Holding

The dismissal order is vitiated due to breach of natural justice and is set aside.

Summary

Arjun Chaubey, a senior clerk in the Northern Railway, was served with twelve charges of gross indiscipline, many of which related to the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent (Respondent 3). After submitting explanations, Respondent 3 himself evaluated the explanations and dismissed Chaubey under Rule 14(ii) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, without holding a formal inquiry, invoking the proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the dismissing authority, being the principal accuser, was barred by the rule against bias and could not act as judge in his own cause, thereby violating natural justice. The Court declared the dismissal order vitiated and set it aside, directing that Chaubey be treated as retired with arrears of salary, provident fund and gratuity payable as if no dismissal had occurred. The appeal was allowed and costs awarded to the appellant.

Issues considered

The validity of a dismissal under Rule 14(ii) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 when the dismissing authority is also the accuser.
Whether the principles of natural justice, particularly the rule against bias, apply to disciplinary dismissals under Article 311(2) of the Constitution.
Whether alleged habitual indiscipline on the part of the employee can cure the procedural infirmity.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 311(2) proviso (b)
Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Ruless. Rule 14(ii)

Subjects

natural justicebiasservice dismissaldisciplinary proceedingsArticle 311Railway Servants Rulesprocedural fairness

Judgment

902
A
ARJUN CHAUBEY
1-
v. '

UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
, .. B .
March 23, 1984

(Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, .C.J., V.D. TULZAPURKAR, R.S. PA1HAK, ·
'D.P. MADON AND M.P. THAKKf\R, JJ.J

c
Service Jurisprudence-Dismissal Order ·passed by the competent authority '-
' d~spensing with an enquiry under Rule I4(ii) of'tht R(li/way- Servants (Discipline
and Appeal) Rafe., 1968 read with Proviso (b) to Article 311(2) of t~e Corutitution
-Majority of charges of appellant's mlsconduct are in relation to competent
authority who dismissed him-Doctrine 0fbias-Accusser cann'ot hf! a judge ofhiS
own cause-NatuYa! Justice, Principles, violated.
D
The appellant was working as a senior clerk in the office of the cbiCf Com-
. mercial Superintendent. 'Northern Railwa;, Va~anasi. On May 22, 198~, the
,.Caior Commercial Officer wrote a letter to him calling up.on him to offer his
expJanatic;>n i'n fegard to tWelve ch&rges of gross indiscipline, mos;Jy rel;lting to
the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent. The appellant submitted his
explanation to the charges by his reply dated June 9, 1982. On the very next day,
the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent served a second_ notice upon the
appellant saying that the exPlanation offered by -him was not convincing but -{
t'hat another chance was being given to him tq offer his' e~p{anation- regardi1g
the spetjfic· charges which were conveyed to· him earli~r. By this letter, the
appellant was als9 ·caned up_on to submit his explanation within three days' as
'.
to why l}eter,rent disCiplinary action should not be t{lken against him. The appel-
lant subrilitted his further explanation on June 14;1982. but on the very next
' d_ay, the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent passed· an order dismissing
him fiom service on the ground that he was not fit to be retained in service.

The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court of Allahabad challen-
ging the order of dismissal on variqus gro·unds. The .writ petition was-dismissed
and hence the appeal special leave of the Court.
G
•
Allowing the appeal, the Court.
'
HELD : I : J. The order of dismissal passed against the appellant siands
vitiated for the simple re~son that the issue· as to who, betwun the ap(>ellant
and Respondent No. 3 (the dismissing authority) was speitking the truth was
d~ided by Respondent No. 3. The main thrust of the charges against the appel-
. lant related to his conduct 'Illa Respondent '3. Therefore, it was not open to the
18.uer tO sit in Judgment over. the eXplanation offered by the appelJant and,
decided that the explanation was untrue. No person can be a judge in his own
l
ARJUN CHA UllEY V, UNIOl-l 303

cause and no witness can certify thttt his oWn tCstimony is true~ Any one who A
has a pers6na1 stake in an .enquiry must keep himself aloof from the conduct of
thejnquiry. [306 F-Hl

