Holding

The will confers only a life interest on the husband, with the remainder absolutely vested in the three minor nephews, rendering Section 124 inapplicable.

Summary

Sitabai executed a will bequeathing her self‑acquired property to her husband, Ramachandra, for his lifetime and thereafter to three minor nephews. After the testator and her husband died, the husband's brother and his children took possession, and a compromise decree was obtained in an injunction suit, which the minors later alleged was procured by undue influence. The trial court, relying on Section 124 of the Indian Succession Act, held that the husband had become the absolute owner, denying the minors' claim. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the construction of the will, emphasizing the testator's clear intention that the husband's interest was limited to a life estate, with the remainder to the minors. The Court held that Section 124 was inapplicable and that the will must be read as granting a life interest to the husband and an absolute remainder to the three minors. Consequently, the appeals were allowed, the lower courts' judgments were set aside, and the suit filed by the minors was decreed in their favour.

Issues considered

The proper construction of the will: whether the husband's interest is a life estate or absolute ownership.
The applicability of Section 124 (illustration (i)) of the Indian Succession Act to the husband's interest.
The effect of the compromise decree obtained in the earlier injunction suit on the minors' rights.

Legislation cited

Indian Succession Act, 1925s. 124

Subjects

Will constructionLife estateRemainder interestIndian Succession ActSection 124Undue influenceCompromise decreeTestamentary intentionMinor beneficiaries

Judgment

ARUNKUMAR AND ANR. A
v.
SHRINIWAS AND ORS.

APRIL 8, 2003

[DORAISWAMY RAJU AND ASHOK BHAN, JJ.] B

Deeds and Documents:

Will-Construing of-Wife bequeathing self acquired property to her
husband and after his death to her three minor nephews as the couple had no C
issue-It was specifically mentioned that after the death of husband, his
relations would have no right to the estate-After death of the testator and
soon after the death of her husband, brother of husband and his children
come in possession of the property and filed an injunction suit which ended
in compromise between the plaintiffs and father of the minors-later the three D
nephews of the testator claiming their right through will filed another suit
stating that the compromise was obtained by undue influence, coercion and
misrepresentation-The trial Judge though acceptud the claim that compromise
decree was vitiated by coercion and misrepresentation, but held that in view
of s. 124 of Indian Succession Act, the husband of testator succeeded as fit!/
owner of the property and as such the plaintiffs were not entitled to the E
propert)~Held, the intention of the testator should be given the primary
importance and courts should construe the words in the background of the
intended meaning which the testator himself desired to ascribe to the words
used-The intention of the testator in respect of what has been bequeathed in
favour of the husband of the testator is only a limited life interest, is 111ade F
clear in the will-Reasons also have been assigned in the will itself as to why
the three minor children hm•e been chosen for being given the ulti111ate and
absolute rights after the death of her husband-In addition to all this, there
is a specific clause which in unmistakable terms stipulates that "'the relations
of my husband have no right to this estate nor there will be any in fitture "-
Thus the testament cannot be construed to bequeath the property absolutely G
in /avow· of the husband and placing such a construction would amount to not
only re-writing the several clauses in the will but wo11ld constitute violence to
the language and firrther defeat the verJ' intention of the testator- On going
through the recitals in the will, the only possible and reasonable construction
that could be placed on the will by giving fir// effect to the intention of the H
453
454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003) 3 S.C.R.

A testator as found expressed in all relevant portions of the will would be to
construe the bequest made in favour of her husband as one for life interest
and remainder bequeathed absolutely in favour of thi! three minors after the
life time of her husband-The provisions of s. 124 will have no relevance to
the case on hand and on the very construction of the will, the claim of the
B appellants is upheld.

Navneet Lal@Rangi v. Gokul and Ors., (1976( I SCC 630, relied on.

Mauleshwar Mani and Ors. v. Jagdish Prasad and Ors., (2000( 2 SCC
468, distinguished.

C CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 9961-9962
of 1995.

From the Judgment and Order dated 20.9.93 of the Mumbai High Court
in F.A. Nos. 3 and 36 of 1986.

D Mrs. J. S. Wad, Ashish Wad and Ms. Niharika Bahl for the Appellants.

S.V. Deshpande and Ms. Anuradha Rustogi for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered:

E The above appeals have been filed against the common Judgment and
decree passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay,
Aurangabad Bench, on 20.9.1993 in FA Nos. 3 and 36of1986, whereby the
learned Judges in affirming the decision of the Trial Court, have chosen to
reject the appeals including the cross-objections.

