ASHWANI KUMAR SAXENAversusSTATE OF M.P.

                          f2012J 10 S.C.R. 540

A                    ASHWANI KUMAR SAXENA
                                     v.
                           STATE OF M.P.
                 (Criminal Appeal No. 1403 of 2012)
                         SEPTEMBER 13, 2012
B
     [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN AND MADAN B. LOKUR, JJ.]

          Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
     2000 - s. 7A rlw. r. 12 of Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007 -
C    Inquiry under - Nature, scope and ambit of - Claim of
    juvenility - Procedure to be followed - For determination of
     age - Held: Age determination inquiry is contemplated u/s.
     7A rlw r. 12 - Therefore, such inquiry is an inquiry under the
    Act and to be conducted following the procedure u/r. 12 and
D   not following the procedure under Cr.P. C. - Age to be
    determined initially on the basis of the documents/certificates
    as indicated in r. 12(3)(a)(i)(ii) and (iii) - The question of
    obtaining medical opinion arises only if the documents/
    certificates are unavailable or found to be fabricated or
E   manipulated - Once the court passes order determining the
    age of the juvenile following the procedure laid down u/s. 7A
    rlw r. 12, that shall be conclusive proof as regards the age of
    that juvenile - In the instant case, the court examined the
    question of juvenility as if it was a criminal trial or inquiry under
F   Cr.P.C - The document produced to prove the date of birth
     was not refuted or rebutted by the opposite party- Hence rule
     12(3)(a)(i)(ii) is complied with - The court wrongly ordered for
    medial opinion disbelieving the documents in support of date
    of birth of the juvenile - Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection
G   of Children) Rules, 2007 - r. 12 - Code of Criminal
    Procedure, 1973.

        Penal Code, 1860- s. 320 rlw s.27 of Arms Act, 1959 -
    Prosecution under - Conviction and sentence of life
    imprisonment by trial court - Appeal pending before High
H                                   540
    ASHWANI KUMAR SAXENA v. STATE OF M.P.                     541

Court - In the meantime, in an application ulss. 6 and 7 of A
Juvenile Justice Act, Supreme Court finding that the accused
was a juvenile - Sentence set aside - Direction to High Court
to place the records before Juvenile Justice Board for
awarding sentence in accordance with the Act of 2000 -
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 B
- Arms Act, 1959 - s. 27.

     Words and Phrases:

     'inquiry: 'enquiry', 'investigation' and 'trial' - Meaning of,
in the context of Cr.P.C. and Juvenile Justice (Care and              C
Protection of Children) Act, 2000.

    The appellant accused was prosecuted uls. 302 IPC
rlw s. 27 of Arms Act During pendency of the trial, he
moved an application ulss. 6 and 7 of Juvenile Justice                o
(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, claiming to
be a juvenile (i.e. below 18 years age on the date of the
Incident). In support of his date of birth, he produced
mark-sheets of eighth standard and Higher Secondary
Board examinations.                                                   E
    The court directed Ossification Test. As per the
medical reports, the age of the accused was not below
18 years on the date of the Incident. The court
disbelieving the school records and relying on the
medical evidence, dismissed the application.                          F
     Appellate court called for the original school records
In order to ascertain the basis for entry of the date of birth,
but disbelieving the same, dismissed the appeal. The
order was confirmed by the High Court. Hence the                      G
present appeal.
     Allowing the appeal, the Court
     HELD: 1.1 Courts below, while dealing with the claim
of juvenility have not properly understood the scope of               H
   542     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012] 10 S.C.R.

A the Juvenile justice (Car~ and Protection of Children) Act,
  2000 particularly, meaning and content of Section 7A of
  the Act read with Rule 12 of Juvenile Justice (Care and
  Protection of Children) Rules, 2007. Section 7A, obliges
  the court only to make an inquiry, not an investigation or a
B trial, an inquiry not under Cr.P.C. but under the Act.
  Criminal Courts, JJ Board, Committees etc., proceed as
  if they are conducting a trial, inquiry, enquiry or
  Investigation as per Cr.P.C. Statute requires the Court or
  the Board only to make an 'inquiry' and in what manner
c that Inquiry has to be conducted is provided in 2007
  Rules. Section 7A has used the expression ~court shall
  make an inquiry", "take such evidence as may be
  necessary" and "but not an affidavit". The Court or the
  Board can accept as evidence something more than an
  affidavit i.e. the Court or the Board can accept
0
  documents, certificates etc. as evidence need not be oral
  evidence. Rule 12 which has to be read along with
  Section 7A has also used certain expressions which are
  also to be borne In mind. Rule 12(2) uses the expression
E "prima facie" and "on the basis of physical appearance"
  or "documents, if available". Rule 12(3) uses the
  expression "by seeking evidence by obtaining". These
  expressions re-emphasize the fact that what is
  contemplated in Section 7A and Rule 12 is only an
  Inquiry. [Paras 13, 27 and 28] [553-B; 561-B-G]
F
        1.2. The age determination inquiry has to be completed
  and age be determined within thirty days from the date
  of making the llpplication, which Is also an Indication of
  the manner In which the Inquiry has to be conducted and
G completed. The word 'Inquiry' has not been defined
  under the Act, but Section 2(y) of the Act says that all
  words and expressions used and not defined in the Act
  but defined in Cr.P.C, shall have the meanings
  respectively assigned to them in that Code. [Para 28]
H [561-G-H; 562-A]
   ASHWANI KUMAR SAXENA v. STATE OF M.P.              543


      1.3. The words inquiry'and inve$tigation'have been     A
·defined in ss. 2(g) and 2(h) of Cr.P.C. respectively. The
 word "enquiry" is not defined under Cr.P.C. which is an
 act of asking for information and al•o consideration of
 some evidence, may be documentary. The expressions
 "trial" has also not been defined in Cr.P.C. but must be    B
 understood in the light of the expressions "inquiry" or
 "investigation" as contained in sections 2(g) and 2(h) of
 Cr.P.C. [Para 29] [562-C-G]

    1.4. The expression "trial" ha'S been generally
understood as the examination by court of issues of fact     C
and law in a case for the purpose of rendering the
judgment relating some offences committed. In very
many cases the Court /the J.J. Board while determining
the claim of juvenility forget that what they are expected
to do Is not to conduct an inquiry under Section 2(g)        D
Cr.P.C. but an inquiry under the Act, following the
procedure laid under Rule 12 and not following the
procedure laid down under Cr.P.C. [Para 30] [562-G-H;
563-A-B]
                                                             E
      1.5. Cr.P.C. makes provisions for not only
investigation, inquiry Into or trial for offences but also
inquiries into certain specific matters. The procedure laid
down for inquiring into the specific matters under Cr.P.C.
naturally cannot be applied in inquiring into other matters F
like the claim of juvenility under Section 7A read with Rule
12 of the 2007 Rules. Thus, the law regarding the
procedure to be followed in such inquiry must ·be found
in the enactment conferring jurisdiction to hold inquiry.
The procedure to be followed under the Act in conducting G
an inquiry Is the procedure laid down In that statute itself
i.e. Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules. One cannot import other
procedures laid down in Cr.P.C. or any other enactment
while making an Inquiry with regard to the juvenility of a
person, when the claim of juvenillty Is raised before the H
    544     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 10 S.C.R.


