ASHOK KUMAR PANDEYversusTHE STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ORS.

A                             ASHOK KUMAR PANDEY
                                           v.
                     THE STA TL OF WEST BENGAL AND ORS.

                                 NOVEMBER 18,2003

B                [DORAISWAMY RAJU ANDARIJITPASAYAT, JJ.]


           Public Interest Litigation:

         Locus stand.._Petitioner filed a writ petition before the Supreme Court
C for conversion of the death sentence to life sentence imposed on the accused
   as there had been no execution of the death sentence for a long time--Held:
   There must be a real and genuine public interest involved in a Public Interest
  litigation (PIL)-A person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in
  the litigation alone has the locus standi-PIL should be aimed at redressal
D of genuine public wrong or public injury and not publicity oriented or
  founded on personal vendetta-On facts, the petitioner did not have locus
  standi to file the Pll-Hence, petition dismissed.

          Constitution of India, 1950.

E          Article 32-Writ petition-Right to seek redress-Held: Ordinarily the
     aggrieved party only has the right to enforce his fundamental rights-If such
     party is a minor, an insane person or is suffering from any legal disability
     any other person may move the Supreme Court on his behalf-Code of
     Criminal Procedure, I973-Ss. 320. (4)(a), 335(/)(b) and :139.

F          The petitioner filed the present petition under Article 32 of the
     Constitution to the effect that the death sentence imposed on the accused by
     the Sessions Court and affirmed by the High Court and this Court needed to
     be converted to life sentence because there had been no execution of the death
     sentence for a long time.

G          According to the petitioner, he saw a news item in a TV channel wherein
     it was shown that the authorities were unaware about the non-execution of
     the death sentence and, therefore the condemned prisoner-the accused, had
     suffered a great degree of mental torture and that itself was a ground for
     conversion of his death sentence to life sentence on the basis of the ratio in
II                                        716
            ASH OK KUMAR PANDEY v. STA TE OF WEST BENGAL                    717
Smt. Triveniben v. State a/Gujarat, [1989) l sec 678. The petitioner further        A
contended that as a public-spirited citizen of the country, he had a locus to
present the petition and when the matter involved life and liberty of a citizen,
this Court should not stand on technicalities and should give effect to the
ratio in Triveniben's case.

      Dismissing the petition, the Court                                            B
      HELD: I.I. When there is material to show that a petition styled as a
public interest litigation is nothing but a camouflage to foster personal
disputes, said petition is to be thrown out. [722-C)

       1.2. Public Interest Litigation (PIL), which has now come to occupy an       C
important field in the administration of law, should not be "publicity interest
litigation" or "private interest litigation" or "politics interest litigation" or
the latest trend "paise income litigation". If not properly regulated and abuse
averted it becomes also a tool in unscrupulous hands to release vendetta and
wreck vengeance, as well. There must be a real and genuine public interest          D
involved in the litigation and not merely an adventure of knight-errant or poke
one into for a probe. It cannot also be invoked by a person or a body of persons
to further his or their personal causes or satisfy his or their personal grudge
and enmity. Courts of justice should not be allowed to be polluted by
unscrupulous litigants by resorting to these extraordinary jurisdiction. A
person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of         E
public interest litigation will alone have a locus standi and can approach the
Court to wipe out violation of fundamental rights and genuine infraction of
statutory provisions, but not for personal gain or private profit or political
motive or any oblique consideration. (722-D-F)

      Janata Dal v. HS. Choudhary, (1992) 4 SCC 305 and Kazi Lhendup                F
Dorji v. Central Bureau ofInvestigation, [1994) Supp. 2 ACC ll6, relied on.

      Smt. Triveniben v. State of Gujarat, (1989) l SCC 678, Sunil Batra (II)
v. Delhi Adminstration, (1980)3 SCC 488, S.P. Guptqv. Union ofIndia, )1981)
Supp. sec 87 and Daya Singh v. Union ofIndia, (1991) 3 sec 61, referred             G
to.

    Stroud's Judicial Dictionary Vol. 4 Raman (!Vth. Edition) and Black's
Law Dectionary (Sixth Edition), referred to.

      1.3. A writ petitioner who comes to the Court for relief in public interest   H
    718                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A must come not only with clean hands like any other writ petitioner but also
  with a clean heart, clean mind and clean objective. (722-G I

          Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India, AIR (1993) SC 852 and K.R.
    Srinivas v. R.M Premchand, (199416 SCC 620, relied on.

