Holding

Rule 25 of the Rajasthan Administrative Service (Emergency Recruitment) Rules 1976 is constitutionally valid and not discriminatory; the appeal is dismissed.

Summary

The appellant, a direct recruit to the Rajasthan Administrative Service under the 1954 Rules, challenged Rule 25 of the Rajasthan Administrative Service (Emergency Recruitment) Rules 1976, which gave emergency recruits a notional year of allotment for seniority, alleging discrimination under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the emergency recruits constitute a distinct class and that the rule’s classification is rational, having a permissible nexus with the objective of accommodating diverse recruits during an emergency. The Court emphasized that the burden of proving unequal treatment lies on the challenger and that no material was produced to show discrimination. It further noted that the rule had operated for over 25 years affecting a vanishing cadre, and striking it down would unsettle seniority. Consequently, the rule was upheld and the appeal dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether Rule 25 of the Rajasthan Administrative Service (Emergency Recruitment) Rules 1976 violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution by discriminating against direct recruits.
Whether the classification between direct recruits (1954 Rules) and emergency recruits (1976 Rules) is based on an intelligible differentia and has a rational nexus with the rule’s purpose.
Whether the challenger has discharged the burden of proving unequal treatment and material discrimination.
Whether a statutory provision can be struck down after long‑standing operation affecting a diminishing cadre.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 16, s. Article 309, s. Article 335, s. Article 46

Subjects

Equality before lawArticle 14Article 16SeniorityEmergency recruitmentClassificationDiscriminationConstitutional validityRule 25

Judgment

..
ASHUTOSH GUPTA A
v.
STATE OF RAlASTHAN AND ORS.
-~
'....-'
MARCH 20, 2002

[G.B. PATTANAIK, S.N. PHUKAN AND BRJJESH KUMAR, 11.J B

Service Law:

Constitution of India-Articles 14 and I 6-Rajasthan Administrative
Service Rules, I 954-Rajasthan Administrative Service (Emergency C
Recruitment) Rules, 1976-Rule 25-Recruitments made under both the Rules-
Seniority-Formula, for fu:ing notional year of allotment and premium
prescribed for period of practice or profession before reqruitment in 1976
Rules-Constitutionality of the Rule-Held, in absence of releva'1t materials
disclosing unequal treatment, Rule 2 5 is valid and constitutional-Formula D
prescribed is not discriminatory in nature.

Appellant was directly recruited by respondent-State in June 1975 under
the Rajasthan Administrative Service Rules, 1954. In November 1978, the
State made some recruitments under the Rajasthan Administrative Service
(Emergency Recruitment) Rules, 1976. In June 1980, a seniority list was E
published by the State placing the persons recruited under the 1976 Rules as
senior to the directly recruited officers made under the 1954 Rules. The direct
recruits filed Writ Petitions before High Court challenging the validity of Rule
25 of the I 976 Rules. Single Judge dismissed the Writ Petitions. Special appeals
fded by the direct recruits before the Division Bench of the High Court were F
also dismissed.

In appeal to the Court, the appellant challenging the validity of Rule
25 of the I 976 Rules co~tended that the persons recruited under the said Rules
and under the 1954 Rules form one class; that providing a special rule for
seniority for recruitment under the 1976 Rules by having a notional year of G
allotment is discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution; that even if they formed two different classes, there is no
intelligible differentia and nexus in providing a notional year of allotment ~or
recruitment under the 1976 Rules without any specific object sought to be
achieved; that the year of allotment based on emoluments is irrational and
649 H
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.
'
I-

A arbitrary; that the period- of practice or profession taken into account in fixing
seniority is irrelevant and illogical; and that the persons with less merit and
no administrative experience were recruited under the 1976 Rules and hence
they are inefficient and are of less standard, who cannot be granted any
•
premmm fior perio
. d. «-- . .·

B Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1. Persons who were recruited under the Rajasthan
Administrative Service (Emergency Recruitment) Rules, 1976 had undertaken
a written test on specified subjects as indicated in the Rules. After qualifying _>.-
C in the written test, they were also subjected to interview conducted by the
· State Public Service Commission in the same manner as those who had been
recruited under the Rajasthan Administrative Service Rules, 1954. There may
have been a variance on the subjects of which they had taken the test. But
that by itself would not be sufficient to hold that the candidates recruited under
the 1976 Rules are less efficient or their suitability had been adjudged at a
D lesser standard. [656-E-F)

1.2. It is a well settled principle that if a person complains of unequal
. treatment, the burden squarely lies on that person to place before the court
sufficient materials from which it can be inferred that there is unequal
E treatment. Where the necessary materials have not been placed, the plea of
provisions befog violative of Article 14 of the Constitution cannot be
. entertained. No material h_as been produced J:>y the appellant to indicate if
any of the persons recruited under the 1976 Rules has reaped any undue
advantage in respect of his past experience by adoption of the formula in the
Rules for the purpose of allotting year of allotment. In the absence of any
F materials, the Court is not required to examine the correctness of the
contention of the appellant on an assumption that the provisions of the Rules
might have enabled the professionals on being recruited to count their past
;experience for reckoning their seniority in the cadre of administrative service
even though the said experience might not have any co-relationship ~ith the
G administrative service. (656-G-H; 657-A-C)
1.3. Where a challenge is made to a statutory provision being ·
discriminatory, allegations in Writ Petition mui.t be specific, clear and·
unambiguous. There must be proper pleading and averments in the
substantive petition before the question of denial of equal protection or
H infringement of fundamental right can be decided. There is always a

(
'
ASHUTOSHGUPTA v. STATE 651

ptesumption in favour of the constitutionality of enactment and the burden A
is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression
of the constitutional principles. The presumption of constitutionally stems from
the wide powers of classification which the legislature must, of necessity possess
in making laws operating differently as regards different groups of persons
in order to give effect to policies. It is presumed that the legislature B
understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people and that its
laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience. The claim of equal
protection under Article 14 is examined with the presumption that the State
. Acts are reasonable and justified. If the challenge to Rule 25 of the 1976 Rules
is examined from the aforesaid stand point, the appellant has utterly failed
to establish any materials. [657-E-G] C
1.4. The concept of equality before law does not involve the idea of
absolute equality amongst all which may be a physical impossibility. Article
14 guarantees similarity of treatment and not identical treatment. The
protection of equal laws does not mean that all laws must be uniform. Equality
before the law means that among equals, the law should be equal and should D
be equally administered and that the likes should be treated alike. Equality
., before the Jaw does not mean that things which are different shall be treated
as though they were the same. A legislature, which has to deal with diverse
problems arising out of an infinite variety of human relations must, of
necessity, have the power to make special laws to attain particular objects E
and for that purpose, it must have large powers of selection or classification
of persons and things upon which such Jaws are to operate. Mere
differentiation or inequality of treatment does not 'per se' amount to
discrimination within the inhibition of the equal protection clause. The State

- has always the power to make classification on a basis of rational distinctions
relevant to the particular subject to be dealt with. [658-B-D] F

1.5. In order to strike down a law under Article 14, the inequality must
arise under the same piece of legislation or under the same set of laws which
have to be treated together as one enactment. Inequality resulting from two
different enactments made by two different authorities in relation to the same G
subject will not be liable to attack under Article 14. The Article does not
require that the legislative classification should be scientifically or logically
perfect. The 1976 Rules have been framed for a specific recruitment to the
Administrative Service. Rule 25 dealing with seniority has been specifically
designed to meet all situations under which people from different walks of
life could be recruited to the Service under the Emergency Recruitment Rules. H
652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] 2 S.C.R.

A The law making authority must be presumed to have examined pros and cons
in making such provision for seniority in the cadre. Hence the said Rule is ~
not discriminatory in nature. [658-G-H; 659-A-B]

1.6. Emergency recruits to the State Administrative Service-Corm a class
by themselves. They are neither direct recruits under the 1954 Rules not are
B they promotees. For the purpose of their seniority in the cadre in the 1976
Rules, the formula adopted cannot be held to be discriminatory in nature.
[659-C]

Anand Prakash Saksena v. Union of India and Ors., [1968) 2 SCR 611 ~
C and KP. Singhal v. State ofRajasthan and Anr., [1995] Supp. 3 SCC 549, relied
on.

