Holding

The property remained coparcenary; the 1999 sale deeds and the 2007 sale deed are illegal and void, and the appellant is entitled to a declaration of ownership.

Summary

The appellant, Arshnoor Singh, is the great‑grandson of Lal Singh whose agricultural land passed to his son Inder Singh in 1951, before the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The property was partitioned among Inder Singh’s three sons in 1964, and the share allotted to Dharam Singh (the appellant’s father) remained coparcenary for his male issue, making the appellant a coparcener by birth in 1985. Dharam Singh later executed two sale deeds on 1 September 1999 in favour of Harpal Kaur without any consideration; he subsequently married her. The appellant sued for a declaration that the suit property was coparcenary and that the sale deeds were void. The trial court held the deeds void; the High Court reversed, holding the property no longer coparcenary. The Supreme Court held that succession opened before 1956, so the property remained coparcenary, the Karta’s power to sell is limited to legal necessity or benefit of the estate, which was not proved, and therefore the 1999 sale deeds and the subsequent 2007 deed are illegal and void under the doctrine of lis pendens. The appellant’s name is to be entered as owner.

Issues considered

Whether the suit property is coparcenary (ancestral) property or self‑acquired property of Dharam Singh.
Whether the sale deeds dated 01‑09‑1999 executed by Dharam Singh in favour of Harpal Kaur are valid.
Whether the subsequent sale deed dated 30‑10‑2007 in favour of respondents 2 & 3 is valid.
Whether the power of a Karta to alienate coparcenary property is subject to the requirement of legal necessity or benefit of the estate.
Whether the doctrine of lis pendens applies to the 2007 sale deed.

Legislation cited

Hindu Succession Act, 1956s. 19, s. 4, s. 8
Indian Stamp Act, 1999s. 47A

Subjects

Mitakshara lawcoparcenary propertysuccessionHindu Succession Actsale deedlegal necessitylis pendenspartitionancestral propertyKarta

Judgment

[2019] 8 S.C.R. 999 999

ARSHNOOR SINGH A
v.
HARPAL KAUR & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 5124 of 2019)
JULY 01, 2019 B
[UDAY UMESH LALIT AND INDU MALHOTRA, JJ.]
Family Law – Succession under Mitakshara Law – Appellant
is the great-grandson of one ‘LS’, who was the owner of large tracts
of agricultural land – ‘LS’ passed away in 1951, and his entire
C
property was inherited by his only son ‘IS’ – This property was
partitioned between three sons of ‘IS’ – Present matter pertains to
the property (‘suit property’) which came to the share of one of his
sons viz. ‘DS’, father of the appellant – ‘DS’ had only one son, the
Appellant, who was born to ‘DS’ through his 1 st wife –’DS’
purportedly sold the entire suit property to Respondent No.1 vide D
two registered Sale Deeds dtd. 01.09.99 – Subsequently, ‘DS’ got
married to Respondent No.1– Appellant filed suit against ‘DS’ and
Respondent No.1, for declaration that the suit property was
coparcenary property, and hence the two Sale Deeds in favour of
Respondent No.1 were illegal, null and void – Suit decreed in favour
E
of the appellant – Respondent No.1 along with the subsequent
purchasers, Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 filed common appeal – Dismissed
– Respondent Nos.1-3 filed second appeal – High Court allowed
the appeal – Held: In the present case, the succession opened in
1951 on the death of ‘LS’, prior to the commencement of the 1956
Act – Nature of the property inherited by his son ‘IS’ was coparcenary F
– Under Mitakshara law, whenever a male ancestor inherits any
property from any of his paternal ancestors upto three degrees above
him, then his male legal heirs upto three degrees below him, would
get an equal right as coparceners in that property – Even though
‘IS’ had effected partition of the coparcenary property amongst his
G
sons in 1964, the nature of the property inherited by his sons would
remain as coparcenary property qua their male descendants upto
three degrees below them – Property allotted to ‘DS’ in partition
continued to remain coparcenary property qua his son, the appellant–

H
999
1000 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 8 S.C.R.

