ASHOK KUMARversusVED PRAKASH & ORS.
- Citation
- 2009 INSC 1320
- Decided
- 17 December 2009
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- TARUN CHATTERJEE
Holding
Section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 embraces the landlord’s bona‑fide requirement for both residential and non‑residential premises, and earlier decisions under the East Punjab Rent Act are persuasive in interpreting this provision.
Summary
The landlord, Om Prakash, let a shop to the tenant Ashok Kumar in 1982 and later sought eviction on the ground of a bona‑fide requirement for his son. The Rent Controller, the appellate authority and the Punjab‑Haryana High Court ordered eviction of the tenant from the non‑residential premises under Section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973. The tenant appealed, contending that Section 13 permits eviction only of residential premises and that the landlord’s death during the proceedings should abate the suit. The Supreme Court examined earlier decisions, particularly Harbilas Rai Bansal v. State of Punjab, which held that a similar provision in the East Punjab Rent Act could not exclude non‑residential premises, and applied that ratio to the Haryana Act, holding that the bona‑fide requirement includes non‑residential premises. The Court also rejected the argument of abatement, noting that the requirement was pleaded for the landlord’s son. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the eviction order upheld.
Issues considered
- Whether Section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 allows a landlord to evict a tenant from a non‑residential premises on the ground of bona‑fide requirement.
- Whether the ratio in Harbilas Rai Bansal and subsequent decisions under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act can be applied to interpret the Haryana Act.
- Whether the death of the original landlord during pendency of the proceedings gives rise to abatement of the eviction suit.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Judgment
[2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 695
ASHOK KUMAR A
v.
VED PRAKASH & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 8417 of 2009)
DECEMBER 17, 2009
8
[TARUN CHATTERJEE AND V. S. SIRPURKAR, JJ.]
Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973:
s. 13 - Eviction of tenant from non-residential premises c
on ground of bona fide need of landlord - HELD: Correct
interpretation of bona fide requirement of landlord of a
residential building must include a non-residential building as
well - Rent Controller and High Court rightly allowed the
petition of landlord - Bonafide requirement being for purposes D
' of son of landlord, on landlord's death, question of abatement
of eviction proceedings cannot arise at all - Abatement - East
Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 - s.13.
Precedent:
E
!
Decision of Court having regard to a particular enactment
- HELD: Holds persuasive value while considering
~ constitutionality of a similar provision albeit in a different
legislation - Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act,
1973. F
An order of eviction of the tenant from non-residential
premises was passed by the Rent Controller under the
Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973
on the ground of bona fide need of the landlord. The order
~
was affirmed by the appellate authority and the High G
Court. In the instant appeal filed by the tenaltt, the
question for consideration before the Court was: whether
the landlord would be entitled to evict his tenant from a
non-residential premises on the ground of bonafide
695 H
696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A requirement under the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent
and Eviction) Act, 1973 when s.13 of the Act provides for
eviction of the tenant only in case of residential building?
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
B HELD: 1.1. Long before the Haryana Urban (Control
of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973, s.13 of the East Punjab
Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 before its amendment,
contained provisions for eviction of a tenant from
residential as well as non-residential premises. In 1956,
c the Legislature, by introducing an amendment to the East
Punjab Rent Act, deleted the word "non-residential
premises" from s.13 with the result that after the
amendment, a landlord could not seek eviction of his
tenant from non-residential premises for his bonafide
D requirement which was originally available to the
landlord. The constitutionality of the said amendment was '
challenged and this Court declaring the amendment
constitutionally invalid, restored the original provisions
of the Act, to the effect that landlord can seek eviction of
E a tenant from a non-residential building as well on the ,_
ground of his bona fide need. Thus, in view of the decision
of this Court, a landlord can seek eviction of his tenant
on the ground of bonafide requirement not only from
residential premises but also from non-residential
F premises under the East Punjab Rent Act. As regards the
plea of appellant that the decision and reasoning
concerning East Punjab Rent Act, cannot apply to the
question arising in the instant case under the Haryana
Rent Act, suffice it to say, there is no reason as to why
the decision concerning one legislation cannot hold
G
persuasive value for the Court, while considering the -f
constitutionality of a very similar provision, albeit in a
different legislation.[Para 10,11, 15 and 25) [702-D-H; 704-
F-G; 708-F]
H Harbilas Rai Bansal vs. State of Punjab 1995 (6) Suppl.
