AUTHORIZED OFFICER, STATE BANK OF TRAVANCORE AND ANOTHERversusMATHEW K. C.

                         [2018] 1 S.C.R. 233                            233


  AUTHORIZED OFFICER, STATE BANK OF TRAVANCORE                          A
                  AND ANOTHER
                                 v.
                          MATHEW K. C.
                  (Civil Appeal No. 1281 of 2018)                       B
                        JANUARY 30, 2018
          [R. F. NARIMAN AND NAVIN SINHA, JJ.]
       Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and
Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 – ss.13(4), 17, 18 – Grant
                                                                        C
of loans by financial institution – Failure of the borrower to pay
the dues – Case of borrower that he was desirous to pay loan amount,
as such sought regularization of the loan amount but bank failed to
consider the same – Writ petition u/Art.226 by borrower – Interim
order passed, staying further proceedings at the stage of s.13(4),
on deposit of Rs.3,50,000/- – Appeal thereagainst dismissed by the      D
Division Bench – On appeal, held: In financial matters grant of ex-
parte interim orders can have a deleterious effect and it is not
sufficient to say that the aggrieved has the remedy to move for
vacating the interim order – Such loan are granted from public
money generated at tax payers’ expense – Timely repayment cannot
                                                                        E
be permitted to be blocked by frivolous litigation – It is the solemn
duty of the court to apply the correct law without waiting for an
objection – Any departure, if permissible, has to be for reasons
discussed, of the case falling under a defined exception – High
Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition in view of the
adequate alternate statutory remedies available to the borrower and     F
without granting opportunity to the bank to contest the
maintainability of the writ petition – Opinion of the Division Bench
that the counter affidavit having subsequently been filed, stay/
modification could be sought of the interim order cannot be
considered sufficient justification to decline interference – Thus,
                                                                        G
the impugned orders are unsustainable, and set aside – Constitution
of India – Art.226 – Alternative Remedy.
      Allowing the appeal, the Court
      HELD: 1.1 The Securitisation and Reconstruction of
                                                                        H
                                 233
234            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2018] 1 S.C.R.


A     Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002
      is a complete code by itself, providing for expeditious recovery
      of dues arising out of loans granted by financial institutions, the
      remedy of appeal by the aggrieved under Section 17 before the
      Debt Recovery Tribunal, followed by a right to appeal before the
      Appellate Tribunal u/s. 18. The High Court ought not to have
B
      entertained the writ petition in view of the adequate alternate
      statutory remedies available to the Respondent. [Para 4][237-E]
            1.2 Normally this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under
      Article 136 of the Constitution is loathe to interfere with an
      interim order passed in a pending proceeding before the High
C     Court, except in special circumstances, to prevent manifest
      injustice or abuse of the process of the court. The discretionary
      jurisdiction under Article 226 is not absolute but has to be
      exercised judiciously in the given facts of a case and in accordance
      with law. The normal rule is that a writ petition under Article 226
D     ought not to be entertained if alternate statutory remedies are
      available, except in cases falling within the well defined
      exceptions. [Para 6][238-C-D]
            1.3 The pleadings in the writ petition are very bald and
      contain no statement that the grievances fell within any of the
E     well defined exceptions. The allegation for violation of principles
      of natural justice is rhetorical, without any details and the prejudice
      caused thereby. It harps only on a desire for regularisation of the
      loan account, even while the Respondent acknowledges its own
      inability to service the loan account for reasons attributable to it
      alone. The writ petition was filed in undue haste immediately after
F     disposal of objections under Section 13(3A). The legislative
      scheme, in order to expedite the recovery proceedings, does
      not envisage grievance redressal procedure at this stage, by
      virtue of the explanation added to Section 17 of the Act. [Para
      7][239-B-C]
G           1.4 The Section 13(4) notice along with possession notice
      u/r.8 was issued. The remedy u/s.17 was now available to the
      respondent if aggrieved. These developments were not brought
      on record or placed before the Court when the interim order
      came to be passed. The writ petition was clearly not instituted
H     bonafide, but patently to stall further action for recovery. There
 AUTHORIZED OFFICER, STATE BANK OF TRAVANCORE v.                         235
                  MATHEW K. C.