B        2. Though no efforts are spared in fostering and developing the laudable
  concept of PIL and extending the long arm of sympathy to the poor, the ignorant,
  the oppressed and the needy whose fundamental rights are infringed and
  violated and whose grievance go unnoticed, unrepresented and unheard of,
  yet this Court cannot avoid but express its opinion that while genuine litigants
C with legitimate grievances relating to civil matters involving properties worth
  h1mdreds of millions of rupees and criminal cases in which persons sentenced
  to death facing the gallows under untold agony and persons sentenced to life
  lmprlionment and kept in incarceration for long years, person suffering from
  undue delay In service matters--government or private, persons awaiting the
  disposal of cases wherein huge amounts of public revenue or unauthorized
D collection of tax amounts are locked up, detenu expecting their release from
  the detention orders etc. etc. are all standing in long queue for having their
  grievances redressed, the busy bodies, middlesome interlopers, wayfarers or
  officious interveners having absolutely no public interest except for personal
  gain or private profit either of themselves or as a proxy of others or for any
  other extraneous motivation or for glare ofpu!Jlicity break the queue muffing
E their faces by wearing the mask of public interest litigation and get into the
  Courts by filing vexatious and frivolous petitions and thus criminally waste
  the valuable time of the Court and as a result of which the queue standing
  outside the doors of the court never moves, which piquant situation creates
  frustration in the minds of the genuine litigants and resultantly they lose
F faith in the adminstration of the judicial system. (724-D-H; 725-A-B)
        3. Public interest litigation is a weapon, which has to be used with great
  care and circumspection, and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see
  that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested
  interest and/or publicity seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an effective
G weapon in the armory of law for delivering social justice to the citizens. The
  attractive brand name of public interest litigation should not be used for
  suspicious products of mischief. It should be aimed at redressal of genuine
  public wrong or public injury and not publicity oriented or founded on personal
  vendetta. The Court must be careful to see that a body of persons or member
H of public, who approaches the Court is acting bona fide and not for personal
            ASH OK KUMAR PANDEY v. STA TE OF WEST BENGAL                    719
gain or private motive or political motivation or other oblique consideration.     A
The Court must not allow its process to be abused for oblique considerations.
Some persons with vested interest indulge in the pastime of meddling with
judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often they
are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity. The petitions of
such busy bodies deserve to be thrown out by rejection at the threshold, and       B
in appropriate cases with exemplary costs. (725-Q--E)

       4.1. The Court has to be satisfied about (a) the credentials of the
 applbmt; p) theprima facie correctness or nature of information given by
him; (c) the information being not vague and indefinite. The information should
show gravity and seriousness involved. The Court has to strike a balance C
between two conflicting interests: (1) nobody should be allowed to indulge in
wild and reckless allegations besmirching the character of others; and (ii)
avoidance of public mischief and to avoid mischievous petitions seeking to
assail, for oblique motives, justifiable executive actions. In such cases however,
the Court cannot afford to be liberal It has to be extremely careful to see that
under the guise of redressing a public grievance, it does not encroach upon D
the sphere reserved by the Constitution to the Executive and the legislature.
The Court has to act ruthlessly while dealing with imposters and busy bodies
or meddlesome interlopers impersonating as public-spirited holy men. They
masquerade as crusaders of justice. They pretend to act in tlie name of Pro
Bono Publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own E
to protect. [725-H; 726-A-C)

      Public Interest Law, USA, 1976, referred to.

     4.2. Courts must do justice by promotion of good faith, and prt"vent law
from crafty invasions. Courts must maintain the social balance by interfering F
where necessary for the sake of justice and refuse to interfere where it is
against the social interest and public good. (726-C-D)

      State ofMaharashtra v. Prabhu, (1994) 2 SCC 481 and Andhra Pradesh
Financial Corporation v. Mis GAR Re-rolling Mills, AIR (1994) SC 2151,
relied on.                                                               G
      4.3. No litigant has a right to unlimited drought on the Court's time
and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes.
Easy access to justice should not be mil used as a licence to file misconceived
and frivolous petitions.
                                                                                   H
    720                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A         Dr. B.K. Subbarao v. Mr. K. Parasaran, (1996) 7 JJ 265, relied on.