A court exercising powers under section 7A of the Act.
  [Paras 31 and 32) [563-B-F]
        1.6. A duty is cast on all Courts/J.J. Board and the
  Committees functioning under the Act to seek evidence
  by obtaining the certificate etc. mentioned in Rule 12 (3)
8
  (a) (i) to (iii). The courts in such situations act as a parens
  patriae because they have a kind of guardianship over
  minors who from their legal disability stand in need of
  protection. [Para 33) [563-G-H; 564-A]
C      1.7. "Age determination inquiry" contemplated u/s. 7A
  of the Act r/w Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules enables the court
  to seek evidence and in that process, the court can
  obtain the matriculation or equivalent certificates, If
  available. Only in the absence of any matriculation or
D equivalent certificates, the court need obtain the date of
  birth certificate from the school first attended other than
  a play school. Only in the absence of matriculation or
  equivalent certificate or the date of birth certificate from
  the school first attended, the court need obtain the birth
E certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority
  or a panchayat (not an affidavit but certificates or
  documents). The question of obtaining medical opinion
  from a duly constituted Medical Board arises only if the
  above mentioned documents are unavailable. In case
F exact assessment of the age cannot be done, then the
  court, for reasons to be recorded, may, if considered
  necessary, give the benefit to the child or juvenile by
  considering his or her age on lower side within the
  margin of one year. [Para 34) (564-A-E]
G       1.8. Once the court, following the above mentioned
    procedures, passes an order, that order shall be the
    conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or
    juvenile in conflict with law. It has been made clear in
    subsection (5) of Rule 12 that no further inquiry shall be
H
   ASHWANI KUMAR SAXENA v. STATE OF M.P.                 545

conducted by the court or the Board after examining and         A
obtaining the certificate or any other documentary proof
after referring to sub-rule (3) of Rule 12. Further, Section
49 of the Act also draws a presumption of the age of the
Juvenility on Its determination. [Para 35] [564-E-G]
                                                                B
     1.9. Age determination inquiry contemplated under
the Act and Rules has nothing to do with an enquiry
under other legislations, like entry in service, retirement,
promotion etc. There may be situations where the entry
made in the matriculation or equivalent certificates, date C
of birth certificate from the school first attended and even
the birth certificate given by a Corporation or a Municipal
Authority or a Panchayat may not be correct But Court,
J.J. Board or a Committee functioning under the Act Is
not expected to conduct such a roving enquiry and to go
behind those certificateto to examine the correctness of D
those documents, kept during the normal course of
business. Only In cases where those documents or
certificates are found to be fabricated or manipulated, the
Court, the J.J. Board or the Committee need to go for
medical report for age determination. [Para 36] [564-G-H; E
565-A-B]
     1.10. Legislature and the Rule making authority in
their wisdom have in categorical terms explained how to
proceed with the age determination Inquiry. Further, Rule       F
12 has also fixed a time limit of thirty days to determine
the age of the juvenility from the date of making the
application for the said purpose. Further, It is also evident
from the Rule that If the assessment of age could not be
done, the benefit would go to the child or juvenile             G
considering his I her age on lower side within the margin
of one year. [Para 42] [568-8-C]
   2.1. In the instant case, the court examined the
question of juvenility of the appellant as If It was
conducting a criminal trial or inquiry under Cr.P.C. After      H
    546    SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2012) 10 S.C.R.

A having summoned the admission register of the Higher
  Secondary Sctiool where the appellant had first studied
  and after having perused the same produced by the
  principal of school and having noticed the fact that the
  appellant was born on 24.10.1990, the court should have
B accepted the admission register produced by the
  principal of the school. The date of birth of the appellant
  was discernible from the school admission register. Entry
  made therein was not controverted or countered by the
  counsel appearing for the State or the private party,
c which is evident from the proceedings recorded and
  which Indicates that they had conceded that there was
  nothing to refute or rebut the factum of date of birth
  entered In the School Admission Register. The above
  document produced by the principal of the school
  conclusively shows that the date of birth was 24.10.1990
D hence section 12(3)(a)(i)(il) has been fully satisfied. The
  appellant has successfully established his juvenlllty on
  the date of occurrence. [Paras 38, 40 and 46] (565-F; 567-
  E-G; 569-C]
E      2.2. The admission register in the school in which the
  candidate first attended Is a relevant piece of evidence
  of the date of birth. The reasoning that the parents could
  have entered a wrong date of birth In the admission
  register hence not a correct date of birth is equal to
F thinking that parents would do so in anticipation that child
  would commit a crime In future and, in that situation, they
  could successfully raise a claim of juvenility. [Para 45]
  (569-A-B]
      2.3. The appellant has already faced the criminal trial
G and the court found him guilty along with two others
  under section 302 IPC and has been awarded life
  imprisonment which is pending in appeal, before the
  High Court. The accused is also involved in few other
  criminal cases as well. Since the appellant was a juvenile
H on the date of the incident, the sentence awarded In
   ASHWANI KUMAR SAXENA v. STATE OF M.P.             547


sessions case is set aside and the High Court is directed   A
to place the records before J.J. Board for awarding
appropriate sentence in accordance with the provisions
of the Act, 2000 and if the appellant has already
undergone the maximum sentence of three years as
prescribed in the Act, he has to be let free, provided he   B
is not in custody in any other criminal case. [Para 47]
[569-E-G]

     Babloo Parsi v. State of Jharkhand and Anr. (2008) 13
SCC 133: 2008 (14) SCR 161; Shah Nawaz v. State of Uttar C
Pradesh and Anr. (2011) 13 SCC 751: 2011 (9) SCR 859 -
relied on.