is no pleading why the remedy available u/s. 17 before the Tribunal      A
was not efficacious and the compelling reasons for by-passing
the same. Unfortunately, the High Court also did not dwell upon
the same or record any special reasons for grant of interim relief
by direction to deposit. [Para 8][239-E-F]
      1.5 It is the solemn duty of the Court to apply the correct        B
law without waiting for an objection to be raised by a party,
especially when the law stands well settled. Any departure, if
permissible, has to be for reasons discussed, of the case falling
under a defined exception, duly discussed after noticing the
relevant law. In financial matters grant of ex-parte interim orders
can have a deleterious effect and it is not sufficient to say that the   C
aggrieved has the remedy to move for vacating the interim order.
Loans by financial institutions are granted from public money
generated at the tax payers expense. Such loan does not become
the property of the person taking the loan, but retains its character
of public money given in a fiduciary capacity as entrustment by          D
the public. Timely repayment also ensures liquidity to facilitate
loan to another in need, by circulation of the money and cannot
be permitted to be blocked by frivolous litigation by those who
can afford the luxury of the same. [Para 16][243-C-E]
      1.6 The writ petition ought not to have been entertained           E
and the interim order granted for the mere asking without
assigning special reasons, and that too without even granting
opportunity to the appellant to contest the maintainability of the
writ petition and failure to notice the subsequent developments
in the interregnum. The opinion of the Division Bench that the
counter affidavit having subsequently been filed, stay/modification      F
could be sought of the interim order cannot be considered
sufficient justification to have declined interference. The
impugned orders are therefore contrary to the law laid down by
this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution and unsustainable.
They are therefore, set aside. [Paras 17, 19][244-B-C, F]                G
      United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tandon and others
      (2010) 8 SCC 110 : [2010] 9 SCR 1; General Manager,
      Sri Siddeshwara Cooperative Bank Limited and another
      v. Ikbal and others (2013) 10 SCC 83 : [2013] 8 SCR
      532; Commissioner of Income Tax and Others v. Chhabil              H
236            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2018] 1 S.C.R.


A           Dass Agarwal (2014) 1 SCC 603; Punjab National
            Bank v. O.C. Krishnan and others (2001) 6 SCC 569 :
            [2001] 1 Suppl. SCR 466; Union Bank of India and
            another v. Panchanan Subudhi (2010) 15 SCC 552;
            Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sachdev and others v. State of
            Maharashtra and others (2011) 2 SCC 782 : [2011] 2
B
            SCR 602; Punjab National Bank and another v.
            Imperial Gift House and others (2013) 14 SCC 622;
            Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Prem Heavy
            Engineering Works (P) Ltd. and Another (1997) 6 SCC
            450 : [1997] 1 Suppl. SCR 184 – referred to.
C                             Case Law Reference
            [2010] 9 SCR 1                     referred to      Para 4
            [2013] 8 SCR 532                   referred to      Para 4
            (2014) 1 SCC 603                   referred to      Para 6
D           [2001] 1 Suppl. SCR 466            referred to      Para 10
            (2010) 15 SCC 552                  referred to      Para 12
            [2011] 2 SCR 602                   referred to      Para 13
            (2013) 14 SCC 622                  referred to      Para 15
            [1997] 1 Suppl. SCR 184            referred to      Para 18
E
            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1281
      of 2018.
            From the Judgment and Order dated 19.06.2015 of the High Court
      of Kerala at Ernakulam in W. A. No. 1218 of 2015 in W. P. (C) No.
F     10035 of 2015.
           H. P. Raval, Sr. Adv., Sanjay Kapur, Ms. Megha Karnwal,
      Ms. Mansi Kapur, Aditya P. Arora, Advs. for the Appellants.
            Roy Abraham, Praveen K., Ms. Reena Roy, Ms. Seema Jain,
      Akhil Abraham, Himinder Lal, Advs. for the Respondent.
G
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            NAVIN SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted.
            2. The present appeal assails an interim order dated 24.04.2015
      passed in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, staying
H
 AUTHORIZED OFFICER, STATE BANK OF TRAVANCORE v.                            237
          MATHEW K. C. [NAVIN SINHA, J.]