           5.1. Though in service matters PILs should not be entertained yet the
    inflow of the so-called PILs involving service matters continues unabated in
    the Courts and strangely are entertained. The least the High Court could do
    is do throw them out.
B
          Dr. Duryodhan Sahu v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra, AIR (1999) SC 114,
    relied on.

          5.2. Court should filter out the frivolous petitions and dismiss them with
    costs so that the message goes in the right direction that petitions filed with
C   oblique motive do not have the app; JVal of the Courts.

          6. At times even on certain unconfirmed news but depending upon the
    gravity or heinous nature of the crime alleged to be perpetrated which would
    prove to be obnoxious to the avowed public policy, morals and greater societal
    interests involved Courts have ventured to intervene.
D
           7. A mere obsession based on religious belief or any other personal
    philosophy cannot be regarded as a legal disability of the type recognized by
    the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any other law which would permit
    initiation of proceedings by a third party, be he a friend. The repercussions
E   of permitting such a third party to challenge the findings of the Court can be
    serious, e.g., in the instant case itself the co-accused who have been acquitted
    by the Designated Court and whose acquittal has been confirmed by this court
    would run the risk of a fresh trial and a possible conviction.

          Karamjeet Singh v. Union of India, AIR (1993) SC 284, relied on.
F
          State ofH.P. v. A Parent ofa Student ofMedical College, Simla, [1985)
    3 SCC 169, Sachidanand Pandey v. State of W.B,. (1987] 2 SCC 295,
    Ramsharan Autyanuprasi v. Union of India, (1989) Supp. I SCC 251.
    Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, [1984) 3 SCC 161, Jasbhai
    Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed, (1976] l SCC 671,
G   Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v. Union of India, (1981( l SCC 568,
    Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti v. State of U.P., (1990( 4 SCC
    449, Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, [1991[ 4 SCC 584,
    Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, (1971( l SCC 598, State of Maharashtra v.
    Sukhdeo Singh, AIR (1992) SC 2100 and Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of
H   India AIR (1993) SC 280, referred to.
    ASHOKKUMARPANDEYv. STA TEOF WEST BENGAL [PASA YAT, J.] 721

      8. The petitioner did not seek to enforce any of his fundamental rights        A
nor did he complain that any of his fundamental right was violated. He sought
to enforce the fundamental rights of others, namely, the two condemned
convicts who themselves did not complain of their violation. Ordinarily, the
aggrieved party, which is affected by any order, has the right to seek redress
by questioning the legality, validity or correctness of the order, unless such       B
party is a minor, an insane person or is suffering from any other disability
which the law recognizes as sufficient to permit another person, e.g. next
friend, to move the court on his behalf.

        CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (crl) No. 199 of
2003.
                                                                                     c
        Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.

        Petitioner-in-person.

        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                                     D
       ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. This petition under Article 32 of the Constitution
of India, 1950 (in short 'the Constitution') has been filed purportedly in public
interest. The prayer in the writ petition is to the effect that the death sentence
imposed to one Dhananjay Chatterjee@ Dhana (hereinafter referred to as 'the
accused') by the Sessions Court, Alipur, West Bengal, affirmed by the Calcutta       E
High Court and this Court, needs to be converted to a life sentence because
there has been no execution of the death sentence for a long time. Reliance
was placed on a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Smt. Triveniben
v. State a/Gujarat, [1989] 1SCC678.

      According to the petitioner, he saw a news item in a TV channel wherein F
it was shown that the authorities were unaware about the non-execution of
the death sentence and, therefore, condemned prisoner, the accused has
suffered a great degree of mental torture and that itself is a ground for
conversion of his death sentence to a life sentence on the basis of ratio in
Triveniben's case (supra). It needs to be noted here that prayer for conversion
of death sentence to life sentence has already been turned down by the G
Governor of West Bengal and the President of India in February 1994 and
June 1994 respectively as stated in the petition. When the matter was placed
for admission, we asked the petitioner who appeared in-person as to what was
his locus standi and how a petition under Article 32 is maintainable on such
nature of information by which he claims to have come to know of it. His H
    722                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A answer was that as a public spirited citizen of the country, he has a locus to
    present the petition and when the matter involved life and liberty of a citizen,
    this Court should not stand on technicalities and should give effect to the
    ratio in Triveniben's case (supra). There has been violation of Article 21 of
    the Constitution and the prolonged delay in execution of sentence is violative
B   of Article 21, so far as the accused is concerned.