ASHOK KUMAR v. VED PRAKASH & ORS. 697
;
=
SCR 178 1996 (1) SCC 1; Gyan Devi Anand vs. Jeevan A
Kumar1985 (1) Suppl. SCR 1 = (1985) 2 SCC 683; Rakesh
Vij vs. Dr. Raminder Pal Singh Sethi and others 1985 (1)
=
Suppl. SCR 1 2005 (8) SCC 504; Mohinder Prasad Jain
vs. Manohar Lal Jain 2006 (2) SCR 513 = 2006 (2) SCC 724,
relied on. B
State of Madhyapradesh v. G.C.Mandawar 1955 SCR
158 =AIR 1954 SC 493 - cited.
1.2. The correct interpretation of bonafide requirement
of a landlord of a residential building must include a non- C
residential building as well. It cannot be said that an
eviction petition filed by a landlord for eviction of a tenant
cannot be filed u/s 13 of the Act when such eviction
proceeding relates to a non-residential building. [Para 20
• and 21) [707-A-B; 707-F] D
Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by LRs. vs. Union of India and
another 2008 (6 ) SCR 566 = 2008 (5) SCC 287, relied on.
Common Cause vs. Union of India and Ors. JT 2003
(Suppl.2) SC 270, Padmasundara Rao and Ors. vs. State of E
Tamil Nadu and Ors. (2002) 3 SCC 533, Union of India vs.
• Deoki Nandan Aggarwal 1991 ( 3) SCR 873 =AIR 1992 SC
96, Naveen Kohli vs. Neethu Kohli 2006 (4) SCC 558; and
Vishnu Dutt Sharma vs. Manju Sharma 2009 (3) SCALE 425,
cited. F
1.3. It is not in dispute that the original landlord died
during the pendency of the revision in the High Court.
Looking at the averments made in the eviction petition,
where the original landlord has categorically pleaded that G
' the requirement was for his son who has become the
landlord because of the death of the original plaintiff, the
question of abatement of the eviction proceedings cannot
arise at all. That apart, the plea regarding abatement of
H
698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A eviction proceedings due to death of original landlord
was not even raised by the tenant before the High Court
when the original landlord died and the respondents
were substituted in his place. [Para 26) (708-G-H; 709-A-
CJ
B Case Law Reference:
1995 ( 6 ) Suppl. SCR 178 relied on para 11
1985 ( 1 ) Suppl. SCR 1 relied on para 13
c 1985 ( 1 ) Suppl. SCR 1 relied on para 15
2006 (2 ) SCR 513 relied on para 17
JT 2003 (Suppl.2) SC 270 cited Para 18
(2002) 3 sec 533 cited Para 18
D
1991 ( 3 ) SCR 873 cited Para 18
r.
2006 (4) sec 558 cited Para 18
2009 (3) SCALE 425 cited Para 18
E
2008 (6 ) SCR 566 relied on para 20
1955 SCR 158 cited para 24
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
F 8417 of 2009.
From the Judgment & Order dated 5.3.2007 of the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in C.R. No. 3943
of 2005.
G Gagan· Gupta for the Appellant.
G.D. Rustagi and Anis Ahmed Khan for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
H
ASHOK KUMAR v. VED PRAKASH & ORS. 699
TARUN CHATTERJEE, J. 1. Leave granted. A
2. This appeal has been filed by the tenant/appellant from
the judgment and final order dated 3rd of March. 2007 passed
by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil
Revision Case No.3943 of 2005 whereby the High Court had
8
dismissed the civil revision case and affirmed the order of the
appellate authority as well as of the Rent Controller thereby
-~ directing eviction of the tenant/appellant from a shop
constructed on the ground floor at Plot No.12, bearing Municipal
No.179 (a), Ward No.3, New Anaj Mandi, Sohna, District
Gurgaon (Haryana) (hereinafter referred to as the 'tenanted C
premises').
