Holding

The High Court’s exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 to stay the trial court’s proceedings was illegal because the matter is covered by the specific provision for appeal against conviction.

Summary

The accused were convicted of murder and related offences by a Sessions Court, which then scheduled a hearing on sentence. The accused failed to appear, leading the trial court to issue non‑bailable warrants. Instead of filing a statutory appeal, the accused filed a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code before the Allahabad High Court alleging misconduct by the trial judge. The High Court stayed the warrants and further proceedings. The informant‑injured witness appealed to the Supreme Court, which held that the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 could not be invoked where a specific statutory remedy – an appeal against conviction – existed. The Supreme Court declared the High Court’s order illegal and erroneous, quashed it, and directed the trial court to proceed with sentencing, ordering the accused to remain in jail pending that process.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC to stay proceedings when a specific statutory appeal against conviction is available.
What is the scope and limitation of the High Court's inherent powers under Section 482 in criminal matters.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. Section 482, s. Section 82, s. Section 83
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. Section 148, s. Section 149, s. Section 302, s. Section 307

Subjects

Inherent jurisdictionSection 482 CrPCAppeal against convictionAbuse of processNon‑bailable warrantSentencingSupreme CourtHigh Court

Judgment

A ARUNSHANKARSHUKLA
v.
STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.

JULY 23, 1999

B [K.T. THOMAS AND M.B. SHAH, JJ.]

Criminal Law : ft.

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 : Section 482 .
c
High Court-Inherent jurisdiction-Scope and ambit of-Trial court
convicted accused and posted the case for hearing on sentence-.But accused,
instead of preferring statutory appeal against conviction, filf!d petition under
S.482-High Court stayed further proceedings-Held : Inherent power not
be invoked in matter covered by specific provisions of the Code-Expressions
D "abuse of the process of law" or "to secure the ends ofjustice" do not confer
unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court-Order of High Court at an uncalled
for stage, illegal.

Words and Phrases:

E "Abuse of the process of law" and "to secure the ends of justice"-
Meaning of-Jn the context of S. 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.

The respondents-accused were convicted by the trial court for offences
under Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 149 of the Penal Code, 1860.
The case was posted to the succeeding days for hearing on sentence. But as
F the accused failed to appear, the trial court issued non-bailable warrants
against ttrem. Instead of appearing before the trial court, the accused filed
a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. before
the High Court alleging misconduct of the trial judge. The High .Court
stayed further proceedings including the operation of the non-bailable warrant
G issued by the trial court. Being aggrieved the appellant-informant-injured
witness filed the present appeal.

Allowing the appeal, this Court

HELD : 1. It is true that under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure
H Code, 1973, the High Court has inherent powers to ma~e such orders as
1060
A.S. SHUKLAv. STATEOFU.P. 1061

- may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent
the abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
But the expressions "abuse of the process of law" or "to secure the ends
of justice" do not confer unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court and the
A

alleged abuse of the process of law or the ends of justice could only be
secured in accordance with law including procedural law and not otherwise. B
Further, inherent powers are in the nature of extraordinary powers to be
used sparingly for achieving the object mentioned in Section 482 of the Code
in cases were there is no express provision empowering the High Court to
achieve the said object. It is well neigh settled that inherent power is not be
invoked in respect of any matter covered by specific provisions of the Code
or if its exercise would infringe any specific provision of the Code. In the C
present case, the High Court overlooked the procedural law, which empowered
the convicted accused to prefer statutory appeal against the conviction of the
offence. The High Court has intervened at an uncalled for stage and soft-
pedaled the course of justice at a very crucial stage of the trial.[1062-D-G]