          Reliance was also placed on few decisions, for example, Sunil Batra (II)
    v. Delhi Administration, [1980] 3 SCC 488; S.P. Gupta. v. Union of India,
    [1981] Supp. SCC 87; Daya Singh v. Union of India, [1991] 3 SCC 61 and
    Janata Dal v. H.S. Choudhary, [ 1992] 4 SCC 305 to substantiate the plea that
C   the petitioner had locus standi to present the petition in public interest and
    this was a genuine public interest litigation.

           When there is material to show that a petition styled as a public interest
    litigation is nothing but a camouflage to foster personal disputes, said petition
    is to be thrown out. Before we grapple with the issue involved in the present
D   case, we feel it necessary to consider the issue regarding public interest
    aspect. Public Interest Litigation which has now come to occupy an important
    field in the administration of law should not be "publicity interest litigation"
    or "private interest litigation" or "politics interest litigation" or the latest trend
    "paise income litigation". If not properly regulated and abuse averted it
    becomes also a tool in unscrupulous hands to release vendetta and wreck
E   vengeance, as well. There must be real and genuine public interest involved
    in the litigation and not merely an adventure of knight errant or poke ones
    into for a probe. It cannot also be invoked by a petsott or a body of persons
    to further his or their personal causes or satisfy his or their personal grudge
    and enmity. Courts of justice should not be allowed to be polluted by
F   unscrupulous litigants by resorting to the extraordinary jurisdiction. A person
    acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of public
    interest litigation will alone have a locus standi and can approach the Court
    to wipe out violation of fundamental rights and genuine infraction of statutory
    provisions, but not for personal gain or private profit or political motive or
    any oblique consideration. These aspects were highlighted by this Court in
G   The Janata Dal case (supra) and Kazi Lhendup Dorji v. Central Bureau of
    Investigation, [1994] Supp. 2 SCC 116. A writ petitioner who comes to the
    Court for relief in public interest must come not only with clean hands like
    any other writ petitioner but also with a clean heart, clean mind and clean
    objective. (See Ramjas Foundation v. Union ofIndia, AIR (1993) SC 852 and
H   K.R. Srinivas v. R.M Premchand, [1994] 6 sec 620).
    ASHOK KUMAR PANDEY v. STA TE OF WEST BENGAL [ PASA YAT, J. ]723

        It is necessary to take note of the meaning of expression 'public interest      A
litigation'. In Strouds Judicial Dictionary, Volume 4 (IV Edition), 'Public Interest'
is defined thus:

        "Public Interest (I) a matter of public or general interest does not
        mean that which is interesting as gratifying curiosity or a love of
        information or amusement but that in which a class of the community             B
        have a pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights
        or liabilities are affected."

      In Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition), "public interest" is defined as
follows:
                                                                                        c
        "Public Interest something in which the public, or some interest by
        which their legal rights or liabilities are affected. It does not mean
        anything the particular localities, which may be affected by the matters
        in question. Interest shared by national government. ....."

      In Jana/a Dal case (supra) this Court considered the scope of public D
interest litigation. In para 52 of the said judgment, after considering what is
public interest, has laid down as follows:

        "The expression 'litigation' means a legal action including all
        proceedings therein initiated in a Court of law for the enforcement of
        right or seeking a remedy. Therefore, lexically the expression "PIL"            E
        means the legal action initiated in a Court of law for the enforcement
        of public interest or general interest in which the public or a class of
        the community have pecuniary interest or some interest by which their
        legal rights or liabilities are affected."

      In paras 60, 61 and 62 of the said judgment, It was pointed out as                F
follows:

        "Be that as it may, it is needless to emphasis that the requirement of
        locus standi of a party to a litigation is mandatory, because the legal
        capacity of the party to any litigation whether in private or public G
        action in relation to any specific remedy sought for has to be primarily
        ascertained at the threshold."

      In para 96 of the said judgment, it has further been pointed out as
follows:
                                                                                        H
    724                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A           "While this Court has laid down a chain of notable decisions with all
            emphasis at their command about the importance and significance of
            this newly developed doctrine of PIL, it has also hastened to sound
            a red alert and a note of severe warning that Courts should not allow
            its process to be abused by a mere busy body or a meddlesome
            interloper or wayfarer or officious intervener without any interest or
B           concern except for personal gain or private profit or other oblique
            consideration."