3. The case made out by the original landlord Mr. Om
Prakash (since deceased) in his eviction petition can be
narrated as follows: D
The tenanted premises was let out to the tenant/appellant
in the year 1982 in which the appellant was carrying on the
business of Commission Agent. The case of bonafide
requirement as pleaded by the original landlord was that the E
original landlord and his two sons were carrying on the same
business as that of the appellant and as the original landlord
had decided to settle his elder son Ved Prakash in the tenanted
~. premises in the business of Commission Agent and the
younger son Arun Kumar in another shop occupied by another
tenant, he was constrained to file the eviction petition on the F
ground of bonafide requirement and a separate eviction
proceeding was also filed against the other tenant by the
original landlord. In spite of repeated reminders to the tenant/
appellant to vacate the tenanted premises, the tenant/appellant
having failed to vacate the same, the original landlord was G
~ constrained to file the eviction proceeding against the tenant/
appellant.
4. The tenant/appellant entered appearance and contested
the eviction proceeding denying the material allegations made H
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A in the application for eviction. In his written objection, the tenanU
appellant had categorically denied that the respondent had any
bonafide requirement for use and occupation of his son for
starting a business of Commission Agent in the tenanted
premises. Accordingly, the tenanUappellant sought for dismissal
B of the eviction petition.
5. The Rent Controller, Gurgaon, by his order dated
31.05.2004, had allowed the application for eviction inter alia
holding that the original landlord had successfully proved his
bonafide requirement of the tenanted premises. Feeling
C aggrieved by this order of the Rent Controller, an appeal was
taken by the tenanUappellant before the Appellate authority
which affirmed the findings of the Rent Controller, Gurgaon and
dismissed the appeal of the tenant/appellant. Again feeling
aggrieved by the order of the appellate authority, a revision
D petition was filed by the appellant before the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana which was dismissed by the impugned ""
order affirming the findings of the Appellate Authority as well
as of the Rent Controller, Gurgaon. Be it mentioned herein that
the original landlord, as noted hereinearlier, died during the
E pendency of the Civil Revision case in the High Court and the
present respondents were substituted in his place.
6. Before us, the pivotal issue that was seriously raised
by the learned counsel for the appellant was as follows: - ;
F (i) Whether the landlord would be entitled to evict his
tenant from a non-residential premises on the
ground of bonafide requirement under the Haryana
Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973
(hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') when Section
G 13 of the Act provides for eviction of the tenant only
in case of residential building if the landlord -1
requires it for his own occupation, and is not
occupying another residential building in the urban
area concerned and has not vacated such building
H without sufficient cause after the commencement of
ASHOK KUMAR v. VED PRAKASH & ORS. 701
[TARUN CHATIERJEE, J.]
East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 in A
the said urban area?
7. On the aforesaid issue, we have heard the learned
counsel appearing for the parties and examined the materials
on record. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, 8
since Section 13 of the Act does not permit a landlord to evict
a tenant who is in occupation of a non-residential building on
the ground of bonafide requirement, the question of evicting the
appellant from the tenanted premises under Section 13 of the
Act would not arise at all. This submission of the learned C
counsel for the tenant/appellant was seriously contested by the
learned counsel for the respondent. Before we take up this
issue for our consideration, it would be appropriate to refer to
Section 13 of the Act which runs as under:-
"Eviction of tenants- D
(1) A tenant in possession of a building or rented land
shall not be evicted therefrom except in accordance
with the provisions of this section.
(2) ................................ (Omitted because it is not E
necessary for our purpose)
(3) A landlord may apply to the controller for an order
directing the tenant to put the landlord in
possession- F
(a) in case of residential building, if-
(i) he requires it for own occupation, is not
occupying another residential building in the
urban area concerned and has not vacated G
such building without sufficient cause after the
commencement of 1949 Act in the said
urban area."
8. A plain reading of Section 13 of the Act would show that H
702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A it permits a landlord to evict a tenant only from a residential
premises and not from the non-residential premises. It is an
admitted position that the landlord/respondent sought to evict
the tenant from the tenanted premises for his own use and
occupation, which was let out for non-residential purposes.
