Supreme Court of India
ASSOCIATION OF LEASING AND FINANCIAL SERVICE COMPANIESversusUNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2010 INSC 733
- Decided
- 26 October 2010
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- S H KAPADIA
Holding
The service tax on financial leasing services is within the legislative competence of Parliament under Entry 97 of List I and is therefore valid.
Summary
The Association of Leasing and Financial Service Companies challenged the levy of service tax under Section 66 of the Finance Act, 1994 (as amended) on financial leasing, equipment leasing and hire‑purchase services, arguing that Parliament lacked competence under Entry 97 of List I because Article 366(29A) treated such transactions as deemed sales, reserving tax power to the States. The Court examined the nature of the transactions, the definition of "banking and other financial services" in Section 65(12), and the distinction between a tax on a service and a tax on a sale. It held that the levy is on the provision of financial services (interest, finance charges and fees) and not on the sale of goods, and therefore falls within the Union’s residuary power under Entry 97, List I. The Court also clarified that Article 366(29A) was intended to broaden the sales‑tax base, not to divest Parliament of the power to tax services. Consequently, the service tax was upheld and the appeals were dismissed.
Issues considered
- The validity of service tax under Section 66 of the Finance Act, 1994 (as amended) on financial leasing services in view of Parliament's legislative competence under Entry 97, List I versus the State's power under Entry 54, List II and Article 366(29A).
- Whether the transaction of financial leasing, equipment leasing and hire‑purchase constitutes a service (taxable under Union List) or a sale (taxable under State List).
Legislation cited
- Accounting Standard AS‑19 (issued by ICAI)
- Constitution of Indias. Article 246(1), s. Article 248, s. Article 366(29A)
- Finance Act, 1994 (as amended)s. 65(105)(zm), s. 65(12), s. 66, s. 67
- Finance Act, 2001s. 65(10), s. 65(72)(zm)
- Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934s. 45(1), s. 451, s. 45(1)(a), s. 45(1)(c), s. 45(1)(f), s. 45(JA)
- Sale of Goods Act, 1930
Subjects
service taxfinancial leasingequipment leasinghire‑purchaselegislative competenceUnion ListEntry 97Article 366(29A)NBFCpith and substanceresiduary power
Judgment
[2010] 13 S.C.R. 381
ASSOCIATION OF LEASING AND FINANCIAL SERVICE A
COMPANIES
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 9344 of 2010)
B
OCTOBER 26, 2010
[S.H. KAPADIA, CJI, K.S. PANICKER
RADHAKRISHNAN AND SWATANTER KUMAR, JJ.]
Finance Act, 1994 (as amended): c
ss. 65(12), 65(105)(zm), 66 - Non-Banking Financial
Company - Equipment leasing and hire-purchase - Service
tax imposed by s.66 on the value of taxable services referred
to in s.65(105)(zm) read with s.65(12), insofar as it relates to D
financial leasing services including equipment leasing and
hire-purchase - Held: Is within the legislative competence of
the Parliament under Entry 97, List I of the Seventh Schedule
to the Constitution by virtue of Article 366 (29A) of the
Constitution - Reserve Bank of India, 1934 - s.451 -
E
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 366(29A) - Accounting
standard AS-19 - Lease - Notification no. 114 dated 2. 1. 1998
issued by RBI ...:. Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act,
1982 - Finance Act, 2001- Service tax - Bank/Banking.
s.65(12) - Banking and financial services - Meaning of. F
s.65(12) - Funding activity undertaken by the financing
party in the form of loan or equipment leasing or hire-purchase
financing, would be exigible to service tax if such activity falls
in the category of "banking and other financial services" ul G
s. 65(12) of the Act.
s. 65(12) - Equipment Leasing and Hire-Purchase
Finance - Meaning of - Held: These are activities of long
381 H
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A term financing and fall within the ambit of "banking and other
financial services" - A financial lease is a lease that transfers
substantially all risks and rewards incidental to ownership -
The income which the lessor earns is by way of finance/
interest charges in addition to the management fees or
B documentation charges, etc. - It is this income which
constitutes the measure of tax for the purposes of calculating
the value of taxable services u/s.67 of the Act.
Constitution of India, 1950:
C Article 248; Seventh Schedule, List I, Entry 97, List II Entry
54 - State Legislature - Competence of, to levy tax on
"financial leasing services" under Entry 54, List II - Held: State
Legislature have competence to levy sales tax on sales
provided that the necessary concomitants of a sale are
D present in the transaction and the sale is distinctly discernible
in the transaction - This would not, however, allow the ,State
to entrench upon the Union List and tax services by mcluding
the cost of such service in the value of the goods - The value
of taxable service u/s. 67 of the Finance Act, 1994 (as
E amended) is income by way of interest/finance charges
(measure of tax) which is not determinative of the character
of the levy - Thus, while State Legislature is competent to
impose tax on "sale" by legislation relatable to Entry 54 of List
II of Seventh Schedule, tax on the aspect of the "services",
F vendor not being relatable to any entry in the State List, would
be within the legislative competence of the Parliament under
Article 248 read with Entry 97 of List I of Seventh Schedule to
the Constitution - Circular F.No. B.111112001-TRU dated
9. 7. 2001 - Notification No. 412006-Service Tax dated
G 1.3.2006 - Finance Act, 1994 (as amended) - Finance Act,
2001.
Article 246(1) - Scope of - Held: It confers exclusive
power firstly, to make laws in respect of matters specified in
Entries 1 to 96 in List 1. and, secondly, it confers the residuary
H power of making laws by Entry 97, which provides "any other
ASSOCIATION OF LEASING AND FINANCIAL SERVICE 383
COMPANIES v. UNION OF INDIA
matter not enumerated in List II and List Ill including any tax A
not mentioned in either of those lists" - The word "other"
means "any subject of legislation other than the subject
mentioned in Entries 1-96".
Article 366(29A) - Object of - Held: Is to tax the
B
composite price so that the full value of the hire-purchase
price is taxed.
Seventh Schedule, List II Entry 54 - Service tax - Held:
Is not a tax on material or sale - It is different and distinct
from tax on sale of goods under Entry 54 List II - Finance C
Act, 2001- Finance Act, 1994 (as amended)- Sale of Goods
Act, 1930 - Service tax.
Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934: s.451 - Financing
activities - Equipment leasing and hire-purchase undertaken 0
as business by NBFCs - Held: Are financial activities
encompassed u/s. 45-l(c)(i) rendered by NBFCs to their
customers and they fall within the meaning of the words
"banking and other financial services" which is brought within
the service tax net u/s. 66 of the Finance Act, 1994 (as E
amended) - Service tax- Finance Act, 2001.
Interpretation of statutes: Legislative entries -
Interpretation of - Held: The principle that legislative entries
must be given the widest interpretation is subject to the
exception that where the entries use legal terms, they must F
be given their legal meaning - The word 'sale' is not defined
in the Constitution, but the words used in the three legislative
lists should receive the widest interpretation and not to the
narrow definition of the word "safe" contained in the Sale of
Goods Act for the purpose of interpreting that expression in G
Entry 54, List II - Sale of Goods Act, 1930 - Constitution of
India, 1950.
Lease: "Finance lease" and "Operating lease" -
Distinction between.
H
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A Words and phrases: 'Sale' - Meaning of
The question which arose for consideration in the
instant appeals was whether the service tax imposed by
Section 66 of the Finance Act, 1994 (as amended) on the
value of taxable services referred to in Section 65(105)
8
(zm) read with section 65(12) of the Act in so far it related
to the financial leasing services including equipment
leasing and hire purchase was within the legislative
competence of the Parliament by virtue of Article 366 (29A)
of the Constitution.
c
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
'
HELD: 1.1. The RBI was constituted under the
Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 inter alia to regulate the
0 country's monetary system. Chapter 111-B of the 1934 Act
deals with provisions relating to NBFCs (Non Banking
Financial Company) and financial institutions. Under
Section 45-l(a), "the business of a Non Banking Financial
Institution" is defined to mean carrying on the business
E of a financial institution referred to in clause (c) of Section
45-1 and includes business of an NBFC. The expression
"financial institution" means any non-banking institution
which carries on as its business an activity inter a/ia of
financing, whether by way of making loans or advances
or otherwise. Thus, Section 45-l(c) treats financing as an
F activity. Under Section 45-l(f), an NBFC is defined to mean
a financial institution or a non-banking institution which
is a company and which as a matter of business receives
deposits or which lends in any manner. Under Section
45-JA the RBI is authorized in public interest to issue
G directions to NBFCs relating to income recognition,
accounting standards, deployment of funds etc. and
such NBFCs shall be bound to follow the policy so
determined. The RBI issued notification no. 114 dated
2.1.1998 whereby the deposit taking activities of NBFCs
H
ASSOCIATION OF LEASING AND FINANCIAL SERVICE 385
COMPANIES v. UNION OF INDIA
was sought to be regulated. As per the said notification, A
an NBFC having not less than 60% of its assets and
deriving not less than 60% of its income from equipment
leasing and hire-purchase activities taken together would
only be eligible for being classified as equipment leasing
company/hire-purchase finance company. [Para 17] f406- B
H; 407-A-H; 408-A]
Taxmann's Statutory Guide to NBFCs page 224 -
referred to.