A Appellant became coparcener in the suit property on his birth i.e.
on 22.08.85 – Respondent No.1 failed to discharge the burden of
proving that ‘DS’ had executed the two Sale Deeds in her favour
out of legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate – In fact, as per
record, the Sale Deeds were without any consideration whatsoever
– Sale Deeds dtd. 01.09.99 cancelled as being illegal, null and
B
void – Consequently, subsequent Sale Deed dtd. 30.10.07 executed
by Respondent No.1 in favour of Respondent Nos.2 & 3 is hit by
the doctrine of lis pendens – Judgment of the Single Judge, set aside
– Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Doctrine of lis pendens.
Family Law – Power of Karta to sell coparcenary property –
C Held: Power of Karta to sell coparcenary property is subject to
certain restrictions viz. the sale should be for legal necessity or for
the benefit of the estate – Onus for establishing the existence of
legal necessity is on the alienee.
Doctrines – Doctrine of lis pendens – Principle of – Discussed.
D
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD:1.1 ‘IS’ had inherited the entire suit property from
his father ‘LS’ upon his death. The succession in this case opened
in 1951 prior to the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act,
E 1956 when ‘IS’ succeeded to his father ‘LS’s property in
accordance with the old Hindu Mitakshara law. Under Mitakshara
law, whenever a male ancestor inherits any property from any of
his paternal ancestors upto three degrees above him, then his
male legal heirs upto three degrees below him, would get an equal
right as coparceners in that property. After the Hindu Succession
F Act, 1956 came into force, this position has undergone a change.
Post – 1956, if a person inherits a self-acquired property from his
paternal ancestors, the said property becomes his self-acquired
property, and does not remain coparcenary property. If succession
opened under the old Hindu law, i.e. prior to the commencement
G of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the parties would be governed
by Mitakshara law. The property inherited by a male Hindu from
his paternal male ancestor shall be coparcenary property in his
hands vis-à-vis his male descendants upto three degrees below
him. The nature of property will remain as coparcenary property

H
ARSHNOOR SINGH v. HARPAL KAUR & ORS. 1001

even after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. A
[Paras 7, 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6] [1009-F; 1011-F-H; 1012-A-B]
1.2 In the present case, the succession opened in 1951 on
the death of ‘LS’. The nature of the property inherited by his son
‘IS’ was coparcenary in nature. Even though ‘IS’ had effected a
partition of the coparcenary property amongst his sons in 1964, B
the nature of the property inherited by ‘IS’s sons would remain
as coparcenary property qua their male descendants upto three
degrees below them. In the present case, the entire property of
‘LS’ was inherited by his son ‘IS’ as coparcenary property prior
to 1956. This coparcenary property was partitioned between the
three sons of ‘IS’ by the court vide a decree of partition dated C
04.11.1964. The shares allotted in partition to the coparceners,
continued to remain coparcenary property in their hands qua their
male descendants. As a consequence, the property allotted to
‘DS’ in partition continued to remain coparcenary property qua
the Appellant. The suit property which came to the share of late D
‘DS’ through partition, remained coparcenary property qua his
son – the Appellant, who became a coparcener in the suit property
on his birth i.e. on 22.08.1985. [Paras 7.7, 7.9, 7.10 & 7.12]
[1012-B, C, G-H; 1013-A, G-H]
1.3 The power of a Karta to sell coparcenary property is E
subject to certain restrictions viz. the sale should be for legal
necessity or for the benefit of the estate. The onus for establishing
the existence of legal necessity is on the alienee. In the present
case, the onus was on the alienee i.e. Respondent No. 1 to prove
that there was a legal necessity, or benefit to the estate, or that
she had made bona fide enquiries on the existence of the same. F
Respondent No.1 has completely failed to discharge the burden
of proving that ‘DS’ had executed the two Sale Deeds dated
01.09.1999 in her favour out of legal necessity or for the benefit
of the estate. In fact, it has come on record that the Sale Deeds
were without any consideration whatsoever. ‘DS’ had deposed G
before the Trial Court that he sold the suit property to
Respondent No.1 without any consideration. Respondent No.1
had also admitted before the Collector, Ferozepur that the Sale
Deeds were without consideration. Hence, the ground of legal
necessity or benefit of the estate falls through. As a consequence,
H
1002 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 8 S.C.R.

