ASHOK VERMAversusTHE STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

                 [2024] 12 S.C.R. 743 : 2024 INSC 1011

                             Ashok Verma
                                   v.
                       The State of Chhattisgarh
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 815 of 2022)
                             19 December 2024
           [C.T. Ravikumar* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Whether concurrent conviction of the appellant u/ss.302, 201 and
       498A of the IPC for the murder of his wife is justified.

                                  Headnotes†
       Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302, 201 and 498A – Concurrent
       conviction – Death of the wife of the appellant-convict, occurred
       in her matrimonial home – Plea of the appellant-convict that
       her death was suicidal and not homicidal:
       Held: Trial Court and High Court concurrently weighed the
       circumstances and gave sturdy reasons to conclude that death of
       the deceased was homicidal in nature and not suicidal – Even after
       seeing his wife hanged using her dupatta, the appellant did not
       care to cut the noose then and there and he chose to do so, only
       after witness(es) were brought to the scene of occurrence – Had
       it been a bona fide, genuine attempt on his part to save her life,
       he would have cut the noose of the ligature then and there itself
       upon seeing her hanged, before going to inform the witness(es)
       that she had hanged herself – Further, the appellant took up the
       plea of alibi on the ground that he was in a nearby garden to the
       place of occurrence at the relevant point of time – DW-1 deposed
       that the appellant was with him during that period in the nearby
       garden however, there is no evidence establishing that DW-1
       was there in the garden during the said period – Strict proof is
       required to establish the plea of alibi – It can be applied only if
       the ‘elsewhere place’ is far away from the place of occurrence
       so that it was extremely improbable or impossible for the person
       concerned to reach the place of occurrence and to participate
       in the crime on the relevant date and time of occurrence – Plea
       of alibi was rightly rejected by the Courts below – Furthermore,


* Author
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       non-rupture of hyoid bone of the deceased would not and should
       not be taken as the sole reason to upturn the concurrent finding
       that it is a case of strangulation – Therefore, plea of appellant
       that the death of victim was not homicidal is rejected. [Paras 7,
       9, 10, 11, 17]

       Evidence Act, 1872 – s.106 – Whether the appellant who was
       bound to offer his version as to how the occurrence had
       taken place in the circumstances obtained in this case, had
       discharged his onus by virtue of s.106:
       Held: s.106 is an exception to the general rule laid down in s.101,
       that the burden of proving a fact rest on the party who substantially
       asserts the affirmative of the issues and that this Section is not
       intended to relieve any person of that duty or burden – If some
       occurrence happened inside a residence where the accused is
       supposed to be, he is bound to offer his version as to how the
       occurrence had taken place – The prosecution succeeded in
       establishing, rather it is an attempt and undisputed fact that the
       deceased and the appellant-convict were residing in the place of
       occurrence, which is the house of the accused – On the death of
       the wife, the appellant alone could offer an explanation, though
       this Section could not be used so as to shift the onus of proving
       the offence from the prosecution to the accused – In the absence
       of explanation when other circumstances fasten the culpability on
       the appellant’s failure to offer satisfactory explanation as to the
       occurrence, the only possible inference could be that the accused
       had participated in the crime. [Paras 18, 19]

                                Case Law Cited
       Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar [1996] Supp. 8 SCR 225 :
       AIR 1997 SC 322; Babudas v. State of M.P. (2003) 9 SCC 86;
       G. Parshwanath v. State of Karnataka, 2010 INSC 525 : [2010]
       10 SCR 377 : (2010) 8 SCC 593; Paramjeet Singh v. State of
       Uttarakhand, 2010 INSC 647 : [2010] 11 SCR 1064 : (2010) 10
       SCC 439; Satish Nirankari v. State of Rajasthan, 2017 INSC 479 :
       [2017] 4 SCR 298 : (2017) 8 SCC 497 – relied on.
       Dnyaneshwar v. State of Maharashtra, 2007 INSC 323 : [2007]
       4 SCR 248 : (2007) 10 SCC 445; Raj Kumar Prasad Tamarkar v.
       State of Bihar and Anr., 2007 INSC 3 : [2007] 1 SCR 13 : (2007)
       10 SCC 433 – referred to.
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                       745

               Ashok Verma v. The State of Chhattisgarh


                      Books and Periodicals Cited
     Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology; Taylor’s Principles
     and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence, 13th Edn., Pp 307- 08.

