ATUL GLASS INDUSTRIES (PVT) LTD. ETC.versusCOLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, ETC.
- Citation
- 1986 INSC 127
- Decided
- 10 July 1986
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- R S PATHAK
Holding
Glass mirrors and glass screens for motor vehicles are to be taxed under the residuary Tariff Item No. 68, not under Tariff Items 23A(4) or 34A.
Summary
Atul Glass Industries, a manufacturer of glass mirrors, challenged the classification of its products for excise duty after the 1979 amendment of the Central Excises and Salt Act. The Revenue argued that glass mirrors fell under Tariff Item 23A(4) ('other glass and glass ware') and that glass screens for motor vehicles were either under 23A(4) or the special entry 34A. The Supreme Court applied the functional‑character test, holding that a mirror, once silvered, is no longer a glass article but a distinct product whose primary function is reflection, and therefore belongs to the residuary Tariff Item 68. Similarly, glass screens are motor‑vehicle parts; the special entry 34A would prevail over the general 23A(4), but after the 1979 Finance Act 34A was limited to fifteen items, so the screens also fall under the residuary Item 68. The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Tribunal’s order, restored the Collector (Appeals) order and directed that both mirrors and screens be taxed under Item 68.
Issues considered
- Whether glass mirrors are to be classified under Tariff Item 23A(4) or the residuary Tariff Item 68 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.
- Whether glass screens used in motor vehicles are to be classified under Tariff Item 23A(4), Tariff Item 34A, or the residuary Tariff Item 68.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Judgment
A
ATIJL Gl,ASS INDUSTRIES (PVT) LTD. ETC.
v.
COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, ETC.
B
JULY 10, 1986
[R.S. PATHAK & SABYASACHI MUKHARJI JJ.]
Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944-First Schedule, Tariff Item
Nos. 23A(4), 34A and 68--'Glass or Glass ware-Interpretation of-
c Glass mirrors--Glass Screens used in motor Vehicles-Classification of.
The appellant carries on the business of manufacturing and sel-
ling glass mirrors. Before March I, 1979 glass mirrors were treated as
exempt from duty as they were manufactured from duty paid glass.
D This exemption was cancelled from March I, 1979 and in Tariff Item
23A(4) the words 'other glass and glass ware' were substituted for the
words 'other glass ware'.
On January 28, 1980, the Excise Authorities issued a notice calling
upon the appellant to take out an L-4 Licence on the ground that glass
E mirrors were classifiable as 'other glass' within the meaning of Tariff
Entry No. 23A(4) of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt
Act, 1944, as a product dutiable from March I, 1979.
The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court and simul-
tanP-ously preferred an appeal before the Collector (Appeals). The High
F Court disposed of the writ petition with the observation that the appel-
lant should pursue its appeal before the Collector (Appeals). The appeal
was allowed by the Collector (Appeals) holding that Tariff Item No. 68
applied to glass mirrors.
On appeal by the Revenue, the Customs, Excise and Gold (Con-
G trol) Appellate Tribunal reversed the decision of the Collector (Appeals)
and held that Tariff Item No. 23A(4) was attracted, and that the glass
mirrors should be classified as 'glass ware'.
In the transferred cases, the manufacturers of motor vehicles
place orders with the petitioner for the manufacture of screens for
H fitting in motor vehicles, commonly known as wind screens, rear
ATUL GLASS INDUSTRIES v. THE COLLECTOR 127
screens, door screens, and these were to be manufactured according to A
the specific shapes and measurements indicated in the orders for the
different vehicles.
The Superintendent of Central Excise called upon the petitioner
to pay excise duty on the basis that these screens fell under Tariff Item
B
No. 23A(4) relating to 'glass and glass ware'. The petitioner tiled writ
petitions in the High Court_ challenging the view taken by the Excise
Authorities.
On the questions: "Whether glass mirrors fall under Tariff Item
No. 23A( 4) or Tariff Item No. 68 and whether glass screens fitted in
motor vehicles as wind screen, rear screens and window screens fall c
under Tariff Item No. 23A(4) or Tariff Item No. 34A or Tariff Item No.
