectuate
  efficiency in public administration and the criminal trial will
   take its own course. The nature of evidence in criminal trial
   is entirely different from the departmental proceedings. In
                                                                  E
   the former, prosecution is to prove its case beyond
   reasonable doubt on the touchstone of human conduct. The
   standard of proof in the departmental proceedings is not
   the same as of the criminal trial. The evidence also is
   different from the standard point of the Evidence Act. The
  evidence required in the departmental enquiry is not F
   regulated by the Evidence Act. Under these
   circumstances, what is required to be seen is whether the
  departmental enquiry would seriously prejudice the
   delinquent in his defence at the trial in a criminal case. It
   is always a question of fact to be considered in each case G
   depending on its own facts and circumstances. In this case,
   we have seen that the charge is failure to anticipate the
   accident and prevention thereof. It has nothing to do with
   the culpability of the offence under Sections 304-A and
    338, IPC. Under these circumstances, the High Court was H
    118        SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012) 9 S.C.R.


A         not right in staying the proceedings."

        Having noticed the aforesaid observations, the Court
    proceeded to distinguish the same with the following
    observations:-
B         "The judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing
          for the respondents are distinguishable on facts and on
          law. In this case, the departmental proceedings and the
          criminal case are based on identical and similar set of
          facts and the charge in a departmental case against the
c         appellant and the charge before the criminal court are one
          and the same. It is true that the nature of charge in the
          departmental proceedings and in the criminal case is
          grave. The nature of the case launched against the
          appellant on the basis of evidence and material collected
D         against him during enquiry and investigation and as
          reflected in the charge-sheet, factors mentioned are one
          and the same. In other words, charges, evidence,
          witnesses and circumstances are one and the same."

E      These observations are of no assistance to the appellant
  as the charges against him in the criminal trial were with regard
  to the commission of offences under Section 120(8), 420, 467,
  468, 471 and 201 of IPC. In the departmental proceedings, the
  appellant has been punished on the basis of the findings that
  he failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty,
F devotion and diligence. It was found that he had violated Rule
  50(4) of the 1992 Rules. In our opinion, it would be the ratio of
  law laid down in the cases of Ajit Kumar Nag (supra) and Depot
  Manager, A.P. State Road Transport Corporation (supra) that
  would be applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case.
G
       40. In the case of Union of India & Ors. Vs .. Naman Singh
    Shekhawat (supra), on facts, the whole departmental
  proceedings were held to be vitiated by bias. It was a case
  where the offences of the disciplinary authority were held to be
H based on no evidence. It was also a case where no witness
  AVINASH SADASHIV BHOSALE (D) THR. LRS. v.                      119
   UNION OF INDIA [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
was examined to prove the allegations against the respondent             A
Shekhawat. It was a case in which the only witness examined
on behalf of the disciplinary authority was the jeep driver, MS
who at the material time was accompanying the respondent.
Even this witness did not support the Department's case yet
the departmental authorities held the charges against the                B
respondent as proved. Besides, it was also found that the
respondent had not been allowed services of a defence
assistant of his choice. He was also not allowed to produce
defence witness J. In paragraph 27 of the judgment, this Court
observed that "the bias on the part of the inquiry officer is explicit   c
from the record. Why the inquiry officer cross-examined the
respondent is beyond anybody's comprehension. He was not
the prosecutor. A presenting officer had been appointed. The
inquiry officer could not have taken over the job of the
presenting officer, particularly when he was a superior officer."        0
     In our opinion, there is no parallel in the facts and
circumstances of the aforesaid case and the present case.

      41. In Capt M.Pau/ Anthony's case (supra), this Court
reiterated the well established principle of law that proceedings        E
in a criminal case and the departmental proceedings can
proceed simultaneously. It was emphasised that the basis for
this proposition is that proceedings in a criminal case and the
departmental proceedings operate in distinct and different
jurisdictional areas. The observations made in paragraph 13              F
which are relevant in the facts of this case are as under:-

     "As we·shall presently see, there is a consensus of judicial
     opinion amongst the High Courts whose decisions we do
     not intend to refer to in this case, and the various
     pronouncements of this Court, which shall be copiously              G
     referred to, on the basic principle that proceedings in a
     criminal case and the departmental proceedings can
     proceed simultaneously with a little exception. As we
     understand, the basis for this proposition is that
     proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental                 H
    120       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2012] 9 S.C.R.

