Holding

An appellate court may overturn an acquittal only if the trial court's judgment is perverse; here the trial court's judgment was not perverse, so the High Court's conviction was unsustainable.

Summary

Arulvelu and his father were charged under IPC s.304B and s.498A for allegedly forcing their wife Mangayarkarasi to commit suicide by demanding dowry. The trial court, after a detailed examination of the evidence and noting that the suicide note did not implicate any accused, acquitted them. The Madras High Court reversed the acquittal, holding that the dowry demand and harassment were proved beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court held that an appellate court may set aside an acquittal only if the trial court's judgment is perverse—i.e., unsupported by evidence or contrary to law. It found the trial court's findings to be a plausible view, not perverse, and therefore restored the acquittal. The Court also clarified that an FIR need not contain exhaustive details but must present a broad story of the prosecution case.

Issues considered

The scope of an appeal against acquittal and when a higher court can overturn a trial court's acquittal.
The meaning and application of the term 'perverse' in criminal judgments.
Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that dowry demand and harassment caused the suicide.
The requirement for material facts to be mentioned in the FIR.
The relevance of the suicide note in establishing culpability.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 304B, s. 498A

Subjects

dowry deathsuicideperverse judgmentappeal against acquittalburden of proofFIR requirementsIPC 498AIPC 304Bcriminal jurisprudence

Judgment

[2009) 14 S.C.R. 1081

-+ ARULVELU AND ANOTHER A
v.
STATE REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
AND ANOTHER
<'
(Criminal Appeal Nos.1233-1234 of 2002)
~ OCTOBER 7, 2009
B

[DALVEER BHANDARI AND DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, JJ.]

.
I
~

Penal Code, 1860: s. 3048, 498A - Suicide committed
by wife of first accused - Suicide note not blaming any one - c
Trial court acquitting first accused and his father - Conviction
by High Court holding that there must be intolerable
harassment meted out to the deceased which prompted her
to commit suicide - On appeal, held: In criminal cases,
conviction can be sustained only when there is clear D
)>
evidence beyond reasonable doubt - High Court while
reversing judgment of trial court observed that in all
probabilities, there was demand of dowry and the deceased
was harassed by the first accused and therefore, she
committed suicide - Approach of High Court was wholly E
fallacious and unsustainable in law.

Appeal against acquittal: Scope of - Held: Unless
i judgment of acquittal passed by trial court is perverse,
appellate Court is not justified in substituting its own view and
reverse the judgment of acquittal - Expression 'perverse' F
means that the findings of the subordinate authority were not
supported by evidence brought on record or they were
again_st the law or suffer from the vice of procedural
irregularity.
G
FIR: FIR should at/east mention a broad story of the
prosecution - Non-mentioning of material and vital facts may
affect the credibility of FIR.

1081 H
1082 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A Words and phrases: Perverse - Meaning of.

Prosecution case was that deceased was forced to
commit suicide because of consistent demand of dowry
made by her husband, the first accused. The defence
version was that deceased was depressed due to the
8
decision of Panchayat not permitting deceased to go to
her parents which prompted her to commit suicide.

Trial Court examined entire evidence and acquitted
husband and father-in-law of the deceased. On appeal,
C High Court set aside the acquittal order holding that the
trial Court gave undue emphasis on minor
contradictions. High Court discarded the version of trial
Court regarding deposition of father of deceased made
for the first time in Court regarding the demand of car
D which he did not mention in the FIR. According to High
Court, unless an intolerable harassment was meted out
to her, there was absolutely no necessity for her to write
in suicide note that the children be handed over to her
mother's house. First accused was convicted under
E s.3048 IPC and under s.498A IPC and second accused
was convicted under s.498A IPC. Hence these appeals.

Allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1. The FIR should at least mention a broad
F story of the prosecution. Non-mentioning of material and
vital facts may affect the credibility of the FIR. High Court
observed that the FIR cannot be an encyclopedia to
contain all the details of history of the case. This
approach of the High Court does not seem to be correct
G [Para 16] [1092-C-D]

2. The approach of the High Co~rt in the impugned
judgment is not in consonance with the settled principles
of criminal jurisprudence. The High Court while reversing
H the judgment of the trial court observed that in all
ARULVELU v. STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1083
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
• -t probabilities, there was demand of dowry and the A
deceased was harassed by the first accused and
therefore, she committed suicide. In criminal cases, the
conviction can be sustained only when there is clear
evidence beyond reasonable doubt. The accused cannot
be convicted on the .ground that in all probabilities the B
accused may have committed the crime. The approach
of the High Court is wholly fallacious and unsustainable

~
• in law. [Para 22] [1100-0-F]

3.1. The trial court very minutely examined the entire
evidence and all documents and exhibits on record. The
c·
trial court's analysis of evidence seems to be correct. It
did not deviate from the normal norms or methods of
evaluation of the evidence. By no stretch of imagination,
it can be held that the judgment of the trial court was
..
-------i' ).. based on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly D
"
unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it
and consequently the judgment of the trial court is
perverse. The law is well settled that, in an appeal against
acquittal, unless the judgment of the trial court is
perverse, appellate Court would not be justified in E
substituting its own view and reverse the judgment of
acquittal. The expression 'perverse' means that the
.. findings of the subordinate authority are not supported
by evidence brought on record or they are against the
law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity. F
[Paras 24, 25 and 26] [1100-G-H;1101-A-C-E]