     Amit Das v. State of Bihar (2000) 5 SCC 488: 2000 (1)
 Suppl. SCR 69; Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand (2005)
3 SCC 551: 2005 (1)SCR 1019 ; Hari Ram v. State of D
Rajasthan and Anr. (2009) 13 SCC 211: 2009 (7) SCR 623;
Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr. (2010) 5 SCC
344: 2010 (5) SCR 137; Mohan Mali and Anr. v. State of
Madhya Pradesh (2010) 6 SCC 669; Jabar Singh v. Dinesh
and Anr. (2010) 3 SCC 757: 2010 (3) SCR 353; Dayanand E
v. State of Haryana (2011) 2 SCC 224: 2011 (1) SCR 173 ;
Anil Agarwal and Anr. v. State of West Bengal (2011) 2
SCALE 429 - referred to.
                   Case Law Reference:
                                                            F
  2000 (1) Suppl. SCR 69 Referred to.          Para 14
  2005 (1) SCR 1019        Referred to.        Para 14
  2009 (7) SCR 623         Referred to.        Para 15
                                                            G
  2010 (5) SCR 137         Referred to.        Para 17
  (201 O) 6 sec 669        Referred to.        Para 19
  2010 (3) SCR353          Referred to.        Para 20
  2011 (1) SCR 173         Referred to.        Para 22      H
    548      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012) 10 S.C.R.


A     (2011) 2 SCALE 429          Referred to.          Para 23
      2008 (14) SCR 161           Relied on.            Para 43
      2011 (9) SCR 859            Relied on.            Para 44
B       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
    No. 1403 of 2012.

        From the Judgment & Order dated 3.12.2010 of the High
    Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Criminal Revision No.
    495 of 2009.
c
          Dinesh Kumar Garg for the Appellant.
          Sidhartha Dave, Jemtiben AO (for Vibha Datta Makhija}
    for the Respondent.
D         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
          K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J. 1. Leave granted.
       2. We notice that large number of cases are being brought
E before this Court against orders passed by the criminal courts,
  on the claim of juvenility under Section 7A of the Juvenile
  Justice (Care and Protection of Children} Act, 2000 (for short
  'the J.J. Act'} read with Rule 12 of The Juvenile Justice (Care
  and Protection of Children} Rules, 2007 (for short 'the 2007
  Rules'}, primarily for the reason that many of the criminal courts
F are not properly appraised of the scope of enquiry
  contemplated under those statutory provisions. We find it
  appropriate in this case to examine the nature of inquiry
  contemplated under Section 7A of the J.J. Act read with Rule
  12 of the 2007 Rules, for future guidance and application by
G the Courts, Boards and the Committees functioning under the
  J.J. Act and Rules.
         3. Before considering the above question and other related
    issues, we may examine, what transpired in the case on hand.
H
    ASHWANI KUMAR SAXENA v. STATE OF M.P.                      549
           [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
     Appellant - Ashwani Kumar Saxena and two others,                 A
namely, Jitender and Ashish were charge-sheeted for the
offences punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal
Code (for short 'the IPC') read with Section 27 of Arms Act and
Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 of the IPC, respectively,
for an offence committed on 19.10.2008 at 12.30 am in front           B
of Krishna Restaurant, Chhatarpur which resulted in the death
of one Harbal Yadav for which Sessions Case No.28/09 was
pending before the First Additional Sessions Judge,
Chhatarpur, Madhya Pradesh (M.P .). On 11.11.2008 the
appellant filed an application before Chief Judicial Magistrate       c
(CJM) Court, Chhatarpur under Sections 6 and 7 of the J.J. Act
claiming that he was juvenile on the date of the incident and
hence, the criminal court had no jurisdiction to entertain this
case and the case be referred to Juvenile Justice Board and
he be granted bail.
                                                                      D
     4. The appellant stated that his date of birth is 24.10.1990
and hence on the date of the incident i.e. on 19.10.2008, he
was aged only 17 years, 11 months and 25 days and was thus
a juvenile. In support of this contention, he produced the attested
mark sheets of the High School of the Board of Secondary              E
Education, M.P. Bhopal as well as Eighth standard Board
Examination, wherein the date of birth was mentioned as
24.10.1990.

     5. Smt. Kiran, widow of victim raised objection to the F
application contending that no evidence had been adduced to
show that the entry made in the school Register was correct
and normally parents would not give correct date of birth on the
admission Register. Further, it was also stated that on physical
appearance, as well, he was over 21 years of age and therefore G
the application be dismissed. Ram Mohan Saxena, father of
the appellant, was examined as PW1 and he deposed that the
date of birth of his son was 24.10.1990 and that he was born
in the house of Balle Chaurasia in Maharajpur and his son was
admitted in Jyoti Higher Secondary School, wherein his date H
   550      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 10 S.C.R.

A of birth was also entered as 24.10.1990. Reference was also
  made to the transfer certificate issued by the above-mentioned
  school, since the appellant had studied from 8th standard to
  10th standard in another school, namely, Ceiling Home English
  School. Further reliance was also placed on a horoscope, which
B was prepared by one Daya Ram Pandey, marked as exhibit
  P-4. Savitri Saxena, the mother of the appellant was also
  examined as PW-4, who also deposed that his son was born
  on 24.10.1990 and had his education at Jyoti Higher
  Secondary School and the School Admission Register kept in
c the school would also indicate his correct date of birth.
       6. The C.J.M. court thought of conducting an ossification
  test for determination of the age of the appellant. Dr. R.P.
  Gupta, PW-2 conducted age identification of the body of the
  appellant by X ray and opined that epiphysis of wrist, elbow,
D knee and iliac crest was fused and he was of the opinion that
  the appellant was more than 20 years of age on 14.11.2008
  and a report exhibited as P-5 was submitted to that extent. Dr.
  S.K. Sharma, Medical Officer, District Hospital, Chhatarpur was
  examined as PW-3, who conducted teeth test on the appellant
E for age identification. PW-3 had found that all 32 teeth were
  there including all wisdom teeth, so the age of the appellant was
  more than 21 years.