          In subsequent paras of the said judgment, it was observed as follows:

            "It is thus clear that only a person acting bona fide and having
c           sufficient interest in the proceeding of PIL will alone have as locus
            standi and can approach the Court to wipe out the tears of the poor
            and needy, suffering from violation of their fundamental rights, but
            not a person for personal gain or private profit or political motive or
            any oblique consideration. Similarly a vexatious petition under the
            colour of PIL, brought before the Court for vindicating any personal
D
            grievance, deserves rejection at the threshold".

          It is depressing to note that on account of such trumpery proceedings
  initiated before the Courts, innumerable days are wasted, which time otherwise
  could have been spent for the disposal of cases of the genuine litigants.
E Though we spare no efforts in fostering and developing the laudable concept
  of PIL and extending our long arm of sympathy to the poor, the ignorant, the
  oppressed and the needy whose fundamental rights are infringed and violated
  and whose grievance go unnoticed, un-represented and unheard; yet we
  cannot avoid but express our opinion that while genuine litigants with legitimate
  grievances relating to civil matters involving properties worth hundreds of
F millions of rupees and criminal cases in which persons st~ntenced to death
  facing gallows under untold agony and persons sentenced to life imprisonment
  and kept in incarceration for long years, persons suffering from undue delay
  in service matters - government or private, persons awaiting the disposal of
  cases wherein huge amounts of public revenue or unauthorized collection of
G tax amounts are locked up, detenu expecting their release from the detention
  orders etc. etc. are all standing in a long serpentine queue for years with the
  fond hope of getting into the Courts and having their grievances redressed,
  the busy bodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners
  having absolutely no public interest except for personal gain or private profit
  either of themselves or as a proxy of others or for any other extraneous
H
    ASHOK KUMAR PANDEY v. ST ATE OF WEST BENGAL [PASAYA T. J. j 725

motivation or for glare of publicity break the queue muffing their faces by           A
wearing the mask of public interest litigation and get into the Courts by filing
vacatious and frivolous petitions and thus criminally waste the valuable time
of the Courts and as a result of which the queue standing outside the doors
of the court never moves, which piquant situation creates frustration in the
minds of the genuine litigants and resultantly they loose faith in the
administration of our judicial system.                                                B
       Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great
care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see
that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested
 interest and/or publicity seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an effective   C
weapon in the armory of law for delivering social justice to the citizens. The
attractive brand name of public interest litigation should not be used for
suspicious products of mischief. It should be aimed at redressal of genuine
public wrong or public injury and not publicity oriented or founded on
personal vendetta. As indicated above, Court must be careful to see that a
body of persons or member of public, who approaches the court is acting               D
bona fide and not for personal gain or private motive or political motivation
or other oblique consideration. The Court must not allow its process to be
abused for oblique considerations. Some persons with vested interest indulge
in the pastime of meddling with judicial process either by force of habit or
from improper motives. Often they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety           E
or cheap popularity. The petitions of such busy bodies deserve to be thrown
out by rejection at the threshold, and in appropriate cases with exemplary
costs.

     The council for Public Interest Law set up by the Ford Foundation in
USA defined the "public interest litigation" in its report of Public Interest Law, p
USA, 1976 as follows:

        "Public Interest Law is the name that has recently been given to
        efforts provide legal representation to previously unrepresented groups
        and interests. Such efforts have been undertaken in the recognition
        that ordinary market place for legal services fails to provide such G
        services to significant segments of the population and to significant
        interests. Such groups and interests include the proper
        environmentalists, consumers, racial and ethnic minorities and others."

       The Court has to be satisfied about (a) the credentials of the applicant;
(b) the prima facie correctness or nature of information given by him; (c) the H
    726                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A information being not vague and indefinite. The information should show
  gravity and seriousness involved. Court has to strike balance between two
  conflicting interests; (i) nobody should be allowed to indulge in wild and
  reckless allegations besmirching the character of others; and (ii) avoidance of
  public mischief and to avoid mischievous petitions seeking to assail, for
  oblique motives, justifiable executive actions. In such case, however, the
B Court cannot afford to be liberal. It has to be extremely careful to see that
  under the guise of redressing a public grievance, it does not encroach upon
  the sphere reserved by the Constitution to the Executive and the Legislature.
  The Court has to act ruthlessly while dealing with imposters and busy bodies
  or meddlesome interlopers impersonating as public-spirited holy men. They
C masquerade as crusaders of justice. They pretend to act in the name of Pro
  Bono Publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own
  to protect.

