ATBIRversusGOVT. OF N.C.T. OF DELHI

                    [2010] 9 S.C.R. 993


                           ATBIR                               A
                              v.
                GOVT. OF N.C.T. OF DELHI
             (Criminal Appeal No. 870 of 2006)
                     AUGUST 9, 2010
                                                               B
    [P. ·sATHASIVAM AND DR. B. S. CHAUHAN, JJ.]

       Penal Code, 1860: s. 302134 - Triple Murder -
  Conviction by courts below on the basis of dying declaration
  and the motive for murder - One accused sentenced to death C
  while the other sentenced to life imprisonment - On appeal,
  held: Dying declaration of one of the deceased is reliable and
  admissible in evidence - The prosecution has also proved
  motive - Conviction imposed is justified """ As regards the
  accused who inflicted the injuries, death sentence is just as D
  his act was barbaric and inhuman - It is a gravest case of
  extreme culpability and rarest of rare case - Sentence I
. Sentencing - Death sentence - Evidence Act, 1872 - s.32 -
  Dying Declaration - Criminal Law - Motive.
     The two appellants-accused alongwith two other            E
accused were prosecuted for having killed three
persons. The prosecution case was that the appellants-
acc used demanded money and transfer of certain
property in their name from their father (PW-5). PW-5
though agreed to do the same, but the appellants-              F
accused apprehended that so long as the deceased
persons (their step-mother 'Sh', step-brother 'M' and step-
sister 'S') were alive, their father would not give them the
property. Appellants-accused with their mother
(absconding accused) and another person, entered the           G
house of their step-mother 'Sh', (deceased) bolted the
door and asked for the money. On refusal by her,
accused 'At' stabbed all the three inmates one by one,
while the other accused persons were holding them. On
                             993                               H
    994      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A information of murder, the police officials went to the
  place of occurrence and found the dead bodies of the
  deceased 'Sh' and 'M'. 'S' was removed to the hospital.
  There she made her statement before the Police Officer
  on the endorsement given by the doctor (PW3) to the
B effect that the patient was fit for statement. Subsequently,
  'S' succumbed to the injuries. Appellants-accused were
  convicted by the trial court while the other accused was
  acquitted. The third accused (mother of the appellant-
  accused) remained absconding. Appellant-accused 'At'
c was sentenced tO death and appellant-accused 'A' was
  sentenced to life imprisonment. The High Court
  dismissed the appeal of the accused i;ersons upholding
  their conviction. Death Reference was also confirmed by
  the High Court. Instant appeals were filed by the accused
0 persons.
          Dismissing the appeals, the Court
          HELD: 1.1. Dying declaration can be the sole basis
    of conviction, if it inspires the full confidence of the court.
E   The court should be satisfied that the deceased was in a
    fit state of mind at the time of making the statement and
    that it was not the result of tutoring, prompting or
    imagination. Where the court is satisfied that the
    declaration is true and voluntary, it can base its
F   conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be
    laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying
    declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction
    unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration
    is merely a rule of prudence. Where dying declaration is
    suspicious, it should not be acted upon without
G   corroborative evidence. A dying declaration which suffers
    from infirmity such as the deceased was unconscious
    and could never make any statement, cannot form the
    basis of conviction. Merely because a dying declaration
    does not contain all the details as to the occurrence, it is
H   not to be rejected. When the eye-witness affirms that the
         ATBIR v. GOVT. OF N.C.T. OF DELHI                995


deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make            A
the dying declaration, medical opinion cannot prevail. If
after careful scrutiny, the court is satisfied that it is true
and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make
a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent,
there shall be no legal impediment to make it basis of           B
conviction, even if there is no corroboration. [Para 16)
1006-H; 1007-A-H; 1008-A-B]

     1.2. In the instant case, the trial court found the dying
declaration credit-worthy and has held the same to have          C
been made by the deceased 'S' in a fit mental state to
depose. After making the declaration, she herself signed
the same and it also carried an endorsement by the
doctor (PW 30) to the effect that she was in a fit mental
state. After careful analysis, the trial court as well as the
High Court found that there is total clarity in its contents     D
and it is not a case where the deceased was either
rambling, unsure or had contradicted herself. There is rio
compulsion that all dying declarations have to be made
before the Magistrate. In the instant case, the Inspector
who recorded the statement was cross-examined and the            E
details and his evidence was not shattered by the
defence. In fact, not even a suggestion was made to the
Investigation Officer about the availability of Magistrate at
the relevant point of time. Since the statement of tt~e
deceased was very brief as to the circumstances and              F
persons involved who caused brl:ltal injuries on her body
as well as her mother and brother, in additio,n to the
same, the doctor (PW 30) has also certified that at the
relevant time she was in a fit mental state and endorsed
the same by putting his signatures near the signature of         G
the deponent i.e. deceased. In such circumstances, there
1
is no reason to disbelieve the statement of the deceased
'S', implicating the three accused persons i.e. the
appe11ants-accused and the absconding accused. [Para
17) [1008-C; 1009-E-H; 1010-A-C]                                 H
    996    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A      1.3. The evidence of the doctors (PW-26 and PW-30),
  who had treated the deceased 'S', indicate that
  immediately after admission in the hospital and at the
  time of making statement, she was in a fit condition. It is
  also clear that immediately after her statement, because
B of the injuries, she was taken to emergency ward and she
  was kept therein till her death. It is also clear that in
  respect of injury on the 'carotid', in view of the fact that it
  was only partially cut and able to speak and inform what
  had happened at the time of the incident, her statement
c to the Inspector (PW-41) in the presence of the doctor
  PW-30 is legally permissible and admissible in evidence.
  [Para 22) [1013-G-H; 1014-A]

       Munnu Raja and Anr. vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh
  (1976) 3 SCC 104; Paras Yadav and Ors. vs. State of Bihar
D (1999) 2 SCC 126; Balbir Singh and Anr. vs. State of Punjab
  (2006) 12 SCC 283; State of Rajasthan vs. Wakteng (2007)
  14 SCC 550; Bijoy Oas vs. State of West Bengal (2008) 4
  SCC 511; Muthu Kutty and Anr vs. State by Inspector of
  Police T. N. (2005) 9 SCC 113; Panneerselvam vs. State of
E Tamil Nadu (2008) 17 SCC 190; Paniben vs. State of Gujarat
  (1992) 2 sec 474, relied on.