B
9. The Act was enacted by the Legislature in order to
control the increase of rent of certain buildings and rented lands
situated within the limits of urban areas and the eviction of
,.
tenants therefrom. Section 2 (g) of the Act defines "residential
building" which means any building which is not a non-
c residential building. Section 11 of the Act prohibits conversion
of a residential building into a non-residential building. Section
13 of the Act deals with eviction of a tenant.
10. At this stage, we need to consider a different Act
D namely, the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (in
short "East Punjab Rent Act"), which was enacted long before
the Act of 1973, with which, we are concerned as we find that
somewhat similar provisions have been enacted in both the
Acts by the Legislature. Section 13 of the East Punjab Relit
E Act, before its amendment, contained provisions for eviction of
a tenant from a residential as well as from a non-residential
premises. However, the Legislature, by introducing an
- F
amendment to the East Punjab Rent Act, had deleted the word
"non-residential premises" from Section 13 of the Act, from
which it will be clear that the landlord cannot seek eviction of a
tenant after amendment from a non-residential premises for his
bonafide requirement which was available to the landlord
before the introduction of the Amendment Act in 1956. This
amendment was introduced by East Punjab Rent Restriction
(Amendment) Act 1956, which came into force on 24th of
G
September, 1956.
11. The constitutionality of the Amendment Act of 1956 by
which deletion of the word "non-residential premises" for
eviction of a tenant on the ground of bonafide requirement under
H Section 13 of the East Punjab Rent Act came under challenge
ASHOK KUMAR v. VED PRAKASH & ORS. 703
[TARUN CHATIERJEE, J.]
in this Court in the case of Harbilas Rai Bansal vs. State of A
-
Punjab 1996 (1) SCC 1, in which this Court held the aforesaid
amendment of the East Punjab Rent Act as unconstitutional and
directed as follows :-
'We allow the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment B
of the High Court, declare the above said provisions of the
amendment as constitutionally invalid and as a
-;
consequence restore the original provisions of the· Act
which were operating before coming into force of the
amendment. The net result is that a landlord-under the Act-
can seek eviction of a tenant from a nonresidential building
c
on the ground that he requires it for his own use. The
parties to bear their own costs."
12. After the amendment of Section 13 of the East Punjab
Rent Act, by which the word "non-residential premises" was D
,. deleted by judicial pronouncement, a landlord seeking eviction
of his tenant on the ground of bonafide requirement would be
entitled to file such eviction proceeding not only in respect of a
residential premises, but also from a non-residential premises.
E
13. While deciding the constitutionality of the aforesaid
amendment of the East Punjab Rent Act, this Court in the
aforesaid decision namely, Harbilas Rai (supra) had also
considered another decision of this Court in Gyan Devi Anand
vs. Jeevan Kumar (1985) 2 SCC 683. In Gyan Devi Anand
F
(supra), this Court also felt the difficulty of the landlord to evict
- his tenant in respect of a non-residential premises. While
considering this aspect, this Court in that decision observed
as under:-
"The legislature in its wisdom did recognise this fact and -G
. ~
the Legislature has provided that bona fide requirement
of the landlord for his own use will be a legitimate ground
under the Act for the eviction of his tenant from any
residential premises. This ground is, however, confined to
residential premises and is not made available in case of H
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (AOOL.) S.C.R.
A commercial premises. A landlord who lets out commercial •
premises to a tenant under certain circumstances may
need bona fide the premises for his own use under
changed conditions in some future date should not in
fairness be deprived of his right to recover the commercial
B premises. Bona fide need of the landlord will stand very
much on the same footing in regard to either class of
permises, residential or commercial. We therefore,
suggest that Legislature may consider the advisability of t-
making the bona fide requirement of the landlord a ground
c of eviction in respect of commercial premises as well."
14. From the aforesaid observation of this Court, it is
therefore clear that this Court in 1985 felt this difficulty and
suggested that suitable legislation or amendment to the Statute
should be made by the Legislature.