68 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act 1944",
allowing the Appeal and the Writ Petitions in the transferred cases, the
Court,
D
HELD: (I) Glass mirrors cannot be classified as 'other glass and
glass ware' set forth in Tariff Item No. 23A(4), and must therefore fall
under the residuary Tariff Item No. 68. l 132F-G I
(2) The original glass sheet undergoes a complete transformation
when it emerges as a glass mirror. What was a piece of glass simp-
E
liciter has now become a commercial product with a reflecting surface.
Into the process of transformation have gone successive stages of pro-
cessing. The evolved product is completely different from the original
glass sheet. What was once a glass piece in its basic character has no
longer remained so. It has been reduced to a mere medium. That is
clear if regard is had to the fundamental function and qualities of a
F
glass mirror. The power to reflect an image is a power derived not from
the glass piece but principally from the silvering and other processes
applied to the glass medium. If any part of the coating is scratched and
removed, that particular area of the glass mirror will cease to be glass
mirror. That simple test demonstrates the major importance attribut-
able to the chemical deposit and coating which constitute a material
G
component of a glass mirror. It is not mandatory that a mirror emp-
loyed for the purpose of reflecting an image should have a glass base.
Copper mirrors have been known from the dawn of history. Now ac-
rylic sheets are sometimes used instead of glass for manufacturing mir-
rors. Therefore, a glass mirror cannot be regarded as a glass. For the
same reason, it cannot be classified as a 'glass ware', for 'glass ware'
H
128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 3 S.C.R.
A means merchandise made of glass and understood in its primary sense
as a glass article. A glass bowl, a glass vase, a glass tumbler, a glass
table top and so on are all articles in which the primary component is
glass. They are nothing more and nothing less. Any treatment of an
ornamental nature applied to such articles does not derogate from their
B fundamental character as glass articles. It is quite the contrary in the
caseofaglassmirror. ll32H; 133A-FJ
(3) It is a matter of common experience that the identity of an
article is associated with its primary function. It is only logical that it
should be so. When a consumer buys it, it is because it performs a
specific function for him. There is a mental association in the mind of
c the consumer between the article and the need it supplies in his life. It is
the functional character of the article which identifies it in his mind. In
the case of a glass mirror, the consumer recalls primarily the reflective
function of the article more than anything else. It is a mirror, an article
which reflects images. It is referred to as a glass mirror only because the
D word glass is descriptive of the mirror in that glass has been used as a
medium for manufacturing the mirror. The basic or fundamental
character of the article lies in its being a mirror. [134C-EJ
State of Uttar Pradesh v. M/s. Kores (India) Ltd. [1977] (l)
S.C.R. 837, Porritts and Spencers (Asia) Ltd. v. State of Haryana
E [1978[ (42) S.T.C. 433, Commissioner of Sales Tax U.P. v. Macneill &
Barry Ltd. Kanpur, [1985] (2) SCALE 1093, Delhi Cloth and General
Mills Co. Ltd. v, State of Rajasthan & Ors. [1980] (3) S.C.R.1109,
Geep Flashlight Industries Ltd. v. Union of India and Others [1985]
(22) E.L.T.3, Indian Aluminium Cables Ltd. v. Union of India and
Others_. (1985) 3 S.C.C. 284 and Indo International Industries v. Com-
F missioner of Sales Tax. Uttar Pradesh, [1981) (3) S.C.R. 294 relied
upon.
State of Orissa v. Gestetner Duplicators (P) Ltd. [1974) (33)
S.T.C. 333 and State of Orissa v. Janta Medical Stores [1976) (37)
S.T.C. 33approved.
G
Commissioner of Sales Tax, U. P. v. Banaras Bead Manufactur-
ing Co. [1970](25) S.T.C. 100 distinguished.
(4) Classification of glass mirrors as 'glass and glass ware' in
Chapter 70 of the Brnssels Tariff Nomenclature, does not advance the
H case of the Revenue, because the First Schedule to the Central Excises
ATULGLASS INDUSTRIES v. THE COLLECTOR 129
r and Salt Act was not modelled on the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature. A
1;here is nothing to show that the Tariff Items were classified in the
Schedule on the basis of the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature. It was when
the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 was enacted that the First Schedule to that
Act was framed in accordance with the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature.
