Holding

Disqualification under Section 29A(c) attaches at the time of resolution‑plan submission and can be cured only by payment of all overdue amounts before that submission; both AMIPL and Numetal are ineligible but may cure within two weeks and resubmit their plans.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined the eligibility of ArcelorMittal India Private Ltd (AMIPL) and Numetal Ltd to submit resolution plans for Essar Steel India Ltd (ESIL) under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) after the introduction of Section 29A. The Court held that disqualification under sub‑clause (c) of Section 29A attaches at the time a resolution plan is submitted, and can be removed only by full payment of overdue amounts with interest before that submission. Both AMIPL and Numetal were found to be ineligible because they, or persons acting in concert with them, were promoters or controllers of NPAs (Uttam Galva, KSS Petron, and the Ruia group). However, the Court granted a two‑week window for the applicants to cure the default and, if they do so, to resubmit their plans for consideration by the Committee of Creditors. The appeals were disposed of with these directions.

Issues considered

The point in time at which disqualification under Section 29A(c) becomes effective.
Whether AMIPL and Numetal are ineligible to submit resolution plans under Section 29A(c) and related sub‑clauses.
Whether the proviso to Section 29A(c) allows cure by means other than payment of overdue amounts.
Whether the corporate veil can be lifted to treat group entities as acting jointly or in concert.
Whether foreign sanctions on VTB Bank render it a ‘connected person’ disqualified under Section 29A(i).

Legislation cited

Banking Regulation Act, 1949
Companies Act, 2013s. 18, s. 2(27), s. 2(53), s. 2(54), s. 2(59), s. 2(69)
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016s. 12, s. 29A, s. 30, s. 30(4), s. 31, s. 3(37), s. 60(5), s. 61, s. 62, s. 64, s. 7
SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 2011s. 2(1)(q)
Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992s. 11, s. 30

Subjects

InsolvencyBankruptcySection 29AResolution planIneligibilityCorporate veilActing in concertNPACommittee of CreditorsPayment of overdue amountsCorporate debtor

Judgment

362 [2018] REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 12 S.C.R. 362 [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED
v.
SATISH KUMAR GUPTA & ORS.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 9402-9405 of 2018)
B OCTOBER 4, 2018
[R. F. NARIMAN AND INDU MALHOTRA, JJ.]
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016: s.29A – Issue relates
to ineligibility of resolution applicants to submit resolution plans
after the introduction of s.29A into the Code – Petition filed under
C
the Code for financial debts owed to the financial creditors-Banks
by the corporate debtor ESIL for Rs.45,000 crores – RP (Resolution
Professional) invited an expression of interest from potential
resolution applicants – Appellant (AMIPL) and one entity Numetal
submitted expression of interest – Submission of resolution plan by
D AMIPL and Numetal – RP found both AMIPL and Numetal ineligible
under s.29A – RP held that AM Netherlands mentioned as a
connected person of AMIPL was disclosed as a promoter of Uttam
Galva which was declared as a NPA – Similar was the situation of
Numetal – AMIPL and Numetal challenged the order of RP before
Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) – On 2.4.2018, pursuant to the RP’s
E
invitation, fresh resolution plans submitted by AMIPL, Numetal and
one other entity ‘Vedanta’ – On 19.4.2018, NCLT passed order in
all the IAs, wherein it first held that there was no patent illegality in
the decision of RP for declaring ineligibility of applicants – It then
went on to hold that RP ought to have produced both the resolution
F plans before the Committee of Creditors (CoC) and to follow the
provision of s.29A(c) r/w s.30(4) for affording opportunity to the
resolution applicants before declaring them ineligible and, therefore,
remanded back the matter to RP and CoC on this ground – Pending
appeals before NCLAT, on 8.5.2018, CoC disqualified AMIPL and
Numetal – On 7.9.2018, NCLAT held that at the time of first resolution
G
plan by Numetal, one of the shareholders being ‘AEL’ was related
party and therefore, Numetal was not eligible to submit resolution
plan in terms of s.29A and that on 29.3.2018, as the AEL was not
the shareholder of Numetal and all the three shareholders being
eligible, Numetal was eligible – Therefore, resolution plan submitted
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ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 363
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by Numetal to be considered by CoC to find out its viability – As A
regards AMIPL, order of NCLT was affirmed subject to condition
that AMIPL shall make payment of all overdue amount with interest
thereon and charges relating to NPA of both the “Uttam Galva”
and “KSS Petron” within three days – Instant appeals filed by AMIPL
and Numetal – Held: The ingredients of sub-clause (c) of s.29A are
B
that, the ineligibility to submit a resolution plan attaches if any
person, as is referred to in the opening lines of s.29A, either itself
has an account, or is a promoter of, or in the management or control
of, a corporate debtor which has an account, which account has
been classified as a non-performing asset, for a period of at least
one year from the date of such classification till the date of C
commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution process – If
it is shown, on facts, that, at a reasonably proximate point of time
before the submission of the resolution plan, the affairs of the
persons referred to in s.29A are so arranged, as to avoid paying
off the debts of the non-performing asset concerned, such persons
D
must be held to be ineligible to submit a resolution plan – In the
instant case, since both the resolution plans even on 2.4.2018,
were hit by s.29A(c), and since the proviso to s.29A(c) will not apply
as the corporate debtors related to AMIPL and Numetal have not
paid off their respective NPAs, ordinarily, these appeals would be
disposed of by merely declaring both resolution applicants to be E
ineligible under s.29A(c) – However, in order to do complete justice
under Art.142 of the Constitution of India, one more opportunity is
given to both resolution applicants to pay off the NPAs of their
related corporate debtors within a period of two weeks in
accordance with the proviso to s.29A(c) – If such payments are
F
made within the said period, both resolution applicants can resubmit
their resolution plans dated 2.4.2018 to CoC, who are then given a
period of 8 weeks to accept, by the requisite majority, the best
amongst the plans submitted, including the resolution plan submitted
by Vedanta – In the event that no plan is found worthy of acceptance
by the requisite majority of the CoC, the corporate debtor, i.e. ESIL, G
shall go into liquidation – Constitution of India – Art.142 – Company
law.
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016: s.29A(c) – It is
important for the competent authority to see that persons, who are
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364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A otherwise ineligible and hit by sub-clause (c), do not wriggle out of
the proviso to sub-clause (c) by other means, so as to avoid the
consequences of the proviso – For this purpose, despite the fact
that the relevant time for the ineligibility under sub-clause (c) to
attach is the time of submission of the resolution plan, antecedent
facts reasonably proximate to this point of time can always be seen,
B
to determine whether the persons referred to in s.29A are, in
substance, seeking to avoid the consequences of the proviso to sub-
clause (c) before submitting a resolution plan.
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016: s.29A – Point of time
at which the disqualification in sub-clause (c) of s.29A will attach –
C Held: The stage of ineligibility attaches when the resolution plan is
submitted by a resolution applicant – The date of commencement of
the corporate insolvency resolution process is only relevant for the
purpose of calculating whether one year has lapsed from the date
of classification of a person as a non-performing asset.
D Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016: s.3(37) – By s.3(37)
of the Code, words and expressions used but not defined in the
Code but defined inter alia by the SEBI Act, 1992, and the Companies
Act, 2013, shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in
those Acts – SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers)
E Regulations, 2011 – s.2(1)(q).
Doctrines/Principles: Doctrine of lifting veil – Held: The
doctrine is applicable even to group companies, so that one is able
to look at the economic entity of the group as a whole.
Words and phrases: Expression “acting jointly” – Meaning
F of in the context of s.29A of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.
Disposing of the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 Where a statute itself lifts the corporate veil,
or where protection of public interest is of paramount importance,
or where a company has been formed to evade obligations
G
imposed by the law, the court will disregard the corporate veil.
Further, this principle is applied even to group companies, so
that one is able to look at the economic entity of the group as a
whole. [Para 34] [427-F-G]

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Faqir Chand Gulati v. Uppal Agencies Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. A
(2008) 10 SCC 345 : [2008] 10 SCR 697; Laurel
Energetics Private Limited v. Securities and Exchange
Board of India, (2017) 8 SCC 541 : [2017] 5 SCR 1005
– held inapplicable.
1.2 The expression “acting jointly” in the opening sentence B
of Section 29A cannot be confused with “joint venture agreements”.
All that is to be seen by the expression “acting jointly” is whether
certain persons have got together and are acting “jointly” in the
sense of acting together. If this is made out on the facts, no
super added element of “joint venture” as is understood in law is
to be seen. The other important phrase is “in concert”. By C
Section 3(37) of the Code, words and expressions used but not
defined in the Code but defined inter alia by the SEBI Act, 1992,
and the Companies Act, 2013, shall have the meanings
respectively assigned to them in those Acts. In exercise of powers
conferred by Sections 11 and 30 of the SEBI Act, 1992, the 2011 D
Takeover Regulations have been promulgated by SEBI. By
Regulation 2(1)(q) of the 2011 Takeover Regulations, “persons
acting in concert” is defined. Under sub-clause (2) of clause (q),
a deeming fiction is enacted, by which a presumption is raised in
the categories mentioned, that a person falling within one category
is deemed to be acting in concert with another person mentioned E
in the same category, unless the contrary is established. The
corporate veil is not merely torn but is left in tatters by sub-
clauses (i) to (iv) of Regulation 2(1)(q)(2). Sub-clause (v) covers
“immediate relatives” i.e., father and son, brothers, etc.
Explanation to Regulation 2(1)(q)(2) defines “associate”, which F
subsumes not merely immediate relatives but other forms in which
a person can be associated with another - which includes the form
of trust, partnership firm and HUF. Wherever persons act jointly
or in concert with the “person” who submits a resolution plan, all
such persons are covered by Section 29A. [Paras 35, 38, 39] [427-
G-H; 428-A-C; 431-E; 433-D-F] G

Technip SA v. SMS Holding (Pvt.) Ltd. & Ors. (2005) 5 SCC 465 :
[2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 223; M/s. Daiichi Sankyo Company Ltd. v.
Jayaram Chigurupati & Ors. (2010) 7 SCC 449 : [2010] 8
SCR 251 – relied on.
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366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A 2.1 The opening words of Section 29A state: “a person
shall not be eligible to submit a resolution plan…”. It is therefore
clear that the stage of ineligibility attaches when the resolution
plan is submitted by a resolution applicant. The date of
commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution process
is only relevant for the purpose of calculating whether one year
B
has lapsed from the date of classification of a person as a non-
performing asset. Further, the expression used is “has”, is in
praesenti. This is to be contrasted with the expression “has been”,
which is used in sub-clauses (d) and (g), which refers to an anterior
point of time. [Para 43] [437-D-F]
C 2.2 The ingredients of sub-clause (c) are that, the
ineligibility to submit a resolution plan attaches if any person, as
is referred to in the opening lines of Section 29A, either itself
has an account, or is a promoter of, or in the management or
control of, a corporate debtor which has an account, which account
D has been classified as a non-performing asset, for a period of at
least one year from the date of such classification till the date of
commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution process.
For the purpose of applying sub-clause (c), any one of three things,
which are disjunctive, needs to be established. The expression
“management” would refer to the de jure management of a
E corporate debtor. The de jure management of a corporate debtor
would ordinarily vest in a Board of Directors, and would include,
in accord with the definitions of “manager”, “managing director”
and “officer” in Sections 2(53), 2(54) and 2(59) respectively of
the Companies Act, 2013, the persons mentioned therein. The
F expression “control” is defined in Section 2(27) of the Companies
Act, 2013. The expression “control” is defined in two parts. The
first part refers to de jure control, which includes the right to
appoint a majority of the directors of a company. The second
part refers to de facto control. So long as a person or persons
acting in concert, directly or indirectly, can positively influence,
G in any manner, management or policy decisions, they could be
said to be “in control”. A management decision is a decision to
be taken as to how the corporate body is to be run in its day to
day affairs. A policy decision would be a decision that would be
beyond running day to day affairs, i.e., long term decisions. So
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long as the management or policy decisions can be, or are in fact, A
taken by virtue of shareholding, management rights, shareholders
agreements, voting agreements or otherwise, control can be said
to exist. Thus, the expression “control”, in Section 29A(c),
denotes only positive control, which means that the mere power
to block special resolutions of a company cannot amount to control.
B
“Control” here, as contrasted with “management”, means de facto
control of actual management or policy decisions that can be or
are in fact taken. [Para 44-48] [438-A-E]
M/s Subhkam Ventures (I) Private Limited v. The
Securities and Exchange Board of India (Appeal No. 8
of 2009 decided on 15.1.2010) – relied on. C