A         proceedings operate in distinct and different jurisdictional
          areas. Whereas in the departmental proceedings, where
          a charge relating to misconduct is being investigated, the
          factors operating in the mind of the disciplinary authority
          may be many such as enforcement of discipline or to
B         investigate the level of integrity of the delinquent or the
          other staff, the standard of proof required in those
          proceedings is also different than that required in a criminal
          case. While in the departmental proceedings the standard
          of proof is one of preponderance of the probabilities, in a
c         criminal case, the charge has to be proved by the
          prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. The little exception
          may be where the departmental proceedings and the
          criminal case are based on the same set of facts and the
          evidence in both the proceedings is common without there
          being a variance."
D
         In our opinion, the facts of this case do not fall within the
  little exception culled out by this Court. The departmental
  proceedings herein and the criminal case are not grounded
  upon the same set of facts and the evidence. As noticed by
E the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority, the
  departmental proceedings related to honesty, integrity and
  devotion of the appellant as a very high ranking bank officer.
  On the basis of the evidence led before the enquiry officer, it
  was held that the appellant had failed to maintain the utmost
F integrity which is required for a bank officer.

       42. The judgment in Sawai Singh's case (supra) examined
  three main submissions made by the counsel for the appellant,
  namely (i) the charges were not clear (ii) there was no evidence
G to support the charges and on the contrary (iii) the evidence
  on record was contrary to the charges made. Upon examination
  of the evidence, it was held that there was a total absence of
  any cogent and reliable evidence against the appellant. It was,
  therefore, held that the findings of the enquiry officer are based
H on no evidence. It was also found that the charges levelled
  AVINASH SADASHIV BHOSALE (D) THR. LRS. v.                    121
   UNION OF INDIA [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
against the appellant were vague making it impossible for him          A
to answer the same. In Paragraph 14, this Court observed as
follows:

     "14. Quite apart from that fact, it appears to us that the
     charges were vague and it was difficult to meet the               8
     charges fairly by any accused. Evidence adduced was
     perfunctory and did not at all bring home the guilt of the
     accused."

     In paragraph 16, this court further emphasised that the
charges must be proved against the charge-sheeted employee             C
in accordance with rules of natural justice. The report of the
inquiry officer must demonstrate that there had been fair play
in action. This is a settled principle of law which has been duly
respected by the inquiry officer, the disciplinary authority as well
as the appellate authority in this case.                               D

     43. The judgment in Pritam Singh's case (supra), in our
opinion, has absolutely no relevance to the issues raised by the
learned counsel for the appellant.

     44. This Court recently reiterated the legal principle that       E
departmental proceedings can be conducted simultaneously to
the criminal trial in the case of Divisional Controller, Kamataka
State Road Transport Corporation Vs. M. G. Vittal Rao (supra).
In this case, making reference to almost all the previous
precedents, this Court has reiterated the legal position as            F
follows:-

      (a)   There is no legal bar for both proceedings to go on
            simultaneously.

      (b)   The only valid ground for claiming that the                G
            disciplinary proceedings may be stayed would be
            to ensure that the defence of the employee in the
            criminal case may not be prejudiced. But even such
            grounds would be available only in cases involving
            complex questions of facts and law.                        H
    122         SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A         (c)    Such defence ought not to be permitted to
                 unnecessarily delay the departmental proceedings.
                 The interest of the delinquent officer as well as the
                 employer clearly lies in a prompt conclusion of the
                 disciplinary proceedings.
B
          (d)    Departmental proceedings can go on
                 simultaneously to the criminal trial, except where
                 both the proceedings are based on the same set
                 of facts and the evidence in both the proceedings
                 is common.
c
         In our opinion, the principles culled out by this Court would
    be a complete answer to all the submissions made by Mr. Jain.