I : 2. On the facts of tho case, the illegality touching the proceedings which
endetl in th~ dismissal of the appellant is, "so patent apd loudly obtrllsive that
it leaves an indelible stamp of infirmity" on the decision of Respondent No. 3.
[307 B-C] ·B

• 2. From the-charges 2 to 7 and ll;it is obvious that if an enq~iry were to
be held into the charges framed against the appellant. the principal witness fen:
the Department would have been Responden~ No. 3 (the dismisSing authority)
himself as the main accuser and-the target of aP!iellant's misconduct. Surpri-
singly, the explanation dated June 9, 1982 of the appellant to the letter of
accusation dated May 22, 1982 was· considered ·on its merit~ by Respondent c
himself. Thereby, the accuser be~ame the Judge. [305 G-H, 306 Al

·Not O!flY that, the further explanation submitted by the appeJlant was consi'.'
dered by Respondent No. 3 himself. The order of dismissal dated-June 15", 1962
which was issued by Respondent No. 3 recites that he was fully . satisfied that it
was not •easonabiy practicable to hold an inquiry into the appellant's conduct as D
provided by the Rules and that he had oome to the conclusion that the appellant
was not fit to be"retained in service· and had, therefore,· to be dismissed,
Evidently, Respondent 3 assessed the weight of his own accusation~ againSt the •
appellant and Passed a jUdg~ent 'Y}lich is one of. the ea;iest to pass-~ namely~
that be himself was truthful person and the appellant a liar. In d~ing this,
Respondent No. 3 viola~ed a fundamental principle or natural justice.
[305 B-C, 306 Fl E,
The State of U.P. v. Moltammad Nooh (1958) SCR ~95, referred to.

3, The contention that inspite of the -above legal po&ition, the appellant
does not deserve the assiStanco of the court, since he was habitually guilty of
acts subversive of discipline cannot be accepted. In the first place, to bold the
appellant guilty of habitual acts of indiscipline is to assume something which F
remain' unproved, Secondly, the illegaJity from· which the order· of dismissal
Pl!Sfd by Respondent No. 3 suffers is of a character so grave and fundamental
that the alleged habitual misbehiA-iour on the part of the appellant cannot cure
. or condone it. [301 CB]

4. The avio<;l needless complications in working out the· mutual rights and G
obligations of the parties, the court directed :

(i) The appellant who is due to retire from service shall be treated as
having retired from service with effect from April 1, 1984 ;
.
(ii) He shall be paid arrears of salary due uhtil March 31, 1984 on the basis
of salary last drkwn by him on June 15, 1982 without taking into H·
account the increments which he might have earned subsequent to Ii\•\
. \l•t•: . . . .
304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.R.
/

A . (iii) The Provident Fund and gratuity sHall also be paid to the appellant as
calculated in accordance with the rules, as if-no order'.or dismissal was
passed against him; and · '

(iv) he ma)' not and shall nof rejoin his duties and he will Ill' treated as OD
leave between 23rd March, 1984 and 31st March, 1984.
)307 F-H, 308 A-Bl
B
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : CivH Appeal No. 2613 of '-1:
1983.

From the Judgment and Order dated 19-11-82 of Allahabad
~
..
High Court in Civil Misc. Writ No. 8287 ofJ982. .,
c
R..K. Garg, S.N. Singh and J).K. Garg, for the appellant. .

P.R. Mridul, Miss A. Subhashini, R.N., Poddar, C. V, Subba Rao :.:·
and A.K, Ganguli for the respondents. .,..
D
The judgment of the ~ourt was. deliver~d by
• CHANDRACHl)D, C.J. The appellant was working as a senior
clerk in ;tirn office of the Chief Commercial Superintendent, Northern
.Railway, Varanasi. On May 22, 1982 the Senior ·Commercial
E Officer wrote a letter to him, calling upon him to offer his explanation

.
in regard to 12 charges of gross indiscipline. The appellant submit-
ted his explanation to the charges by bis reply. .dated June 9, . 1982.
On the very next day, the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent
served a second notice upon the appellant, saying that the explana-
tion ottered by him was not convincing but that another chance was •
F
being ·given to him to offer his explanation regarding the specific
charges which were conveyed to him by' the letter of May 22, 1982.
By this letter, the appellant was also cklled upon to submit hi!!' ex-
planation within three days as to why deterrent disciplinary action
should not be taken against him. The appellant submitted bis
G further explanation on June 1.4, 1982, but on the very next day; the •
· Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent' passed an order dismiss-
ing him from service· on the ground that he was not fit to be retain-
ed in service. ·