2.3 Section 29A(c) speaks of a corporate debtor “under the
management or control of such person”. The expression “under”
would seem to suggest positive or proactive control, as opposed
to mere negative or reactive control. This becomes even clearer
when sub-clause (g) of Section 29A is read, wherein the D
expression used is “in the management or control of a corporate
debtor”. Under sub-clause (g), only a person who is in proactive
or positive control of a corporate debtor can take the proactive
decisions mentioned in sub-clause (g), such as, entering into
preferential, undervalued, extortionate credit, or fraudulent E
transactions. It is thus clear that in the expression “management
or control”, the two words take colour from each other, in which
case the principle of noscitur a sociis must also be held to apply.
Thus viewed, what is referred to in sub-clauses (c) and (g) is de
jure or de facto proactive or positive control, and not mere negative
control which may flow from an expansive reading of the definition F
of the word “control” contained in Section 2(27) of the Companies
Act, 2013, which is inclusive and not exhaustive in nature. [Para
50] [440-F-H; 441-A]
Chintalapati Srinivasa Raju v. Securities and Exchange
Board of India, (2018) 7 SCC 443; Securities and G
Exchange Board of India v. Kishore R. Ajmera (2016)
6 SCC 368 : [2016] 1 SCR 1118 – relied on.
2.4 Sub-clause (a) refers to a de jure position, namely, where
a person is expressly named in a prospectus or identified by the
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368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A company in an annual return as a promoter. Sub-clauses (b) and
(c) speak of a de facto position. Under sub-clause (b), so long as
a person has “control” over the affairs of a company, directly or
indirectly, in any manner, he could be said to be a promoter of
such company. Under sub-clause (c), such person need not be a
member of the Board of Directors of a company, but can be a
B
person who in fact advises, directs or instructs the Board to act.
Under the proviso, only a person who acts in a professional
capacity is excluded from the talons of sub-clause (c). Any person
who wishes to submit a resolution plan, if he or it does so acting
jointly, or in concert with other persons, which person or other
C persons happen to either manage or control or be promoters of a
corporate debtor, who is classified as a non-performing asset and
whose debts have not been paid off for a period of at least one
year before commencement of the corporate insolvency
resolution process, becomes ineligible to submit a resolution plan.
The first proviso to sub-clause (c) makes it clear that the
D
ineligibility can only be removed if the person submitting a
resolution plan makes payment of all overdue amounts with
interest thereon and charges relating to the non-performing asset
in question before submission of a resolution plan. Any person
who wishes to submit a resolution plan acting jointly or in concert
E with other persons, any of whom may either manage, control or
be a promoter of a corporate debtor classified as a non-performing
asset in the prescribed period must first pay off the debt of the
said corporate debtor classified as a non-performing asset in order
to become eligible under Section 29A(c). [Paras 53, 54] [442-A-G]
F 3.1 If a person has been a promoter, or in the management,
or control, of a corporate debtor in which a preferential
transaction, undervalued transaction, extortionate credit
transaction or fraudulent transaction has taken place, and in
respect of which an order has been made by the Adjudicating
Authority under the Code, such person is ineligible to present a
G resolution plan under Section 29A(g). This ineligibility cannot
be cured by paying off the debts of the corporate debtor.
Therefore, it is only such persons who do not fall foul of sub-
clause (g), who are eligible to submit resolution plans under sub-
clause (c) of Section 29A, if they happen to be persons who were
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in the erstwhile management or control of the corporate debtor. A
[Para 56] [444-B-D]
3.2 It is important for the competent authority to see that
persons, who are otherwise ineligible and hit by sub-clause (c),
do not wriggle out of the proviso to sub-clause (c) by other means,
so as to avoid the consequences of the proviso. For this purpose, B
despite the fact that the relevant time for the ineligibility under
sub-clause (c) to attach is the time of submission of the resolution
plan, antecedent facts reasonably proximate to this point of time
can always be seen, to determine whether the persons referred
to in Section 29A are, in substance, seeking to avoid the
consequences of the proviso to sub-clause (c) before submitting C
a resolution plan. If it is shown, on facts, that, at a reasonably
proximate point of time before the submission of the resolution
plan, the affairs of the persons referred to in Section 29A are so
arranged, as to avoid paying off the debts of the non-performing
asset concerned, such persons must be held to be ineligible to D
submit a resolution plan, or otherwise both the purpose of the
first proviso to sub-section (c) of Section 29A, as well as the larger
objective sought to be achieved by the said sub-clause in public
interest, will be defeated. [Para 57] [446-E-G]
Madras Petrochem Ltd. and Anr. v. Board for Industrial E
and Financial Reconstruction and Ors., (2016) 4 SCC
1: [2016] 11 SCR 419; Innoventive Industries Ltd. v.
ICICI Bank & Anr. (2018) 1 SCC 407 : [2017] 8
SCR 33; E.V. Mathai v. Subordinate Judge, Kottayam
& Ors., (1969) 2 SCC 194 : [1970] 1 SCR 345 – relied
on. F

4.1 How the corporate insolvency resolution process is to
work from the inception. Before admission of an application under
Section 7 by a financial creditor, the Adjudicating Authority is,
under Section 7(4), to first ascertain the existence of a default
within 14 days of receipt of the application, as specified in Section G
7(4). Upon satisfaction that such default has occurred, it may
then admit such application, subject to rectification of defects,
which the proviso in Section 7(5) says must be done within 7
days of receipt of such notice from the Adjudicating Authority by
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370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A the applicant. The time frame within which ascertainment of default
is to take place, as well as the time within which the defect is to
be rectified are directory in nature, the reason being that the
stage of these provisions is before admission of the application.
The corporate insolvency resolution process commences from
the date of admission of the application vide Section 7(6). Section
B
7(7) makes it incumbent upon the Adjudicating Authority to
communicate the order accepting or rejecting the application to
the financial creditor and the corporate debtor within a period of
7 days of such admission or rejection. [Para 69] [462-E-H]
Surendra Trading Co. v. Juggilal Kamlapat Jute Mills
C Company Ltd. & Ors. (2017) 16 SCC 143 – relied on.
4.2 The time limit for completion of the insolvency
resolution process is laid down in Section 12. A period of 180
days from the date of admission of the application is given by
Section 12(1). This is extendable by a maximum period of 90
D days only if the Committee of Creditors, by a vote of 66%, votes
to extend the said period, and only if the Adjudicating Authority
is satisfied that such process cannot be completed within 180
days. The authority may then, by order, extend the duration of
such process by a maximum period of 90 days. What is also of
E importance is the proviso to Section 12(3) which states that any
extension of the period under Section 12 cannot be granted more
than once. This has to be read with the third proviso to Section
30(4), which states that the maximum period of 30 days mentioned
in the second proviso is allowable as the only exception to the
extension of the aforesaid period not being granted more than
F once. Section 33 makes it clear that when either of these two
contingencies occurs, the corporate debtor is required to be
liquidated in the manner laid down in Chapter III. Section 12,
construed in the light of the object sought to be achieved by the
Code, and in the light of the consequence provided by Section
G 33, therefore, makes it clear that the periods previously
mentioned are mandatory and cannot be extended. In fact, even
the literal language of Section 12(1) makes it clear that the
provision must read as being mandatory. The expression “shall
be completed” is used. Further, sub-section (3) makes it clear
that the duration of 180 days may be extended further “but not
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exceeding 90 days”, making it clear that a maximum of 270 days A
is laid down statutorily. Also, the proviso to Section 12 makes it
clear that the extension “shall not be granted more than once”.
[Paras 70, 71, 72] [463-A-C, E-G; 464-A]
4.3 Regulation 40A of the CIRP Regulations presents a
model timeline of the corporate insolvency resolution process, B
on the basis that the time available is 180 days. It is of utmost
importance for all authorities concerned to follow this model
timeline as closely as possible. [Para 74] [466-F-G; 470-F]
4.4 It is settled law that a statute is designed to be workable,
and the interpretation thereof should be designed to make it so C
workable. [Para 75] [470-G-H]
Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi v. S. Teja Singh
[1959] Supp. 1 SCR 394 – relied on.
4.5 Given the timeline, and given the fact that a resolution
applicant has no vested right that his resolution plan be D
considered, it is clear that no challenge can be preferred to the
Adjudicating Authority at this stage. A writ petition under Article
226 filed before a High Court would also be turned down on the
ground that no right, much less a fundamental right, is affected at
this stage. This is also made clear by the first proviso to Section E
30(4), whereby a Resolution Professional may only invite fresh
resolution plans if no other resolution plan has passed muster.
However, a Resolution Professional is only to “examine” and
“confirm” that each resolution plan conforms to what is provided
by Section 30(2). The Resolution Professional is required to
examine that the resolution plan submitted by various applicants F
is complete in all respects, before submitting it to the Committee
of Creditors. The Resolution Professional is not required to take
any decision, but merely to ensure that the resolution plans
submitted are complete in all respects before they are placed
before the Committee of Creditors, who may or may not approve G
it. The fact that the Resolution Professional is also to confirm
that a resolution plan does not contravene any of the provisions
of law for the time-being in force, including Section 29A of the
Code, only means that his prima facie opinion is to be given to
the Committee of Creditors that a law has or has not been
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A contravened. Section 30(2)(e) does not empower the Resolution
Professional to “decide” whether the resolution plan does or does
not contravene the provisions of law. Thus, the importance of
the Resolution Professional is to ensure that a resolution plan is
complete in all respects, and to conduct a due diligence in order
to report to the Committee of Creditors whether or not it is in
B
order. Even though it is not necessary for the Resolution
Professional to give reasons while submitting a resolution plan
to the Committee of Creditors, it would be in the fitness of things
if he appends the due diligence report carried out by him with
respect to each of the resolution plans under consideration, and
C to state briefly as to why it does or does not conform to the law.
[Paras 76-78] [471-F-H; 472-A-E; 473-D-E]
5.1 A Resolution Professional has presented a resolution
plan to the Committee of Creditors for its approval, but the
Committee of Creditors does not approve such plan after
D considering its feasibility and viability, as the requisite vote of
not less than 66% of the voting share of the financial creditors is
not obtained. The first proviso to Section 30(4) furnishes the
answer, which is that all that can happen at this stage is to require
the Resolution Professional to invite a fresh resolution plan within
the time limits specified where no other resolution plan is available
E with him. It is clear that at this stage again no application before
the Adjudicating Authority could be entertained as there is no
vested right or fundamental right in the resolution applicant to
have its resolution plan approved, and as no adjudication has yet
taken place. It is the Committee of Creditors which will approve
F or disapprove a resolution plan, given the statutory parameters
of Section 30. [Paras 79, 80] [473-E-H; 474-A]
5.2 Regulation 39 of CIRP Regulations shows that the
disapproval of the Committee of Creditors on the ground that
the resolution plan violates the provisions of any law, including
G the ground that a resolution plan is ineligible under Section 29A,
is not final. The Adjudicating Authority, acting quasi-judicially,
can determine whether the resolution plan is violative of the
provisions of any law, including Section 29A of the Code, after
hearing arguments from the resolution applicant as well as the
Committee of Creditors, after which an appeal can be preferred
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from the decision of the Adjudicating Authority to the Appellate A
Authority under Section 61. If, on the other hand, a resolution
plan has been approved by the Committee of Creditors, and has
passed muster before the Adjudicating Authority, this
determination can be challenged before the Appellate Authority
under Section 61, and may further be challenged before the
B
Supreme Court under Section 62, if there is a question of law
arising out of such order, within the time specified in Section 62.
Section 64 also makes it clear that the timelines that are to be
adhered to by the NCLT and NCLAT are of great importance,
and that reasons must be recorded by either the NCLT or NCLAT
if the matter is not disposed of within the time limit specified. C
Section 60(5), when it speaks of the NCLT having jurisdiction to
entertain or dispose of any application or proceeding by or against
the corporate debtor or corporate person, does not invest the
NCLT with the jurisdiction to interfere at an applicant’s behest
at a stage before the quasi-judicial determination made by the
D
Adjudicating Authority. [Paras 80, 81] [474-C-G]
Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul & Ors. v. Keshwar Lal
Chaudhuri & Ors. AIR 1941 FC 5; Jang Singh v. Brijlal
& Ors. [1964] 2 SCR 146; A.S. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak
& Ors. [1988] Supp. 1 SCR – relied on.
E
6.1 Facts of this case: Numetal was incorporated in
Mauritius on 13.10.2017, expressly for the purpose of submission
of a resolution plan qua the corporate debtor, i.e., ESIL. Two
other companies, viz., AHL and AEL, were also incorporated on
the same day in Mauritius. The son of the promoter of ESIL held
the entire share capital of AHL, which in turn held the entire F
shareholding of AEL, which in turn held the entire share capital
of Numetal. At this stage there can be no doubt whatsoever that
the son of the promoter, would be deemed to be a person acting
in concert with the corporate debtor, being covered by Regulation
2(1)(q)(v) of the 2011 Takeover Regulations. On 18.10.2017, AEL G
transferred its shareholding of 26.1% in Numetal to a group
company, viz., ECL. This group company was ultimately owned
by ‘Virgo Trust’ and ‘Triton Trust’, the beneficiaries of which are
companies owned by the promoter of ESIL, his brother and their
immediate family members. The very next day, the son of
H
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A promoter of ESIL settled an irrevocable and discretionary trust,
viz., the ‘Crescent Trust’, and settled the entire share capital of
AHL into the Trust, at a par value of USD 10,000. The
beneficiaries of this Trust were general charities, as well as
entitles owned by the brother of promoter of the corporate debtor,
and entities owned by son of promoter. [Paras 84-86] [476-C-F;
B
477-C-D]
6.2 On 20.11.2017, the son of the promoter of ESIL settled
‘Prisma Trust’, another irrevocable and discretionary trust, whose
beneficiaries are “general charities” and one ‘Solis Enterprises
Limited’, a company incorporated in Bermuda, whose share
C capital is held by the son of promoter of ESIL. Numetal by a
response dated 30.3.2018, admitted that while the trust deed
relating to Prisma Trust allowed the trustee to benefit any English
or Bermuda charity, “no particular charity is named at this stage”.
The Trustee of AEL is one ‘Rhone Trustee’, Singapore. The son
D of promoter of ESIL was the ultimate natural person who held
the beneficial interest in AEL through Prisma Trust, through Solis
Enterprises Limited. This emerged from Section 6.7 of the
resolution plan submitted by Numetal to the Resolution
Professional. The Resolution Professional, after looking at this
affidavit of Prisma Trust, correctly noted that statements of such
E a nature would not have been made by a truly independent trustee
of a discretionary trust, which demonstrated that the trustee was
under the complete control of the son of promoter of ESIL. This
in turn indicated that Prisma Trust was one more smokescreen
in the chain of control, which would conceal the fact that the actual
F control over AEL is by none other than the son of the promoter.
[Paras 87, 88] [477-D-F; 478--B-C]
6.3 One day later on 22.11.2017, the trustees of the Prisma
Trust acquired 100% of the shareholding of AHL for a par value
of approximately USD 10,000 from the trustees of the Crescent
G Trust. On this very date, merely one day before the Ordinance
bringing into force Section 29A was promulgated, ECL transferred
its shareholding of 26.1% of the share capital of Numetal to
Crinium Bay, an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of VTB Bank,
whose shares in turn are held by the Russian Government. AEL
also transferred shares representing 13.9% of the share capital
H
ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 375
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS.