1.7. The contention of the appellant that there is no nexus in the formula
for fixation of seniority under Rule 25 of the 1976 Rules with the object sought
to be achieved, tho~gh may not be thoroughly unsustainable, but in the
D absence of any materials establishing the perpetration of the discrimination,
the Rule cannot be struck down since the persons recruited under the Rules
have either superannuated or about to superannuate. Since it is a dying cadre
and the Rule has operated for more than 25 years, the Court is not inclined
to strike down the Rule. Though the Rules have not demonstratively shown
as to how the income has any nexus for the object sought to be achieved, yet
E it is inappropriate to strike down the Rules after it has operated for more
than a quarter century, in respect of a vanishing cadre, the seniority provision
should not be altered after this length of time as it would unsettle the entire
seniority in the cadre. [660-B, F ,E]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7777 of
F 1997.

From the Judgment and Order dated 16.5.97 of the Rajasthan High
Court in D.B.S.A. No. 312 of 1983.

Sushil Kumar Jain, A.P. Dhamija for the Appellant.
G
S.K. Bhattacharya, (NP), Ms. Sandhya Goswami and M.P.S. Tomar
for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

H PATTANAIK, J. The appellant is a direct recruit to· the Rajasthan
ASHUTOSH GUPTA v. STATE [PATI'ANAIK, J.] 653

Administrative Service, having been selected through the competitive A
examination held by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission. The
recruitment of the appellant had been made on 5.6.1975 under the Rajasthan
Administrative Service Rules 1954. The Government of Rajasthan finding
necessity for making emergency recruitment to the State Administrative Service
framed a set of Rules in the year 1956, called 'The Rajasthan Administrative B
Service (Emergency Recruitment) Rules 1956' and then another similar set
of Rules have been framed in the year 1959, called 'The Rajasthan
Administrative Service (Emergency Recruitment) Rules, 1959'. Emergency
recruitment had taken place under the aforesaid two Emergency Recruitment
Rules, once in the year 1956 and another in the year 1959. While the appellant
has joined the Rajasthan Administrative Service on being recruited under the C
provisions of Rajasthan Administrative Service Rules of 1954 on 5.6.1975,
and is continuing, a set of Rules were framed by the Governor in exercise of
power under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution on 29.9.1976,
called 'The Rajasthan Administrative Service (Emergency Recruitment) Rules,
1976.' The said Rules were amended on 15.12.1976 (hereinafter referred to
as 'The Emergency Recruitment Rules, 1976'). Persons on being selected D
under the provisions of the aforesaid Emergency Recruitment Rules of 1976
were appointed on 6.11.1978. The validity of the Rules relating to seniority
under the Emergency Recruitment Rules of 1956 as well as of 1959 were
challenged in a Writ Petition and the learned Single Judge of Rajasthan High
Court quashed the provision dealing with seniority in the aforesaid Emergency E
Recruitment Rules by judgment dated 4.4.1980. Special appeals being filed
by the State Government and the same were dismissed by the Division Bench
on 14.8.1980. A seniority list was published by the State Government on
2.6.1980 and in the aforesaid list persons recruited under the Recruitment
Rules of 1976 were shown as senior to the directly recruited officers to the
Rajasthan Administrative Service in the year 1974 and 1976. A batch of Writ F
Petitions were filed by the direct recruits challenging the validity of Rule 25
of the Emergency Recruitment Rules 1976. On 12.6.1981 Rule 23 of the
Emergency Recruitment Rules of 1956 and 1959 were amended and under
the amended provision the emergency recruits would rank junior to the special
recruits and senior to the direct recruits appointed during the same year. The G
batch of Writ Petitions including the Writ Petition filed by the appellant were
dismissed by the learned Single Judge by judgment dated 7.1.1983. Special
appeals were filed against the same to the Division Bench and the Division
Bench by the impugned judgment dated 16.5 .1997, having upheld the validity
of Rule 25 of the Emergency Recruitment Rules of 1976 and having affirmed
the judgment of the learned Single Judge the present appeal by grant of H
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.

