Holding

The Court held that the appellant did not exercise a lawful right of private defence and the convictions under Sections 302, 324, 342 and 454 IPC stand.

Summary

The appellant Arun, brother of the deceased Sampatrao Gopal Khandekar, was convicted of murder and related offences for killing his brother during a family land dispute. The appellant claimed he acted in private defence, alleging the deceased was the aggressor. The Supreme Court examined the principles of private defence under Sections 96‑106 of the Indian Penal Code, the burden of proof under Section 105 of the Evidence Act, and relevant factors such as the nature of injuries, imminence of threat and availability of police recourse. Citing numerous precedents, the Court held that the appellant’s conduct exceeded the scope of lawful self‑defence and was not a justified response to an imminent threat. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the appeal and upheld the convictions. The appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the appellant was justified in invoking the right of private defence under Sections 96‑106 IPC.
Whether the convictions under Sections 302, 324, 342 and 454 IPC should be set aside.

Legislation cited

Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 105
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 100, s. 101, s. 102, s. 103, s. 104, s. 105, s. 302, s. 324, s. 342, s. 454, s. 96, s. 97, s. 98, s. 99

Subjects

private defenceself-defenceIndian Penal CodeSection 302murderburden of prooffamily land disputecriminal appeal

Judgment

[2009] 4 S.C.R. 289

I ARUN A
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
Criminal Appeal No. 1490 of 2007
MARCH 16, 2009
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND ASOK KUMAR GANGULY,
JJ .
.,
Penal Code, 1860- ss. 302, 324, 342, 454 and 96 - 106
..;:
• - Right of private defence -Availability and extent of- Plea,
when can be raised and mode of proof - Stated - On facts, c
deceased succumbed to injuries inflicted by accused persons
- Conviction and sentence ulss. 302, 324, 342 and 454 by
courts below negating the plea of exercise of private defence
raised by accused - Justification of - Held: On facts and the
-'( legal principles set out, order of courts below justified. D
~·

The question which arose for consideration in this
appeal was whether the courts below were justified in
convicting and sentencing the appellants for offence
....t punishable u/ss. 302, 324, 342 and 454 IPC, negating the
plea of the appellant-accused that the deceased was the E
aggressor and the appellant was exercising his right of

;,
i
. private defence.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 In order to find whether right of private F
defence is available or not, the injuries received by the
accused, the imminence of threat to his safety, the injuries
caused by the accused and the circumstances whether
the accused had time to have recourse to public
-~ authorities are all relevant factors to be considered. [Para G
15] [301-H; 302-A]
Biran Singh v. State of Bihar AIR 1975 SC 87; Wassan
Singh v. State of Punjab (1996) 1 SCC 458, Sekar alias Raja
289 H
290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 4 S.C.R.

A Sekharan v. State represented by Inspector of Police, TN. 2002
(8) sec 354 - referred to.
1.2 A person who is apprehending death or bodily
injury cannot weigh in golden scales in the spur of moment
and in the heat of circumstances, the number of injuries
B required to disarm the assailants who were armed with
weap'?ns. In moments of excitement and disturbed mental
equilibrium it is often difficult to expect the parties to
preserve composure and use exactly only so much force
in retaliation commensurate with the danger apprehended 4

c to him where assault is imminent by use of force, it would
be lawful to repel the force in self-defence and the right of
private-defence commences, as soon as the threat
becomes so imminent. Such situations have to be
pragmatically viewed and not with high-powered
D spectacles or microscopes to detect slight or even
~
marginal overstepping. Due weightage has to be given •
to, and hyper technical approach has to be avoided in
considering what happens on the spur of the moment on
the spot and keeping in view normal human reaction and
E conduct, where self-preservation is the paramount
consideration. But, if the fact situation shows that in the
guise of self-preservation, what really has been done is
to assault the original aggressor, even after the cause of ~

reasonable apprehension has disappeared, the plea of •
F right of private-defence can legitimately be negatived. The
Court dealing with the plea has to weigh the material to
conclude whether the plea is acceptable. It is essentially,
a finding of fact. [Para 16] [302-C-G]
Butta Singh v. The State of Punjab AIR 1991 SC 1316 -
G referred to.