of Numetal to Crinium Bay, thus making Crinium Bay’s total A
holding in Numetal 40%. On the same date, AEL also transferred
shares representing 25.1% of the share capital of Numetal to
Indo, and also transferred shares representing 9.9% of the share
capital of Numetal to TPE. These transfers were likely to have
taken place between 10.2.2018 and 12.2.2018. At the time of
B
submission of its first Resolution Plan dated 12.2.2018, the
shareholding of Numetal was as follows: Crinium Bay: 40% Indo
: 25.1% TPE: 9.9% AEL: 25%. As of this date, the son of
promoter, who is the ultimate beneficiary in the chain of control
of the trusts which in turn controlled AEL, was very much on the
scene, holding through AEL 25% of the shareholding of Numetal. C
[Paras 89-90] [478-D-H]
7.1 One other extremely important fact is that the earnest
money in the form of Rs. 500 crores, credited to the account of
the corporate debtor, was provided to Numetal by AEL as a
shareholder of the resolution applicant, viz. Numetal. This earnest D
money deposit of Rs.500 crores made by AEL continued to remain
with the Resolution Professional till date, despite the fact that,
by the time the second resolution plan was submitted by Numetal
on 2.4.2018, AEL had exited as a shareholder of Numetal. Under
clause 4.4.4 of the request for proposal for submission of
resolution plans for ESIL, the earnest money deposit stands to E
be forfeited if any condition thereof is breached or the
qualifications of the potential resolution applicant are found to be
untrue. [Para 91] [479-A-C]
7.2 Clause 6.7 of Numetal’s resolution plan stipulated that
it satisfied the minimum tangible net worth requirement, as set F
out under the request for proposal, because Crinium Bay held
40% of the shareholding of Numetal, and that VTB Bank, Crinium
Bay’s holding company had sufficient net worth, as on 31.12.2016,
to comply with the requirement under the request for proposal.
The excerpted portions of Numetal’s resolution plan make it clear
G
that, since Numetal itself was a newly incorporated entity, with
no financial or experience credentials of its own, it therefore
relied entirely on the credentials of each of its constituent
shareholders. This shows that Numetal itself revealed in its
resolution plan that its corporate veil should be lifted, for without
lifting this veil, none of the parameters of the request for proposal H
376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A could have been met by Numetal itself. It is thus clear that the
four shareholders of Numetal were persons “acting jointly” within
the meaning of Section 29A. This being the case, it is clear that
the argument that VTB Bank is a “connected person”, being
ineligible under sub-clause (j), would have to be rejected, as VTB
Bank is itself, through its wholly owned subsidiary of Crinium
B
Bay, a person acting jointly with the three other shareholders of
Numetal, and would, therefore, fall within the first part of Section
29A itself. This being so, it cannot be said that VTB Bank is a
person “connected to” any one of the persons acting jointly, as it
is itself a person acting jointly, and therefore covered by the first
C part of Section 29A. [Paras 92, 93] [481-C-D; 482-B-D]
7.3 On 29.3.2018, AEL transferred its 25% shareholding
in Numetal to the other three constituent shareholders, thereby
leaving its shareholding in Numetal as ‘Nil’. In response to the
Resolution Professional’s invitation, the second Resolution Plan,
D therefore, submitted by Numetal on 2.4.2018, did not have AEL
as a constituent of Numetal; instead, Crinium Bay continued with
40% of the shareholding of Numetal, with TPE’s holding now
augmented to 29.5% and Indo’s to 34.1%. Given the fact that
the son of promoter is a person deemed to be acting in concert
with his father (who was a promoter of the corporate debtor ESIL),
E there is no doubt whatsoever that Section 29A(c) would be
attracted as on the date of submission of the first resolution plan,
viz. 12.2.2018, as AEL was held by Prisma Trust, whose ultimate
beneficiary is son of promoter himself. This would show that the
NPA declared over a year before the date of commencement of
F the corporate resolution process of ESIL (i.e. in 2015) would
render Numetal ineligible to submit a resolution plan. The only
manner in which Numetal could successfully present a resolution
plan would be to first pay off the debts of ESIL, as well as those of
such other corporate debtors of the Ruia group of companies,
which were declared as NPAs prior to the aforesaid period of one
G year, before submitting its resolution plan. However, if the date
of the second resolution plan is to be seen, son of promoter of
the corporate debtor ESIL appears to have disappeared from the
scene altogether, as the three entities left are stated to be
independent entities in the form of two Russian entities and one
H
ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 377
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS.

UAE entity. Viewed on 2.4.2018, therefore, it could not be said A
that son of promoter of the corporate debtor ESIL had disappeared
from the scene altogether, so as to obviate the application of
Section 29A(c). This is for two reasons. First, Rs.500 crores
that was deposited towards submission of earnest money
continued to remain deposited by AEL even post 2.4.2018,
B
showing thereby that son of promoter of the corporate debtor
ESIL continued to be present, insofar as Numetal’s second
resolution plan was concerned. Further, having regard to the
reasonably proximate state of affairs before submission of the
resolution plan on 2.4.2018, beginning with Numetal’s initial
corporate structure, and continuing with the changes made till C
date, it is evident that, the object of all the transactions that have
taken place after Section 29A came into force on 23.11.2017 was
undoubtedly to avoid the application of Section 29A(c), including
its proviso. Therefore, whether the first or second resolution
plan is taken into account, both would clearly be hit by Section
D
29A(c), as the looming presence of son of promoter of the
corporate debtor ESIL was found all along, from the date of
incorporation of Numetal, till the date of submission of the second
resolution plan. [Paras 94, 95] [482-E-H; 483-A-E]
8.1 The ultimate shareholder of the resolution applicant,
viz. AMIPL, is directly the ultimate shareholder of AMNLBV as E
well, which is an L.N. Mittal Group Company. When the corporate
veil of the various companies is pierced, both AMIPL and
AMNLBV are found to be managed and controlled by Shri L.N.
Mittal, and are therefore persons deemed to be acting in concert
as per Regulation 2(1)(q)(2)(i) of the 2011 Takeover Regulations. F
That AMNLBV is a promoter of Uttam Galva is clear from the
aforementioned facts, being expressly stated as such in Uttam
Galva’s annual returns. The reasonably proximate facts prior to
the submission of both resolution plans by AMIPL would show
that there is no doubt whatsoever that AMNLBV’s shares in
Uttam Galva were sold only in order to get out of the ineligibility G
mentioned by Section 29A(c), and consequently the proviso
thereto. The fact that the lenders with whom AMNLBV had a
Non Disposal Undertaking have not yet moved any forum for a
declaration that the sale of the shares, being without their consent,
H
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A is non est, does not absolve AMNLBV from having failed to first
obtain their consent before selling off its shares in Uttam Galva.
Such sale is directly contrary to the Non Disposal Undertaking
given to the lenders. Quite apart from this, it is also clear that
shares worth Rs.19.50 each were sold at a distress value of Re.1
each, so as to overcome the provisions of Section 29A(c) and the
B
proviso thereto. It is clear therefore that the Uttam Galva
transaction clearly renders AMIPL ineligible under Section 29A(c)
of the Code. [Para 109] [491-G-H; 492-A-D]
8.2 Insofar as the transaction with regard to KSS Petron is
concerned, the facts are that on 3.3.2011, Fraseli, an entity
C registered and incorporated in Luxemburg, which is managed
and controlled by Shri L.N. Mittal, held 32.22% of the
shareholding of KSS Global, a company domiciled in the
Netherlands. On 19.5.2011, by a Shareholders Agreement
entered into between KSS Holding, KSS Infra EALQ, Fraseli
D and KSS Global, the first three companies were each given a
right to appoint an equal number of directors on the board of
directors of KSS Global, which in turn held 100% of the share
capital of KSS Petron, a company incorporated in India. Fraseli
was also granted affirmative voting rights on decisions regarding
certain specified matters, both at the board and the shareholder
E level, in respect of KSS Global and all companies controlled by
it, which would include KSS Petron. As has been stated
hereinabove, KSS Petron was declared as an NPA on 30.9.2015.
As in the case of Uttam Galva, Fraseli divested its shareholding
in KSS Petron on 9.2.2018, i.e., only three days before AMIPL
F submitted its first resolution plan. On the same day, the directors
nominated by Shri L.N. Mittal, through Fraseli, resigned from
the board of KSS Global. [Para 110] [492-E-H]
8.3 There can be no doubt whatsoever that Fraseli, being a
company managed and controlled by Shri L.N. Mittal, holding
G one third of the shares in KSS Global, which in turn held 100% of
the share capital in KSS Petron, was in joint control of KSS Petron,
if the corporate veil of all these companies is disregarded.
Further, the Shareholders Agreement of 19.5.2011 makes it clear
that the joint control of KSS Global would be between three
entities, viz., KSS Holding, KSS Infra EALQ and Fraseli, each of
H
ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 379
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS.

whom had the right to appoint an equal number of directors on A
the board of directors of KSS Global. Not only this, but Fraseli
was also granted affirmative voting rights as aforementioned, on
certain important specified matters. There would be no doubt
whatsoever that, just before presentation of the resolution plan
of 12.2.2018, AMIPL would be hit by Section 29A(c), as a group
B
company of Shri L.N. Mittal exercised positive control, by its
shareholding, right to appoint directors and affirmative voting
rights, over KSS Global, which in turn held 100% shareholding
in KSS Petron. Again, as in the case of Uttam Galva, there can
be no doubt whatsoever that the sale of Fraseli’s shareholding in
KSS Global, together with the resignation of the Mittal directors C
from the board of directors of KSS Global, is a transaction
reasonably proximate to the date of submission of the resolution
plan by AMIPL, undertaken with the sole object of avoiding the
consequence mentioned in the proviso to Section 29A(c). Having
regard to the law laid down in this judgment, it is, therefore, clear
D
that AMIPL is ineligible under Section 29A(c) of the Code, on
this account as well. [Para 111] [493-A-E]
8.4 Since it is clear that both sets of resolution plans that
were submitted to the Resolution Professional, even on 2.4.2018,
are hit by Section 29A(c), and since the proviso to Section 29A(c)
will not apply as the corporate debtors related to AMIPL and E
Numetal have not paid off their respective NPAs, ordinarily, these
appeals would have been disposed of by merely declaring both
resolution applicants to be ineligible under Section 29A(c). In
order to do complete justice under Article 142 of the Constitution
of India, one more opportunity is given to both resolution F
applicants to pay off the NPAs of their related corporate debtors
within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of this
judgment, in accordance with the proviso to Section 29A(c). If
such payments are made within the said period, both resolution
applicants can resubmit their resolution plans dated 2.4.2018 to
the Committee of Creditors, who are then given a period of 8 G
weeks from this date, to accept, by the requisite majority, the
best amongst the plans submitted, including the resolution plan
submitted by Vedanta. In the event that no plan is found worthy
of acceptance by the requisite majority of the Committee of
H
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A Creditors, the corporate debtor, i.e. ESIL, shall go into liquidation.
[Para 113] [493-H; 494-A-E]
Ms. Eera Through Dr. Manjula Krippendorf v. State
(Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr. (2017) 15 SCC 133 :
[2017] 7 SCR 924; Salomon v. A Salomon and Co. Ltd.
B [1897] AC 22; Life Insurance Corporation of India v.
Escorts Ltd. & Ors., (1986) 1 SCC 264 : [1985] 3 Suppl.
SCR 909; Union of India v. ABN Amro Bank and others
(2013) 16 SCC 490; Balwant Rai Saluja & Anr. etc.
etc. v. Air India Ltd. & Ors., (2014) 9 SCC 407; Delhi
Development Authority v. Skipper Construction
C Company (P) Ltd. & Another, (1996) 4 SCC 622 : [1996]
2 Suppl. SCR 295 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2017] 7 SCR 924 referred to Para 26
D [1985] 3 Suppl. SCR 909 referred to Para 30
(2013) 16 SCC 490 referred to Para 31
(2014) 9 SCC 407 referred to Para 32
[1996] 2 Suppl. SCR 295 referred to Para 33
E [2008] 10 SCR 697 held inapplicable Para 35
[2017] 5 SCR 1005 held inapplicable Para 35
[2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 223 relied on Para 40
[2010] 8 SCR 251 relied on Para 41
F
(2018) 7 SCC 443 relied on Para 51
[2016] 1 SCR 1118 relied on Para 51
[1970] 1 SCR 345 relied on Para 58
[2016] 11 SCR 419 relied on Para 62
G
[2017] 8 SCR 33 relied on Para 64
(2017) 16 SCC 143 relied on Para 69
[1959] Supp. 1 SCR 394 relied on Para 75
AIR 1941 FC 5 relied on Para 82
H
ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 381
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS.

[1964] 2 SCR 146 relied on Para 83 A
[1988] Supp. 1 SCR relied on Para 83
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 9402-
9405 of 2018
From the Judgment and Order dated 07.09.2018 passed by the B
National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in Company
Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 169, 171, 172 and 173 of 2018
WITH
Civil Appeal Nos. 9582, 10204, 10208 of 2018.
C
Harish N. Salve, Dr. A. M. Singhvi, Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Mukul
Rohatgi, Mihir Thakore, K. V. Vishwanathan, Ramji Srinivasan, Gopal
Subramanium, Sr. Advs., Raghav Shankar, R. N. Karanjawala, Ms. Ruby
Singh Ahuja, Vishal Gehrana, Anupam Prakash, Sanjeet Ranjan, Utkarsh
Maria, Sudhir Sharma, Abhishek Swaroop, Akhil Anand, Sameen Kumar
Vyas, Amit Bhandari, Ms. Misha Chandna, Avishkar Singhvi, Naman D
Singh Bagga, Ms. Manik Karanjawala, Rajat Sethi, Sahil Monga, Deepak
Joshi, Sanyat Lodha, Devanshu Sajlan, Akash Lamba for M/s.
Karanjawala & Co., Mahesh Agarwal, Keyur Gandhi, Raheel Patel,
Arjun Joshi, Ms. Aastha Mehta, Rudreshwar Singh, Gautam Singh, Ms.
Shaili A. Shah, Hemanta Kothari, Kumar Saurabh Singh, Aashutosh
E
Sampath, Ashwij Ramiah, Kaushik Poddar, Ms. Kristy Baptist, Ms. Zainab,
Ms. Devanshi Singh, Raunak Dhillon, Karan Khanna, Naveen Hegde,
Bunmeet Singh Grover, Ms. Ananya Dhar Choudhury, Ms. Vrinda
Bhandari, R. Venkataraman for M/s. Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas, Ms.
Misha, Sapan Gupta, Hitesh Kumar Saini, Pavan Bhushan, Vaijayant
Paliwal, Ms. Jasveen Kaur, S. S. Shroff, Advs. with them for the F
appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
R. F. NARIMAN, J. 1. The facts of the present case revolve
around the ineligibility of resolution applicants to submit resolution plans
after the introduction of Section 29A into the Insolvency and Bankruptcy G
Code, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”), with effect from
23.11.2017.
2. On 2.8.2017, the Adjudicating Authority, being the NCLT,
Ahmedabad Bench, passed an order under Section 7 of the Code at the
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382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A behest of financial creditors, being the State Bank of India and the
Standard Chartered Bank, admitting a petition filed under the Code for
financial debts owed to them by the corporate debtor Essar Steel India
Limited (hereinafter referred to as “ESIL”), in the sum of roughly
Rs.45,000,00,00,000 (Rupees Forty Five Thousand Crores). Shri Satish
Kumar Gupta was appointed as the Interim Resolution Professional and
B
confirmed as such on 4.9.2017. Consequently, the Resolution Professional
published an advertisement dated 6.10.2017, seeking expression of
interest from potential resolution applicants who wished to submit
resolution plans for the revival of ESIL. In terms of the advertisement,
the last date for submission of an expression of interest was 23.10.2017.
C Pursuant to this advertisement, one ‘ArcelorMittal India Private Limited’
(hereinafter referred to as “AMIPL”) submitted an expression of interest
on 11.10.2017. An entity called Numetal Limited (hereinafter referred
to as “Numetal”), also submitted an expression of interest on 20.10.2017.
On 24.12.2017, the Resolution Professional published a ‘request for
proposal’, in which it was stated that the last date for submission of
D
resolution plans would be 29.1.2018. On a request made by the
Committee of Creditors, the NCLT extended the duration of the corporate
insolvency resolution process by 90 days beyond the initial period of 180
days, i.e., upto 29.4.2018. The Resolution Professional therefore issued
the first addendum to the request for proposal, extending the date for
E submission of resolution plans to 12.2.2018. Given this, both AMIPL and
Numetal submitted their resolution plans on this date. On 20.3.2018,
apprehending that the Resolution Professional would recommend that it
be declared ineligible, Numetal filed I.A. No. 98 of 2018 before the
NCLT inter alia seeking that it be declared eligible as a resolution
applicant. On 23.3.2018, however, the Resolution Professional found
F
both AMIPL and Numetal to be ineligible under Section 29A. Insofar as
AMIPL is concerned, the Resolution Professional found thus:
“2. Please note that during the course of the evaluation of the
Resolution Plan, I became aware of the fact that ArcelorMittal
Netherlands B.V. (AM Netherlands) (which is mentioned as a
G ‘connected person’ of AM India in the Resolution Plan) has been
disclosed as the ‘promoter’ of Uttam Galva Steels Limited (Uttam
Galva) pursuant to which my Advisor had requested certain
clarifications from AM India on 26 February 2018 (Request for
Clarification 1) and on 14 March 2018 (Request for Clarification 2).
H
ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 383
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