Gaya Din (Dead) through LRs. & Others v. Hanuman
Prasad (Dead)through LRs. & Others (2001) 1 SCC 501;
Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. &
G
Others AIR 1966 Cal. 31; Triveni Rubber & Plastics v.
"';
Collector of Central Excise, Cochin AIR 1994 SC 1341; M.
S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma &Another AIR 1977 Kar. 58;
Moffett v. Gough 1 LR. 1r. 371; Godfrey v. Godfrey 106 NW

H
:
1084 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A 814; Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P. (2003) 1
SCC 761; Ku/deep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police &
Others (1999) 2 SCC 10; H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation
Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, Kamal & Others v. Gopi
Nath & Sons & Others 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312; Sheo
B Swarup & Others v. King Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227; Surajpa/
Singh & Others v. The State, AIR 1952 SC 52; Tulsiram
Kanu v. The State, AIR 1954 SC 1, Atley v. State of Uttar
Pradesh AIR 1955 SC 807; Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab f
AIR 1957 SC 216; M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra AIR
c 1963 SC 200; Khedu Mohton & Others v. State of Bihar,
(1970) 2 SCC 450; Bishan Singh & Others v. The State of
Punjab (1974) 3 SCC 288; K. Gopa/ Reddy v. State of Andhra
Pradesh (1979) 1 SCC 355; Tota Singh & Another v. State
of Punjab (1987) 2 SCC 529; Sambasivan & Others v. State
of Kera/a (1998) 5 SCC 412; BhagwanSingh & Others v.
D
State of M.P. (2002) 4 SCC 85; Harijana Thirupa/a & Others
v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., Hyderabad (2002)
6 SCC 470; State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram (2003) 8 SCC
180; Budh Singh & Others v. State of UP (2006) 9 SCC 731;
Kalyan Singh v. State of MP (2006) 13 SCC 303; Kallu alias
E Masih & Others v. State of MP (2006) 10 SCC 313; State of
Goa v. Sanjay Thakran & Another, (2007) 3 SCC 755;
Shambhoo Missir & Another v. State of Bihar (1990) 4 SCC
t
17; Chandrappa & Others v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4
SCC 415; Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC
F 450, referred to.

Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English
Sixth Edition; Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English;
International Edition; The New Oxford. Dictionary of English
G 1998 Edition; New Webster's Dictionary of the English
Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition); Stroud's Judicial
Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition, referred to.

3.2. The appellate court should be very slow in

H
ARULVELU v. STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1085
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

setting aside a judgment of acquittal particularly in a case A
where two views are possible. The trial court judgment
cannot be set aside because the appellate court's view
is more probable. The appellate court would not be
justified in setting aside the trial court judgment unless
it arrives at a clear finding on marshalling the entire B
evidence on record that the judgment of the trial court is
either perverse or wholly unsustainable in law. The
appellate court would be justified in reversing the
judgment of acquittal only if there are substantial and
compelling reasons and when the judgment of the trial c
court is found to be perverse judgment. The accused is
presumed to be innocent until proven guilty. The accused
possessed this presumption when he was before the trial
court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption
that he is innocent. This fundamental principle must be D
~
kept in view while dealing with the judgments of acquittal
passed by the trial court. Careful marshalling of the entire
evidence and the documents on record shows that the
view taken by the trial court is a possible and plausible
view. The judgment of the trial court cannot be termed as
E
perverse. The High Court ought not to have substituted
the same by its own possible view. [Paras 41, 44 and 45]
[1108-B-C, 1109-E-F; G-H]

State of Rajasthan v. Naresh@ Ram Naresh 2009 (11)
SCALE 699; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Banne Alias Baijnath F
and Ors. (2009) 4 SCC 271; Dhanapal v. State by Public
Prosecutor, Madras 2009 (12) Scale 127, relied on.

Case Law Reference:
(2001) 1 sec so1 referred to Para 26 G
* AIR 1966 Cal. 31 referred to Para 27
AIR 1994 SC 1341 referred to Para 28
AIR 1977 Kar. 58 referred to Para 29 H
1086 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) $.C.R.
1

A 1 LR. 1r. 371 referred to Para 30 ..
106 NW 814 referred to Para 31
(2003) 1 sec 761 referred to Para 33
(1999) 2 sec 10 referred to Para 34
B
1992 Supp (2) sec 312 referred to Para 35
AIR 1934 PC 227 referred to Para 36 +
AIR 1952 SC 52 referred to Para 36
c
AIR 1954 SC 1 referred to Para 36
AIR 1955 SC 807 · referred to Para 36
AIR 1957 SC 216 referred to Para 36
D AIR 1963 SC 200 referred to Para 36
-"'
(1970) 2 sec 450 referred to Para 36
(1974) 3 sec 288
,
referred to Para 36

E (1979) 1 sec 355 referred to Para 36
(1987) 2 sec 529 referred to Para 36
(1998) 5 sec 412 referred to Para 36
(2002) 4 sec 85 referred to Para 36
F
(2002) 6 sec 470 referred to Para 36
(2003) 8 sec 180 referred to Para 36
(2006) 9 sec 131 referred to Para 36
G
(2006) 13 sec 303 referred to Para 36
(2006) 10 sec 313 referred to Para 36
(2007) 3 sec 755 referred to Para 36
H
ARULVELU v. STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1087
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

(1990) 4 sec 11 referred to Para 37 A
c2001) 4 sec 415 referred to Para 38

c2008) 1o sec 450 referred to Para 39
2009 (11) SCALE 699 relied on Para 40
B
c2009) 4 sec 211 relied on Para 42
2009(12) Scale 127 relied on Para 44

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
Nos. 1233-1234 of 2002. C

From the Judgment & Order dated 12.3.2002/28.3.2002
of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Criminal Appeal
No. 315 of 1992 and Crl. R.C. No. 691 of 1991.
D
K.V. Viswanathan, B. Ragunath, Anup Kumar, S.R. Setia
for the Appellants.