1.3 The right of self-defence is a very valuable rig ht,
serving a social purpose and should not be construed
narrowly. Situations have to be judged from the subjective
point of view of the accused concerned in the surrounding
H
ARUN V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 291

J excitement and confusion of the moment, confronted with A
a situation of peril and not by any microscopic and
pedantic scrutiny. In adjudging the question as to whether
more force than was necessary was used in the prevailing
circumstances on the spot it would be inappropriate, to
adopt tests by detached objectivity which would be so B
natural in a Court room, or that which would seem
absolutely necessary to a perfectly cool bystander. The
_,
person facing a reasonable apprehension of threat to
• himself cannot be expected to modulate his defence step
by step with any arithmetical exactitude of only that much c
which is required in the thinking of a man in ordinary times
or under normal circumstances. [Para 17] [303-A-D]
Vidhya Singh v. State of MP AIR 1971 SC 1857 - referred
to.
,~
D
Russel on Crime 11th Edition Volume I p 49 - referred
to.
1.4 The right of private defence is essentially a
defensive right circumscribed by the governing statute
.... i.e. the IPC, available only when the circumstances clearly E
, justify it. It should not be allowed to be pleaded or availed
j as a pretext for a vindictive, aggressive or retributive
• ..
I

' purpose of offence. It is a right of defense, not of
retribution, expected to repel unlawful aggression and not
as retaliatory measure. While providing for exercise of the F
right, care has been taken in IPC not to provide and has
not devised a mechanism whereby an attack may be
pretence for killing. A right to defend does not include a
right to launch an offensive, particularly when the need
to defend no longer survived. [Para 19] [303-F-H; 304-A]
.1' G
James Martin v. State of Kera/a 2004 (2) SCC 203 -
referred to.
1.5 In the instant case, when the factual scenario is
examined in the background of the principles set out, the
H
292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 4 S.C.R.

A inevitable conclusion is that the appeal is without merit.
[Para 21] [304-B]
Munshi Ram and Ors. v. Delhi Administration AIR 1968
SC 702; State of Gujarat v. Bai Fatima AIR 1975 SC 1478;,
State of UP v. Mohd. Musheer Khan AIR 1977 SC 2226;
B Mohinder Pal Jolly v. State of Punjab AIR 1979 SC 577; Salim
Zia v. State of UP AIR 1979 SC 391; Lakshmi Singh v. State
of Bihar AIR 1976 SC 2263; Jai Dev. v. State of Punjab AIR
1963 SC 612 - referred to ..
•
c Case Law Reference
AIR 1968 SC 702 Referred to Para 12
AIR 1975 SC 1478 Referred to. Para 12
AIR 1977 SC 2226 Referred to Para 12
D IP
AIR 1979 SC 577 Referred to Para 12
'
AIR 1979 SC 391 Referred to Para 12
AIR 1976 SC 2263 Referred to Para 13
E AIR 1963 SC 612 Referred to Para 14
'
AIR 1975 SC 87 Referred to Para 15 1
1996) 1 sec 458 Referred to Para 15 ,..
•
2002 (8) sec 354 Referred to Para 15
F
AIR 1991 SC 1316 Referred to Para 16
AIR 1971 SC 1857 Referred Para 17
2004 (2) sec 203 Referred to Para 19
G CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 1490 of 2007
From the Judgement and Order dated 27.09.2005 of the
High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Appeal No. 1 of
H 2000.
ARUN V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 293

A.V. Rao, Prabhakar Parnam, Venkateswara Rao A
Anumolu, for .the Appellant.
R.K. Adsure, for the Respondent.
The Judgement of the Court was delivered by
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. B