A Special Leave has been filed. While upholding the validity of Rule 25 of the
Emergency Recruitment Rules 1976, the learned Single Judge as well as the
Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court strongly relied upon the judgment
of this Court in Anand Parkash Saksena v. Union of India and Ors., (1968)
2 Supreme Court Reports - 611 and K.P. Singhal v. State of Rajasthan and
B Anr., (1995) Suppl. 3 Supreme Court Cases 549. When this appeal has been
placed before a Bench of this Court on 4.12.2001, a Bench of this Court
examined the two decisions on which reliance has been placed and the fact
that in Singhal's case (supra) this Court examined Rule 25 of the Emergency
Recruitment Rules 1976 and held that the notional service could be taken
into account as a part of service. It was further observed. that it is no doubt
C true that the constitutional validity of Rule 25 (3)(1) and Rule 25(3)(2) of the
Emergency Recruitment Rules of 1976 was not the subject matter of challenge,.
but having regard to the conclusions arrived at, by the earlier Bench decision
of this Court of two learned judges it will be more appropriate that the appeal
should be heard by a Bench of three learned Judges and that is how the
matter has come before us.
D
Mr. Sushi! Kumar Jain, appearing for the appellant contended that the
persons recruited to the Rajasthan Administrative Service under the Emergency
Recruitment Rules of 1976 and persons appointed to the cadre under the
Recruitment Rules of 1954, all form only one class and, therefore, providing
E a special rule for seniority of those who were recruited under the Emergency
Recruitment Rules of 1976 by having a notional year of allotment is
discriminatory on the face of it and violates Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution oflndia and must be struck down. Alternatively, Mr. Jain argued
that even if they form two different classes for the classification between
them made under Rule 25, there has been no intelligible differentia and there
F is no nexus between providing a notional year of allotment for those who
were recruited under the Emergency Recruitment Rules of 1976 with any
specific object sought to be achieved and, therefore, Rule 25 of the Emergency
Recruitment ~\!Jes, more particularly, the formula for giving a year of allotment
must be struck down. According to Mr. Jain, Rule 25 of the Emergency
G Recruitment Rules, which provided .that the year of allotment should be 1976
minus N 1 plus half of N2 and both NI and N2 being dependent uJ'on the )

factor whether monthly emolument is Rs 625 or le~s than Rs. 625, there must
be some rationale with the aforesaid fixation of emolument. But the Rules
being totally silent and the Rule Making Authority having not indicated, the
entire basis is imaginary and arbitrary and, therefore, the same must be struck
H down. Mr. Jain also urged that in the matter of determining the seniority, the
ASHUTOSH GUPTA v. STA TE [PATTANAIK, J.] 655
period of practice or profession is given certain premium, depending upon A

- the emoluments therefrom whether Rs. 625 or less than that. It is un-imaginable
that such practice or profession has any relevance in the matter of
administrative· experience and consequently, the very basis is illogical and
has to be struck down. According to Mr. Jain, when legislation is attacked,
as being discriminatory, two conditions must be fulfilled to uphold the B
legislation namely (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible
differentia which distinguishes persons that are grouped together from other
left out of the group and (ii) that the differentia must have a rational relation
to the object sought to be achieved by the legislation in question. According
to Mr. Jain, the impugned provision contained in Rule 25 of the Emergency
Recruitment Rules, does not satisfy either of the conditions. Referring to the C
preamble of the Emergency Recruitment Rules, Mr. Jain submitted that as
more persons were immediately needed in Rajasthan Administrative Service,
a Special Recruitment Rules had been framed and people from different
walks of life were permitted to compete in the examination and get recruited.
The standard of examination that had been fixed and the methodology of
selection was undoubtedly different and, therefore, people with less merit D
could be taken in the service. Such people with inferior qualifications and
their suitability having been tested with inferior standard, could not have
/' been granted any premium for their past period during which period they did
not have any administrative experience and adjudged from this stand point,
the provisions of Rule 25 must be held to be grossly discriminatory and the E
High Court committed error in upholding the validity of the Rules.