1.2. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India C
(ICAI) also issued AS-19 "Accounting for Leases". It is
mandatory in respect of financial leases executed on or
after April, 2001. It inter alia provides for capitalization of
finance lease assets in the books of the lessee instead
of lessor. The lessor [NBFC] is required to show the D
assets leased only as receivables in its balance sheet
instead of as fixed assets. The implication of AS-19 for
the NBFC prescribed by RBI by amendments to the 1998
Directions is that all financial leases would be accounted
like hire-purchase transactions. All these circulars and E
guidelines issued by RBI are relied upon only to show
that equipment leasing and hire-purchase are activities
undertaken as business by NBFCs which are regulated
as para banking activities by the RBI under the
provisions of the 1934 Act. They are regulated not only F
to protect depositors but also customers. The said
activities are financing activities encompassed under
Section 45-l(c)(i) which in turn constitutes "rendition of
services to its customer(s)" which is the taxable event
under Section 65(105)(zm) of the Finance Act, 1994 (as G
amended). Apart from. NBFCs, even banks through their
subsidiaries with the\ approval of RBI can undertake
equipment leasing, hire-purchase business and financial
services. These are not direct lending activities. However,
RBI treats them as services or facilities. The financial
H
386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A facilities are extended by way of equipment leasing or
hire-purchase finance subject to approval of RBI. The
significance of the circulars and guidelines issued by the
RBI is to show that the activities undertaken by NBFCs
of equipment leasing and hire-purchase finance are
B facilities extended by NBFCs to their' customers; that,
they are financial services rendered by NBFCs to their
customers and that they fall within the meaning of the
words "banking and other financial services" which is
sought to be brought within the service tax net under
c Section 66 of the Finance Act, 1994. With the application
of AS-19, the leased assets are required to be shown as
"receivables" and not as fixed assets which further
shows that equipment leasing and hire-purchase finance
are financial facilities which thereby fund the projects
presented by the customers to banks and other financial
0
institutions including NBFCs. Thus, the impugned tax is
levied on these services as taxable services. It is not a
tax on material or sale. The taxable event is rendition of
service. The impugned tax is different~nd distinct from
tax on sale of goods under Entry 54 List II of the Vllth
E Schedule to the Constitution. [Paras 18, 19] [408-C-G; 409-
A-E]
Manual of NBFCs 9th Edition Page 268; Taxmann's
RBI Instructions for Banking Operations 7th Edition page 224
F - referred to.
1.3. A common method of selling goods is by means
of an agreement commonly kn9wn as a hire-purchase
agreement which is more aptly described as a hiring
G agreement coupled with an option to purchase, i.e., to
say that the owner lets out the chattel on hire and
undertakes to sell it to the hirer on his making certain
number of payments. A hire-purchase agreement
partakes of the nature of a contract of bailment with an
element of sale added to it. However, if the intention of
H
ASSOCIATION OF LEASING AND FINANCIAL SERVICE 387
COMPANIES v. UNION OF INDIA
the financing party in obtaining the hire-purchase and the A
allied agreements is to secure the return of the loan
advanced to its customer the transaction would be merely
a financing transaction. The funding activity undertaken
by the financing party which could be in the form of loan
or equipment leasing or hire-purchase financing, would B
be exigible to service tax if such activity falls in the
category of "banking and other financial services" under
Section 65(12) of the Finance Act, 1994 (as amended). The
financial transaction was earlier out of the tax net. In the
process, there are two different and distinct transactions, c
viz., the financing transaction and the equipment leasing/
hire-purchase transaction. The former is exigible to
service tax under Section 66 of Finance Act, 1994 (as
amended) whereas the latter would be exigible to local
sales tax/VAT. Funding or financing the transaction of 0
equipment leasing and hire-purchase covers two
different and distinct transactions. The activity of funding
or financing by NBFC who is in the business of financing
by giving loans, or equipment leasing or hire-purchase
finance falls in the category of financial services rendered
by NBFCs to their customers. It is an activity in relation
E
to the hire-purchase or lease transaction. Ther.e is
distinction between a "finance lease" and "operating
lease". A finance lease transfers all the risks and rewards
incidental to ownership, even though the title may or may
not be eventually transferred to the lessee. On the other F
hand, an operating lease is a lease other than the finance
lease. Accounting of a "finance lease" is under AS-19,
which is mandatory for NBFCs. It is a completely different
regime. In a finance lease, it is the lessee who selects the
equipment to be supplied by the dealer or the G
manufacturer, but the lessor [finance company] provides
the funds, acquires the title to the equipment and allows
the lessee to use it for its expected life. During the period
of the lease, the risk and rewards of ownership are
transferred to the lessee who bears the risks of loss, H
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A destruction and depreciation or malfunctioning. The
bailment which underlies finance leasing is only a device
to provide the finance company with a security interest
[its reversionary right). If the lease is terminated
prematurely, the lessor is entitled to recoup its capital
B investment [less the realizable value of the equipment at
the time] and its expected finance charges [less an
allowance to reflect the return of the capital] [Para 20)
(409-F-H; 410-A-H; 411-A-G)
C Sale of Goods Act by Mui/a 6th Edition; Chitty on
Contract, a hire-purchase agreement - referred to.
1.4. NBFCs essentially are loan companies. They
basically conduct their business as loan companies.
They could be in addition thereto in the business of
D equipment leasing, hire purchase finance and investment.
Because NBFCs are basically loan companies, they are
required to show the assets leased as "receivables" in
their balance sheets. The activities of hire-purchase
finance/equipment leasing undertaken by NBFCs come
E under the category of "para banking". In substance, a
finance lease, unlike an operating lease, is a financial loan
(assistance/facility) by the lessor to the lessee. In the
bailment termed "hire" the bailee receives both
possession of the chattel and the right to use it in return
F for remuneration. On the other hand, equipment leasing
is long term financing which helps the borrower to raise
funds without outright payment in the first instance. Here
the "interest" element cannot be compared to
consideration for lease/hire which is in the nature of
G remuneration (consideration) for hire. Thus, financing as
an activity or business of NBFCs is different and distinct
from operating lease/hire-purchase agreements in the
classical sense. The elements of the finance lease or loan
transaction are quite different from those in equipment
leasing/hire-purchase agreements between owner
H
ASSOCIATION OF LEASING AND FINANCIAL SERVICE 389
COMPANIES v. UNION OF INDIA
(lessor) and the hirer (lessee). There are two independent A
transactions and what the impugned tax seeks to do is
to tax the financial facilities extended to its customers by
the NBFCs under Section 66 of the 1994 Act (as amended)
as they come under "banking and other financial
services" under Section 65(12) of the said Act. "The B
finance lease" and "the hire-purchase finance" thus
squarely come under the expression "financial leasing
services" in Section 65(12) of the Finance Act, 1994 (as
amended). [Para 21] [412-A-F]
c
All-India Federation of Tax Practitioners v. Union of India
(2007) 7 SCC 527; T.N. Kalayana Mandapam Association
v. Union of India (2004) 5 SCC 632 Gujarat Ambuja Cements
Ltd. v. Union of India (2005) 4 SCC 214; Godfrey Phillips
India Ltd. v. State of UP. (2005 (2) SCC 515; The Second D
Gift Tax Officer, Mangalore v. D.H. Hazareth AIR 1970 SC
999; Mis Ujagar Prints (II) v. Union of India (1989) 3 SCC
488; Mis. International Tourist Corporation v. State of Haryana
AIR 1981 SC 774 - relied on.
2.1. The principle that legislative entries must be given E
the widest interpretation is subject to the exception that
where the entries use legal terms, they must be given
their legal meaning. The word "sale" is a nomen juris. It
is the nanie of a consensual contract. The law with
regard to chattels is embodied in the Sale of Goods Act. F
A contract of sale is different from an agreement to sell
and unlike other contracts, operates by itself and without
delivery to transfer the property in the goods sold. The
word "sale" connotes both a contract and a conveyance
or transfer of property. It is true that the word "sale" is G
not defined in the Constitution but it is well recognized
canon of construction that the words used in the three
legislative Lists should receive the widest interpretation
and not to the narrow definition of the word "sale"
contained in the Sale of Goods Act for the purpose of H
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A interpreting that expression in Entry 54, List II. [Paras 23,
24, 26) [414-8-G-H; 416-E-F]
Constitutional Law of India by H.M. Seervai, pp. 2437 -
referred to.
B 2.2. Before the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment)
Act, hire-purchase transa.ction could have been taxed by
Union under Entry 97, List I but as a matter of policy,
Parliament brought in Article 366 (29A) as recommended
by the Law Commission. Clause (29A) of Article 366
C provided for an inclusive :definition and has two limbs.
The first limb says that the tax on sale or purchase of
goods includes a tax on transactions specified in sub-
clauses (a) to (f). The second limb provides that such
transfer, delivery or supply of goods referred to in the first
D limb shall be deemed to be a sale of those goods by the
person making the transfer, delivery or supply, and
purchase of those goods by the person to whom such
transfer, delivery or supply is made. In *K.L. Johar's case,
this Court held that the States can tax hire-purchase
E transactions resulting in sale but only to the extent to
which tax is levied on the sale price. This led the
Parliament to say, in the Statement of Objects and
Reasons to the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment)
Act, "though practically the purchaser in a hire-purchase
F transaction gets the goods on the date of entering into
the hire-purchase contract, it has been held by the
Supreme Court in *K.L. Johar's case that there is a sale
only when the purchaser exercises the option to
purchase which is at a later date and, therefore, only the
G depreciated value of the goods involved in such
transaction at the time the option is exercised becomes
assessable to sales tax which position has resulted in
avoidance of tax in various ways." Thus, the Statement
of Objects and Reasons that the concept of "deemed
sale" is brought in by the Constitution (Forty-sixth
H
ASSOCIATION OF LEASING AND FINANCIAL SERVICE 391
COMPANIES v. UNION OF INDIA
Amendment) Act only in the context of imposition of sales A
tax and that the words "transfer, delivery or supply" of
goods is referred to in the second limb of Article 366(29A)
to broaden the tax base and that as indicated in the
Report of Law Commission prior to the judgment of this
Court in **Gannon Dunkerley's case, works contract was B
always taxed by the States as part of the word "sale" in
Entry 48/54 of List II. The object behind enactment of
Article 366(29A) is to tax the composite price so that the
full value of the hire-purchase price is taxed and to avoid
the judgment in *K.L. Johar's case whose implication was C
to narrow the tax base resulting in seepage of sales tax
revenue. It is in that sense the concept of splitting of the
contract has to be understood. Thus, it cannot be said
that Parliament divested itself of the power to levy service
tax by enactment of the Constitution (Forty-sixth D
Amendment) Act. Even in the Report of the Law
Commission, it was observed that "if a hire-purchase
transaction results in a sale, sales-tax is undoubtedly
leviable by the States. No doubt, it is difficult to determine
the "sale price" for the purpose of the sales tax law but E
this has no bearing on the question of legislative
competence". Thus, reliance placed by the appellant(s)
on the expression "splitting up" in *K.L. Johar's case was
misconceived because the "splitting up" referred to in
*K.L. Johar's case was in regard to valuation and not in F
regard to legislative competence. [Paras 29, 30) [417-F-
H; 418-C-H; 419-A-D]
**The State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co.,
(Madras) Ltd. (1959) SCR 379 - relied on.
G
*K.L. Johar and Co. v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer
(1965) 2 SCR 112 - referred to.