- V. Krishnamurthy, P.V. Saravanaraja, Promila, S.
Thananjayan for the Respondents.
E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DALVEER BHANDARI, J. 1. These appeals are directed
against the judgment of the High Court of Madras dated
12.~.2002 in Criminal Appeal No. 315 of 1992 and Criminal
R.C. No. 691 of 1991 respectively. F

2. In the instant case, the High Court has reversed the
judgment of acquittal passed by the II Additional Assistant
Sessions Judge, Periyar District in Sessions Case No. 45 of
1999 and convicted the accused persons. G

3. Brief facts which are necessary to dispose of the matter
are recapitulated as under:

This appeal is filed by Arulvelu, A-1 and Krishnasamy, A-
2 (father of A-1). Appellant Arulvelu has been convicted under H
1088 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 14 {ADDL.) S.C.R.

A section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code (for short 'IPC') and
sentenced to seven years rigorous imprisonment and he has
been further convicted under section 498-A IPC and sentenced
to rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay
a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default to suffer three months rigorous
B imprisonment. Appellant accused no.2 has been imposed
sentence of fine of Rs.1,000/- under section 498-A of IPC, in
default to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of three
i
months.
•

c (since4. deceased),
Before the marriage of Arulvelu with Mangayarkarasi
an agreement was entered into to the effect
that towards the consideration of the marriage, deceased's
father P.W.1 would give gold ornaments of the weight of 50
sovereigns along with other articles and a car to Arulvelu.

D 5. The father of the deceased could give ornaments of the
weight of only 30 sovereigns of gold and also could not give
the car as undertaken. Instead of giving the remaining
ornaments of 20 sovereigns and a car, P.W.1 in all gave only
Rs.5,000/- in small installments. This was the main cause of
annoyance of Arulvelu and his family members with the
-
E
deceased. It is the case of the prosecution that accused nos.
1 to 3 had been torturing the deceased Mangayarkarasi by
demanding a car and money. -1-

6. A baby boy was born to Arulvelu and the deceased
F Mangayarkarasi. Arulvelu told his wife that he would take back
her along with the newly born child only if ornaments of the
weight of 5 sovereigns and a cash amount of Rs.5,000/- were
given to him. The _father of the deceased had given ornaments
of the weight of 4 sovereigns and a cash of Rs.5,000/- to the
G first accused. The first accused had taken back the deceased
and the child only after receiving the aforementioned articles
from P.W.1.

7. The first accused had demanded the balance ornament
H of the weight of one sovereign when the second child was born.
ARULVELU v. STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1089
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]

-1 The father of the deceased gave ornament of the weight of one A
.. sovereign.

8. The first accused had sent the deceased
Mangayarkarasi many times to her father for getting money for
doing business. According to the prosecution, since the car was B
not given to the first accused, he had beaten a·nd tortured the
deceased asking her to get the car from P.W.1.
Mangayarkarasi ultimately became disgusted with her life and
at 11.30 a.m. on 15.3.1989, she committed suicide by hanging
herself.
c
9. The prosecution, in ord,er to prove its case, had
examined 20 witnesses. K. Ramalingam P.W.1 is the father of
the deceased. D. Latha P.W.4 is the sister of the deceased.
S.T.P. Muthusamy Mudaliar P.W.5 is the neighbour. Thirumathi
N. Yasodha P.W.2 is the tenant of P.W.1and P.W.3 A. D
Periasamy is the person who had arranged the marriage of the
first accused and the deceased. V.P. Subramaniam P.W.6 is
a close relative of the deceased. N.Manickam P.W.8 is a
member of the Panchayat. S.A. Periasamy P.W.9 is another
Sambandhi of P.W.1 who later on turned hostile. E

10. The fact that the deceased had committed suicide by
hanging herself is undisputed. The question which arises for our
adjudication is whether the appellant is guilty for compelling the
deceased to commi~ suicide. According to the prosecution she
was forced to commit suicide because of consistent demands
F
of dowry made by the first accused. According to P.W.1 the
father of the deceased, his daughter committed suicide
because he could not give gold and a car as agreed before
her marriage. The accused persons started torturing and
harassing the deceased which ultimately led to suicide. G

11. The trial court in its lengthy and comprehensive
judgment has dealt with the prosecution evidence and also all
the 33 material exhibits. According to the learned trial Judge,
the evidence of P.W.1 that he agreed to give balance H
1090 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A ornaments was not corroborated by P.W.3. According to the t-
trial court, P.W.1 had admitted that for the first time, he told the ...,.._
court that accused no. 2 demanded 40 sovereigns and the
same was not stated either before the police officers or during
Revenue Divisional Officer's enquiry. According to the trial
B Judge, P.Ws. 15, 17 and 20 would depose that P.W.1 has not
told about the demand of ornaments during his cross-
examination. The trial court further held that P.W.1 had admitted
that he did not tell about the demand of 40 sovereigns of gold
by accused no. 2 during the course of investigation, it is his
c case that an agreement was reached at 35 sovereigns. This
has been corroborated by P.W.3 also. P.W.15, the Revenue
Division Officer who conducted the enquiry and who also held
the inquest came to the conclusion that the death was due to
cruelty meted out to the deceased by way of demand of dowry.
He has stated in the cross examination that during enquiry
D
P.W.1 did not tell him that first accused demanded 5 sovereigns
as a condition to take his wife and the child after delivery.
P.W.15 further stated that during enquiry P.W.1 did not tell him
that the first accused demanded Rs.10,000/- for his business.
During ·cross-examination on the side of the accused, P. W .15
E had admitted as follows:

"P.W.1 stated that in his evidence that A2 demanded 50
sovereign of gold before marriage, but he accepted to put
only 30 sovereign of gold and remaining 20 sovereign will
F be given later and if the business goes well then he will
get a car. But he never stated in his evidence that A2
demanded 40 sovereign of gold and P .W.1 refused and
then accepted to give later."