       2. The prosE;!cution has also proved motive. It is
  abundantly clear from the evidence of PW-5 that his
F sons, particularly, appellant-accused 'At' apprehended
  that because of the presence of his step-mother and her
  children, he might not get properties of his father (PW5),
  at once. Since this was in his mind and in consultation
  with his mother (the absconding accused), he planned to
G eliminate the entire family of the second wife of his father
  (PW 5). These aspects have been amply projected by the
  prosecution and rightly accepted by the trial court and
  the High Court. [Para 22) [1014-C-E)

      3. The guidelines indicated in Bachan Singh's case
H have to be culled out and applied to the facts of each
          ATBIR v. GOVT. OF N.C.T. OF DELHI               997


  individual case where the question of imposing of death A
 sentence arises. In the instant case, the murders
  committed by accused 'At' is extremely brutal and
  diabolical one. The cold blooded murder is committed
  with deliberate design in order to inherit the entire
  property of his father (PW5) without waiting for his death. B
  The magnitude of the crime is also enormous in
  proportion since accused 'At', with the assistance of his
  mother and brother, committed multiple murders of all the
  members of the family. Apart from this, the victims are
  none else than his step-mother, brother and sister. The c
  victims are innocent who could not have or has not
   provided even an excuse much less a provocation for
  murder. Further, the victims were unaware of the sudden
. entry of accused 'At' and others and after bolting the door
   from inside, they have no other way to go out or resist 0
   except subjecting themselves to the wishes of accused
   'At'. Though accused 'At' was also at the age of 25 at the
   relevant point of time, considering his hunger and lust for
   property, killing his own family members when they had
   no occasion to provoke or resist, and causing 37 knife
                                                                  E
   blows on vital parts of all the three persons, it is a gravest
   case of extreme culpability and rarest of rare case and
   death sentence alone would be proper and adequate.
   Taking into consideration all the facts and materials, it is
   crystal clear that the entire act of accused 'At' amounts
   to a barbaric and inhuman behaviour of the highest F
   order. The manner in which the murder was carried out
   in the instant case is extremely brutal, gruesome,
   diabolical, and revolting as to shock the collective
   conscience of the community. In the circumstances, the
   conviction and the sentence of death iinposed on G
   accused 'At' is confirmed. The conviction and the
   setence of life imprisonment imposed on accused 'A' is
   also confirmed. [Paras 26 and 34] [1019-C; 1023-D-H]

      Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684,          H
    998      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A followed Machhi Singh vs. State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC
  470, relied on.

                         Case Law Reference:
          (1976) 3 sec 104          Relied on.          Para 9
B
          (1999) 2 sec 126          Relied on.          Para 10
          (2006) 12 sec 283         Relied on.          Para 11
          (2001) 14 sec 550         Relied on.          Para 12
c         (2008) 4 sec 511          Relied on.          Para 13

          (2005) 9 sec 113          Relied on.          Para 14

          (2008) 11 sec 190         Relied on.          Para 15

D         (1992) 2 sec 474          Relied on.          Para 15
          (1980) 2 sec 684          Followed.           Para 24
          (1983) 3 sec 410          Relied on.          Para 25

        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
E
    No. 870 of 2006.

        From the Judgment & Order dated 13.01.2006 of the High
    Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 805 of 2004
    and Murder Reference No. 3 of 2004.
F
                                  WITH

    Crl. A. No. 877 of 2006.

       K.B. Sinha, A.T.M. Rangaramanujam, J.S. Atri, V. Senthil
G Kumar, Ashok Kumar Singh, Shanti Kumar Jaisani, Sanjeev
  Kumar Sharma, Bhakti Pasrija, J.K. Mishra, Subhash Kaushik,
  Niraj Jha, Anil Katiyar for the appearing parties.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
H
         ATBIR v. GOVT. OF N.C.T. OF DELHI                999


     P. SATHASIVAM, J. 1. These appeals are directed            A
against the final judgment and order dated 13.01.2006 of the
High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 805
of 2004, Murder Reference No. 3 of 2004 and Criminal Appeal
No. 876 of 2004 whereby the High Court dismissed the criminal
appeals filed by the appellants herein and confirmed the         B
sentence awarded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Delhi in Murder reference.

    2. The case of the prosecution is as under:

      (a) Atbir, the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 870 of 2006 C
is the son of one Jaswant Singh. Jaswant Singh had married ·
accused Chandra @ Chandrawati, who is absconding and
from the said wedlock, three children, namely, Satbir, Atbir and
Anju were born to them. Thereafter, Jaswant Singh married
Sheela Devi, the deceased and from their wedlock, one D
daughter Sonu @ Savita and one son Manish @ Mannu - the
deceased, were born. Sheela Devi - the 2nd wife of Jaswant
Singh was staying at Mukherjee Nagar, Delhi, with her children.
They were having dispute over the division of their properties.
                                                                  E
      (b) On the afternoon of 22.01.1996, on receiving
information of m1;1rder of a man and that of one injured at N-33,
Mukherjee Nagar, Delhi, Inspector Virender Singh, Addi. S.H.O.,
Mukherjee Nagar Police Station along with ASI Kanwar Lal, Ct.
Manoj Kumar and Ct. Jogender Singh rushed to the place of
occurrence and found two dead bodies, one of female and
                                                                  F
other of a boy aged about 16 years in the adjacent room on
the ground floor of N-33, Mukherjee Nagar, Delhi. Both were
 later identified as Smt. Sheela Devi, second wife of Jaswant
 Singh and her son Manish @ Mannu. It was revealed at the spot
that one injured, namely, Sonu @ Savita, daughter of Sheela G
 Devi was removed to Hindu Rao Hospital in a PCR Gypsy. After
 leaving ASI Kanwar Lal at the spot, Inspector Virender Singh
 along with his team rushed to Hindu Rao Hospital and on
 endorsement given by Dr. Sharat Chandra Jai Singh-PW 30
                                                                  H
    1000    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A that "patient fit for statement", recorded the statement given by
  Sonu @ Savita. In the statement, Sonu @ Savita alleged that
  Chandra @ Chandrawati her step-mother, along with her son
  Atbir, one Ashok-appellant herein in Crl. Appeal No. 877 of
  2006 and one person whose name she did not know entered
B their house and demanded money from her mother Sheela Devi
  but she refused. Accused persons bolted the doors from inside
  and Atbir took out a knife and stabbed Manish @ Mannu, who
  was held by Chandra @ Chandrawati, Ashok and another.
  Thereafter, Atbir stabbed Sheela Devi and then Sonu @ Savita
c with knife. On the above statement, a case under Sections 307
  and 302 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as
  "l.P.C.") was registered at Mukherjee Nagar Police Station and
  investigation started. On 24.01.1996, Sonu @ Savita
  succumbed to her injuries and died at Hindu Rao Hospital.