1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division
Bench of the Bombay High Court, Aurangabad Bench upholding
the conviction of the appellant for offence punishable under
Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') c
and sentence of imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.500/-
with default stipulation. He was also convicted for offence
punishable under Section 324 IPC and sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year.and a fine of
Rs.250/- with default stipulation. He was also convicted for
0
r
1 offence punishable under Section 342 IPC and sentenced to
undergo RI for three months and fine of Rs.100/- with default
stipulation. Additionally, he was charged for offence punishable
under Section 454 IPC and he was separately sentenced to
suffer RI for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs.250/-
with default stipulation. Two others co-accused persons were E
acquitted by the trial Court of all charges. Both the appellant .
and the State filed appeals. The State's appeal was directed
against the acquittal of accused Nos.2 and 3 arid the same was
dismissed at the admission stage.
F
3. Background facts giving rise to the trial as projected by ·
the prosecution are as follows:
Appellant and the deceased Sampatrao Gopal Khandekar
were real brothers. They had two other brothers by name
Haribhau and lndakar. The deceased Sampatrao was an G
educated person and was a professor at Balbhim College in
Beed. He was also managing an educational trust by name
"Bade Baba Shikshan Sanstha" at village Lahuri, Taluka Kaij,
in district Beed. Deceased and his brothers were separate in
residence and there was a partition effected between the . H
294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 4 S.C.R.

A brothers. Deceased Sampatrao was in possession of his share
of the ancestral lands and also had some self acquired land at
village Kolhewadi As regards the educational trust mentioned
herein above, deceased Sampatrao was a founder member
and the Secretary. The family of Sampatrao was residing at
B Beed since Sampatrao was serving as a professor in the town.
Sampatrao used to get his lands, in village Kolhewadi, cultivated
with the help of labourers. His two brothers i.e. the present
appellant and lndakar (A-3) who were residents of village
Kolhewadi, had a dispute with the deceased Sampatrao as the
c partition and its terms were not acceptable to them. Sampatrao
and wife Mangalabai had filed Regular Suit No.285 of 1996 in
the Court of the Civil Judge, Junior Division at Kaij for a
declaration of title and injunction in respect of five lands which
were the suit property in that suit. The suit was filed against two
D brothers i.e. the present appellant and A-3 lndakar as well as
some other members of their family. In the suit, the deceased
and his wife filed an application for grant of interim injunction,
on 31' October1996, and the interim injunction ap~lication was
1

allowed by the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Kaij 4 November,
1996. Even after the grant of injunction, the disputes remained,
E because the cotton crops were allegedly stolen by accused No.1
Arun, acquitted accused No.3 lndakar and their family members
and in this regard a police complaint was filed by PW-13
Mangalabai, wife of deceased against the present appellant
and A-3 and their family members. She had prayed for strict
' .
F police action against the persons named in the complaint. All
these facts indicate that the relations between family of
deceased Sampatrao and the families of his two real brothers
were strained and inimical.
G The incident in question took place on 22nd November
1996. Prior to incident, PW-11 Bhairu Anna Khose had been
engaged by deceased Sampatrao to work in his fields for
period of three months in lieu of payment of Rs.5,000/-. PW-
11 Bhairu Khose had executed a Naukarnama to this effect. He
had agreed to work on the field of Sampatrao on 21st December,
H
ARUN V STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 295
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