3.1. When one reads Entry 97 of List I with Article
246(1 ), it confers exclusive power firstly to make laws in
H
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A respect of matters specified in Entries 1 to 96 in List I and,
secondly, it confers the residuary power of making laws
by Entry 97. Article 248 does not provide for any express
powers of Parliament but only for its residuary power.
Article 248 adds nothing to the power conferred by
B Article 246(1) read with Entry 97, List I. Entry 97, List I
which confers residuary powers on Parliament provides
"any other matter not enumerated in List II and List Ill
including any tax not mentioned in either of those lists".
The word "other" is important. It means "any subject of
c legislation other than the subject mentioned in Entries 1-
96". Lastly, one must keep in mind a clear distinction
between the subject and the measure of tax. The
impugned levy relates to or is with respect to the
particular topic of "banking and other financial services"
which includes within it one of the several enumerated
0
services, viz., financial leasing services. The impugned
tax is on activity/ service rendered by the service provider
to its customer. Equipment Leasing/ Hire-Purchase
finance are long term financing activities undertaken as
their business by NBFCs. As far as the taxable value in
E case of financial leasing including equipment leasing and
hire-purchase is concerned, the amount received as
principal is not the consideration for services rendered.
Such amount is credited to the capital account of the
lessor/ hire-purchase service provider. It is the interest/
F finance charge which is treated as income or revenue
and which is credited to the revenue account. Such
interest or finance charges together with the lease
management fee/ processing fee/ documentation charges
are treated as considerations for the services rendered
G and accordingly, they constitute the value of taxable
services on which service tax is made payable. In fact,
by Notification No. 4/2006-Service Tax dated 1.3.2006, the
Government had given exemption from payment of
service tax to financial leasing services including
H
ASSOCIATION OF LEASING AND FINANCIAL SERVICE 393
COMPANIES v. UNION OF INDIA [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
equipment leasing and hire-purchase on that portion of A
taxable value comprising of 90% of the amount
representing as interest, i.e., the difference between the
instalment paid towards repayment of the lease amount
and the principal amount in such instalments paid. In
other words, service tax is leviable only on 10% of the B
interest portion. It was clarified in Circular F.No. B.11 /1 /
2001-TRU dated 9.7.2001 that service tax, in the case of
financial leasing including equipment leasing and hire-
purchase, will be leviable only on the lease management
fees/ processing fees/ documentation charges recovered c
at the time of entering into the agreement and on the
finance/ interest charges recovered in equated monthly
instalments and not on the principal amount. Merely
because for valuation purposes inter a/ia "finance/
interest charges" are taken into account and merely D
because service tax is imposed on financial services with
reference to "hiring/ interest" charges, the impugned tax
does not cease to be service tax nor does it become tax
on hire-purchase/ leasing transactions under Article
366(29A) read with Entry 54, List II. Thus, while State E
Legislature is competent to impose tax on "sale" by
legislation relatable to Entry 54 of List II of Seventh
Schedule, tax on the aspect of the "services", vendor not
being relatable to any entry in the State List, would be
within the legislative competence of Parliament under
Article 248 read with Entry 97 of List I of the Seventh F
Schedule. [Paras 36, 37] [422-G-H; 423-D-H; 424-A-G]
Goodricke Group Ltd. v. State of West Bengal (1995)
Suppl 1 sec 707 - relied on.
G
Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited v. Union of India (2006)
3 sec 1 - held inapplicable.
3.2. The States have legislative competence to levy
sales tax on sales provided that the necessary
H
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A concomitants of a sale are present in the transaction and
the sale is distinctly discernible in the transaction. This
does not, however, allow the State to entrench upon the
Union List and tax services by including the cost of such
service in the value of the goods. The impugned
B provision operates qua an activity of funding/ financing
of equipment/ asset under equipment leasing under
which a lessee is free to select, order, take delivery and
maintain the asset. The lessor (NBFC) renders financial
services to its customers and what is taxed under the
c impugned provision is the income, by way of finance/
interest charges in addition to management fees/
documentation charges, which is earned by the financier
(lessor). The taxable event is the service which is
rendered by the finance company to its customer. The
value of taxable service under Section 67 is income by
0
way of interest/finance charges (measure of tax) which
is not determinative of the character of the levy. Thus,
Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994 (as amended) seeks
to tax financial services rendered by the appellant(s) with
reference to the income which the appellant(s) earns by
E way of interest/ finance charges. The question of splitting
up of transactions, as contended on behalf of the
appellant(s), would not arise. Service tax imposed by
Section 66 of the Finance Act, 1994 (as amended) on the
value of taxable services referred to in Section
F 65(105)(zm) read with Section 65(12) of the said Act,
insofar as it relates to financial leasing services including
equipment leasing and hire-purchase is within the
legislative competence of the Parliament under Entry 97,
List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. [Paras
G 39, 40] [426-B-H; 427-A-E; 428-A-B]
Case Law Reference:
(2006) 3 sec 1 held inapplicable Para 5,
7,31, 38, 39
H
ASSOCIATION OF LEASING AND FINANCIAL SERVICE 395
COMPANIES v. UNION OF INDIA
(1965) 2 SCR 112 referred to Para 6, A
25,27, 30
c2001) 1 sec 527 relied on Para 7
(2004) 5 sec 632 relied on Para 7
B
c2005) 4 sec 214 relied on Para 7
c2005 (2) sec 515 relied on Para 22
AIR 1970 SC 999 relied on Para 22
(1959) SCR 379 relied on Para 23
c
(1965) 2 SCR 112 referred to Para 25
AIR 1970 SC 999 relied on Para 33
(1989) 3 sec 488 relied on Para 34 D
AIR 1981 SC 774 relied on Para 35
(1995) suppl 1 sec 101 relied on Para 36
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. E
9344 of 2010.
From the Judgment & Order dated 09.06.2009 of the High
Court of Madras in WP No. 14905 of 2001.
WITH F
C.A. Nos. 9345, 9346, 9347, 9348, 9350-9351 of 2010.
SLP (C) No. 10607 of 2010.
Goolam E. Vahar.vati, AG, Bishwajit Bhattacharya, ASG, G
Arvind P. Datar, T.R. Andhyarujina, A. Raghunath, K. Swami,
Prabha Swami, U.A. Rana, Mrinal Majumdar (for Gagrat & Co.),
Satish Parasaran, A.M.P. Latha, Prabha Swami, S. Nanda
Kumar, Achin Goel, R. Satish Kumar, V.N. Raghupathy, Rajiv
Nanda, Rupesh Kumar, Mohd. Mannan, Rohit Sharma, Ajay H
396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A Singh, Judy James, Mihir Chatterjee, B. Krishna Prasad, Anil
Katiyar for the apparing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was'delivered by
S.H. KAPADIA, CJI 1. Leave granted.
B
2. In this batch of Civil Appeals, the controversy pertains
to validity of Sections 65(12) and 65(105)(zm) of the Finance
Act, 1994 (as amended) insofar as the said provisions seek
to levy service tax on leasing and hire purchase. The appellants
c contend that service tax imposed by Section 66 of the Finance
Act, 1994 on the value of taxable services referred to in Section
65(105)(zm) read with Section 65(12) of the Finance Act, 1994
(as amended), insofar as it relates to financial leasing services
including equipment leasing and hire purchase is beyond the
0 legislative competence of Parliament by virtue of Article
366(29A) of the Constitution.
Facts in Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 24704 of 2009
3. Appellant is an Association of leasing and financial
E companies. Finance Act sought to levy service tax on "banking
and other financial services". Section 137 of the Finance Act,
2001 substituted Section 65 of the Finance Act, 1994 by a new
Section 65 which defined "banking and other financial services".
Subsequently, this definition also underwent some changes by
F way of Section 90 of the Finance Act, 2004 and Section 135
of the Finance Act, 2007. The relevant part of the definition as
on date contained in Section 65(12) of the Finance Act, 1994
is as follows:
"65. In this Chapter, unless the context otherwise requires
G
(12) "banking and other financial services" means -
(a) the following services provided by a banking
H
ASSOCIATION OF LEASING AND FINANCIAL SERVICE 397
COMPANIES v. UNION OF INDIA [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
company or financial institution including a non- A
banking financial company or any other body
corporate or commercial concern namely: -
(i) financial leasing services including equipment
leasing and hire-purchase;" B
4. Appellant had filed a writ petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution before the High Court challenging the levy of
service tax imposed by Section 65(12)(a)(i). During the
pendency of the writ petition, Union of India issued a Notification C
ST dated 1.3.2006 exempting 90% of the amount repayable
under hire-purchase/ equipment leasing agreement(s) from
service tax on the ground that the said 90% represented interest
income earned by the service provider. According to the
appellant, the concept of "service tax" was first introduced by
the Finance Act, 1994 which came into force w.e.f. 1.7.1994 D
under Chapter V. No service tax was levied by the said Act or
by its subsequent amendment till 2001. However, vide Finance
Act, 2001 service tax was imposed on "banking and other
financial services". Vide Section 137{a) of the Finance Act,
2001, Section 65 of the Finance Act, 1994 was replaced by a E
new Section 65 which defined "banking and other financial
. services" vide clause (10). By virtue of the said definition under
Section 65(10){i), Parliament has sought to bring within the
service tax net, transactions in the nature of financial leasing,
equipment leasing and hire-purchase. By Section 65(72), the F
expression "taxable service" has been defined to mean any
service provided to a customer, by a banking company or a
financial institution including NBFC, in relation to banking and
other financial services [See Section 65(72)(zm)]. Being
aggrieved by the inclusion of hire-purchase and leasing G
services within the service tax net, the appellant herein
challenged the amendment of 2001 as ultra vires the legislative
competence of the Parliament. By the impugned judgment, the
Madras High Court has dismissed the writ petition, hence, this
civil appeal. H
398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A Submissions
5. Mr. Arvind P. Datar, learned senior counsel appearing
on behalf of the appellant(s), submitted that the effect of Article
366(29A) is to treat six types of transactions as deemed sales
so as to enable state legislatures to levy sales tax under Entry
8
54, List II; that, the Statement of Objects and Reasons to the
Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act makes it clear that all
six transactions could have been taxed under Entry 97, List I
by Parliament. However, based on-4he 61st Report of the Law
C Commission, the Constitution has now conferred exclusive
power to the States to levy sales tax by expanding Entry 54,
List II by insertion of Article 366(29A). Thus, having
characterized constitutionally the subject matter of hire-
purchase and leasing as a sale (deemed sale), it is not open
to Parliament to tax the same subject matter under Entry 97,
D List I. Thus, by reason of the Constitution (Forty-sixth
Amendment) Act, there exist six transactions as "sales". That,
inevitable corollary is that power of taxation of hire-purchase/
leasing, being sales, is exclusively with the state legislatures.