The glass mirrors were still not specifically mentioned under the
Customs Tariff Act 1975. They are now being brought in as such by the B
Customs TariffBill 1985. [135E-H]
I (5) Classification of glass mirrors by the Indian Standards lostitu·
t tion as "glass and glass ware" in its glossary of terms furnishes a piece
of evidence only as to the manner in which the product has been treated
for the purpose of the specifications laid down by the Indian Standard c
Institution. [136A-B]
~ (6) The screens used in motor vehicles cannot be described as
"glass or glass wares" under Tariff Item No. 23A(4). No one dealing in
or using the screens would consider them as "glass or glass ware".
They can only be considered as motor vehicle parts. Even if it is as- D
sumed that they could fall under Tariff Item No. 23A(4) relating to
"glass and glass ware" also, in as much as Tariff Item No. 34A is a
special entry and Tariff Item No. 23A( 4) is a general entry, the special
must exclude the general and therefore also it is Tariff Item No. 34A
which prevails and is attracted. [138F-H]
E
(7) After the amendment of Tariff Item No. 34A by the Finance
Act 1979 the scope of that Tariff Item is restricted to the 15 commodities
specified therein. That being so the screens manufactured by the petitioner
merit classification in the residuary Tariff Item No. 68. [138H; 139A-B I
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3435 F
of 1984 etc.
From the Order dated 24.7.1984 of the Customs, Excise and
Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in Appeal No. ED/
SB/A.664/84-D.
G
K.K. Venugopal, Soli J. Sorabji, Bishambar Lal, H.K. Kochar
LL. Beri, P.K. Chatterjee, Rajesh Agarwal and Aron Kr Sinha for
< the Appellants.
G. Das, A. Subhashini, P .P. Singh, C. V. Sobba Rao and
Sushma Ratha for the Respondents. H
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 3 S.C.R.
A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
PATHAK, J. The question raised in the appeal filed by Atul Glass
Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. (C.A. No. 3435 of 1984) under s. 35L(b) of the
Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 is whether glass mirrors fall under
B Tariff Item No. 23A(4) or Tariff Item No. 68 of the First Schedule to
the Central Excises and Salt Act.
That is also the question raised in the Transferred Cases Nos.
349, 350 and 355 of 1983 filed by the Hindustan Safety Glass Works
Ltd., with an additional question whether the glass screens fitted in
motor vehicles as wind screens, rear screens and window screens fall
c under Tariff Item No. 23A(4) or Tariff Item No. 34A or Tariff Item
No.68. '1
The Appellant, Atul Glass Industries (Pvt.) Ltd., carries on the
business of manufacturing and selling glass mirrors. It purchases duty
D paid glass sheets from the manufacturers of glass, and either in their
original size or after reducing them to smaller sizes puts the glass
sheets through a process of treatment. The glass pieces are buffed with
the aid of buffing machines in order to improve the surface of the glass
and prepare it for mirror processing. The glass is fed into an automatic
silvering conveyor line where it passes through a stage of mechanical
E
cleaning and polishing with the aid of nylon bristle brushes so that the
glass surface is rendered free of scratches, dust particles and carbohy-
drates. The glass is then washed mechanically with the aid of cylindri-
cal brushes using distilled water as a washing medium. Thereafter the
glass surface is sensitised by chemical compounds such as stannous
chloride, and rinsed with distilled or demineralised water to remove
F excess of chemicals. The sensitised glass is passed through a chamber
where silver in liquid form with the aid of reducing solutions is applied
as a very thin and uniform adherent reflective film on the surface of
the glass. The silver coating, being of malleable metal, is protected by
a coating of copper in the form of a thin metal deposit with the aid of
an electromagnetic spray system. The excess of copper and acidic solu-
tions are rinsed away with the distilled or demineralised water. Subse-
G
quently hot air is employed for the purpose of drying, and the humidity
is removed completely with the aid of an infra-red heating system.