,f 1996 and Sampatrao had asked him to meet him at village A
Neknoor. Accordingly, they had met at Neknoor and from there
had gone to village Kolhewadi. On 22nd December, 1996, in the
morning, deceased Sampatrao took PW-11 Bhairu to his field.
Adjoining to the field of deceased Sampatrao, was the field of
accused No.2. This field had an electric motor and a pipeline B
fitted therei~. At the spot, there was some discussion between
deceased Sampatrao and accused No.2 pertaining to the supply
• of water to his field and to the field of accused No.1. Accused
4 No.3 lndakar was also present at the spot, at that time. After
this incident, the deceased Sampatrao and PW-11 Bhairu came c
walking through the fields to Shri Bade Baba Vidyalaya Mandir
i.e. the school situated at village Lahuri. They reached the Lahuri
school at about 11.45 a.m. got the office room opened through
a Peon and were sitting in the office. At that time, accused Nos.1
and 3 came running towards the school. A-1 Arun, who was also
D
~
-1 working as a peon in the said school, latched the door of the
office room from outside and from the window he told PW-11
Bhairu that if he wanted to save himself, he should come out.
Sampatrao told his brother Arun that Bhairu was his servant
and that he would not leave. Sampatrao then locked the door of
the office from inside, shutting out accused No.1 Arun. Accused E
No.1 Arun then climbed on to the roof of the office, which was a
tin shed. He bent a sheet of tin on the roof of the said office and
__,, -.;
from the opening so created, he jumped into the office room.
After jumping into the office room he took out chilly powder from
his right pocket and threw it into ·the eyes of deceased F
Sampatrao. He then picked up an iron hammer and with this
iron hammer as well as a brick which had been stored in the
room along with 6ther bricks kept for construction purposes, he
hit the deceased Sampatrao pressed his neck and inflicted eight
blows on the head of the deceased. PW-11 Bhairu was G
'.,,..
requesting accused No.1 Arun not to beat Sampatrao. At that
time, accused No.2 informed Bhairu from the window that he
should not interfere in the quarrel between the brothers. Accused
No.2 caught hold of the hands of PW-11 Bhairu near the window.
Accused No.1 was also carrying a wire on his waist and he H
296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 4 S.C.R.

A used this wire also to beat Sampatrao. Accused No.1 threw a },
brick which struck the forehead of Bhairu and also beat Bhairu
with the wire. Bhairu fell down and pretended to be dead.
Accused No.1 A1 un, however, asked Bhairu to shift the table to
the place in the room where the tin sheet of the roof had been
8 bent. He made Bhairu keep a chair on the table and both, he
and Bhairu got out of that room through the damaged tin roof.
The accused Nos.1 to 3, thereafter, left the place and went
together to the side of Lahuri village. There were some other •
persons who went behind them. This entire incident was over ..
c by about 1.00 p.m. PW-11 Bhairu then went in a jeep to Police
Station, Kaij. He narrated the entire incident to the police and
the police recorded his FIR on the same day.

Sudarshan Mundhe, API (PW-17) who was then attached
to the Kaij Police Station, registered the crime under CR. No.257
D of 1996, for offences punishable under Sections 302, 342 read
with Section 34 IPC. He found that the clothes of the complainant
'
were blood stained. He first seized the clothes of the
complainant under Panchnama (Exhibit-31). Since the
complainant was injured the investigating officer referred him
E for medical treatment to the Government Hospital at Kaij. PW-
17 API Sudarshan then summoned a photographer and together
with the photographer, he went to the spot of the incident. He
found the room of the office to be locked. The police managed >-
to open the lock of the office but even after opening the lock and "
F unlatching the door they found that they could not enter the office
because it was latched from inside. One police constable was
then made to climb to the roof and he entered the office from
the opening in the roof and unlatched the office door from inside.
The photographer then entered and took several photographs
of the dead body of deceased and all the other articles found
G
inside the room. It was found that a chair had been kept on a
table under the spot and the tin roof had been bent and the
photograph of this was also taken. After photographing the room,
the investigating officer prepared the panchnama and seized
several articles which were found in the room. On the same day,
H
ARUN V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 297
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