The purpose of the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act
E was to reserve the exclusive competence to tax hire-purchase/
leasing transactions with state legislatures which is clearly seen
from the 61 st Report of the Law Commission which
recommended constitutional amendment. In this connection,
learned counsel has placed reliance on the principles laid down
F by this Court in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited v. Union of
India ((2006) 3 sec 1]. According to the learned counsel, once
by reason of the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act the
hire-purchase/ leasing is deemed to be a sale, any attempt to
levy service tax on the same transaction will amount to a
G colourable exercise of power. According to the learned counsel,
when sales tax is already paid for the transfer of the right to
use the goods particularly when such transfer is a deemed sale
under Article 366(29A), it is not open to Parliament to impose
service tax on the same transaction once again. According to
H
ASSOCIATION OF LEASING AND FINANCIAL SERVICE 399
COMPANIES v. UNION OF INDIA [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
the learned counsel, the impugned judgment of the High Court A
assumes erroneously that hire-purchase/ leasing transactions
include the concept of rendition of service and, thus, the
impugned judgment needs to be set aside.
6. Mr. T.R. Andhyarujina, learned senior counsel appearing
B
on behalf of one of the appellants, submitted that prior to the
Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act, the Parliament had
the legislative competence to levy service tax on a hire-
purchase transaction or leasing transacti9n; except on the sale
part in such transaction, which lay in the competence of the
States under Entry 54, List II. In this connection, learned.counsel
c
placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in K.L. Johar and
Co. v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer [(1965) 2 SCR 1'12].
That, by the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act in Article
366(29A)(c) and (d), hire-purchase/ leasing transactions were
deemed to be sales and, consequently, the legislative D
competence in respect of hire part of the transaction was made
over to the States. That, the Law Commission in its 61st Report
stated that "the other alternative would be to transfer the entire
power to the States. This will achieve a merger of the existing
power of the States to tax the sale part and the new power to E
tax the hire part, which will enable state legislatures to provide
for a tax on hire purchase price without demarcation". As a
consequence of the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act,
the Parliament's competence to levy a tax on an activity relating
to financial leasing services including equipment leasing and F
hire-purchase is constitutionally truncated by the newly conferred
exclusive legislative competence of States over the deemed
sales in Article 366(29A)(c) and (d). According to the
appellant(s), when Section 65 of the Finance Act imposes a
service tax on "value of taxable services", the value cannot G
include the elements of transaction of hire-purchase and
leasing, which have now been transferred to the exclusive
legislative competence of the States. That, although Parliament
can levy service tax on the providing of services of hire-
purchase and leasing of equipment if the service provider levies H
400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A a charge by way of management fee, processing fee,
documentation charges or administrative fees, the Parliament
cannot levy a service tax in respect of the hire part in such
transactions in view of the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment)
Act and, consequently, the Parliament has no legislative
8 competence to levy service tax on the hiring charges in the
transaction. The said hiring charges are nothing but interest
charges on the finance provided in hiring and leasing and
hence the impugned tax cannot extend to tax the interest
charged in the transactions. According to the learned counsel,
C various States have been imposing sales tax/ VAT on the entire
transaction of hire-purchase/ leasing including the component
of hire charges, interest and other charges. This is done in view
of the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act. Thus, when
sales tax/ VAT is charged by the States on the entire
consideration including interest received under the hire-
D purchase and leasing transactions any tax by Parliament on the
same is beyond the competence and residuary pow~r under
Entry 97 of List I. Thus, according to the learned coun·sel, levy
of service tax in respect of the hire part in hire-purchase/
leasing transactions is beyond the competence of the
E Parliament.
7. Mr. Goolam E. Vahanvati, learned Attorney General for
India, submitted that the basic contention advanced on behalf
of the appellant(s) is that by reason of introduction of Article
F 366(29A) by the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act, the
entire power of taxation in respect of hire-purchase transactions
is now vested only in the States under Entry 54 of List II and
that the Parliament has no power at all including the power to
levy a service tax. According to the Attorney General, the said
G argument is based on the contents of the 61st Report of the
Law Commission, particularly, in relation to the background in
which clauses (c) and (d) of Article 366(29A) were
recommended. The learned Attorney General invited our
attention to the historical background of Article 366(29A) and
H the 61 st Report of the Law Commission in support of his
..
ASSOCIATION OF LEASING AND FINANCIAL SERVICE 401
COMPANIES v. UNION OF INDIA [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
submission that a legal fiction was sought to be inserted in A
Article 366 in order to give an artificial extension to the
definition of sale so as to include the power to levy sales tax
even on the hiring part, and this is all that Articl.e 366(29A)
intended to do. From that, according to learned Attorney
General, one cannot infer that Parliament has divested itself of B
the power to levy service tax. According to learned Attorney
General, the question of service tax was not even present in
the mind of Parliament when the Constitution (Forty-sixth
Amendment) Act was enacted and, therefore, reliance on the
61st Report of the Law Commission was completely C
misconceived. According to learned Attorney General, the
reliance placed on Para 44 of the Bharat Sanchar Nigam
Limited (supra) by the appellant(s) is completely misconceived
because that judgment read in entirety recognizes the power
of Union of India to levy service tax. The learned Attorney D
General placed heavy reliance on the judgment of this Court in
All-India Federation of Tax Practitioners v. Union of India
((2007) 7 SCC 527]. The learned Attorney General drew our
attention to the conceptual distinction between a service tax
and a tax on hiring transaction. According to him, the business E
of banking or organizing financial services is an organized
activity and service tax is imposed on that activity of financial
leasing services provided by a banking company, a non-
banking financial company, a body corporate engaged in the
business of financial leasing, etc. That, service tax is not F
imposed on the hiring part of a hire-purchase transaction.
According to the learned Attorney General, it is wrong to
suggest that the whole "field" is covered by Entry 54 of List II
as is sought to be contended on behalf of the appellant(s)
because Article 366(29A), by way of a legal fiction, deems a G
tax on the delivery of goods on hire purchase to be a sale. To
interpret this fiction to mean that even a tax on financial leasing
services is a tax on delivery of goods amounts to creating a
fiction within a fiction, which is impermissible in law. Therefore,
according to the learned Attorney General, there is no question
H
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A of the impugned levy being a levy of service tax on a hire-
purchase transaction. Relying on the doctrine of pith and
substance, it was submitted that the substance of the impugned
law must be looked at in order to determin~ whether it is in pith
and substance within a particular entry whatever its ancillary
B effect may be. Applying the said test, it was submitted that
imposition of service tax on financial leasing services including
equipment leasing and hire purchase does not, in pith and
substance, fall within the scope of Entry 54 of List II as extended
by Article 366(29A). On the other hand, according to the
c learned Attorney General, in three decisions of this Court in the
case of T. N. Kalayana Mandapam Association v. Union of
India [(2004) 5 SCC 632], Gujarat Ambuja Cements Ltd. v.
Union of India [(2005) 4 SCC 214] and All-India Federation
of Tax Practitioners (supra), it has been held that levy of service
tax falls within Entry 97 of List I. For the afore-stated reasons,
0
it was submitted that the impugned levy is within the legislative
competence of Parliament with reference to Entry 97 of List I
of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and, thus, the same is
constitutionally valid.
E Relevant provisions of the Finance Act, 2001 (as
amended)
8. By the Finance Act, 2001, Section 65 of the Finance
Act, 1994 stood substituted. For deciding this batch of cases,
F we are concerned with Section 65( 10) read with Section
65(72)(zm), relevant parts whereof are quoted hereinbelow:
"65. Definitions- In this Chapter, unless the context
otherwise requires,-
G (10) "banking and other financial services" means, the
following services provided by a banking company or a
financial institution including a non-banking financial
company, namely:-
(i) financial leasing services including equipment
H
ASSOCIATION OF LEASING AND FINANCIAL SERVICE 403
COMPANIES v. UNION OF INDIA [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
leasing and hire-purchase by a body corporate; A
(72) "taxable service" means any service provided,-
(zm) to a customer, by a banking company or a
financial institution including a non-banking financial
company, in relation to banking and other financial B
services;"
9. The point to be noted is that whereas Section 65(10)/
Section 65(12) defines what is "banking and other financial
services", Section 65(72)(zm)/Section 65(105)(zm) indicates c
what is "taxable service". Section 65(12) read with Section
65(105)(zm), as amended, read as under:
"65. Definitions.- In this Chapter, unless the context
otherwise requires,-
D
(12) "banking and other financial service" means-
(a) the following services provided by a banking
company or a financial institution including a non-
ba nking financial company or any other body E
corporate, namely:-
(i) financial leasing services including
equipment leasing and hire-purchase by a
body corporate;
F
(105) "taxable service" means any service provided,-
(zm) to a customer, by a banking company or a
financial institution including a non-banking financial
company, in relation to banking and other financial G
services;"
10. We also quote hereinbelow Section 66 of Finance Act,
2001 which deals with charge of service tax and the relevant
portion whereof reads as under:
H
404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A "66. Charge of service tax- (1) On and from the date of
commencement of this Chapter, there shall be levied a tax
(hereinafter referred to as the service tax), at the rate of
five per cent. of the value of the taxable services referred
to in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (d) of clause (72) of section
B 65 and collected in such manner as may be prescribed."
11. We also quote hereinbelow Section 67 of Finance Act,
2001 which deals with valuation of taxable services for charging
service tax. The relevant portion of Section 67 is quoted
herebelow:
c
"67. Valuation of taxable services for charging service
tax- For the purposes of this Chapter, the value of any
taxable service shall be the gross amount charged by the
service provider for such service rendered by him."