After thorough drying, the silver and copper coatings are protected
with four coats of special mirror backing paint applied with the aid of a
roller coating machine in four stages. The paint is baked in the baking
H conveyor after thorough drying. The other side of the mirror is
ATUL GLASS INDUSTRIES v. THE COLLECTOR [PATHAK, l.] 131
A
T mechanically cleaned. The mirror thus produced is finally sent for
quality control inspection. Cut glass is employed in the case of decora-
tive mirrors. The cut glass is shaped with the aid of cutting lathe-
machines before subjecting it to the silver process. Edge grinding or
bevelling and hole-drilling is done, if required, after the mirror has
been manufactured. B
Before the budget of 1979, Tariff Item No. 23 relating to 'glass
and glass-ware' prescribed the different rates of duty in respect of ( 1)
l sheet glass and plate glass, (2) laboratory glass-ware, (3) glass shells,
glass globes and chimney for lamps and lantern, and (4) 'other glass-
ware including table-ware'. During the period following the budget of
1979 which is the period which concerns us, Tariff Item No. 23A c
relating to glass and glass-ware specified the rates of duty in respect of
( 1) flat glass, which included sheet glass, wired glass and rolled glass
+ whether in the form of plate glass, figured glass or in any other form,
(2) laboratorty glass-ware, (3) glass shells, glass globes and chimney
for lamps and lantern and (4) 'other glass and glass-ware including D
table-ware'. Tariff Item No. 68 is of residuary character and relates to
"all other goods not elsewhere specified," but excluding alcohol,
opium and certain other goods specified therein. The rate of duty is
higher if the product falls under Tariff Item No. 23A(4) than if it fell
under Tariff Item No. 68. The appellant submitted a classification list
showing glass mirror as covered by duty under Item No. 68. Before
E
March 1, 1979 glass mirrors were treated as exempt from duty as they
were manufactured from duty paid glass. The exemption was cancelled
from March 1, 1979. Simultaneously Tariff Item No. 23A(4) under-
went an amendment, as mentioned earlier, by the substitution of
I words 'other glass and glass-ware' for the words 'other glass-ware'.
\ F
On January 28, 1980 the Excise Authorities issued a notice cal-
~ ling upon the appellant to take out an L-4 Licence on the ground that
glass mirrors were classifiable as 'other glass' within the meaning of
Tariff Entry No. 23A( 4) as a product now dutiable from March 1,
1979. The appellant filed a writ petition in the Delhi High Court and
simultaneously preferred an appeal before the Collector (Appeals). G
The High Court disposed of the writ petition without deciding the
question of liability to duty on its merits, observing that the appellant
.( should pursue its appeal before the Collector (Appeals). On January
24, 1984 the appeal was allowed by the Collector (Appeals). He held
that Tariff Item No. 68 applied to glass mirrors. The Revenue ap-
pealed to the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal. H
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 3 S.C.R.
A The Appellate Tribunal allowed the appeal and reversed the decision
of the Collector (Appeals) holding that Tariff Item No. 23A(4) was
i
attracted. The Appellate Tribunal held that glass mirrors should be
classified as 'glass ware'. And now this appeal.
B It appears from the record before us that the true classification of
glass mirrors has been the subject of fluctuating opinion among the
\
higher echelons of the Revenue. Opinion has varied from time to time.