At the outset, it may be stated that recruitment to Rajasthan
Administrative Service through a special emergency recruitment and to have
a statutory rule for such recruitment is not new to the State and in fact in
almost every State, there has been such recruitment once or twice. The very F
purpose for having such an emergency recruitment is the urgent need to man
the cadre of the administrative service and the insufficient number existing
at a point of time. But it cannot be said that the process of selection, even
for such emergency recruitment is either less competitive or the persons
recruited are inefficient. It may be borne in mind that even in the Indian G
Administrative Service also, there has been an emergency recruitment.

In the Constitution itself, even while providing in Article 46 that the
State shall promote the special care for the educational and economic interest
of the weaker section of the people and in particular of the Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes and Article 16(4) of the Constitution having further H
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.

A provided that the mandate of Article 16(1) (a) requiring equality of opportunity
-
for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any
office in the State does not prevent the State from making any provision for
the reservation of appointments to posts in favour of any backward class of
.....__
...
citizens which in the opinion of the State is not adequately represented in the
services of the State. Article 335 stipulates that the claims of the members of
B Scheduled Castes and Scheduled,.Tribes shall be taken into consideration ,
...
consistent with the maintenance of efficiency of administration, in the making
of appointment to services and posts in .connection with the affairs of the
Union or of State. It is, thus, apparent that even in the matter of reservation
in favour of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes the founding fathers of
c the Constitution did make a provision relating to the maintenance of efficiency
of administration. In this view of the matter, if any statutory provision provides
for a recruitment of a candidate without bearing in mind the maintenance of
efficiency of administration such a provision cannot be sustained being against
the constitutional mandate. But we are unable to accede to the contention of
Mr. Jain that those persons who got recruited to the Rajasthan Administrative
D Service under the Emergency Recruitment Rules are either in-efficient or
their suitability has been adjudged on an inferior standard. It may be reiterated
that those persons also had undertaken a written test on specified subjects as
· indicated in the Rules and after qualifying in the written test they were also "'-
subjected to interview conducted by the Public Service Commission, in the
E same manner, as those who had been recruited to Rajasthan Administrative
Service under the Recruitment Rules of 1954 though there may have been a
variance on the subjects of which they had taken the test. But that by itself
would not be sufficient to hold that the candidates recruited under the
Emergency Recruitment Rules are less efficient or their suitability had been
adjudged at a lesser standard. We would, therefore, reject the submissions
F made by Mr. Jain on the ground of discrimination, on the score.

Article 14 of the Constitution secures equal protection to government
servants and Article 16 is a particular application of general guarantee provided
!n Article 14. The doctrine of equality before law is a necessary corollary to
concept of rule of law accepted by the Constitution. It is well settled principle
G that if a person complains of unequal treatment, the burden squarely lies on
that person to place before the court sufficient materials from which it can ~

be inferred that there is unequal treatment. Where, however, the necessary
materials have not been placed to show how there has been an unequal
treatment, the plea of provisions being violative· of Article 14 cannot be
H entertained. We record this conclusion of ours, as in course of hearing of this
ASHUTOSH GUPTA v. STATE [PATTANAIK,J.] 657

-
- matter. Mr. Jain, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, had often repeated A
that the provision of the Emergency Recruitment Rules has permitted even a
beetle shop owner with the minimum income as indicated therein to appear
and compete at the test and on being selected, the period for which he had
been earning the aforesaid amount could be taken into account for the purpose
of seniority in the cadre even though there has been no nexus between that
period and the service to which he has been recruited. Apart from making
B
such submission on a hypothetical basis, no material has been produced to
indicate if anyone of the persons recruited under the Emergency Recruitment
... Rules has reaped any undue advantage in respect of his past experience by
adoption of the formula in the Emergency Recruitment Rules for the purpose
of allotting year of allotment as 1976 - (N l + N 2). In the absence of an iota c
of materials on this aspect, we are not required to examine the correctness of
the said submission of Mr. Jain, on an assumption that the provisions of the
recruitment rules might have enabled the professionals ori being recruited to
count their past experience for reckoning their seniority in the cadre of
administrative service even though the said experience might not have any
co-relationship with the administrative service. Even otherwise, the entire D