        Courts must do justice by promotion of good faith, and prevent law
  from crafty invasions. Courts must maintain the social balance by interfering
D where necessary for the sake of justice and refuse to interfere where it is
  against the social interest and public good. (See State of Maharashtra v.
  Prabhu, [1994] 2 SCC 481 and Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation
  v. Mis GAR Re-Rolling Mills and Anr., AIR (1994) SC 2151). No litigant has
  a right to unlimited drought on the Court time and public money in order to
E get his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes. Easy access to justice
  should not be misused as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions.
  (See Dr. B.K. Subbarao v. Mr. K. Parasaran, [1996] 7 JT 265). Today people
  rush to Courts to file cases in profusion under this attractive name of public
  interest. They must inspire confidence in Courts and among the public.

F       As noted supra, a time has come to weed out the petitions, which
  though titled as public interest litigations are in essence something else. It
  is shocking to note that Courts are flooded with large number of so called
  public interest litigations where even a minuscule percentage can legitimately
  be called as public interest litigations. Though the parameters of public
  interest litigation have been indicated by this Court in large number of cases,
G yet unmindful of the real intentions and objectives, Courts are entertaining
  such petitions and wasting valuable judicial time which, as noted above,
  could be otherwise utilized for disposal of genuine cases. Though in Dr.
  Duryodhan Sahu and Ors. v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra and Ors., AIR (1999)
  SC 114, this Court held that in service matters PILs should not be entertained,
H the inflow of so-called P!Ls involving service matters continues unabated in
     ASH OK KUMAR PANDEY v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL [PASAYAT, J.] 72 7

the Courts and strangely are entertained. The least the High Courts could do           A
is to throw them out on the basis of the said decision. The other interesting
aspect is that in the PILs, official documents are being annexed without even
indicating as to how the petitioner came to possess them. In one case, it was
noticed that an interesting answer was given as to its possession. It was
stated that a packet was lying on the road and when out of curiosity the
petitioner opened it, he found copies of the official documents. Whenever              B
such frivolous pleas are taken to explain possession, the Court should do well
not only to dismiss the petitions but also to impose exemplary costs. It would
be desirable for the Courts to filter out the frivolous petitions and dismiss
them with costs as afore-stated so that the message goes in the right direction
that petitions filed with oblique motive do not have the approval of the               C
Courts.

       Coming to the facts of the case, it has not been shown as to how and
in what manner the accused, condemned prisoner is handicapped in not
seeking relief if any as available in law. The matter pertains to something to
happen or not at Kolkatta and what was the truth about the news or cause               D
for the delay, even if it be is not known or ascertained or even attempted to
be ascertained by the petitioner before approaching this Court. To a pointed
query, the petitioner submitted that the petitioner "may not be aware" of his
rights, that except the news he heard he could not say any further and "the
respondent-State may come and clarify the position. This petition cannot be            E
entertained on such speculative foundations and premises and to make a
roving enquiry. May be at times even on certain unconfirmed news but
depending upon the gravity or heinous nature of the crime alleged to be
perpetrated which would prove to be obnoxious to the avowed public policy,
morals and greater societal interests involved, Courts have ventured to
intervene but we are not satisfied that this could be one such case, on the            F
facts disclosed. It is reliably learnt that a petition with almost identical prayers
was filed before the Calcutta High Court by relatives of the accused and the
same has been recently dismissed by the High Court.

      In Gupta's case (supra) it was emphatically pointed out that the relaxation
of the rule of locus standi in the field of PIL does not give any right to a           G
busybody or meddlesome interloper to approach the Court under the guise
of a public interest litigant. He has also left the following note of caution:
(SCC p.219, para 24)

        "But we must be careful to see that the member of the public, who
                                                                                       H
    728                    SUPREME COURT REPOR              ~ (2003) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A           approaches the court in cases of this kiwi. is acting bona fide and
            not for personal gain or private profit n.- political motivation or other
            oblique consideration. The court muo; not allow its process to be
            abused by politicians and others to delay legitimate administrative
            action or to gain a political objective."

B         In State of H.P. v. A Parent of a Student of Medical College, Simla and
    Ors., [1985] 3 SCC 169, it has been said that public interest litigation is a
    weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection.