A the Sale Deeds dated 01.09.1999 are hereby cancelled as being
illegal, null and void. ‘DS’ could not have sold the coparcenary
suit property, in which the Appellant was a coparcener, by the
aforesaid alleged Sale Deeds. [Paras 8-8.4] [1014-B, G;
1015-A-D]
B 1.4 Since Respondent No. 1 has not obtained a valid and
legal title to the suit property through the Sale Deeds dated
01.09.1999, she could not have passed on a better title to
Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 either. The subsequent Sale Deed dated
30.10.2007 executed by Respondent No.1 in favour of Respondent
Nos. 2 & 3 is hit by the doctrine of lis pendens. The underlying
C principle of the doctrine of lis pendens is that if a property is
transferred pendente lite, and the transferor is held to have no
right or title in that property, the transferee will not have any
title to the property. The Sale Deed dated 30.10.2007 executed
by Respondent No.1 in favour of Respondent Nos.2 & 3 being
D null and void, is hereby cancelled. The Appellant being a male
coparcener in the suit property, was vitally affected by the
purported sale of the suit property by his father. The Appellant
therefore had the locus to file the Suit for a Declaration that the
suit property being coparcenary property, could not have been
sold by his father without legal necessity, or for the benefit of the
E estate. The very fact that the Sale Deeds dated 01.09.1999 were
executed without any consideration, would itself show that the
suit property was sold without any legal necessity. Being
coparcenary property, it could not have been sold without legal
necessity, or for the benefit of the estate. Judgment passed by
F the Single Judge of the High Court vide the Impugned Order
dated 13.11.2018, being contrary to law, is set aside. The Sale
Deeds dated 01.09.1999 executed by ‘DS’ in favour of
Respondent No. 1 are hereby cancelled and set aside.
Consequently, the subsequent Sale Deed dated 30.10.2007
executed by Respondent No.1 in favour of Respondent Nos. 2 &
G 3 during the pendency of proceedings is illegal, and hereby
cancelled and set aside. The name of the Appellant is to be
recorded in the Jamabandis as the owner of the suit property.
[Paras 9, 10-10.2 11] [1015-E-G; 1016-A-F]

H
ARSHNOOR SINGH v. HARPAL KAUR & ORS. 1003

Shyam Narayan Prasad v. Krisha Prasad & Ors. (2018) A
7 SCC 646 : [2018] 5 SCR 36 ; Yudhishter v. Ashok
Kumar (1987) 1 SCC 204 : [1987] 1 SCR 516 ;
Valliammai Achi v. Nagappa Chettiar and Ors. AIR 1967
SC 1153 : [1967] SCR 448 ; Rani & Anr. v. Santa Bala
Debnath & Ors. (1970) 3 SCC 722 : [1971] 2 SCR
B
603 ; Vijay A. Mittal & Ors. v. Kulwant Rai (Dead)
through LRs & Ors. (2019) 3 SCC 520 : [2019]
2 SCR 507 ; T.G. Ashok Kumar v. Govindammal & Ors.
(2010) 14 SCC 370 : [2010] 14 SCR 560 – relied on.
Uttam v. Saubhag Singh (2016) 4 SCC 68 – held
inapplicable. C

Mulla on Hindu Law (22nd Edition) Pg. 372 – referred
to.
Case Law Reference
(2016) 4 SCC 68 held inapplicable Para 5 D
[2018] 5 SCR 36 relied on Para 7.2
[1987] 1 SCR 516 relied on Para 7.4
[1967] SCR 448 relied on Para 7.11
[2019] 2 SCR 507 relied on Para 8.1 E

[1971] 2 SCR 603 relied on Para 8.1
[2010] 14 SCR 560 relied on Para 9
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5124
of 2019. F
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.11.2018 of the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in RSA No. 1354 of 2014.
Manoj Swarup, Sr. Adv., Ankit Swarup, Dr. Mansi Jain,
Ms. Vidisha Swarup, Advs. for the Appellant.
G
Anuj Bhandari, Abhinav Srivastava, Siddhartha Jha, Advs. for
the Respondents.

H
1004 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 8 S.C.R.

A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
INDU MALHOTRA, J. Leave granted.
1. The present Civil Appeal has been filed to challenge the Order
dated 13.11.2018 passed in RSA No. 1354 of 2014 by the Punjab &
Haryana High Court at Chandigarh.
B
2. The background facts in which the present Civil Appeal has
been filed are briefly stated as under:
2.1. Lal Singh was the owner of large tracts of agricultural land
in Village Khangarh, District Ferozepur, Punjab. The
C Appellant herein is the great-grandson of Lal Singh.
The genealogy table of Lal Singh’s family is set out hereinbelow
for the sake of convenience:
Lal Singh

D
Inder Singh

Gurcharan Singh Dharam Singh Swaran Singh Dharam Kaur
(son) (son) (son) (daughter)
E