                               List of Acts
     Penal Code, 1860; Evidence Act, 1872.

                            List of Keywords
     Concurrent conviction; Concurrent finding; Murder; Matrimonial
     home; Death suicidal and not homicidal; Hanged; Dupatta; Noose;
     Ligature; False plea of alibi; Garden; ‘elsewhere place’; Far
     away from the place of occurrence; Non-rupture of hyoid bone;
     Strangulation; Satisfactory explanation.

                           Case Arising From
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
     815 of 2022
     From the Judgment and Order dated 01.02.2019 of the High Court
     of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in CRA No. 845 of 2013

                        Appearances for Parties
     A Sirajudeen, Sr. Adv., Ms. Manjeet Chawla, Mrs. Usha Pant
     Kukreti, Advs. for the Appellant.
     Prashant Singh, Mrs. Prerna Dhall, Piyush Yadav, Alok Sahay,
     Advs. for the Respondent.

                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                               Judgment

     C.T. Ravikumar, J.

1.   This appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court
     of Chhattisgarh in Criminal Appeal No.845 of 2013 whereby and
     whereunder it confirmed the conviction of the appellant under Sections
     300 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short the “IPC”) punishable
     under Section 302, IPC, 201 and 498A of the IPC, in Sessions Trial
     No. 147 of 2012 and the sentences imposed therefor.
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2.     Shortly stated, the prosecution case is as hereunder: -
       The marriage between the appellant-convict and the deceased
       Smt. Pushpa was solemnised in the year 2006. The incident which
       led to the conviction of the appellant in connection with the death
       of Smt. Pushpa occurred on 26.01.2012 at his house, which is
       the matrimonial home of the deceased. The paternal home of the
       deceased is also proximately situated viz., around 50 meters from
       her matrimonial home. The appellant is addicted to gambling and
       to lash out money therefor, he used to torture her physically and
       mentally. He had even mortgaged the jewellery of the deceased
       for the said purpose. The deceased used to share such sorrowful
       incidents with PW-8 Aarti, who is her own sister. On 26.01.2012,
       also when PW-8 went to the house of the deceased she told that
       she was thrashed by the appellant-husband. At about quarter to
       7 pm on 26.01.2012, the appellant went to his in-laws’ house and
       informed them that Pushpa hanged herself and thereupon, he along
       with her parents gone back home where Pushpa was seen on bed
       on her knees and still knotted by dupatta around the neck, which in
       turn, was tied to a piece of wood near the ceiling fan. Despite the
       opposition, the appellant cut the noose and took her in a vehicle to
       Sector-9 Hospital, where the doctor checked and declared her as
       dead. Autopsy on her body was conducted by PW-11, Dr. P. Akhtar.
       In fact, initially a case was registered only under Section 174 of the
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short the “Cr.P.C.”) but, later
       FIR No.269/12 was registered on 07.04.2012 under Sections 302,
       201 and 498A, IPC against the appellant. On being tried, the trial
       Court convicted him as noted above and for the conviction under
       Section 300, IPC, he was sentenced under Section 302, IPC, to
       undergo life imprisonment and also with a fine of Rs.1000/-, for the
       conviction under Section 201, IPC, he was sentenced to undergo
       rigorous imprisonment for three years with fine of Rs.500/- and for the
       conviction under Section 498A, IPC, he was sentenced to undergo
       rigorous imprisonment for one year with a fine of Rs.500/-. Default
       sentences were also passed in case of payment of fine imposed
       for the conviction under the aforesaid sections. The corporeal
       sentences were ordered to be run concurrently. In the appeal viz.,
       in Criminal Appeal No.845 of 2013, the High Court confirmed the
       conviction under the aforesaid sections and also the sentences
       imposed therefor.
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                         747