2. The order passed by the High Court entertaining the petition of the D
convicted accused under Section 482 of the Code is, on the face of it, illegal
erroneous and to say the least, unfortunate. It was known to the High Court
that the trial court passed proceedings to the effect that final judgment and
order convicting the accused were pronounced by the trial court. It was also
recorded by the trial court that as the accused were absent, the court had E
issued non-bailable warrants. In such a situation, instead of directing the
accused to remain present before the Court for resorting to the steps
contemplated by the law for passing the sentence, the High Court has stayed
further proceedings including the operation of the non-bailable warrants
, issued by the trial court. It is disquieting that High Court has overlooked
, the important legal aspect that accused have a right of appeal against the F
order of conviction purported to have been passed by the trial court. In such
circumstances, the High Court ought not to have entertained a petition under
Section 482 of the Code and stonewalled the very efficacious alternative
remedy of appeal as provided in the Code. Merely because the accused made
certain allegations against the trial judge the substantive law cannot be by G
passed. [1064-E-G]

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
680 of 1999.

From the Judgment and Order dated 27. l .99 of the Allahabad High Court H
1062 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 3 S.C.R.

A in Crl. M.No. 743of1997.
Rakesh Dwivedi, Amitesh Kumar and Gopal Singh for the Appeallant.

Sushil Kumar and Uday Umesh Lalit -for the Respondent No.2-4.

B A.S. Pundir and Ms. Alka Aggarwal for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SHAH, J. Leave granted.

C It appears that unfortunately the High Court by exercising its inherent
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (for short "the
Code") has prevented the flow of justice on the alleged contention of the
convicted accused that it was polluted by so called misconduct of the judicial
officer. It is true that under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has
inherent powers to make such orders as rnay be necessary to give effect to
D any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of process of any Court
or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But the expressions "abuse of (he
.
._

process of law" or "to secure the ends of justice" do not confer unlimited
jurisdiction on the High Court and the alleged abuse of the process of law
or the ends of justice could only be secured in accordance with law including
E procedural law and not otherwise. Further, inherent powers are in the nature
of extraordinary powers to be used sparingly for achieving the object
mentioned in Section 482 of the Code in cases where there is no express
provision empowering the High Court to achieve the said object. It is well
neigh settled that inherent power is not to be invoked in respect of any matter
covered by specific provisions of the Code or if its exercise would infringe
F any specific provision of the Code. In the present case, the High Court
overlooked the procedural law which empowered the convicted accused to
prefer statutory appeal against conviction of the offence. High Court has
intervened at an uncalled for stage and soft-pedaled the course of justice at
a very crucial stage of the trial.
G In the present case, accused-respondents were charged for the offences
punishable under Sections 148, 302, 149 and also under Section 307/149 of the
IPC for the incident which took place at about 1.30 P.M. on 26th July, 1981
at the village in Jhahirpur District, Lucknow. It appears that for one or the
other reason, the trial dragged on till the end of November 1997. The
H proceedings as minuted by the Sessions Judge show that on 20.11.1997
A.S. SHUKLA v. STATE OF U.P. [SHAH, J.] 1063
. judgment was pronouncep convicting Ram Gopal Misra, Ram Naresh and A
Radhey Sham Mishra under Section 302 and 307 read with Section 149 ofIPC..
Accused Ram Gopal Misra was absent, but the other two accused went
outside the court and did not return. So the case was posted to the succeeding
days and since none of the accused turned up the sessions court ordered
non-bailable warrants of arrest to be issued against them on 25. l l .1997.
B
Instead of appearing before the trial court the accused filed a petition
under Section 482 of the Code which was numbered as Criminal Miscellaneous
Case No.743of1997 before the Lucknow Bench of the High Court of Allahabad.
The matter was placed b~fore Virendra Saran J. The learned judge called for
the comments of the Ses~ions Judge concerned. The Court also directed the C
Sessions Judge to send the record including the short-hand book in a sealed
cover. Thereafter on 6th January, 1998 the High Court stayed the execution
of warrants of arrest issued against-- the accused. It appears that from 6th
January, 1998 to 29th January, 1999 the High Court posted the Criminal
Miscellaneous Case to a large number of days for hearing, but unfortunately
on every such day the hearing was merely adjourned, with a direction that D
interim order shall continue. ..J,

From the facts stated above\ it is. .seen that ~dditional Sessio!ls Judge
pronounced judgment dated 20- l I-t997 CQnvicting the accused-respondents
and as the accused were requiti:,d to be h~~on° the question of sentence,
the matter was kept on 21st, 22nd and 25th of~mber, 1997. But as the E-
accused failed to appear, the trial judge issuednot'f~~ts returnable
by 2nd December, 1997.

