Holding

Premises of nationalised banks are public premises under the Public Premises Act, and the Act's provisions override those of the Delhi Rent Control Act for such premises, precluding reliance on rent‑control protection.

Summary

The Supreme Court considered appeals by Ashoka Marketing Ltd. and other tenants whose leases in premises owned by nationalised banks and the Life Insurance Corporation had expired and who were facing eviction under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 as well as proceedings under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The key questions were whether such premises qualify as "public premises" under the 1971 Act and whether the provisions of that Act override the Rent Control Act for premises covered by both statutes. The Court held that premises of nationalised banks are indeed public premises under Section 2(e)(2)(ii) of the Public Premises Act and that, to the extent the two statutes overlap, the later, special Public Premises Act prevails over the Rent Control Act, barring tenants from invoking rent‑control protection. Consequently, the appeals and the writ petitions were dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether premises belonging to nationalised banks fall within the definition of "public premises" under Section 2(e) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971.
Whether the Public Premises Act overrides the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 where both statutes apply to the same premises.
Whether a person whose tenancy has expired or been terminated can claim protection under the Rent Control Act after being deemed in unauthorised occupation under the Public Premises Act.

Legislation cited

Banks Nationalisation Acts. 3
Companies Act, 1956s. 3
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958s. 14, s. 22, s. 50, s. 54
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971s. 15, s. 2(e), s. 4(i), s. 7(3)
Transfer of Property Act, 1882s. 106

Subjects

public premisesunauthorised occupationevictionnationalised banksrent controlstatutory interpretationspecial vs general legislationnon obstante clauseDelhi Rent Control ActPublic Premises Act

Judgment

ASHOKA MARKETING LID. AND ANR. ETC: ETC.
v. A
PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK AND ORS. ETC. ETC.

AUGUST 7, 1990

[SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, CJ., B.C. RAY, M.H. KANIA, B
K.N. SAIKIA AND S.C. AGRAWAL, JJ.]

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: Sections 14, 22, 50 and 54-
~~Tenant of 'Public Premises'-Tenancy terminated or expires under
-1 Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971-
Whether entitled to invoke the statutory protection of Rent Control Act,
1958. c
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act,
197 I: Sections 2(e), 4(i) and 7(3)-'Public Premises'-Whether includes
premises belonging to Nationalised banks-Tenant in such premises-
Tenancy expires or is terminated-Whether can invoke pro:~ction of D
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.

The appellants /petitioners were tenants in the premises belonging
to the respondent Banks /Life Insurance Corporation of India. Their
tenancy had expired or had been terminated by the respondents and
eviction proceedings initiated against them under the provisions of the E
.,. ::j P.ublic Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. Writ
petitions under Article 226 were f"ded by the appeUants in the High
Court challenging the orders of eviction passed againSt them, which
were dismissed; hence these appeals. The writ petitioners moved this
Court directly under Article 32 of the Constitution against the notices of
termination of tenancy issued to them.

-
F
'·
The Public Premises Act of 1971 was preceded by two enactments
the Government Premises (Eviction) Act 1950, and the Public Premises
(eviction of unauthorised occupants) Act, 1958 which were declared
unconstitutional by different High Courts.
G
Jagu_ Singh v. M. Shaukat /iii, (58 Cat. W.N. 1066); Satish Chander
& Anr. v. Delhi Improvement Trust, AIR 1958 Punjab l; Brigade
Commander, Meerut Sub Area v. Ganga Prasad, AIR 1956 AU. 507;
P.L. Mehar etc. v. D.R. Khanna, etc., AIR 1971Deihl1 and Northern
~ India Caterers Private Ltd. v. State of Punjab & Anr., [1967] 3 SCR
399. H

649
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 3 S.C.R.

This led to the enactment of the Public Premises Act in 1971. The i._-
A validity of this act was upheld by this Court in Hari Singh v. The
Military Estate Officer, [1973] I SCR SIS.

Before this Court, the contentions were advanced by the parties
mainly on two questions (i) whether the provisions of the Public
B Premises Act were applicable to the Premises belonging to a nationa-
lised bank; and (ii) whether the provisions of the Public Premises Act
override the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act.

\In regard to the applicability of the Public Permises act, it was
inter alia contended that the premises belonging to a nationalised bank
or insurance company did not fall within the ambit of the deimition of
c 'Public Premises' contained in Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act
for the reason that the nationalised bank was not a company as defined
in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 19S6 and it was also not a· corpora-
tion established by or under a Central Act. On the other hand, it was
contended that the respondents being nationalised bank, was a corpora-
D lion established by a Central Act, viz., the Bank Nationalisation Act,
and the premises belonging to a nationalised bank were 'public pre-
mises' under section 2(e)(2)(1i) of the Public Premises Act.

In regard to the second question, each side claimed that the enact-
ment relied upon by it was a special statute and the other enactment was
E general, and also invoked the not obstante clause contained in the enact-
ment relied upon. In this connection, it was argued on behalf of the
respndents that the Public Premises Act having been enacted by Parlia-
ment in exercise of legislative power under Article 246( 1) of the
Constitution in respect of matters enumerated in the Union List would

F
ipso-facto override the provisions of the Rent Control Act enacted in
exercise of the legislative powers under Article 246(4) in respect of
matters enumerated in the concurrent list.
-
Dismissing the appeals and the writ petition, this Court,

HELD: (I) The provisions of the Public Premises Act, to the
G extent they cover premises falling within the ambit of the Rent Control
Act, override the provisions of the Rent Control Act, and a person in
unauthorised OCCUJlalion of public premises under Section 2(e) of the Act
cannot invoke the protection of the Rent Control Act. [6940-E)

(2) After the second world war there has been development of a
H new pattern of public corporation in England as an Instrument of plan-
ASHOKA MARKETING v. P.N.B. 651

ning in the mixed economy. The general characteristii:s of such a public A
-,....)-. corporation is that it is normally created by a special statute; it has no
shares and no share holders, either private or public, and its share
holder, in the symbolic sense, is the nation represented through
Government and Parliament; and it bas the legal status of a corporate
body wtb independent legal personality. There has been a simialr
B
growth of this type of public corporation in other countries. This trend
• and a n1lJDber of such
is also ev_ident in our country since lndej>endenc;e
public corporations have been constituted by Acts of Parliament. l668A-C]
-I
(3) The expression 'corporation' in Section 2(e)(2)(ii) of tbe
Public Premises Act would include public corporations of the new pat-
tern constituted under the Central Acts wherein _the entire paid-up c
capital vests in the Central Government. [670G l

----- S.S. Dhanoa v. Municipal Corporation, Delhi, [1981] 3 SCR864,
distinguished.
D
(4) In order to constitute a corporation it is not necessary that
there should be shareholders or members and that in the new pattern of
public corporation that bas developed there are no shareholders or
members. [67JGJ

:( Bank of New South Wales & Ors. v. The Common-wealth, [1948]
~
E
76 CLR 1 and R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, [1970] 3 SCR 530,
referred to.

Oriental Bank of Commerce v. Delhi Development Authority,
[1985] 55 Company Cases 81, overruled.
F
(5) Provisions of the Banks Nationalisation Act show that the
nationalised Bank has been constituted as a distinct juristic person by
the Act and it is owned by the Central Government. They further
indicate that the nationalised bank has all the attributes of the new
pattern of public corporation. l667B]
G
(6) The object of the legislation in enlarging the defmltion of
'public premises' in Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act is to make
available the machinery of the Act for evicting unauthorised occupants
not only from the premises belonging to the Central Government but
also from premises belonging to Coml'anies, Corporation and statutory
bodies in which the Central Government has a substantial interest. [670D-Ej H
652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1990] 3 S.C.R.

(7) Under Section 2(e)(2)(i) premises belonging to a company
A incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, in which not less than
fifty one percent of the paid-op capital is held by the Central Govern-
ment, are to be treated as public enterprises. It could not be the inten·
lion of Parliament that premises beloning to public corporations whose
entire paid-up capital vests in the Central Government and who are the
B instrumentalities of State would be excluded from the ambit of the
definition of 'public premises'. [670E-G]

(8) Keeping in view the provisions of the nanks Nationalisation
Act the nationalised bank is a corporation established by a Central Act
and it is owned and controlled by the Central Government. The
premises belonging to a nationalised bank are public premises under
c Section 2(e)(2)(ii) of the Public Premises Act. [67 IH; 672AI

(9) There is no warrant for confining the scope of the definition of
'public premises' contained in section 2(e) to premises used for residen-
tial purposes only and to exclude premises used for commercial
o purposesfromitsambit. [672D]

Hari Singh v. Military Estate Officer, [1973] l SCR 515, referred
to.

(10) No distinction can be made between premises used for resi-
E dential purposes and premises nsed for commercial purposes in the
matter of eviction of nnauthorised occupants of public premises and the
consideration which necessitate providing a speedy machinery for evic·
lion of persons in unauthorised occupation of public premises apply
equally to both the types of public premises. I6738-C]

F (11) The definition of the expression 'unauthorised occupation'
contained in Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act is in two parts. The
second part of the definition is inclusive in nature and expressly covers
continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after
the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer)
under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has
G been determined for any reason whatsoever. The words "whether by
way of grant or any other mode of transfer" in this part of the defmi-
tion are wide in amplitude and would cover a lease because lease is a
mode of transfer under the Transfer of Property Act. [673F; G-H; 6748]

Brigadier K.K. Venna v. Union of India, AIR 1954 8om 358,
H distinguished.
ASHOKA MARKETING v. 1'.N.B. 653

~___.i.- Lallu Yeshwant Singh v.. Rao Jagdish Singh.& ·Ors., [1968] ·2 SCR A
203, .and Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India &
Ors., [1985] Suppl ..3 SCR 302, referred to.

(12) It is tnie that there is no requirement in the Public Premises
Act that the Estate Officer must be a person well versed in law. But,
that, by itself, cannot be a ground for excluding from .the ambit ·of the IB
said Act premises in unauthorised occupation of persons who obtained
possession of the said premises under a lease when the Public Premises
Act and the Rules framed thereunder provide for a right of appeal of
the District Judge against an order of the Estate Officer. which shows
that the finnl order that is passed is by a judicial officer. (675F-H]

Magan/al Chhagganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Gre- c
ater Bombay & Ors., [1975] l SCR 1, referred to.

(13) As regards rent control legislations enacted by the State
legislatures, the position is well settled that such legislation .fall within
the ambit of entries 6, 7 and 13 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the D
Constitution. [682E]

Indu Bhushan Bose v. Rama !)undari Devi & Anr., (1970] 1 SCR
443; V. Dhanpal Chettiar's v. Yesodai Ammal, [1980] 1 SCR 334; Jai
Singh Jairam Tyagi Etc. v. Mamanchand Ratilal Agarwal & Ors.,
[1980] 3 SCR 224; Accountant and Secretarial Services Pvt. Ltd. &Anr. E
v. Union of India & Ors., [1988] 4SCC 324, referred to.

(14) The Rent Control Act has been enacted by Parliament in
relation to the Union Territory of Delhi in exercise of the legislative
power conferred under Article 246(4) of the Constitution which em-
powers Parliament to make laws with respect to any matter for any part F
of the territory of India not included in a State notwithstanding that
such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List. \682G J

( 15) The Public Premises Act deals with Government property as
well as property belonging to other legal eotities mentioned in clauses
(2) and (3) of Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act. In so far as it G
relates to eviction of unauthorised occupants from premises belonging
to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the Central
Government, the Public Premises Act would fall within entry 32 of List I
being law with respect to a property of the Union. The property belong-
ing to the various legal entities mentioned in clauses (2) and (3) of
Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act canoot be regarded as propertY of H
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1990] 3 S.C.R.

the Union and the Public Premises Act cannot be held to have been :..___-
A
enacted under entry 32 of List I in respect of the said properties. In so
far as it deals with a lessee or licensee of premises other than premises
belonging to the Central Govt; the Public Premises Act has been enac-
led in exercising the legislative power in respect of matters enumerated
in the concurrent list. [682H; 683A-C]
B
(16) Both the statutes, viz. the Public Premises Act and the Rent
Control Act, have been enacted by the same legislature, Parliament, in
exercise of the legislative powers in respect of the matters enumerated
.,
in the Concurrent List. [684C I

Accountant and Secretarial Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India
c And Ors., (1988] 4 SCC 324; Smt. Saiyada Mossarrat v. Hindustan
Steel Ltd., (1989] I SCC 272 and L.S. Nair v. Hindustan Steel Ltd., ~·

AIR 1980 MP. 106, referred to.