F The only question that arose for consideration was as to the construction
to be placed on the Will dated 28. 1.1969, executed by late Sitabai wife of
Ramchandra Ganesh Mudhalwadkar. Indisputably, she is the absolute owner
of the property which was the subject matter of the Will in question. As per
the Will, a translated copy of which was furnished and placed on record, the
G testator made the bequest in the following terms:

"After my death, my husband Shri Ramachandra Ganesh
Mudhalwadkar shall be the heir and owner of my property as detailed
below. In accordance with this Will (i) Master Anilkumar s/o Narhari
aged 12 (ii) Master Arunkumar s/o Narhari aged 9 (iii) Master
H Shashikant s/o Narhari aged 6, shall be the owners of my property
ARUNKUMAR v. SHRINIWAS 455
after the death of my husband. Narhar Shamrao Satarkar will be their A
guardian. My property, the details of which are given below shall be
enjoyed by my husband Shri Ramchandra Ganesh Mudhalwadkar
and the above named (i) Anilkumar (ii) Arunkumar (iii) Shashikant
• sons of Narhar Shamrao Satarkar in accordance with this Will. This
will is being made for the benefit and enjoyment of the property by B
my above named husband and minor boys. The said minor boys are
the sons of my niece i.e. the sons of the daughter of my brother. I
have no issues and there is no likelihood of any, now. These boys and
their mother have stayed with me since their childhood. That is why
I have the same affection for them as if they are my children. Since
I am fond of them, I wish that my property should naturally go to C
them after my death and the death of my husband. The source of my
property which is being given away by this testament is like this. This
is my self acquired property. At the time of my marriage, my mother
has given me 15 tolas of gold. After my marriage my husband has
given me ornaments weighing 20 tolas. Thus 35 tolas of gold is my
St;idhan and out of the sale proceeds of gold the said property is D
purchased.

The relations of my husband have no right to this estate nor there will
be any in future. "

The testator died on 20. 5. 1976. Her husband who came into possession E
of the property under the Will also died on 20. 8. 1976. It appears that the
brother of Ramachandra-deceased husband of the testator, came with his
children to perform the last rites of deceased Ramachandra and from that
time onwards he continued to stay in the property by dislodging the plaintiffs
who were minors, at that time, followed by some criminal complaints etc. it F
appears that soon thereafter a civil suit No. 689/1976 against the appellant in
FA No. 36 of 1996 then a min or and the father of the appellants was filed
for an injunction restraining him from interfering with the possession of the
properties and for a declaration that he is the absolute owner of the house.
The said suit appears to have ended into a compromise, in the teeth of undue
pressures and coercion due to some police complaints and that by virtue of G
the compromise decree passed in the said suit, the respondents continued to
hold possession of the property. The appellants filed special civil suit No. 76/
I989 contending that as per the Will of the deceased Sitabai, referred to
above, they had become the owners of the property after the life time of her
husband Ramachandra and the compromise decree obtained in the presence H
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003) J S.C.R.

A of the father of the appellants, was vitiated by undue influence, coercion and
misrepresentation and therefore, it does not affect the rights of the appellants
to the property under the Will. Claiming that the defendants were in unlawful
possession of the suit property the appellants-plaintiffs, claiming to be the
real owners and entitled to get possession of the suit property, filed a suit for
B possession. The suit was hotly contested and the learned trial Judge after trial
though sustained the claim that the compromise decree passed in RCS No.
689 of 1976 was vitiated by coercion and misrepresentation and will not
stand in the way of the appellant-plaintiffs, construed the Will to mean that
the disposition in favour of the plaintiffs was preceded and superseded by the
disposition in favour of the deceased Ramachandra the husband of the testator,
C who according to the learned trial Judge in the light of Section 124, illustration
(i) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, inherited the property as full owner
and therefore, the plaintiffs were not entitled to the relief as prayed for.

Aggrieved the appellants herein have filed two separate appeals.
Defendants 1 to 3 and 5 to 7 have filed cross-objections challenging the
D findings regarding the nature and legality of the compromise decree passed
in RCS no. 689 of 1976. Those appeals as well as cross-objections came to
be dismissed affirming the decision of the learned trial Judgt!, resulting in the
filing of these appeals.

The learned counsel for the appellants reiterating the stand taken in the
E courts below contended that the Will in question has not been properly
construed and the construction made thereof in the light of Section 124,
illustration (i), resulted in a grave error of law. The husband of the testator
had, according to the learned counsel, got only a life estate and not absolute
estate as a full owner and the construction placed on the Will by the courts
F · below, defeats the wishes and intention of the testator, and therefore cannot
be sustained.

Per contra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents
while deriving inspiration from the findings of the courts below contended
that the legacy in favour of the plaintiffs will not take effect on the terms of
G the Will unless the husband of the testator pre-deceased the testator and that
at any rate the interest created under the Will in favour of the husband
Ramachandra was not only an absolute one but also takes effect immediately
after the death of the testator.