Further to the responses received from AM India on 28 February A
2018 and 17 March 2018 (collectively the AM India Responses)
on the aforementioned requests for clarifications, I understand
that:
2.1. AM Netherlands had acquired 29.05% of the shareholding in
Uttam Galva in 2009 and has since been classified as a promoter B
of Uttam Galva;
2.2. AM Netherlands had entered into a ‘co-promoter’ agreement
dated 4 September 2009 with the other promoters of Uttam Galva
(Co-Promoter Agreement) under which AM Netherlands had
various rights (including certain rights which can be considered C
as participative in nature and not merely protective);
2.3. Uttam Galva’s account was classified as a ‘non-performing
asset’ (NPA) on 31 March 2016 by Canara Bank and Punjab
National Bank (which classification has continued for more 1 year
till 02 August 2017); D
2.4. AM Netherlands has sold its shareholding in Uttam Galva to
the other promoters of Uttam Galva on 7 February 2018; and
2.5. AM Netherlands has applied to the National Stock Exchange
Limited and the BSE Limited, each on 8 February 2018 for
declassification as a ‘promoter’ of Uttam Galva under Regulation E
31A(2) of the Securities and Exchange Board of India
3. Further, as on the Plan Submission Date, AM Netherlands (had
not obtained the Stock Exchange Approvals relating to
declassification as a promoter of Uttam Galva and) continued to
be classified as a promoter of Uttam Galva. F
4. In light of the above, AM India is ineligible under the provisions
of Section 29A(c) of the IBC and pursuant to paragraph 4.11.2(a)
of the RPP, the Resolution Plan is hereby rejected and will not be
placed before the Committee of Creditors.”
3. Similarly, holding Numetal to be ineligible, the Resolution G
Professional, on the same date, found:
“2.1. as on the date of submission of its expression of interest
(EOI) on 20 October 2017 by Numetal, it relied on Essar
Communications Limited (ECL), one of its shareholders to comply
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384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A with the eligibility requirement relating to its ‘tangible net worth’
(TNW) (as stipulated in the section titled ‘Eligibility Criteria’ in
the EOI);
2.2. as on the Plan Submission Date, Numetal relied on Crinium
Bay, its shareholder to comply with the eligibility requirement
B relating to its TNW (as stipulated in Section 6.7 of the Resolution
Plan);
2.3. Numetal was incorporated 7 days before submission of the
EOI; and
2.4. Numetal is a newly incorporated joint venture between Aurora
C Enterprises Limited, Crinium Bay, Indo International Limited and
Tyazhpromexport.
3. Since Numetal has at all stages relied on its shareholders to
comply with the eligibility requirements relating to submission of a
resolution plan in respect of ESIL, for the purposes of ensuring
D compliance with Section 29A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Code, 2016 (IBC), I have considered each of the shareholders of
Numetal as joint venture partners to be acting jointly for the
purposes of submission of the Resolution Plan. Whilst considering
the eligibility of the shareholders of Numetal, since Aurora
E Enterprises Limited (AEL) is held completely by Rewant Ruia
(through various companies and a trust), I have considered Rewant
Ruia, Crinium Bay, Indo International Limited and Tyazhpromexport
for scrutiny under Section 29A of the IBC.
4. Further, pursuant to Regulation 2(q) of the Securities and
F Exchange Board of India (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and
Takeovers) Regulations, 2011 (SAST Regulations), a person is
deemed to acting in concert with amongst others, his (or her)
‘immediate relatives’, which term (as defined under Regulation
2(1) of the SAST Regulations) includes the father of such person.
Therefore, in relation to the Resolution Plan in respect of ESIL
G (which contemplates the acquisition of ESIL by Numetal by way
of a merger of ESIL with a wholly owned subsidiary of Numetal),
Rewant Ruia is deemed to be acting in concert with his father
Ravi Ruia.
5. Further, as on the Plan Submission Date:
H
ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 385
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

(a)* Ravi Ruia (who Rewant Ruia is deemed to be acting in A
concert with) was the promoter of ESIL whose account was
classified as an NPA for more than 1 year, prior to the
commencement of corporate-insolvency resolution process
(CIRP) of ESIL on 2 August 2017; and
(b) Ravi Ruia (who Rewant Ruia is deemed to be acting in B
concert with) has executed a guarantee in favour of SBI (for
itself and a consortium of lenders) and the CIRP application
filed by SBI has been admitted by the National Company Law
Tribunal on 2 August 2017.
6. In light of the above, Rewant Ruia (who is acting jointly with C
the other shareholders of Numetal for the purposes of submission
of the Resolution Plan) is ineligible under Section 29A of the IBC,
specifically paragraphs (c) and (h) and accordingly, as on the Plan
Submission Date, Numetal (which is nothing but an incorporated
joint venture investment vehicle through which its shareholders
are submitting the Resolution Plan) was not eligible under Section D
29A of the IBC.
7. Accordingly and for the reasons set out in paragraphs 5 and 6
above, please note that pursuant to paragraph 4.11.2(a) of the
RFP, the Resolution Plan is hereby rejected and will not be placed
before the Committee of Creditors.” E

4. On 26.3.2018, AMIPL filed I.A. No. 110 of 2018 before the
Adjudicating Authority, challenging “the order” of the Resolution
Professional dated 23.03.2018. Numetal did likewise vide I.A. No. 111
of 2018.
F
5. On 2.4.2018, pursuant to the Resolution Professional’s invitation,
fresh resolution plans were submitted (as both the resolution plans before
this were found to be ineligible) by AMIPL, Numetal, and one other
entity, namely ‘Vedanta Resources Ltd.’. On this very date, the NCLT
directed that the bids of the resolution applicants, submitted pursuant to
the revised request for proposal, should not be opened pending adjudication G
of I.A. No. 98 of 2018 filed by Numetal.
6. On 19.4.2018, the Adjudicating Authority, being the NCLT,
passed its order in all the I.A.s, in which it first held:

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386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A “21. As per the matter available on the record, a third party
contestant, Arcelor Mittal India Pvt. Ltd., by filing Additional
Application No. P-7 of 2018 has also sought for impleading itself
in Intervention Application No. IA 98/2018 the Numetal has filed
a Reply opposing such relief as being sought for by the present
Applicant, Numetal Ltd., and in the present IA and also sought a
B
declaration in its favour to be declared as eligible for filing a valid
resolution plan as on 12.2.2018 thus, it has opposed the application
alleging disability/ineligibility on the part of M/s. Numetal Ltd., to
file a valid and proper resolution plan as on date of 12.2.2018.
Since we have not decided the Impleadment Application in favour
C of ArcelorMittal by formally impleading it as party in the present
I.A. No. 98 of 2018 and only audience were given to its learned
counsel in support of its resolution plan, therefore, we find it
appropriate to confine the issue of determination of eligibility mainly
on the reason which formed a basis for the RP and CoC for not
founding eligible for submission of resolution plan by the resolution
D
applicant, M/s. Numetal Ltd., and not on additional ground as put
forth by the ArcelorMittal. However, the oral submissions
advanced by learned counsel for parties including the ArcelorMittal
duly supported by their Written Submissions are being taken into
consideration for deciding the issue involved in the present
E application.
For arriving at such findings/conclusion of the RP has obtained
legal opinion and its such findings is based on such opinion which
were explained to the CoC for reaching to appropriate conclusion/
decision. Equally, the applicant in I.A. No. 98/2018 also obtain
F legal opinion from renowned jurists, e.g. (former judge of the
hon’ble Supreme Court) and from former learned Law Officer of
the GOI which are placed on record along with the present IA
also in support of their case in this opinion it is expressed the
Numetal Ltd. (Resolution Applicant) is a single and independent
corporate entity and it cannot be termed as a consortium of its
G shareholders not it intend to implement the resolution plan jointly
with another person hence, in view of this the amended clause
4.11.2(1) to the RFP would neither be applicable nor binding upon
the resolution applicant and thus, it is not required at all to seek an
approval from the RP or the CoC. In respect of proposed change
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ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 387
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

its shareholding of ESIL in terms of RET and also are required A
under the other provisions of the Law. It has been also emphasised
that the Numetal Ltd., is not a SPV brought into existence merely
for the purpose of submitting the resolution plan in respect of the
corporate debtor ESIL as it has recently entered into an agreement
to acquire majority stock in Odisha Slurry Pipeline Infrastructure
B
Ltd., by an independent contract from the Resolution Plan. Thus,
it cannot be presumed that the applicant is such a corporate entity
which is brought into the existence only for the purpose of putting
forth resolution plan for the ESIL.
Since, there is difference in the legal opinions among the Learned
Luminaries and law firms and more than one views are possible C
in the present case to be acted upon then, it cannot be said that
there is patently illegality in the conclusion of the RP or it acted
arbitrarily or mala fidely in rejecting the resolution plan by relying
on the legal opinion received and believed to be true by him and
which were placed before the CoC. Moreover, the RP under the D
provision of the Code it is expected to make scrutiny of a resolution
plan in conformity with the law of the land and to take such a
prudent decision which a common man in normal course may
arrive and think just and proper. This court being the Adjudicating
Authority under the Code is not expected to substitute its view
upon the discretion and wisdom of the RP and CoC to opt for only E
which a particular view until and unless it is the case of patent
illegality or arbitrariness.
Therefore, for the aforesaid reason in our prima facie view we do
not find any patent illegality in the decision of the RP for declaring
ineligible to applicants which is a prudent decision where there is F
possibility of more than one legal view then this court at this stage
is not expected to substitute its view and to interfere with the
conclusion of the RP.”
7. It then went on to hold:
G
“19. Thus, the date on which a person stands disqualified would
be the date of commencement of the Corporate Insolvency
Resolution Process of the Corporate Debtor, i.e., ESIL. This
date is 02.08.2017 on which date, ArcelorMittal India Pvt. Ltd., is
disqualified in view of the fact that its connected persons of AM
H
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A Netherland and L.N. Mittal are disqualified as they have an account
or an account of the corporate debtor under their management
and control or of whom they are a promoter classified as NPA
under the guidelines of the Reserve Bank of India and at least a
period of one year has lapsed from the date of such classification
till the date of commencement of corporate insolvency resolution
B
process of the corporate debtor. The said disqualification starts
from 02.08.2017 can only be remedied in the manner provided in
the proviso to clause (c) of section 29A read with section 30(4)
proviso and in no other manner. The disqualification commenced
on 02.08.2017 continues till 12.02.2018 and the same
C disqualification cannot be relieved by merely ceasing to be the
promoter or by selling shares in the companies whose accounts
are NPA such as Uttam Galva or KSS Petron.
20. On perusal of annexure R/4, i.e., shareholding pattern annexed
with the reply of Numetal Ltd., it is found that ArcelorMittal is a
D publicly known promoter of Uttam Galva and its shareholding is
classified under “promoter and promoter group” in the filings made
in the Stock Exchange of India. As per shareholding pattern of
Uttam Galva disclosed in the stock exchange as on December,
2017 ArcelorMittal was a single largest shareholder having
significant shareholding of 29.05 % in Uttam Galva.
E
21. On perusal of the record it is found that connected person of
the applicant are the promoter of KSS Petron Pvt. Ltd., a company
incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, having registered
office at Swastik Chamber, 6th Floor, Sion Trombay Road,
Chembur, Mumbai has been NPA for more than a year and CIRP
F has been initiated against the KSS Petron vide order dated
01.08.2017 by Mumbai Bench of the National Company Law
Tribunal.
22. It is also pertinent to mention herein that, in the minutes of the
meeting of the committee of creditors which reproduces the
G decision of the RP pursuant to the opinions received by the RP
from Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas and Mr. Khambatta.
Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas had opined that AM Netherlands
exercised positive control over Uttam Galva and merely divesting
the shareholding prior to the submission of the resolution plan could
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ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 389
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