         Khalid, J. in his separate supplementing judgment in Sachidanand
    Pandey v. State of W.B., [1987] 2 SCC 295,331 said:
c
           "Today public spirited litigants rush to courts to file cases in profusion
           under this attractive name. They must inspire confidence in courts
           and among the public. They must be above suspicion. (SCC p.331,
           para 46)

D                   *              *                *
                Public interest litigation has now come to stay. But one is led to
           think that it poses a threat to courts and public alike. Such cases are
           now filed without any rhyme or reason. It is, therefore, necessary to
           lay down clear guidelines and to outline the correct parameters for
E          entertainment of such petitions. If courts do not restrict the free flow
           of such cases in the name of public interest litigations, the traditional
           litigation will suffer and the courts of law, instead of dispensing
           justice, will have to take upon themselves administrative and executive
           functions. (SCC p. 334, para 59)

F                   *              *                *
                I will be second to none in extending help when such help is
            required. But this does not mean that the doors of this court are
            always open for anyone to walk in. It is necessary to have some self-
            imposed restraint on public interest litigants." (SCC p.335, para 61)
G
           Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Bench in
    RamsharanAutyanuprasiv. Union of India, [1939] Supp. I SCC 251, was in
    full agreement with the view expressed by khalid, J. in Sachidanand Pandey's
    case (supra) and added that 'public interest litigation' is an instrument of the
    administration of justice to be used properly in proper cases.
H
     ASH OK KUMARPANDEYv. STATE OF WEST BENGAL [PASAY AT, J. ]729

     See also separate judgment by Pathak, J. (as he then was) in Bandhua            A
Mukti Morcha V. Union of India, [1984] 3 sec 16L

      Sarkaria, J. in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir
Ahmed and Ors., [ 1976] I SCC 671, expressed his view that the application
of the busybody should be rejected at the threshold in the following terms:
(SCC p. 683, p11ra 37).                                                              B
       "It will be seen that in the context of locus standi to apply for a writ
       of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily fall in any of these categories:
       (i) 'person aggrieved'; (ii) 'stranger'; (iii) busybody or meddlesome
       interloper. Persons in the last category are easily distinguishable from
       those coming under the first two categories. Such persons interfere           C
       in things which do not concern them. They masquerade as crusaders
       for justice. They pretend to act in the name of pro bono publico,
       though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to
       protect. They indulge in the pastime of meddling with the judicial
       process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often, they        D
       are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity; while
       the ulterior intent of some applicants in this category, may be no more
       than spoking the wheels of administration. The High Court should do
       well to reject the applications of such busybodies at the threshold."

      Krishna Iyer, J. in Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union {Regd.) Sundri         E
and Ors. v. Union of India, [1981]1SCC563, in stronger terms stated: (SCC
p. 589, para 48).

       "If a citizen is no more than a wayfarer or officious intervener without
       any interest or concern beyond what belongs to any one of the 660
       million people of this country, the door of the court will not be ajar        F
       for him."

     In Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti v. State of U.P.,
[1990] 4 SCC 449, Sabyasachi Mukharji, C.J. observed: (SCC p. 452, para 8).

       "While it is the duty of this Court to enforce fundamental rights, it         G
       is also the duty of this Court to ensure that this weapon under Article
       32 should not be misused or permitted to be misused creating a
       bottleneck in the superior court preventing other genuine violation of
       fundamental rights being considered by the court."

     In Union Carbide Corporation V. Union of India, [1991] 4 sec 584, 610,          H
    730                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A Ranganath Mishra, C.J. in his separate judgment while concurring with the
    conclusions of the majority judgment has said thus: (SCC p. 610, para 21.

            "I am prepared to assume, nay, concede, that public activists should
            also be permitted to espouse the cause of the poor citizens but there
            must be a limit set to such activity and nothing perhaps should be
B           done which would affect the dignity of the Court and bring down the
            serviceability of the institution to the people at large. Those who are
            acquainted with jurisprudence and enjoy social privilege as men
            educated in law owe an obligation to the community of educating it
            properly and allowing the judicial process to continue unsoiled."
c          In Subhash Kumar v. State ofBihar, [1991] I SCC 598, it was observed
    as follows:

            "Public interest litigation cannot be invoked by a person or body of
            persons to satisfy his or its personal grudge and enmity. If such
            petitions under Article 32, are entertained it would amount to abuse
D           of process of the court, preventing speedy remedy to other genuine
            petitioners from this court. Personal interest cannot be enforced though
            the process of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution in the
            garb of a public interest litigation. Public interest litigation contemplates
            legal proceeding for vindication or enforcement of fundamental rights
E           of a group of persons or community which are not able to enforce
            their fundamental rights on account of their incapacity, poverty or
            ignorance of law. A person invoking the jurisdiction of this court
            under Article 32 must approach this Court for the vindication of the
            fundamental rights of affected persons and not for the purpose of
            vindication of his personal grudge or enmity. It is the duty of this
F           Court to discourage such petitions and to ensure that the course of
            justice is not obstructed or polluted by unscrupulous litigants by
            invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court for personal matters
            under the garb of the public interest litigation".

G          In the words of Bhagwati, J. {as he then was) "the courts must be
    careful in entertaining public interest litigations" or in the words of Sarkaria,
    J. "the applications of the busybodies should be rejected at the threshold
    itself' and as Krishna Iyer, J. has pointed out, "the doors of the courts should
    not be ajar for such vexatious litigants".

H         It will be appropriate at this stage to take note of what this Court felt
     ASHOK KUMAR PANDEY v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL [PASAYAT, J.] 731

 when dealing with petitions under Article 32 with somewhat similar issues. A
The petitioner in one case filed writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution
challenging the order of this Court whereby it had affirmed the conviction of
two accused and confirmed the death sentence for reasons stated in its
judgment in State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdeo Singh, AIR (1992) SC 2100.

      The writ petition was dismissed holding that third party has no locus         B
standi to challenge the conviction by filing the writ petition under Article 32
of the Constitution. (See Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India, AIR (1993)
SC280).

       The petitioner there claimed to be a friend of the convicts, and it was      C
held that he has no locus standi to move the Court under Article 32 of the
Constitution. Unless the aggrieved party is a minor or an insane or one who
is suffering from any other disability which the law recognizes as sufficient
to permit another person e.g., next friend, to move the Court on his behalf;
for example, see Sections 320(4-a), 330(2) read with Sections 335(J)(b) and 339
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the "Code"). Ordinarily the       D
aggrieved party has the right to seek redress. Admittedly, it was not the case
of the petitioner that the two convicts are minors or insane persons but had
argued that since they were suffering from an acute obsession such obsession
amounts to a legal disability which permits the next friend to initiate
proceedings under Article 32 of the Constitution.
                                                                                    E
      A mere obsession based on religious belief or any other personal
philosophy cannot be regarded as a legal disability of the type recognized by
the Code or any other law which would permit initiation of proceedings by
a third party, be he a friend. It must be remembered that the repercussions
of permitting such a third party to challenge the findings of the Court can be      F
serious, e.g., in the instant case, itself the co-accused who have been acquitted
by the Resignated Court and Court and whose acquitted has been confirmed
by this Court would run the risk of a fresh trial and a possible conviction.

      Similar view was expressed in Karamjeet Singh v. Union of India, AIR
{I 993) SC 284.                                                            G
      It was noted that Article 32 which finds a place in Part III of the
Constitution entitled "fundamental rights" provides that right to move this
Court for the enforcement of the rights conferred in that part is guaranteed.
It empowers this Court to issue directions or orders or writs for the enforcement
of any of the fundamental rights. The petitioner did not seek to enforce any H
    732                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A of his fundamental rights nor did he complain that any of his fundamental
    right was violated. He sought to enforce the fundamental rights of others,
    namely, the two condemned convicts who themselves did not complain of
    their violation. Ordinarily,, the aggrieved party which is affected by any order
    has the right to seek redress by questioning the legality, validity or correctness
B   of the order, unless such party is a minor, an insane person or is suffering
    from any other disability which the law recognizes as sufficient to permit
    another person, e.g. next friend, to move the court on his behalf.

          Unless an aggrieved party is under some disability recognized by law,
    it would be unsafe and hazardous to allow any third party be a member of
C   the Bar to question the decision against third parties.

           Neither under the provisions of the Code nor under any other statute
    is a third party stranger permitted to question the correctness of the conviction
    and sentence.

D         Based on the above backgrounds, we do not think this to be a fit case
    which can be entertained and that too, under Article 32 of the Constitution
    and is accordingly dismissed, but without costs.

    v.s.s.                                                       Petition dismissed.