Arshnoor Singh (Appellant)
2.2. Lal Singh passed away in 1951, and his entire property was
inherited by his only son Inder Singh. In 1964, Inder Singh
F during his lifetime, effected a partition of the entire property
vide decree dated 04.11.1964 passed in Civil Suit No. 182
of 4.11.1962 between his three sons viz. Gurcharan Singh,
Dharam Singh, and Swaran Singh in equal shares.
Thereafter, the three sons transferred one-fourth share
G in the entire property back to their father Inder Singh for
his sustenance. As a consequence, Inder Singh and his three
sons held one-fourth share each in the property.
Inder Singh expired on 15.04.1970, and his one-fourth
share was inherited by his heirs i.e. his widow, three sons,
H and his daughter.
ARSHNOOR SINGH v. HARPAL KAUR & ORS. 1005
[INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

2.3. The present matter pertains to the property which came to A
the share of one of his sons viz. Dharam Singh (hereinafter
referred to as the “suit property”), which was agricultural
land comprised of about 119 kanals 2 marlas, situated in
Village Khangarh, District Feozepur, Punjab.
2.4. Dharam Singh had only one son viz. Arshnoor Singh – the B
Appellant herein. The Appellant was born on 22.08.1985
to Dharam Singh through his 1st wife.
2.5. Dharam Singh purportedly sold the entire suit property to
Respondent No. 1 viz. Harpal Kaur vide two registered
Sale Deeds dated 01.09.1999 for an ostensible sale C
consideration of Rs. 4,87,500/-.
The first Sale Deed bearing Wasika No. 1075 pertains
to land admeasuring 59 kanals 11 marlas situated in Khasra
No. 35; the second Sale Deed bearing Wasika No. 1079
pertains to land admeasuring 59 kanals 11 marlas in Khasra D
No. 36.
2.6. On 21.09.1999, the two Sale Deeds were sent by the Sub
Registrar to the Collector, Ferozepur for action u/S. 47A of
the Indian Stamp Act, 1999 as the Sale Deeds were
undervalued. E
Dharam Singh and Respondent No. 1 – Harpal Kaur
appeared before the Collector. Dharam Singh admitted that
no consideration was exchanged in lieu of the two Sale
Deeds, and the amount of Rs. 4,87,500/- was mentioned
only for the purpose of registration. F
Respondent No. 1 – Harpal Kaur, the purported vendee,
admitted that no money was paid by her to Dharam Singh
in exchange for the suit property.
2.7. Subsequently, on 29.09.1999, Dharam Singh got married to
Respondent No. 1. G
The Collector, Ferozepur vide Order dated 24.01.2000,
held that the two Sale Deeds executed by Dharam Singh in
favour of Respondent No. 1 were without any monetary
transaction.
H
1006 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 8 S.C.R.

A 2.8. The Appellant became a major on 22.08.2003.
On 23.11.2004, the Appellant filed a Suit for Declaration
against his father Dharam Singh as Defendant No. 1, and
Harpal Kaur as Defendant No. 2 (Respondent No. 1 herein)
for a declaration that the suit property was coparcenary
B property, and hence the two Sale Deeds dated 01.09.1999
executed by his father Dharam Singh in favour of
Respondent No. 1 herein were illegal, null and void. The
Appellant further prayed for a permanent injunction
restraining Respondent No. 1 from further alienating,
transferring, or creating a charge on the suit property.
C
2.9. During the pendency of the Suit, Respondent No. 1 entered
into a transaction whereby she purportedly sold the suit
property jointly to Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 viz. Kulwant
Singh and Jung Bahadur vide a Sale Deed dated 30.10.2007.
D Respondent No. 1 filed an Application to Implead
Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 as co-defendants in the Suit.
However, the said Application was disposed of vide Order
dated 25.09.2010, with liberty granted to Respondent
No. 1/Defendant No. 2 to defend their rights.

E 2.10. The Additional Civil Judge, Ferozepur vide Order dated
29.04.2011, decreed the Suit in favour of the Appellant
Plaintiff.
Dharam Singh in his deposition had stated that he
executed the Sale Deeds without any monetary
F consideration since Respondent No. 1 insisted on transfer
of the suit property in her name as a pre-condition for
marriage.
The Trial Court held that the suit property was ancestral
coparcenary property of Dharam Singh and the Appellant.
Respondent No. 1 failed to prove that Dharam Singh had
G
sold the suit property to Respondent No. 1 for either legal
necessity of the family, or for the benefit of the estate.
Consequently, the two Sale Deeds dated 01.09.1999
purportedly executed by Dharam Singh in favour of
Respondent No. 1/Defendant No. 2 were illegal, null and
H
ARSHNOOR SINGH v. HARPAL KAUR & ORS. 1007
[INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