(17) The Rent Control Act makes a departure from the general
D law regulating the relationship of landlord and tenant contained in the
Transfer of Property Act inasmuch as it makes provision for determina-
lion of standard rent, it specifies the grounds on which a landlord can
seek the eviction of a tenant, it prescribes the forum for adjudication of
disputes between landlords and ten1111ts and the procedure which has to
)'
be followed in such proceedings. The Rent Control Act can, therefore,
E be said to be a special statute regulating the relationship of landlord and
tenarit in the Union Territory of Delhi. [686D-F]

(18) The Public Premises Act is also a special statute relating to
eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises. [689EJ
-
'-.
F Jain Ink Manufacturing Company v. Life Insurance Corporation ,, ~
of India &Anr., [1981] I SCR 498, referred to.

(19) Both the enactments, namely, the Rent Control Act and the
Public Premises Act, are special statutes in relation.to the matters dealt
with therein. Therefore, the exception contained in the principle that a
G subsequent general law cannot derogate from an earlier special law
cannot )le invoked and in accordance with the principle that the later
laws abrogate earlier contrary laws, the Public Premises Act must pre-
vail over the Rent Control Act. [686H; 687 A] r
J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. The State of
H Uttar Pradesh, [1961] 3 SCR 185; U.P. State Electricity Board v. Hari
ASHOKA MARKETING v. P.N.B. 655

Shankar Jain, [1979] 1SCR3.55 and Life Insurance Corporation v. D.J.
A
-._,,i._Bahadur, [1981] 1SCR1083, referred to.

(20) In the tase of inconsistency between the provisions of two
enactments, both of which can be regarded as Special in nature, the
conflict has to be resolved by reference to the purpose and policy under-
lying the two enactments and the clear intendment conveyed by the B
language of the relevant provisions therein. [688G]

-t- Shri Ram Narain v. The Simla Banking and Industrial Co. Ltd.,
[1956] SCR 603; Kumaon Motor Owners' Union Ltd. v. The State of
Uttar Pradesh, [1966] 2 SCR 121 and Sarwan Singh v. Kasturi Lal,
[ 1977] 2 SCR 421, referred to.
c
(21) Keeping in view the object and purpose underlying both the
~ enactments viz., the Rent Control Act and the Public Premises Act, the
provisions of the Public Premises have to he construed as overriding the
provisfons contained in the Rent Control Act. [690H]
D
122) The Parliament was aware of the non obstante clauses con-
tained in Section 14 and 22 and the provisions contained in Sections 50
and 54 of the Rent Control Act when it en11cted the Public Premises Act
containing a specific provision in Section 15 barring jurisdiction of all
Jt courts (which would include the Rent Controller under the Rent Con-
trol Act). This indicates that Parliament intended that the provisions of E
the Public Premises Act would prevail over the provisions of the Rent
Control Act inspite of the above mentioned provisions contained in the
~ Rent Control Act. [691A-BI

(23) The scope of the provisions of the Public Premises Act cannot
be cut down on the basis of an apprehension that the corporations may F
he induced to earn profits by purchasing property in possession of
tenants at a low price and after buying such property evict the tenants
after terminating their tenancy and thereafter sell the said property at a
much higher value. Every activity of a public authority especially in the
background of the assumption on which such authority enjoys immu-
nity from the rigours of the Rent Act, must be informed by reason and G
guided by the public interest. [693F; E-GJ

~ Mis Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v. Board of Trustees of the
Port of Bombay, [1989] 3 SCC 293, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2368
H
of 1986 Etc.
656 SUPREME COURT rulPORTS [1990] 3 S.C.R.

From the Judgment and Order dated 30.5.1986 of the Delhi High
A Court in CW No. U95 of 1986.

K.K. Venugopal, A.K. Ganguli, Yogeshwar Prasad, P.R. Seeth-
araman, S.K. Gupta and A.K.Srivastava for the Appellants.

P Soli .I. Sorabjee, Attorney Ge~eral. Kapil Sibbal. Addition2J
Solicitor General. G.L. Sangbi, S. Ganesh, Mrs. Susbma Suri. EMS
Anam, Atul Nanwa. Aman Vad1her. S.K._Mehta, Kailash Vasdev and
S.R. Srivastava for the Respondents. -,.-

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c S.C. AGRAWAL, J. The common question which arises fo1 con-
sideration in these appeals, by special leave, and the writ petition filed
under Article 32 of the Constitution is, whether a person who was
inducted as a tenant in premises, which are public premises for the
purpose of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants)
D Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Public Premises Act'), and
whose tenancy has expired or has beeen terminated, can be evicted
from the said premises as being a person in unauthorised-occupation of
the premises under the provisions of the Public Premises Act and
whether such a person can invoke the protection of the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rent Control Act').
~-.
E In short, the question is, whether the provisions of the Public Premises
Act would override the provisions of the Rent Control Act in relation
to premises which fall within the ambit of both the enactments.

Civil Appeals Nos. 2368 and 2369 of 1986 relate to the premises
which are part of a building situated at 5 Parliament Street, New
F Delhi. The said building originally belonged to Pun jab National Bank
Ltd., a banking company. Ashoka Marketing Ltd. (Appellate No. 1 in
Civil Appeal No. 2368 of 1986) and Mis Sahu Jain Services Ltd.
(Appellant No. 1 in Civil Appeal No. 2369 of 1986) were tenants of
premises located in the said building since July 1st, 1958. As a result of
the enactment of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of
G Undertakings) Act, 1970 (herei11after referred to as the 'Banks
Nationalisation Act'), the undertaking of the Punjab National Bank
Ltd., was transferred and vested in Punjab National Bank a body
corporate constituted under the provisions of the said Act and the
aforesaid appellants became the tenants of Punjab National Bank. By
notices dated May 18, 1971 issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of
H Property Act, the tenancies of both the appellants were terminated by
ASHOKA MARKETING v. P.N.B. [AGRAWAL, J.[ 657

Punjab National Bank, with effect from, November, 39, 1971. There-
A
after, the said Bank initiated proceedings under the Rent Control Act
against both the appellants. in those proeeedings an objection was
raised by the said appellants that proceedings for eviction under the
Rent Control Act were not maintainable in view of the provisions
contained in the Public Premises Act. During the pendency of the said
proceedings under the Rent Control Act, proceedings were initiated B
by the Estate Officer against the appellants under the provisions of
the Public Premises Act and while the said proceedings under Public
..,-·· Premises Act were pending the earlier proceedings initiated under the
Rent Control Act were dismissed by the Additional Rent Controller,
Delhi, by orders dated August 6, 1979. In-the proceecfings, under the
Public Premises Act, the Estate Officer passed orders for eviction
again.st the appellants and the appeals filed by the appellants against
c
the said orders of the Estate Officer were dismissed by the Additional
District Judge, Delhi. The appellants filed writ petitions under Article
226 of the Constitution, in the Delhi High Court. The said writ peti-
tions were dismissed by the High Court by orders dated May 30, 1986.
Aggrieved by the said orders of the High Court, the appellants have D
filed these appeals after obtaining special leave to appeal.

Civil Appeal No. 3725 of 1986 relates to an office room in the
Allahabad Bank Building situated at 17, Parliament Street, New
Delhi. The said building belongs to Allahabad Bank, a body corporate
constituted under the provisions of the Banks Nationalisation Act. E
The said premises were let out to Pt. K.B. Parsai, the apl'ellant in this
appeal, for a period of three years with effect from, February 1, 1982.
After the expiry of the said period eviction proceedings under the

--
·~
\
>
provisions of the Public Premises Act were initiated to evict the appel-
lant and in those proceedings the Estate Officer passed an order dated
March 29, 1986. The appellant filed a writ petition under Article 226of
the Constitution, wherein he challenged the validity of the order
passed by the Estate Officer. The said writ petition was dismissed
by the Delhi High Court by order dated August 7, 1986. The appellant
F

has filed this appeal against the said decision of the Delhi High Court
after obtaining Special Leave to Appeal.
G
Writ Petition No. 864 of 1985, relates to premises in the building,
located at 10, Darya Ganj, New Delhi. The said building originally
belonged to Bharat Insurance Company Limited, as Insurance Com-
pany which was carrying on life insurance business. M/s Bennett Cole-
man & Co. Ltd., (petitioner No. 1 in the writ petition) was in occu-
pation of a part of the said property as a tenant under Mis Bharat H
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 3 S.C.R.

Insurance Co. Ltd. since 1948. The life insurance business was
A nationalised under the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 whereby
the Life Insurance Corporation was established and the life insurance
business carried on by the various insurance companies, including M/s
Bharat Insurance Company Ltd., was nationalised and vested in the
Life Insurance Corporation. As a result petitioner No. 1 became a
B tenant of the Life Insurance Corporation. The Life Insurance Corpo-
ration gave a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act
terminating a tenancy of petitioner No. 1 with effect from, August 31,
1953 and thereafter proceedings for eviction were initiated against
petitioner No. 1 under the provisions of the Public Premises Act and
notices dated December 15, 1984 were issued by the Estate Officer
under Section 4( 1) and Section 7(3) of the Public Premises Act. Feel-
c ing aggrieved by these notices the petitioners have filed the writ
petition.

Before we proceed to deal with the submissions of the learned
counsel for the appellants in the appeals and for the petitioners in the
D writ petition (hereinafter referred to as 'the petitioners') it would be
relevant to advert to the legislative history of Public Premises Act.

The Public Premises Act was preceded by two such enactments.
The first enactments was the Government Premises (Eviction) Act,
1950 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1950 Act') which was enacted by
E Parliament to provide for the eviction of certain persons from Govern-
ment premises and for certain matters connected therewith. It was
confined, in its application, to premises (a building or a part of a
building) belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by the Cent-
ral Government and it empowered the competent authority to evict a
-
person in unauthorised occupation of such premises after issuing a
F notice to such person. The 1950 Act did not define the expression
"unauthorised occupation" and it also did not prescribe the procedure
to be followed by the competent authority before passing the order of
eviction. There was a provision for appeal to the Central Government
against the order of the competent authority. The 1950 Act was
declared as unconstitutional by the Calcutta High Court (in Jagu Singh
G v. M. Shaukat Ali, 58 Cal. WN 1066) and by the Punjab High Court (in
Satish Chander & Anr. v. Delhi Improvement Trust, Etc., AIR 1958
Punjab 1) on the ground that it imposed unreasonable restriction on
the right of the citizens to acquire, hold and dispose of property
guaranteed under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution, and by the
Allahabad High Court (in Brigade Commander, Meerut Sub Area v.
H Ganga Prasad, AIR 1956 All. 507) on the ground that it was violative
ASHOKA MARKETING v. P.N.B. [AGRAWAL, J.] 659

-.__.,I. of the rights to equality guaranteed under Article 14 of the A
Constitution.

Thereupon Parliament enacted the Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the
1958 Act'). In the 1958 Act, the definition of Public Premises was
enlarged to include, in relation to the Union Territory of Delhi, pre- B
mises belonging to Municipal Corporation of Delhi, or any municipal
~-· · committee or notified area committee am! premises .belonging to Delhi
Development Authority. In the 1958 Act, the expression "unauthori-
sed occupation" was defined. It also laid down the procedure to be
followed by the Estate Officer for evicting a person in unauthorised
occupation of public premises and it made provision for filing an
appeal against every order of the Estate Officer before the District c
Judge or such other Judicial Officer in that district of not less than ten
years standing as the District Judge may designate in that behalf. In
Northern India Caterers Private Limitedv. The State of Punjab &Anr.,
[ 1967] 3 SCR 399 Section 5 of the Punjab Public Premises and Land
(Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1959 was held to be yoid by this D
Court on the ground that the said provision conferred an additional
remedy over and above the remedy by way of suit and that by provid-
ing two alternative remedies to the Government and in leaving it to the
unguided discretion of the Collector to resort to one or the other a11d
to pick and choose some of those in occupation of public properties
and premises for the application of the more drastic procedure under E
Section 5, the said provision was violative of Article 14 of the Constitu-
tion. The provisions contained in the Punjab Act were similar to those
contained in the 1958 Act. Keeping in view the decision of this Court
in Northern India Caterers Private Limited's case (supra); Parliament
eancted Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants)
Amendment Act, 1968 whereby the 1958 Act was amended and Sec- F
tion lOE was introduced and a bar was created to the jurisdiction of
civil court to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of eviction of
any person in unauthorised occupation of any public premises or the
recovery of the arrears of the rent or damages payable under the
provisions of the 1958 Act. The Delhi High Court (in P.L. Mehra etc.
v. D.R. Khanna, etc., AIR 1971Delhi1) held that whole of the 1958 G
Act was void under Article 15(2) being violative of the provisions of
Article 14 of the Constitution and the amendment of 1968 was
ineffective.