D
12. Since in this batch of cases there is a challenge to the
Constitutional validity of the imposition of service tax on hire-
purchase/ lease transactions, we are also required to quote
hereinbelow Article 366(29A) of the Constitution:
E "(29A) "tax on the sale or purchase of goods"
includes-
(a) a tax on the transfer, otherwise than in pursuance of a
contract, of property in any goods for cash, deferred
F payment or other valuable consideration;
(b) a tax on the transfer of property in goods (whether as
goods or in some other form) involved in the execution of
a works contract;
G (c) a tax on the delivery of goods on hire-purchase or any
system of payment by installments;
(d) a tax on the transfer of the right to use any goods for
any purpose (whether or not for a specified period) for
H cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration;
ASSOCIATION OF LEASING AND FINANCIAL SERVICE 405
COMPANIES v. UNION OF INDIA [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
(e) a tax on the supply of goods by any unincorporated A
association or body of persons to a member thereof for
cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration;
(f) a tax on the supply, by way of or as part of any service
or in any other manner whatsoever, of goods, being food
8
or any other article for human consumption or any drink
(whether or not intoxicating), where such supply or service,
is for cash, deferred payment or other valuable
consideration,
and such transfer, delivery or supply of any goods shall be C
deemed to be a sale of those goods by the person making
the transfer, delivery or supply and a purchase of those
goods by the person to whom such transfer, delivery or
supply is made;"
D
13. We also quote hereinbelow Articles 246 and 248 of
the Constitution, which read as follows:
"246 - Subject-matter of laws made by Parliament and by
the Legislatures of States
E
(1) Notwithstanding anything in clauses (2) and (3),
Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect
to any of the matters enumerated in List 1 in the Seventh
Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the "Union
List"). F
(2) Notwithstanding anything in clause (3), Parliament and
subject to clause (1), the Legislature of any State also,
have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in List Ill in the Seventh Schedule (in this
Constitution referred to as the "Concurrent List"). G
(3) Subject to clauses (1) and (2), the Legislature of any
State has exclusive power to make laws for such State or
any part thereof with respect to any of the matters
H
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule (in this
Constitution referred to as the 'State List').
(4) Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any
matter for any part of the territory of India not included in a
State notwithstanding that such matter is a matter
B
enumerated in the State List.
248 - Residuary powers of legislation
(1) Parliament has exclusive power to make any law with
c respect to any matter not enumerated in the Concurrent
List or State List.
(2) Such power shall include the power of making any law
imposing a tax not mentioned in either of those Lists."
D 14. We are also required to quote Entry 97 of List I, which
reads as under:
"97. Any other matter not enumerated in List II or List Ill
including any tax not mentioned in either of those Lists."
E 15. We quote hereinbelow Entry 54 of List II, which reads
as under:
"54. Taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than
newspapers, subject to the provisions of entry 92A of List
F I."
Meaning of the words "banking and other financial
services" in Section 65(12) of Finance Act. 1994
16. Before dealing with the submissions we need to clarify
G the concept of "banking and other financial services" which
expression finds place in Section 65(12)(a)(i) of the Finance
Act, 1994 (as amended).
17. At the outset, it may be noted that the Appellant(s) is
H a non-banking financial company ["NBFC", for short]. The RBI
ASSOCIATION OF LEASING AND FINANCIAL SERVICE 407
COMPANIES v. UNION OF !NOIA [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
was constituted under the RBI Act, 1934 ("1934 Act", for short) A
inter alia to regulate the country's monetary system. It is
appointed as a regulator to secure the monetary stability and
to operate the credit system of the country. Chapter 111-B of the
1934 Act deals with provisions relating to NBFCs and financial
institutions. Under Section 45-l(a), "the business of a NBFC" B
is defined to mean carrying on the business of a financial
institution referred to in clause (c) of Section 45-1 and includes
business of a NBFC. The expression "financial institution"
means any non-banking institution which carries on as its
business an activity inter alia of financing, whether by way of c
making loans or advances or otherwise. Thus, Section 45-l(c)
treats financing as an activity. Under Section 45-l(f), an NBFC
is defined to mean a financial institution which is a company;
a non-banking institution which is a company and which as a
matter of business receives deposits or which lends in any
0
manner. These activities are regulated by RBI under the 1934
Act. Thus, all NBFCs'which carry on these activities as part of
their business come within the purview of being financial
institutions. Under Section 45-IA, no NBFC shall carry on the
business of a non-banking financial institution without obtaining
a certificate of registration from RBI. Under Section 45-JA the E
RBI is authorized in public interest to issue directions to NBFCs
relating to income recognition, accounting standards,
deployment of funds etc. and such NBFCs shall be bound to
follow the policy so determined. Accordingly, under notification
dated 2.1.1998 bearing No. 114, the deposit taking activities F
of NBFCs was sought to be regulated. Under the said
notification, there is classification of NBFCs. Vide Clause 5 it
has been clarified that several instances have come to the notice
of RBI where NBFCs conducting their business as loan
companies claim themselves to be equipment leasing/hire- G
purchase finance companies with the intention to avail of higher
borrowing limits and thus an NBFC having not less than 60%
of its assets and deriving not less than 60% of its income from
equipment leasing and hire-purchase activities taken together
will only be eligible for being classified as equipment leasing H
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A company/hire-purchase finance company. The said notification
is relied upon only to demonstrate that the classification of Joan
or investment companies is not only asset and income based
but also that certain NBFCs undertake activities of equipment
leasing and hire-purchase financing in addition to giving of
B loans. Under clause (a) of the said Direction, RBI has
categorized NBFCs on the basis of the businesses in which
they are engaged including giving of Joans, hire-purchase
finance and equipment leasing activities [See Taxmann's
Statutory Guide to NBFCs page 224].
c 18. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAJ)
has also issued AS-19 "Accounting for Leases". It is mandatory
in respect of financial leases executed on or after April, 2001.'
It inter alia provides for capitalization of finance lease assets
in the books of the lessee instead of lessor. The lessor [NBFC]
D is required to show the assets leased only as receivables in
its balance sheet instead of as fixed assets. The implication
of the above AS-19 for the NBFC prescribed by RBI vide
amendments to the 1998 Directions is that all financial leases
would now be accounted like hire-purchase transactions [See
E Manual of NBFCs 9th Edition Page 268]. Similarly, under the
RBI Guidelines dealing with accounting for investments, NBFCs
having not less than 60% of the total assets in lease and hire
purchase and deriving not less than 60% of their total income
from such activities can be classified as hire purchase/
F equipment leasing companies. All these circulars and
guidelines issued by RB.I are relied upon only to show that
equipment leasing and hire-purchase are activities undertaken
as business by NBFCs which are regulated as para banking
activities by the RBI under the provisions of the 1934 Act. They
G are regulated not only to protect depositors but also customers
[See Section 45-J(c)(iii)(i)]. The above activities are financing
activities encompassed under Section 45-l(c)(i) which in turn
constitutes "rendition of services to its customer(s)" which is the ,
taxable event under Section 65(105)(zm) of the Finance Act.
H 1994 (as amended). Apart from NBFCs, even banks through
ASSOCIATION OF LEASING AND FINANCIAL SERVICE 409
COMPANIES v. UNION OF INDIA [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
their subsidiaries with the approval of RBI can undertake A
equipment leasing, hire-purchase business and financial
services. These are not direct lending activities. However, RBI
treats them as services 'Or facilities. The financial facilities are
extended by way of equipment leasing or hire-purchase finance
subject to approval of RBI [See Taxmann's RBI Instructions for B
Banking Operations 7th Edition page 224].
19. The significance of the above circulars and guidelines
is to show that the activities undertaken by NBFCs of equipment
leasing and hire-purchase finance are facilities extended by C
NBFCs to their customers; that, they are financial services
rendered by NBFCs to their customers and that they fall within
the meaning of the words "banking and other financial services"
which is sought to be brought within the service tax net under
Section 66 of the Finance Act, 1994. One more aspect needs
to be highlighted. With the application of AS-19, the leased D
assets are required to be shown as "receivables" and not as
fixed assets which further shows that equipment leasing and
hire-purchase finance are financial facilities which thereby funds
projects presented by the customers to banks and other financial
institutions including NBFCs. Thus, the impugned tax is levied E
on these services as taxable services. It is not a tax on material
or sale. The taxable event is rendition of service. Hence, the
impugned tax is different and distinct from tax on sale of goods
under Entry 54 List II of the Vllth Schedule to the Constitution.
F
20. According to Sale of Goods Act by Mulla [6th Edition]
a common method of selling goods is by means of an
agreement commonly known as a hire-purchase agreement
which is more aptly described as a hiring agreement coupled
with an option to purchase, i.e., to say that the owner lets out G
the chattel on hire and undertakes to sell it to the hirer on his
making certain number of payments. If that is the real effect of
the agreement there is no contract of sale until the hirer has
made the required number of payments and he remains a
bailee till then. But some so-called hire-purchase agreements H
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A are in reality contracts to purchase, the price to be paid by
instalments and in those cases the contract is a contract of sale
and not of hiring. It depends on the terms of the contract whether
it is to be regarded as a contract of hiring or a contract of sale.
A hire-purchase agreement partakes of the nature of a contract
B of bailment with an element of sale added to it. However, if the
intention of the financing party in obtaining the hire-purchase
and the allied agreements is to secure the return of the loan
advanced to its customer the transaction would be merely a
financing transaction. [See page 75]. The point which needs
c to be re-stated is that the funding activity undertaken by the
financing party which could be in the form of loan or equipment
leasing or hire-purchase financing, would be exigible to service
tax if such activity falls in the category of "banking and other
financial services" under Section 65(12) of the Finance Act,
1994. The financial transaction was earlier out of the tax net. In
0
the process there are two different and distinct transactions, viz.,
the financing transaction and the equipment leasing/hire-
purchase transaction. The former is exigible to service tax
under Section 66 of Finance Act, 1994 (as amended) whereas
the latter would be exigible to local sales tax/VAT. Funding or
E financing the transaction of equipment leasing and hire-
purchase covers two different and distinct transactions. The
activity of funding or financing by NBFC who is in the business
of financing by giving loans, or equipment leasing or hire-
purchase finance falls in the category of financial services
F rendered by NBFCs to their customers. It is an activity in relation
to the hire-purchase or lease transaction. In this connection, as
and by way of illustration we need to give an illustration which
brings out the distinction between a "finance lease" and
"operating lease". A finance lease transfers all the risks and
G rewards incidental to ownership, even though the title may or
may not be eventually transferred to the lessee. In the case of
"finance lease" the lessee could use the asset for its entire
economic life and thereby acquires risks and rewards incidental
to the ownership of such assets. In substance, finance lease is
H a financial loan from the lessor to the lessee. On the other hand
ASSOCIATION OF LEASING AND FINANCIAL SERVICE 411
COMPANIES v. UNION OF INDIA [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
an operating lease is a lease other than the finance lease. A
Accounting of a "finance lease" is under AS-19, which as stated
above, is mandatory for NBFCs. It is a completely different
regime. According to Chitty on Contract, a hire-purchase
agreement is a vehicle of instalment credit. It is an agreement
under which an owner lets chattels out on hire and further agrees B
that the hirer may either return the goods and terminate the
hiring or elect to purchase the goods when the payments for
hire have reached a sum equal to the amount of the purchase
price stated in the agreement or upon payment of a stated sum.