. experience of such recruits could not have been totally wiped off and therefore
the rule making authority while making the rules for recruitment on emergency
basis did make the provisions contained in Rule 25 which is also in para-
materia with similar provisions available elsewhere including the one which
was meant for emergency recruitment to the Indian Administrative Service. E
Where the challenge is made to a statutory provision being discriminatory,
allegations in writ petition must be specific, clear and unambiguous. There
must be proper pleadings and averments in the substantive petition before the
question of denial of equal protection of infringement of fundamental right
can be.decided. There is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality
of enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there F
has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles. The presumption
of constitutionality stems from the wide power of classification which the
legislature must, of necessity possess in making laws operating differently as
regards different groups of persons in order to give effect to policies. It must
be presumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the G
' need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest
by experience. The claim of equal protection under Article 14, therefore, is
examined with the aforesaid presumption that the State Acts are reasonable
and justified. If we examine the challenge to the impugned provision from
the aforesaid stand point, we have no hesitation \o hold that the appellants
have utterly failed to establish any materials from which grievances about the H
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) 2 S.C.R.

A discrimination alleged can be said to have been made.
The concept of equality before law does not involve the idea of absolute
equality amongst all which may be a physical impossibility. All that Article
14 guarantees is the similarity of treatment and not identical treatment. The
-
protection of equal Jaws does not mean that all Jaws must be uniform. Equality
B before the law means that among equals the Jaw should be equal and should
be equally administered and that the likes should be treated alike. Equality
before the law does not mean that things which are different shall be treated
as though they were the same. It is true that Article 14 enjoins that the people
similarly situated should be treated similarly 'but what amcrunt of dissimilarity
C would make the people disentitle to be treated equally is rather a vexed
question. A legislature, which has to deal with diverse problems arising out
of an infinite variety of human relations must of necessity, have the power
of making special faws, to attain particular objects; and for that purpose it
must have large powers of selection or classification of persons and things
upon which such laws are to operate. Mere differentiation or inequality of
D treatment does not 'per se' amount to discrimination within the inhibition pf
the equal protection clause. The State ha~ always the power to make
classification on a basis of rational distinctions relevant to the particular
subject to be dealt with. In order· to pass the test of permissible classification,
two conditions must be fulfilled, namely (i) that the classification must be
E founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things
that are grouped together from others who are left out of the group, and (ii)
that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be
achieved by the Act. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between
the basis of classification and the object of the Act. When a law is challenged
as violative of Article 14, it is necessary in the first place to ascertain the
F policy underlying the statute and the object intended to be achieved by it.
Having ascertained the policy and the object of the Act, the Court has to
apply a dual test in examining the validity, the test being, whether the
classification is rational and based upon an intelligible differentia which
distinguished persons or things that are grouped together from others that are
G left out of the group, and whether the basis of differentiation has any rational
nexus or relation with its avowed policy and objects. In order that a law may
be struck down under this Article, the inequality must arise under the same
piece of legislation or under the same set of laws which have to be treated
together as one enactment. Inequality resulting from two different enactments
made by two different authorities in relation to the same subject will not be
H liable to attack under Article 14. It is well settled that Article 14 does not
,
ASHUTOSH GUPTA v. STATE [PATT ANA!K, J.] 659
require that the legislative classification should be scientifically or logically A
perfect. If we examine the impugned provisions of the Emergency Recruitment
Rules from the aforesaid stand point the conclusion is irresistible that the
aforesaid set of Rules have been framed for a specific recruitment to the
Administrative Service. The provision of Section 25 dealing with the seniority
has been specifically designed to meet all situations under which people from B
different walks of life could be recruited to the Rajasthan Administrative
Service under the Emergency Recruitment Rules. The law making authority
must be presumed to have examined pros and cons in making the aforesaid
provision for seniority in the cadre which is in pari materia with similar
provisions for recruitment to the Indian Administrative Service and, therefore,
it is difficult for us to hold that the aforesaid provision is discriminatory in C
nature.