D        (c) On completion of the formalities, the challan was filed
    in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate and after completion of
    committal proceedings, the case was re-allocated to the Court
    of Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi. On 12.08.1997, a charge
    under Section 302 read with Section 34 l.P.C. was framed
E   C!gainst accused Atbir, Ashok and Chandra @ Chandrawati.
    On 24.08.1999, on filing the supplementary challan against
    accused Arvind, the charge was re-framed against all the
    accused persons, namely, Atbir, Ashok, Arvind and Chandra
    @ Chandrawati by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, to
F   which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Prosecution
    examined as many as 41 witnesses and their statements were
    recorded. The Additional Sessions Judge, vide order dated
    27.09.2004, convicted Atbir - appellant in Crl.A. No.870/2006
    with death penalty and Ashok- appellant in Crl. A. No. 877/2006
G   with life imprisonment and acquitted Arvind. The accused
    Chandra @ Chandrawati remained absconding. Being
    aggrieved by the order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi,
    the appellants herein filed appeal before the High Court. The
    murder reference was also sent by the Sessions Court to the
H   High Court. The High Court, by the impugned judgment and
         ATBIR v. GOVT. OF N.C.T. OF DELHI                  1001
                 [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

order dated 13.01.2006, confirmed the findings recorded by the      A
Additional Sessions Judge and upheld the conviction of the
appellants awarded by him. Against the said judgment, the
appellants have preferred these appeals by way of special
leave before this Court.
                                                                    B
     3. Heard Mr. K.B. Sinha, learned senior counsel for the
appellant in Crl. Appeal No. 870 of 2006, Mr. A.T.M.
Rangaramanujam, learned senior counsel for the appellant in
Crl. Appeal No. 877 of 2006 and Mr. J.S. Atri, learned senior
counsel for the respondent-State.
                                                                    c
     4. Mr. K. 8. Sinha, learned senior counsel, has raised the
following contentions:-

    (i) Whether the dying declaration made before the police
    officer without there being any corroboration from any other    D
    independent witness in itself is sufficient to convict the
    accused with capital punishment.

    (ii) When there was sufficient time for the Magistrate to be
    called for recording the dying declaration, the statement
    made before the Investigating Officer can be treated as         E
    dying declaration and the conviction of the accused with
    capital punishment can be sustained.

    (iii) When the Doctor-PW 30, in whose presence the
    alleged statement "Dying Declaration" was recorded, has         F
    stated in his deposition that the trachea of the deceased
    Sonu @ Savita was torn then whether the dying
    declaration made before the Investigation Officer inspire
    the confidence to base the conviction on the said sole
    statement.                                                      G

    (iv) When all the injuries responsible for causing the death,
    as noted in the statement of doctor C. B. Dabbas-PW 9,
    who conducted the post-mortem on the dead body, were
    on the neck then whether the dying declaration made
                                                                    H
    1002     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] .9 S.C.R.


A         before the 1.0. can be relied on to base the conviction.

          (v) Whether no corroboration of any kind is required to the
          dying declaration and the conviction can be based solely
          on the dying declaration.
B         (vi) Whether the High Court is justified in holding that the
          lust for property was the motive of the accused persons
          for committing the murder.

          (vii) Whether the courts below are justified in awarding
c         death sentence in the facts and circumstances of the case
          and principles laid down by this Court.
     -.
       5. Mr. Rangaramanujam, learned senior counsel for one
  of the appellants reiterated very same contentions relating to
  recording of dying declaration by the police officer when the
0 Magistrate was very well available. He also submitted that in
  the absence of any corroborative evidence, conviction solely
  on the basis of dying declaration cannot be sustained. He
  further submitted that though, the knife, which was said to be
  used and recovered, prosecution has not established the
E ownership of the same.

       6. Mr. Atri, learned senior counsel for the State has
  submitted that in view of the cate'gorical statements by way of
  dying declaration by Sonu@ Savita, recorded by police officer
F after certifying that she was in a fit state of mind to make a
  statement by the doctor coupled with the admissible portion of
  Suresh Chauhan PW-2, Arvind Monga PW-4, Jaswant Singh
  PW-5, Ct. Kulvinder Singh PW-8. Dr. C.B. Dabbas PW-9, Dr.
  Ruma Jain PW-26 and Dr. Sharat Chandra Jai Singh PW-30,
G absolutely there is no ground for interference. He also
  highlighted that in view of aggravating circumstances,
  eliminating the entire family and considering the brutality and
  exceptional depravity, the appellant-Atbir deserves capital
  punishment. The life imprisonment imposed on the other
H accused, namely, Ashok is also justifiable and there is no valid
         ATBIR v. GOVT. OF N.C.T. OF DELHI                   1003
                 [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

ground for interference and prayed for dismissal· of both the         A
appeals.

     7. We have carefully considered the rival contentions and
perused the relevant materials.

    8. Among the various contentions raised by both the sides,        B
major part relates to two legal submissions:-

   (a) Admissibility and reliability of the dying declaration
made by Sonu @ Savita before the Investigating officer.

    (b) Whether death sentence insofar as Atbir and life
                                                                      c
sentence insofar as Ashok is warranted.

{A) "Dying Declaration".

     It is true that in the case on hand, conviction under Section    o
302 was based solely on the dying declaration made by Sonu
@ Savita and recorded by Investigating Officer in the presence
of a Doctor. Since we have already harrated the case of
prosecution which led to three deaths, eliminating the second
wife and the children of one Jaswant Singh, there is no nee·d         E
to traverse the same once again. This Court in a series of
decisions enumerated and analyzed, that while recording the
dying declaration, factors such as mefltal condition of the maker,
alertness of mind and memory, evidentiary value etc. have to
be taken into account.
                                                                      F
    9. In MunnuRaja and Another vs. The State of Madhya
Pradesh, (1976) 3-scc 104, this Court held:-

     " .... It is well settled that though a dying declaration must
     be approached with caution for the reason that the maker         G
     of the statement cannot be subject to cross-examination,
     there is neither a rule of law nor a rule of prudence which
     has hardened into a rule of law that a dying declaration
     cannot be acted upon unless it is corroborated .... "
                                                                      H
    1004    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A        lf1s true that in the same decision, it was held, since the
    Investigating Officers are naturally interested in the success of
    the investigation and the practice of the Investigating Officer
    himself recording a dying declaration during the course of an
    investigation ought not to have been encouraged.
B
       10. In Paras Yadav and Ors. vs. StQte of Bihar, (1999) 2
  SCC 126, this Court held that lapse on the part of the .
  Investigation Officer in not bringing the Magistrate to record the
  statement of the deceased should not be taken in favour of the
  accused. This Court further held that a statement of the
c deceased recorded by a police officer in a routine manner as
  a complaint and not as a dying declaration can also be treated
  as dying declaration after the death of the injured and relied
  upon if the evidence of the prosecution witnesses clearly
  establishes that the deceased was conscious and was in a fit
D state of health to make the statement.