not remove the disqualification under section 29A(c) of the Code, A
unless cured by payment.
23. It is an admitted position that AM Netherlands is an indirect
100% subsidiary of ArcelorMittal Societe Anonyme (AMSA)
which is a listed company incorporated in Luxemburg. On the
other hand, AM India is also an indirect subsidiary (99.99%) of B
AMSA. Accordingly, AMSA is promoter, in management and in
control of AM India, the resolution applicant and AM Netherlands
is a subsidiary company/associate company of AMSA in view of
which AM Netherlands becomes a connected person and such
connected person has an account of corporate debtor Uttam Galva
under its management, control or of whom such connected person, C
namely, AM Netherlands is a promoter is classified as NPA for
more than one year before 02.082017. Consequently, AM India
shall not be eligible to submit a resolution plan as on 12.02.2018.
24. It is an admitted position that Laxminarayan Mittal is controlling
AM India being an indirect subsidiary of AMSA. Accordingly, D
LN Mittal/AMSA is promoter in management and in control of
AM India, the resolution applicant, and LN Mittal is also in
management and control of KSS Global BV in view of what is
stated above and KSS Petron which is a 100% subsidiary of KSS
Global BV is also under management and control of LN Mittal. E
KSS Petron has a NPA for more than one year and consequently,
LN Mittal being a promoter/in control of KSS Global BV/KSS
Petron Pvt. Ltd., is a connected person whose account is classified
non-performing. Consequently, AM India shall not be eligible to
submit a resolution plan.
F
25. From a bare reading of section 29A(c) it is very clear that a
person shall not be eligible to submit a resolution plan, if such
person, or any other person acting jointly or in concert with such
person; has an account, or an account of a corporate debtor under
the management or control of such person or whom such person
is a promoter, classified as non-performing asset in accordance G
with the guidelines of the Reserve Bank of India issued under the
Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (10 of 1949) and at least a period
of one year has lapsed from the date of such classification till the
date of commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution
process of the corporate debtor, H
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A PROVIDED that the person shall be eligible to submit a resolution
plan if such person makes payment of all overdue amounts with
interest thereon and charges relating to non-performing asset
accounts before submission of resolution plan.
Section 29A does not distinguish between positive and negative
B control. Any person who is either promoter or in the management
or in the control of the business of the corporate debtor and in
default is ineligible. Person connected to ArcelorMittal India Pvt.
Ltd., who are either promoter or in the management with KSS
Petron and Uttam Galva Steels Ltd., are ineligible. Mere sale of
shares and declassification as promoter after the companies have
C gone into default cannot be absolved them responsibility. In order
to become eligible, overdue amounts to lenders in both the cases
of KSS Petron and Uttam Galva Steels Ltd., should be paid by
ArcelorMittal before being eligible to bid, as provided in Section
29A itself.”
D 8. Having said this, it then remanded the matter to the Committee
of Creditors as follows:-
“27. Further, we are of the view that RP ought to have produced
both the resolution plan before the CoC, along with his comments
of eligibility of both the resolution applicants for consideration of
E the CoC and to follow the provision of section 29A(c) read with
section 30(4) for the purpose of affording the opportunity to the
resolution applicants before declaring them ineligible. In our view,
such procedure has not been followed hence, it vitiate the
proceeding of the CoC and hence the present matter can be
F remanded back to the RP and CoC on this ground alone for their
reconsideration.”
9. Appeals were filed by both Numetal and AMIPL, on 26.4.2018
and 27.4.2018 respectively, before the Appellate Authority, being the
NCLAT. Before these appeals could be decided, in compliance with the
G order passed by the Adjudicating Authority, the Committee of Creditors,
after hearing both AMIPL and Numetal, disqualified AMIPL by an order
dated 8.5.2018 as follows:
“48. In wrapping up this post-decisional hearing, we reiterate that
AMIL is an ineligible resolution applicant under Section 29A(c)
of the IBC, who acting in concert with AMBV (the promoter of
H
ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 391
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

Uttam Galva on insolvency commencement date and connected A
person of AMIL) and Arcelor Mittal Group in attempting to avoid
their obligations to make payment as provided under Section
29A(c) of mc (sic) with reference to Uttam Galva and KSS Petron.
Their unwillingness to make payment in the Uttam Galva matter
or the KSS Petron matter by their actions of 7th of February, 2018
B
and 9th of February, 2018 as stated above is an avoidance device.
49. In case of Uttam Galva, AMBV arranged the sale of its
shareholding at a nominal value just days prior to the date of
submission of the Resolution Plan is evidence of the fact that
AMIL is in concert with AMBV such action is a manifestation of
the passage of Section 29A under IBC. As promoter of Uttam C
Galva and as member of the Arcelor Mittal Group referred above,
they should have made payment of the Overdue Amounts to the
lenders of Uttam Galva.
50. The same conduct of Arcelor Mittal Group acting through
Fraselli and KSS Global in terminating the shareholders agreement D
in KSS Global, the holding company of KSS Petron, a device has
been to avoid payment of the Overdue Amounts of KSS Petron
before filing the Resolution Plan for ESIL. The close proximity of
this action on 9 th February, 2018, one day before the plan
submission date is a telling act of avoidance. E
51. Since the CoC have not by themselves filed an appeal over
the Ld. Adjudicating Authority’s order dated 19 th April, 2018, the
concession granted by the Ld. Adjudicating Authority to give an
opportunity to cure the ineligibility, we are indicating to AMIL, its
connected persona and persons in concert to cure their disability F
under Section 29A(c) of IBC by making a payment to the lenders
of Uttam Galva for Overdue Amounts of Uttam Galva, another
payment to the lenders of KSS Petron constituting Overdue
Amounts in KSS Petron and Overdue Amounts of such other
companies which are classified as NPAs and where Arcelor Mittal
Group is a promoter. Such payments will have to be made by G
AMIL or its constituents / connected persons no later than 15th
May, 2018, especially since the law actually requires that this
curative payment of overdue amounts, interests and charges should
be made by the corporate resolution intending applicant / resolution
applicant before the Resolution Plan is filed. This concession by H
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A the CoC is without prejudice to the CoC’s right to strictly enforce
the law and provisions of Section 29A(c) of the IBC. The proof
of such payment in form of a No Overdue Amounts letter
(indicative format set out in Annex) shall be submitted to the RP
(with notification to the CoC) by 6:00 P.M. IST on 15th May
2018. As we have limited time available under the CIR process
B
of ESIL, AMIL is requested to adhere to these timelines.”
10. By another order of the same date, the Committee of Creditors
disqualified Numetal as follows:
“44. Numetal and AEL are related as an associate company, on
C account of the fact that AEL (alias Rewant Ruia) has significant
influence over Numetal pursuant to its control of at least 20% of
the total voting power of Numetal. Since an associate company is
considered as a related party to a resolution applicant where
such resolution applicant and other persons are acting jointly or in
concert, Numetal is clearly said to be acting jointly and in concert
D with AEL. This in turn means Numetal is acting in concert with
Mr. Rewant Ruia and hence with Mr. Ravi Ruia, the promoter
and guarantor of ESIL (a non-performing asset since 2016). This
inflicts a disability and ineligibility upon Numetal / its consortium
and constituent shareholders.”
E xxx xxx xxx
57. Thus in wrapping up the post decisional hearing, we reiterate
that Numetal is an ineligible resolution applicant acting in concert
with Rewant Ruia and his connected person namely his relative /
father Ravi Ruia, who is a promoter of a corporate debtor ESIL,
F which has a non-performing asset account.
58. Since the CoC have not by themselves filed an appeal over
the Ld. Adjudicating Authority’s Order dated 19 th April, 2018, the
concession granted by the Ld. Adjudicating Authority to give an
opportunity to cure the ineligibility, we are indicating to the resolution
G applicant, i.e. Numetal and the consortium of Crinium Bay, Indo,
TPE and AEL as persons acting in concert with Numetal, that
they would be eligible only if they make payment of (i) the Overdue
Amounts constituting NPA in ESIL as on 30 th April, 2018
aggregating to Rs. 37,558.65 crores in principal and interest and
Rs. 1,688.27 crores in penal interest and other charges and such
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ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 393
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

other additional Overdue Amounts which have accrued till the A
date of payment; and (ii) the Overdue Amounts of such other
companies which are classified as NPAs and where Mr. Ravi
Ruia / Mr. Rewant Ruia are promoters. Such payments will have
to be made by Numetal or its constituents / consortium no later
than 15th May, 2018, especially since the law actually requires
B
that this curative payment should be made before the resolution
plan is filed. This concession is without prejudice to the CoC’s
right to strictly enforce the law and the provisions of Sections
29A(c) and 29A(h) of IBC. The proof of such payment in form
of a no-Overdues Amounts letter (indicative format set out in
Annex 3) shall be submitted to the RP (with notification to CoC) C
by 6:00 P.M. IST on 15th May 2018, As we have limited time
available under the CIR process of ESIL, Numetal is requested
to adhere to these timelines.”
11. In the appeals that were filed before it, the Appellate Authority,
insofar as Numetal’s Resolution plan was concerned, vide an order dated D
7.9.2018 held as follows:-
“44. On behalf of ‘AM India Ltd.’, it was submitted that ‘VTB
Bank’ one of the shareholders of ‘Numetal Ltd.’ is ineligible in
view of Article 5(c) of the EU Regulations of 2014. Though such
submission has been made, no order or evidence has been placed E
on record to suggest that any order of prohibition was imposed by
the European Union against the ‘VTB Bank’. Neither the date of
order nor order passed by any competent authority or court of
law has been placed on record.
45. On the other hand, it will be evident that Council of European F
Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) No. 833/2014 concerning
Restricting measures in view of Russia action. In fact, in view of
situation in Ukraine, the European Union Regulation was adopted.
Apart from the aforesaid fact, that ‘AM India Ltd.’ has not brought
on record any penal order passed by any court of law relating to
disability, if any, which is corresponding to any of the disability G
shown in clauses (a) to (h) of Section 29A. Therefore, the stand
taken by the ‘AM India Ltd.’ with regard to ineligibility of ‘VTB
Bank’ is fit to be rejected.
xxx xxx xxx
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394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A Resolution Plan submitted by the ‘Numetal Ltd.’ on 12th
February, 2018
60. As on 12th February, 2018, when the 1st Resolution Plan was
submitted by ‘Numetal Ltd.’, it had four shareholders.
(i) ‘Crinium Bay’ : 40%
B
(ii) ‘Indo’ : 25.1%
(iii) ‘TPE’ : 9.9%
(iv) ‘AEL’ : 25%
61. Admittedly, Mr. Rewant is 100% shareholder of ‘AEL’ and
C
‘AEL’ held 25% in ‘Numetal Ltd.’ even as on 12th February, 2018,
Mr. Rewant being son of Mr. Ravi, who is the promoter of the
‘Corporate Debtor’, we hold that ‘AEL’ is a related party and
comes within the meaning of ‘person in concert’ in terms of
Regulation 2(1)(q).
D
62. In view of the aforesaid findings, we hold that at the time of
submission of 1st Resolution Plan by ‘Numetal Ltd.’, one of the
shareholders being ‘AEL’, ‘Numetal Ltd.’ was not eligible to submit
‘Resolution Plan’ in terms of Section 29A.
Position of ‘Numetal Ltd.’ as on 29th March, 2018 when the
E subsequent ‘Resolution Plan’ was submitted by ‘Numetal
Ltd.’.
63. The ‘Committee of Creditors’ had extended the period for
submitted a fresh ‘Resolution Plan’ by 2nd April, 2018. ‘Numetal
Ltd.’ filed fresh ‘Resolution Plan’ on 29th March, 2018. On the
F said date the ‘Numetal Ltd.’ consisted of the three shareholders: -
(a) ‘Crinium Bay’ (‘VTB’) : 40%
(b) ‘Indo’ : 34.1%
(c) ‘TPE’ : 25.9%
G
64. As on 29th March, 2018, as the ‘AEL’ was not the shareholder
of ‘Numetal Ltd.’ and all the three shareholders aforesaid being
eligible, we hold that ‘Numetal Ltd.’ in respect of the ‘Resolution
Plan’ dated 29th March, 2018, is eligible and the provision of Section
29A, as on 29th March, 2018 is not attracted to the ‘Numetal
H
ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 395
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

Ltd.’. For the reasons aforesaid, we are of the view that the A
‘Resolution Plan’ submitted by ‘Numetal Ltd.’ on 29th March, 2018
is required to be considered by the ‘Committee of Creditors’ to
find out its viability, feasibility and financial matrix.”
12. In the same order, insofar as AMIPL’s resolution plan was
concerned, the Appellate Authority held as follows: B
“107. In the present case, the ‘Expression of Interest’ was
submitted by ‘AM India Ltd.’ on 11th October, 2017 and by
‘Numetal Ltd.’ on 20th October, 2017, both prior to 23rd November,
2017 i.e. the date Section 29A was inserted by the Insolvency
and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2017 but the C
‘Resolution Plans’ were submitted by both ‘AM India Ltd.’ and
‘Numetal Ltd.’ on 12th February, 2018.
108. The question arises for consideration is as to what will be
the position if, on the basis of ‘Information Memorandum’ the
‘Expression of Interest’ is submitted by the ‘Resolution Applicants’ D
prior to 23rd November, 2017 and whether they are eligible to take
advantage of 2nd proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 30.?
109. Section 29A came into force on 23rd November, 2017. Those
who submitted ‘Resolution Plan’ prior to the said date and if covered
by clause (c) of Section 29A are entitled to derive benefit of second E
proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 30. Under ‘I&B Code’ there
is no provision to submit ‘Expression of Interest’ prior to
‘Resolution Plan’. What we find from the invitation seeking
‘Expression of Interest’ to submit a ‘Resolution Plan’ for ‘Essar
Steel Limited’ published on 6th October, 2017 is the first stage of
‘Resolution Plan’. Therefore, we hold that ‘Expression of Interest’ F
is part of the ‘Resolution Plan’, which follows the ‘Resolution
Plan’. In such case, the date of submission of the ‘Expression of
Interest’ should be treated to be the date of submission of the
‘Resolution Plan’. In this background, we hold that the date of
submissions of the 1st ‘Resolution Plan(s)’ of ‘AM India Ltd.’ G
and ‘Numetal Ltd.’ will be deemed to be 11th October, 2017/12th
February, 2018 and 20th October, 2017/12th February, 2018
respectively.
110. If the aforesaid proposition is not accepted, it will deprive
the ‘Resolution Applicants’ from deriving advantage of second
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396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 30 inserted on 23rd
November, 2017, even though they acted to submit the ‘Resolution
Plan’ by submitting the ‘Expression of Interest’ of ‘Resolution
Plan’.
111. In view of the aforesaid finding, we hold that the Adjudicating
B Authority rightly held that the Appellant- ‘AM India Ltd.’ should
have been given the opportunity by the ‘Committee of Creditors’
in terms of second proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 30.
112. The question arises for consideration is whether the ‘AM
Netherlands’ is eligible, having transferred its entire shareholding
of ‘Uttam Galva’ on 7th February, 2018 and by transferring of its
C
entire shareholding of ‘Fraseli’ in ‘KSS Global’ on 9th February,
2018 i.e. two to four days prior to the submission of ‘Expression
of Interest’ (first phase of ‘Resolution Plan’).
113. Proviso to clause (c) of Section 29A reads as follows:

D “Provided that the person shall be eligible to submit a
resolution plan if such person makes payment of all overdue
amounts with interest thereon and charges relating to non-
performing asset accounts before submission of resolution
plan”
114. The aforesaid proviso to clause (c) makes it clear that the
E
person shall be eligible to submit a ‘Resolution Plan’ if such person
makes payment of all overdue amounts with interest thereon and
charges relating to non-performing asset accounts before
submission of ‘Resolution Plan’. It does not stipulate any other
mode to become eligible and thereby does not prescribe any other
F mode to become ineligible, including by selling the shares thereby
existing as a member of the Company whose account has been
classified as non-performing asset accounts in accordance with
the guidelines of the Reserve Bank of India.
115. Second proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 30 also stipulates,
G as follows:
“30. Submission of resolution plan.%
(4) xxx xxx xxx
Provided further that where the resolution applicant referred
to in the first proviso is ineligible under clause (c) of section
H
ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 397
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

29A, the resolution applicant shall be allowed by the committee A
of creditors such period, not exceeding thirty days, to make
payment of overdue amounts in accordance with the proviso
to clause (c) of section 29A”
116. From both the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that except in
the manner the ‘Resolution Applicants’ can make it eligible and B
get rid of ineligibility under clause (c) of Section 29A that is by
making payment of all overdue amounts in accordance with the
proviso to clause (c) of Section 29A, no other manner a person,
who is otherwise ineligible under clause (c) of Section 29A, can
become eligible. There is no provision in the ‘I&B Code’ which
permits an ineligible person to become eligible by selling or C
transferring its shares of the Company whose accounts have been
declared as NPA in accordance with the guidelines of Reserve
Bank of India.
117. Admittedly, ‘AM Netherlands’ is related party of ‘AM India
Ltd.’. ‘AM Netherlands’ was the promoter of ‘Uttam Galva’ on D
the date when the ‘Uttam Galva’ classified as NPA in accordance
with the guidelines of Reserve Bank of India and a period of one
year has elapsed from the date of such classification, at the time
of commencement of ‘Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process’
of the ‘Corporate Debtor’. E
118. Once the stigma of “classification of the account as NPA”
has been labelled on the promoter of the ‘Uttam Galva’, even
after sale of shares by ‘AM Netherlands’ it may ceased to be a
member or promoter of the ‘Uttam Galva’, but stigma as was
attached with it will continue for the purpose of ineligibility under F
clause (c) of Section 29A, till payment of all overdue amount with
interest and charges relating to NPA account of the ‘Uttam Galva’
is paid.
119. ‘AM Netherlands’ is 100% subsidiary of ‘AMSA’ which is
a listed company incorporated in Luxemburg. ‘AM India Ltd.’ is G
also a subsidiary of ‘AMSA’ having 99.99% shareholding in it.
Accordingly, ‘AMSA’ is also a promoter, in the management and
in control of ‘AM India Ltd.’. ‘Fraseli’ is a company owned and
controlled by a company called by ‘Mittal Investments’ acquired
about one third of the share capital of ‘KSS Global BV’. Pursuant
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398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A to such acquisition, ‘Fraseli’ acquired control over ‘KSS Global
BV’ which in turn controls ‘KSS Petron’ and ‘Petron Engineering’.
‘Mittal Investments’ is owned and controlled by LN Mittal Group,
the promoters of the ‘AM India Pvt. Ltd’.
120. ‘AM India Ltd.’ divested its shareholding in ‘KSS Global
B BV’ which is 100% owner of ‘KSS Petron’ (a Company whose
account has been declared as NPA). ‘AM India Ltd.’ has its
control over it will be evident from the fact that it has nominee
Directors, who also resigned on 9th February, 2018 i.e. 3 days
before submission of the ‘Expression of Interest’ of ‘Resolution
Plan’ by ‘AM India Ltd.’ This will be also clear from the fact that
C the ‘AM India Ltd.’ was nothing that an entity controlling and
managing in ‘KSS Global BV’ (which is 100% owner of ‘KSS
Petron’ an NPA Company) divested its shareholding in ‘KSS
Global BV’ on 9th February, 2018 i.e. 3 days before submission
of the ‘Expression of Interest’ of ‘Resolution Plan’.
D 121. We have also noticed that consequent to such acquisition of
control by ‘Fraseli’, on 23rd May, 2011 a public announcement
was made under ‘SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and
Takeover) Regulations, 1997’ for the acquisition of shares of
‘Petron Engineering’ inter alia by ‘KSS Global BV’ and ‘Fraseli’.
E Therefore, we hold that Mr. L.N. Mittal Group, a connected person
of ‘AM India Ltd.’ being the promoter and in the control and
management of ‘KSS Petron’ since 2011 and ‘KSS Petron’ having
classified as ‘NPA’ by multiple banks, the stigma attached to it
cannot be cleared by ‘KSS Global’ by divesting its shares in ‘KSS
Petron’ on 9th February, 2018 and the stigma will continue for the
F purpose of ineligibility under clause (c) Section 29A, till the payment
of all overdue amount with interest thereon and charges relating
to NPA account of ‘KSS Petron’.
122. Admittedly, there are three nominee Directors of ‘AM India
Ltd.’ in ‘KSS Petron’, one of the NPA Company. The nominee
G Directors of the Appellant- ‘AM India Ltd.’ had also resigned on
9th February, 2018 i.e. three days’ before the submission of the
‘Resolution Plan’. Therefore, it is clear that the ‘AM India Ltd.’
had complete control over the ‘KSS Petron’.

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ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 399
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

123. It is informed that after impugned order passed by the A
Adjudicating Authority, the ‘AM India Ltd.’ had made conditional
deposit of Rs. 7,000 Crores in its own current account (Escrow
Account). Such depositation of the amount in its own Escrow
Account does not qualify as a payment of overdue amounts in
terms of proviso to clause (c) of Section 29A. A conditional offer
B
to pay the over dues amount cannot be accepted till it is complied
in the light of proviso to clause (c) of Section 29A unconditionally.
124. Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of ‘AM India Ltd.’ when asked, on instruction,
submitted that if this Appellate Tribunal accept the ‘Resolution
Plan’ submitted by the ‘AM India Ltd.’, it may deposit the non- C
performing assets amount with interest in the respective accounts
which were declared as NPA in accordance with the guidelines
of the Reserve Bank of India.
125. As we hold that ‘AM India Ltd.’ is also entitled to the benefit
of second proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 30, we give one D
opportunity to the ‘Resolution Applicant’- ‘AM India Ltd.’ to make
payment of all overdue amount with interest thereon and charges
relating to Non Performing Accounts of both the ‘Uttam Galva’
and the ‘KSS Petron’ in their respective accounts within three
days i.e. by 11th September, 2018. If such amount is deposited in E
the accounts of both Non-Performing Accounts of ‘Uttam Galva’
and ‘KSS Petron’ within time aforesaid and is informed, the
‘Committee of Creditors’ will consider the ‘Resolution Plan’
submitted by ‘AM India Ltd.’ along with other ‘Resolution Plans’,
including the ‘Resolution Plan’ submitted by the ‘Numetal Ltd.’
on 29th March, 2018, and if so necessary, may negotiate with the F
‘Resolution Applicant(s)’. An early decision should be taken by
the ‘Committee of Creditors’ and on approval of the ‘Resolution
Plan’, the ‘Resolution Professional’ will place the same
immediately before the Adjudicating Authority who in its turn will
pass order under Section 31 in accordance with law. The G
‘Successful Resolution Applicant’ will take steps for execution of
its ‘Resolution Plan’ and deposit the upfront money if proposed, in
terms of the ‘Resolution Plan’.

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400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A 126. Taking into consideration the fact that a long period has
taken due to pendency of the case before the Adjudicating
Authority and thereafter, before this Appellate Tribunal, we direct
the Adjudicating Authority to exclude the period the appeal was
pending before this Appellate Tribunal i.e. from 26th April, 2018
till today (7th September, 2018) for the purpose of counting the
B
total period of 270 days. The impugned order dated 19th April,
2018 passed by the Adjudicating Authority so far as it relates to
eligibility of ‘Numetal Ltd.’ as on the date of the submission of the
‘Resolution Plan’ dated 29th March, 2018 is set aside. The
impugned judgment/order in respect to ‘AM India Ltd.’ is affirmed
C with conditions as mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. All the
appeals are disposed of with aforesaid observations and directions.
The parties will bear their respective cost.”
13. This is how both AMIPL and Numetal are before us in appeals
from the Appellate Authority’s order dated 7.9.2018.
D 14. Shri Harish N. Salve, learned Senior Advocate appearing on
behalf of AMIPL, argued that Section 29A, as originally enacted,
disqualified a person who has an account of a corporate debtor under
the management or control of such person, or of whom such person is a
promoter, which account was declared as a non-performing asset. The
E further condition is that one year should have elapsed from the date of
such declaration till the date of commencement of the corporate insolvency
resolution process of the corporate debtor. Thus, a plain reading of the
same establishes that the ineligibility under Section 29A is in relation to
the submission of a resolution plan, which must consist of the elements
set out in Section 30. Responding to preliminary enquiries, i.e., an
F expression of interest, is not the subject matter of a resolution plan, and
therefore, the relevant time is the time of submission of a resolution
plan. He further argued that the amendment made to Section 29A in
June, 2018, expressly stating that the relevant time was the time of
submission of a resolution plan, is clarificatory in nature. Once this
G becomes clear, everything on facts falls into place. According to the
learned Senior Advocate, AMIPL is an indirect subsidiary of one
‘ArcelorMittal Societe Anonyme’ (hereinafter referred to as “AMSA”),
which is a listed company in Luxemburg. AMSA holds 100% shares in
one ‘ArcelorMittal Belvel & Differdange Societe Anonyme’ (hereinafter
referred to as “AMBD”), a company incorporated in Luxemburg, which
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ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 401
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

in turn holds 100% in one ‘Oakey Holding BV’, a company incorporated A
in the Netherlands, which in turn holds 99.99% shares in AMIPL.
ArcelorMittal Netherlands BV (hereinafter referred to as “AMNLBV”),
which is a member of the L.N. Mittal Group incorporated in the
Netherlands, is 100% held by AMSA (the Chairman and CEO of AMSA
being Shri L.N. Mittal). AMNLBV held 29.05% in one ‘Uttam Galva
B
Steels Limited’ (hereinafter referred to as “Uttam Galva”) which is an
Indian company, listed in India. Uttam Galva was declared as a non-
performing asset on 31.3.2016, with a debt of around Rs. 6000 crores.
According to Shri Salve, Uttam Galva, though it entered into a Co-
Promotion Agreement with AMNLBV on 4.9.2009, was really promoted
by the Miglani Group of businessmen who are Indian citizens residing in C
Mumbai. The Co-Promotion Agreement conferred on AMNLBV the
right to appoint 50% of the non-independent directors on the board, as
well as certain affirmative voting rights. This required that the Articles
of Association be amended, which was never in fact done. In 2015
itself, AMNLBV had written off the investment in Uttam Galva from its
D
books, seeking an exit from Uttam Galva at this time. AMNLBV never
appointed any director or exercised any voting rights in Uttam Galva.
What is important to note is that it had transferred its entire shareholding
in Uttam Galva on 7.2.2018 to one ‘Sainath Trading Company Private
Limited’, which was a Miglani Group Company, for Re.1 per share (having
purchased the shares at Rs.120 per share). The depository participant E
account of AMNLBV ceased to show the said shares with effect from
7.2.2018. The Co-Promotion Agreement dated 4.9.2009, pursuant to
which the status of “promoter” had been conferred on AMNLBV, stood
automatically terminated vide clause 21.6 thereof on 7.2.2018. In order
to put the matter beyond any doubt, the parties also executed a Co-
F
Promotion Termination Agreement on 7.2.2018. On 8.2.2018, Uttam
Galva filed the necessary forms with the Registrar of Companies and
made the necessary disclosures with the National Stock Exchange and
Bombay Stock Exchange to declassify AMNLBV as a promoter of
Uttam Galva. This was accordingly done on 21.3.2018 and 23.3.2018
before the NSE and BSE respectively. Such declassification, being a G
ministerial act, is relatable to the date of sale of shares, i.e., 7.2.2009,
and considered effective from the said date. Inasmuch as AMNLBV
therefore ceased to be a promoter in Uttam Galva prior to 12.2.2018,
the resolution plan is not hit by Section 29A(c). Similarly, according to
the learned Senior Advocate, insofar as KSS Petron Private Limited
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402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A (hereinafter referred to as “KSS Petron”) is concerned, it is an admitted
case that ‘Fraseli Investments Sarl’ (hereinafter referred to as “Fraseli”)
is a company owned and controlled by one ‘Mittal Investments Sarl,’
which in turn is owned and controlled by the L.N. Mittal Group, the
promoters of AMIPL. Fraseli held 32.22% in one ‘KazStroy Service
Global BV’ (hereinafter referred to as “KSS Global”), a company
B
incorporated in the Netherlands which in turn held 100% of KSS Petron,
an Indian company. The shareholders agreement entered into between
Fraseli and KSS Global permitted Fraseli to appoint two out of six nominee
directors in KSS Global, and provided for an affirmative vote of
shareholders with respect to certain matters. According to the learned
C Senior Advocate, if the definition of “control” in Section 2(27) of the
Companies Act, 2013 is applied, the relationship of KSS Global with
KSS Petron would not constitute “control” over the wholly owned
subsidiary in India. In any case, the entire shareholding of Fraseli in
KSS Global was transferred back to the promoters of KSS Global on
9.2.2018, i.e., 3 days before submission of the resolution plan. KSS
D
Petron has been classified as a non-performing asset by multiple banks,
and the corporate insolvency resolution process was initiated against it
on 1.8.2017 before the NCLT. It may be added that KSS Petron was
declared a non-performing asset on 30.9.2015 with a debt of around Rs.
1000 crores. The learned Senior Advocate therefore attacked the finding
E of the Appellate Authority on this score, and stated that, as Section 29A
was not attracted, the question of paying off the debts of Uttam Galva
and KSS Petron would not arise.
15. When it came to Numetal’s resolution plan, the learned Senior
Advocate argued that it is important to remember that Numetal was
F incorporated on 13.10.2017 by Shri Rewant Ruia, son of Shri Ravi Ruia
(who was a promoter of the corporate debtor of ESIL), with the specific
objective of trying to acquire ESIL. At the time of its incorporation, one
‘Aurora Enterprises Limited’ (hereinafter referred to as “AEL”), a Ruia
Group Company, held 100% shareholding of Numetal. In turn AEL’s
100% shareholding was held by one ‘Aurora Holdings Limited’
G (hereinafter referred to as “AHL”), 100% of whose shareholding was
held by Shri Rewant Ruia, who was a former director of the corporate
debtor, i.e. ESIL. On 18.10.2017, a few weeks before Section 29A was
introduced, AEL transferred 26.1% of its shares in Numetal to one ‘Essar
Communications Limited’ (hereinafter referred to as “ECL”), a group
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KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