further proceedings at the stage of Section 13(4) of the Securitisation     A
and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security
Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred as the ‘SARFAESI Act’), on
deposit of Rs.3,50,000/-within two weeks. An appeal against the same
has also been dismissed by the Division Bench observing that counter
affidavit having been filed, it would be open for the Appellant Bank to
                                                                            B
seek clarification/modification/variation of the interim order.
       3. Shri H.P. Raval, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
Appellants, submits that the loan account of the Respondent was declared
a Non-Performing Asset (NPA) on 28.12.2014. The outstanding dues
of the Respondent on the date of the institution of the writ petition was
Rs.41,82,560/-. Despite repeated notices, the Respondent failed and         C
neglected to pay the dues. Statutory notice under Section 13(2) of the
SARFAESI Act was issued to the Respondent on 21.01.2015. The
objections under Section 13(3A) were considered, and rejection was
communicated by the Appellant on 31.3.2015. Possession notice was
then issued under Section 13(4) of the Act read with Rule 8 of The          D
Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as
‘the Rules’) on 21.04.2015.
        4. The SARFAESI Act is a complete code by itself, providing for
expeditious recovery of dues arising out of loans granted by financial
institutions, the remedy of appeal by the aggrieved under Section 17        E
before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, followed by a right to appeal before
the Appellate Tribunal under Section 18. The High Court ought not to
have entertained the writ petition in view of the adequate alternate
statutory remedies available to the Respondent. The interim order was
passed on the very first date, without an opportunity to the Appellant to
file a reply. Reliance was placed on United Bank of India vs. Satyawati     F
Tandon and others, 2010 (8) SCC 110, and General Manager, Sri
Siddeshwara Cooperative Bank Limited and another vs. Ikbal and
others, 2013 (10) SCC 83. The writ petition ought to have been dismissed
at the threshold on the ground of maintainability. The Division Bench
erred in declining to interfere with the same.                              G
      5. Shri Roy Abraham, learned Counsel for the Respondent,
submitted that it was desirous to repay the loan, and merely sought
regularisation of the loan account. The inability to service the loan was
genuine, occasioned due to market fluctuations causing huge loss in
business, beyond the control of the Respondent. The failure of the Bank     H
238             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2018] 1 S.C.R.


A     to consider the request for regularisation of the loan account, the absence
      of a right to appeal under Section 17 against the order passed under
      Section 13(3A), the Respondent was left with no option but to prefer the
      writ application as the Respondent genuinely desired to discharge the
      loans. The collateral security offered included agricultural lands also,
      which had to be excluded under Section 31 of the SARFAESI Act.
B
      There had been violation of the principles of natural justice. A large
      number of similar writ applications are pending before the High Court
      preferred by the concerned borrowers, but the Bank has singled out the
      present Respondent alone for a challenge.
             6. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties.
C     Normally this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the
      Constitution is loathe to interfere with an interim order passed in a pending
      proceeding before the High Court, except in special circumstances, to
      prevent manifest injustice or abuse of the process of the court. In the
      present case, the facts are not in dispute. The discretionary jurisdiction
D     under Article 226 is not absolute but has to be exercised judiciously in
      the given facts of a case and in accordance with law. The normal rule is
      that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution ought not to be
      entertained if alternate statutory remedies are available, except in cases
      falling within the well defined exceptions as observed in Commissioner
      of Income Tax and Others vs. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, 2014 (1) SCC
E     603, as follows:
            “15. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has recognised
            some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy i.e. where the
            statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions
            of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental
F           principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the
            provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed
            in total violation of the principles of natural justice, the proposition
            laid down in Thansingh Nathmal case, Titaghur Paper Mills case
            and other similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain
G           a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective
            alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute
            under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains
            a mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds the field.
            Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal
            of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring
H           the statutory dispensation.”
 AUTHORIZED OFFICER, STATE BANK OF TRAVANCORE v.                                  239
          MATHEW K. C. [NAVIN SINHA, J.]

       7. The pleadings in the writ petition are very bald and contain no         A
statement that the grievances fell within any of the well defined
exceptions. The allegation for violation of principles of natural justice is
rhetorical, without any details and the prejudice caused thereby. It harps
only on a desire for regularisation of the loan account, even while the
Respondent acknowledges its own inability to service the loan account
                                                                                  B
for reasons attributable to it alone. The writ petition was filed in undue
haste in March 2015 immediately after disposal of objections under
Section 13(3A). The legislative scheme, in order to expedite the recovery
proceedings, does not envisage grievance redressal procedure at this
stage, by virtue of the explanation added to Section 17 of the Act, by
Amendment Act 30 of 2004, as follows :-                                           C
       “Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared
       that the communication of the reasons to the borrower by the
       secured creditor for not having accepted his representation or
       objection or the likely action of the secured creditor at the stage
       of communication of reasons to the borrower shall not entitle the          D
       person (including the borrower) to make an application to the
       Debts Recovery Tribunal under this sub-section.”
       8. The Section 13(4) notice along with possession notice under
Rule 8 was issued on 21.04.2015. The remedy under Section 17 of the
SARFAESI Act was now available to the Respondent if aggrieved. These              E
developments were not brought on record or placed before the Court
when the impugned interim order came to be passed on 24.04.2015.
The writ petition was clearly not instituted bonafide, but patently to stall
further action for recovery. There is no pleading why the remedy available
under Section 17 of the Act before the Debt Recovery Tribunal was not             F
efficacious and the compelling reasons for by-passing the same.
Unfortunately, the High Court also did not dwell upon the same or record
any special reasons for grant of interim relief by direction to deposit.
       9. The statement of objects and reasons of the SARFAESI Act
states that the banking and financial sector in the country was felt not to       G
have a level playing field in comparison to other participants in the financial
markets in the world. The financial institutions in India did not have the
power to take possession of securities and sell them. The existing legal
framework relating to commercial transactions had not kept pace with

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240            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2018] 1 S.C.R.