Emergency recruits to the Rajasthan Administrative Service form a
class by themselves, they being neither direct recruits under the Recruitment
Rules of 1954 nor are they promotees. For the purpose of their seniority in
the cadre, in the Emergency Recruitment Rules of 1976, a formula has been D
adopted. The said formula, in our opinion cannot be held to be discriminatory
in nature. In fact in Anand Prakash Saksena v. Union of India and Ors.,
[ 1968] 2 SCR 611, in somewhat similar circumstances, considering the validity
of Regulation 3(3) of the Special Recruits Seniority Regulations, this Court
held that since the Special recruits form a distinct class and the Regulation E
properly adopts the formula for fixing the seniority, the said Regulation
cannot be held to be arbitrary or violative of Article 14 and 16 of the
Constitution. The ratio in the aforesaid case should apply to the case in hand.
We may also take note of the fact that provisions of the Emergency
Recruitment Rules came up for consideration in the case of K.P. Singhal"v.
State of Rajasthan and Anr., [ 1995] Supp. 3 SCC 549. In that case F
interpretation of sub-rule (3) of Rule 32 of the Rajasthan Administrative
Service Rules, 1954, came up for consideration. The. Court held that for the
purpose of 20 years' service for being eligible to be appointed on the super
time scale under sub-rule (3) of Rule 32, the notional service to which
emergency recruits are entitled under Rule 25 of the 1976 Rul~s, should be G
• ' added. In other words, the formula indicated in Rule 25, conferring a notional
year of allotment to persons recruited under the Emergency Recruitment
Rules, was very much before the Court and the Court held that the side
notional service should be reckoned for computing the period of twenty years
of service. It is true, as contended by Mr. Jain, that the validity of Rule 25
of the Emergency Recruitment Rules was not before the Court in the aforesaid H
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.

A case, but having examined the provisions and having expressed the view that
the notional service to 'Which the emergency recruits are entitled under Rule
25, should be added, it ciµi be assumed that the Court has also upheld the
validity of Rule 25. The aforesaid observation of this Court in the three Judge
Bench decision in Singhal 's case, runs counter to the contention of Mr. Jain,
B for the appellant.
The contention of Mr. Jain that there is no nexus in the formula for
fixation of seniority under Rule 25 of 1976 Rules with the object sought to
be achieved though may not be thoroughly unsustainable, but in the absence
of any materials establishing how the alleged discrimination has perpetrated
we are not inclined to strike down the same, more particularly, when the
C persons for whose benefit the aforesaid Rules had been engrafted are adying
cadre, hardly few of them remaining in service, and that the Rule has operated
upon for last quarter century. It is true, that the formula under Rule 25
confers benefit under the principle of NI + N2 in relation to the conferment
of year of allotment of the emergency recruits and it has not been
D demonstratively :;hown as to how the income has any nexus for the object
sought to be achieved, but yet we think it inappropriate to strike down the
Rules after it has operated for more than a quarter century on that score. A
special formula fixing seniority of the emergency recruits other than that
provided in the normal Rules had been thought of so that the entire past
experience of such recruits is not totally wiped off. Having regard to the facts
E and circumstances of the present case, and bearing in mind that hardly a few
people of those emergency recruits are there in the cadre who are also on the
verge of superannuation, we are not inclined to strike down the aforesaid
Rule governing the seniority of the emergency recruits and thereby unsettle
the matter of seniority in the cadre.
F In course of hearing, we were also told that those who had joined the
Rajasthan Administrative Service under the provisions of Emergency
Recruitment Rules of 1976, have either superannuated or about to
superannuate. Thefr seniority in the cadre as determined under Rule 25 of the
Emergency Recruitment Rules has operated for all this period from 1976
G onwards. In respect of a vanishing cadre, the seniority provision which h$15
.operated for more than 25 years, the same should not be altered after this j

length of time, as it would unsettle the entire seniority in the cadre. In. the
aforesaid premises, we do not find any justification for our interference with
the impugned Judgment of the High Court. The Civil Appeal fails and is
dismissed.
H B.S. Appeal dismissed.