12. The trial judge, while discussing the evidence of
G
P.W.15, found that there was no demand of bridal gifts before
the marriage. The trial judge disbelieved the version of P.W.3 *
holding that he is not related to P .W.1 and he pleaded
ignorance about the date and month of meeting of P.W.1 and
accused no. 2. The trial judge also disbelieved the testimony
H
ARULVELU v. STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1091
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
~
of P .W .1 regarding giving of 4 sovereigns and Rs.5,000/- to A
the first accused after the birth of the first child and another
sovereign of jewel at the time of birth of the second child for
the reason that those facts were not spoken to during
investigation. This part of the prosecution case is disbelieved.
The trial judge has clearly held that P.W.1 deposed for the first B
time in the court with regard to demand of a car. He did not
mention this fact in the first information report.
" 13. Ex. P.8 is the suicide note of the deceased which reads
as under:
c
"Nobody is responsible for my death. Children should be
handed over to mother's house."

In the suicidal note, the deceased had not implicated any
accused. This factor has also weighed heavily with the trial court D
in acquitting all the accused. The argument on behalf of the
accused was that the accused no. 1 had suspected the
character of his mother-in-law and other members of his in-law's
family, so he did not want the deceased to visit her parents'
house and to resolve the dispute Panchayat was held and, as
E
per the version of P.W.1, according to the decision of
Panchayat, P.W.1 should not go to the house of the accused
and the deceased and accused nos. 1 to 3 also should not go
to the house of P.W.1. As per the version of the accused, the
decision of the Panchayat not permitting the deceased to go
to her parents perhaps led to suicide. The trial court after F
carefully examining the entire evidence acquitted the accused.

14. According to the High Court, if she (the deceased) had
no problem in her marital house and she was living peacefully
with her husband and in-laws, what was the necessity for her G
to commit suicide? Why should she write in her suicide note
to leave her children in her mother's house? According to the
High Court, unless an intolerable harassment was meted out
\ to her, there was absolutely no necessity for her to write like
this that the children be handed over to her mother's house. H
1092 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A Therefore, the High Court held that, in all probabilities, there was ~·

demand of dowry and the deceased was harassed by the first
accused and therefore, she committed suicide.

15. The High Court set aside the judgment of the trial court
on the count that the trial court gave undue emphasis on the
B
minor inconsistencies and contradictions. The High Court
discarded the version of the trial court regarding P.W.1's
deposition for the first time in court regarding demand of car ·1
which he did not mention in the first information report (FIR).

c 16. The High Court observed that the FIR cannot be an
encyclopedia to contain all the details of history of the case.
This approach of the High Court does not seem to be correct.
The FIR should at least mention a broad story of the prosecution
and not mentioning of material and vital facts may affect the
D credibility of the FIR.

17. The trial court doubted the veracity of the statement of
P.W .1 because it did not find any corroboration of the statement
of P.W.1 with the statement of P .W.3 regarding agreeing to give
the balance gold sovereigns. The High Court without any basis
E
discarded the judgment of the trial court.

18. The trial judge observed that the testimony of P .W .1
is not credible because he for the first time in the court had
stated that accused no. 2 had demanded 40 sovereigns. This
F was not stated either before the police officer or during
Revenue Divisional Officers' enquiry.

19. The trial court disbelieved the version of P.W.1
regarding giving 4 sovereigns and Rs.5,000/- to the first
G accused after the birth of the first child and another sovereign
of jewel at the time of birth of the second child for the reason
·~
that those facts were not spoken to durihg the investigation. The
High Court held this part of the prosecution case unbelievable,
but the fact remains that the demand of dowry was proved
beyond doubt through the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 3. This
H
ARULVELU v. STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1093
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
~
approach of the High Court is not correct. A
20. The High Court ought to have considered the entire
evidence in a proper perspective. Unless comprehensive view
of the entire evidence is taken in the proper perspective, a
correct conclusion may not be possible. In this case, there has B
been acquittal by the trial court and, while reversing the order
of acquittal, the High Court ought to have carefully considered
\-' the following circumstances:

(1) In the suicide note Ex. P-8, the deceased has not
implicated any of the accused. This is indeed a very c
significant and vital factor which ought to have
received proper attention by the High Court.

\. (2) There is no credible evidence to suggest that soon
before the death, the deceased has been subjected D
1--
to cruelty or harassment by the accused in
connection with any demand of dowry which led to
a serious act of committing suicide.

(3) The High Court failed to consider that the marriage
took place in the year 1983 and the deceased E
committed suicide in the year 1989 i.e. after more
.,. than six years of the marriage. There are two small
children out of the wedlock. It is quite improbable
that ordinarily there would be consistent demands
of dowry after six years. The fact of consistent F
demands is not established from clear evidence of
the prosecution.

(4) The distance between the matrimonial home and
the parental home of the deceased is merely one F
kilometer. There are many houses around the
house of the accused. It is submitted that there was
neither a whisper nor any complaint was filed by
P.W.1 before the deceased committed suicide.