Tariff Advice No. 60 of 1979 dated December 18, 1979 issued by the
~
Central Board of Excise and Customs took the stand that glass mirrors
could be described as glass ware and therefore, merited classification
under Tariff Item No. 23A(4). Subsequently on doubts being raised
c regarding such classification, the Central Board of Excise and Customs
considered the matter further, and by Tariff Advice No. 61 of 1980
dated September 27, 1980 opined that glass mirrors would fall under
Tariff Item No. 68 in as much as while glass sheets were used as raw t
material the subsequent processing applied thereto gave rise to a diffe-
D rent commercial product altogether, the utility of the glass being
reduced to a mere medium. This was, of course, subject to the condition
that the glass sheets, out of which the glass mirrors were prepared, had
paid appropriate duty under Tariff Item No. 23A before being emp-
Joyed in the manufacture of mirrors. The controversy was re-opened
later, and the Central Board of Excise and Customs reverted to its
E original understanding of the classification for the product. By Tariff
Item No. 41 of 1981 dated May 7, 1981 it pointed out that glass mir-
rors had been classified under the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature as
"glass and glass-ware" and taking the view that after undergoing
silvering a glass mirror still remained glass it advised that glass mirrors
should be treated as liable to excise duty under Tariff Item No. 23A( 4) \
as 'other glass and glass-ware'. It has been noticed that the Superinten- /
F
dent of Central Excise called upon the appellant to take out an L-4
Licence on the footing that glass mirrors fell under Tariff Item No. •
23A(4), that on appeal, the Collector (Appeals) reached the conclu-
sion that it was not open to such classification but fell under the re-
siduary Tariff Item No. 68, and that the Appellate Tribunal thereafter
G reversed the Collector (Appeals) and upheld the Superintendent of
Central Excise. It is in this uncertain climate of opinion that the ques-
tion calls for decision by this Court.
A broad description of the process through which a glass sheet
passes has been detailed earlier. It indicates clearly to our mind that
H the original glass sheet undergoes a complete transformation when it
ATULGLASS INDUSTRIES v. THE COLLECTOR [PATHAK, J.l 133
A
r now
emerges as a glass mirror. What was a piece of glass simpliciter has
become a commercial product with a reflecting surface. Into the
process of transformation have gone successive stages of processing
with the aid of chemicals such as stannous chloride, silver nitrate and
copper coating besides an entire range of physical proscesses involving
polishing, washing, coating, drying, varnishing, evaporation and cool- B
ing. The evolved product is completely different from the original glass
l sheet. What was once a glass piece in its basic character has no longer
remained so. It has been reduced to a mere medium. That is clear if
I regard is had to the fundamental function and qualities of a glass
mirror. The power to reflect an image is a power derived not from the
glass piece but principally from the silvering and other processes ap-
plied to the glass medium. If any part of the coating is scratched and
c
removed, that particular are·a of the glass mirror will cease to be glass
mirror. That simple test demonstrates the major importance attribut-
~- able to the chemical deposit and coating which constitute a material
component of a glass mirror. It is not mandatory that a mirror em-
ployed for the purpose of reflecting an image should have a glass base. D
Copper mirrors have been known from the dawn of history. In the
modern age, acrylic sheets are sometimes used instead of glass for
manufacturing mirrors. It is apparent, therefore, that a glass mirror
cannot be regarded as a glass. For the same reason, it cannot be
classified as 'glass ware', for 'glass ware' means merchandise made of
glass and understood in its primary sense as a glass article. A glass E
bowl, a glass vase, a glass tumbler, a glass table-top and so on are all
articles in which the primary component is glass. They are nothing
more and nothing less. Any treatment of an ornamental nature applied
to such articles does not derogate from their fundamental character as
/ glass articles. It is quite the contrary in the case of a glass mirror. The
,.
\ case is more akin to that of carbon paper. A sheet of paper with a
carbon coating thereon is employed for the purpose of producing
copies of the original. The paper is a mere base while the function is
performed by the carbon coating. This Court held in State of Uttar
F
Pradesh v. Mis Kores (India).Ltd. [1977) (1) S.C.R. 837, that carbon
paper could not be described as paper. It referred to the functional
difference between the two, and pointed out that while paper would be G
understood as meaning a substance which was used for writing or print-
ing or drawing on or for packing or decorating or covering the walls.
~ carbon paper, which is manufactured by coating the tissue paper with a
thermosetting ink based mainly on wax, non drying oils,. pigments and
dyes could not be so described.
H
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 3 S.C.R.
A The test commonly applied to such cases is: How is the product
identified by the class or section of people dealing with or using the
T
product? That is a test which is attracted whenever the statute does not
contain any definition. Porritts and Spencer (Asia) Ltd. v. State of
Haryana [1978] (42) S.T.C. 433. It is generally by its functional charac-
B ter that a product is so identified. In Commissioner of Sales Tax, U. P.
v. Macneill & Barry Ltd., Kanpur 11985] (2) SCALE 1093. This Court
expressed the view that ammonia paper and ferro paper, used for
obtaining prints and sketches of site plans could not be,described as '
c
paper as that word was used in common parlance. On the same basis
the Orissa High Court held in State of Orissa v. Gestetner Dluplicators
(P) Ltd. [1974] (33) S.T.C. 333 that stencil paper could not be clas-
sified as paper for the purposes of the Orissa Sales Tax Act. It is a
J
matter of common experience that the identity of an article is asso-
ciated with its primary function. It is only logical that it should be so.