       11. The effect of dying declaration not recorded by the
  Magistrate was considered and reiterated in Bafbir Singh &
  Anr. VS:- State of Punjab, (200G) 12 SCC 283. Paragraph 23
E of the said judgment is relevant which reads as under:
           -·
         "23. However, in State of Karnataka v. Shariff, (2003) 2
         SCC 473, this Court categorically held that there was no
         requirement of law that a dying declaration must necessarily
         be made before a Magistrate. This Court therein noted its
F        Era"rlier decision in Ram Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar,
         (1998) 4 sec 517' wherein it was also held that the dying
         declaration need not be in the form of questions and
         answers. (See also Laxman v. State of Maharashtra,

G          -
         (2002) 6 sec 11 O)."

  It is clear that merely because che dying declaration was not
  recorded by the Magistrate, by itself cannot be a ground to
  reject the whole prosecution case. It also clarified that where
  the declaration is wholly inconsistent or contradictory statements
H are made or if it appears from the records that the dying
         ATBIR v. GOVT. OF N.C.T. OF DELHI                    1005
                 [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

declaration is not reliable, a question may arise as to why the        A
Magistrate was not called for, but ordinarily the same may not
be insisted upon. This Court further held that the statement of
the injured, in event of her death may also be treated as FIR.

     12. In State of Rajasthan vs. Wakteng, (2007) 14 SCC              B
550, the view in Balbir Singh's case(supra) has been reiterated.
The following conclusions are relevant which read as under:

    "14. Though conviction can be based solely on the dying
    declaration, without any corroboration the same should not
    be suffering from any infirmity.                                   C

    15. While great solemnity and sanctity is attached to the
    words of a dying man because a person on the verge of
    death is not likely to tell lie or to concoct 'a case so as to
    implicate an innocent person but the court has to be               o
    careful to ensure that the statement was not the result of
    either tutoring, prompting or a product of the imagination.
    It is, therefore, essential that the court must be satisfied
    that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the
    statement, had clear capacity to observe and identify the          E
    assailant and that he was making the statement without any
    influence or rancour. Once the court is satisfied that the
    dying declaration is true and voluntary it is sufficient for the
    purpose of conviction."

      13. In Bijoy Das vs. State of West Bengal, (2008) 4 SCC          F
511, this Court after quoting various earlier decisions,
reiterated the same position.

     14. In Muthu Kutty & Anr. Vs. State By Inspector of Police,
T.N., (2005) 9 SCC 113, the following discussion and the               G
ultimate conclusion are relevant which read as under:

           "14. This is a case where the basis of conviction of
    the accused is the dying declaration. The situation in which
    a person is on the deathbed is so solemn and serene when
    he is dying that the grave position in which he is placed,         H
    1006   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A      is the reason in law to accept veracity of his statement. It
       is for this reason that the requirements of oath and cross-
       examination are dispensed with. Besides, should the dying
       declaration be excluded it will result in miscarriage of
       justice because the victim being generally the only
B      eyewitness in a serious crime, the exclusion of the
       statement would leave the court without a scrap of
       evidence.

               15. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great
       weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no
c      power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for
       eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is
       the reason the court also insists that the dying declaration
       should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of
       the court in its correctness. The court has to be on guard
D      that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of
       either tutoring, or prompting or a product of imagination.
       The court must be further satisfied that the deceased was
       in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe
       and identify the assailant. Once the court is satisfied that
E      the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can
       base its conviction without any further corroboration. It
       cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the
       dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction
       unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration
F      is merely a rule of prudence."

       15. The same view has been reiterated by a three Judge
  Bench decision of this Court in Panneerselvam vs. State of
  Tamil Nadu, (2008) 17 SCC 190 and also the principles
G governing the dying declaration as summed up in Paniben vs.
  State of Gujarat, (1992) 2 SCC 474.

       16. The analysis of the above decisions clearly shows that,

               (i)   Dying declaration can be the sole basis of
H
ATBIR v. GOVT. OF N.C.T. OF DELHI                     1007
        [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

           conviction if it inspires the full confidence of    A
           the Court.

  (ii)       The Court should be satisfied that the
           deceased was in a fit state of mind at the
           time of making the statement and that it was        8
           not the result of tutoring, prompting or
           imagination.

  (iii)    Where the Court is satisfied that the
           declaration is true and voluntary, it can base
           its conviction without any further                  C
           corroboration.

  (iv)     It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of
           law that the dying declaration cannot form the
           sole basis of conviction unless it is               o
           corroborated.       The rule        requiring
           corroboration is merely .a rule of prudence.

  (v)      Where dying declaration is suspicious, it
           should not be acted upon without
           corroborative evidence.                             E

  (vi)     A dying declaration which suffers from
           infirmity such as the deceased was
           unconscious and could never make any
           statement cannot form the basis of                  F
           conviction.

  (vii)    Merely because a dying declaration does not
           contain all the details as to the occurrence,
           it is not to be rejected.
                                                               G
  (viii)    Even if it is a brief statement, it is not to be
           discarded.

  (ix)     When the eye-witness at.firms that the
           deceased was not in a fit and conscious             H
    1008    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A                    state to make. the dying declaration, medical
                     opinion cannot prevail.

               (x)   If after careful scrutiny, the Court is satisfied
                     that it is true and free from any effort to induce
                     the deceased to make a false statement and
B
                     if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be
                     no legal impediment to make it basis of
                     conviction, even if there is no corroboration.