This led to the enactment of the Public Premises Act by Parlia-
ment in 1971. It was brought into effect from 16th September, 1958, H
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1990] 3 S.C.R.

the date on which the 1958 Act came into force. The provisions of the
A Public Premises Act are similar to those contained in the 1958 Act.
The definition of 'public premises' contained in Section 2(e) of the
Public Premises Act has been widened so as to include premises
belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of a company, as
defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956, in which not less than
B fifty one per cent of the paid-up capital is held by the Central Govern-
ment as well as premises belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf
of any corporation (not being a company, as defined in Section 3 of the
Companies Act in 1956, or a local authority) established by or under a
Central Act and owned and controlled by the Central Government. It
contains certain additional provisions, providing for offences and
penalities (Section 11), liability of heirs and representatives (Section
c 13) recovery of rent etc. as an arrear of land revenue (Section 14) and
bar of jurisdiction of Courtc (Section lS). The validity of the Public
Premises Act was upheld by this Court in Hari Singh & Ors. v. The
Military Estate Officer &Anr., [1973] l SCR SlS.

D The Public Premises Act was amended in 1980 by the Public
Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Amendment Act,
1980, whereby the definition of 'public premises' in Section 2(e) was
amended to include premises belonging to or taken on lease by or on
behalf of certain autonomous and statutory organisations, viz., any
University established or incorporated by any Central Act, any Insti-
E tute incorporated by the Institutes of Technology Act, 1961, any
Board of Trustees constituted under the major Port Trusts Act, 1963,
and the Bhakra Management Board and as well as premises belonging
to or taken on lease by any Company which is subsidiary of a Company
as defined in Section 3 of the Comnames Act, 19S6 in which not less
than fifty one· per cent of the pa1a-up capital is held by the Central
F Government. By the said Amending Act of 1980, the total period
taken in eviction proceedings was also sought to be curtailed by reduc-
ing the period for showing cause against notice of eviction, the period
within which an unauthorised occupant should vacate the premises
after eviction order has been passed and the period for filing an appeal
against the order of an Estate Officer. By the said Amending Act of
G 1980 provisions were also made, by inserting Sections 5A, SB and SC,
to deal with the squatting or spreading of goods on or against or in
front of any public premises and removal of unauthorised construc-
tions or encroachments on public premises. The Public Premises Act
was further amended in 1984 by the Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorised Occupants) Amendment Act, 1984 whereby ceitai:>
H further amendments were made to provide for increased penalties ana ~
ASHOKA MARKETING v, .P.N.B. (AGnAV'-.\L, J.] f!61

making the offences under the Act cognisabte and to enable th.e Es tat~
}\
~__,.(.Officers to exercise their powers under the. Act effectively.

As stated in the preamble, the Public Premises Adi has been
enacted to provide for the eviction of unauthorised occupants from
public premises and, for certain incidental matters. In Section 2, various
expressions have been defined. The definitions of the following expre- B
ssions which are of relevance are reproduced as under:

"(c) "Premises" means any land or any building or part of
a building and includes-

(i) the garden, grounds and out houses, if any, appertaining
to such building or part of a building, and c
(ii) any fitting affixed-to such building or part of a building
for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof;"

"(e) "Public Premises" means- D

(1) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisi-
tioned by, or on behalf of, the Central Government, and
includes any such premises which have been placed by that
Government, whether before or after the commencement
'
of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occu- E
pants) Amendment act, 1980 under the· control of Secre-
tariat of either House of Parliament for providing residen-

-
tial accommodation to any member of the staff of that
Secretariat;

\ (2) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease by, or on F'
>-- behalfof,-

(i) any company as defined in $ection 3 of the Companies
Act, 1956 ( 1 of 1956) in which not less than fifty one per
cent of the paid-up share capital is held by the Central
Government or any Company which is a subsidiary. (within G
the meaning of the Act) of the first mentioned company,

(ii) any corporation (not being a company as defined in
Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 ( 1 of 1956), or a local
authority) established by or under a Central Act and owned
or controlled by the Central Government, H
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 3 S.C.R.

(iii) any University established or incorporated by any
A Centrnl Act, :......._ ~

(iv) any Institute incorporated by the Institutes of Techno-
logy Act, 1961 (59 of 1961);

B (v) any Board of Trustees constituted under the Major
Port Trusts Act, 1963 (38 of 1963);

(vi) the Bhakra Management Board constituted under Sec-
tion 79 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 (31of1966)
and that Board as and when renamed as the Bhakra-Beas
Management Board under Sub-section (6) of Section 80 of
c the Act; and

(3) m relation to the Union Territory of Delhi-

(i) any premises belonging to the Municipal Corporation
D of Delhi, or any municipal committee or notified area com-
mittee. and

(ii) any premises belonging to the Delhi Development
Authority, whether such premises are in the possession of,
or leased out by the said Authority." ¥
E
"(g) "Unauthorised Occupation", in relation to any public
premises, means tne occupation by any person of the public
premises without authority for such occupation, and inclu-
des the continuance by any person of the public premises
after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other
F mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy
the premises has expired or has been expired for any reason
whatsoever."

Section 3 makes provision for appointment by Central Government of
gazetted officer of Government or officers of equal rank of the sta-
G wtory authority as Estate Officers. Section 4 relates to issue of show
cause against order of eviction and provides as under:

"(1) If the Estate Officer is of opinion that any persons are
in unauthorised occupation of any public premises and that
they should be evicted, the Estate Officer shall issue in the
H manner hereinafter provided a notice in writing calling
ASHOKA MARKETING v. P.N.B. [AGRAWAL, l.] 663

- _,.{.__ upon all persons concerned to show cause why an order of
A
eviction should not be made.

(2) The notice shall-

(a) specify the grounds on which the order of eviction is
proposed to be made; and B

.._.,- (b) require all persons concerned, that is to say, all persons
who are, or may be, in occupation of, or claim interest in,
the public premises,-

(i) to show cause, if any, against the proposed order on or
before such date as is specified in the notice, being a date c
not earlier than seven days from the date of issue thereof;
and

(ii) to appear before the Estate Officer on the date
specified in the notice alongwith the evidence which they D
intend to produce in support of the cause shown, and also
for personal hearing, if such hearing is desired.

(3) The Estate Officer shall cause the notice to be served
by having it affixed on the outer door or some other cons-
picuous part of the public premises and in such other E'
manner as may be prescribed, whereupon the notice shall
be deemed to have been duly given to all persons concerned.

- a
~··
( 4) Where the Estate Officer knows or has reasons to
believe that any persons are in occupation of the public
premises, then, without prejudice to the provisions of sub-
section (3), he shall cause a copy of the notice to be served
F

on every such person by post or by delivering or tendering
it to that person or in such other maner as may be
prescribed."

Section 5 relates to eviction of unauthorised occupants and provides as G
under:
,._"' "(1) If, after considering the cause, if any, shown by any
person in pursuance of a notice under Section 4 and any
evidence produced by him in support of the same and after
personal hearing, if any, given under clause (b) of sub- H
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1990] 3 S.C.R.

section (2) of Section 4, the estate officer is satisfied that
A occupation of public premises is unauthorised, the estate . "'- -
officer may make an order of eviction, for reasons to be
recorded therein, directing that the public premises shall be
vacated on such date as may be specified in the order, by all
persons who may be in occupation thereof or any part
B thereof, and cause a copy of the order to be affixed on the
outer door or some other conspicuous part of the public
premises.

(2) If any person refuses or fails to comply with the order
of eviction on or before the date specified in the said order
or within fifteen days of the date of its publication under
c sub-section (lJ whichever is later, the estate officer of any
other officer duly authorised by the estate officer in this
behalf may after the date so specified or after the expiry of
the period aforesaid, whichever is later, evict that person
from, and take possession of the public premises and may,
D for that purpose, use such force as may be necessary."

Section 5A provides for removal of unauthorised constructions/struc-
tures or fixtures, cattle or other animal from public premises. Section
5B deals with demolition of unauthorised constructions. Section SC
empowers the Estate Officer to seal unauthorised constructions. Sec-
E tion 6 provides for disposal of property left on public premises by
unauthorised occupants. Section 7 empowers the Estate Officer to
require payment of rent or damages on account of use and occupation of

-
public premises alongwith interest by the person found in unauthori-
sed occupation. Section 8 lays down that an Estate Officer shall, for
the purpose of holding any inquiry under the Act, have the same
F powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908, when trying to suit in respect of certain matters, viz. summoning
and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining H.im on
·'"'·
oath, requiring discovery and production of documents; and any other
matter which may be prescribed. Section 9 provides for an appeal from
every order of the Estate Officer in respect of any public premises
G passed under Sections 5, 5B, SC and 7 to an appellate officer who shall
be a district judge of the district in which the public premises are
situated or such other judicial officer in the district of not less than ten
years' standing as the district judge may designate in this behalf. It also
prescribes the period of limitation for filing such appeals and also lays
down that the appeal shall be disposed of by the appellate officer as
H expeditiously as possible. Sections 10 attaches finality to the orders
ASHOKA MARKETING v. P.N.B. !AGRAWAL, J.I 665

~ _;k. made by an Estate Officer or appellate officer and provides that the
- ~aid orders shall not be called in qustions in any original snit applica-
A
tion or execution proceeding and no injunction shall be granted by any
court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in
pursuance of any power conferred by or under the Act. Section J 1
provides for offences and penalties and Section 1lA lays cl.own tnat
the offences under Section 11 would be treated as cognizable offences B
under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Section 15 relates to bar
-f-· of jurisdiction and it provides as under:

"No court shall have jurisdiction to enterain any suit or
proceeding in respect of-

(a) the eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occu- c
pation of any such public premises, or

(b) the removal of any building, structure of fixture or
goods, cattle or other animal from any puhlic premises
under Section 5-A, or D

(C) the demolition of any building or other structure
made, or ordered to be made, under Section 5B, or

(cc) the sealing of any erection or work or of any public
premises under Section 5-C, E

(d) the arrears of rent payable under sub-section (1) of
Section 7 or damages payable under sub-section (2), or
interest payable under sub-section (2-A) of that section,

(e) the recovery of- F

(i) costs of removal of any building, structure or fixture or
goods, cattle or other animal under Section 5-A, or

(ii) expenses of demolition under Section 5-B, or
G
(iii) costs awarded to the Central Government or statutory
authority under sub-section (5) of Section 9, or

(iv) any portion of such rent, damages, cost of removal,
expenses of demolition or costs awarded to the Central
Government or the statutory authority." H
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 3 S.C.R.

In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 18 of the Public
A Premises Act, the Central Government has made the Public Premises
.....__~

(Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Rule, 1971 (hereinafter refer-
red to as the 'Public Premises Rules'). Rule 5 of said Rules relates to
holding of inquiries and Rule 9 relates to procedure in appeals.

B We will first deal with the contentions urged by the foamed
counsel for the petitioners with regard to the scope of the definition of
the expression 'Public Premises' contained in Section 2(e) and 'unau-
-~
thorised occupation', contained in Section 2(g) of the Public Premises
Act.

As mentioned earlier, the appeals relate to premises belonging
c to nationalised Banks, viz. Punjab National Bank and Allahabad
Bank, constituted under the provisions of the Banks Nationalisation
Act. It has been urged by Shri Yogeshwer Prasad, that the premises
belonging to a nationalised bank do not fall within the ambit of the
definition of 'Public Premises' contained in Section 2( e) of the Public
D Premises Act, for the reason that nationalised bank is not a company
as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 and it is also not a
corporation established by or under a Central Act. The submission of
the learned counsel for the respondent banks is that the nationalised
bank is a corporation established by a Central Act, viz. the Banks
Nationalisation Act, and the premises belonging to a nationalised Y-
E bank are 'public premises' under Section 2(e )(2)(ii) of the Public Pre-
mises Act. The question which, therefore, requires to be considered is
whether a nationalised bank is a coporation established by or under a
Central Act and is owned or controlled by the Central Government.