When a consumer buys an article, he buys it because it performs a .~
specific function for him. There is a mental association in the mind of
the consumer between the article and the need it supplies in his life. It
D
is the functional character of the article which identified it in his mind.
In the case of a glass mirror, the consumer recalls primarily the reflec-
live function of the article more than anything else. It is a mirror, an
article which reflects images. It is referred to as a glass mirror only
because ti)e word glass is descriptive of the mirror in that glass has
E been used as a medium for manufacturing the mirror. The basic or
fundamental character of the article lies in its being a mirror. It was
observed by this Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v.
State of Rajasthan & Ors. [1980] (3) S.C.R. 1109. Which was a case
under the Sales Tax law:
"In determining the meaning or connotation of words and
F (
expressions describing an article or commodity the turnover
of which is taxed in a sales tax enactment, if there is one r-
principle fairly well-settled it is that the words or expression
must be construed in the sense in which they are understood
in the trade, by the dealer and the consumer. It is they who
are concerned with it, and it is the sense in which they under-
G
stand it that consitutes the definitive index of the legislative
intention when the statute was enacted."
).
That was also the view expressed in Geep Flashlight Industries
Ltd. v. Union of India and Others. [19851) (22) E.L.T. 3. Where the
H goods are not marketable that principle of construction is not attract-
ATULGLASS INDUSTRIES v. THE COLLECTOR [PATHAK, J.J 135
ed. Indian Aluminium Cables Ltd. v. Union of' India and Others. A
[1985]) (3) S.C.C. 284. The question whether thermometers, lactomet-
ers, syringes, eye-wash glasses and measuring glasses could be des-
cribed as 'glass ware' for the purpose of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947
was answered by the Orissa High Court in State of Orissa v. Jania
Medical Stores [19761) (37) S.T.C. 33. In the negative. To the same B
effect is the decision of this Court in Indo International Industries v.
Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh, I1981] (3) S.C.R. 294.
Where hypodermic clinical syringes were regarded as falling more
accurately under the entry relating to "hospital equipment and ap-
paratus" rather than under the entry which related to "glass wares" in
the U.P. Sales Tax Act.
c
Reliance was placed by the Revenue on Commissioner of Sales
Tax, U.P. v. Banaras Bead Manufacturing Co. [19701) (25) S.T.C. JOO.
Where the Allahabad High Court held that glass beads could be de-
scribed as 'glass ware for the purpose of a Notification issued under the
U.P. Sales Tax Act. The decision of the High Court rested on the
D
manner in which the contextual setting was altered in successive and
different Notifications promulgated under the U.P. Sales Tax Act,
indicating the content of the expression as developed through succes-
sive Notifications.
Our attention has been drawn on behalf of the Revenue to the
E
circumstance that glass mirrors have been classified as 'glass and glass
ware' in Chapter 70 of the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature. It seems to us
that this circumstance can hardly advance the case of the Revenue,
because the First Schedule to the Central Execises and Salt Act does
not appear to have been modelled on the Brussels Tariff Nomencla-
ture. There is nothing to show that the Tariff Items were classified in
F
the Schedule on the basis of the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature. It was
when the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 was enacied that the First Schedule
to that Act was framed in accordance with the Brussels Tariff Nomen-
clature, evidently because the progress made in industrial growth and
economic development, and the substantial changes in the composi-
tion and pattern of India's external trade called for the need to moder-
G
nise and rationalise the nomenclature of India's Tariff in line with
contemporary conditions1 • The glass mirrors were still not specifically
mentioned under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. They are now being
brought in as such by the Customs Tariff Bill, 1985.
t. (Introductory Comments on the Customs Tariff Act, 1975).