D
15. In Gian Devi (supra), the question that was raised ~
before the Constitutional Bench was whether under the Delhi
Rent Control Act, 1958, the statutory tenancy in respect of
commercial premises was heritable or not. While answering
E this question in Gian Devi Anand (supra), this Court answered
the question in the affirmative. The observations that were
made by this Court in Gian Devi Anand (supra), as noted
hereinealier, were made, keeping in view the hardship being
caused to the landlords of non-residential premises, who cannot
F evict their tenants even on the ground of bonafide requirement
for personal use. Accordingly, in view of our discussions made
hereinabove and in view of the observations made by this Court
in the aforesaid two decisions, the only conclusion that can be
drawn is that a landlord can seek eviction of his tenant on the
-
ground of bonafide requirement not only from residential
G
premises but also from a non-residential premises under the •
East Punjab Rent Act. '
16. This view was also approved by a Three-Judge Bench
decision of this Court in Rakesh Vij vs. Dr. Raminder Pal
H Singh Sethi and others 2005 (8) SCC 504 in which, it has been
ASHOK KUMAR v. VED PRAKASH & ORS. 705
[TARUN CHATIERJEE, J.]
held that eviction of a tenant who is occupying a non-residential A
premises of a landlord, on the ground of bonafide requirement
under the East Punjab Rent Act, would be available in which
the decision in Harbi/as' case (supra) was followed.
17. Following the decision of the Harbilas' Case (supra) 8
and the other decisions referred to hereinabove, this Court in
a recent decision reported in Mohinder Prasad Jain vs.
Manohar Lal Jain 2006 (2) SCC 724 held that a landlord is
entitled to seek eviction of a tenant under the Act from a non-
residential building on the ground that the landlord bonafide C
required the tenanted premises for his own use and occupation.
In para 5 of the said decision in that case, this Court observed
as under:-
"We may notice that this Court in Harbilas Rai Bansal v.
State of Punjab held such a provision to be D
unconstitutional, whereas in Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan
Kumar somewhat different note was struck. The question
recently fell for consideration before a three-Judge Bench
of this Court in Rakesh Vij v. Dr. Raminder Pal Singh
Sethi wherein this Court upheld the ratio laid down in E
Harbilas Rai Bansal (supra) stating:
We allow the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of
the High Court, declare the abovesaid provisions of the
... amendment as constitutionally invalid and as a
consequence restore the original provisions of the Act F
which were operating before coming into force of the
amendment. The net result is that a landlord "under the
Act" can seek eviction of a tenant from a non- residential
building on the ground that he requires it for his own
use.(Emphasis supplied)" G
18. In view of the aforesaid decision of this Court, which
followed the earlier decisions although on different Rent Acts,
we need not delve on this question any further but our Judgment
will not be completed if we do not consider the decisions cited H
706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
~
A by the learned counsel on behalf of the appellant. As noted
hereinearlier, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted
before us that since the Act only permits a landlord to evict a
tenant on the ground of bonafide requirement from a residential
building and nothing has been stated in that provision or right
B has been created on the landlord to evict a tenant from a non-
residential building on the ground of bonafide requirement, it
is not open to the landlord to apply for eviction of a tenant from
a non-residential premises on the ground of bonafide •
requirement when such ground was not specifically conferred
c the Legislature under Section 13 of the Act or to the landlord
by
to apply for eviction of the tenant from the non-residential
premises. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the
appellant, the decision in Mohinder Prasad Jain (supra), which
was delivered under the Act, is not a good law and, therefore,
the matter may be referred to a larger Bench for consideration
D .,
of this question. In support of this submission, the learned
counsel for the appellant had cited a number of decisions
namely, Common Cause vs. Union of India and Ors. JT 2003
(Suppl.2) SC 270, Padmasundara Rao and Ors. vs. State of
Tamil Nadu and Ors. (2002) 3 SCC 533, Union of India vs.
E Deoki Nandan Aggarwal AIR 1992 SC 96, Naveen Kohli vs.
Neethu Kohli 2006 (4) SCC 558 and Vishnu Dutt Sharma vs.
Manju Sharma 2009 (3) SCALE 425.
19. We have carefully considered the aforesaid decisions
F of this Court, as noted hereinearlier. It is difficult to accept that
the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant in
support of his aforesaid submission will lead us to hold that the
landlord shall not be entitled to evict a tenant from a non-
-
residential premises for bonafide requirement, when such
G ground for eviction has been made available only in case of
·.
residential premises. In our view, the view taken in Mohinder
Prasad Jain (Supra) cannot be said to be a bad law on the
ground that it was really an usurpation of legislative duties on
the part of the Court by any stretch of imagination.