The nationalised banks have been established under the Banks .J

~
F Nationalisation Act, wherein the nationalised banks have been
described as 'corresponding new bank'. In sub-section (i) of Section 3
of the Banks Nationalisation Act, it has been provided that on the
commencement of the said Act, there shall be constituted such cor-
responding new banks as are specified in the First Schedule. In sub-
section (2) of Section 3, it is laid down that the paid-up capital of every
G corresponding new bank constituted under sub-section (1) shall, until
any provision is made in this behalf in any scheme made under Section
9, be equal to the paid-up capital of the existing bank in relation to _,,..__,
which it is the corresponding new bank. Sub-section(3) of Section 3
provides that the entire capital of the new bank shall stand vested in,
and allotted to the Central Government. Sub-section (4) of Section 3
H lays down that every corresponding new bank shall be a body corpo-
I
ASHOKA MARKETING v. P.N.B. [AGRAWAL, J.] 667

rate with perpetual succession and a common seal with power, subject
A
to the provisions of the said Act, to acquire, hold and dispose of
property, and to contract, and may sue ard be sued in its name. From
the aforesaid provisions contained in Section 3 of the Banks Nationali-
sation act it is evident that the nationalised banks have been estab-
lished under the provisions of the said Act and the same are distinct
juristic persons with perpetual succession and the power to acquire, B
hold and dispose of property and to contract and having the right to
sue and be sued in their own name and further that the entire capital of
_,---- - the said banks is vested in the Central Government, meaning thereby,
that the said banks are owned by the Central Government.

Shri Yogeshwer Prasad has pointed out that, in view of Section
3(4) of the Banks Nationalisation Act, the nationalised bank is a body c
corporate and not a corporation and that there is a distinction between
a body corporate and a corporation inasmuch as a body corporate
includes bodies, such as companies, co-operative societies, etc., which
are not corporations. Reliance bas been placed in this regard on the
decision of Delhi High Court in Oriental Bank of Commerce and D
Another v. Delhi Development Authority and Another, [1985) 55 Com-
pany Cases 81. We find no substance in this contention.

In English law a corporation has been defined as "a body of
"Ipersons or an office which is recognised by the law has having a
personality which is distinct from the separate personalities of the E
members of the body or the personality of the individual holder for the
time being of the office in question." (See Ha/sbury's Laws of
England, Fourth Edition, Volume 9, Para 1201). Generally speaking,
corporations are of two kinds; corporation aggregate and corporation
sole. A corporation aggregate has been described as an incorporated
group of co-existing persons and a corporation sole as an incorporated F
~ series of successive persons, (Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edition
P 308. The distinctive feature of a corporation are that it has the
capacity of continuous existence and succession, notwithstanding
changes in its membership and it possesses the capacity of taking,
holding and conveying property, entering into contracts, suing and
being sued, and exercising such other powers and priviledges confer- G
red on it by law of its creation just as a natural person may (See .S.S.
Dhanoa v. Municipal Corporation, Delhi & Ors., [1981) 3 SCR 864.
~-~ Corporations aggregate may be public or private. A public corporation
is a corporation formed for a public purpose e.g. local government
authorities, and it is usually incorporated by a public general Act of
Parliament. A private corporation is a corporation formed for profit H
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990) 3 S.C.R.

e.g. a limited company, and it is usually incorporated under a statutory
A
enactment. After the second world war there has been development of _.._ ~
a new pattern of public corporations in England as an instrument of
planning in the mixed economy. The general characteristics of such a
public corporation is that it is normally created by a special statute; it
has no shares and no shareholders either private or public, and its
B shareholder, in the symbolic sense, is the nation represented through
Government and Parliament; the responsibility of the public corpora-
tion is to the Government, represented by the competent Minister and
through the Minister to Parliament; the administration of the public ~"
corporation is entirely in the hands of a board which is appointed by
the competent Minister; and it has the legal status of a coporate body
with independent legal personality. (See W. Friedman: The New
c Public Corporations and the Law [1947) 12 Mod. LR 234-236.) There
is a similar growth of this type of public corporation in other countries.
This trend is also evident in our country since independence and a
number of such public corporations have been constituted by Acts of
Parliament.
0
The distinction between such a public corporation and a corpora-
tion gtmerally known in law has been explained in the following obser-
vations of Denning L.J., as he then was:-

"The Transport Act, 1947, brings into being the British )<
E Transport Commission, which is a statutory corporation of
a kind comparatively new to English law. It has many of the
qualities which belong to corporations of other kinds to
which we have been accustomed. It has, for instance,
defined powers which it cannot exceed; and it is directed by
a group of men whose duty it is to see that those powers are
F properly used. It may own property, carry on business,
borrow and lend money, just as any other corporation may
do, so long as it keeps within the bounds which Parliament
has set. But the significant difference in this corporation is
that there are no shareholders to subscribe the capital or to
have any voice in its affairs. The money which the Corpora-
G tion needs is not raised by the issue of shares but by bor-
rowings and its borrowing is not served by debentures; but
is guaranteed by the Treasury. If it cannot repay, the loss
falls on the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom; ~-"
that is to say, on the taxpayer. There are no shareholders to
elect the directors or to fix their remuneration. There are
H no profits to be made or distributed." (Tamlin v. Hanna-
ford, [1950) lKB 13).
ASHOKA MARKETING v. P.N.B. [AGRAWAL, J.] 669

Reference has already been made to the provisions of the Banks A
Nationalisation Act which show that the nationalised bank has been
constituted as a distinct juristic person by the Act and it is owned by
the Central Government. There are other provisions in the Banks
Nationalisation Act which show that the general superintendence,
direction and management of the affairs of the business of the bank is
vested in a Board of Directors constituted by the Central Government B
and the Central Government has the power to remove a person from
the membership of the Board of Directors (Section 7(2) & 7(3) and in
the discharge of its functions the Bank is to be guided by such direc-
tions in regard to matters of policy involving public interest as the
Central Government may, after consultation with the Governor of the
Reserve Bank, give (Section 8). This indicates that the nationalised c
bank has all the attributes of the new pattern of public corporation.

Merely because the expression 'body corporate' ha~ been used in
relation to the nationalised banks in Section 3(4) of the Banks
Nationalisation Act and the expression 'corporation' has not been
used, does not mean that the nationalised bank is not a corporation. D
The expression 'body corporate' is used in legal parlance to mean a
'public or private corporation' (Black's Law Dictionary p. 159).

Shri Yogeshwer Prasad has urged that in order to constitute a
· corporation there must exist persons, i.e. members, composing it, and
that tl)is element is missing in the nationalised banks inasmuch as the E
Banks Nationalisation Act does not provide for any membership to
these banks. This contention is without any merit because, as noticed
earlier, in the new pattern of public corporations which have develo-
ped, there are no shares and no shareholders, either public or private,
and its sharesholder, in the symbolic sense, is the nation represented
through Government and Parliament. A similar contention was raised F
before the High Court of Australia in the Bank of New South Wales &
Ors. v. The Commonwealth, [1948] 76 C.L.R. 19 in relation to the
Commonwealth Bank established as a body corporate by the Com-
monwealth Bank Act, 1945. While rejecting this contention, Latham
C.J. has observed:
G
"The Commonwealth Parliament has declared that the
bank is a corporation and the Court must on this, as on
many previous occasions, accept that the bank (though it
has no corporators) exists as a new kind of juristic person."
(p. 227)
H
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 3 S.C.R.

Similary Dixon J. has observed:
A
"Although the Commonwealth Bank is declared to be a
body corporate there are no corporators. I see no reason to
doubt the constitutional power of the Federal Parliament,
for a purpose within its competence, to create a juristic
B person without identifying an individual or a group of
natural persons with it, as the living constituent or con-
stituents of the corporation. In other legal systems an
abstraction or even an inanimate physical thing has been
made an artificial person as the object of rights and
duties." (p. 361)
c It may also be mentioned that in R. C. Cooper v. Union of India,
! 1970) 3 SCR 530 this Court, while referring to nationalised banks
constituted under the provisions of the Banking Companies (Acquisi-
tion and Transfer of Undertakings) Ordinance, 1969, has treated the
nationalised banks as corporations.
D
While construing the expression 'corporation' in Section 2(e)
(2)(ii) of the Public Premises Act it cannot be ignored that the object
of the legislation in enlarging the definition of 'public premises' in
Section 2( e) is to make available the machinery of the Act for evicting
unauthorised occupants not only from the premises belonging to the
E Central Government but also from premises belonging to Companies,
Corporations and statutory bodies in which the Central Government
has a substantial interest. Under Section 2(e)(2)(i) premises belonging
to a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, in which
not less than fifty one per cent of the paid-up capital is held by the
Central Government, are to be treated as public premises. It could not
F be the intention of Parliament that premises belonging to public corpo-
rations whose entire paid-up capital vests in the Central Government
and who are the instrumentalities of State would be excluded from the
ambit of the definition of 'public premises'. In our opinion, therefore,
the expression 'corporation' in Section 2(e)(2)(ii) of the Public
Premises Act would include public corporations of the new pattern
G constituted under the Central Acts wherein the entire paid-up capital
vests in the Central Government.

Sbri Yogeshwere Prasad has placed reliance on the decision of
this Court in S.S. Dhanoa's case (supra) wherein this Court has con-
sidered the question whether the Co-operative Store Ltd., a co-
H operative society registered under the Bombay Co-operative Societies
ASHOKA MARKETING v. P.N.B. [AGRAWAL, J.] 671

Act, 1925 is a corporation established by or under a Central, Provin-
A
cial or State Act, for the purposes of clause Twelfth of Section 21 of
the Indian Penal Code. This Court has observed that a corporation
established by or under an Act of legislature could only mean a body
corporate which owes its existence and not merely its corporate status
to the Act and a distinction has been drawn between a corporation
established by or under an Act and a body incorporated under an Act. B
It has been held that the Co-operative Store Ltd., which is a society
- registered under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, is not
a statutory body because it is not created by a statute and that it is a
body created by an act of a group of individuals in accordance with the
provisions of a Statute. This decision does not lend any assistance to
the contention of Shri Yogeshwer Prasad.
c
In Otiental Bank of Commerce's case (Supra) the overruled ques-
tion for consideration was, whether the Chairman of a nationalised
bank is a public servant and sanction under Section 197 of Code of
Criminal Procedure was necessary to prosecute him. M.L. Jain, J. has
held that the nationalised bank is a body corporate and not a corpora- D
tion within the meaning of clause Twelfth of Section 21 I.P.C. and,
therefore, the Chairman of the nationalised bank is not a public
servant under Section 21 I.P.C. The learned Judge has further held
that even if the nationalised bank is a corporation, the Chairman of the
said bank is not in the service· or pay of the bank and further (in the
facts of the case) it could not be said that the Chairman was acting or E
purporting to act in the discharge of official duty. Sachar, J. did not
consider it necessary to deal with the question, as to whether the
nationalised bank is a corporation because he was of the view that
Section 197 Cr. P.C. was not attracted. For the reasons mentioned
earlier, the judgment of Jian, J. insofar as it draws a distinction bet-
ween a 'body corporate' and a 'corporation' and laws down that the
\. . nationalised bank, though a 'body corporate' is not a corporation,
F

cannot be upheld. The other reason giver. by Jain, J. is that the
nationalised bank is merely a personified institution having no
meinbers and is, therefore, not a corporation. This view also cannot be
sustained. We have already pointed out that in order to constitute a
corporation it is not necessary that there should be sharesholders or
members and that in the new pattern of public corporation that has
developed there are no shareholders or members.

Keeping in view the provisions of the Banks Nationalisation Act
we are of the opinion that the nationalised bank is a corporation
established by a Central Act and it is owned and controlled by the H
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1990] 3 S.C.R.

A Central Government. The premises belonging to a nationalised bank ~- _
are public premises under Section 2( e )(2)(ii) of the Public Premises
Act. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of Shri
Y ogeshwar Prasad that premises belonging to a nationalised bank do
not fall within the ambit of the definition of 'public premises' con-
tained in Section 2( e) of the Public Premises Act.
B
Shri Yogeshwer Prasad has also urged that 'public premises' as
defined in Section 2( e) of the Public Premises Act, must be confined to
premises let out for residential purposes only and should not cover
premises let vut for commercial purposes and that if premises let out
for commercial purposes are included, Section 2(e) would be rendered
unconstitutional as being violative of the provisions of Articles 14,
c 19(1)(g) and 21 read with Articles 39 and 41 of the Constitution. The
submission of Shri Yogeshwer Prasad is that a construction which
would sustain the constitutionality of the provisions of Section 2(e)
should be preferred over a construction which would render them
constitutional. We find no force in this contention.
D
There is no warrant for confining the scope of the definition of
'public premises' contained in Section 2(e) to premises used for resi-
dential purposes only and to excluded premises used for 'Commercial
purposes from its ambit. In Hari Singh v. Military Estate Officer,
(Supra) a similar contention was advanced and it was argued that the Y
E expression 'premises' in Public Premises Act would not apply to
agricultural land. This Court rejected that contention with the
observation:

"The word 'premises' is defined to mean any land. Any
-
land will include agricultural land. There is nothing in the
F Act to exclude the applicability of the Act to agricultural
land."