void. The Appellant was held entitled to joint possession of A
the suit property with his father.
2.11. Respondent No. 1 along with the subsequent purchasers –
Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 filed a common Civil Appeal RBT
No. 130 of 3.6.2011/7.9.2013 before the Additional District
Judge, Ferozepur. B
The ADJ vide Judgment & Order dated 13.01.2014
dismissed the Appeal. The Appellate Court held that the
two Sale Deeds dated 01.09.1999 were executed without
any consideration as per the admission of Dharam Singh,
and Respondent No. 1 in their statements recorded by the C
Collector, Ferozepur.
In the absence of any legal necessity, or benefit to the
estate of the joint Hindu family, the Sale Deeds dated
01.09.1999 were illegal, null and void.
2.12. Aggrieved by the aforesaid Order, Respondent Nos. 1, 2 & D
3 filed RSA No. 1354 of 2014 before the Punjab & Haryana
High Court.
2.13. During the pendency of the Regular Second Appeal before
the High Court, Dharam Singh expired on 05.01.2017.
E
2.14. The High Court vide the impugned Judgment & Order dated
13.11.2018, allowed the RSA filed by the Respondents, and
set aside the concurrent findings of the courts below.
The High Court held that (i) the Appellant had no locus
to institute the Suit, since the coparcenary property ceased
F
to exist after Inder Singh partitioned the property between
his 3 sons in 1964; (ii) the Appellant had no right to challenge
the Sale Deeds executed on 01.09.1999 on the ground that
the sale consideration had not been paid, since only the
executant of the Sale Deeds viz. Dharam Singh (Defendant
No. 1) could have made such a challenge; and (iii) G
Jamabandis for the years 1957 – 58 till 1970 – 71 were not
produced by the Appellant.
2.15. Aggrieved by the impugned Judgment & Order dated
13.11.2018 passed by the High Court, the Appellant has
filed the present Civil Appeal. H
1008 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 8 S.C.R.

A 3. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties, and perused
the pleadings and written submissions filed by the parties.
4. Mr. Manoj Swarup, Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
Appellant, submitted that the suit property was coparcenary property in
which the Appellant had become a coparcener by birth.
B It was further submitted that since the suit property was
coparcenary property, Dharam Singh could not have alienated it without
legal necessity of the family, or benefit to the estate.
It was further submitted that the Sale Deed dated 30.10.2007
purportedly executed by Respondent No. 1 in favour of Respondent
C Nos. 2 & 3, during the pendency of the Suit, was hit by lis pendens.
Hence, it was illegal, null and void.
5. Mr. Ritin Rai, Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondents
submitted that the Civil Suit was filed by the Appellant in collusion with
his father Dharam Singh (Defendant No. 1), as Dharam Singh’s marriage
D with Respondent No. 1 had fallen apart, and had subsequently been
dissolved through a decree of divorce on 15.12.2010. It was contended
that the Civil Suit was filed by the Appellant at the behest of his father
Dharam Singh.
It was further submitted that the suit property was not coparcenary
E property when the two Sale Deeds were executed on 01.09.1999. Inder
Singh’s property ceased to be coparcenary property after it was divided
vide the decree dated 04.11.1964. Reliance was placed on the decision
of this Court in Uttam v. Saubhag Singh,1 wherein it was held that:
“18. Some other judgments were cited before us for the
F proposition that joint family property continues as such even
with a sole surviving coparcener, and if a son is born to such
coparcener thereafter, the joint family property continues as
such, there being no hiatus merely by virtue of the fact there
is a sole surviving coparcener. Dharma Shamrao Agalawe v.
Pandurang Miragu Agalawe (1988) 2 SCC 126, Sheela Devi
G
v. Lal Chand, (2006) 8 SCC 581, and Rohit Chauhan v.
Surinder Singh (2013) 9 SCC 419, were cited for this purpose.
None of these judgments would take the appellant any further
in view of the fact that in none of them is there any
consideration of the effect of Sections 4, 8 and 19 of the
H 1
(2016) 4 SCC 68
ARSHNOOR SINGH v. HARPAL KAUR & ORS. 1009
[INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