         45. In view of the aforesaid legal principles enunciated and
0 reiterated by this Court, we cannot accept that because the
   appellant had been prosecuted, the departmental proceedings
   could not have been continued simultaneously. As pointed out
   by Mr. Dwivedi, the charges against the appellant in the
   criminal trial related to the commission of criminal offences
E under Sections 120(B), 420, 467, 468, 471 and 201 of Indian
   Penal Code. The proof of criminal charges was depended upon
   prosecution producing proof beyond reasonable doubt relating
   to the culpability of the appellant alongwith other persons. In the
 . departmental proceedings, the basic charge was that appellant
   whilst posted as a Branch Manager of Washi Turbhe Branch,
F failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty,
   devotion and diligence to ensure and protect the interest of the
   Bank and acted in a manner unbecoming of a Bank Officer.
   The aforesaid charge clearly related to the manner in which the
   appellant performed the duties as the Manager of the Branch
G of the Bank. It had nothing to do with any criminal liability
   attaching to such conduct. It must be.emphasised that Bank
   officials act as trustees of funds deposited by the public with
   the Bank. They have an obligation to earn the trust and
   confidence of not only the account holders but also the general
H public. The standard of integrity required of the Bank officials,
  AVINASH SADASHIV BHOSALE (D) THR. LRS. v.                    123
   UNION OF INDIA [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
particularly the cashiers, accountants, auditors and the               A
Management at all levels, is like the Caesar's wife, they must
be above suspicion. Mr.Bhosale failed to maintain such high
standards of integrity. He therefore, acted in violation of Rule
50(4) of the 1992 Rules. We, therefore, do not find any merit
in the aforesaid submissions of Mr. Jain.                              B

      46. Mr. Dwivedi, in our opinion, has rightly pointed out that
the conduct of the criminal trial was in the hands of the
prosecuting agency. Having registered the First Information
Report, the Bank had little or no role to play, apart from
rendering assistance to the prosecuting agencies. In our               C
opinion, the failure of the prosecution in producing the
necessary evidence before the trial court can not have any
adverse impact on the evidentiary value of the material
produced by the Bank before the Inquiry Officer in the
departmental proceedings. Before the Inquiry Officer, the Bank         D
had placed on the record all the relevant documents which
clearly establish that the appellant had exceeded his
discretionary powers in purchasing the cheques and issuing
demand drafts to show undue favour to the three construction
companies named in the charge sheet. In view of the above,             E
the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer can not be said to
be based on no evidence. It is a settled proposition of law that
the findings of Inquiry Officer cannot be nullified so long as there
is some relevant evidence in support of the conclusions
recorded by the Inquiry Officer. In the present case, all the          F
relevant documents were produced in the Inquiry to establish
the charges levelled against the appellant. It is a matter of record
that the appellant did not doubt the authenticity of the
documents produced by the Bank. He merely stated that the
signature on the documents were not his. The aforesaid                 G
statement of the appellant was nullified by Mr. S.M. Mahadik,
who appeared as a witness for the Bank. He clearly stated that
he recognized the signature of the appellant as he had been
working as his subordinate.
                                                                       H
    124       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 9 S.C.R.

A        47. The findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer cannot be
    said to be based on no evidence. In such circumstances, the
    appellant cannot take any advantage of the findings of
    innocence recorded by the criminal court. The 'clean chit' given
    by the learned Magistrate was influenced by the failure of the
8   prosecution to lead the necessary evidence. No advantage of
    the same can be taken by the appellant in the departmental
    proceedings.

         48. We also do not find any merit in the submissions made
C by Mr. Jain that the order by the Disciplinary Authority is vitiated
   by non-application of mind. The extracts reproduced above
   would clearly indicate that the Disciplinary Authority was alive
   to all the submissions made by the appellant. The Disciplinary
   Authority had taken into consideration all the relevant material
   and only then concluded that the charges have been duly proved
D against the appellant. Furthermore, it is a matter of record that
   the appellant was duly supplied a copy of the Inquiry Report and
   he had submitted detailed objections to the same. These
   objections were placed before the Disciplinary Authority
  together with the Inquiry Report. Therefore, the appellant can
E not possibly claim that there has been a breach of rule of natural
  justice.

       49. Similarly, the Appellate Authority has also given cogent
  reasons in support of its conclusion. This is also apparent from
F the extract of the order of the Appellate Authority reproduced
  above.

        50. In view of the aforesaid, we find no merit in this appeal
    and the same is hereby dismissed.
G 8.8.8.                                         Appeal dismissed.