. "',. the investigating officer arrested accused No.1 Arun and seized A
his bloodstained clothes under Panchnama. The arrest cum-
seizure panchnama was produced at the trial and marked
Exhibit-32. The investigating officer referred accused No.1 Arun
for medical examination as he found some injuries on his person.
The investigating officer then collected the medical certificates B
of the complainant and the present appellant. As per the medical
certificates, the injuries that were found on the person of the
·~
complainant, (PW-11) Bhairu and A-1 were simple injuries
... caused by a hard and blunt substance .
After completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed.
c
As the accused persons pleaded innocence trial was held and
19 witnesses were examined to further the prosecution version.
PWs 8 and 11 were stated to be eye witnesses to the
occurrence. They were two students who were staying in the
D
.,. -l hostel of the school. The trial Court found the evidence to be
cogent, credible and recorded the conviction so far as the
present appellant is concerned. In appeal, it was stated that the
appellant had gone unarmed and alone to the school to persuade
the deceased to put an end to the dispute between them. When
the appellant made his request to the deceased, he ::1bused E
him in filthy language and made obscene suggestion. He also
__, started pushing the appellant outside the room. When he saw
•• ·that the appellant was not going out of the room, the deceased
picked up a hammer which was lying in the room and gave blows
on the head of the appellant who tried to save himself. The F
deceased gave two more blows on the head and when the
appellant apprehended that he was likely to be killed he gave
some more blows. Appellant tried to save himself and when he
was trying to save himself and when he was in a fit of
G
·' uncontrollable anger, in that process the deceased and the
appellant might have been injured. It is also stated that the stand
regarding throwing of chilly powder was false and the chilly
powder was subsequently planted at the scene of the offence.
The State's stand was that in view of accepted position
H
298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 4 S.C.R.

A regarding the presence of the accused and the role described
by PWs 8, 10 and 11 there is no scope for interference with the
well reasoned judgment of the trial Court. The High Court
accepted the stand and dismissed the appeal.

4. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant
8
submitted that there was an earlier FIR which was suppressed
and after deliberation report was lodged which was treated as
a FIR. It was the deceased who was the aggressor and the
appellant was exercising his right of private defence. According
C to him, the deceased gave four blows on his head and, therefore,
the judgment of the High Court is clearly unsustainable.

11. In response, learned counsel for the respondent-State
submitted that the FIR was promptly lodged. The injuries stated
to have been sustained by the accused are simple in nature.
D The evidence of PWs 8, 10 and 11 is clear, cogent and credible
...
and, therefore, there is no scope for any interference. '
12. Only question which needs to be considered, is the
alleged exercise of right of private defence. Section 96, IPC
E provides that nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise
of the right of private defence. The Section does not define the
expression 'right of private defence'. It merely indicates that
nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of such right.
Whether in a particular set of circumstances, a person
F legitimately acted in the exercise of the right of private defence
is a question of fact to be determined on the facts and
circumstances of each case. No test in the abstract for
determining such a question can be laid down. In determining
this question of fact, the Court must consider all the surrounding
circumstances. It is not necessary for the accused to plead in
G so many words that he acted in self-defence. If the
circumstances show that the right of private defence was
legitimately exercised, it is open to the Court to consider such a
plea. In a given case the Court can consider it even if the
accused has not taken it, if the same is available to be
H
ARUN V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 299
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT. J.]

.. 1 considered frO'm the material on record. Under Section 105 of A
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short 'the Evidence Act'), the
burden of proof is on the accused, who sets up the plea of self-
defence, and, in the absence of proof, it is not possible for the
Court to presume the truth of the plea of self-defence. The Court
shall presume the absence of such circumstances. It is for the B
accused to place necessary material on record either by himself
adducing positive evidence or by eliciting necessary facts from
-.i
the witnesses examined for the prosecution. An accused taking
. ,.
the plea of the right of private defence is not necessarily required
to call evidence; he can establish his plea by reference to c
circumstances transpiring from the prosecution evidence itself.
The question in such a case would be a question of assessing
the true effect of the prosecution evidence, and not a question
of the accused discharging any burden. Where the right of private
defence is pleaded, the defence must be a reasonable and D
,,.. -1
probable version satisfying the Court that the harm caused by
the accused was necessary for either warding off the attack or
for forestalling the further reasonable apprehension from the side
of the accused. The .burden of establishing the plea of self-
defence is on the accused and the burden stands discharged E
by showing preponderance of probabilities in favour of that plea
on the basis of the material on record. (See Munshi Ram and
-.... Ors. v. Delhi Administration (Al R 1968 SC 702), State of Gujarat
v. Bai Fatima (AIR 1975 SC 1478), State of U.P v. Mohd.
Musheer Khan (AIR 1977 SC 2226), and Mohinder Pal Jolly F
v. State of Punjab (AIR 1979 SC 577). Sections 100 to 101
define the extent of the right of private defence of body. If a person
has a right of private defence of body under Section 97, that
right extends under Section 100 to causing death if there is
reasonable apprehension that death or grievous hurt would be G
~"' the consequence of the assault. The oft quoted observation of
this Court in Salim Zia v. State of U.P (AIR 1979 SC 391 ), runs
as follows:
~

~
"It is true that the burden on an accused person to establish
H
300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 4 S.C.R.