H
ASHOK KUMAR v. VED PRAKASH & ORS. 707
[TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
20. Therefore, the decisions cited by the learned counsel A
for the appellant cannot be relied upon for the purpose of
holding that the Court is not conferred with the power to
entertain an eviction petition against a tenant relating to non-
residential premises as, in our view, the correct interpretation
of bonafide requirement of a landlord of a residential building B
~- must include a non-residential building as well in view of the
.. decisions referred to hereinabove. In this connection, we may
also add that it may be pertinent to note that in the case of
Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by LRs. vs. Union of India and
another 2008 (5) SCC 287, a similar provision in the Delhi c
Rent Act, 1958 was found to be unconstitutional. In this
connection, reference may be made to para 38 of the said
decision, which reads as under:-
"38. In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section
t' 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act is violative of the doctrine of D
equality embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution of India
insofar as it discriminates between the premises let for
residential and non-residential purposes when the same
are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation for
himself or for any member of his family dependent on him E
and restricts the latter's right to seek eviction of the tenant
from the premises let for residential purposes only.
21. Thus, in view of the overall discussions made
hereinabove, we are unable to accept the submission of the F
learned counsel for the appellant that an eviction petition filed
by a landlord for eviction of a tenant cannot be filed under
Section 13 of the Act when such eviction proceeding relates
to a non-residential building.
' G
22. Before parting with this Judgment, a short submission
\
of the learned counsel for the appellant needs to be dealt with.
According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the case of
Harbilas (supra) and Rakesh Vij (Supra) were rendered on the
amendments made to East Punjab Rent Act, whereas the case
H
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A of Mohinder Prasad Jain (supra) and the issue before us
concerned removing a classification which existed from the
inception of the legislation.
23. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the
B appellant, a decision and reasoning concerning East Punjab
Rent Act cannot apply to a question with respect to the present
Act because both the legislations are products of different ~
legislatures and the rationale behind one cannot be compared
at par with that of the other.
c 24. The learned counsel for the appellant, in support of this
contention, relied on a decision of this Court in the case of State
of Madhyapradesh v. G.C.Mandawar, AIR 1954 SC 493 and
strong reliance on para 9 of this decision was pressed by the
learned counsel for the appellant, which may be quoted :-
D ~
Paragraph 9: "It is conceivable that when the same
Legislature enacts two different laws but in substance they
form one legislation, it might be open to the Court to
disregard the form and treat them as one law and strike it
E down, if in their conjunction they result in discrimination. But
such a course is not open where, as here, the two laws
sought to be read in conjunction are by different
Governments and by different legislatures."
25. There is no quarrel in the aforesaid principle laid down
F by this Court in the aforesaid decision. However, we do not see
why the decision concerning one legislation cannot hold
persuasive value for the Court, while considering the
constitutionality of a very similar provision, albeit in a different
legislation.
G ~
26. It is not in dispute that the original landlord died, as
noted herein, during the pendency of the Civil Revision case
in the High Court. There is a faint argument of the learned
counsel for the appellant that on such date, the requirement of
the landlord had perished. In our view, there is no merit in this
H
ASHOK KUMAR v. VED PRAKASH & ORS. 709
[TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
submission of the learned counsel for the appellant. Looking A
at the averments made in the eviction petition, where the
original landlord has categorically pleaded that the requirement
was for his son who presently is the landlord because of the
death of the original plaintiff, the question of abatement of the
eviction proceeding cannot arise at all. That apart, the B
submission so made before us by the learned counsel for the
appellant was not even raised by the appellant before the High
Court where the original landlord died and the present
respondents have been substituted in his place.
27. In this view of the matter, we do not find any substance
c
in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant. No
other question was raised by the learned counsel for the
appellant in support of this appeal and accordingly, we do not
find any merit in this appeal. The appeal is thus dismissed.
r There will be no order as to costs. D
R.P. Appeal dismissed.
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