We are also unable to hold that the inclusion of premises used for
commercial purposes within the ambit of the definition of 'public pre-
mises', would render the Public Premises Act as violative of the right
G to equality guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution or right to
freedom to carry on any occupation, trade or business guaranteed
under Article 19( l)(g) of the Constitution or the right to liberty
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. It is difficult to
appreciate how a person in unauthorised occupation of public pre-
mises used for commercial purposes, can invoke the Directive Princi-
H pies under Article 39 and 41 of the Consiitution. As indicated in the
ASHOKA MARKETING v. P.N.B. [AGRAWAL, J.J 673

i statement of Objects and Reasons the Public Premises Act has been
A
------ enacted to provide for a speedy machinery for the eviction of unau-
thorised occupants of public premises. It serves a public purpose, viz.
making available, for use, public premises after eviction of persons in
authorised occupation. The need to provide speedy machinery for
eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation cannot be confined to
premises used for residential purposes. There is no reason to assume B
that such a need will not be there in respect of premises used for
commercial purposes. No distinction can, terefore, be made between
premises used for residential purposes and premises used for commer-
cial purposes in the matter of eviction of unauthorised occupants of
public premises and the considerations which necessitate providing a
speedy machinery for eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation
of public premises apply equally to both the types of public premises.
c
We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of Shri Yogeshwer
Prasad that the definition of public premises contained in Section 2(e)
of the Public Premises Act should be so construed as to exclude pre-
mises used for commercial purposes from its ambit.
D
Shri A.K. Ganguli, has urged that a person who was put in
occupation of the premises as a tenant and who was continued in such
occupation after the expiry or the termination of his tenancy cannot be
regarded as a person in unauthorised occupation under Section 2(g) of
the Public Premises Act. The submission of Shri Ganguli is that, the
occupation of a person who was put in possession as a tenant is juridical E
possession and such an occupation cannot be regarded as unauthorised
occupation. In support of this submission, Shri Ganguli has placed
reliance on the decision of the Bombay High Court in Brigadier K. K.
Verma & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr., A.LR. 1954 Bombay 358
which has been approved by this Court in Lallu Yeshwant Singh v. Rao
Jagdish Singh & Ors., [ 1968] 2 S.C.R. 203. F

The definition of the expression 'unauthorised occupation' con-
tained in Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act is in two parts. In the
first part the said expression has been defined to mean the occupation
by any person of the Public premises without authority for such occu-
pation. It implies occupation by a person who has entered into occupa- G
tion of any public premises without lawful authority as well as occupa-
tion which was permissive at the inception but has ceased to be so. The
second part of the definition is inclusive in nature and it expressly
covers continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises
after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of
transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has H
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1990] 3 S.C.R.

A expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever. This part
covers a case where a person had entered into occupation legally under
valid authority but who continues in occupation after the authority
under which he was put in occupation has expired or has been
determined. The words "whether by way of grant or any other mode of
transfer" in this part of the definition are wide in amplitude and would
B
cover a lease because lease is a mode of transfer under the Transfer of
Property Act. The definition of unauthorised occupation contained in
Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act would, therefore, cover a case
where a person has entered into occupation of the public premises
legally as a tenant under a lease but whose tenancy has expired or has
been determined in accordance with law.
c
Brigadier K.K. Verma'& Anr. v. Union of India & Anr. (Supra)
was decided under the provisions of the Government Premises (Evic-
tion) Act, 1950, which did not contain the definition of the expression
'unauthorised occupation'. In that case it has been held that under the
Indian law, the possession of a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant is
0
protected by law and although he may not have the right to continue in
possession, after the termination of the tenancy, his possession is juri-
dical and that possession is protected by statute, and therefore, an
erstwhile tenant can never become a trespasser and his possession
cannot be regarded as unauthorised occupation. The learned Judges
E have also observed that unless the legislature had given indication of a
clear intention that by the expression 'unauthorised occupation' it
meant not only person who had no title at all but also persons who are
titled at the inception and whose title came to an end, it would not be
proper to give an interpretation to the expression 'unauthorised occu-
pation' which would run counter to the principles of law which have
-
been accepted in this country. After this decision the legislature
F
intervened and introduced the definition of the expression 'unau-
thorised occupation' in the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised
Occupants) Act, 1958, which definition has been reproduced in Sec-
tion 2( e) of the Public Premises Act and in the said definition the
legislature has taken care to make an express provision indicating that
the expression 'unauthorised occupation' includes the continuance in
G occupation by any person of the public premises after th~ authority
(whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which
he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been
determined for any reason whatsoever. In the circumstances the
petitioners cannot derive any assistance from the decision of the
H Bombay High Court in Brigadier K.K. Verma's case (supra).
ASHOKA MARKETING v. P.N.B. [AGRAWAL, J.J 675

Shri Ganguli has placed reliance on the decision of A.P. Sen, J.
A
in Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Others,
I 1985] Suppl. 3 S.C.R. 382 and has submitted that in that case the
learned Judge has held that cases involving relationship between the
lessor and lessee fall outside the purview of the Public Premises Act.
We have carefully perused the said decision and we are unable to agree
with Shri Ganguli. In that case A.P. Sen, J. has observed that the new B
building had been constructed by the Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd.
after the grant of permission by the lessor, and, therefore, the Express
Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. was not in unauthorised occupation of the same
within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act. It was
also held by the learned Judge that the Express Building constructed
by the Express Newspapers Ltd. with the sanction of lessor on plots
Nos. 9 and 10 demised on perpetual lease can, by no process of reason-
c
ing, be regarded as public premises belonging to the Central Govern-
-------- -· ment under Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act, and therefore,
there·was no question of the lessor applying for eviction of the Express
Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. under the provisions of the Public Premises Act.
The aforesaid observations indicate that the learned Judge did not D
proceed on the basis that cases involving relationship of lessor and
lessee fall outside the purview of the Public Premises Act. On the
other hand the said observations show that the learned Judge has held
that.theiJrovisions of the Public Premises Act could not be invoked in
the facts of that case.
E
Another submission that has been urged by Shri Ganguli is that
the question whether a lease has been determined or not involves
complicated questions of law and the estate officer, who is not
required to be an officer well versed in law, cannot be expected to
decide such question and, therefore, it must be held that the provisions
of the Public Premises Act have no application to a case when the F
person sought to be evicted had obtained possession of the premises as
a lessee. It is true that there is no requirement in the Public Premises
Act that the estate officer must be a person well versed in law. But,
that, by itself, cannot be a ground for excluding from the ambit of the
said Act premises in unauthorised occupation of persons who obtained
possession of the said premises under a lease. Section 4 of the Public G
Premises Act requires issuing of a notice to the person in unauthorised
occupation of any Public Premises requiring him to show cause why an
order of eviction should not be made. Section 5 makes provisions for
production of evidence in support of the cause shown by the person
who has been served with a notice under Section 4 and giving of a
personal hearing by the estate officer. Section 8 provides that an estate H
676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 3 S.C.R.

A otficer, shall, for the purpose of holding any enquiry under the said
Act have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code .\...__ ~
of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit in respect of the matters
specified therein namely:

(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any perso:1 and
B examining him on oath;

(b) requiring discovery and production of documents; and
y
(c) any other matters ·which may be prescribed.

Rule 5(2) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised
c Occupants) Rules, 1971, requires the estate officer to record the sum-
mary of evidence tendered before him. Moreover Section 9 confers a
right of appeal against an order of the estate officer and the said appeal
has to be heard either by the district judge of the district in which the
public premises are situate or such other judicial officer in that district
D of not less than ten years' standing as the district judge may de1ignate
in that behalf. In shows that the final order that is passed is by a
judicial officer in the rank of a district judge.

E
A similar contention was raised before this Court in Magan/al
Chhagganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay &
Others, [ 1975] 1 SCR 1 wherein the validity of the provisions of Chap-
,.,
ter VA of the Bombay Municicpal Corporation Act, 1888 and the
Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955 were cha.ilenged
before this Court and the said contention was negatived. Aligiriswami,
J. speaking for the majority, has observed as under: -
F "Even though the officers deciding these questiom; would
be administrative officers there is provision in these Acts
for giving notice to the party affected, to inform him of the
grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be
made, for the party affected to file a written statement and
~
~

-
produce documents and be represented by lawyers. The
G provisions of the Civil Procedure Code regarding summon-
ing and enforcing attendance of persons and examining
them on oath, and requiring the discovery and production
of documents are a valuable safeguard for the person ...t -
affected. So is the provision for appeal to the Principal
Judge of the City Civil Court in the city of Bombay, or to a
H District Judge in the district who has got to deal with the
ASHOKA MARKETING v. P.N.B. [AGRAWAL, J.) 677

matter as expeditiously as possible, also a sufficient safe-
A
guard as was recognised in Suraj Mall Mehta's case."

Having dealt with the submissions of learned counsel for the
petitioners on the applicability of the provisions of Public Premises
Act, we may come to the main question involved in these matters,
namely, whether the provisions of the Public Premises Act override B
the provisions of the Rent Control Act. For appreciating the submis-
sions of the learned counsel on this question it is necessary to examine
Y---the provisions of both the enactments. The relevant provisions of the
Public Premises Act have already been set out. We may briefly refer to
the provisions of the Rent Control Act.

The Rent Control Act has been enacted by Parliament to provide c
for the control of rents and evictions and of rate of hotels and lodging
~ _ houses and for the lease of vacant premises to Government, in certain
areas in the Union Territory of Delhi. It extends to the areas included
within the limits of the New Delhi Municipal Committee and the Delhi
Cantonment Board and to such urban areas within the limits of the D
Municipal Corporation of Delhi as are specified in the First Schedule
to the Act (Section 1(2). The expression 'premises is defined in Section
2(i) as under:

.,_, "Premises means any building c;>r part of a building which is
or, is intended to be, let separately for use as a residence or E
for commercial use or for any other purpose, and includes:

(i) the garden, grounds and outhouses, if any, appertain-
ing to such building or part of the building;

(ii) any-furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such F
building or part of the building;

but does not include a room in a hotel or lodging house."

Section 3, which excludes the applicability of the Act to certain
premises, provide as under: G

"Nothing in this Act shall apply:

(a) to any premises belonging to the Government;

(b) to any tenancy or other like relationship created by a H
678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990) 3 S.C.R.

grant from the Government in respect of the premises ta-
A
ken on lease, or requisitioned, by the Government

Provided that where any premises belonging to Govern-
ment have been or are lawfully let by any pernon by virtue
of an agreement with the Government or otherwise, then,
B notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any
court or other authority, the provisions of this Act shall
apply to such tenancy.

(c) to any premises, whether residential or not, whose
montly rent exceeds three thousand and five hundred
c
rupees; or

(d) to any premises constructed on or after the commence-
-
ment of the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1988, . ~
for a period of ten years from the date of completion of
such construction."
D
Chapter II (Sections 4 to 13) contains provisions regarding rent
including fixation of standard rent. Chapter III (Sections 14 to 25)
contains provisions for control of eviction, of tenants. Section 14 gives
protection to tenants against eviction and provides that an order for
eviction of a tenant can be passed only on one or more of the grounds ~
E mentioned in clauses (a) to(!) of sub-section (1). Special provisions
have been made for recovery of immediate possession of premises in
Sections 14A to 14D in respect of certain classes of landlords. Section
22 contains a special provision for recovery of possession of premises
where the landlord is a company or a body corporate or a local autho-
rity or a public institution if the premises are required for the use of . ~
p employees of such landlord or, in the case of a public institution, for
the furtherance of its activities. In Chapter IIIA (Sections 25-A to -'<
25-C) provisions have been made for summary trial of certain applica-
tions for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement of the land-
lord. Chapter IV (Sections 26 to 29) contains provisions relating to
deposit of rent. Chapter V (Sections 30 to 34) contains provisions
G relating hotels and lodging houses. Chapter VI (Sections 35 to 43)
contains provisions relating to appointment of controllers and their
powers and functions and appeals. Section 42 makes provisions for
execution of orders passed by the Controller or in appeal, as a decree ,A'.~
of civil court. Section 43 attaches finality to the order passed by the
Controller and the order passed in appeal. Chapter VII (Sections 44 to
H 49) contains provisions regarding special obligations of landlords and
ASHOKA MARKETING v. P.N.B. [AGRAWAL, J.) 679

penalties. Chapter VIII (Sections 50 to 57) contains miscellaneous
. - ~ provisions. Under Section 50 jurisdiction of civil courts is barred in
A
respect of matters specified therein. Section 54 saves the operation of
certain enactments, namely, Administration of Evacuee Property Act,
1950, the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 and the
Delhi Tenants (Temporary Protection) Act, 1956.
B
On a comparison of the provisions of the Public Premises Act
and the Rent Control Act it will be found that:
---:i-
1. By virtue of Section 1(2) of the Public Premises Act, the said
Act is applicable throughout the territory of India, whereas, 'in
view of Section 1(2) of the Rent Control Act, the said Act is
confined in its application to areas included within the limits c
of the New Delhi Municipal Committee and the Delhi
Cantonment Board and to such urban .areas within the limits
of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi as are specified in ,the
First Schedule and any other urban area included within the
limits of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi to which provi- D
sions of the said Act are extended by the Central Government
by notification in the Official Gazette.