The essence of the transaction is bailment of goods by the c
owner to the hirer and the agreement by which the hirer has
the option to return the goods at some time or the other [See
para 36.242, 36.243]. Further, in the bailment termed "hire" the
bailee receives both possession of the chattel and the right to
use it in return for remuneration to be paid to the bailor [See
0
para 32.045]. Further, under the head "equipment leasing", it
is explained that it is a form of long-term financing. In a finance
lease, it is the lessee who selects the equipment to be supplied
by the dealer or the manufacturer, but the lessor [finance
company] provides the funds, acquires the title to the equipment
and allows the lessee to use it for its expected life. During the
E
period of the lease the risk and rewards of ownership are
transferred to the lessee who bears the risks of loss, destruction
and depreciation or malfunctioning. The bailment which
underlies finance leasing is only a device to provide the finance
company with a security interest [its reversionary right]. If the F
lease is terminated prematurely, the lessor is entitled to recoup
its capital investment ~less the realizable value of the equipment
at the time] and its expected finance charges [less an
allowance to reflect the return of the capital] [para 32.057]. In
the case of hire-purchase agreement the periodical payments G
made by the hirer is made up of :
(a) consideration for hire
(b) payment on account of purchase
H
412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A 21. To sum up, NBFCs essentially are loan companies.
They basically conduct their business as loan companies. They
could be in addition thereto in the business of equipment
leasing, hire purchase finance and investment. Because
NBFCs are basically loan companies, they are required to show
B the assets leased as "receivables" in their balance sheets. That,
the activities of hire-purchase finance/equipment leasing
undertaken by NBFCs come under the category of "para
banking". That, in substance a finance lease, unlike an operating
lease, is a financial loan (assistance/facility) by the le~ssor to
c the lessee. That, in the bailment termed "hire" the bailee
receives both possession of the chattel and the right to use it
in return for remuneration. On the other hand, equipment leasing
is long term financing which helps the borrower to raise funds
without outright payment in the first instance. Here the "interest"
element cannot be compared to consideration for lease/hire
0
which is in the nature of remuneration (consideration) for hire.
Thus, financing as an activity or business of NBFCs 1s different
and distinct from operating lease/hire-purchase agreements in
the classical sense. The elements of the finance lease or loan
E transaction are quite different from those in equipment leasing/
hire-purchase agreements between owner (lessor) and the hirer
(lessee). There are two independent transactions and what the
impugned tax seeks to do is to tax the financial facilities
extended to its customers by the NBFCs under Section 66 of
the 1994 Act (as amended) as they come under "banking and
F other financial services" under Section 65(12) of the said Act.
"The finance lease" and "the hire-purchase finance" thus
squarely come under the expression "financial leasing services"
in Section 65(12) of the Finance Act, 1994 (as amended).
G Nature and character of service-tax
22. In All India Federation of Tax Practitioners' case
(supra), this Court explained the concept of service tax and held
that service tax is a Value Added Tax ('VAT for short) which in
turn is a destination based consumption tax in the sense that it
H
ASSOCIATION OF LEASING AND FINANCIAL SERVICE 413
COMPANIES v. UNION OF INDIA [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
is levied on commercial activities and it is not a charge on the A
business but on the consumer. That, service tax is an economic
concept based on the principle of equivalence in a sense that
consumption of goods and consumption of services are similar
as they both satisfy human needs. Today with the technological
. advancement there is a very thin line which divides a "sale" B
from "service". That, applying the principle of equivalence,
there is no difference between production or manufacture of
saleable goods and production of marketable/saleable services
in the form of an activity undertaken by the service provider for
consideration, which correspondingly stands consumed by the c
service receiver. It is this principle of equivalence which is
inbuilt into the concept of service tax under the Finance Act,
1994. That service tax is, therefore, a tax on an activity. That,
service tax is a value added tax. The value addition is on
account of the activity which provides value addition, for 0
example, an activity undertaken by a chartered accountant or
a broker is an activity .undertaken by him based on his
performance and skill. This is from the point of view of the
professional. However, from the point of view of his client, the
chartered accountanUbroker is his service provider. The value
E
addition comes in on account of the activity undertaken by the
professional like tax planning, advising, consultation etc. It gives
value addition to the goods manufactured or produced or sold.
Thus, service tax is imposed every time service is rendered to
the customer/client. This is clear from the provisions of Section
65(105)(zm) of the Finance Act, 1994 (as amended). Thus, the F
taxable event is each exercise/ activity undertaken by the
service provider and each time service tax gets attracted. The
same view is reiterated broadly in the earlier judgment of this
Court in Godfrey Phillips India Ltd. v. State of U.P. [(2005 (2)
SCC 515] in which a Constitution Bench observed that in the G
classical sense a tax is composed of two elements: the person,
thing or activity on which tax is imposed. Thus, every tax may
be levied on an object or on the event of taxation. Service tax
is, thus, a tax on activity whereas sales tax is a tax on sale of
a thing or goods. H
414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A Law as it stood before the Constitution (Forty-sixth
Amendment) Act, 1982:
23. The principle that legislative entries must be given the
widest interpretation is subject to the exception that where the
entries use legal terms, they must be given their legal meaning.
8
This principle was established in The State of Madras v.
Gannon Dunkerley & Co., (Madras) Ltd. [(1959) SCR 379]
where it was held that in Entry 48 List II, Seventh Schedule of
the Government of India Act, 1935, the words "sale of goods"
had the same meaning which those words have in the Sale of
C Goods Act, 1930 ("1930 Act" for short). Thus, a legislature
cannot extend its taxing power by defining the words "sale of
goods" to cover transactions which did not constitute "sale of
goods" within the 1930 Act. Accordingly, it was held in Gannon
Dunkerley's case that in a building contract there was neither
D a contract to sell materials used in the construction nor did the
property in the materials pass as movables. Accordingly, it was
held that the provisions of the Madras General Sales Tax
(Amendment) Act, 1947 defining a sale to include "a works
contract" were ultra vires. It was held that the exercise of
E legislative power by the State legislature was an exercise to
enlarge that power which would amount to amending Entry 54
of List II by an ordinary law which was impermissible because
under that Entry the subject of the legislative power was tax on
sale of goods.
F
24. The word "sale" is a nomen juris. It is the name of a
consensual contract. The law with regard to chattels is
embodied in the Sale of Goods Act. A contract of sale is
different from an agreement to sell and unlike other contracts,
G operates by itself and without delivery to transfer the property
in the goods sold. The word "sale" connotes both a contract and
a conveyance or transfer of property. The law relating to
building contracts was well-known when Gannon Dunkerley's
case was decided and under that law the supply of goods as
part of the works contract was not a sale. Thus, the essential
H
ASSOCIATION OF LEASING AND FINANCIAL SERVICE 415
COMPANIES v. UNION OF INDIA [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
ingredients of the "sale" are agreement to sell movables for a A
price and property passing therein pursuant to an agreement.
Therefore, to allow subsequent exercise of legislative power to
enlarge that power, would be to amend the entry relating to that
power in the Constitution by an ordinary law, which is not
permissible. The principle of Gannon Dunker/ey's case, B
however, has no application to a law enacted by the Parliament
imposing sales tax on supply of materials in building contracts
since Parliament has power to legislate in respect of Part C
States under Article 246(4). It is important to note that such
power in the Parliament on the above matter could also be c
found in Entry 97, List I read with Article 248(2). Entry 97 gives
effect to Article 248. Thus, although a sales tax on materials
supplied under a building contract is outside Entry 54, List II,
as held in Gannon Dunker/ey's case, Parliament has power
to impose such a tax. [See Constitutional Law of India by H.M. D
Seervai, pp. 2437]
25. In K.L. Johar and Co. v. Deputy Commercial Tax
Officer [(1965) 2 SCR 112], this Court held that a hire-purchase
agreement had two elements, an element of bail and an
element of sale. When all the terms of the said agreement E
stood satisfied and the option to purchase was exercised, only
at that stage sales tax would be exigible; but the legislature
would have no power to tax such agreements till that stage was
reached. Till that stage, a hire-purchase agreement is not a sale.
It is important to note that under K.L. Johar's case, bailment F
termed as "hire" fell within the competence of the Parliament,
the tax on sale of goods came within the competence of the
State Legislature. Further, delivery which is the essence of
bailment was not treated as an essential element of sale as a
taxable event and as a result certain consequences as G
enumerated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons to the
Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act ensued, as
highlighted hereinbelow.
26. It is in view of the above problems, that the Constitution
H
416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1982 came to be enacted. The
61st Report of the Law Commission begins with the genesis.
One of the points referred to in the Law Commission's Report
related to the restricted scope for the levy of sales tax by State
Governments in respect of works-contract and hire-purchase
B transactions. In the report it has been stated vide paras 1.6 &
1. 7 at page 10 "since the expression 'sale of goods' in Entry
54 of State List has the same meaning as in Sale of Goods
Act, a hire-purchase agreement is not a sale, as no property
passes in such a transaction until the option to purchase is
c exercised and the other terms of the agreement are fulfilled.