Hindu Succession Act. The law, therefore, insofar as it applies A
to joint family property governed by the Mitakshara School,
prior to the amendment of 2005, could therefore be
summarized as follows:
…
(vi) On a conjoint reading of Sections 4, 8 and 19 of the Act, B
after joint family property has been distributed in accordance
with section 8 on principles of intestacy, the joint family
property ceases to be joint family property in the hands of
the various persons who have succeeded to it as they hold
the property as tenants in common and not as joint tenants.” C
It was further submitted that the Appellant had no locus to file the
Civil Suit on the ground that no sale consideration was paid by Respondent
No. 1 to Dharam Singh. The Appellant was not a party to the Sale
Deeds, and only the executant of the Sale Deeds viz. Dharam Singh,
could have filed such a suit. D
6. The issues that arise for consideration before us are two-fold:
(i) whether the suit property was coparcenary property or self-acquired
property of Dharam Singh; (ii) the validity of the Sale Deeds executed
on 01.09.1999 by Dharam Singh in favour of Respondent No. 1, and the
subsequent Sale Deed dated 30.10.2007 executed by Respondent No. 1 E
in favour of Respondent Nos. 2 & 3.
7. With respect to the first issue, it is the admitted position that
Inder Singh had inherited the entire suit property from his father Lal
Singh upon his death. As per the Mutation Entry dated 16.01.1956
produced by Respondent No. 1, Lal Singh’s death took place in 1951. F
Therefore, the succession in this case opened in 1951 prior to the
commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 when Inder Singh
succeeded to his father Lal’s Singh’s property in accordance with the
old Hindu Mitakshara law.
7.1. Mulla in his commentary on Hindu Law (22nd Edition) has
G
stated the position with respect to succession under
Mitakshara law as follows:
Page 129
“A son, a grandson whose father is dead, and a great-
grandson whose father and grandfather are both dead, H
1010 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 8 S.C.R.

A succeed simultaneously as single heir to the separate
or self-acquired property of the deceased with rights of
survivorship.”
Page 327
“All property inherited by a male Hindu from his father,
B father’s father or father’s father’s father, is ancestral
property. The essential feature of ancestral property
according to Mitakshara law is that the sons, grandsons
and great-grandsons of the person who inherits it,
acquire an interest, and the rights attached to such
C property at the moment of their birth.
A person inheriting property from his three immediate
paternal ancestors holds it, and must hold it, in
coparcenary with his sons, son’s sons, and son’s son’s
sons, but as regards other relations, he holds it, and is
D entitled to hold it as his absolute property.”
(emphasis supplied)
7.2. In Shyam Narayan Prasad v. Krisha Prasad & Ors.,2
this Court has recently held that :
“12. It is settled that the property inherited by a male
E
Hindu from his father, father’s father or father’s father’s
father is an ancestral property. The essential feature of
ancestral property, according to Mitakshara Law, is that
the sons, grandsons, and great grandsons of the person
who inherits it, acquire an interest and the rights
F attached to such property at the moment of their birth.
The share which a coparcener obtains on partition of
ancestral property is ancestral property as regards his
male issue. After partition, the property in the hands of
the son will continue to be the ancestral property and
the natural or adopted son of that son will take interest
G
in it and is entitled to it by survivorship.”
(emphasis supplied)

2
(2018) 7 SCC 646
H
ARSHNOOR SINGH v. HARPAL KAUR & ORS. 1011
[INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

7.3. Under Mitakshara law, whenever a male ancestor inherits A
any property from any of his paternal ancestors upto three
degrees above him, then his male legal heirs upto three
degrees below him, would get an equal right as coparceners
in that property.
7.4. In Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar,3 this Court held that : B
“11. This question has been considered by this Court in
Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Kanpur and Ors. v.
Chander Sen and Ors. [1986] 161 ITR 370 (SC) where
one of us (Sabyasachi Mukharji, J) observed that under
the Hindu Law, the moment a son is born, he gets a C
share in father’s property and become part of the
coparcenary. His right accrues to him not on the death
of the father or inheritance from the father but with the
very fact of his birth. Normally, therefore whenever the
father gets a property from whatever source, from the
grandfather or from any other source, be it separated D
property or not, his son should have a share in that and
it will become part of the joint Hindu family of his son
and grandson and other members who form joint Hindu
family with him. This Court observed that this position
has been affected by Section 8 of the Hindu Succession E
Act, 1956 and, therefore, after the Act, when the son
inherited the property in the situation contemplated by
Section 8, he does not take it as Kar of his own
undivided family but takes it in his individual capacity.”
(emphasis supplied) F
7.5. After the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force, this
position has undergone a change. Post – 1956, if a person
inherits a self-acquired property from his paternal ancestors,
the said property becomes his self-acquired property, and
does not remain coparcenary property. G
7.6. If succession opened under the old Hindu law, i.e. prior to
the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the
parties would be governed by Mitakshara law. The property

3
(1987) 1 SCC 204 H
1012 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 8 S.C.R.