A     changing commercial practices and financial sector reforms resulting in
      tardy recovery of defaulting loans and mounting non-performing assets
      of banks and financial institutions. The Narasimhan Committee I and II
      as also the Andhyarujina Committee constituted by the Central
      Government Act had suggested enactment of new legislation for
      securitisation and empowering banks and financial institutions to take
B
      possession of securities and sell them without court intervention which
      would enable them to realise long term assets, manage problems of
      liquidity, asset liability mismatches and improve recovery. The
      proceedings under the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial
      Institutions Act, 1993, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the DRT Act’) with
C     passage of time, had become synonymous with those before regular
      courts affecting expeditious adjudication. All these aspects have not
      been kept in mind and considered before passing the impugned order.
           10. Even prior to the SARFAESI Act, considering the alternate
      remedy available under the DRT Act it was held in Punjab National
D     Bank vs. O.C. Krishnan and others, (2001) 6 SCC 569, that :-
            “6. The Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special
            procedure for recovery of debts due to the banks and the financial
            institutions. There is a hierarchy of appeal provided in the Act,
            namely, filing of an appeal under Section 20 and this fast-track
E           procedure cannot be allowed to be derailed either by taking
            recourse to proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the
            Constitution or by filing a civil suit, which is expressly barred.
            Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the
            jurisdiction of the court under Articles 226 and 227 of the
            Constitution, nevertheless, when there is an alternative remedy
F
            available, judicial prudence demands that the Court refrains from
            exercising its jurisdiction under the said constitutional provisions.
            This was a case where the High Court should not have entertained
            the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and should have
            directed the respondent to take recourse to the appeal mechanism
G           provided by the Act.”
             11. In Satyawati Tandon (supra), the High Court had restrained
      further proceedings under Section 13(4) of the Act. Upon a detailed
      consideration of the statutory scheme under the SARFAESI Act, the
      availability of remedy to the aggrieved under Section 17 before the
H
 AUTHORIZED OFFICER, STATE BANK OF TRAVANCORE v.                               241
          MATHEW K. C. [NAVIN SINHA, J.]

Tribunal and the appellate remedy under Section 18 before the Appellate        A
Tribunal, the object and purpose of the legislation, it was observed that a
writ petition ought not to be entertained in view of the alternate statutory
remedy available holding :-
      “43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law
      that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under       B
      Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available
      to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater
      rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other
      types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial
      institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving
      challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc.      C
      the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by
      Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are
      a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain
      comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also
      envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the      D
      grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases,
      the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article
      226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies
      available under the relevant statute.
      ***                                                                      E
      55. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated
      pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore
      the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and the
      SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for
      passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of         F
      banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We
      hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their
      discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and
      circumspection.”
      12. In Union Bank of India and another vs. Panchanan                     G
Subudhi, 2010 (15) SCC 552, further proceedings under Section 13(4)
were stayed in the writ jurisdiction subject to deposit of Rs.10,00,000/-
leading this Court to observe as follows :
      “7. In our view, the approach adopted by the High Court was
      clearly erroneous. When the respondent failed to abide by the
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242            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2018] 1 S.C.R.