(5) It appears from the statement under section 313 H
1094 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A IPC that A-1 wanted his wife (deceased) to keep
some distance from her parental home. It transpired
in the meeting of the Panchayat that to settle the
dispute between the husband and wife and to
reduce the affinity of the wife (deceased) towards
B her parental home (One kilometer away from the
parental home), the Panchayat took the decision
that both the families should not visit each other. The
impact of the decision of Panchayat on the -1
deceased was not properly appreciated by the
c High Court.

(6) 5.A. Periyasamy P.W.9 has not supported the case
of the prosecution. He has stated that "we told
Ramalingam that he and his wife should not go to
Arulvelu"s house often". He has also admitted that J

D A-1 and Magaiyarkarsi (deceased) were living .\
happily.

(7) Ramalingam P.W.1 has stated that he consoled
and advised his daughter to be bold as they would
E not come to see her as per the dictum of the
Panchayat and wisely handle the situation at her
matrimonial house. In fact the suggestion of defence
is that the Panchayat was convened as there was
-1
a serious apprehension about the character of the
F mother of the deceased and her family. That is why
in the Panchayat no discussion about dowry
demand was whispered. Moreover, if the first
appellant did not like his deceased wife, he would
not be keen on keeping her with him.
G (8) It appears that the Panchayat's decision caused
serious depression to the deceased. It is submitted
that the deceased's strong affinity towards her
parents and her inability to cope up with the
situation coupled with her sickness, she was driven
H to such a situation to commit suicide.
ARULVELU v. STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1095
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
..f (9) R. Murugesan P.W.15, the RDO who prepared the A
inquest report has also stated about the
"" panchayat's decision and has opined that "the
reason for her death may be the control exerted on
her that she should not go to her mother's house".
8
(10} The trial court has observed that when the accused
were questioned under section 313 Cr.P.C., they
,. filed a written statement jointly. In that written
statement it has been explained that - "Due to
mental agony, incurable stomach-ache, pain over
the body and the control by the first accused that
c
she should not go to the house of her parents,
Mangayarkarasi had committed suicide". Further
that "Arulvelu, without marrying for the second time
for several years looked after the children with lot
~ ,. of love and affection so that the children may not D
feel the absence of their mother. The family of
.( accused is a joint family. In that family, accused
,
nos. 1 to 3 and Vijayakumar, another son of
accused nos. 2 and 3 and his wife Padma are living
jointly." E

(11) The trial court noticed serious contradictions and
t inconsistencies in the evidence of P.W.1 and those
became relevant particularly when the High Court
was dealing with the order of acquittal. F
(12} There are material contradictions in the statements
of P.W.1 and P.W.3. P.W.1 says after the birth of
first child there was demand. Whereas P.W.3 says
after 6-7 months of the marriage there was
demand. Further P.W.1 says that 20 days before G
+ the occurrence A-2 and A-3 said that customary
gifts were not good. Whereas P.W.3 says that after
6-7 months of 1st incident deceased was told that
the articles were not good. P .W .1 says 30
sovereigns. However, P.W.3 says 35 sovereigns. H
1096 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
1-
).-
A P.W.1 has stated that he said to A-2 that he could t- '
give 20 sovereign later on. However, P.W.3 does F
1'-
not corroborate the same. Though P.W .3 has stated
that A-2 demanded car during the marriage
negotiation, however, P.W.3 has not corroborated
B the evidence of P.W.1 with regard to the demand
of car. ~
}

It is submitted that none of the investigating officers -t
have supported P.W.1 with regard to the demand ,..,
of jewels, car, cash and/or with regard to
c harassment to the deceased due to non fulfillment
of the above said items.

(13) A Periyasamy P.W.3 has not been examined by
~
the DSP Sivanandam, RDO, Karuppusamy and
D others. Only CB CID Velu examined him. CB CID,
-1 r-
Velu has stated that P.W.3 told him that the (a)
P.W.1 is not his relative (b) not a family friend (c)
accused is also not related (d) that he did not go ~
for condolence when Mangai died (e) he does not
E know about Seer Varisai (f) he does not know
about the dates on which he arranged the talks.
However during his deposition he has admitted that
he knows Palaniappan, -the brother of Rukmani
-1
(P.W.1's wife) and he is his relative. P.W.20 has
F admitted that P.W.3 has said that Ramlingam
(P. W .1) is his family friend. For the above said
reasons the evidence was of P.W.3 was not relied
upon the trial court. It is submitted that the High
Court has not considered these aspects.
•
G (14) D. Latha P.W.4 stated that she was present during
the talks when the demand during the marriage
negotiation took place. However, P.W.3 says during
talks except P .W .1 and A-2 no body was present.
Further none of the witnesses including P.W.1 has
H said that P.W.4 was present during the talks.
ARULVELU v. STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1097
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]

.... K. Sivanandhan, Deputy Superintendent of Police A
P. W .17 has stated that P. W .4 has not stated that
"' failure to buy a car became a problem. She has not
stated about the demand of 50 sovereigns and a
{ car. Therefore the trial court has disbelieved the
't presence of P.vy.4 during the talks. B

D. Latha P.W.4 has not given in her evidence that
she had known personally that little by little 20
~
sovereign were given. The trial court has held that
P.W.4 does not speak anything about the timings
of the torture like four weeks, 20 days or 8 days
c
before the death. /