       17. In the case on hand, the Additional Sessions Judge
C has found the dying declaration credit worthy and has held the
  same to have been made by the deceased in a fit mental state
  to depose. The English translation of the dying declaration, as
  made by the deceased to Inspector V.S. Chauhan-PW-41 in
  the presence of Dr. Sharat Chandra Jai Singh, PW-30 and as
D recorded by him, which was registered as FIR reads thus:

         Ms Sonu @ Savita, d/o Shri Jaswant Singh, aged 16
    years, r/o - N-33, Mukherjee Nagar, Delhi made the following
    statement:-
E       "I reside at the aforesaid address. My father's name is
        Jaswant Singh and that of my mother is Sheela. Today at
        about 2:30 p.m. My mother Sheela, brother Mannu and
        myself were present in the house and were doing our
        work. At that time, my step mother Chandra, her son Atbir,
F       one Ashok and one more person, whose name I do not
        know, entered our house and demanded money from my
        mother whereupon, my mother told that she was not having
        money. Thereafter, Atbir took out a knife while my step
        mother Chandra, Ashok and the third one caught hold of
G       my brother Manish @ Mannu. Atbir, then stabbed upon my
        brother and injured him badly. Then, they caught hold of
        my mother. Atbir also injured my mother badly. Thereafter
        they caught hold of me and gave several knife blows upon
        me as a result of which I also got badly injured. I have
H
          ATBIR v. GOVT. OF N.C.T. OF DELHI                     1009
                  [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

     witnessed the incidence. A. PCR Van has brought me (to              A
     the hospital). Legal action may be taken accordingly."
                                                        Sd/- Sonu
                                                      (In English)
                                                         Attested
                                              Sd/- V.S. Chauhan          B
                                                      (In English)
                                                    Dt. 2.1.1996
                                                           S.H.O.
                                      P.S. Mukherjee Nagar,Delhi
     'The statement has been taken in my presence. The patient
                                                                         c
     is in composed mentis.'
                                               Sd/- Sarat Chandra
                                                          Jai Singh
                                                        (In English)     0
                                                     Dt. 22.1. 1996
                                                         C.M.O.(o)"
After making the above declaration she herself signed the
same and it also carries an endorsement by Dr. Sharat
Chandra to the effect that she was in a fit mental state. After          E
careful analysis, the trial Judge as well as the High Court found
that there is total clarity in its contents and it is not a case where
the deceased was either rambling, unsure or had contradicted
herself. We have already adverted to the several decisions of
this Court holding that there is no compulsion that all dying            F
declarations have to be made before the Magistrate. In the case
on hand, the incident occurred on 22.01.1996 at 2.30 p.m., the
injured Sonu @ Savita was admitted in the hospital at 3.30 p.m.
and she made declaration at 4.05 p.m. on the same day. It is
also relevant to note that immediately after recording her               G
statement, doctor referred her to Emergency Ward to save her
life. However, she died on 24.01.1996 at 12.30 p.m. The
Inspector who recorded the statement was cross-examined and
the details and his evidence was not shattered by the defence,
 in fact, not even a suggestion to the Investigation Officer about       H
    1010    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A  the availability of Magistrate at the relevant point of time. Since
   the statement of Sonu @ Savita was very brief as to the
 _ circumstances and persons involved who caused brutal injuries
   on her body as well as her mother and brother, in addition to
   the same, Dr. Sharat Chandra has also certified that at the
B relevant time she was in a fit mental state and endorsed the
   same by putting his signatures near the signature of the
   deponent Sonu @ Savita. In such circumstances, there is no
   reason to disbelieve the statement of Sonu @ Savita
   implicating the three accused persons i.e. Atbir, Ashok
c  (appellants herein) and Chandra @ Chanarawati (absconding
   accused).

        18. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants, by
  pointing out the nature of injuries on the neck of Sonu @ Savita
  and her medical report, contended that it would be highly
D improbable to make such a statement after sustaining such
  injuries. In order to meet the above contention, the prosecution
  has heavily relied on the statements of Dr. C.B. Dabas-PW-9,
  Dr. (Mrs.) Ruma Jain-PW-26 and Dr. Sharat Chandra-PW30.

E       19. Dr. C.B. Dabas-PW-9, on 25.01.1995, conducted
    postmortem examination on the body of the deceased Savita.
    He noticed 21 external injuries. After internal examination, he
    found the following injuries on the neck:

         "Neck: Wounds of the neck were further explode and it
F
        was observed that muscles of neck on both sides were cut.
        Under injury No .. 2, 4, 5 and 6. With evidence of surgical
        devridement and repair. There was infusion of blood in
        neck tissues and blood rest and blood was still oozing out
        from neck vessel of rt. Side. Both external jugular veins and
G       left facial artery were cut under injury No. 2 and 4 with
        surgical cultures present in situ. Right carotid was partially
        cut under injury No. 6 alongwith the muscles and smaller
        vessels of blood was still oozing out of the severed
        vessels. There was a stitched wound on tracheal thyroid.
H       Traches was patent. Other neck structure were intact."
           ATBIR v. GOVT. OF N.C.T. OF DELHI                     1011
                   [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
  /

Since emphasis was about' damage to carotid cartridge, there              A
is no need to refer his examination about chest, abdomen and
head. It is also relevant to note question and answer and cross-
examination about damage to carotid artery .
      ./

      "Que: Kindly name the blood vessel which had been                   B
      severed in injury No. 6?

      Ans. Mainly it was right common carotid cartridge and other
      small vessels.

            It is correct that injuries no. 2, 4 and 5 external jugular   c
      veins and left facial arteries were cut. It is correct that
      jugular and carotid artery are major blood vessels. Carotid
      artery supplies blood to the brain. Carotid artery was
      partially cut. It is correct that with this partial cut in the
      carotid artery the blood supply to the brain will be reduced.       D

      Que: Whether this reduced blood supply to the brain will
      adversely affect the functioning of the brain and will induce
      coma?

      Ans. It will depend upon the amount of blood oozing out of          E
      cut in common carotid artery.

             I have not given the dimension of the cut in the
      common carotid artery as described. The bigger the size
      of the cut in the artery it will speed up the process of            F
      affecting the brain function."

It is clear that according to PW-9, right carotid was partially cut.
Trachea was patent and other neck structures were intact. He
has reiterated the same in cross-examination also. Inasmuch
as the injury on the carotid was partial coupled with opinion of G
Dr. Sharat Chandra PW-30, it cannot be claimed that she was
fully disabled from making any statement.

    20. Dr. (Mrs.) Ruma Jain, PW-26, attached to Hindu Rao
Hospital as CMO, on the date of the incident i.e. on 22.01.1996,          H
    1012    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A   in her evidence deposed that on that day at about 3.30 PM
    Savita was brought by ASI Shanti. She medically examined her.
    Though she found her general condition was not satisfactory
    she had stated that she was conscious and responding to
    verbal command. She also noted various injuries including the
B   injury on the neck. Though during cross-examination, she has
    stated that the drowsiness was excessive but in respect of a
    specific question by the Public Prosecutor, she answered that
    "I did not indicate the extent of drowsiness in the MLC
    Ex.PW26/A. What was mentioned by me was drowsiness and
C   responding to verbal command." She also clarified that before
    signing her statement before re-examination she had stated that
    the word excessive appearing in the cross-examination should
    not have been there. If we analyze the evidence of PW-26, which
    also makes it clear that at the time when Sonu @ Savita was
D   admitted in the hospital at 3.30 PM though there was indication
    of drowsiness, the fact remams that she was responding to
    verbal command and able to make a statement.