        7. Dr. R.P. Gupta (PW-2) and Dr. S.K. Sharma (PW-3)
F were cross-examined by the counsel for the appellant. Dr. R.P.
  Gupta (PW-2) stated that there might be margin of 3 years on
  both side while Dr. S.K. Sharma (PW-3) had denied the said
  statement and he was of the opinion that wisdom teeth never
  erupt before the age of 17 years and might be completed upto
  the age of 21 years. Dr. S.K. Sharma (PW-3) concluded since
G all four wisdom teeth were found erupted, the appellant would
  be more than 21 years as on 14.11.2008.
      8. The C.J.M. Court felt that school records including mark
  sheets etc. cannot be relied upon since teacher, who entered
H those details, was not examined and stated as follows:
    ASHWANI KUMAR SAXENA v. STATE OF M.P.                     551
           [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
    "The date of birth mentioned in all the certificates is          A
    24.10.1990. But it is significant that such date of birth was
    recorded on the basis of the date of birth disclosed by the
    father while getting him admitted in the school and neither
    the school admission form, admission register in original
    were called for and even statement of no teacher, who got        B
    admitted in the school, was got recorded in the court to
    determine on the basis of which document actually the date
    of birth was got recorded as per the principle of law laid
    down by the Honourable Supreme Court that the date of
    birth should be relied only when it was recorded in the          C
    school on the basis of our authenticated documents and
    the parents used to get the date of birth of the children
    recorded for some with variation for some benefit and
    therefore same cannot be held as authenticated."
     9. The C.J.M., therefore, placing reliance on the report of     D
the ossification test took the view that the appellant was more
than 18 years of age on the date of the incident. Consequently,
the application was dismissed vide order dated 1.01.2009. The
appellant aggrieved by the above mentioned order filed
Criminal Appeal No. 15 of 2009 before the First Additional           E
Sessions Judge, Chhatarpur.
    10. The appellant again placed considerable reliance on
school records including mark sheets, transfer certificate etc.
and submitted that the reliance placed on the odontology report      F
was wrongly appreciated to determine the age of the appellant.
    The First Additional Sessions Judge stated as follows:
    "On th~ perusal of entire record it appears that the
    evidence of Ram Mohan Saxena who is father of the                G
    appellant is not reliable as he says that the date of birth of
    appellant was mentioned by him at the time of admission
    in school on the basis of Horoscope. It does not bear the
    date when it was prepared. Papers of the Horoscope are
    crispy. The Pandit who prepared the Horoscope was not            H
    552       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2012] 10 S.C.R.


A         examined for the reason best known to the appellant.
          Therefore, the best evidence has been withheld by the
          appellant. Therefore, adverse inference is to be drawn
          against the appellant. The Horoscope is manufactured
          and fabricated and tailored for ulterior motive. n
B
                                                   (emphasis added}

       11. The First Additional Sessions Judge though
  summoned the original register of Jyoti English School, wanted
  to know on what basis the date of birth of the appellant was
C entered in the School Admission Register. PW1, the father of
  the appellant had therefore to rely upon the horoscope on which
  First Additional Sessions Judge has commented as follows:

          "Horo-Scope was found to be recently made which does
D         not mention the date when it was prepared and it appears
          to be recently made and original register of the Jyoti Higher
          Secondary School also does not mention that on what
          basis the date of birth of the appellant was recorded first
          time in the school register. Therefore, the version of the
          Ram Mohan Saxena that the date of birth of the appellant
E
          was recorded on the basis of Horoscope is not supported
          by the register No.317 of the school. The Horoscope
          does not bear the date when it was prepared. It appears
          to be recently made. The original school admission form
          and the person who made the entries first time in the
F         school has not been examined in this Court. Therefore,
          no credence can be given to such entry in the school. n

                                                   (emphasis added}
G      12. Learned First Additional Sessions Judge, on the
  above reasoning, dismissed the appeal though the Principal
  of Jyoti Higher Secondary School himself had appeared before
  the Court with the School Admission Register, which showed
  the date of birth as 24.10.1990. Aggrieved by the same, the
H appellant approached the High Court and the High Court
   ASHWANI KUMAR SAXENA v. STATE OF M.P.                      553
          [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
confirmed the order passed by the C.J.M. Court as well as the         A
First Additional Sessions Judge stating that the appellant had
failed to establish his onus that his age was below 18 years on
the date of the incident.

     13. We are unhappy in the manner in which the C.J.M.
Court, First Additional Sessions Judge's Court and the High           B
Court have dealt with the claim of juvenility. Courts below, in our
view, have not properly understood the scope of the Act
particularly, meaning and content of Section 7A of the J.J. Act
read with Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules Before examining the
scope and object of the above mentioned provisions, it will be        C
useful to refer some of the decided cases wherein the above
mentioned provisions came up for consideration, though on
some other context.

     14. In Amit Das v. State of Bihar, [(2000) 5 SCC 488), D
this Court held that while dealing with the question of
determination of the age of the accused for the purpose of
finding out, whether he is a juvenile or not, hyper technical
approach should not be adopted while appreciating the
evidence adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the E
plea that he is a juvenile and if two views are possible on the
same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the
accused to be juvenile in borderline cases. In Amit Das case,
this Court has taken the view that the date of production before
the Juvenile Court was the date relevant in deciding whether the F
appellant was juvenile or not for the purpose of trial. The law
laid down in Amit Das to that extent was held to be not good
law, in Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand [(2005) 3 SCC 551),
wherein a five Judge Bench of this Court decided the scope of
sections 32 and 2(h), 3, 26, 18 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986
and took the view that it was the date of the commission of the G
offence and not the date when the offender was produced
before the competent court was relevant date for determining
the juvenility.

     15. In Pratap Singh case, this Court held that section 20        H
    554     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 10 S.C.R.