(15) S.T.P. Muthusamy Mudaliar P.W.5's testimony does
not inspire confidence. He says that during the
verbal argument between A-1 and Rukmani Amma, D
,.,
1
'
A-1 asked about car. However, Y'asodha P.W.2 did
not say the same. Further, Rukmani Amma was not
examined. It is submitted that the trial court has
discussed the contradictions between P.W.2, P.W.1
and P.W.5 and about utterance with regard to car E
in the quarrel and therefore the trial court has not
relied on P.W.5. It is submitted that apart from
Rukminiammal, Shaktivel (P.W.1's son) and
+- Planniappan was also not examined by the
prosecution. F
(16) S.A. Periyasamy P.W.9 (Sambandhi of P.W.1) has
not supported the case of prosecution. He says that
he advised Ramlingam that they should not go to
A-1 's house often. During his cross-examination he
has stated that "I understood that Arulvelu and G
Mangaiyarkarasi were living a happy matrimonial
life. There is a Car in my son Sivakumar's name
TNC-4128. Its RC was in the name of Ramalingam
S/o Palaniappa Mudhaliar."
H
1098 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A (17) The Assistant Judicial Magistrate PW 11 has stated
that crime number of Exhibit A-1 has been
I

manipulated. Further, P.W.13 has -stated that ,>

"Ramalingam has given only one complaint on that
day. Exhibit A13 is the first original copy. Exhibit
B A 18 is the original of another set of copies taken.
The person who has written Exhibit 13 has not
written Exhibit A 18". The trial court has also
discussed the discrepancy with regard to Exh. A-
13 and Exh.A-18.
c (18) R. Murugesan P.W.15, RDO who prepared the
inquest report has admitted that Yashoda (P.W.2)
was examined on 30.03.89. He also stated that
nearly 1000 houses would be there. It was crowded
area with many houses. However, no neighbour
D was examined as a witness. Further, P.W.17 has
admitted that A-1 said to him that he (A-1) brought
the doctor. However, P.W.15 did not believe the
same. It is submitted that P.W.15 has not given any
cogent reason for disbelieving the same. It is
E submitted that the conduct of P.W.15 (the RDO)
was adversely commented by the trial court.

(19) R.Murugesan P.W.15 has stated that
Rukmaniammal said that on 18.3.89
F Mangayarkarsi came to the house as she was ill.
She asked as to why did she (Rukmaniammal)
made controversy in a house where the death had
taken place. She has also stated that on 21.3.89
she had sent medicine and tablets to
Mangayarkarasi's husband's house through a car.
G It is submitted that R. Murugesan P.W.15 has
admitted that Ramlingam (P.W.1) has not stated
that A-1 had told him that he was going to get into
another marriage. Further, he (P.W.1) did not say
about demand of 5 sovereigns, Rs.10,000/- and
H
ARULVELU v. STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1099
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]

that dowry was not enough. He (P.W.1) has also not A
stated before P. W .15 that Mangayarkarsi came to
his house 8 days before and told that she could live

.. only if he buys a car. Further, P.W.1 had also not
stated before him that on Tuesday their daughter's
parents in law asked them to buy a car. P.W.15 has B
further admitted that Yashoda (P.W.2) had stated
that A-1 came to Rukmanniammal and told that
'because of you, A am very ashamed'. P.W.15 has
also stated that P.W.1 had not told him that before
marriage there was any discussion about dowry on c
presence of some persons. Further that none of the
witnesses has stated that they discussed about
jewels and car before the marriage.

(20) The Panchayat's decision coupled with the
'r condition of illness could have driven the deceased D
to commit suicide. This possibility cannot be ruled
out. P.W.15 has also stated that on 22.3.89 a
panchayat was convened to decide on the issue of
dispute between both the families. In that
Panchayat it has been decided that they should not E
visit each others house and Mangaiyarkarasi has
to be advised accordingly.

(21) The High Court has made erroneous observation
that: "It is not the panchayat decision that the F
deceased should not visit her parents. The only
thing is P. W .1 should not go to the house of the
accused".

As per the case of prosecution and as per the
evidence it is crystal clear that the Panchayat's G
1 decision was that 'both the familier should not visit
each other'.

(22) The High Court failed to appreciate that the
prosecution has failed to prove that with all H
1100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009) 14 (ADDL.} S.C.R.

A certainty, the dowry demand was the-only cause for t-
the deceased to commit suicide. The High Court
has simply presumed with the following words: "The
immediate temptation for her to commit suicide
appears to be the demand of a car and subsequent
~
B quarrel of the first accused with the mother of the
deceased. She has died in her in-law's house. Why
should she commit suicide if she was happily living
with the first accused?" ·f

c clearly21.demonstrate
These are some of the material and vital aspects which
that the trial court has carefully analyzed the
entire evidence on record and the view taken by the trial court
is certainly a possible or plausible view.

22. In our considered opinion, the approach of the High
D Court in the impugned judgment is not in consonance with the :
settled principles of criminal jurisprudence. The High Court -~

while reversing the judgment of the trial court observed that "in
all probabilities, I am inclined to hold that there was demand
of dowry and the deceased was harassed by the first accused
E and therefore, she committed suicide." In criminal cases the
conviction can be sustained only when there is clear .evidence
beyond reasonable doubt. The accused cannot be convicted
on the. ground that iff all probabilities the accused may have
committed the crime. The approach of the High Court is wholly
F fallacious and unsustainable in law.
23. The real question which falls for our consideration is
whether the view which has been taken by the trial court was a
possible or a plausible view.