company of the corporate debtor. On 19.10.2017 Shri Rewant Ruia settled A
an irrevocable discretionary trust, called the ‘Crescent Trust’, which
purchased the shares of AHL at par value. On 20.10.2017, when
Numetal submitted its expression of interest, it had two share holders,
i.e., AEL (holding 73.9%) and ECL (holding 26.1%). On 22.11.2017,
when the Finance Minister made a statement that the Code would be
B
amended in order to prevent unscrupulous persons from submitting
resolution plans, AEL transferred 13.9% of its shareholding in Numetal,
and ECL its entire 26.1% shareholding, to one ‘Crinium Bay Holdings
Limited’ (hereinafter referred to as “Crinium Bay”), a 100% indirectly
held subsidiary of one ‘VTB Bank’, which in turn was a Russian company,
the majority of whose shares were held by the Russian Government. C
Crinium Bay thus became the owner of 40% of the shareholding of
Numetal. AEL subsequently transferred 25.1% of the shareholding in
Numetal to one ‘Indo International Trading FZCO’ (hereinafter referred
to as “Indo”), a Dubai company, and 9.9% of the shareholding to one
‘JSC VO Tyazhpromexport’ (hereinafter referred to as “TPE”), a
D
Russian company. AEL was left with only a 25% shareholding in Numetal.
Even this holding in Numetal was ultimately divested on 29.3.2018, so
that Crinium Bay held 40%, TPE held 25.9% and Indo held 34.1% in
Numetal, with AEL’s holding becoming ‘Nil’. Shri Salve has argued
that Numetal is hit by Section 29A(i) of the Code, as VTB Bank, the
parent of Crinium Bay, stands prohibited from accessing the securities E
markets in the European Union pursuant to an order dated 31.7.2004,
and in the United States by two orders. This being the case, Numetal is
directly hit by sub-section (f) read with sub-section (i) of Section 29A. It
is also hit by Section 29A(j) as Crinium Bay, being a subsidiary of VTB
Bank, becomes a “connected person” as defined under sub-clauses (i)
F
and (iii) of Explanation 1 to Section 29A(j). One very important fact
that was stressed by him was that an amount of Rs. 500 crores was
given by AEL to Numetal so that it could deposit the requisite earnest
money that had to be made along with the resolution plan furnished by
Numetal. This amount, that was admittedly furnished by AEL, continues
to remain with the Resolution Professional, and has till date not been G
withdrawn by AEL, showing that Shri Rewant Ruia continues to be
vitally interested and linked with the resolution plan of Numetal, even
after the complete exit of AEL as its shareholder. He therefore submitted
that, given these facts, whereas AMIPL should have been held eligible,
it was wrongly held to be ineligible by the Appellate Authority; and that
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404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A Numetal, being clearly hit by several provisions of Section 29A, was
wrongly held to be eligible. He stressed the fact that one of the core
objectives of Section 29A was to ensure that the promoter of the corporate
debtor should not through or by circular means come back in order to
regain the company that he himself had run to the ground. For this
purpose, he relied upon the Finance Minister’s statement on 29.12.2017,
B
while introducing the Bill to amend the Code by introducing Section 29A,
together with the Statements of Objects and Reasons appended to the
said Bill.
16. Dr. A.M. Singhvi, learned Senior Advocate, supported the
arguments of Shri Salve. According to him, Section 29A(c) always had
C the application of the resolution plan date as the relevant date, given the
in praesenti “has” which is also there in clauses (h) and (j), and is
similar to the expression “is” which is to be found in clauses (a), (b), (e)
and (f), as contrasted with the expression “has been” used in clauses
(d) and (g), of Section 29A. According to him, the amendment made in
D 2018 is in any case clarificatory in nature. He supported the attack of
Shri Salve on the Appellate Authority’s judgment, stating that so far as
Uttam Galva is concerned, it is well established that the sale of shares is
complete once they move out of the demat account of the seller, which
in this case took place five days before 12.2.2008. For this he cited
certain judgments. He also supported Shri Salve’s argument by stating
E that Numetal is clearly disqualified under several clauses of Section 29A.
17. On the other hand, Shri Mukul Rohatgi, learned Senior
Advocate, appearing on behalf of Numetal, stated that Numetal was a
company which was therefore a separate person in law from its
shareholders. He contended that on the date of submission of the
F resolution plan (i.e., 12.2.2018), AEL held only 25%, which would be
below the figure of 26% mentioned in the request for proposal dated
24.12.2017, wherein “control” has been defined as a person holding
more than 26% of the voting share capital in the company. According to
him, in any case by 2.4.2018, when it submitted a fresh resolution plan,
G AEL had walked out completely, leaving behind two Russian companies
holding 40% and 25.9% respectively of Numetal, and Indo, a Dubai
Company, holding 34.1%. According to the learned Senior Advocate,
Numetal cannot possibly be described as a joint venture of its
shareholders, and for this purpose he cited some of our judgments.
According to him, a joint venture is a contractual arrangement whereby
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two or more parties undertake an economic activity which is subject to A
joint control, which is missing in the present case as a shareholder in a
company is distinct from the company itself. He added that Section
29A(c) requires that Numetal as a person, together with any other person
acting jointly or in concert, has to have an account of a corporate debtor
under its management or control, or of whom such person is a promoter
B
(which is classified as a non-performing asset for a period of at least
one year before the date of commencement of the corporate insolvency
resolution process of the corporate debtor). According to the learned
Senior Advocate, Shri Rewant Ruia would not fall within any of these
categories, on a reading of Section 2(27) of the Companies Act, 2013,
which defines “control”; Section 2(69) of the Companies Act, 2013, C
which defines “promoter”; and Sections 2(53) and 2(54) of the Companies
Act, 2013, which define “manager” and “managing director”
respectively. He emphatically argued that though Shri Rewant Ruia is
the son of Shri Ravi Ruia, who is a promoter of the corporate debtor, and
though he may be deemed to be a “person acting in concert” within
D
the definition contained in Regulation 2(1)(q) of the SEBI (Substantial
Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 2011 (hereinafter
referred to as the “2011 Takeover Regulations”), yet, he cannot be
considered to be a “connected person” under Section 29A(j) of the
Code. This is for the reason that under Explanation 1 to Section 29A(j),
the expression “connected person” can only mean a related party or a E
person who is referred to in sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of Explanation 1, and
since Shri Rewant Ruia is neither a promoter of nor in the management
or control of the resolution applicant Numetal, he would fall outside of
sub-clause (iii) of Explanation 1. According to Shri Rohatgi, the Appellate
Authority was absolutely correct in saying that Numetal would not be
F
ineligible under Section 29A. He strongly attacked Shri Salve’s argument
that VTB Bank, the holding company of Crinium Bay, was barred from
accessing the securities market by either the European Union or the
United States. He took us to the original orders and argued that the
document of the European Union, being Council Regulation 833 of 2014
dated 31.7.2014, pursuant to Article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning G
of the European Union, was owing to restrictive measures taken in view
of Russia’s actions destabilizing the situation in Ukraine. Because Russia
had illegally annexed Crimea, political sanctions were imposed by this
document, which cannot possibly be said to be sanctions imposed by an
authority equivalent to SEBI in India. The sanctions also did not relate
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406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A in any manner to the securities market. Equally, insofar as the two
orders of the United States are concerned, they were also political
sanctions imposed against Russian companies for the same reason by
the Office of Foreign Assets Control by a Presidential Order. He even
argued that insofar as the European Union is concerned, the
corresponding “authority” to SEBI is the ‘European Securities and
B
Market Authority’, whereas in the United States it would be the ‘Securities
Exchange Commission,’ neither of whom has issued any sanctions which
would interdict VTB Bank from accessing or trading in the securities
market. He also countered Shri Salve’s submission that the Rs. 500
crores that was advanced by AEL and given as earnest money for the
C resolution plan was not yet withdrawn, contending that this was so because
the validity of the first bid by Numetal continues to be sub judice.
18. Shri Rohatgi then attacked AMIPL by stating that even a
literal reading of Section 29A(c) would make it clear that in the case of
Uttam Galva, AMNLBV, which is admittedly an L.N. Mittal Group
D Company, was directly covered by sub-clause (c) as it had been shown
as a “promoter” in the annual reports of Uttam Galva, and would
therefore fit the definition of “promoter” contained in Section 2(69) of
the Companies Act, 2013. What is of great importance, and what is in
fact not disclosed, is that a Non-Disposal Undertaking was issued to the
State Bank of India, the secured creditor of Uttam Galva, on 12.7.2011
E by AMNLBV, agreeing that it would not sell, transfer or dispose of any
shares held by it without the consent of the lenders of Uttam Galva.
According to Shri Rohatgi, therefore, the transfer of these shares, the
recognition of such transfer by Uttam Galva, and the consequent
application to the Stock Exchanges for declassification as promoter,
F without obtaining the consent of the State Bank of India, is invalid in law
and a fraud played by AMNLBV. Further, in the disclosures that were
made under the 2011 Takeover Regulations, the column relatable to the
existence of any non-disposal undertakings was left blank. In addition,
since a sale of shares between co-promoters inter se is exempted from
the requirement of making a public offer under Regulation 3(1) read
G with Regulation 10(1)(a)(2) of the 2011 Takeover Regulations, it is clear
that on the one hand promoter status is claimed in order to avail of the
regulation, whereas, in the present case, it is argued that, in substance,
AMNLBV is not in fact a promoter. Equally, leaving a blank in the form
against the column which required disclosure of non-disposal undertakings,
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is a fraud played on SEBI, and on the shareholders of Uttam Galva; as A
otherwise, in the public offer that would have had to be made, the shares
of Uttam Galva would have had to be purchased at the higher price that
is mentioned in the said Regulations. Incidentally, according to Shri
Rohatgi, in any case, getting out of Uttam Galva by paying a price of
Re.1 per share when the market value on that date was Rs.19.50 per
B
share is again a fraudulent transaction, which cannot possibly pass muster
under Section 29A. Further, insofar as KSS Petron is concerned, it is
clear that Fraseli’s holding of 32.22% in KSS Global would certainly
amount to de facto control, if not de jure control, of KSS Petron, its
wholly owned subsidiary, as defined under Section 2(27) of the
Companies Act, 2013. The transfer of Fraseli’s shareholding on 9.2.2018, C
before submission of the resolution plan on 12.2.2018, is again a dubious
and fraudulent act squarely hit by Section 29A. Shri Rohatgi further
argued that Shri Pramod Mittal, brother of Shri L.N. Mittal, is a connected
person, which would trigger Section 29A(j). Shri Pramod Mittal is a
promoter and director of one ‘Gontermann Piepers (India) Limited’, which
D
has also been declared an NPA, rendering Shri L.N. Mittal ineligible
under Section 29A(j). Equally, Shri L.N. Mittal, Shri Pramod Mittal and
other members of the Mittal family are promoters of one ‘Ispat Profiles
India Limited’. This company was ordered to be wound up by the BIFR,
appeals from which have been dismissed by the AAIFR. Consequently,
Shri L.N. Mittal, as a related party of Shri Pramod Mittal, would render E
AMIPL ineligible under sub-clause (c) read with sub-clause (j) of Section
29A of the Code.
19. Shri Gopal Subramanium, learned Senior Advocate appearing
on behalf of the Committee of Creditors, has placed before us the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2017, F
introducing Section 29A, and commented on the difference between the
opening lines of the said Ordinance as compared with those of the
Amendment Act of 2017. The Amendment Act of 2017 brings in
“persons acting in concert”. According to the learned senior counsel,
“persons acting in concert” has been dealt with by the Justice P.N.
Bhagwati Committee Report on Takeovers, 1997, which he read out to G
us in copious detail. He also referred to some of our judgments on
tearing the corporate veil, and on persons acting in concert. According
to him, there should be no interference by the appropriate authority at
the behest of a resolution applicant at the stage of a Resolution
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408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A Professional processing resolution applications, and the subsequent stage
of a Committee of Creditors disapproving a resolution plan. According
to him, the period of 270 days is a watertight compartment, within which
either a resolution plan will be approved, or the corporate debtor be
wound up. According to him, the practice of interlocutory applications
being filed at anterior stages of the proceedings before the Adjudicating
B
Authority, and orders of remand to the Committee of Creditors, should
be stopped. However, the time taken by the Adjudicating Authority and
the Appellate Authority in deciding disputes that may arise before them
should be excluded from the computation of 270 days as aforesaid.
According to the learned Senior Advocate, the expressions “persons
C acting in concert” and “control” are broad enough to bring all associated
persons within the dragnet of Section 29A. He cited a number of
judgments on how this provision should be construed in accordance with
the object sought to be achieved by the said provision, which should
never be stultified or defeated, so as to get to the real state of affairs of
the facts of every given case. Therefore, it is very important to remember
D
that phrases such as “persons acting in concert” and “control” are
meant not only to pierce the corporate veil, but also to get to the real
persons who present resolution plans. On the facts of each case,
according to Shri Subramanium, both resolution plans were correctly
rejected by the Resolution Professional and the Committee of Creditors,
E as they were both hit by the provisions of Section 29A. Any circular
method, by which payment of debts of an NPA of a person acting jointly
or in concert under the proviso to Section 29A(c) is sought to be avoided,
should be interdicted. According to the learned Senior Advocate, both
resolution plans are hit by Section 29A(c), and the only way out is for
both resolution applicants to pay up the debts of the respective NPAs of
F
the corporate debtors who are associated with them.
20. Shri K.V. Viswanathan, learned Senior Advocate, appearing
on behalf of the Resolution Professional, drew our attention to the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution
Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016 (hereinafter referred
G to as the “CIRP Regulations”), and stated that the role of the Resolution
Professional is essentially to do a due diligence on each resolution plan
submitted before it. It is only after such due diligence is done that this
plan is to be forwarded to the Committee of Creditors. According to
him, even if it is found that the resolution plan in question contravenes
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KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