A           terms of one-time settlement, there was no justification for the
            High Court to entertain the writ petition and that too by ignoring
            the fact that a statutory alternative remedy was available to the
            respondent under Section 17 of the Act.”
           13. The same view was reiterated in Kanaiyalal Lalchand
B     Sachdev and others vs. State of Maharashtra and others, 2011 (2)
      SCC 782 observing:
            “23. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court rightly dismissed
            the petition on the ground that an efficacious remedy was available
            to the appellants under Section 17 of the Act. It is well settled that
            ordinarily relief under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India
C
            is not available if an efficacious alternative remedy is available to
            any aggrieved person. (See Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance
            Co. Ltd.; Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and SBI v. Allied
            Chemical Laboratories.)”
             14. In Ikbal (supra), it was observed that the action of the Bank
D     under Section 13(4) of the ‘SARFAESI Act’ available to challenge by
      the aggrieved under Section 17 was an efficacious remedy and the
      institution directly under Article 226 was not sustainable, relying upon
      Satyawati Tandon (Supra), observing :
            “27. No doubt an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the
E           exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 but by now
            it is well settled that where a statute provides efficacious and
            adequate remedy, the High Court will do well in not entertaining a
            petition under Article 226. On misplaced considerations, statutory
            procedures cannot be allowed to be circumvented.
F           ***
            28…….In our view, there was no justification whatsoever for the
            learned Single Judge to allow the borrower to bypass the
            efficacious remedy provided to him under Section 17 and invoke
            the extraordinary jurisdiction in his favour when he had disentitled
            himself for such relief by his conduct. The Single Judge was clearly
G
            in error in invoking his extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226
            in light of the peculiar facts indicated above. The Division Bench
            also erred in affirming the erroneous order of the Single Judge.”
            15. A similar view was taken in Punjab National Bank and
      another vs. Imperial Gift House and others, (2013) 14 SCC 622,
H     observing:-
 AUTHORIZED OFFICER, STATE BANK OF TRAVANCORE v.                                 243
          MATHEW K. C. [NAVIN SINHA, J.]

       “3. Upon receipt of notice, the respondents filed representation          A
       under Section 13(3-A) of the Act, which was rejected. Thereafter,
       before any further action could be taken under Section 13(4) of
       the Act by the Bank, the writ petition was filed before the High
       Court.
       4. In our view, the High Court was not justified in entertaining the      B
       writ petition against the notice issued under Section 13(2) of the
       Act and quashing the proceedings initiated by the Bank.”
        16. It is the solemn duty of the Court to apply the correct law
without waiting for an objection to be raised by a party, especially when
the law stands well settled. Any departure, if permissible, has to be for        C
reasons discussed, of the case falling under a defined exception, duly
discussed after noticing the relevant law. In financial matters grant of
ex-parte interim orders can have a deleterious effect and it is not sufficient
to say that the aggrieved has the remedy to move for vacating the interim
order. Loans by financial institutions are granted from public money             D
generated at the tax payers expense. Such loan does not become the
property of the person taking the loan, but retains its character of public
money given in a fiduciary capacity as entrustment by the public. Timely
repayment also ensures liquidity to facilitate loan to another in need, by
circulation of the money and cannot be permitted to be blocked by frivolous
litigation by those who can afford the luxury of the same. The caution           E
required, as expressed in Satyawati Tandon (supra), has also not been
kept in mind before passing the impugned interim order:-
       “46. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the
       State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes,
       cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public        F
       importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional
       and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to
       recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured
       creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious
       adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions,       G
       which (sic will) ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of
       the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful
       and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such
       matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case

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244                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2018] 1 S.C.R.


A             falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash
              Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad, Whirlpool
              Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks and Harbanslal Sahnia v.
              Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and some other judgments, then the High
              Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public
              interest, pass an appropriate interim order.”
B
             17. The writ petition ought not to have been entertained and the
      interim order granted for the mere asking without assigning special
      reasons, and that too without even granting opportunity to the Appellant
      to contest the maintainability of the writ petition and failure to notice the
      subsequent developments in the interregnum. The opinion of the Division
C
      Bench that the counter affidavit having subsequently been filed, stay/
      modification could be sought of the interim order cannot be considered
      sufficient justification to have declined interference.
             18. We cannot help but disapprove the approach of the High Court
      for reasons already noticed in Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. vs.
D     Prem Heavy Engineering Works (P) Ltd. and Another, 1997 (6) SCC
      450, observing :-
              “32. When a position, in law, is well settled as a result of judicial
              pronouncement of this Court, it would amount to judicial impropriety
              to say the least, for the subordinate courts including the High Courts
E             to ignore the settled decisions and then to pass a judicial order
              which is clearly contrary to the settled legal position. Such judicial
              adventurism cannot be permitted and we strongly deprecate the
              tendency of the subordinate courts in not applying the settled
              principles and in passing whimsical orders which necessarily has
F             the effect of granting wrongful and unwarranted relief to one of
              the parties. It is time that this tendency stops.”
            19. The impugned orders are therefore contrary to the law laid
      down by this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution and
      unsustainable. They are therefore set aside and the appeal is allowed.
G           20. All questions of law and fact remain open for consideration in
      any application by the aggrieved before the statutory forum under the
      SARFAESI Act.


      Nidhi Jain                                                      Appeal allowed.
H