               Ashok Verma v. The State of Chhattisgarh


3.   Heard the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant and
     the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State.
4.   The facts expatiated earlier would reveal that the appellant was
     convicted concurrently for the aforesaid offences and there is
     concurrency even with respect to the sentences imposed therefor. In
     such circumstances, there is, in fact, very little scope for interference
     in an appeal by Special Leave. In such cases, overlooking of a
     vital piece of evidence which would tilt the balance in favour of the
     convict-appellant or that the finding is based and built on inadmissible
     evidence, which if eschewed from evidence, the prosecution case
     would be substantially discredited or it would impair the prosecution
     case, are some such situations where this Court may interfere with.
     When the contentions raised are pitted against the evidence on record,
     they would reveal no such circumstances. Still, we will proceed to
     consider the contentions raised to find out any other tenable grounds
     are raised by the appellant which may persuade us to entertain this
     appeal against the concurrent conviction.
5.   The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the plea of
     ‘alibi’ was not properly appreciated and considered, especially with
     reference to the oral testimony of DW-1. Despite the non-rupture
     of the hyoid bone the Courts wrongly concluded that the nature of
     the death was homicide. It is also contended that no circumstances
     which irresistibly pointing to the guilt of the appellant-convict were
     established by the prosecution though the conviction was based on
     circumstantial evidence.
6.   Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State
     would submit that the circumstances that led to the finding of guilt
     against the appellant were discussed in detail by the trial Court and
     the High Court as the Appellate Court reappreciated and concurred
     with them besides adding additional reasons for confirming the
     conviction as also the sentence. In short, it is submitted that the
     cumulative effect of such circumstances relied on by the Courts do
     not brook any hypothesis other than the one irresistibly leading to
     the guilt of the appellant-convict, no interference with the concurrent
     conviction as also sentence, is invited in this case.
7.   In view of the rival contentions, we have bestowed careful
     consideration of the said contentions with reference to the materials
     on record. As noted earlier, the incident which led to the death of Smt.
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                           Supreme Court Reports


       Pushpa, the wife of the appellant-convict, had occurred admittedly
       in her matrimonial home. The case of the appellant-convict is that
       a careful scanning of the evidence on record would reveal that the
       prosecution had failed to establish that it is a case of homicide and
       in fact, it is a case of suicide. Adding to the above contentions, the
       learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the appellant was
       implicated in this case and was convicted without any satisfactory
       evidence much less any clinching evidence and also disregarding the
       fact that it was he who attempted to save her life and in that regard
       after cutting the noose of the ligature he took her to the hospital.
       While considering the contention, we shall not lose sight of the fact
       that more often criminals would try to dub a murder as suicidal or
       accidental death. The identification of the nature of the death is,
       therefore, always an important medico-legal problem. In that regard,
       the Courts concerned have to study the total evidence to discern
       whether death is a case of homicide or suicide or accidental. The
       concurrent finding in the case on hand with reference to the evidence
       on record is that it is a case of homicide. Presumption is only a rule
       in the realm of burden of proof and the trial Court and the High Court
       concurrently weighed the circumstances and gave sturdy reasons
       to conclude that death of Pushpa is homicidal in nature and not
       suicidal. In such circumstances, we are not persuaded to entertain
       the concurrently repelled contention of the appellant that the death
       of Pushpa was not homicidal.
8.     Now, the question is about the sustainability of the concurrent finding
       on the culpability of the appellant. Of course, various contentions
       have been raised by the appellant to assail the finding of guilt against
       him concurrently referred to in the judgments of the trial Court and
       the High Court. There can be no doubt that while dealing with the
       such a question creation of fake scene by the appellant, absence of
       explanation by the accused despite being bound by virtue of Section
       106 of the Evidence Act are also to be taken into consideration. In
       the context of the case on hand, the case established by the oral
       testimony of PW-8, Arti who is the own sister of the deceased would
       show that at about 7 pm on the fateful day the appellant came to
       the paternal home of the deceased and informed that Smt. Pushpa
       hanged herself and immediately thereupon, herself, her mother and
       sister went along with him to his house viz., matrimonial home of
       the deceased. The further fact established through the mouth of
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                          749