The essential principles which should guide the courts in interpretation
H of Wills, in contrast to the other class or category of documents, have been
\

ARUNKUMAR v. SHRINIW AS 457
set out, on a review of the entire case law on the subject, succinctly in the A
decision of this Court in Navneet Lal@ Rangi v. Gokul and Ors., (1976] I
sec 630, as hereunder:
(i) The fundamental rule is to ascertain the intention of the testator
from the words used, the surrounding circumstances for the purpose
of finding out the intended meaning of the words which have been B
employed;

(ii) The court, in doing so is entitled to put itself into the armchair of
the testator and is bound to bear in mind also other matters than
merely the words used and the probability that the testator had/would
have used the words in a particular sense, in order to arrive at a right C
construction of the Will and ascertain the meaning of the language
used;

(iii) The true intention of the testator has to be gathered not by attaching
importance to isolated expression but by reading the Will as a whole,
with all its provisions and ignoring none of them, as redundant or D
contradictory, giving such construction as would give to every
expression some effect rather than that which would render any of
the expressions inoperative;

(iv) Where apparently conflicting dispositions can be reconciled by
giving full effect to every word used in a document, such a construction E
should be accepted instead of a construction which would have the
effect of cutting down the clear meaning of the words used by the
testator;

(v) It is one of the cardinal principles of construction of Wills that to F
the extent that it is legally possible effect should be given to every
disposition contained in the Will, unless the law prevents effect being
given to it. If even there appear to be two repugnant provisions
conferring successive interests and the first interest created is valid
the subsequent interest cannot take effect, the court will proceed to
the farthest extent to avoid repugnancy, so that effect could be given G
as far as possible, to every testamentary intention contained in the
Will.

After declaring the above position, the term 'Malik' used therein, as in
the present case before u~, despite the use of language such as-"of my
entire estate ........ and shall have all the proprietary powers" construed H
(

458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 3 S.C.R.

A the. Will to confer only a mere life estate, the context and surrounding
circumstances were relied upon to give effect to the real intention of the
testator in giving the property ultimately to the testators sister's son. The
distinction attempted by the High Court to exclude the applicability of the
ratio laid down therein is without any rhyme or reason and not based upon
•
any genuine or real difference. The High Court instead of objectively
B construing the Will, applying the well settled principles in the context and
surrounding circumstances disclosed from the Will itself and deducing its
conclusion by a rational process of reasoning, first assumes the bequest to in
favour of the husband to be absolute and then attempts to distinguish the
decision of this Court in its application to the case on hand as irrelevant
C considerations.

We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel
appearing on either side. On going through the recitals in the Will and
construed in the light of the intention openly and firmly expressed in
unmistakable terms, by the testator as well as the underlying scheme of
D disposition made under the Will, as also the reasons which impelled her to
bequeath ultimately the properties for the benefit of the minors, the appellants,
we are unable to subscribe to the construction placed by the courts below or
approve of the same. Though it is stated that after the death of the testator
her husband Ramachandra shall be the heir and owner of the property there
E is an essential rider and limitation indicating that such succession or ownership
has to be "as detailed below", meaning thereby further stipulations as are
contained in the Will. The said clause in the Will is immediately followed by
the provisions that in accorda.nce with the Will the three appellants herein
shall be the owners of the property after the death of the husband. The
intention of the testator in respect of what has been bequeathed in favour of
F the husband of the testator is only a limited life interest, is made clear also
by the words next following, "My property ....... shall be enjoyed by my
husband ..... and the above named ........ three minors. " It is found
further stated in the Will that the same is being made "for the benefit and
enjoyment of the property by my above husband and minor boys." Reasons
G also have been assigned in the Will itself as to why those three minor children
have been chosen for being given the ultimate and absolute rights after the
death of her husband. In addition to all this, there is a specific clause which
in unmistakeable terms stipulate that "the relations of my husband have no
right to this estate nor there will be any in future. "

H In the light of the above noticed provisions in the Will, the testament
ARUNKUMAR v. SHRINIWAS 459
cannot be construed to bequeath the property absolutely in favour of the A
husband and placing such a construction would amount to not only re-writing
the several clauses in the Will but would constitute violence to the language
and further defeat the very intention of the testator. Courts !-rave often reiterated
the cardinal principle that the intention of the testator should be given the
primary importance and construe the words in the background of the intended B
meaning which the testator himself desired to ascribe to the words used.
There are overwhelming intrinsic materials in the document itself which, in
our view, necessitate a limited meaning being given to the word 'Malik' in
this case also to construe the bequest in favour of the husband to be a life
estate only. We are convinced, on going through the recitals in the Will, that
the only possible and reasonable construction that could be placed on the C
Will by giving full effect to the intention of the testator as found expressed
in all relevant portion of the Will would be to construe the bequest made in
favour of her husband as one for life interest and remainder bequeathed
absolutely in favour of the three minors after the life time of her husband.

Strong reliance placed by the learned counsel for the respondents on D
the decisions of this Court in Mauleshwar Mani and Ors. v. Jagdish Prasad
and Ors., [2002] 2 SCC 468 are inappropriate having regard to the vast and
radical difference in the language of the document construed therein and the
one before us, in this case. The provisions contained in Section 124 will have
no relevance to the case on hand and on the very construction of the Will, E
the claim of the appellants deserves to be upheld.

Consequently, the appeals are allowed, the judgment and decree of the
courts below are set aside and the suit filed by the appellants shall stand
decreed, as prayed for.
F
No costs.

R.P. Appeals allowed.