Similarly, in a building contract, which is indivisible, there is no
sale of goods. It is contract of works. Similarly, a transaction
betWeen an hotelier and a resident customer is one of 'service'
and is not taxable as 'sale of goods'; if there is a consolidated
charge for boarding and lodging". That, Gannon Dunkerley's
0
case is an example of composiie contracts, involving supply of
goods and services. It is in this background that we have
considered the question whether the power to tax indivisible
contracts of works should be conferred on the States. It is in
E the above background that the Law Commission in fact
observes "Supreme Court with respect appears to have
adopted an unusually resvicted interpretation of the word
"sale"". It is true that the Word "sale" is not defined in the
Constitution but is well recognized canon of construction that
the words used in the three legislative Lists should receive the
F widest interpretation and not to the narrow definition of the word
"sale" contained in the Sale of Goods Act for the purpose of
interpreting that expression in Entry 54, List JI. That is the
principal juridical ground on which we have expressed our
preference for the transfer of power to tax such contracts to the
G State Legislatures. That, the Commission would prefer
restoration of the power to State legislature [See pages 19 and
20). Thus, to restore the power to levy sales tax on such
contracts, the Commission suggested the third out of the three
below-mentioned alternatives:
H
ASSOCIATION OF LEASING AND FINANCIAL SERVICE 417
COMPANIES v. UNION OF INDIA [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
(i) amending State List Entry 54; A
(ii) adding a fresh Entry in the State List;
(iii) inserting in Article 366 a wide definition of "sale"
so as to include works contract.
B
27. It is the third alternative that brought in Article 366(29A)
vide the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1982 (page
21 ). Even in the context of hire-purchase contracts the same
alternative is opted for by the Commission. However, two
obser.iations of the Commission may be noticed. The first is c
in para 25, page 32. It reads as follows:
"The effect of the judgment in K.L. Johar's case is to reduce
the tax base on which sales tax is payable. A tax on hire-
purchase without sale can be levied on the full value of D
the hire-purchase transaction by the Union under the
residuary power - entry 97 of Union List."
28. To the same effect is the observation of the
Commission at page 37:
E
'The power to tax hire-purchase within the State a/so vests
in the Union under Union List, entry 97."
29. Thus, before the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment)
Act, hire-purchase transaction could have been taxed by Union
under Entry 97, List I but as a matter of policy Parliament F
brought in Article 366 (29A) as recommended by the
Commission. The point to be noted is that reliance on the report
[though it helps our above reasoning on some of the aspects]
placed by the appellant (s) only shows that service tax was not
in the mind of Parliament when the Constitution (Forty-sixth G
Amendment) Act stood enacted. It was not even in the mind of
the Law Commission. That, as stated above, only on the
principal juridical ground that the word "sale" in Entry 54, List II
should have been read widely, the Commission suggested that
Article 366 be amended so that power to tax such contracts H
418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A remains with the State Legislature as originally intended. In fact
at page 20, the Commission states "before the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Gannon Dunkerley's case, the word "sale"
was usually regarded as including works contract and works
contract was regarded as falling in Entry 54, List II and that
B taxes were in fact being levied and recovered by the States".
Scope of Article 366(29Al
30. If one examines Article 366(29A) carefully, one finds
that clause (29A) provides for an inclusive definition and has
C two limbs. The first limb says that the tax on sale or purchase
of goods includes a tax on transactions specified in sub-
clauses (a) to (f). The second limb provides that such transfer,
delivery or supply of goods referred to in the first limb shall be
deemed to be a sale of those goods by the person making the
D transfer, delivery or supply and purchase of those goods by the
person to whom such transfer, delivery or supply is made. Now,
in K.L. Johar's case, this Court held that the States can tax hire-
purchase transactions resulting in sale but only to the extent to
which tax is levied on the sale price. This led the Parliament to
E say, in the Statement of Objects and Reasons to the
Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act, "though practically
the purchaser in a hire-purchase transaction gets the goods on
the date of entering into the hire-purchase contract, it has been
held by the Supreme Court in K. L. Johar's case that there is a
F sale only when the purchaser exercises the option to purchase
which is at a later date and therefore only the depreciated value
of the goods involved in such transaction at the time the option
is exercised becomes assessable to sales tax which position
has resulted in avoidance of tax in various ways." Thus, we find
G from the Statement of Objects and Reasons that the concept
of "deemed sale" is brought in by the Constitution (Forty-sixth
Amendment) Act only in the context of imposition of sales tax
and that the words "transfer, delivery or supply" of goods is
referred to in the second limb of Article 366(29A) to broaden
the tax base and that as indicated in the Report of Law
H
ASSOCIATION OF LEASING AND FINANCIAL SERVICE 419
COMPANIES v. UNION OF INDIA [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
Commission prior to the judgment of this Court in Gannon A
Dunkerley's case, works contract was always taxed by the
States as part of the word "sale" in Entry 48/54 of List II. The
object behind enactment of Article 366(29A) is to tax the
composite price so that the full value of the hire-purchase price
is taxed and to avoid the judgment in K.L. Johar's case whose B
implication was to narrow the tax base resulting in seepage of
sales tax revenue. It is in that sense "splitting" of the contract
needs to be understood. Thus, it cannot be said that Parliament
divested itself of the power to levy service tax vide enactment
of the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act. Even in the c
Report of the Law Commission, it has been observed that "if a
hire-purchase transacHon results in a sale, sales-tax is
undoubtedly leviable by the States. No doubt, it is difficult to
determine the "sale price" for the purpose of the sales tax law
but this has no bearing on the question of legislative 0
competence" (page 26). Thus, reliance placed by the
appellant(s) on the expression "splitting up" in KL Johar's case
is misconceived because the "splitting up" referred to in K.L.
Johar's case was, as stated above, in regard to valuation and
not in regard to legislative competence.
E
Whether the State Legislature has the exclusive
competence to levy tax on "financial leasing services"
under Entry 54, List II?
31. On behalf of the appellant(s) it was submitted that the F
State Legislature has the exclusive competence to levy a tax
on hire-purchase and financial leasing by reason of Entry 54,
List II read with Article 366(29A). It was submitted that, as held
by this Court in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited
(supra) [vide para 44], splitting was permissible under Article G
366(29A) only in two cases indicated in sub-clauses (b) and
(f) and that in no other service (including hire-purchase).
32. For answering the above, we need to keep in mind the
doctrine of "pith and substance" and the rule of interpretation
H
420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A of legislative entries. These have to be applied to what is stated
hereinabove in the earlier part of our judgment in which we have
dealt with the concept of "banking and other financial services"
and the nature and character of "service tax" as a tax on
activities. We may reiterate that Equipment Leasing and Hire-
B Purchase Finance are activities of long term financing and they
fall within the ambit of "banking and other financial services".
As stated above, a financial lease is a lease that transfers
substantially all risks and rewards incident to ownership. In the
said lease, the lessor (NBFC) merely finances the equipment/
c asset which the lessee is free to select, order, take delivery and
maintain. The lessor (NBFC) arranges the funding. It accepts
the invoice from the vendor (supplier) and pays him. The
income which the lessor earns is by way of finance/ interest
charges in addition to the management fees or documentation
charges, etc. It is this income which constitutes the measure
0
of tax for the purposes of calculating the value of taxable
services under Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994. Thus, a
financial lease would come within "financial leasing services"
in terms of Section 65(12)(a){i). There are different types of
financial leases, namely, a tax-based financial lease, a
E leverage lease and an operating lease. In the present case,
there is no adjudication of the matter. The appellant(s)
approached the High Court directly without proper adjudication
by the competent authority under the Finance Act, 1994. Even
in the matter of allocation between the principal and finance/
F interest charges, adjudication under the Act was warranted
which has not been done. One must also bear in mind that Article
366(29A) is essentially sales tax specific. It was brought in to
expand the tax base which stood narrowed down because of
certain judgments of this Court. That is the reason for bringing
G in the concept of "deemed sale" under which tax could be
imposed on mere "delivery" on hire-purchase [See clause (c)]
which expression is also there in the second limb of the said
article.
H 33. To begin we would like to quote hereinbelow from the
ASSOCIATION OF LEASING AND FINANCIAL SERVICE 421
COMPANIES v. UNION OF INDIA [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
judgment of this Court the relevant observations in the case of A
The Second Gift Tax Officer, Mangalore v. D.H. Hazareth [AIR
1970 SC 999] on the doctrine of pith and substance:
"The sovereignty of Parliament and the Legislatures is a
sovereignty of enumerated entries, but within the ambit of 8
an entry, the exercise of power is as plenary as any
Legislature can possess, subject, of course, to the
limitations arising from the fundamental rights. The entries
themselves do not follow any logical classification or
dichotomy. As was said in State of Rajasthan v. S. Chawla C
(1959) Supp 1 SCR 904 =(AIR 1959 SC 544) the entries
in the Lists must be regarded as enumeratio simplex of
broad categories. Since they are likely to overlap
occasionally, it is usual to examine the pith and substance
of legislation with a view to determining to which entry they
can be substantially related, a slight connection with D
another entry in another List notwithstanding. Therefore, to
find out whether a piece of legislation falls within any entry,
its true nature and character must be in respect to that
particular entry. The entries must of course receive a large
and liberal interpretation because the few words of the E
entry are intended to confer vast and plenary powers. If,
however, no entry in any of the three Lists covers it, then it
must be regarded as a matter not enumerated in any of
the three Lists. Then it belongs exclusively to Parliament
under entry 97 of the Union List as a topic of legislation." F
34. We also quote hereinbelow the relevant observations
in the case of Mis Ujagar Prints (II) v. Union of India [(1989)
3 sec 488]:
"Entries to the legislative lists, it must be recalled, are not G
sources of the legislative power but are merely topics or
fields of legislation and must receive a liberal construction
inspired by a broad and generous spirit and not in a narrow
pedantic sense. The expression "with respect to" in Article
, 246 brings in the doctrine of "Pith and Substance" in the H
422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A understanding of the exertion of the legislative power and
wherever the question of legislative competence is raised
the test is whether the legislation, looked at as a whole, is
substantially 'with respect to' the particular topic of
legislation. If the legislation has a substantial and not
B merely a remote connection with the entry, the matter may
well be taken to be legislation on the topic."
35. On the interpretation of legislative entries the law is
well-settled by the judgment of this Court in the case of Mis.
C International Tourist Corporation v. State of Haryana [AIR 1981
SC 774] in the following terms:
" ... Before exclusive legislative competence can be claimed
for Parliament by resort to the residuary power, the
legislative incompetence of the State legislative must be
D clearly established. Entry 97 itself is specific that a matter
can be brought under that entry only if it is not enumerated
in List II or List Ill and in the case of a tax if it is not
mentioned in either of those Lists. In a Federal Constitution
like ours where there is a division of legislative subjects
E but the residuary power is vested in Parliament, such
residuary power cannot be so expansively interpreted as
to whittle down the power of the State Legislature. That
might affect and jeopardise the very federal principle. The
federal nature of the Constitution demands that an
F interpretation which would allow the exercise of legislative
power by Parliament pursuant to the residuary powers
vested in it to trench upon State legislation and which
would thereby destroy or belittle State autonomy must be
rejected ... "
G 36. Now coming to the main point whether the whole field
is covered by Entry 54 and that the levy of service tax is
incompetent, it is important to note the language of Entry 97,
List I and Article 248 except for the word "other" in Entry 97.