A the plea of self-defence is not as onerous as the one .,.,
which lies on the prosecution and that, while the prosecution
is required to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt,
the accused need not establish the plea to the hilt and
may discharge his onus by establishing a mere
B preponderance of probabilities either by laying basis for
that plea in the cross-examination of the prosecution
witnesses or by adducing defence evidence."

The accused need not prove the existence of the right of
private defence beyond reasonable doubt. It is enough for him
>-
...
c to show as in a civil case that the preponderance of probabilities
is in favour of his plea. ...
13. The number of injuries is not always a safe criterion for
determining who the aggressor was. It cannot be stated as a
D universal rule that whenever the injuries are on the body of the
~
accused persons, a presumption must necessarily be raised
that the accused persons had caused injuries in exercise of the
right of private defence. The defence has to further establish
that the injuries so caused on the accused probabilise the
E version of the right of private defence. Non-explanation of the .
,
injuries sustained by the accused at about the time of occurrence
or in the course of altercation is a very important circumstance.
But mere non-explanation of the injuries by the prosecution may
not affect the prosecution case in all cases. This principle applies
F to cases where the injuries sustained by the accused are minor
and superficial or where the evidence is so clear and cogent,
so independent and disinterested, so probable, consistent and
credit-worthy, that it far outweighs the effect of the omission on
the part of the prosecution to explain the injuries. [See Lakshmi
G Singh v. State of Bihar (AIR 1976 SC 2263)]. A plea of right of
private defence cannot be based on surmises and speculation. "'-
While considering whether the right of private defence is
available to an accused, it is not relevant whether he may have
a chance to inflict severe and mortal injury on the aggressor. In •
H order to find whether the right of private defence is available to
ARUN V STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 301
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

." an accused, the entire incident must be examined with care A
and viewed in its proper setting. Section 97 deals with the subject
matter of right of private defence. The plea of right comprises
the body or property (i) of the person exercising the right; or (ii)
of any other person; and the right may l;le exercised in the case
of any offence against the body, and in the case of offences of B
theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, and attempts at
such offences in relation to property. Section 99 lays down the
.....
... limits of the right of private defence. Sections 96 and 98 give a
right of private defence against certain offences and acts. The
right given under Sections 96 to 98 and 100 to 106 is controlled c
by Section 99. To claim a right of private defence extending to
voluntary causing of death, the accused must show that there
were circumstances giving rise to reasonable grounds for
apprehending that either death or grievous hurt would be caused
,.. -1 to him. The burden is on the accused to show that he had a right D
of private defence which extended to causing of death. Sections
100 and 101, IPC define the limit and extent of right of private
defence.

14. Sections 102 and 105, IPC deal with commencement E
and continuance of the right of private defence of body and
property respectively. The right commences, as soon as a
.. .,, reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an
attempt, or threat, to commit the offence, although the offence
may not have been committed but not until there is that F
reasonable apprehension. The right lasts so long as the
reasonable apprehension of the danger to the body continues.
In Jai Dev. v. State of Punjab (AIR 1963 SC 612), it was
observed that as soon as the cause for reasonable apprehension
,i' disappears and the threat has either been destroyed or has G
been put to route, there can be no occasion to exercise the
right of private defence.

15. In order to find whether right of private defence is
available or not, the injuries received by the accused, the H
302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 4 S.C.R.