         21. The other doctor examined by the prosecution is Dr.
    Sarat Chandra Jai Singh PW-30. In his evidence, he deposed
E   that on 22.01.1996, he was posted in Hindu Rao Hospital as
    Superintendent of Surgery. On that day injured Sonu was
    brought to the hospital and she was medically examined by Dr.
    Tomar, Casualty Medical Officer and he had opined injured to
    be fit for statement on the MLC Ex.PW-26/A. His further
F   statement and assertion are as follows:-

        "On that day lnsp. V.S. Chauhan had met me at MLC Ward
        and he had told me that a dying declaration was to be
        recorded by him (by the lnsp.). On the request of lnsp.
        Chauhan I medically examined injured Ms. Sonu. She was
G
        mentally fit to maker her statement i.e. she could
        understand the questions and could answer the questions
        put to her. After I certified the injured to be medically fit for
        statement lnsp. V.S. Chauhan had recorded the statement
        of injured Ms. Sonu Ex. PW4/A in my presence and I made
H
         ATBIR v. GOVT. OF N.C.f OF DELHI                    1013
                 [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

    my.endorsement Ex. PW-30/A to the erect that the                  A
    statement had ~een taken in presence and the patient was
    in composed mentis and the endorsement bears my
    signatures at point P. lnsp. Chauhan had read over
    statement Ex. PW 4/A to the injured Ms. Sonu and she
    signed statement at point Q in token of correctness of her        B
    statement."

    In the cross-examination, he deposed that:

    "When lnsp. Chauhan was recording the statement of Ms.
    Sonu I heard her statement and then after the recording           C
    of this statement was over, lnsp. Chauhan read over the
    statement to me and at that time Ms. Sonu was also there
    and then I signed this statement by giving my
    endorsement. It is correct that I did not mention in my
    endorsement Ex. PQ 30/A that lnsp. Chauhan read over              D
    this statement. To me and Ms. Sonu. During this time, Ms.
    Sonu was in surgical emergency ward. Patient had stab
    injuries and the injuries were pleading profusely."

PW-30 also asserted that immediately after her statement,             E
Sonu was taken to surgical emergency ward, since she had
stab injuries and was bleeding profusely. It was in evidence that
she was continuously in the emergency ward and ultimately
died on 24.01.1996 at 12.30 PM. This was the reason that
because of her critical position after admission and making her       F
statement, the Magistrate could not be secured to record her
statement.

     22. The evidence of PW-26 and PW-30, who had treated
Sonu, indicate that immediately after admission in the hospital
at 3.30 PM on 22.01.1996 and at the time of making statement          G
at 4.05 PM she was in a fit condition. It is also clear that
immediately after her statement because of the injuries she was
taken to emergency ward and she was kept therein till her death
on 24.01.1996. It is also clear thatiq respect of injury on the
carotid in view of the fact that it was only partially cut and able   H
    1014    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A to speak and inform what had happened at 2.30 PM, her
  statement to Inspector P.S.Chauhan PW-41 in the presence of
  Dr. Sarat Chandra Jai Singh PW-30 is legally permissible and
  admissible in evidence. The learned trial Judge has rightly
  relied on those materials and the High Court correctly approved
B the same. We accept the said conclusion and reject the
  contentions raised by Mr. Sinha and Mr. Rangaramanujam.

    (B) "Motive"

       The prosecution has also proved motive. It is abundantly
C clear from the evidence of Jaswant Singh, PW-5 that when
  Satbir and his brother Atbir demanded 25-26 Bighas of
  agricultural land in Bulandshahar,. U.P. though agreed but
  executed a Will (Ex. PW-5/D) bequeathing those lands in their
  favour but the same was not acceptable by his sons, particularly
D Atbir and he apprehended that because of the presence of his
  step-mother and her children, he may not get properties of his
  father, both movable and immovable, at once. Since this was
  in his mind and in consultation with his mother Chandra @
  Chandawati, he planned to eliminate the entire family of Sheela.
E These aspects have been amply projected by the prosecution
  and rightly accepted by the trial Court and the High Court.

    (C) Death sentence

       24. When the constitutional validity of death penalty for
F murder provided in Section 302 of the Penal Code and
  sentencing procedure embodied in sub-section (3) of Section
  354 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, was questioned,
  the Constitution Bench of this Court in Bachan Singh v. State
  of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684, after thorough discussion,
G rejected the challenge to the constitutionality of the said
  provisions and ruled that "life imprisonment is the rule and death
  i;entence an exception". It has also noted that "Aggravating as
  well as "Mitigating Circumstances" to be considered for
  imposition of sentence of death.
H
           ATBIR v. GOVT. OF N.C.T. OF DELHI               1015
                   [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

"Aggravating Circumstances                                          A

     (a)     If the murder has been committed after previous
             planning and involves extreme brutality; or

     (b)     If the murder involves exceptional depravity; or
                                                                    B
     (c)     If the murder is of a member of any of the armed
             forces of the Union or of a member of any police
             force or of any public servant and was committed:-

             (i)    While such member or public servant was on      C
                    duty; or

             (ii)   In consequence of anything done or
                    attempted to be done by such member or
                    public servant in the lawful discharge of his
                    duty as such member or public servant           D
                    whether at the time of murder he was such
                    member or public servant, as the case may
                    be, or had ceased to be such member or
                    public servant; or
                                                                    E
     (d)     If the murder is of a person who had acted in the
             lawful discharge of his duty under Section 43 of the
             Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or who had
             rendered assistance to a Magistrate or a police
             officer after demanding his aid or requiring his       F
             assistance under Section 37 and Section 129 of
             the said Code."

"Mitigating Circumstances"

     (1)     That the offence was committed under the influence     G
             of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.

     (2)     The age of the accused. If the accused is young or
             old, he shall not be sentenced to death.
                                                                    H
    1016     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A          (3)   The probability that the accused would not commit
                 criminal acts of violence as would constitute a
                 continuing threat to society.

           (4)   The probability that the accused can be reformed
                 and rehabilitated.
B
                 The State shall by evidence prove that the accused
                 does not satisfy the conditions (3) and (4) above.

           (5)   That in the facts and circumstances of the case the
c                accused believed that he was morally justified in
                 committing the offence.

           (6)   That the accused acted under the duress or
                 domination of another person.

D          (7)   That the condition of the accused showed that he
                 was mentally defective and that the said defect
                 impaired his capacity to appreciate the criminality
                 of his conduct."