This is because when one reads Entry 97 of List I with Article
H 246(1) it confers exclusive power first, to make laws in respect
ASSOCIATION OF LEASING AND FINANCIAL SERVICE 423 .
COMPANIES v. UNION OF INDIA [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
of matters specified in Entries 1 to 96 in List I and, secondly, it A
confers the residuary power of making laws by Entry 97. Article
248 does not provide for any express powers of Parliament but
only for its residuary power. Article 248 adds nothing to the
power conferred by Article 246(1) read with Entry 97, List I. In
the context of an exhaustive enumeration of subjects of B
legislation what does the conferment of residuary power mean?
Entry 97, List I which confers residuary powers on Parliament
provides "any other matter not enumerated in List II and List Ill
including any tax not mentioned in either of those lists". The
word "other" is important. It means "any subject of legislation c
other than the subject mentioned in Entries 1-96". Lastly, we
must keep in mind a clear distinction between the subject and
measure of tax. [See Goodricke Group Ltd. v. State of West
Bengal, (1995) Suppl 1 SCC 707]
37. Applying the above decisions to the present case, on D
examination of the impugned legislation in its entirety, we are
of the view that the impugned levy relates to or is with respect
to the particular topic of "banking and other financial services"
which includes within it one of the several enumerated services,
viz., financial leasing services. These include long time E
financing by banks and other financial institutions (including
NBFCs). These are services rendered to their customers which
comes within the meaning of the expression "taxable services"
as defined in Section 65(105)(zm). The taxable event under the
impugned law is the rendition of service. The impugned tax is F
not on material or sale. It is on activity/ service rendered by the
service provider to its customer. Equipment Leasing/ Hire-
Purchase finance are long term financing activities undertaken
as their business by NBFCs. As far as the taxable value in case
of financial leasing including equipment leasing and hire- G
purchase is concerned, the amount received as principal is not
the consideration for services rendered. Such amount is
credited to the capital account of the lessor/ hire-purchase
service provider. It is the interesU finance charge which is
treated as income or revenue and which is credited to the H
424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A revenue account. Such interest or finance charges together with
the lease management feel processing fee/ documentation
charges are treated as considerations for the services
rendered and accordingly they constitute the value of taxable
services on which service tax is made payable. In fact, the
B Government has given exemption from payment of service tax
to financial leasing services including equipment leasing and
hire-purchase on that portion of taxable value comprising of
90% of the amount representing as interest, i.e., the difference
between the instalment paid towards repayment of the lease
C amount and the principal amount in such instalments paid (See
Notification No. 4/2006 - Service Tax dated 1.3.2006). In other
words, service tax is leviable only on 10% of the interest portion.
(See also Circular F.No. B.11/1/2001-TRU dated 9.7.2001 in
which it has been clarified that service tax, in the case of
financial leasing including equipment leasing and hire-
0
purchase, will be leviable only on the lease management fees/
processing fees/ documentation charges recovered at the time
of entering into the agreement and on the finance/ interest
charges recovered in equated monthly instalments and not on
the principal amount). Merely because for valuation purposes
E inter alia "finance/ interest charges" are taken into account and
merely because service tax is irnposed on financial services
with reference to "hiring/ interest" charges, the impugned tax
does not cease to be service tax and nor does it become tax
on hire-purchase/ leasing transactions under Article 366(29A)
F read with Entry 54, List II. Thus, while State Legislature is
competent to impose tax on "sale" by legislation relatable to
Entry 54 of List II of Seventh Schedule, tax on the aspect of the
"services'', vendor not being relatable to any entry in the State
List, would be within the legislative competence of the
G Parliament under Article 248 read with Entry 97 of List I of
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.
38. According to Mr. Arvind Datar and Mr. K. Parasaran,
learned counsel appearing on behalf of some of the appellants,
H once the subject matter of hire-purchase and leasing is
ASSOCIATION OF LEASING AND FINANCIAL SERVICE 425
COMPANIES v. UNION OF INDIA [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
constitutionally characterized as a sale (deemed sale) by the A
Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act, the said subject
matter can be taxed only under Entry 54, List II and it cannot
be taxed under Entry 97, List I. According to the learne.d
counsel, the object behind enactment of the Constitution (Forty-
sixth Amendment) Act was to reserve the exclusive competence 8
to tax hire-purchase transactions with the State Legislature and
exclude the Parliament from the legislative sphere. In support
of the above contentions, learned counsel placed reliance on
para 44 of the judgment of this Court in the case of Bharat
Sanchar Nigam Limited (supra), the relevant portion of which c
is quoted hereinbelow: ·
"44. Of all the different kinds of composite transactions, the
drafters of the Forty-Sixth Amendment chose three
specifications, a works contract, a hire-purchase contract
D
and a catering contract to bring them within the fiction of a
deemed sale. Of these three, the first and third involve a
kind of service and sale at the same time."
39. Emphasizing the underlined words, the learned counsel
contended that a hire-purchase does not involve a sale and E
service at the same time and, therefore, service tax cannot be
levied on the interest/ finance charges which is sought to be
done in the present case. In our view, the judgment in Bharat
Sanchar Nigam Limited's case has no application to the
present case. As stated above, what is challenged in this case F
is the service tax imposed by Section 66 of the Finance Act,
1994 (as amended) on the value of taxable services referred
to in Section 65(105)(zm) read with Section 65(12) of the said
Act, insofar as it relates to financial leasing services including
equipment leasing and hire-purchase as beyond the legislative G
competence of Parliament by virtue of Article 366(29A) of the
Constitution. In short, legislative competence of the Parliament
to impose service tax on financial leasing services including
equipment leasing and hire-purchase is the subject matter of
challenge. Legislative competence was not the issue before this
H
426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A Court in the Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited's case. In that
case, the principal question which arose for determination was
in respect of the nature of the transaction by which mobile
phone connections are enjoyed. The question was whether
such connections constituted a sale or a service or both. If it
B was a sale then the States were legislatively competent to levy
sales tax on the transaction under Entry 54, List II of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution. If it was service then the Central
Government alone had the legislative competence to levy
service tax under Entry 97, List I and if the nature of the
C transaction partook of the character of both sale and service,
then the moot question would be whether both the legislative
authorities could levy their separate taxes together or only one
of them. It was held that the subject transaction was a service
and, thus, the Parliament had legislative competence to levy
D service tax under Entry 97, List I. In para 88 of the said
judgment, this Court observed that "No one denies the
legislative competence of the States to levy sales tax on sales
provided that the necessary concomitants of a sale are present
in the transaction and the sale is distinctly discernible in the
E transaction. This does not however allow the State to entrench
upon the Union List and tax services by including the cost of
such service in the value of the goods". The principle of law in
para 88 squarely applies to the present case. As stated above,
we are concerned with "financial leasing services" which are
F sought to be taxed under Section 65(12)(a)(i). The taxable event
is indicated in Section 65(105)(zm). As stated above, the
impugned provision operates qua an activity of funding/
financing of equipment/ asset under equipment leasing under
which a lessee is free to select, order, take delivery and
G maintain the asset. The lessor (NBFC) arranges the finances.
It accepts the invoice from the vendor (supplier) and pays him.
Thus, the lessor (NBFC) renders financial services to its
customer(s) and what is taxed under the impugned provision
is the income, by way of finance/ interest charges in addition
to management fees/ documentation charges, which is earned
H
ASSOCIATION OF LEASING AND FINANCIAL SERVICE 427
COMPANIES v. UNION OF INDIA [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI.]
by the financier (lessor). The taxable event is the service which A
is rendered by the finance company to its customer(s). The
value of taxable service under Section 67 is income by way of
interest/finance charges (measure of tax) which is not
determinative of the character of the levy. Thus, Section 67 of
the Finance Act, 1994 seeks to tax financial services rendered B
by the appellant(s) with reference to the income which the
appellant(s) earns by way of interest/ finance charges. In the
circumstances and for the reasons given hereinabove, the
question of splitting up of transactions, as contended on behalf
of the appellant(s), does not arise. As held hereinabove, c
equipment leasing and hire-purchase finance constitute long
term financing activity. Such an activity was not the subject
matter of the discussion in the Bharat Sanchar Nigam
Limited's cas_e. The service tax in the present case is neither
on the material nor on sale. It is on the activity of financing/
0
funding of equipment/ asset within the meaning of the words
"financial leasing services" in Section 6.5(12)(a)(i). Lastly, we
may state that this Court has on three different occasions upheld
the levy of service with reference to Entry 97 of List I in the face
of challenges to the competence of the Parliament based on
the entries in List II and on all the three occasions, this Court E
has held that the levy of service tax falls within Entry 97 of List
I. The decisions are in the case of T.N. Ka/ayana Mandapam
Association (supra), Gujarat Ambuja Cements Ltd. (supra)
and All-India Federation of Tax Practitioners (supra).
F
Conclusion
40. As stated above, the appellant(s) had moved the High
Court in the writ petition challenging the validity of Section 66
of the Finance Act, 1994 on the value of taxable services G
referred to in Section 65(105)(zm) read with Section
65(12)(a}(i) without exhausting: the statutory remedy. The
contracts entered into by the appellant(s) with its customers
were not vetted. There has been no adjudication under the Act
in most of these cases and, therefore, we hereby direct the
H
,
428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A competent authority under the Finance Act, 1994 to decide the
matter in accordance with the law laid down. Subject to above,
for the afore-stated reasons, we hold that the service tax
imposed by Section 66 of the Finance Act, 1994 (as amended)
on the value of taxable services referred to in Section
B 65(105)(zm) read with Section 65(12) of the said Act, insofar
as it relates to financial leasing services including equipment
leasing and hire-purchase is within the legislative competence
of the Parliament under Entry 97, List I of the Seventh Schedule
to the Constitution. Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed with
c no order as to costs.
D.G. Appeal dismissed.
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