H
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 3 S.C.R.
A It is pointed out that glass mirrors have been classified by the
Indian Standards Institution as "glass and glass ware" in the glossary
of terms prepared by it in respect of that classification. That, to our
mind, furnishes a piece of evidence only as to the manner in which the
product has been treated for the purpose of the specifications laid
B down by the Indian Standards Institution. It was a test employed by
this Court in Union of India v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills, 11963]
Supp. (!) S.C.R. 586, but was regarded as supportive material only of
the expert opinion furnished by way of evidence in that case. The
considerations to which we have adverted should, in our opinion, have
greatly weighed in deciding the question raised in this appeal. So also
in Union Carbide Co. Ltd. v. Assistant Collector of Central Excise and
c Others, 11978] E.L.T. 180, the description set forth in the publications
of the Indian Standards Institution was regarded as a piece of evidence
only. There were other more tangible considerations which weighed
with the Court in reaching its conclusions.
D We are firmly of the view that glass mirrors cannot be classified
as 'other glass and glass ware' set forth in Tariff Item No. 23A(4), and
must therefore fall under the residuary Tariff Item No. 69 ..
An additional point arises in Mis Hindustan Safety Glass Works
Ltd. (Transfer Cases Nos. 349, 350 and 355 of 1983). The manufactur-
E ers of motor vehicles place orders with the appellant for the manu-
facture of screens for fitting in motor vehicles. They are commonly
known as wind screens, rear screens and door screens. The screens are
manufactured according to the specific shape and measurements indi-
cated in the orders, for different vehicles require screens of different
shapes and measurements. The screen is manufactured from sheet
F glass. It is first given shape and size according to the specifications
contained in the order and thereafter subjected to the process of
toughening. It is a fabricated article.
Tbe Superintendent of Central Excise called upon the petitioner
to pay excise duty on the basis that the screens fell under Tariff Item
G No. 23A(4) relating to 'glass and glass ware'. The petitioner filed writ
petitions in the Allahabad High Court challenging the view taken by
the Excise authorities. The question in these cases is whether the
screens manufactured by the petitioners can be classified under Tarjff
Item No. 23A(4) or Tariff Item No. 34A or Tariff Item No. 68.
H Prior to February 28, 1979 Tariff Item No. 34A, which was
ATULGLASS INDUSTRIES v. THE COLLECTOR [PATHAK, J.J 137
headed Item No. 34A-Motor Vehicle Parts, related to "Parts and A
accessories not elsewhere specified, of Motor vehicles and Tractors,
including Trailers", and the rate of duty prescribed was 20% ad val-
orem. Under Rule 8 of the Central Excises and Salt Rules, the Central
Government issued Notification No. M.F. (D.R.I) 99/71 dated May
29, 1971, as amended by a subsequent Notification, exempting parts B
and accessories of motor vehicles and tractors falling under Tariff Item
No. 34A other than those specified in the Schedule annexed to the
Notification, from the whole of the duty of excise leviable thereon.
l The Schedule annexed to the Notification did not mention the screens
manufactured for motor vehicles. The parts and accessories specifi-
cally mentioned in the Notification to the Schedule were covered by a
Notification No. 101/71 C.E. dated May 29, 1971 as amended subse- c
quently, by which the Central Government exempted under Rule 8
parts and accessories of motor vehicles, provided it was establishd to
the satisfaction of the Collector of Central Excise that the parts were
intended to be used as original equipment parts by the manufacturers
of motor' vehicles and tractors falling under Tariff Item No. 34A. The
D
Finance Bill of 1979 introduced changes in Tariff Item No. 34A. Tariff
Item No. 34A now spoke of 'parts and accessories of motor vehciles
and tractors, including trailers, the folowing namely'.-and here fol-
lowed 15 parts and accessories. The screens manufactured by the
petitioner did not figure in that list. Until the enactment of the Finance
Bill of 1979, the commodities manufactured by the petitioner would
E
have fallen within the ambit of Tariff Item No. 34A. But after the
introduction of the Finance Bill 1979 the Central Government issued
Notification No. 76 of 1979 C.E. dated March 1, 1979 under Rule 9,
whereby parts and accessories of moto~ vehicles and .tractors which
-
had not been specified in Tariff Item No. 34A but which fell under that
Tariff Item were exempted from so much duty of excise leviable there-
F
on as was in excess of 8% ad valorem. Two more Notifications were
issued, No. 74/79 C.E. dated March, 1 1979 and No. 75/79 C.E. dated
March 1, 1979. By these Notifications parts and accessories of motor
vehicles and tractors falling under Tariff Item No. 34A were exempted
from the whole of the duty of excise leviable thereon provided the said
parts or accessories were intended to be used in the manufacture of
G
assembled components of motor vehicles and tractors and such assemb-
led components were used as original equipment parts by the manu-
< facturers of those vehicles and such parts and accessories which were
intended to be used as original equipment parts by such manufactur-
ers. On the enforcement of the Finance Act 1979 the ambit of Tariff
Item No. 34A became restricted to the 15 specified commodities. The H
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 3 S.C.R.