E        25. A three-Judge Bench in Machhi Singh vs. State of
    Punjab, (1983) 3 SCC 470 after analyzing the Constitution
    Bench decision in Bachan Singh (supra), held the following
    propositions for determination of rarest of rare cases:-

           "Death Sentence
F
        32. The reasons why the community as a whole does not
        endorse the humanistic approach reflected in 'death
        sentence-in-no-case' doctrine are not far to seek. In the first
        place, the very humanistic edifice is constructed on the
G       foundation of 'reverence for life' principle. When a member
        of the community violates this very principle by killing
        another member, the society may not feel itself bound by
        the shackles of this doctrine. Secondly, it has to be realised
        that every member of the community is able to live with
H       safety without his or her own life being endangered
     ATBIR v. GOVT. OF N.C.T. OF DELHI                     1017
             [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

because of the protective arm of the community and on                A
account of the rule of law enforced by it. The very existence
of the rule of law and the fear of being brought to book
operates as a deterrent for those who have no scruples in
killing others if it suits their ends. Every member of the
community owes a debt to the community for this                      B
protection. When ingratitude is shown instead of gratitude
by 'killing' a member of the community which protects the
murderer himself from being killed, or when the community
feels that for the sake of self-preservation the killer has to
be killed, the community may well withdraw the protection            c
by sanctioning the death penalty. But the community will
not do so in every case. It may do so 'in rarest of rare
cases' when its collective conscience is so shocked that
it will expect the holders of the judicial power centre to inflict
death penalty irrespective of their personal opinion as              0
regards desirability or otherwise of retaining death penalty.
The community may entertain such a. sentiment when the
crime is viewed from the platform of the motive for, or the
manner of commission of the crime, or the anti-social or
abhorrent nature of the crime, such as for instance:
                                                                     E
I. Manner of commission of murder

33. When the murder is cor ·rnitted in an extremely brutal,
grotesque, diabolical, revolting or dastardly manner so as
to arouse intense and extreme indignation of the                     F
community. For instance,

      (i) when the house of the victim is set aflame with the
end in view to roast him alive in the house;

       (ii) when the victim is subjected to inhuman acts of          G
torture or cruelty in order to bring about his or her death;

(iii) when the body of the victim is cut into pieces or his
body is dismembered in a fiendish manner;

II. Motive for commission of murder                                  H
    1018   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 9 S.C.R.

A       34. When the murder is committed for a motive which
      · evinces total depravity and meanness. For instance when
        (a) a hired assassin commits murder for the sake of
        money or reward (b) a cold-blooded murder is committed
        with a deliberate design in order to inherit property or to
B       gain control over property of a ward or a person under
        the control of the murderer or vis-a-vis whom the murderer
        is in a dominating position or in a position of trust, or (c)
        a murder is committed in the course of betrayal of the
        motherland. ·
c      Ill. Anti-social or socially abhorrent nature of the crime

       35. (a) When murder of a member of a Scheduled Caste
       or minority community, etc. is committed not for personal
       reasons but in circumstances which arouse social wrath.
D      For instance when such a crime is committed in order to
       terrorise such persons and frighten them into fleeing from
       a place or in order to deprive them of, or make them
       surrender, lands or benefits conferred on them with a view
       to reverse past injustices and in order to restore the social
E      balance.

       (b) In cases of 'bride burning' and what are known as
       'dowry deaths' or when murder is committed in order to
       remarry for the sake of extracting dowry once again or to
       marry another woman on account of infatuation.
F
       IV. Magnitude of crime

       36. When the crime is enormous in proportion. For instance
       when multiple murders say of all or almost all the members
G      of a family or a large number of persons of a particular
       caste, community, or locality, are committed.

       V. Personality of victim of murder

       37. When the victim of murder is (a) an innocent child who
H      could not have or has not provided even an excuse, much
         ATBIR v. GOVT. OF N.C.T. OF DELHI                1019
                 [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

    less a provocation, for murder (b) a helpless woman or a       A
    person rendered helpless by old age or infirmity (c) when
    the victim is a person vis-a-vis whom the murderer is in a
    position of domination or trust (d) when the victim is a
    public figure generally loved and respected by the
    community for the services rendered by him and the             B
    murder is committed for political or similar reasons other
    than personal reasons."

    26. In this background, the guidelines indicated in Bachan
Singh's case (supra) have to be culled out and applied to the
facts of each individual case where the question of imposing       C
of death sentence arises. The following propositions emerge
from Bachan Singh's case:

         "(i) The extreme penalty of death need not be inflicted
    except in gravest cases of extreme culpability.                D
          (ii) Before opting for the death penalty the
    circumstan_ces of the 'offender' also require to be taken
    into consideration along with the circumstances of the
    'crime'.
                                                                   E
          (iii) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence
    is an exception. In other words death sentence must be
    imposed only when life irr. 1,;isonment appears to be an
    altogether inadequate punishment having regard to the
    relevant circumstances of the crime, and provided, and         F
    only provided, the option to impose sentence of
    imprisonment for life cannot be conscientiously exercised
    having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime
    and all the relevant circumstances.
                                                                   G
          (iv) A balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating
    circumstances has to be drawn up and in doing so tne
    mitigating circumstances have to be accorded full
    weightage and a just balance has to be struck between
    the aggravating and the mitigating circumstances before
                                                                   H
    1020    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A       the option is exercised."

        In order to apply these guidelines, inter alia, the following
    questions may be asked and answered:

        "(a) Is there something uncommon about the crime which
B       renders sentence of imprisonment for life inadequate and
        calls for a death sentence?

        (b) Are the circumstances of the crime such that there is
        no alternative but to impose death sentence even after
c       according maximum weightage to the mitigating
        circumstances which speak in favour of the offender?"

  If upon taking an overall global view of all the circumstances in
  the light of the aforesaid proposition and taking into account
  the answers to the questions posed hereinabove, the
D circumstances of the case are such that death sentence is
  warranted, the Court would proceed to do so.

       27. In view of the principles culled out from the earlier
  decisions, let us find out whether the present case would fall in
E the category of rarest of the rare case warranting death
  sentence.