A of the Act would apply only in cases in which accused was
  below 18 years of age on 01.04.2001 i.e. the date of which the
  2000 Act came into force, but it would have no application in
  case the accused had attained the age of 18 years on date of
  coming into force of the 2000 Act. Possibly to get over the rigor
B of Pratap Singh, a number of amendments were introduced in
  2000 Act w.e.f 28.02.2006 by Act 33 of 2006, the scope of
  which came up for consideration in Harl Ram v. State of
  Rajasthan and Another((2009) 13 SCC 211]. In Hari Ram, this
  court took the view that the Constitution Bench judgment in
C Pratap Singh case was no longer relevant since it was
  rendered under the unamended Act. In Hari Ram while
  examining the scope of Section 7A of the Act, this Court held
  that the claim of juvenility can be raised before any court at any
  stage and such claim was required to be determined in terms
  of the provisions contained in the 2000 Act and the Rules
0 framed thereunder, even if the juvenile had ceased to be so on
  or before the date of commencement of the Act. It was held that
  a juvenile, who had not completed 18 years of age on the date
  of commission of the offence, was also entitled to the benefits
  of Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 as the provisions of section 2(k)
E had always been in existence even during the operation of the
  1986 Act.
       16. Further, it was also held that on a conjoint reading of
  sections 2(k), 2(1), 7A, 20 and 49 r/w Rules 12 and 98 places
F beyond all doubt that all persons who were below the age of
  18 years on the date of commission of the offence even prior
  to 1.4.2001 would be treated as juveniles even if the claim of
  juvenility was raised after they had attained the age of 18 years
  on or before the date of commencement of the Act and were
G undergoing sentence upon being convicted. With regard to the
  determination of age, this Court held that the determination of
  age has to be in the manner prescribed in Rule 12 of the 2007
  Rules and opined that the determination of age is an important
  responsibility cast upon the Juvenile Justice Boards.
H
   ASHWANI KUMAR SAXENA v. STATE OF M.P.                  555
          [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
     17. The scope of Section 7A of the Act and Rule 12 of A
the 2007 Rules again came up for consideration before this
Court in Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another
((2010) 5 sec 344]. That was a case where the appellant was
convicted for offences under section 302/34 and 307/34 IPC
for committing murder of one of his close relatives and for B
attempting to murder his brother. The appellant was not a
juvenile within the meaning of 1986 Act, when the offences were
committed but had not completed 18 years of age on that date.
      18. This court held from the language of the Explanation
to Section 20 that in all pending cases, which would include C
not only trial but even subsequent proceedings by way of
revision or appeal etc., the determination of juvenility of a
juvenile has to be in terms of clause {I) of Section 2, even if
the juvenile ceases to be a juvenile on or before 1st April 2001,
when the Act of 2000 came into force, and the provisions of D
the Act would have applied as if the said provision had been
in full force for all purposes and for all material times when the
alleged offence was committed. This Court held clause {I) of
Section 2 of the Act 2000 provides that "juvenile in conflict with
 law" means a "juvenile" who is alleged to have committed an E
offence and has not completed eighteenth year of age as on
the date of the commission of such offence. Section 20 also
enables the Court to consider and determine the juvenility of a
 person even after conviction by the regular court and also
empowers the Court, while maintaining the conviction to set F
aside the sentence imposed and forward the case to the J.J
 Board concerned for passing sentence in accordance with the
provisions of the 2000 Act.
   19. This Court in Mohan Mali and Another v. State of          G
Madhya Pradesh ((2010) 6 SCC 669] has again considered
the scope of Section 7A of the Act. That was a case where
plea of juvenility was raised before this court by the convict
undergoing sentence. The appellant therein was convicted
under sections 302/34, 326/34 and 324/34 IPC and was             H
    556      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 10 S.C.R.


A sentenced to life imprisonment and had already undergone 9
  years of imprisonment. In that case a copy of the birth certificate
  issued by the Chief Registrar (Birth and Death) Municipal
  Corporation, Dhar u/s 12 of the Birth and Death Registration
  Act 1969 maintained by the Corporation was produced. This
B Court noticed that as per that certificate the date of birth of the
  accused was -12.11.1976. After due verification, it was
  confirmed by the State of Madhya Pradesh that he was a
  juvenile on the date of commission of the offence and had
  already undergone more than the maximum sentence provided
c under Section 15 of the 2000 Act by applying Rule 98 of the
  2007 Rules read with Section 15 and 64 of the 2000 Act. The
  accused was ordered to be released forthwith.
        20. In Jabar Singh v. Dinesh and Another [(2010) 3 SCC
  757], a two Judge Bench of this Court while examining the
D scope of Section 7A of the Act and Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules
  and Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act took the view that
  the trial court had the authority to make an enquiry and take
   necessary evidence to determine the age. Holding that the High
  Court was not justified in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction
E to upset the finding of the trial court, remitted the matter to the
  trial court for trial of the accused in accordance with law treating
  him to be not a juvenile at the time of commission of the alleged
  offence. The court noticed that the trial court had passed the
  order rejecting the claim of juvenility of respondent No.1 therein
F on 14.02.2006, the Rules, including Rule 12 laying down the
  procedure to be followed in determination of the age of a
  juvenile in conflict with law, had not come into force. The court
  opined that the trial court was not required to follow the
  procedure laid down in Section 7A of the Act or Rule 12 of the
G Rules and therefore in the absence of any statutory provision
  laying down the procedure to be followed in determining a claim
  of juvenility raised before it, the Court had to decide the claim
  of juvenility on the materials or evidence brought on record by
  the parties and section 35 of the Evidence Act.
H
   ASHWANI KUMAR SAXENA v. STATE OF M.P.                      557
          [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
     21. The court further stated that the entry of date of birth     A
of respondent No.1 in the admission form, the school records
and transfer certificates did not satisfy the condition laid down
in Section 35 of the Evidence Act in as much as the entry was
not in any public or official register and was not made either
by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty or by any
                                                                          8
person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law
of the country and therefore, the entry was not relevant under
section 35 of the Evidence Act for the purpose of determining
the age of respondent no.1 at the time of commission of the
alleged offence. We have our own reservations on the view             C
expressed by the bench in Jabar Singh's case. (supra).
                                                                      •
     22. In Dayanand v. State of Haryana [(2011) 2 SCC 224).,
this Court considered the scope of sections 2(k), 2(1), 7-A 20
and 64 (as amended by Act 33 of 2006 w.e.f. 22.08.2006). This
Court dealt with a case where the appellant was aged 16 years         D
5 months and 19 days on the date of occurrence, the Court held
that he was a juvenile and thus could not be compelled to
undergo the rigorous imprisonment as imposed by the trial
court and affirmed by High Court. This Court set aside the
sentence and ordered that the appellant be produced before                E
the J.J. Board for passing appropriate sentence in accordance
with 2000 Act.

     23. In Anil Agarwal and Another v. State of West Bengal
[(2011) 2 SCALE 429), this Court was examining the claim of
juvenility made at a belated stage stating that the appellants            F
were minors at the time of the alleged offence and hence should
not be tried along with the adult co-accused. The trial court
dismissed the appellant's application as not maintainable as
it had been filed at a belated stage. The High Court, in revision,
while holding that the application had been made belatedly,           G
granted liberty to appellants to raise their plea of juvenility and
to establish the same before the Sessions Judge at the stage
of the examination under section 313 Cr.P.C.