(2) Under Clauses (c) of Section 2 of the Public Premises Act,
the expression 'premises' has a wider connotation and it
includes open land as well as building or part of a building. E
Under the Rent Control Act the expression 'premises' as
defined in clause (i) of Section 2 has a narrower connotation
to mean any building or a part of building and it does not
cover open land .

.3. In view of the definition of the expression 'public premises' F
contained in clause (e) of Section 2 of the Public Premises
Act, the said Act, in addition to the premises belonging to or
taken on-lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of, the Cent-
ral Government, is applicable to premises belonging to or
taken on lease by or on behalf of the companies and statutory
bodies mentioned in clauses (2) and (3) of Section 2(e). The G
Rent Control Act, on the other hand, is applicable to all
premises except premises belonging to the Government or to
any tenancy or other like relation~hip created by a grant from
the Government in respect of the premises taken on lease, or
requisitioned, by the Government (Section 3). In view of the
amendment introduced in Section 3 by the Delhi Rent Con- H
680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1990] 3 S.C.R.

trol Act is not applicable to premises, whether residential or
A
not, whose monthly rent exceeds three thousand and five J... - .
hundred rupees and premises constructed on or after the com-
mencement of the said Amendment Act, for a period of ten
years from the date of completion of such construction.

B 4. The provisions of the Public Premises Act are applicable to
Public Premises in occupation of a person having no authority
for such occupation, including a person who was allowed to
occupy the public premises under a grant or any other mode ~
of transfer and who has continued in occupation after the
authority under which he was alowed to occupy that premises
has expired or has been terminated. The provisions of the
c Delhi Rent Control Act are applicable only to persons who
have obtained possession of the premises as tenants and
whose tenancy is continuing as well as persons who after the
expiration or termination of the tenancy have continued in
occupation of the premises.
D
As a result of this comparison it can be said that certain pre-
mises, viz. building or parts of buildings lying within the limtis of the
New Delhi Municipal Committee and the Delhi Cantonment Board
and in urban areas within the limits of the Municipal Corporation of
Delhi, which belong to or are taken on lease by any of the companies
E or statutory bodies mentioned in clauses (2) and (3) of Section 2(e) of
the Public Premises Act and which are in occupation of a person who
obtained possession of the said premises as a tenant and whose tenancy
has expired or has been terminated but who is continuing in occupa-
tion of the same, would ex-fade fall within the purview of both the
enactments. The question which, therefore, arises is whether the
F occupant of such premises can seek the protection available under the
provisions of Rent Control Act and he can be evicted from the pre-
mises only in accordance with the said provisions and proceedings for
eviction of such a person cannot be initiated under the provisions of
the Public Premises Act.

G Shri Venugopal and other learned counsel representing the
petitioners have urged that the Rent Control Act is a sell-contained
code providing for regulating the relationship of landlords and tenants
and it makes comprehensive provisions with regard to control of rents
as well as eviction of tenants and that the provision of the Rent Con-
trol Act, being special in nature insofar as lease-hold properties in
H Delhi are concerned, would prevail over the provisions of the Public
ASHOKA MARKETING v. P.N.B. [AGRAWAL, J.] 681

Premises Act which are in the nature of general provisions relating to
A
_ J eviction of unauthorised occupants from Government premises in the
whole country. In support of this submission the learned counsel for
the petitioners have placed reliance on Sections 22 and 54 and the
non-obstante clause contained in Section 14(1) of the rent Control
Act. It has also been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners
that the Public Premises Act does not contain any machinery for the B
termination of the tenancy and that in view of the decision of this
Court in V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal, [ 1980] 1 SCR 334,
--! the jural relationship of landlord and tenant can come to an end only
on the passing of an order of eviction by a competent court in accor-
dance with the provisions of the Rent Control Act and that in the
absence of an order of eviction under the provisions of the Rent Con-
trol Act no proceedings can be initiated against a person who came c
into occupation of the premises as a tenant and who is continuing in
occupation of the said premises after the contractual tenancy has
~-

expired or has been terminated.

The learned Attorney General and Shri G.L. Sanghi, appearing D
on behalf of the respondents in the appeals, have urged that the Public
Premises Act is in the nature ot a special enactment making provision
for speedy' and expeditious recovery of possession of public premises
from persons in unauthorised occupation of the same whereas the
Rent Control Act is general enactment regulating the relationship of
-f landlord and tenant and since the Public Premises Act is a special E
enactment it would override the provisions of the Rent Control Act. It
has also been urged that the Public Premises Act is a later enactment,
having been enacted in 1971, whereas the Rent Control Act was enac-
ted in 1958, and, therefore, the Public Premises Act would prevail
over the Rent Control Act. It has been urged that Section 15 of the
Public Premises Act which bars the jurisdiction of other Courts is in F
the nature of a non obstante clause which gives overriding effect to the
provisions of the Public Premises Act.

The learned Addi. Solicitor General, appearing for the respon-
dents in the writ petitions, has adopted a different line of argument.
He has contended that the Public Premises Act had been enacted by G
Parliament in exercise of its legislative power under Article 246(1)
read with entries 32, 95 and 97 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution whereas the Rent Control Act has been enacted by Parli-
ament in exercise of its legislative power under Article 246(4) read
with entries 6, 7 and 13 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution and since the Public Premises Act has been enacted in H
682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 3 S.C.R.

exercise of the legislative power under Article 246(1) of the Constitu-
A tion, it would prevail over the Rent Control Act enacted in exercise of
legislative power under Article 246( 4) of the Constitution.

At this stage, it may be mentioned that in Jain Ink Manufactur-
ing Company v. Life Insurance Corporation of India &Another, [1981]
B 1SCR498 decided by a bench of three Judges, it has been held that the
Public Premises Act overrides the provisions of the Delhi Rent Con-
trol Act. In that case it has been observed that the scope and object of
the Public Premises Act is quite different from that of Rent Control ~-
Act and while the Public Premises Act operates in a very limited field
in that it applies only to a limited nature of premises belonging only to
particular sets of individuals, a particular set of juristic persons like
c Companies, Corporations or the Central Government, whereas the
Rent Control Act is of much wider application and it applies to all
private premises which do not fall within the limited exceptions indi-
cated in Section 2 of the Public Premises Act and the object of the
. -----
Rent Control Act is to afford special protection to all the tenants or
D private landlords or landlords who are neither a Corporation nor
Government or Corporate Bodies. It was, therefore, held that the
Public Premises Act is a special Act as compared to the Rent Control
Act and it overrides the provisions of the Rent Control Act. The
learned counsel for the petitioners have assailed the correctness of the
said decision and have submitted that it needs reconsideration.
E
As regards rent control legislation enacted by the State legisla-
tures the position is well settled that such legislation fall within the
ambit of entries 6, 7 and 13 List III of the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution (See: Indu Bhushan Bose v. Rama Sundari Devi &
Another, [1970] 1 SCR 443; V Dhanpa/ Chettiar's case (supra); Jai
-·~
F Singh Jairam Tyagi etc. v. Mamanchand Ratilal Agarwal & Others,
[ 1980] 3 SCR 224 and Accountant and Secretarial Services Pvt. Ltd. &
Another v. Union of India & Others, [ 1988] 4 SCC 324.

The Rent Control Act has been enacted by Parliament in relation
to the Union Territory of Delhi in exercise of the legislative power
G conferred under Article 246(4) of the Constitution which empowers
Parliament to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the
territory of India not included in a State notwithstanding that such
matter is a matter enumerated in the State List.

Tue Public Premises Act deals with Government property as well
H as property belonging to other legal entities mentioned in clauses (2)
ASHOKA MARKETING v. P.N.B. [AGRAWAL, J.] 683

__.;.- and (3) of Section 2( e) of the Public Premises Act. In so far as it relates
to eviction of unauthorised occupants from premises belOnging to or A
taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the Central Govern·
ment the Public Premises Act would fall within entry 32°of List I being
law with respect to a property of the Union. The property belonging to
the various legal entities mentioned in clauses (2) and (3) of Section
2( e) of the Public Premises Act cannot be regarded as property of the B
Union and the Public Premises Act cannot be held to have been enac·
--r·ied under entry 32 of List I in respect of the said properties. In
Accountant and Secretarial Services Pvt. Ltd. and Another v. Union of
India and Others, (supra) this Court has held that the Public Premises
Act, in relation to properties other than the properties belonging to
the Central Government has been enacted under the concurrent list.
The learned Additional Solicitor General has placed reliance on the c
·-~-·decision of this Court in Smt. Saiyada Mossarrat v. Hindustan Steel
Ltd., [ 1989] 1SCC272 wherein it has been held that with regard to the
subject matter of speedy eviction of unauthorised occupants from
properties belonging to a Government companv, wherein the Central
Government has more than fifty one per cent of the paid-up capital, D
the source of authority can be traced to entry 97 read with entry 95 of
Union List (List 1). This Court has, however, affirmed the decision of
the Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in L. S. Nair v.
Hindustan Steel Ltd., AIR 1980 MP 106 wherein it has been held that
~
insofar as the Public Premises Act deals with a lessee or licencee of
premises belonging to a Government company, the subject matter of E
the Act would be covered by entries 6, 7 and 46 of List III. After
quoting the observations of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in this
regard, this Court has observed:

"Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to
show that there is any infirmity in the reasoning of the High F
Court."

This shows that the decision of this Court is founded on the view
mentioned above. Since the Act was held to be covered by entries 6, 7
and 46 of List III, it was not necessary to invoke the residuary power of
legislation under entry 97 of List I. The observations made by this G
Court that the source of authority in the matter of speedy eviction of
unauthorised occupants from properties belonging to a Government
company wherein the Central Government has more than fifty one per
cent of the paid-up share capital can, in any case, be traced to entry 97
read with entry 95 of List I are obiter in nature only. There is, there·
fore, no inconsistency between the decisions of this Court in Accoun- H
684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990) 3 S.C.R.

tant and Secretarial :o>ervices Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and Smt. Saiyada ~ ~
A
Mossarrat case (supra) inasmuch as in both the decisions it is held that
the Public Premises Act insofar as it deals with a lessee or licencee of
premises other than premises belonging to the Central Government
has been enacted in exercise of the legislative powers in respect of
matters enumerated in the Concurrent List. We are in agreement with
B this view.

This means that both the statutes, viz. the Public Premises Act
and the Rent Control Act, have been enacted by the same legislature,
Parliament, in exercise of the legislative powers in respect of the
matters enumerated in the Concurrent List. We are, therefore, unable
to accept the contention of the learned Additional Solicitor General
c that the Public Premises Act, having been enacted by Parliament in
exercise of legislative powers in respect of matters enumerated in the
Union List would ipso-facto override the provisions of the Rent Con-
trol Act enacted in exercise of the legislative powers in respect of
matters enumerated in the Concurrent List. In our opinion the ques-
D tion as to whether the provisions of the Public Premises Act override
the provisions of the Rent Control Act will have to be considered in
the light of the principles of statutory interpretion applicable to laws
made by the same legislature.