               Ashok Verma v. The State of Chhattisgarh


     the said prosecution witness is that upon reaching there Pushpa
     was seen on her knees on bed and still knotted by dupatta around
     the neck which, in turn, tied to a wood near the ceiling fan. As per
     PW-8, despite the opposition of their mother when he attempted to
     cut the noose of the ligature and request to wait for the arrival of their
     relatives, he cut it immediately and took her to a nearby hospital at
     Sector 9. Soon on check-up, the doctor declared that she was dead.
     In this context, it is also worthy to note the oral evidence of DW-1,
     Subhash Rao. DW-1 had deposed that on that day, he along with
     the appellant went to Maitri Garden and from there returned home
     between 6 pm and 7 pm and he got down near the lane leading
     to his house. Thereafter, the appellant came to him and informed
     that Pushpa had hanged herself. According to him, thereupon, he
     along with the appellant went to the latter’s house and thereafter,
     he cut the noose of the ligature and took Pushpa to the hospital
     where she was checked and declared as dead. In this context it is
     also relevant to note that there is no scintilla of evidence suggesting
     that she was alive when the noose was cut or that she breathed
     her last enroute to the hospital. We have referred to the evidence
     of DW-1 to show that the cutting of the noose of the ligature, as
     per the version of prosecution witness as also that of DW-1 was
     done only after the appellant went to the witness(es) and informed
     of seeing Pushpa hanged herself. In short, going by the case of
     the prosecution or that of the defence even after seeing Pushpa
     hanged using her dupatta, he did not care to cut the noose then
     and there and had chosen to do so, only after witness(es) were
     brought to the scene of occurrence.
9.   In the above context, it is also relevant to note the absence of self-
     inflicted injuries like scratches on the body of the deceased, going
     by the necroscopical evidence consisting of the oral evidence of
     PW-11, Dr. P. Akhtar with his report. When this be the evidence
     on record how can the appellant contend that he made a bid to
     save the life of the deceased wife Pushpa and in that regard cut
     the noose of the ligature and took her to the hospital. Had it been
     a bona fide, genuine attempt on his part to save her life, he would
     have cut the noose of the ligature then and there itself upon seeing
     her hanged, before going to inform the aforesaid witness(es) that
     she had hanged herself. We are of the considered opinion that the
     contention of the counsel for the appellant as aforesaid regarding the
750                                                            [2024] 12 S.C.R.

                               Supreme Court Reports


       lifesaving attempt, will be of no assistance in the face of evidence
       of the facts established.
10. We will now consider the question whether the contention of the
    appellant that the plea of alibi was considered perversely, especially
    without properly appreciating the evidence of DW-1. In the decision
    in Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar,1 this Court took note of the
    meaning of the Latin word ‘alibi’ as ‘elsewhere’ and observed and
    held that the said plea would be available only if that ‘elsewhere’ is
    a place which is that much far off making it extremely impossible or
    improbable for the person concerned to reach the place of occurrence
    and participate in the offence concerned on the relevant date and
    time. Paragraph 22 and 23 of the said decision which is relevant for
    the purpose reads thus: -
            “22. We must bear in mind that an alibi is not an exception
            (special or general) envisaged in the Penal Code, 1860
            or any other law. It is only a rule of evidence recognised
            in Section 11 of the Evidence Act that facts which are
            inconsistent with the fact in issue are relevant. Illustration
            (a) given under the provision is worth reproducing in this
            context:
            “The question is whether A committed a crime at Calcutta
            on a certain date; the fact that on that date, A was at
            Lahore is relevant.”
            23. The Latin word alibi means “elsewhere” and that word
            is used for convenience when an accused takes recourse
            to a defence line that when the occurrence took place
            he was so far away from the place of occurrence that it
            is extremely improbable that he would have participated
            in the crime. It is a basic law that in a criminal case, in
            which the accused is alleged to have inflicted physical
            injury to another person, the burden is on the prosecution
            to prove that the accused was present at the scene and
            has participated in the crime. The burden would not be
            lessened by the mere fact that the accused has adopted
            the defence of alibi. The plea of the accused in such


