ATMA RAM MITTALversusISHWAR SINGH PUNIA

                               ATMA RAM MITTAL
  A
                                        v.
                              ISHW AR SINGH PUNJA

                                  AUGUST 22, 1988

 B      [SABYASACHI MUKHARJI ANDS. RANGANATHAN,JJ.]

             Hmyww Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973: Sec-
       tions 1(3) and 13( 1)-Exemption from applicability of Rent Control
       Act-Period of 'ten years' exemption-Expiring during pendency of
       eviction suit-Effect of-Once rights crystallise adjudication to be in
       accurJance ~vith law.
 c
            Statutory Constitution: Purposive interpretation in a social
       amelioration legislation-An imperative irrespective of anything else.

             Words and Phrases: 'Actus curiam neminem gravabit'-Meaning
 D     of

             The appellant-landlord filed a civil suit against the respondent-
       ten.ant for possession of a shop which had been rented out by him in
       1978. The suit was filed on the basis that the respondent was in arrears
       ~f rent from !st December, 1981 to 31st May, 1982, that the tenancy
 E     had been terminated by giving a suit notice, and that Section 1(3) of the
       Haryana urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 exempted the
       building from the purview of the Act.

              On or about 15th February, 1983, the respondent-tenant filed his
       written statement, and in November· 1984, moved an application for
 F     dismissal of the suit stating that the s~op in question was constructed in
       June 1974 and as such, the period of 10 years had elapsed by June 1984
       in. terms of Section 1(3) of the Act and as such, the immunity from the
       application of the Act having expired, the suit under the Act is not
       maintainable, and that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred.

 (;          The Sub-Judge held that the decree was not necessary to be pas-
       sed within the exemption period of LO years under Section 1(3) of the
       Act, and accordingly dismissed the respondent's application.

             The respondent preferred a revision petition to the High Court,
       which held that as the suit had not been decreed within the period of IO
. Fl   years, the. building in question came within the operation of the Act and
                                          528
                        A.R. MITTAL v. 1.S. PUNIA                       529

as such, the rent Act was.applicable and the Civil Court had no jurisdic•       A
tion. The High Court allowed the petition and consequently dismissed
the suit pending before the Sub-Judge.

      The landlord appealed to this Court by Special Leave.
                                                                                B
      Allowing the appeal and remanding the case, ·

      HELD: L(a)'The rights 'of the parties will have to be determined
on the ·basis of the rights available to' them on the date of the suit. The
Judgment and Order of the High Court set aside, and order of the
Sub-Judge restored. The suit to proceed in accorwmce with law. l533G-53SF]
                                                                                c
      (b) Section 13 of the Act provides that the tenanlin possession of
a building or a rented land shall not be evicted therefrom except in
accodance with the provisions of tbe said Section. Those provisions
would not be applkable under Section 1(3) to a suit instituted within 10
years from the date of the completion of the building in question. [534B]       D
     (c) It is well-settled that no man should suffer because of the fault
of the Court or oelay in the procedure. "Actus curiam nenilnem ·
gravabit"-an act of Court shall prejudice no man. [534E]

       (d) Hal'ing regard to the time normally consumed for adjudica-
                                                                                E
tion, the IO years exemption or holiday from the application of the Rent
Act would become illusory, if the suit has to be filed within that time
and be disposed of :rmally. l534F J

      (e) It is common knowledge that unless a suit is instituted soon
after the date of letting, it would never be disposed of within IO years
                                                                                F
and even then within that time it may not be disposed of. That will make
the 10 years holiday from the Rent Act illusory and provide no incentive
to the landlords to build new houses to solve problem of shortages of
houses. The purpose of the legislation would thus be defeated. [534Gl

      (f) Bearing in mind the well-settled principle, that the rights of
                                                                                G
parties' crystallise on the date of the institution of the snit; the meaning-
ful construction must be that the exemption would apply for a·period of
IO years and will continue to be available until the suit is disposed of or
adjudicated. Such suit or proceedings must be instituted within the
stipulated 'period of IO years. Once rights crystallise the adjudication
must be in accordance with law. [535E]                                          H
       530          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

.,'\         Vineet Kumar v. Mangat Sain Wadhera, [1984] 3 S.C.C. 3S2;
       Nand Kishore Marwah and Ors. v. Spmundri Devi, [1987] 4 S.C.C.
       382; Om Prakash Gupta v. Dig. Vijendrapal Gupta, [1982] 3 S.C.R.
       491; Ram Saroop Raiv. Lilavati, [1980] 3 S.C.C. 452, referred to.