One such principle of statutory interpretation which is applied is
E contained in the latin maxim: leges posteriores priores conterarias
abrogant, (later laws abrogate earlier contrary laws). This principle is
subject to the exception embodied in the maxim: generalia specialibus
non derogant, (a general provision does not derogate from a special
one). This means that where the literal meaning of the general enact-
ment covers a situation for which specific provision is made by another
F enactment contained in an earlier Act, it is presumed that the situation
was intended to continue to be dealt with by the specific provision
rather than the later general one (Benion: Statutory Interpretation
p. 433-34).

The rationale of this rule is thus explained by this Court in the
G J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. The State of Uttar
Pradesh & Others, [1961] 3 SCR 185:

"The rule that general provisions should yield to specific
provisions is not an arbitrary principle made by lawyers and
Judges but springs from the common understanding of man
H and women that when the same person gives two directions
ASHOKA MARKETING v. P.N.B. [AGRAWAL, J,J 685

one covering a large number of matters in general and
A
another to only some of t.hem his intention is that these
latter directions should prevail as regards these while as
regards all the rest the earlier directions should have
effect." (p. 94)

In U.P. State Electricity Board & Ors. v. Hari Shankar Jain & B
Ors., [ 1979] 1 SCR 355 this Court has observed:

"In passing a special Act, Parliament devotes its entire
consideration to a particular subject. When a General Act
is subsequently passed, it is logical to presume that Parlia-
ment has not repealed or modified the former Special Act
unless it appears that the Special Act again received consi- c
deration from Parliament." (p. 366)

In Life Insurance Corporation v. D.J. Bahadur, [1981] 1 SCR
1083 Krishna Iyer, J. haspoin&d out: '
D
"In determining whether a statute is a special or a general
one, the focus must be on the principal subject matter plus
the particular perspective. For certain purposes, an Act
may be general and for certain other purposes it may be
special and we cannot blur distinctions when dealing with
finer points oflaw ." (p. 1127) E

The Public Premises Act is a later enactment, having been enac-
ted on 23rd August, 1971, whereas the Rent Control Act was enacted
on 31st December, 1958. It represents the later will of Parliament and
should prevail over the Rent Control Act unless it can be said that the
Public Premises Act is a general enactment, whereas the Rent Control F
Act is a special enactment and being a special enactment the Rent
Control Act should preavil over the Public Premises Act. The submis-
sion of learned counsel for the petitioners is that the Rent Control Act
is a special enactment dealing with premises in occupation of tenants,
whereas the Public Premises Act is a general enactment dealing with
the occupants of Public Premises and that insofar as public premises in G
occupation of tenants are concerned the provisions of the Rent Con-
trol Act would continue to apply and to that extent the provisions of
the Public Premises Act would not be applicable. In support of this
submission reliance has been placed on the non obstante clauses con-
tained in Section !4· and 22 of 1JMuRent Control Act as well as the
provisions contained in Sections 50 and 54 of the said Act. On the H
686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 3 S.C.R.

other hand the learned counsel for the respondents have urged that the _
A Rent Control Act is a general enactment dealing with the relationship-""--
of landlord and tenant generally, whereas the Public Premises Act is a
special enactment making provision for speedy recovery of possession
of Publip Premises in unauthorised occupation and that the provisions
of.the Public Premises Act, a later Special Act, will, therefore, over-
B ride the provisions of the Rent Control Act in so far as they are
applicable to Public Premises in occupation of persons who have con-
tinued in occupation after the lease has expired or has been deter- ---r-
mined. The learned counsel for the respondents have pl:mi:d reliance
on Section 15 of the Public Premises Act which bars the jurisdiction of
all courts in respect of the eviction of any person who is in unau-
thorised occupation of any Public Premises and other matters specified
c therein. It has been submitted that the said provision is also in the
nature of a non obstante clause which gives overriding effect to the
provisions of the Public Premises Act. Thus each side claims the enact-
ment relied upon by it is a special statute and the other enactment is
general and also invokes the non obstante clause contained in the
D enactment relied upon.

The Rent Control Act makes a departure from the general law
regulating the relationship of landlord and tenant contained in the
Trnasfer of Property Act inasmuch as it makes provision for deter-
mination of standard rent, it specifies the grounds on which a landlord
E can seek the eviction of a tenant, it prescribes the forum for adjudica-
tion of disputes between landlords and tenants and the procedure
which has to be followed in such proceedings. The rent Control Act
can, therefore, be said to be a special statute regulating the relation-
ship of landlord and tenant in the Union Territory of Delhi. The Public
Premises Act makes provision for a speedy machinery to secure evic-
F lion of unauthorised occupants from public premises. As opposed to
the general law which provides for filing of a regular suit for recovery
of possession of property in a competent Court and for trial of such a
suit in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil
Procedure, the Public Premises Act confers the power to pass an order
for eviction of an unauthorised occupant in a public premises on a
G designated officer and prescribes the procedure to be followed by the
said officer before passing such an order. Therefore, the Public Pre-
mises Act is also a special statute relating to eviction of unauthorised
occupants from public premises. In other words, both the enactments,
namely, the Rent Cotrol Act and the Public Premises Act, are special
statutes in relation to the matters dealt with therein. Since, th/: Public
H Premises Act is a special statute and not a general enactment the
ASHOKA MARKETING v. P.N.B. [AGRAWAL, J.J 687

exception contained in the principle that a subsequent general law
A
- __;. cannot derogate from an earlier special law cannot be invoked and in
accordance with the principle that the later laws abrogate earlier con-
trary laws, the Public Premises Act must prevail over the Rent Control
Act.

We arrive at the same conclusion by applying the principle which B
is followed for resolving a conflict between the provisions of two
special enactments made by the same legislature. We may in this con-
- ! · text refer to some of the cases which have come before this Court
where the provisions of two enactements made by the same legislature
were found to be inconsistent and each enactment was claimed to be a
special enactment and had a non obstante clause giving overriding
effect to its provisions. c
In Shri Ram Narain v. The Simla Banking and Industrial Co.
Ltd., [1956) SCR 603 this Court was considering the provisions con-
tained in the Banking Companies Act, 1949 and the Displaced Persons
(Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951. Both the enactments contained provi- D
sions giving overriding effect to the provisions of the enactment over
any other law. This Court has observed;

"Each enactment being a Special Act, the ordinary princi-
ple that a special law overrides a general law does not
afford any clear solution in this case" (p. 613) E

"It is, therefore, desirable to determine the overriding
effect of one or the other of the relevant provisions in these
two Acts, in a given case, on much broader considerations
of the purpose and policy underlying the two Acts and the
clear intendment conveyed by the language of the relevant F
provisions therein." (p. 615)

Similarly in Kumaon Motor Owners' Union Ltd. and Another v.-
The State of Uttar Pradesh, [1966) 2 SCR 121 there was conflict bet-
ween the provisions contained in Rule 131(2)(gg) and (i) of the
Defence of India Rules, 1962 and Chapter IV-A of the Motor Vehicle G
Act, 1939. Section 68-B gave overriding effect to the provisions of
Chapter IV(A) of the Motor Vehicle Act whereas Section 43 of the
Defence of India Act, 1962, gave overriding effect to the provisions
contained in the Defence of India Rules. This Court held that the
Defence of India Act was later than the Motor Vehicles Act and,
therefore, if there was anything repugnant, the provisions oi the later
688 SUPREME COURT. REPORTS [1990] 3 S.C.R.

Act should prevail. This Court also looked into object behind the two
A
statutes, namely, Defence of India Act and Motor Vehicles Act and on -\..._ -
that basis also it was held that the provisions contained in the Defence
of India Rules would have an overriding effect over the provisions of
the Motor Vehicles Act.

B In Sarwan Singh & Another v. Kasturi Lal, [1977] 2 SCR 421, the
question for consideration was, whether the provisions of Section 14A
and Chapter IHA of the Rent Control Act will prevail over those
contained in Sections 19 and 39 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and ·--y
Clearance) Act, 1956. Section 14A and 25A of the Rent Control Act
contained non obstante clauses but in Section 54 of the Rent Control
Act it was expressly provided that nothing in the said Act shall effect
c the provisions of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act,
1956. Moreover in Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and
Clearance) Act, 1956 there was non-obstante clause and Section 39 of
the said Act gave overriding effect to the provisions of the said enact-
ment over any other law. This Court has observed:
D
"When two or more laws operate in the same field and each
contains a non-obstante clause stating that its provisions
will override those of any other law, stimulating and inci-
sive problems of interpreation arise. Since statutory
interpretation has no conventional protocol, cases of such
E conflict have to be decided in reference to the obejct and
purpose of the laws under consideration." (p. 433)

After examining the special and specific purpose underlying the
enactment of Section 14A and Chapter IIIA of the Rent Control act
and the fact that the Rent Control Act was a later enactment this Court
held that the provisions of the Rent Control Act would prevail over
those contained in the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act,
1956.

The principle which emerges from these decisions is that in the
case of inconsistency between the provisions of two enactments, both
of which can be regarded as Special in nature, the conflict has to be
resolved by reference to the purpose and policy underlying the two
enactments and the clear intendment conveyed by the language of the
relevant provisions therein. We propose to consider this matter in the
light of this principle.

H The statement of objects and reasons for the enactment of the
ASHOKA MARKETING v. P.N.B. [AGRAWAL, J.] 689

Rent Control Act, indicates that it has been enacted with a view: A
-__?
(a) to devise a suitable machinery for expeditious adjudication
of proceedings between landlords and tenants;

(b) to provide for the determination of the standard rent pay-
able by tenants of the various categories of premises which B
should be fair to the tenants, and at the same time, provide
incentive for keeping the existing houses in good repairs, and for
further investment in house construction; and

(c) to give tenants a larger measure of protection against
eviction.
c
This indicates that the object underlying the Rent Control Act is to
- ___ make provision for expeditious adjudication of disputes between land-
lords and tenants, determination of standard rent payable by tenants
and giving protection against eviction to tenants. The premises belong-
ing to the Government are excluded from the ambit of the Rent D
Control Act ~hich means that the Act has been enacted primarily to
regulate the private relationship between landlords and tenants with a
view to confer certain benefits on the tenants and at the same time to
balance the interest of the landlords by providing for expeditious
___, adjudication of proceedings between landlords and tenant.
E
As mentioned earlier, the Public Premises Act has been enacted
with a view to provide for eviction of unauthorised occupants from
public premises. In the statement of objects and reasons for this enact-
ment reference has been made to the judicial decisions whereby by the
1958 Act was declared as unconstitutional and it has been mentioned:
F
"The court decisions, referred to above, have created seri-
ous difficulties for the Government inasmuch as the pro-
ceedings taken by the various Estate Officers appointed
under the Act either for the eviction of persons who are in
unauthorised occupation of public premises or for the
recovery of rent or damanges from such persons stand null G
and void. It has become impossible for Government to take
expeditious action even inflagrant cases of unauthorised
occupation of public premises and recovery of rent or
damages for such unauthorised occupation. It is, therfore,,
considered imperative to restore a speedy machinery for
the eviction of persons' who are in unauthorised occupation H
690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1990] 3 S.C.R.

of public premises keeping in view at the same time the
A
necessity of complying with the provision of the Constitu- --..__ -
lion and the judicial pronouncements, referred to above."

This shows that the Public Premises Act has been enacted to deal with
the mischief of rampant unauthorised occupation of public premises by
B providing a speedy machineryfor the eviction of persons in unau-
thorised occupation. In order to secure this object the said Act pre-
scribes the time period for the various steps which are equired to be
taken for securing eviction of the persons in unauthorised occupation._ ~
The object nnderlying the enactment is to safeguard public interest by
making available for public use premises belonging to Central Govern-
ment, Companies in which the Central Government has substantial
c interest, Corportions owned or controlled by the Central Government
and certain autonomous bodies and to prevent misuse of such
premises.