G 24. We have carefully perused the judgment of the trial
court and the impugned judgment of the High Court. The trial
court very- minutely examined the entire evidence and all
documents and exhibits on record. The trial court's analysis of
evidence also seems to be correct. The trial court has not
H deviated from the normal norms or methods of evaluation of the
ARULVELU v. STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1101
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
1
evidence. By no stretch of imagination, we can hold that the A
judgment of the trial court is based on no evidence or evidence
11111( which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would
act upon it and-consequently the judgment of the trial court is
perverse.
B
25. We also fail to arrive at the conclusion that the
discussion and appreciation of the evidence of the trial court
is so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of
irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse and the
findings rendered by the trial court are against the weight of
evidence. The law is well settled that, in an appeal against
c
acquittal, unless the judgment of the trial court is perverse, the
Appellate Court would not be justified in substituting its own view
and reverse the judgment of acquittal.
,. 26. The expression 'perverse' has been dealt with in D
number of cases. In Gaya Din (Dead) through LRs. & Others
v. Hanuman Prasad (Dead) through LRs. & Others (2001) 1
SCC 501 this Court observed that the expression 'perverse'
means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not
supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against Ei
the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity.

27. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co.
Ltd. & Others Al R 1966 Cal. 31, the Court observed that
'perverse finding' means a finding which is not only against the I

weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself.
F

28. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. Collector of Central
Excise, Cochin Al R 1994 SC 1341, the Court observed that
this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the
1-
authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so G
perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those
findings.

29. In M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another AIR
1977 Kar. 58, the Court observed that any order made in
H
1102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. ,.
30. In Moffett v. Gough, 1 LR. 1r. 371, the Court observed
that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is "'
not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against ;'

the evidence.
B
31. In Godfrey v. Godfrey 106 NW 814, the Court defined
'perverse' as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the f
right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct
etc.
c
32. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various
dictionaries in the following manner:

1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current
English Sixth Edition
D 1
PERVERSE: Showing deliberate determination to behave
in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or
unreasonable.

E 2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English -
International Edition

PERVERSE: Deliberately departing from what is normal
and reasonable.

F 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English - 1998 Edition
PERVERSE: Law (of a verdict) against the weight of
evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law.

4. New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language
G (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition)

PERVERSE: Purposely deviating from accepted or
expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward;
stubborn; cross or petulant.
H
ARULVELU v. STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1103
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]

5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, A
Fourth Edition

PERVERSE: A perverse verdict may probably be defined
as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but
is altogether against the evidence.
B
33. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P. (2003)
.~ 1 SCC 761, the Court observed thus:

"We are of the opinion that the trial court was quite
justified in acquitting the appellants of the charges as the c
view taken by it was reasonable one and the order of
acquittal cannot be said to be perverse. It is well settled
that appellate court would not be justified in interfering with
the order of acquittal unless the same is found to be
perverse. In the present case, the High Court has o
committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal
of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same
did not suffer from the vice of perversity."

34. In Ku/deep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police &
Others (1999) 2 SCC 10, the Court while dealing with the E
scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as
under:

"9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not
interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic F
enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence,
it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to
judicial scrutiny.

10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be
maintained between the decisions which are perverse and G,
those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no
evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and
no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would
be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which
is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever H
1104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be
treated as perverse and ·the findings would not be
interfered with."

35. The meaning of 'perverse' has been examined in H.
B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum- Assessing
8
Authority, Kamal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others 1992
Supp (2) SCC 312, this Court observed·,
as under:

"7. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which
the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was
c raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion,
the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court
of appeal against the assessment. While it was open to
the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to
have considered whether the denial of relief under the
D proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open
to the High Court re-appreciate the primary or perceptive
facts which were otherwise within the domain of the fact-
finding authority under the statute. The question whether
the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales
E tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or
inferential facts based on primary facts found by the.
statutory authorities. But what was assailed in review was,
in substance, the correctness - as distinguished from the
legal permissibility - of the primary or perceptive facts
F themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is
arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by
taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding
so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of
irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the
finding is rendered infirm in law."
G
36. The legal position seems to be well settled and
consistent at least since 1934 when the Privy Council decided
the case of Sheo Swarup & Others v. King Emperor AIR 1934
PC 227 in which the Court {per Lord Russell) observed as
H under:
-l ARULVELU v. STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1105
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
j
"..the High Court should and will always give proper weight A
and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the
trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a
presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has
been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to B
the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an
appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by
~
a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses .. "

The aforesaid decision was followed in subsequent judgments
of this Court. [See: Surajpal Singh & Others v. The State, AIR
c
1952 SC 52; Tulsiram Kanu v. The State, AIR 1954 SC 1,
Atley v. State of Uttar Pradesh Al R 1955 SC 807; Balbir Singh

- ~
v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 216; M.G. Agarwal v. State
of Maharashtra Al R 1963 SC 200; Khedu Mohton & Others
v. State of Bihar, ( 1970) 2 SCC 450; Bishan Singh & Others D
v. The State of Punjab (1974) 3 SCC 288; K. Gopal Reddy
....,,.. v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1979) 1 SCC 355; Tota Singh &
Another v. State of Punjab (1987) 2 SCC 529; Sambasivan
& Others v. State of Kera/a (1998) 5 SCC 412; Bhagwan
Singh & Others v. State of M.P. (2002) 4 SCC 85; Harijana E
Thirupala & Others v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P.,
Hyderabad (2002) 6 SCC 470; State of Rajasthan v. Raja
t
Ram (2003) 8 SCC 180; Budh Singh & Others v. State of UP
(2006) 9 SCC 731; Ka/yan Singh v. State of MP (2006) 13
- SCC 303; Kal/u alias Masih & Others v. State of MP (2006) F
10 SCC 313; and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran & Another,
(2007) 3 sec 755]
L. 37. In Shambhoo Missir & Another v. State of Bihar
(1990) 4 SCC 17, this Court observed thus:
G
"We are of the view that the High Court has interfered with
the order of acquittal passed by the trial court not only for
no substantial reasons but also by ignoring material
infirmities in the prosecution case. Hence, we allow the
appeals and set aside the order of the High Court H
1106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A convicting and sentencing the accused in both the ~
appeals."