             2.(a) Purposive interpretation in a social amelioration legislation
$ is an imperative irrespective of anything else~ [5J4G]

             (b) Judicial time and energy is more often than not consumed in
       finding what is the intel!tion of Jhe Parlialnent or in other words, the will
       of the people. The fairest and most ratiqnal method to interpret the will
       of ihe legislator is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law '
C      was made, by signs most natural and probable and these signs are either
       the words, the context, the subject matter, the effects and consequences
       or the spirit and reasons of the law. l534H-535A]

             (c) Each word, phrase or sentence has to be construed in the light
       of the purpose of the Act itself but words must be construed with imagi-
11>    nation of purpose behind. them. Though the Court is concerned with
       seeking of intention, it is rather looking to the meaning of the ivord that
       the legislator has used and the true meaning of the words used. [535B]

             Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras, [1953] SCR 677 and Black-
       Clawson International Ltd. v. Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg A
E      G, [1975] A.C. 591at613.

             CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3081
       of 1988.

           From the Jlldgment and Order dated 25.10.1985 of the Punjab
fl     and'Haryana High Court in Civil Revision No. 2457 of 1985.

             R.K. Jain and Ms. Abba Jain for the Appellant.

             K.C. Sharma and R.K. Virmani for the Respondent.

q            .The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

            SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. Special leave granted. The
       appeal is disposed of herein after hearing counsel for both the parties.

             The appellant-landlord filed a suit for possession in the Civil
Ii Court of Hissar in Haryana. The respondent is the tenant in the shop
               A.R. MITIAL v. l.S. PUNIA iMUKHARJI, J.]               531

  situated at Raj Guru Market which had been rented out to the respon-
                                                                            A
  dent in 1978. The suit was filed on the basis that the respondent was in
  arrears of rent from 1st December, 1981 to 31st May, 1982 and the
  tenancy of the respondent had been terminated by giving him notice.
  The suit was filed for recovery of possession on the terrninatioQ or
  expiry of the. period of tenancy. It was filed because of Section 1(3) of
  the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 B
  (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The Act was passed with the
  object to control the increase of rent of certain buildings and rented
  land situated within the limits of urban areas and the eviction of ten-
. ants.' therefrom. For our present purpose, it would suffice if we bear in
  mind- two relevant provisions. Section 1(3) of the Act provides as
  follows:
                                                                              c
             "Nothing in this Act shall apply to any building the con-
             struction of which is completed on or after the commence-
             ment of this Ac.Hor a period of ten years from the date of
             its cotripletion."
                                                                              D
       Section 13 of the Act deals with the eviction of tenants and
 sub-section (1) thereof provides that the tenant in possession· of a
 building or a rented land shall not. be evicted therefrom except in
 accordance with the provisions of that section. The section thereafter
 enumerates the statutory grounds for eviction upon which eviction is
 permiHed which incidentally are more or less similar statutory grounds       E
 all over the country.

        On or _about 15th February, 1983, the respondent-tenant filed his
 written staJelf!eiii. ln November, 191!4, the respondent-tenant moved
 an application for dismissal of the suit of the appellant stating that the
 shop in question was constructed in June, 1974 as such the period of         F
 ten years had elapsed by June, 1984 in terms of section 1(3) of the Act.
 ancJ., as such, the iinmunity from the application of the Act had
 expired. The suit under the Act is not maintainable and the jurisdic-
 tion of the Civil Court stands barred. ne learned Sub-Judge, Hissar.
 held that the decree was not necessary to be passed within the exemp-
 tion period of ten years under section 1(3) of the Act. the learned          G
 Sub-Judge. accordingly dismissed the respondent's application.
 Aggrieved thereby, the tenant-respondent preferred a revision to the
 High Court of Punjab and Haryana. The High Court held that as the
 suit had not been decreed within the period of ten years, the building
 in question came within the operatiol! qt the Act and as such the Rent
 Act was _applicable and the Civil Court had no jurisdiction. In the          H
     532         SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R ..

     premises, the learned Judge of the High Court dismissed the suit pend,
     ing before the Sub-Judge. Aggrieved thereby the appellant' has come
     up in appeal to this Court.