A commodities manufactured by the petitioner did not fall within the
ambit of Tariff Item No. 34A.
It is case of the petitioner that the commodities manufactured by
it fall within the ambit of the residuary Item No. 68 of the First
Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act. Prior to the enforcement
B of the Finance Act, 1979 the Central Government had, under Rule 8,
issued Notification No. 166 C.E. -dated April 19, 1979 whereby all
excisable goods on which the duty of excise was payable and in the
manufacture of which parts and accessories of motor vehicles falling
under Item No. 34A had been used were exempted from so much of
the duty of the excise leviable thereon as was equivalent to the duty of
c excise paid by the said parts and accessories. Another Notification No.
167 /79 dated April 19, 1979 was issued under Rule 3 whereby parts and
accessories of motor vehicles falling under Item No. 34A and intended
for use in further manufacture of excisable goods were exempted from
the whole of duty leviable thereon provided that the intended use was
in a factory of a manufacturer different from the factory in which the
D said parts and accessories had been manufactured. The Notifications
did not apply to the 15 specified items. Subsequently the two Notifica-
tions were amended by Notification No. 187/79 C.E. dated May 10,
1979 by deleting the reference to Tariff Item No. 34A and substituting
for it Tariff Item No. 68. According to the petitioner the result of these
successive Notifications is that the parts and accessories of motor vehi-
E cles fall under Tariff Item No. 34A prior to the enforcement of Finance
Act 1979 and after the enforcement of that Act they fall under Tariff
Item No. 68 provided that the parts and accessories of motor vehicles
do not find mention in Tariff Item Na. 34A as amended by the Finance
Act, 1979.
F Upon the tests and having regard to the foregoing considerations
which have appealed to us when considering the proper classification
of glass mirrors, we have no hesitation in holding that the screens
cannot be described as "glass or glass wares" under Tariff Item No.
23A(4). No one dealing in or using the screens would consider them as
"glass or glass ware". They can only be considered as motor »ehicle
parts. Even if we assume that they could fall under Tariff Item No.
G
23A(4) relating to 'glass and glass ware' also, inasmuch as Tariff Item
No. 34A is a special entry and Tariff Item No. 23A(4) is a general
entry, the special must exclude the general and therefore also it is
Tariff Item No. 34A which prevails and is attracted.
H It is clear, however, that after the amendment of Tariff Item No.
ATUL GLASS INDUSTRIES v. THE COLLECTOR [PATHAK, J. J 139
34A by the ·Finance Act 1979 the scope of that Tariff Item is restricte<;I A
to the 15 commodities specified therein. That being so the screens
manufactured by the petitioner merit classification in the residuary
Tariff Item No. 68.
In the; result, Civil Appeal No. 3435 of 1984 is allowed, the order
dated July 24, 1984 of the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appel- B
late Tribunal is set aside and the Order dated January 24, 1984 of the
Collector (Appeals) is restored. In the Transfer Cases, we allow the
writ petitions and direct that the glass mirrors and screens manu-
factured by the petitioner be treated to excise duty in the light of the
observations made by us. The parties shall bear their own costs.
c
A.P.J. Appeal and Petitions allowed.
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