When the informant-injured witness moved an application in the High
Court for modification of the order dated 9th December, 1997 that was placed F
before LP. Vashishth, J. who observed that it was contended by counsel for
the private respondent that since the convicting judgment was already
pronounced by the trial court and the matter was fixed for hearing, the petition
was no longer maintainable, however, as the application seeks modification
of the Order, the same may be placed before the Hon'ble Judge whose order
is sought to be modified. Thereafter, Virendra Saran, J. on 6-1-1998 directed G
the matter to be placed before the appropriate bench on 20th January, 1998
and till that date the execution of the warrants of arrest and the process
issued under Section 82 and 83 CR.P.C. were stayed. From that date onwards,
the matter was adjourned for one or the other reason, as stated above.

The informant-injured witness filed this appeal by Special Leave and H
c

1064 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 3 S.C.R.

A contended that the accused who were convicted of the offence of murder of
two persons have succeeded in evading the arrest till that date and it amounts
to abuse of the process of the Court and the judicial system. It was submitted
that accused have misled the High Court by their misrepresentations and
having obtained an interim order of stay of arrest, accused on one pretext or
B the other, succeeded in getting adjournments and thus delayed hearing of the
matter. It was, therefore, prayed that the proceedings in the High Court be
quashed or the High Court be directed to dispose of the application under
Section 482 filed by the accused. On 1st April, 1999 this. Court has directed
as under:-

C "Issue notice. The order passed by the High Court staying the arrest .../
of respondent Nos.2,3 & 4 in connection with their conviction under Section
302/34 IPC is put in abeyance. In other words, the said respondents are liable
to surrender or it is open to the authority to put them in prison."

On 12th May, 1999 we directed that all further proceedings in the
D Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 743 of 1997 of the Allahabad High Court,
Lucknow Bench be stayed until further orders from this Court.

In our view, the order passed by the High Court entertaining the petition
of the convicted accused under Section 482 of the Code is, on the face of
it, illegal, erroneous and to say the least, unfortunate. It was known to the ·'
E High Court that the trial court passed proceedings to the effect that final
judgment and orde·r convicting the accused were pronounced by the frial
court. It was also recorded by the trial court that as the accused were absent,
the court had issued non-bailable warrants. In such a situation, instead of
directing the accused to remain present before the Court for resorting to the
steps contemplated by the law for passing the sentence, the High Court has
F stayed further proceedings including the operation of the non-bailable warrants
issued by the trial court. It is disquietfug that the High Court has overlooked
the important legal aspect that accused have a right of appeal against the
order of conviction purported to have been passed by the trial court. In such
circumstances the High Court ought not to have entertained a petition under
G Section 482 of the Code and stonewalled the very efficacious alternative
remedy of appeal as provided in the Code. Merely because the accused made
certain allegations against the trial judge the substantive law cannot be
bypassed.

In this view of the matter, this appeal is allowed and the order passed
- H by the High Court entertaining the petition under Section 482 and the other
' A.S. SHUKLA~· STATE OF U.P. [SHAH, J.] 1065
interim orders. passed thereunder are quashed. The learned Sessions Judge A
is directed to hear the accused on the question of sentence and pass
appropriate orders according to law. Till then the accused shall remain in jail.
This appeal stands disposed of accordingly.

We make it clear that it is open to. the High Court to consider all the
contentions which the accused may raise against the said conviction either B
in the appeal which they may file, or administratively, untrammeled by any of
the observations made by us in the judgment.

v.s.s. Ap)'.leal allowed.

' ..