It would thus appear that, while the Rent Control Act is inten-
D ded to deal with the general relationship of landlords and tenants in
respect of premises other than government premises, the Public Pre-
mises Act is intended to deal with speedy recovery of possession of
premises of public nature, i.e. property belonging to the Central
Government, or Companies in which the Central Government has
substantial interest or Corporations owned or controlled by the Cent-
E ral Government and certain corporations, institutions, autonomous
bodies and local authorities. The effect of giving overriding effect to
the provisions of the Pubic Premises Act over the Rent Control Act,
would be that buildings belonging to Companies Corporations and
Autonomous bodies referred to in Section 2(e) of the Public Prmises
Act would be excluded from tbe ambit of the Rent Control Act in the
F same manner as properties belonging to the Central Government. The
. reason underlying the exclusion of property belonging to the Govern-
ment from the ambit of the Rent Control Act, is that Government
while dealing with the citizens in respect of property belonging to it
would not act for its own purpose as a private landlord but would act in
public interest. What can be said with regard to Government in rela-
G tion to property belonging to it can. also be said with regard to com-
panies, corporations and other statutory bodies mentioned in Section
2(e) of the Public Premises Act. In our opinion, therefore, keeping in
view the object and purpose underlying both the enactments viz., the
Rent Control Act and the Public Premises Act, the provisions of the
Public Premises Act have to be construed as overriding the provisions
H contained in the Rent Control Act.
ASHOKA MARKETING v. P.N.B. [AGRAWAL, J.J 691

. ~ J· As regards the non obstante clauses contained in Sections 14
A
and 22 and the provisions contained in Sections 50 and 54 of the Rent
Control Act, it may be stated that Parliament was aware of these
provisions when it enacted the Public Premises Act contained a
specific provision in Section 15 barring jurisdiction of all courts (which
would include the Rent Controller under the Rent Control Act). This
indicates that Parliament intended that the provisions of the Public B
Premises Act would prevail over the provisions of the Rent Control
-r· Act inspite of the above mentioned provisions contained in the Rent
Control Act.

It has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that
there is no conflict between the provisions of the Rent Control Act and
the Public Premises Act and that both the provisions can be given c
_ _ effect to without one overriding the other. In this regard, it has been
- pointed out that since no provisions has been made in the Public Pre-
mises Act for the termination of the lease, the provisions of the Rent
Control Act can be held applicable upto the stage of termination of the
lease, and thereafter, proceedings can be initiated for eviction under D
the provisions of the Public Premises Act. In support of this submis-
sion, reliance has beeen placed on Dhanpal Chettiar's case (supra),
wherein it has been held that in view of the special provisions con-
tained in the State Rent Conirol Acts, it is no longer necessary to issue
~ a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act to terminate
the tenancy because inspite of the said notice the tenant is entitled to E
continue in occupation by virtue of the provisions of the said Acts. In
the said case, it has been further laid down that the relationship bet-
ween the landlord and tenant continues till the passing of the order of
/-· eviction in accordance with the provisions of the Rent act, and there-
fore, for the eviction of the tenant in accordance with the law, an order
',, of the competent Court under the Rent Control Act is necessary. This F
would mean that in order to evict a person who is continuing in occu-
pation after the expiration or termination of his contractual tenancy in
accordance with law, two proceedings will have to be initiated. First,
there will be proceedings under Rent Control Act before the Rent
Controller followed by appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal and
revision before the High Court. After these proceedings have ended G
they would be followed by proceedings under the Public Premises Act,
__ )..._ before the Estate Officer and the Appellate Authority. In other
words, persons in occupation of public premises would receive greater
protection than tenants in premises owned by private persons. It could
not be the intention of Parliament to confer this dual benefit on
persons in occupation of public premises. H
692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990) 3 S.C.R.

It has also been urged that in Section 22 of the Rent Control Act,
A
special provision has been made for recovery of possession of premises
belonging to a company or other body corporate or any local authority
or any public institution and that premises belonging to companies,
corporations and autonomous bodies mentioned in clauses (2) and (3)
of Section 2(e) of the Public Premises would be covered by the said
B provision and that in view of this special provision it is not necessary to
have a further provision in the Public Premises Act for the recovery of
possession belonging to those bodies, and therefore, the provisions of
the Public Premises Act should be confined in their application to
premises other than premises covered by the Rent Control Act. Sec-
tion 22 of the Rent Control Act provides as under:
c "Where the landlord in respect of any premises is any com·
pany or other body corporate of any local authority or any
public institution and the premises are required for the use
of employees of such landlord or in the case of a public
institution for the furtherance of its activities, then, not-
D withstanding anything contained in Section 14 or any other
law, the Controller may, on an application made to him in
this behalf by such landlord, place the landlord in vacant
possession of such premises by evicting the tenant and
every other person who may be in. occupation therof, if the
Controller is satisfied-
E
(a) that the tenant to whom such premises were let for use
as a residence at a time when he was in the service or
employment of the landlord, has ceased to be in such
service or employment; or

F (b) that the tenant has acted in contravention of the terms,
express or implied, under which he was authorised to
occupy such premises; or

(c) that any other person is in unauthorised occupation of
such premises; or
G
(d) that the premises are required bona fide by the public
institution for the furtherance of its activities.

Explanation-For the purpose of this section, "public in-
stitution" includes any educational institutional, library,
H hospital and charitable dispensary but does not include any
ASHOKA MARKETING v. P.N.B. {AGRAWAL. J.] 693

such institution set up by any private trust."
A
The said special provision shows that, it enables recovery of
possession or premises of which the landlord is a company or other
body corporate or any local authority or any public institution in
certain circumstances viz., if the premises are required for the use of
the employees or such landlord. In the case of public institutions pos- B
session can also be obtained under this provision if the premises are

r reqquired for the furtherance of its activities. In other words, recovery
of possession is permissible under this·, provision only in certain
circumstances and for certain purpci~.e,.:•;lnspite of this provision
Parliam~nt has considered it necessar}i«tifilC!end the Public Premises
Act to premises belonging to companies, corporations and statutory
bodies mentioned in Clauses (2) and (3) of Section 2(e) by widening c
the definition of the expression "public premises" in Section 2(e) of
the Public Premises Act. The scope and ambit of the aforesaid power
conferred under the Public Premises Act cannot be restricted by refer-
ence to the provision contained in Section 22 of the Rent Control Act.
D
It has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners that
many of the corporations referred to in Section 2(e )(2)(ii) of the Public
Premises Act, like the nationalised banks and the Life Insurance
-..,· Corporation, are trading corporations and under the provisions of the
enactments whereby they are constituted these corporations are re-
quired to carry on their business with a view to earn profit, and that E
there is nothing to preclude these corporations to buy property in
possession of tenants at a low price and after buying such property
evict the tenants after .terminating the tenancy and thereafter sell the
~ .. said property at a much higher value because the value of property in
possession of tenants is much less as compared to vacant property. We
are unable to cut down the scope of the provisions of the Public Pre- F
mises Act on the basis of such an apprehension because as pointed out
by this Court in Mis Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v. Board of Trus-
tees of the Port of Bombay, [1989] 3 SCC 293:

"Every activity of a public authority especially in the back-
ground of the assumption on which such authority en joys G
immunity from the rigour of the Rent Act, must be in-
formed by reason and guided by the public interest. All
exercise of discretion or power by public authorities as the
respondent, in respect of dealing with tenants in respect of
which they have been treated separately and distinctly from
other landlords on the assumption that they would not act H
694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990) 3 S.C.R.

as private landlords, must be judged by that standard."

~,
A
These observations were made in the context of the provisions of the
Bomaby Rents, Hotel and Lodging Houses Rates (Control) Act, 1947
whereby exemption from the provisions of the Act has been granted to
premises belonging to the Bombay Port Trust. The consequence of
B giving overriding effect to the provisions of the Public Premises Act is
that premises belonging to companies and statutory bodies referred to
in Cluases (2) and (3) of Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act would
be exempted from the provisions of the Rent Control Act. The actions
of the companies and statutory bodies mentioned in Clauses (2) and
(3) of Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act while dealing with their
properties under the Pubic Premises Act will, therefore, have to be
C judged by the same standard.

For the reasons aforesaid, we are unable to accept the contention
of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the provisions contained
in the Public Premises Act cannot be applied to premises which fall
D within the ambit of the Rent Control Act. In our opinion, the provi-
sions of the Public Premises Act, to the extent they cover premises
falling within the ambit of the Rent Control Act, override the provi-
sions of the Rent Control Act and a person in unauthorised occupation
of public premises under Section 2(e) of the Act cannot invoke the
protection of the Rent Control Act.
E
In Civil Appeal No. 3723 of 1966, Shri Yogeshwer Prasad sought
to raise contentions relating to the particular facts of that case,
namely, that the termination of the lease of the appellant is vitiated by
malafides and that the said appellant could not be held to be a person ...J
in unauthorised occupation of the premises and further that the pro-
F ceedings have not been taken in accordance with the provisions of the ..,.
Public Premises Act. We find that in this case the appellant filed a writ
petition in the High Court directly against the order passed by the
Estate Officer without filing an appeal against the said order before
the Appellate Authority. The High Court has held that the question of
ma/a fides is a disputed question of fact and the same could not be gone
G into in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. We are in
agreement of the said view of the High Court. As regards the other
contentions we are of the view that the appellant cannot be permitted -.ol
to agitate matters which could be agitated by him in appeal before the
Appellate Authority.

H In Civil Appeals Nos. 2368 and 2369 of 1986 the learned counsel
ASHOKA MARKETING v. P.N.B. [AGRAWAL, J.} 695

- '"-- for the respondents have raised a preliminary objection with regard to
the maintainability of these appeals on the ground that the appellants,
A
on account of their conduct, are not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction
of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. The submission of
the learned counsel is that before initiating proceedings under the
provisions of the Public Premises Act the respondent Bank, viz. the
Punjab National Bank, had initiated proceedings under the Rent Con- B
trol Act for the eviction of the appellants had in those proceedings the
--.----- appellants had filed an objection with regard to the maintainabiEty of
the eviction proceedings under the Rent Control Act before the Addi-
tional Rent Controller and thereupon the Respondent Bank initiated
proceedings for eviction of the appellants under the Public Premises
Act and thereafter the proceedings initiated by the respondent Bank
under the Rent Control Act were dismissed by the Additional Rent
c
- -~-
Controller by orders dated the 6th August, 1989. The learned counsel
of the respondents have urged that the appellants, having raised the
objection against the maintainability of the proceedings for eviction
under the Rent Control Act on the ground that proceedings could only
be maintained under the provisions of the Public Premises Act and D
having got them dismissed, cannot tum round and raise an objection
that the proceedings for eviction under the Public Premises Act are not
maintainable and the proceedings can only be taken under the Rent
Control Act. The learned counsel for the appellants have submitted
~
that special leave to appeal was granted by this Court after notice to
the respondents and at that stage the respondents had raised this E
objection but this Court granted special leave and it is not permissible
for the respondents to agitate this question now. The orders dated the
6th August, 1989 which were passed by the Additional Rent Controller
in the proceedings for eviction initiated by the respondent Bank under
Rent Control Act against the appellants in these appeals have been
placed on record by the respondents and from the said orders it F
appears that in the proceedings initiated under the Rent Control Act
the appellants had raised a plea that the premises in question had been
declared public premises under the Public Premises Act and in view of
that the proceedings under the Rent Control Act were not competent.
The said orders also show that the Additional Rent Controller dismis-
sed the proceedings for eviction under the Rent Control Act on the G
view that the Public Premises Act is applicable to premises in question

r and his jurisdiction was excluded. This would show that the proceed-
ings which were initiated by the Respondent Bank for the eviction of
the appellants under the Rent Control Act were dismissed as not main-
tainable on the ground that the Rent Control Act was not applicable to
the premises and the premises are governed by the provisions of the H
696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS· [ 1990] 3 S.C.R.

A Public Premises Act. This finding was recorded by the Additional Rent
Controller in view of the objection raised by the appellants with
regard to the maintainability of those proceedings. In other words, the
appellants succeeded in ihose proceedings on the basis of their plea
that the premises were not governed by the Rent Control Act and were
governed by the provisions of the Public Premises Act. Having got the
B proceedings under the Rent Control Act dismissed the appellants are
now raising the plea that the proceedings under the Public Premises
··~
Act are not maintainable and that the only remedy available is under
the Rent Control Act. This conduct of the appellants would have
disentitled them from invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under
Article 136 of the Constitution. Since we are of the view that the
C appellants canot succeed on the merits, we do not propose to dismiss
the appeals on this preliminary ground.

In the result the appeals and the writ petition are dismissed.
There will be no order as to costs.
D The appellants in Civil Appeals Nos. 2368 and 2369 of 1986 had
been dispossessed from the premises in their occupation after the dis-
missal of their appeals by the Additional District Judge. During the
pendency of these appeals interim orders were passed by this Court
whereunder possession of a part of the premises was restored to the
appellants. Since these appeals have been dismissed the appellants in
E both the appeals are directed to handover the possession of the portion
of the premises in their occupation to the Respondent Bank within one
month.

In Civil Appeal No. 3725 of 1986 and Writ Petition No. 864 of
1985, this Court had passed interim orders staying the eviction of the
F petitioners in those matters. Since the appeal and the writ petition are
being dismissed the said interim orders shall stand vacated.

R.S.S. Petitions dismissed.