A inherited by a male Hindu from his paternal male ancestor
shall be coparcenary property in his hands vis-à-vis his male
descendants upto three degrees below him. The nature of
property will remain as coparcenary property even after
the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
B 7.7. In the present case, the succession opened in 1951 on the
death of Lal Singh. The nature of the property inherited by
his son Inder Singh was coparcenary in nature. Even though
Inder Singh had effected a partition of the coparcenary
property amongst his sons in 1964, the nature of the property
inherited by Inder Singh’s sons would remain as coparcenary
C property qua their male descendants upto three degrees
below them.
7.8. The judgment in Uttam v. Saubhag Singh (supra) relied
upon by the Respondents is not applicable to the facts of
the present case. In Uttam, the appellant therein was
D claiming a share in the coparcenary property of his
grandfather, who had died in 1973 before the appellant was
born. The succession opened in 1973 after the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 came into force.
The Court was concerned with the share of the
E appellant’s grandfather in the ancestral property, and the
impact of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. In
light of these facts, this Court held that after property is
distributed in accordance with Section 8 of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956, such property ceases to be joint family
F property in the hands of the various persons who have
succeeded to it. It was therefore held that the appellant
was not a coparcener vis-à-vis the share of his grandfather.
7.9. In the present case, the entire property of Lal Singh was
inherited by his son Inder Singh as coparcenary property
G prior to 1956. This coparcenary property was partitioned
between the three sons of Inder Singh by the court vide a
decree of partition dated 04.11.1964. The shares allotted in
partition to the coparceners, continued to remain
coparcenary property in their hands qua their male

H
ARSHNOOR SINGH v. HARPAL KAUR & ORS. 1013
[INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

descendants. As a consequence, the property allotted to A
Dharam Singh in partition continued to remain coparcenary
property qua the Appellant.
7.10. With respect to the devolution of a share acquired on partition,
Mulla on Hindu Law (22nd Edition) states the following:
“§ 339. Devolution of share acquired on partition. – B
The effect of a partition is to dissolve the coparcenary,
with the result, that the separating members thenceforth
hold their respective shares as their separate property,
and the share of each member will pass on his death to
his heirs. However, if a member while separating from C
his other coparceners continues joint with his own male
issue, the share allotted to him on partition, will in his
hands, retain the character of a coparcenary property
as regards the male issue [§ 221, sub-§ (4)].”
(emphasis supplied) D
7.11. This Court in Valliammai Achi v. Nagappa Chettiar and
Ors.,4 held that:
“10. … It is well settled that the share which a co-sharer
obtains on partition of ancestral property is ancestral
property as regards his male issues. They take an interest E
in it by birth whether they are in existence at the time of
partition or are born subsequently: [see Hindu Law by
Mulla, Thirteenth Edition p. 249, para 223 (2)(4)]. If
that is so and the character of the ancestral property
does not change so far as sons are concerned even F
after partition, we fail to see how that character can
change merely because the father makes a will by which
he gives the residue of the joint family property (after
making certain bequests) to the son.”
(emphasis supplied)
G
7.12. The suit property which came to the share of late Dharam
Singh through partition, remained coparcenary property qua
his son – the Appellant herein, who became a coparcener in
the suit property on his birth i.e. on 22.08.1985.
4
AIR 1967 SC 1153 H
1014 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 8 S.C.R.

A Dharam Singh purportedly executed the two Sale Deeds
on 01.09.1999 in favour of Respondent No. 1 after the
Appellant became a coparcener in the suit property.
8. The second issue which has arisen for consideration is whether
the two Sale Deeds dated 01.09.1999 executed by Dharam Singh in
B favour of Respondent No. 1, were valid or not.
8.1. It is settled law that the power of a Karta to sell coparcenary
property is subject to certain restrictions viz. the sale should
be for legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate.5 The
onus for establishing the existence of legal necessity is on
C the alienee.
In Rani & Anr. v. Santa Bala Debnath & Ors.,6 this
Court held that :
“10. Legal necessity to support the sale must however
be established by the alienees. Sarala owned the land
D in dispute as a limited owner. She was competent to
dispose of the whole estate in the property for legal
necessity or benefit to the estate. In adjusting whether
the sale conveys the whole estate, the actual pressure
on the estate, the danger to be averted, and the benefit
E to be conferred upon the estate in the particular instance
must be considered. Legal necessity does not mean
actual compulsion: it means pressure upon the estate
which in law may be regarded as serious and sufficient.
The onus of providing legal necessity may be discharged
by the alienee by proof of actual necessity or by proof
F that he made proper and bona fide enquires about the
existence of the necessity and that he did all that was
reasonable to satisfy himself as to the existence of the
necessity.”
(emphasis supplied)
G
8.2. In the present case, the onus was on the alienee i.e.
Respondent No. 1 to prove that there was a legal necessity,