· The appellant filed a writ' petition in the High Court of
H Allahabad challenging the order of dismissal on various grounds.
The Union of India, the. Senior Commercial Officer and the Deputy
Chief Commercial Superintendent were impleaded to !hat petition
ARJUN CHAUBEY v. UN!ON (Chandrachud, C.J.) 305

as Respondents 1 to 3. That writ petition having been dismissed by A
.
the High Conrt, .the appellant
. has filed .this appear by. special leave.

The order dismissing the appellant from service .was passed by
·Respondent 3 under Ru.le 14(ii) of the .Railway Servants (Discipline
' and Appeal) Rules, 1968 read with Proviso (b) to ~rticle 311(2) 9f B
the Constitution. Respondent 3 recorded his reasons in writing for
coming to the conclusion that it was not reasonably practicable to
hold an inquiry into . the conduct of the appellant in the manner
.
provided by the relevant rnles, and thereafter, he proceeded.to pass..
the or<ler of dismissal without holding any inquiry.
c
Quite some time was taken by the appellant's counsel in-argu-
ing upon the true meaning and intendment of the Disciplin~ and
Appeal Ru\es, 1968 and in urging that the appellant should have
been affordetl an opportunity of being heard on the question as to
whether, it was or was not reasonably practicable to hold an in,quiry. ·
into the charges levelled against him. It was also urged by the learn- D. ·
ed counsel that the fact that it was not reasonably practicable to 1
hold a full-fledged inquiry as. contemplated by the Rules, did:not
justify. the non-holdirig of any inquiry at alL We do not propose to
enter into the merits of these contentions since, the appellant is
entitled .to succeed on another ground. E

The Jetter dated May 22, 1982 which contains accusations of
gross misconduct against the appellant enumerates 12 charges, out .
of which Charges Nos. 2 to 7 and JI refer to the appellant's miscon-
duct In relation to Respondent 3. For exampfo, the second charge
alleges that. the appellant entered the office of Respondent 3 and F
challenged him in an offensive and derogatory language. Charge
No. 3 says .that the appellant was in the habit of forcing himself on
}lespondent 3 two or three times every day with petty' complaints.
Charge No. 4 alleges that the appellant stormed into the office of
Respondent 3 and shouted at him, using foul words. Charges 5, 6
• and 7 contain similar allegations. The allegation contained in G
Charge No. 11 is to the effect that behaving as a leader of goondas,
the appellant hired the services of other goondas and created secu-
rity problems for Respondent 3 and the members ot his family. It
is obvious that if an inquiry were· to be held into the charges framed
·against the appellant, the principal witness for the Department would
H
have been Respondent 3 himself as the main accuser and the target

'
.
of appellant's roiscon~uct. It is surprising in \his context that tb~
'
r
306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984) 3 S.C.R.
A expl.anation dated June 9, 1982 which was furnished by the appel-
lant to the letter of accusation dated May 22, . 1982 was considered
on its merits by . Respondent ·3 himself. Thereby, the accuser be-
~ame the judge. The letter writt;n to the appellant by Respondent 3.
on June 10,. 1982 says :· · : .
e· •
"I have carefully gone through your defence explana-
tion dated 9.6.82 to the charges given in this office Jetter of
even No. dated 22.S.82 and the same i? not convincing at all.
Befqre taking any actipn under D. & A.R., I would like io
offer you another chance for giving· your explaniations to the
c specific charges conveyed to you vide this ojjlce letter dated
22:5.82.
. .
Please submit your defence . explanation within three
days as to .why a deterrent disciplinary action should•not be
taken against you". • -~
D
:rhe appellant submjtted his further explanation, V.:hieh also ~Q6 . ·
. . by Respondent 3 himself.
considered