1   1996 INSC 1260 : [1996] Supp. 8 SCR 225 : AIR 1997 SC 322
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                        751

               Ashok Verma v. The State of Chhattisgarh


          cases need be considered only when the burden has
          been discharged by the prosecution satisfactorily. But once
          the prosecution succeeds in discharging the burden it is
          incumbent on the accused, who adopts the plea of alibi,
          to prove it with absolute certainty so as to exclude the
          possibility of his presence at the place of occurrence. When
          the presence of the accused at the scene of occurrence
          has been established satisfactorily by the prosecution
          through reliable evidence, normally the court would be
          slow to believe any counter-evidence to the effect that
          he was elsewhere when the occurrence happened. But if
          the evidence adduced by the accused is of such a quality
          and of such a standard that the court may entertain some
          reasonable doubt regarding his presence at the scene
          when the occurrence took place, the accused would, no
          doubt, be entitled to the benefit of that reasonable doubt.
          For that purpose, it would be a sound proposition to be
          laid down that, in such circumstances, the burden on the
          accused is rather heavy. It follows, therefore, that strict
          proof is required for establishing the plea of alibi. This
          Court has observed so on earlier occasions (vide Dudh
          Nath Pandey v. State of U.P. [(1981) 2 SCC 166; State
          of Maharashtra v. Narsingrao Gangaram Pimple [(1984) 1
          SCC 446.”
11. In the context of the afore-extracted paragraphs, it is relevant to
    note that in the case on hand, the appellant was bound to explain
    what happened on that day at his house by virtue of Section 106 of
    the Evidence Act since the appellant and the deceased were man
    and wife and the incident had occurred in the house where they
    were residing. Therefore, he was bound to explain and establish the
    same as it is a fact, exclusively within his knowledge, by concrete
    evidence, if he fails to establish the plea of ‘alibi’.
12. In the case on hand, the appellant convict took up the plea of alibi on
    the ground that he was in a nearby garden to the place of occurrence
    at the relevant point of time. DW-1 deposed that the appellant was
    with him during that period in the nearby Maitri Garden and returned
    from there between 6 pm and 7 pm and he got down near the lane
    of his house. Furthermore, he would depose that thereafter, the
    appellant came back and told him that Pushpa hanged herself and
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       then he proceeded to the house of the appellant and the noose was
       cut and she was taken to hospital.
13. As held in Binay Kumar Singh’s case (supra), strict proof is
    required to establish the plea of alibi. There is absolutely no evidence
    establishing that DW-1 was there in the garden during the said period.
    Then, how his version could be relied on by the appellant to establish
    the plea of alibi. That apart, the very fact is that the appellant took up
    the plea of alibi on the ground that he was in a nearby garden itself
    would be sufficient to throw the case put forth by him as defence, in
    the light of Binay Kumar Singh’s case (supra). The plea of alibi, in
    the light of the decision in Binay Kumar Singh’s case (supra) can
    be applied only if the ‘elsewhere place’ is far away from the place
    of occurrence so that it was extremely improbable or impossible
    for the person concerned to reach the place of occurrence and to
    participate in the crime on the relevant date and time of occurrence.
    In such circumstances, we are of the considered view that the said
    contention was rightly rejected by the Courts below.
14. The effect of false plea of alibi was considered by this Court in
    Babudas v. State of M.P. 2 and in G. Parshwanath v. State of
    Karnataka.3 In G. Parshwanath’s case, this Court held that when
    the accused gave a false plea that he was not present on the spot,
    his statement would be regarded as additional circumstance against
    him strengthening the chain of circumstances already found firm.
15. In the decision in Babudas’s case (supra), this Court held that in a
    case of circumstantial evidence, a false plea of alibi set up by the
    accused would be a link in the chain of circumstances but then it
    could not be the sole link or sole circumstances based on which a
    conviction could be passed.
16. In the decision in Paramjeet Singh v. State of Uttarakhand,4 this
    Court held that the aid of false defence led on behalf of accused
    could be used to lend assurance to the Court when the case of the
    prosecution is established on the basis of circumstantial evidence.
17. Now, we will deal with the contention made as a last-ditch effort against
    the finding of the Courts below that Pushpa’s death is homicidal,