     24. Reversing the finding recorded by the High Court, this           H



                                              •
    558       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 10 S.C.R.

A Court took the view that Section 7A of the Act, as it now reads,
  gives right to any accused to raise the question of juvenility at
  any point of time and if such an issue is raised, the Court is
  under an obligation to make an inquiry and deal with that claim.
  The court held Section 7A has to be read along with Rule 12
8 of the 2007 Rules. This Court, therefore, set aside the order of
  the High Court and directed the trial court to first examine the
  question of juvenility and in the event, the trial court comes to a
  finding that .the appellants were minors at the time of
  commission of the offence, they be produced before the J.J.
C Board for considering their cases in accordance with the
  provisions of the 2000 Act.
       25. We may in the light of the judgments referred to herein
  before and the principles laid down therein while examining the
  scope of Section 7 A of the Act, Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules and
D Section 49 of the Act examine the scope and ambit of inquiry
  expected of a court, the J.J. Board and the Committee while
  dealing with a claim of juvenility.
       26. We may, however, point out that none of the above
E mentioned judgments referred to earlier had examined the
  scope, meaning and content of Section 7A, Rule 12 of the 2007
  Rules and the nature of the inquiry contemplated in those
  provisions. For easy reference, let us extract Section 7A of the
  Act and Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules:
F          ·section 7A - Procedure to be followed when claim of
          juvenility is raised before any court.

          (1)Whenever a claim of juvenility is raised before any court
          or a court is of the opinion that an accused person was a
G         juvenile on the date of commission of the offence, the court
          shall make an inquiry, take such evidence as may be
          necessary(but not an affidavit) so as to determine the age
          of such person, and shall record a finding whether the
          person is a juvenile or a child or not, stating his age as
H         nearly as may be:
ASHWANI KUMAR SAXENA v. STATE OF M.P.                    559
       [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
Provided that a claim of juvenility may be raised before any     A
court and it shall be recognised at any stage, even after
final disposal of the case, and such claim shall be
determined in terms of the provisions contained in this Act
and the rules made thereunder, even if the juvenile has
ceased to be so on or before the date of commencement            B
of this Act.
(2) If the court finds a person to be a juvenile on the date
of commission of the offence under sub-section (1 ), it shall
forward the juvenile to the Board for passing appropriate        C
order, and the sentence if any, passed by a court shall be
deemed to have no effect."
Rule 12. Procedure to be followed in determination of
Age. -(1) In every case concerning a child or a juvenile in
conflict with law, the court or the Board or as the case may D
be the Committee referred to in rule 19 of these rules shall
determine the age of such juvenile or child or a juvenile in
conflict with law within a period of thirty days from the date
of making of the application for that purpose.
                                                               E
(2) The Court or the Board or as the case may be the
Committee shall decide the juvenility or otherwise of the
juvenile or the child or as the case may be the juvenile in
conflict with law, prima facie on the basis of physical
appearance or documents, if available, and send him to F
the observation home or in jail.
(3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict
with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted
by the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the
Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining -                     G
(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if
available; and in the absence whereof;
(ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than   H
a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof;
    560       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2012] 10 S.C.R.

A         (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a
          municipal authority or a panchayat;

          (b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause
          (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly
B         constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of
          the juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of the age
          cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as the case
          may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be recorded
          by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the
          child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side
c         within the margin of one year.

          and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking
          into consideration such evidence as may be available, or
          the medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding
D         in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified
          in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence
          whereof, clause (b} shall be the conclusive proof of the age
          as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with law.

          (4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the juvenile in conflict
E
          with law is found to be below 18 years on the date of
          offence, on the basis of any of the conclusive proof
          specified in sub-rule (3), the court or the Board or as the
          case may be the Committee shall in writing pass an order
          stating the age and declaring the status of juvenility or
F
          otherwise, for the purpose of the Act and these rules and
          a copy of the order shall be given to such juvenile or the
          person concerned.
          (5) Save and except where, further inquiry or otherwise is
G         required, inter alia, in terms of section 7A, section 64 of
          the Act and these rules, no further inquiry shall be
          conducted by the court or the Board after examining and
          obtaining the certificate or any other documentary proof
          referred to in sub-rule (3) of this rule.
H
   ASHWANI KUMAR SAXENA v. STATE OF M.P.                     561
          [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]

    (6) The provisions contained in this rule shall also apply      A
    to those disposed off cases, where the status of juvenility
    has not been determined in accordance with the
    provisions contained in subrule(3) and the Act, requiring
    dispensation of the sentence under the Act for passing
    appropriate order in the interest of the juvenile in conflict   B
    with law.

                                             (emphasis added)

      27. Section 7A, obliges the court only to make an inquiry,
not an investigation or a trial, an inquiry not under the Code of   C
Criminal Procedure, but under the J.J. Act. Criminal Courts, JJ
Board, Committees etc., we have noticed, proceed as if they
are conducting a trial, inquiry, enquiry or investigation as per
the Code. Statute requires the Court or the Board only to make
an 'inquiry' and in what manner that inquiry has to be conducted    D
is provided in JJ Rules. Few of the expressions used in Section
7 A and Rule 12 are of considerable importance and a
reference to them is necessary to understand the true scope
and content of those provisions. Section 7A has used the
expression "court shall make an inquiry", "take such evidence       E
as may be necessary" and "but not an affidavit". The Court or
the Board can accept as evidence something more than an
affidavit i.e. the Court or the Board can accept documents,
certificates etc. as evidence need not be oral evidence.

     28. Rule 12 which has to be read along with Section 7A         F
has also used certain expressions which are also be borne in
mind. Rule 12(2) uses the expression "prima facie" and "on the
basis of physical appearance" or "documents, if available". Rule
12(3) uses the expression "by seeking evidence by obtaining".
These expressions in our view re-emphasize the fact that what       G
is contemplated in Section 7A and Rule 12 is only an inquiry.
Further, the age determination inquiry has to be completed and
age be determined within thirty days from the date of making
the application; which is also an indication of the manner in
which the inquiry has to be conducted and completed. The            H
    562       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 10 S.C.R.