The order of dillmissal dated June 15, 1982 which was issued
E by Respondent 3 recites that he was fully satisfied that it was:not
reasonably praeticable to hold an inquiry into the appellant's con-
duct as provided bytlje Rule~ and that he ·had come to the conclu-
sion that the appellant was not fit to be retained in service. and had,
therefore, to be dismissec\. Evi.dently, Respondent 3 assessed.the
weight of his own accusations against the ,appellal)t and pas5ed a
F judgment which is one of the easiest to pass, namely, that he.him-
self was a trut11ful person and the appellant a liar. In doing ,th~;
Respondent 3 violated a fundamental principle of naturaLjustice. ••
The main thrust of the charges against the appellant related .to
his conduct qua Respondent 3. Therefore, it was not open to t]le .
G ~ ..
latter to sit in judgment over the explanation offered. by the appel~
!ant and decide that the explanation was untrue. No person can be
a judge in his ·own cause and no witµess can certify that hfs own
testimony is true. Any one who has a personal .stake in, an lnqui~y
must keep himself aloof from the conduct of the : inqniry.
H
The order of dismissal passed against the appellant stands
vitillte~ for tile simple rea!ll:m th<it the ·issue as to who, between th

•
AJRUN CHAUBEY ~· UNION (Chandrachud, C.J.) 307
"· appellant and Respondent 3; was speaking the truth was decided by A
~ Respondent 3 himself.

In The State of U11ar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh, 1 S.R. Das,
C.J., observed, while. speaking for the majority, that the roles of a
· judge and a witness cannot.be· played by Dne and the same person
..and that ~t is futile to expect, when those roles are combined, thatthe It.
judge can hold the scales of justice e\'en .. We may borrow the lang-
>i u~ge of Das, C.J., and record a finding on the facts of the case be-
.{ fore us that the illegality touching the proceedings whiclr ended in
the dismissal of the appellant is "so patent and loudly obtrusive that
it leaves an io,delible stamp of infirmity" on the decision of Respon-
dent3. . · C

Mr. Mridul, appearing on lie half of the respondent, contended
that though this may be the true le.gal position, .the appellant does
not deserve the assistance of the Court since, he was habitually
guilty of acts subversive• of discipline. This argument does not im- D •
press us.·

In the first place, to' hold tli.e appellant gui'Jity of habitual acts
of indiscipline is to assume something which remains unproved .
. $econdly, the illegality.from which the order of dismissal passed by
Respondent- 3 suffers is of a character so grave and fundamental LE
that the alleged habitual misbehivfour on the part of the appellant
cannot cure or condone it. ·

In the result, we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment·
of the High Court. The order dated June 15, 1982 whereby the F
appellant was dlsinissed from service is set aside. In order, however,
to avoid needless complications ' in working out the mutual rights.
and obligations of the parties, we direct that the appellant, who is
.due to retire within about six· months, shall be- treated as having
retired from service with effect from April 1. 1984. He shall be
paid the arrears of his salary due until March 31, 1984,on the G
t
basis of the salacy lasCdrawn by him on June 15, 1982, without tak-
ing itito account the increments which he might have earned· subse-
quent to that date. The provident fund and gratuity shall also be
paid to the appellant as calculated in accordance with the' rules, as if
no order of dismissal w:ts passed against him. The appellant may
H

(I) [1958] SCR 595, 609 .
.,
308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [198413 s.c.R.

A . not and shall not rejoin his .duties. He will be treated as on leave
between.now and March 31, 1984.

The arrears of salary until·March 31, 1984 shall be paid to the
appellant on the basis· indicated above, on ot befo~e that date and,
in ariy event, not later than May I, 1984. The provident fund and
n gratuity shall be paid to him within a period of two months ·from
today.. . y

Mr. Garg made a statement before us on behalf of his client,
the appellant, that the appellant is neithi!'r in o~cuption of any
official residential accommodation, rior is.he. in possession of the
garage which. is referred to in Ch;rge No. 6 in the letter of May 22,.
1982, .

The appeal \viii stand disposed of in terms of the above order.
llespondent I, the Union of I.ndia, shall pay .to .the appellant a sum j
of Rs. l;OOOf (Rupees one thousand) as .his costs.

• S.R. Appeal allowed.

·~ .

.h
•
.,

.
. '