2   (2003) 9 SCC 86
3   2010 INSC 525 : [2010] 10 SCR 377 : (2010) 8 SCC 593
4   2010 INSC 647 : [2010] 11 SCR 1064 : (2010) 10 SCC 439
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                          753

                   Ashok Verma v. The State of Chhattisgarh


     based on the non-rupture of hyoid bone. Based on the decision in
     Satish Nirankari v. State of Rajasthan,5 and the relevant text at
     page 454 and 456 of Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology,
     the contention(s) unsuccessfully raised before the High Court were
     reiterated before us and in other words, contended that non-rupture
     of hyoid bone would indicate that death of Pushpa is suicidal and
     not homicidal in nature. We have already held that sturdy and sound
     reasons have been given by two Courts to conclude that it is a case of
     homicide. Non-rupture of hyoid bone of Pushpa would not and should
     not be taken as the sole reason to upturn the said concurrent finding
     that it is a case of strangulation. In this context, it is to be noted that
     in Satish Nirankari’s case, this Court held even in the absence of
     non-rupture of hyoid bone cause of death can be of strangulation. The
     position and posture of the body of Pushpa when PW-8 and others
     came to the house of the appellant-convict, as deposed by PW-8,
     were not challenged in cross-examination. This was duly taken note
     of by the Courts. In view of the said decision and what is stated sin
     Taylor’s Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence, 13th Edn.,
     Pp 307-08, which were extracted in paragraph 14 of the impugned
     judgment and in view of the position obtained from the evidence of
     PW-8, we do not find any reason to proceed further with the said
     contention that owing to the non-rupture of hyoid bone the finding
     of homicidal death invites interference.
18. Now, we will consider whether the appellant who was bound to
    offer his version as to how the occurrence had taken place in the
    circumstances obtained in this case, had discharged his onus by virtue
    of Section 106 of the Evidence Act. Section 106 is an exception to
    the general rule laid down in Section 101, that the burden of proving
    a fact rest on the party who substantially asserts the affirmative of
    the issues and that this Section is not intended to relieve any person
    of that duty or burden.
19. If some occurrence happened inside a residence where the accused
    is supposed to be, he is bound to offer his version as to how the
    occurrence had taken place. In the case on hand, the prosecution
    had succeeded in establishing, rather it is an attempt and undisputed
    fact that the deceased and the appellant-convict were residing in the
    place of occurrence, which is the house of the accused. On the death


5   2017 INSC 479 : [2017] 4 SCR 298 : (2017) 8 SCC 497
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       of the wife, the appellant alone could offer an explanation, though
       this Section could not be used so as to shift the onus of proving
       the offence from the prosecution to the accused. In the absence
       of explanation when other circumstances fasten the culpability on
       the appellant’s failure to offer satisfactory explanation as to the
       occurrence, the only possible inference could be that the accused
       had participated in the crime. (See the decisions in Dnyaneshwar
       v. State of Maharashtra,6 and Raj Kumar Prasad Tamarkar v.
       State of Bihar and Anr. 7 ).
20. As established by the prosecution, the place of occurrence is the
    matrimonial home of the deceased where the deceased and appellant
    were living. The evidence of PW-8, Aarti that the deceased was
    being tortured, physically and mentally was also not controverted
    while being cross-examined, as held by the two Courts. The Courts
    have taken note of the fact that though PW-8 gave evidence to such
    effect while being examined in chief, there was no cross-examination
    on such points to make her untrustworthy.
21. The cumulative effect and impact of all such circumstances explained
    together with the sturdy reasons assigned by the trial Court which
    got confirmation from the impugned judgment, constrain us to hold
    that this appeal is devoid of merits. Consequently, the captioned
    appeal stands dismissed.

       Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.



       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan




6   2007 INSC 323 : [2007] 4 SCR 248 : (2007) 10 SCC 445
7   2007 INSC 3 : [2007] 1 SCR 13 : (2007) 10 SCC 433