38; In Chandrappa & Others v. State of Kamataka (2007)
4 SCC 415, this Court reiterated the legal position as under:
B "(1) An appellate court has full power to review,
reappre(fiate and reconsider the evidence upon which the
order of acquittal is founded.

(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no
c limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power
and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach
its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.

D
(3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and
compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very
strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring
mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers
i
-
E
of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such
phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of
language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate
court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of
-
the court to review the evidence and to come to its own
conclusion.
-t
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in
F case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of
the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is
available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal
-
jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be
innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court ..1
of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal,
G
the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced,
reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis
of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not
H disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court."

-
ARULVELU v. STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1107
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
~
39. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC A
450, a two Judge Bench of this Court ·of which one of us
(Bhandari, J.) was a member had an occasion to deal with most
of the cases referred in this judgment This Court provided
guidelines for the Appellate Court in dealing with the cases in
which the trial courts have acquitted the accused. The following B
principles emerge from the cases above:
1. The accused is presumed to be innocent until
proven guilty. The accused possessed this
presumption when he was before the trial court. The
trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that
c
he is innocent.
2. The power of reviewing evidence is wide and the
,.. appellate court can re-appreciate the entire
~ evidence on record. It can review the trial court's D
conclusion with respect to both facts and law, but
... the Appellate Court must give due weight and
consideration to the decision of the trial court.
3. The appellate court should always keep in mind that
E
the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching
the demeanour of the witnesses. The trial court is
in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the
witnesses.
4. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise F
disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very
substanti~I and compelling reasons" for doing so.

5. If two reasonable or possible views can be reached
- one that leads to acquittal, the other to conviction G
- the High Courts/appellate courts must rule in
favour of the accused.

40. This Court in a recently delivered judgment State of
Rajasthan v. Naresh @ Ram Naresh 2009 (11) SCALE 699
again examined judgments of this Court and laid down that "An H
1108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

\
A order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the
court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the
finger towards the accused. This Court has dealt with the scope
of interference with an order of acquittal in a number of cases."

· 41. Careful scrutiny of all these judgments lead to the
B
definite conclusion that the appellate court should be very slow
in setting aside a judgment of acquittal particularly in a case
where two views are possible. The trial court judgment can not
be set aside because the appellate court's view is more
probable. The appellate court would not be justified in setting
c aside the trial court judgment unless it arrives at a clear finding
on marshalling the entire evidence on record that the judgment
of the trial court is either perverse or wholly unsustainable in
law.

D 42. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Banne Alias Baijnath and i
Ors. (2009) 4 sec271, a two-Judge Bench of this court of
which one of us (Bhandari, J.) was a member had an occasion
to deal with this controversy in detail has laid down some of
...
the circumstances in which this court would be justified in
E interfering with the judgment of the High Court. The
circumstances discussed in the judgment are illustrative not
exhaustive.

(i) The High Court's decision is based on totally
erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal
F position;

(ii) · The High Court's conclusions are contrary to
evidence and documents on record; J

(iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing
G t·
with the evidence was patently illegal leading to
grave miscarriage of justice;

(iv) The High Court's judgment is manifestly unjust and
unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on
H the record of the case;
ARULVELU v. STATE REPRESENTED BY THE 1109
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]

(v) This Court must always give proper weight and A
consideration to the findings of the High Court;

(vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in
interfering with a case when both the Sessions
Court and the High Court have recorded an order
8
of acquittal.

43. The appellate courts must keep in view these
aforementioned observations in dealing with the appeals where
the trial court has acquitted the accused.
c
44. In Dhanapal v. State by Public Prosecutor, Madras
(Criminal Appeal No.987 of 2002 decided on September 1,
2009), this Court again examined the aforementioned
decisions and analyzed the principles emerging out of the said
decisions, it seems to us that despite series of judgments, the D
High Court has not clearly appreciated the legal position.

- Unquestionably, the Appellate Court has power to review and
re-appreciate the entire evidence on record. The appellate court
would be justified in reversing the judgment of acquittal only if
there are substantial and compelling reasons and when the
judgment of the trial court is found to be perverse judgment.
E

Interfering in a routine manner where other view is possible is
contrary to the settled legal position crystallized by
aforementioned judgments of this Court. The accused is
presumed to be innocent until proven guilty. The accused
F
possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court.
The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is
innocent. This fundamental principle must be kept in view while
dealing with the judgments of acquittal passed by the trial court .
.l

45. We have re-examined the entire case because of the G
conflicting judgments of the Trial Court and the High Court. On
careful marshalling of the entire evidence and the documents
on record, we arrive at the conclusion that the view taken by
the trial court is a possible and plausible view. The judgment
of the trial court cannot be termed as perverse. The High Court H
1110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 14 (ADDL.) $.C.R.

A ought not to have substituted the same by its own possible view.
The impugned judgment of the High Court cannot stand the
scrutiny of the well settled legal position which has been
crystallized for more than 80 years since the case of Sheo
Swarup. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we are
B constrained to set aside the impugned judgment of the High
Court.

46. Consequently, these appeals filed by the appellants are ;
allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court set aside
and that of the trial court is restored.
c
D.G. Appeals allowed.

• >

J.