       28. It is seen from the evidence of Jaswant Singh, PW-5
  that he had married one Chandra @ Chandrawati in the year
  1963. Three children, namely, Satbir, Atbir and Anju were born
F to them. However, in 1971 Jawant Singh had deserted his wife
  Chandra and in 1973 he married Sheela Devi, the deceased,
  as his second wife. Two children, namely, Sonu @ Savita and
  Manish @ Manu were born from the second wife. It is further
  SE~en ftom the evidence of Jaswant Singh that his first wife's
G son Satbir visited him and demanded transfer of agricultural
  land of 25-26 bighas in Bulandshahar, U.P. in favour of himself
  and Atbir. Though Jaswant Singh agreed to the request but
  executed a Will (Ex. PW-5/D) in 1995 bequeathing those lands
  in favour of Satbir and Atbir. It is further seen that these two
H sons, namely, Satbir and Atbir were insisting on immediate
             ATBIR v. GOVT. OF N.C.T. OF DELHI                     1021
                     [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

    transfer by way of a registered document. In addition to the A
    same, they also demanded a house in Mathura or share in
    House No. N-33 Mukherjee Nagar, Delhi. It is the categorical
    stand of Jaswant Singh that Atbir, Satbir and Chandra used to
    demand money. They also threatened that if he fails to pay the
    money as demanded, they would kill him. The fact that Atbir was B
    not in a position to enjoy the lands as demanded and his father
    refused to pay money made Atbir and her mother to take some
    drastic steps. It is also their grievance and in their mind that
    because his father wants to part with major properties in favour
    of Sheela, second wife, and their children Sonu @ Savita and c
    Manish @ Mannu, it is in their mind that so long as the second
    wife and her children were alive, he and his brother may not
    get any thing and decided to do away with the family of Sheela.
    In other words, all the accused persons including Atbir felt that
    they would not get their legitimate share in the property as long D
    as Sheela and her children are alive and, therefore, they should
    do away with. As rightly observed by the trial Court and the High·
    Court, this could provide a strong motive to the accused
    persons for committing the crime.

         29. As argued before the Courts below, learned counsel             E
  for the appellant has raised a similar contention stating that
  Atbir was a young man of 25 years and already spent ten years
  in jail, ·that itself is a sufficient punishment for the crime. He also
  highlighted th~t he had no past history of any crime and it
  cannot be claimed that it is impossible to change his state of            F
  mind. in the future. He also pointed out that Atbir's main aim
  was to grab the property of his father immediately that too
  without giving a share to anyone. By pointing out these
· mitigating circumstances and the legal principles as formulated
1
  in Bachan Singh's case and Machhi Singh's case, prayed for                G
: leniency and according to him, punishment of death sentence
  is not warranted.
1

         30. It is relevant to mention that Jaswant Singh, father of
    Atbir deserted his first wife and their children in 1971. Atbir and     H
    1022       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A his brother Satbir had some grievance about their father for
  deserting their mother and living with Sheela Devi - second
  wife and her children. Apart from the same, Atbir demanded
           1

  land a·nd house property and money immediately, though his
  father Jaswant Singh agreed and executed a Will. Since the
B properties would come to his hands only after the demise of
  his father, Atbir along with other accused persons committed
  this ghastly crime. As rightly observed by the courts below,
  among the three accused, Atbir planned for the crime which
  was executed in a brutal manner and decided to wipe out the
c entire family so that his father would leave all the properties and
  money in their favour.

       31. The manner in which three persons were brutally
  murdered shocks the conscience. The aggravated accused,
  under the leadership of Atbir, reached the house of Sheela Devi
D and initially demanded money and bolted the door from inside
  and, thereafter, inflicted 11 cut injuries on Manish @Mannu by
  Atbir when the others caught hold of him. After finishing him,
  Atbir inflicted 5 grievous injuries on deceased Sheela
  mercilessly. He also inflicted another 21 injuries on the
E deceased Sonu @ Savita ignoring her tender age. The manner
  in which Atbir first stabbed Manish @ Mannu followed by
  Sheela and then Sonu @ Savita showed that there was a
  determination to finish the entire family so that he and his
  brother enjoy the entire property and money immediately.
F
        32. Another aggravating circumstance is that the crime had
  been committed and executed after closing the doors with all
  the three deceased being left helpless and unarmed. Closing
  of the door and bolting it from inside clearly shows the
G determination to complete the crime and take away the life of
  all the three. Among them, two of them were in the young age
  and they could not be provoked and instigated in any manner.

      33. It is seen from the evidence of the Doctors particularly,
  Post-mortem Doctor, that the accused Atbir inflicted as many
H as 37 knife injuries on the body of three innocent persons. A
         ATBIR v. GOVT. OF N.C.T. OF DELHI                   1023
                 [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
perusal of the post-mortem reports of the three deceased              A
clearly shows the nature of the injuries inflicted on all the vital
parts and the accused Atbir continued his action mercilessly
till all the three lost their breath. Fortunately, before the death
of Sonu @ Savita, she was taken to the hospital where she
made a statement to the effect that how they were killed by the       8
accused particularly, by Atbir. She categorically mentioned that
it was Atbir who took out the knife and inflicted stab blows on
all the three deceased. We have already mentioned the fact that
Atbir inflicted 37 knife blows which resulted in the death of three
persons.                                                              c
      34. After analyzing all the relevant materials let in by the
prosecution and in the light of the well established principles
including aggravating and mitigating circumstances as laid by
the Constitution Bench in Bachan Singh's case (supra) and
explained in Machhi Singh's case (supra), we conclude the             D
murders committed by Atbir is extremely brutal and diabolical
one. The cold blooded murder is committed with deliberate
design in order to inherit the entire property of Jaswant Singh
without waiting for his death. The magnitude of the crime is also
enormous in proportion since Atbir, with the assistance of his        E
mother and brother, committed multiple murders of all the
members of the family. Apart from this, the victims are none
else than his step-mother, brother and sister. The victims are
innocent who could not have or has not provided even an
excuse much less a provocation for murder. Further, the victims       F
were unaware of the sudden entry of Atbir and others and after
bolting the door from inside, they have no other way to go out
or resist except subjecting themselves to the wishes of Atbir.
Though the accused Atbir was also at the age of 25 at the
relevant point of time considering his hunger and lust for            G
property killing his own family members when they had no
occasion to provoke or resist and causing 37 knife blows on
vital parts of all the three persons, we conclude that it is a
 gravest case of extreme culpability and rarest of rare case and
 death sentence alone would be proper and adequate. We have
                                                                      H
    1024     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A   already noted that the accused had no justifiable ground for his
    action. We are also satisfied that the victims were helpless and
    undefended. Taking into consideration of all the facts and
    materials, it is crystal clear that the entire act of Atbir amounts
    to a barbaric and inhuman behaviour of the highest order. The,
8   manner in which the murder was carried out in the present case
    is extremely brutal, gruesome, diabolical, and revolting as to
    shock the collective conscience of the community.

      35. In the light of the above discussion, we confirm the
  conviction and sentence of death imposed on Atbir and the
C same shall be executed in accordance with law. We also
  confirm the conviction and sentence of life imprisonment
  imposed on Ashok.

         36. Consequently, both the appeals are dismissed.

    K.K.T.                                      Appeals dismissed.