5
Vijay A. Mittal & Ors. v. Kulwant Rai (Dead) through LRs & Ors., (2019) 3 SCC 520;
Mulla on Hindu Law (22nd Edition), Pg. 372.
6
H (1970) 3 SCC 722.
ARSHNOOR SINGH v. HARPAL KAUR & ORS. 1015
[INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

or benefit to the estate, or that she had made bona fide A
enquiries on the existence of the same.
8.3. Respondent No. 1 has completely failed to discharge the
burden of proving that Dharam Singh had executed the two
Sale Deeds dated 01.09.1999 in her favour out of legal
necessity or for the benefit of the estate. In fact, it has B
come on record that the Sale Deeds were without any
consideration whatsoever.
Dharam Singh had deposed before the Trial Court that
he sold the suit property to Respondent No. 1 without any
consideration. Respondent No. 1 had also admitted before C
the Collector, Ferozepur that the Sale Deeds were without
consideration.
Hence, the ground of legal necessity or benefit of the
estate falls through.
8.4. As a consequence, the Sale Deeds dated 01.09.1999 are D
hereby cancelled as being illegal, null and void. Dharam Singh
could not have sold the coparcenary suit property, in which
the Appellant was a coparcener, by the aforesaid alleged
Sale Deeds.
9. Since Respondent No. 1 has not obtained a valid and legal title E
to the suit property through the Sale Deeds dated 01.09.1999, she could
not have passed on a better title to Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 either.
The subsequent Sale Deed dated 30.10.2007 executed by
Respondent No. 1 in favour of Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 is hit by the
doctrine of lis pendens. The underlying principle of the doctrine of lis F
pendens is that if a property is transferred pendente lite, and the
transferor is held to have no right or title in that property, the transferee
will not have any title to the property.7 The Sale Deed dated 30.10.2007
executed by Respondent No. 1 in favour of Respondent Nos. 2 & 3
being null and void, is hereby cancelled.
G
10. The Plaintiff/Appellant being a male coparcener in the suit
property, was vitally affected by the purported sale of the suit property
by his father Dharam Singh.

7
T.G. Ashok Kumar v. Govindammal & Ors., (2010) 14 SCC 370. H
1016 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 8 S.C.R.

A The Appellant therefore had the locus to file the Suit for a
Declaration that the suit property being coparcenary property, could not
have been sold by his father Dharam Singh without legal necessity, or
for the benefit of the estate.
As a consequence, the Appellant was entitled to move the Court
B for a Declaration that the two Sale Deeds dated 01.09.1999 executed
by his father Dharam Singh in favour of Respondent No. 1 were illegal,
null and void.
10.1. The very fact that the Sale Deeds dated 01.09.1999 were
executed without any consideration, would itself show that
C the suit property was sold without any legal necessity. Being
coparcenary property, it could not have been sold without
legal necessity, or for the benefit of the estate.
10.2. The non-production of the Jamabandis would make no
difference, as it did not affect the title/ownership of the suit
D property.
11. In view of the aforesaid discussion on law, the judgment passed
by the learned Single Judge of the High Court vide the Impugned Order
dated 13.11.2018, being contrary to law, is set aside.
The Sale Deeds dated 01.09.1999 bearing Wasika Nos. 1075 and
E 1079 executed by Dharam Singh in favour of Respondent No. 1 are
hereby cancelled and set aside.
Consequently, the subsequent Sale Deed dated 30.10.2007
executed by Respondent No. 1 in favour of Respondent Nos. 2 & 3
during the pendency of proceedings is illegal, and hereby cancelled and
F set aside.
The name of the Appellant is to be recorded in the Jamabandis
as the owner of the suit property.
The Civil Appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms. All pending
Applications, if any, are accordingly disposed of.
G
Ordered accordingly.

Divya Pandey Appeal allowed.

H