A imminence of threat to his safety. the injuries caused by the i'.
accused and the circumstances whether the accused had time
to have recourse to public authorities are all relevant factors to
be considered. Similar view was expressed by this Court in
Biran Singh v. State of Bihar (AIR 1975 SC 87). (See: Wassan
B Singh v. State of Punjab (1996) 1 SCC 458, Sekar alias Raja
Sekharan v. State represented by Inspector of Police, TN.
(2002 (8) sec 354).
..
16. As noted in Butta Singh v. The State of Punjab (AIR .
c 1991 SC 1316), a person who is apprehending death or bodily
injury cannot weigh in golden scales in the spur of moment and
in the heat of circumstances, the number of injuries required to
disarm the assailants who were armed with weapons. In
moments of excitement and disturbed mental equilibrium it is
D often difficult to expect the parties to preserve composure and
~

use exactly only so much force in retaliation commensurate with
the danger apprehended to him where assault is imminent by
use of force, it would be lawful to repel the force in self-defence
and the right of private-defence commences, as soon as the
E threat becomes so imminent. Such situations have to be
pragmatically viewed and not with high-powered spectacles or
microscopes to detect slight or even marginal overstepping.
Due weightage has to be given to, and hyper technical approach
has to be avoided in considering what happens on the spur of
F the moment on the spot and keeping in view normal human
reaction and conduct, where self-preservation is the paramount
consideration. But, if the fact situation shows that in the guise of
self-preservation, what really has been done is to assault the
original aggressor, even after the cause of reasonable
G apprehension has disappeared, the plea of right of private- '\,
defence can legitimately be negatived. The Court dealing with
the plea has to weigh the material to conclude whether the plea
is acceptable. It is essentially, as noted above, a finding of fact.

H 17. The right of ~'3lf-defence is a very valuable right, serving
• ARUN V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 303
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

- a social purpose and should not be construed narrowly. (See A
Vidhya Singh v. State of M.P (AIR 1971 SC 1857). Situations
have to be judged from the subjective point of view of the
accused concerned in the surrounding excitement and
confusion of the moment, confronted with a situation of peril and
not by any microscopic and pedantic scrutiny. In adjudging the B
question as to whether more force than was necessary was used
in the prevailing circumstances on the spot it would be
_.
inappropriate, as held by this Court, to adopt tests by detached
< ~
objectivity which would be so natural in a Court room, or that
which would seem absolutely necessary to a perfectly cool c
bystander. The person facing a reasonable apprehension of
threat to himself cannot be expected to modulate his defence
step by step with any arithmetical exactitude of only that much
which is required in the thinking of a man in ordinary times or
under normal circumstances.
D
y
' 18. In the illuminating words of Russel (Russel on Crime,
11th Edition Volume I at page 49):
".... a man is justified in resisting by force anyone who
~
manifestly intends and endeavours by violence or surprise
E
to commit a known felony against either his person,
habitation or property. In these cases, he is not obliged to
retreat, and may not merely resist the attack where he
' .,. "" stands but may indeed pursue his adversary until the
danger is ended and if in a conflict between them he
happens to kill his attacker, such killing is justifiable." F

19. The right of private defence is essentially a defensive
right circumscribed by the governing statute i.e. the IPC,
available only when the circumstances clearly justify it. It should
not be allowed to be pleaded or availed as a pretext for a G

- ~·'" vindictive, aggressive or retributive purpose of offence. It is a
right of defense, not of retribution, expected to repel unlawful
aggression and not as retaliatory measure. While providing for
exercise of the right, care has been taken in IPC not to provide
and has not devised a mechanism whereby an attack may be
H
304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 4 S.C.R.

A pretence for killing. A right to defend does not include a right to
launch an offensive, particularly when the need to defend no
longer survived.
20. The above position was highlighted in James Martin
v. State of Kera/a (2004 (2) SCC 203).
B
21. When the factual scenario is examined in the
background of the principles set out above, the inevitable
conclusion is that the appeal is without merit, deserves dismissal ~
which we direct. ~

N.J. Appeal dismissed.

...

'\.