A word 'inquiry' has not been defined under the J.J. Act, but
  Section 2(y) of the J.J. Act says that all words and expressions
  used and not defined in the J.J. Act but defined in the Code of
  Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2of1974), shall have the meanings
  respectively assigned to them in that Code.
B
        29. Let us now examine the meaning of the words inquiry,
    enquiry, investigation and trial as we see in the Code of
    Criminal Procedure and their several meanings attributed to
    those expressions.
c          "Inquiry" as defined in Section 2(g), Cr.P.C. reads as
          follows:
          "Inquiry" means every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted
          under this Code by a Magistrate or Court.
D         The word "enquiry" is not defined under the Code of
          Criminal Procedure which is an act of asking for
          information and also consideration of some evidence,
          may be documentary.

E         "Investigation" as defined in section 2(h), Cr.P.C. reads as
          follows:

          "Investigation includes all the proceedings under this code
          for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer
          or by any person (other than a Magistrate) who is
F
          authorized by a Magistrate in this behalf.
          The expressions "trial" has not been defined in the Code
          of Criminal Procedure but must be understood in the light
          of the expressions "inquiry" or "investigation" as contained
G         in sections 2(g) and 2(h) of the Code of Criminal
          Procedure."
       30. The expression "trial" has been generally understood
  as the examination by court of issues of fact and law in a case
H for the purpose of rendering the judgment relating some
   ASHWANI KUMAR SAXENA v. STATE OF M.P.                       563
          [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
offences committed. We find in very many cases that the Court A
/the J.J. Board while determining the claim of juvenility forget
that what they are expected to do is not to conduct an inquiry
under Section 2(g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but an
inquiry under the J.J. Act, following the procedure laid under
Rule 12 and not following the procedure laid down under the B
Code.

     31. The Code lays down the procedure to be followed in
every investigation, inquiry or trial for every offence, whether
under the Indian Penal Code or under other Penal laws. The             C
Code makes provisions for not only investigation, inquiry into
or trial for offences but also inquiries into certain specific
matters. The procedure laid down for inquiring into the specific
matters under the Code naturally cannot be applied in inquiring
into other matters like the claim of juvenility under Section 7A
read with Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules. In other words, the law           D
regarding the procedure to be followed in such inquiry must be
found in the enactment conferring jurisdiction to hold inquiry.
     32. Consequently, the procedure to be followed under the
J.J. Act in conducting an inquiry is the procedure laid down in        E
that statute itself i.e. Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules. We cannot
import other procedures laid down in the Code of Criminal
Procedure or any other enactment while making an inquiry with
regard to the juvenility of a person, when the claim of juvenility
is raised before the court exercising powers under section 7A          F
of the Act. Many of the cases, we have come across, it is seen
that the Criminal Courts are still having the hangover of the
procedure of trial or inquiry under the Code as if they are trying
an offence under the Penal laws forgetting the fact that the
specific procedure has been laid down in section 7A read with          G
Rule 12.
     33. We also remind all Courts/J.J. Board and the
Committees functioning under the Act that a duty is cast on them
to seek evidence by obtaining the certificate etc. mentioned in
Rule 12 (3) (a) (i) to (iii). The courts in such situations act as a   H
    564      SUPREME COURT·REPORTS                (2012] 10 S.C.R.


A parens patriae because they have a kind of guardianship over
  minors who from their legal disability stand in need of
  protection.

        34. "Age determination inquiry" contemplated under
B section 7A of the Act r/w Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules enables
  the court to seek evidence and in that process, the court can
  obtain the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available.
  Only in the absence of any matriculation or equivalent
  certificates, the court need obtain the date of birth certificate
C from the school first attended other than a play school. Only in
  the absence of matriculation or equivalent certificate or the date
  of birth certificate from the school first attended, the court need
  obtain the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal
  authority or a panchayat (not an affidavit but certificates or
  documents). The question of obtaining medical opinion from a
D duly constituted Medical Board arises only if the above
  mentioned documents are unavailable. In case exact
  assessment of the age cannot be done, then the court, for
  reasons to be recorded, may, if considered necessary, give the
  benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his or her age on
E lower side within the margin of one year.

       35. Once the court, following the above mentioned
  procedures, passes an order; that order shall be the conclusive
  proof of the age as regards such child or juvenile in conflict with
F law. It has been made clear in subsection (5) or Rule 12 that
  no further inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board
  after examining and obtaining the certificate or any other
  documentary proof after referring to sub-rule (3) of the Rule 12.
  Further, Section 49 of the J.J. Act also draws a presumption
G of the age of the Juvenility on its determination.
       36. Age determination inquiry contemplated under the JJ
  Act and Rules has nothing to do with an enquiry under other
  legislations, like entry in service, retirement, promotion etc.
  There may be situations where the entry made in the
H matriculation or equivalent certificates, date of birth certificate
    ASHWANI KUMAR SAXENA v. STATE OF M.P.                       565
           [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
 from the school first attended and even the birth certificate given A
 by a Corporation or a Municipal Authority or a Panchayat may
 not be correct. But Court, J.J. Board or a Committee functioning
 under the J.J. Act is not expected to conduct such a roving
 enquiry and to go behind those certificates to examine the
 correctness of those documents, kept during the normal course B
 of business. Only in cases where those documents or
 certificates are found to be fabricated or manipulated, the
  Court, the J.J. Board or the Committee need to go for medical
  report for age determination.

      37. We have come across several cases in which trial C
 courts have examined a large number of witnesses on either
 side including the conduct of ossification test and calling for
 odontology report, even in cases, where matriculation or
 equivalent certificate, the date of birth certificate from the school
 last or first attended, the birth certificate given by a corporation D
 or a municipal authority or a panchayat are made available. We
 have also come across cases where even the courts in the
 large number of cases express doubts over certificates
 produced and carry on detailed probe which is totally
 unwarranted.                                                          E

       38. We notice that none of the above mentioned principles
  have been followed by the courts below in the instant case. The
  court examined the question of juvenility of the appellant as if it
  was conducting a criminal trial or inquiry under the Code. Notice     F
  was issued on the application filed by the juvenile and in
  response to that State as well as the widow of the victim filed
  objection to the application. The father of the appellant was
  cross examined as PW 1 and was permitted to produce
  several documents including the mark sheet of class five              G
  marked as exhibit P-1, mark sheet of class eight marked as
  exhibit P-2, mark sheet of Intermediate Education Board, MP,
  marked as exhibit P-3, horoscope prepared by Daya Ram
  Pandey marked as exhibit P-4. Further, the mother of the
' appellant was examined as PW 4, Transfer Certificate was
  produced on the side of the appellant which was marked as             H
    566       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 10 S.C.R.