           More or less identical provisions of the U.P. Act had come up for
     consideration before this Court in the case of Vineet Kumar v. Man gal
a    Sain Wadhera, [1984] 3 S.C.C. 352. The only point that was urged
     before this Court in that decision was whether the premises which was
     not ten years' old on the date of the suit and was exempted from the
     operation of the new Rent Act, could be governed by it if ten years
     expired during the pendency of the litigation .. The relevant provisions
     of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Evic-
     tion) Act, 1972 provided as follows:
c
                "20. Bar of suit for eviction of tenant except on specified
                grounds. (1) Save as provided in sub-section (2), no suit
                shall be instituted for the eviction of a tenant from a build-
                ing, notwithstanding the determination of his tenancy by
                efflux of time or on the expiration of a notice to quit or in
                any other manner:

                      Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall' bar a
                suit for the eviction of a tenant on the determination of his
                tenancy by efflux of time where the tenancy for a fixed term
                was entered into by or in pursuance of a compromise or
                adjustment arrived at with reference to a suit, appeal, revi-
                sion or execution proceeding, which is either recorded in
                court or otherwise reduced to writing and signed by the
                tenant."

I"      In Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera, (supra), the respon-
  dent-landlord filed a suit for eviction and for. arrears of rent and
  damages, inter alia, on the grounds that the building in question was
  not covered by the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent
  and Eviction) Act, 1972 in view of the exemption granted to new
  buildings under section 2(2) of the said Act and that the defendant-
G appellant had defaulted in payment of rent. The tenant had resisted
  the claim on the ground that having regard to the date of construction
  of the building, it was covered by the Act, that the plaint l)aving not
  been am.ended so as to bring the suit under the Act, it was barred by
  section 20· and thai there was no default in payment of rent. As
  mentioned hereinbefore, during the pendency of the litigation the
H exemption granted under section 2(2). expired. The question was
              A.R. MITTAL v. I.S. PUNJA [MUKHARJI, J.[               533

whether the premises which was not ten years' old on the date of the A
suit and was exempted from the operation of the Rent Act, would be
governed by it if ten years expired during the pendency of the litiga-
tion. Allowing the appeal, this Court held that the al'pellant must, get
benefits of the Act which became applicable to the premises in qi;tes-
tion during the pendency of the litigation. That would not affect 'the
cause of action in that case. It was held that the contention that the B
Court had to dedde the case on the basis of cause of action that
accrued prior to the date of filing the suit and not on a new cause of
action was not sustainable. It was further held that normally amend-
ment in plaint is not allowed if it changes the causes of action. How-
·ever, where the amendment does not constitute an addition of a new
cause of action, or raise a new case, but amounts to no more than
 adding to the facts already on the record, the amendment would be
                                                                              c
 allowed even after the statutory period of limitation. This Court
observed that processual justice required that the events and develop-
ments subsequent to the institution of proceedings must be taken into
 consideration in appropriate cases to promote substantial justice.
 Vineet Kumar's case (supra) was discussed and explained by this Court D
 in Nand Kishore Marwah and others v. Sammundri Devi, [1987] 4
 S.C.C. 382. This Court held that in view of section 2(2) of the 1972
 Act,' if an assessme_11t is made of the ne"'.lY built house.then the date of
 completion of the building, the date from which IO years are to be
 computed, will be the date on which the first assessment was made.
 Therefore, the period of 10 years have to be computed from October, E
  1976. This Court further held that if a tenant is entitled to the
 advantage of sections 39 and 40 of the Act and the p-eriod of 10 years
 elapses during the pendency of the eviction suit or appeal before this
 Court (which is the continuation of the suit), then the tenant would be
 entitled to the benefits of the Act. This Court further held that within
 10 years as provided for in section 2(2) restri£tion on the institution of F
 suit as provided for in section 20( I) will not be applicable. It was held
 that during the pendency of the litigation even if 10 years expired the
 restriction under section 20 will not be attracted as the suit had been
instituted within 10 years. It is well-settled that the rights of the parties
will have to be determined on the basis of the rights available to them
 on the date of the suit. This Court pointed out that the attention of the G
 Court had not been drawn to the decision of this Court in Om Prakash
 Gupta v. 'Dig. Vijendrapal Gupta, [1982] 3 S.C.R. 491. This Court
 referred to the words used in section 20 of the said Act which em-
phasised that "no suit shall be instituted for eviction." This clearly
indicates that the restriction put_ under section 20 of the said Act is to.
the institution of the suit itself,'!nd, therefore, it is clear that if the H
    534          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 11988] Supp. 2 s.c.R.

A   pr()vision of tl!js Act applies then no suit for eviction can be instituted
    except on the grounds specified in the sub-sections of that section of
    the Act. This applies more so in the instant case where the section 13
    of the Act provides that the tenant in possession of a building or a
    rented -land shall not be evicted therefrom except in accordance with
    the provisions of this section. Those provisions would not be applic-
a   able to a suit instituted within 10 years from the date of the completion
    of the building in question. That is the plain meaning of the expression
    "use". It was-further to be borne in mind-that i-n -finding o~t the plain
    meaning of the expression "use'", the language, the background, the
    context, the purpose, these all have to be borne in mind.

          In Ram Saroop Rai v .. Lilavati, [1980] 3 S.C.C. 452, Krishna
    Iyer, J. has explained the s~ction 2(2) of the U .P. Act as follows;

                "The legislature found that rent control law has a chilling
                effect on new building construction, and so, to encourage
                more building operations, amended the statute to release,
D               from the shackle of legislative restriction, 'new construc-
                tions' for a period of ten years. So much so, a landlord who
                had let out his new building could recover possession with-
                out impediment if he instituted such proceedings within ten
                years of completion."

           It is well-settled that no man should suffer because of the fault of
    the Court or delay in the procedure. Broom has stated the maxim
    "actus curialll neminem gravabit"-an act of Court shall prejudice, no
    man. Therefore, having regard to the .time normally consumed for
    adjudication, the 10 years exemption or holiday from the application
    of the Rent Act would become illusory, if the suit has to be filed within
    that time and be disposed of finally. It is common knowledge that
    unless a suit is instituted soon after the date of Jetting it would never be
    disposed of witl;in 10 years and even then within that time it may not
    be disposed of. That will make the 10 years holidays from the Rent Act
    illusory and provide no focentive to the landlords to build new houses
    to solve problem of shortages of houses. The purpose of legislation
    would thus be defeated. Purposive interpretation in a social ameliora-
    tion legislation is an imperative irrespective of anything else.,

          Judicial time and energy is more often than riot consumed in
    finding what is the intention of the Parliament or in other words, the
    will of the people. Blackstone tells us that the fairest and most rational
H   method to interpret the will of the legislator is by exploring his_inten-
               A.R. MITfAL v. l.S. PUNJA !MUKHARJI, J.)                535

!'ions at the" tfu:ie when the Jaw was made, by signs most natural and         A
probable. And these signs are either the words, the context, the sub-
ject matter, tlie effects and ·consequence, or the spirit and reason of
the law. (Underlined by the Court). See Commentaries on the Laws of
England (facsimile of 1st edition of 1765, Universiiy of Chicago Press,
1979 Vol. 1, p. 59). Mukherjea, J. as the learned Chief Justice then
was, in Poppatlal Shah v. State uf Madras, (1953) SCR 677 said that            B
each ";ord, phrase or sentence was to be construed in the light of
purpose of the Act itself. But words must be construed with imagina-
tion of purpose behind them said Judge Learned Hand, long time ago ..
It appears, therefore, thafthough we are concerned with seeking of
intention, we are rather looking to the meaning of the words that the
legislator has used and the true meaning of what words as was said by          c
Lord Reid in Black-Clawson International Ltd. v. Papierwerke
Waldhof-Aschaffenburg AG, (1975] Appeal Cases 591 at 613. We are
clearly of the opinion that having regard to the language we must find
the reason and the spirit of the Jaw. If the immunity from the operation
cif the Rent Act is made and depended upon the ultimate disposal of
the case within the period of exemption of 10 years which' iSin reality        D
an impossibility, then there would be empty reasons. In our opinion,
bearing in mind the' well-settled principle that the rights of the parties
crystallise on the date Of the in$tiiution of the suit as enunciated by this
Court in Om Prakash Gupta v. Dig Vijendrapal Gupta, (supra); the
meaningful construction must be that the exemption would apply for        a E
period of 10 yea~ and wiil continue to be available until suit is dis-
posed of or adjudicated. Such suit or proceeding must be instituted
withiri -thestlplllated penod of10-ye3rs:-once rlgh!S aystiillise the
adjudication must bein accordance with law.                -            ,_

      In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the High
Court was in error in the view it took. The judgment and order of the          F
High Court are set aside and the order of the learned Sub-Judge is
restored: The suit will now "proceed iii acciirdance"With law in the light
of the observations herein as dxpeditiously as possible. The costs of the
appeal will be the costs of the suii.               . -

N.V.K.                                                   . Appeitl allowed.    G