A exhibit P-6. Noticing that the parents of the appellant were
  attempting to show a lesser age of the child so as to escape
  from the criminal case, the Court took steps to conduct
  ossification test. Dr. R.P. Gupta was examined as PW 2 who
  had submitted the report. Dr. S.K. Sharma was examined as
B PW 3. Placing considerable reliance on the report submitted
  after conducting ossification test, the application was dismissed
  by the trial court.
        39. We find that the appellate court, of course, thought it
  necessary to summon the original register of Jyoti English
C School where the appellant was first admitted and the same
  was produced by the Principal of the School. We have called
  for the original record from the Court and perused the same.
  On 4.09.2009, the Sessions Judge passed the following order:

D         04.02.09. Court found it necessary to call for the
          Admission Register of the appellant in Jyoti High
          Secondary School and ordered the production of the
          Register of Admission, from the concerned school in ST.
          No. 29/09.
E
                                                                Sd/-
                                                              Judge

          On 09.02.2009, another order was passed as follows:

F         From Jyoti High Secondary School, the Principal of the
          school was present along with the concerned admission
          register. He produced the copy of the admission register
          before the court after proving its factum. Register was
          returned after the perusal. The Counsel is directed that if
G
          he wants to produce any other evidence/documents, he
          may do so.
                                                 (emphasis added)
                                                              Sd/-
                                                            Judge
H
   ASHWANI KUMAR SAXENA v. STATE OF M.P.                     567
          [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]

    On 11.02.09, after hearing the counsel on either side, the       A
    Court passed the order:

    The counsel for the state Shri Nayak, APG stated/
    conceded that in respect to refute/rebuttal of the
    Admission Register the state do not wish to file further         8
    Evidence/documents.
                                             (emphasis added)
                                                          Sd/-
                                                        Judge
    On 12.02.2009, after hearing counsel on either side, the         C
    Court again passed the order:

    In presence of the advocates, order pronounced in the
    open court that this Appeal is hereby Dismissed.
                                                             Sd/-    D
                                                           Judge
     40. We fail to see, after having summoned the admission
register of the Higher Secondary School where the appellant
had first studied and after having perused the same produced
by the principal of school and having noticed the fact that the      E
appellant was born on 24.10.1990, what prompted the Court
not to accept that admission register produced by the principal
of the school. The date of birth of the appellant was discernible
from the school admission register. Entry made therein was not
controverted or countered by the counsel appearing for the           F
State or the private party, which is evident from the proceedings
recorded on 11.02.2009 and which indieates that they had
conceded that there was nothing to refute or rebut the factum
of date of birth entered in the School Admission Register. We
are of the view the above document produced by the principal         G
of the school condusively shows that the date of birth was
24.10.1990 hence section 12(3)(a)(i)(ii) has been fully satisfied.
    41. The Sessions Judge, however has made a fishing
inquiry to determine the basis on which date of birth was
entered in the school register, which pro'!1pted the father of the   H
    568     SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 10 S.C.R.


A appellant to produce a horoscope. The horoscope produced
  was rejected by the Court stating that the same was fabricated
  and that the Pandit who had prepared the horoscope was not
  examined. We fail to see what types of inquiries are being
  conducted by the trial courts and the appellate courts, when the
B question regarding the claim of juvenility is raised.
       42. Legislature and the Rule making authority in their
  wisdom have in categorical terms explained how to proceed
  with the age determination inquiry. Further, Rule 12 has also
  fixed a time limit of thirty days to determine the age of the
C juvenility from the date of making the application for the said
  purpose. Further, it is also evident from the Rule that if the
  assessment of age could not be done, the benefit would go to
  the child or juvenile considering his I her age on lower side
  within the margin of one year.
D
       43. The Court in Babloo Parsi v. State of Jharl<hand and
  Another [(2008) 13 sec 133) held, in a case where the
  accused had failed to produce evidence/certificate in support
  of his claim, medical evidence can be called for. The court held
E that the medical evidence as to the age of a person, though a
  useful guiding factor is not conclusive and has to be considered
  along with other cogent evidence. This court set aside the order
  of the High Court and remitted the matter to the Chief Judicial
  Magistrate heading the Board to re-determine the age of the
  accused.
F
       44. In Shah Nawaz v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another
  [(2011) 13 sec 751), the Court while examining the scope of
  Rule 12, has reiterated that medical opinion from the Medical
  Board should be sought only when matriculation certificate or
G equivalent certificate or the date of birth certificate from the
  school first attended or any birth certificate issued by a
  Corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat or
  municipal is not available. The court had held entry related to
  date of birth entered in the mark sheet is a valid evidence for
H determining the age of the accused person so also the school
   ASHWANI KUMAR SAXENA v. STATE OF M.P.                      569
          [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
leaving certificate for determining the age of the appellant.         A
      45. We are of the view that admission register in the
school in which the candidate first attended is a relevant piece
of evidence of the date of birth. The reasoning that the parents
could have entered a wrong date of birth in the admission
register hence not a correct date of birth is equal to thinking       B
that parents would do so in anticipation that child would commit
a crime in future and, in that situation, they could successfully
raise a claim of juvenility.
      46. We are, therefore, of the view that the appellant has
successfully established his juvenility on the date of occurrence     C
of the crime i.e. 19.10.2008 on which date he was aged only
17 years 11 months 25 days. The appellant has already faced
the criminal trial in sessions case No. 28 of 2009 and the Court
found him guilty along with two others under section 302 IPC
and has been awarded life imprisonment which is pending in            o
appeal, before the Hon'ble Court at Jabalpur as Crime Appeal
No. 1134 of 2009.
      47. We notice that the accused is also involved in few other
criminal cases as well. Since we have found that the appellant
was a juvenile on the date of the incident, in this case, we are      E
inclined to set aside the sentence awarded in sessions case
No. 28/2009 by Sessions Court and direct the High Court to
place the records before J.J. Board for awarding appropriate
sentence in accordance with the provisions of Act, 2000, and
if the appellant has already undergone the maximum sentence           F
of three years as prescribed in the Act, needless to say he has
to be let free, provided he is not in custody in any other criminal
case. We are informed that the appellant is involved in few other
criminal cases as well, those cases will proceed in accordance
with law.                                                             G
      48. The appeal is allowed. Sentence awarded by the court
below is accordingly set aside and the case records be placed
before the concerned J.J. Board for awarding appropriate
sentence.
K.K.T.                                           Appeal allowed.      H