any law, such finding would only be a tentative opinion formed by the A
Resolution Professional, who has to submit the plan to the Committee of
Creditors once it is complete in all respects. According to him, a conjoint
reading of Section 25(2)(i) of the Code, read with Section 30(3) and the
second proviso to Section 30(4), would necessarily lead to this conclusion.
Also, according to the learned Senior Advocate, the expression “control”
B
contained in Section 29A(c) should be construed noscitur a sociis with
the word “management”, and so construed, would only mean positive,
de facto, control of such person.
21. At this point, it is necessary to first set out Section 29A in its
various forms: as first introduced by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2017 and the Insolvency and Bankruptcy C
Code (Amendment) Act, 2017, together with the amendment made by
the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Act, 2018.
Section 29A, as introduced by the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code
(Amendment) Ordinance, 2017, on 23.11.2017, reads as follows:
“29A. A person shall not be eligible to submit a resolution plan, if D
such person, or any other person acting jointly with such person,
or any person who is a promoter or in the management or control
of such person,-
(a) is an undischarged insolvent;
E
(b) has been identified as a wilful defaulter in accordance with
the guidelines of the Reserve Bank of India issued under the
Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (10 of 1949);
(c) Whose account is classified as non-performing asset in
accordance with the guidelines of the Reserve Bank of India issued F
under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (10 of 1949) and period
of one year or more has lapsed from the date of such classification
and who has failed to make the payment of all overdue amounts
with interest thereon and charges relating to non-performing asset
before submission of the resolution plan;
G
(d) Has been convicted for any offence punishable with
imprisonment for two years or more; or
(e) Has been disqualified to act as a director under the Companies
Act, 2013 (18 of 2013);
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410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A (f) Has been prohibited by the Securities and Exchange Board of
India from trading in securities or accessing the securities markets;
(g) Has indulged in preferential transaction or undervalued
transaction or fraudulent transaction in respect of which an order
has been made by the Adjudicating Authority under this Code;
B (h) Has executed an enforceable guarantee in favour of a creditor,
in respect of a corporate debtor under insolvency resolution process
or liquidation under this Code;
(i) Where any connected person in respect of such person meets
any of the criteria specified in clauses (a) to (h).
C
Explanation – For the purposes of this clause, the expression
“connected person” means-
(i) any person who is promoter or in the management or control
of the resolution applicant; or
D (ii) any person who shall be the promoter or in management or
control of the business of the corporate debtor during the
implementation of the resolution plan; or
(iii) the holding company, subsidiary company, associate
company or related party of a person referred to in clauses (i)
E and (ii)
(j) Has been subject to any disability, corresponding to clauses (a)
to (i), under any law in a jurisdiction outside India.”
22. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2017,
received the assent of the President on 28.1.2018, but came into force
F with retrospective effect from 23.11.2017. Section 29A, as contained
therein, reads as follows:
“29A. Persons not eligible to be resolution applicant. - A
person shall not be eligible to submit a resolution plan, if such
person, or any other person acting jointly or in concert with such
G person—
(a) is an undischarged insolvent;
(b) is a wilful defaulter in accordance with the guidelines of the
Reserve Bank of India issued under the Banking Regulation Act,
1949 (10 of 1949);
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(c) has an account, or an account of a corporate debtor under the A
management or control of such person or of whom such person is
a promoter, classified as non-performing asset in accordance with
the guidelines of the Reserve Bank of India issued under the
Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (10 of 1949) and at least a period
of one year has lapsed from the date of such classification till the
B
date of commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution
process of the corporate debtor:
Provided that the person shall be eligible to submit a resolution
plan if such person makes payment of all overdue amounts with
interest thereon and charges relating to non-performing asset
accounts before submission of resolution plan; C

(d) has been convicted for any offence punishable with
imprisonment for two years or more;
(e) is disqualified to act as a director under the Companies Act,
2013 (18 of 2013); D
(f) is prohibited by the Securities and Exchange Board of India
from trading in securities or accessing the securities markets;
(g) has been a promoter or in the management or control of a
corporate debtor in which a preferential transaction, undervalued
transaction, extortionate credit transaction or fraudulent transaction E
has taken place and in respect of which an order has been made
by the Adjudicating Authority under this Code;
(h) has executed an enforceable guarantee in favour of a creditor
in respect of a corporate debtor against which an application for
insolvency resolution made by such creditor has been admitted F
under this Code;
(i) has been subject to any disability, corresponding to clauses (a)
to (h), under any law in a jurisdiction outside India; or
(j) has a connected person not eligible under clauses (a) to (i).
G
Explanation.— For the purposes of this clause, the expression
“connected person” means—
(i) any person who is the promoter or in the management or control
of the resolution applicant; or
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A (ii) any person who shall be the promoter or in management or
control of the business of the corporate debtor during the
implementation of the resolution plan; or
(iii) the holding company, subsidiary company, associate company
or related party of a person referred to in clauses (i) and (ii):
B Provided that nothing in clause (iii) of this Explanation shall apply
to—
(A) a scheduled bank; or
(B) an asset reconstruction company registered with the Reserve
C Bank of India under section 3 of the Securitisation and
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security
Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002); or
(C) an Alternate Investment Fund registered with the Securities
and Exchange Board of India.”
D 23. Finally, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second
Amendment) Act, 2018, received the assent of the President on 17.8.2018,
but came into force with retrospective effect from 6.6.2018. The said
amendment inter alia amended Section 29A, which now reads as follows:
“29A. Persons not eligible to be resolution applicant.—A
E person shall not be eligible to submit a resolution plan, if such
person, or any other person acting jointly or in concert with such
person—
(a) is an undischarged insolvent;
(b) is a wilful defaulter in accordance with the guidelines of the
F Reserve Bank of India issued under the Banking Regulation Act,
1949 (10 of 1949);
(c) at the time of submission of the resolution plan has an account,
or an account of a corporate debtor under the management or
control of such person or of whom such person is a promoter,
G classified as non-performing asset in accordance with the guidelines
of the Reserve Bank of India issued under the Banking Regulation
Act, 1949 (10 of 1949) or the guidelines of a financial sector
regulator issued under any other law for the time being in force,
and at least a period of one year has lapsed from the date of such
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classification till the date of commencement of the corporate A
insolvency resolution process of the corporate debtor:
Provided that the person shall be eligible to submit a resolution
plan if such person makes payment of all overdue amounts with
interest thereon and charges relating to non-performing asset
accounts before submission of resolution plan: B
Provided further that nothing in this clause shall apply to a resolution
applicant where such applicant is a financial entity and is not a
related party to the corporate debtor.
Explanation I.—For the purposes of this proviso, the expression
“related party” shall not include a financial entity, regulated by a C
financial sector regulator, if it is a financial creditor of the corporate
debtor and is a related party of the corporate debtor solely on
account of conversion or substitution of debt into equity shares or
instruments convertible into equity shares, prior to the insolvency
commencement date. D
Explanation II.—For the purposes of this clause, where a
resolution applicant has an account, or an account of a corporate
debtor under the management or control of such person or of
whom such person is a promoter, classified as non-performing
asset and such account was acquired pursuant to a prior resolution E
plan approved under this Code, then, the provisions of this clause
shall not apply to such resolution applicant for a period of three
years from the date of approval of such resolution plan by the
Adjudicating Authority under this Code;
(d) has been convicted for any offence punishable with F
imprisonment—
(i) for two years or more under any Act specified under the
Twelfth Schedule; or
(ii) for seven years or more under any other law for the time
being in force: G
Provided that this clause shall not apply to a person after the
expiry of a period of two years from the date of his release from
imprisonment:

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A Provided further that this clause shall not apply in relation to a
connected person referred to in clause (iii) of Explanation I;
(e) is disqualified to act as a director under the Companies Act,
2013 (18 of 2013):
Provided that this clause shall not apply in relation to a connected
B person referred to in clause (iii) of Explanation I;
(f) is prohibited by the Securities and Exchange Board of India
from trading in securities or accessing the securities markets;
(g) has been a promoter or in the management or control of a
C corporate debtor in which a preferential transaction, undervalued
transaction, extortionate credit transaction or fraudulent transaction
has taken place and in respect of which an order has been made
by the Adjudicating Authority under this Code:
Provided that this clause shall not apply if a preferential transaction,
D undervalued transaction, extortionate credit transaction or
fraudulent transaction has taken place prior to the acquisition of
the corporate debtor by the resolution applicant pursuant to a
resolution plan approved under this Code or pursuant to a scheme
or plan approved by a financial sector regulator or a court, and
such resolution applicant has not otherwise contributed to the
E preferential transaction, undervalued transaction, extortionate
credit transaction or fraudulent transaction;
(h) has executed a guarantee in favour of a creditor in respect of
a corporate debtor against which an application for insolvency
resolution made by such creditor has been admitted under this
F Code and such guarantee has been invoked by the creditor and
remains unpaid in full or part;
(i) is subject to any disability, corresponding to clauses (a) to (h),
under any law in a jurisdiction outside India; or
(j) has a connected person not eligible under clauses (a) to (i).
G
Explanation I.—For the purposes of this clause, the expression
“connected person” means—
(i) any person who is the promoter or in the management or
control of the resolution applicant; or
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(ii) any person who shall be the promoter or in management or A
control of the business of the corporate debtor during the
implementation of the resolution plan; or
(iii) the holding company, subsidiary company, associate
company or related party of a person referred to in clauses (i)
and (ii): B
Provided that nothing in clause (iii) of Explanation I shall apply to
a resolution applicant where such applicant is a financial entity
and is not a related party of the corporate debtor:
Provided further that the expression “related party” shall not
include a financial entity, regulated by a financial sector regulator, C
if it is a financial creditor of the corporate debtor and is a related
party of the corporate debtor solely on account of conversion or
substitution of debt into equity shares or instruments convertible
into equity shares, prior to the insolvency commencement date;
Explanation II.—For the purposes of this section, “financial entity” D
shall mean the following entities which meet such criteria or
conditions as the Central Government may, in consultation with
the financial sector regulator, notify in this behalf, namely—
(a) a scheduled bank;
E
(b) any entity regulated by a foreign central bank or a securities
market regulator or other financial sector regulator of a
jurisdiction outside India which jurisdiction is compliant with
the Financial Action Task Force Standards and is a signatory
to the International Organisation of Securities Commissions
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding; F
(c) any investment vehicle, registered foreign institutional
investor, registered foreign portfolio investor or a foreign venture
capital investor, where the terms shall have the meaning
assigned to them in regulation 2 of the Foreign Exchange
Management (Transfer or Issue of Security by a Person G
Resident Outside India) Regulations, 2017 made under the
Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (42 of 1999);
(d) an asset reconstruction company registered with the
Reserve Bank of India under Section 3 of the Securitisation
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A and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of
Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002);
(e) an Alternate Investment Fund registered with the Securities
and Exchange Board of India;
(f) such categories of persons as may be notified by the Central
B Government.”
24. The Hon’ble Minister of Finance and Minister of Corporate
Affairs, Shri Arun Jaitley, while moving the Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Code (Amendment) Bill, 2017, stated on 29.12.2017:

C “The core and soul of this new Ordinance is really Clause 5, which
is Section 29A of the original Bill. I may just explain that once a
company goes into the resolution process, then applications would
be invited with regard to the potential resolution proposals as far
as the company is concerned or the enterprise is concerned. Now
a number of ineligibility clauses were not there in the original Act
D and, therefore, Clause 29A introduces those who are not eligible
to apply. For instance there is a clause with regard to an
undischarged insolvent who is not eligible to apply; a person who
has been disqualifies under the Companies Act as a director cannot
apply and a person who is prohibited under the SEBI Act cannot
E apply. So these are statutory disqualifications. And there is also a
disqualification in Clause (c) with regard to those who are
corporate debtors and who as on the date of the application making
a bid do not operationalise the account by paying the interest itself
i.e. you cannot say that I have an NPA. I am not making the
account operational. The accounts will continue to be NPAs and
F yet I am going to apply for this. Effectively this clause will mean
that those who are in management and on account of whom this
insolvent or non-performing asset has arisen will now try and say.
I do not discharge any of the outstanding debts in terms of making
the accounts operational and yet I would like to apply and set the
G enterprise back at a discount value, for this is not the object of this
particular Act, So clause 5 has been brought in with that purpose
in mind.” (emphasis supplied)
25. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the aforesaid Bill
lays down:
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“2. The provisions for insolvency resolution and liquidation of a A
corporate person in the Code did not restrict or bar any person
from submitting a resolution plan or participating in the acquisition
process of the assets of the company at the time of liquidation.
Concerns have been raised that persons who, with their misconduct
contributed to defaults of companies or are otherwise undesirable,
B
may misuse this situation due to lack of prohibition or restrictions
to participate in the resolution or liquidation process, and gain or
regain control of the corporate debtor. This may undermine the
processes laid down in the Code as the unscrupulous person would
be seen to be rewarded at the expense of the creditors. In addition,
in order to check that the undesirable persons who may have C
submitted their resolution plans in the absence of such a provision,
responsibility is also being entrusted on the committee of creditors
to give a reasonable period to repay overdue amounts and become
eligible.” (emphasis supplied)
26. It is in this background that the section has to be construed. D
In Ms. Eera Through Dr. Manjula Krippendorf v. State (Govt. of
NCT of Delhi) & Anr., (2017) 15 SCC 133, this Court, after referring
to the golden rule of literal construction, and its older counterpart the
“object rule” in Heydon’s case, referred to the theory of creative
interpretation as follows:-
E
“122. Instances of creative interpretation are when the Court looks
at both the literal language as well as the purpose or object of the
statute in order to better determine what the words used by the
draftsman of legislation mean. In D.R.
Venkatachalam v. Transport Commr. [D.R.
Venkatachalam v. Transport Commr., (1977) 2 SCC 273], an F
early instance of this is found in the concurring judgment of Beg,
J. The learned Judge put it rather well when he said: (SCC p. 287,
para 28)
“28. It is, however, becoming increasingly fashionable to start
with some theory of what is basic to a provision or a chapter G
or in a statute or even to our Constitution in order to interpret
and determine the meaning of a particular provision or rule
made to subserve an assumed “basic” requirement. I think
that this novel method of construction puts, if I may say so, the
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418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A cart before the horse. It is apt to seriously mislead us unless
the tendency to use such a mode of construction is checked or
corrected by this Court. What is basic for a section or a chapter
in a statute is provided: firstly, by the words used in the statute
itself; secondly, by the context in which a provision occurs, or,
in other words, by reading the statute as a whole; thirdly, by
B
the Preamble which could supply the “key” to the meaning of
the statute in cases of uncertainty or doubt; and, fourthly, where
some further aid to construction may still be needed to resolve
an uncertainty, by the legislative history which discloses the
wider context or perspective in which a provision was made to
C meet a particular need or to satisfy a particular purpose. The
last mentioned method consists of an application of the mischief
rule laid down in Heydon case [Heydon case, (1584) 3 Co
Rep 7a : 76 ER 637] long ago.”
xxx xxx xxx
D 127. It is thus clear on a reading of English, US, Australian and
our own Supreme Court judgments that the “Lakshman Rekha”
has in fact been extended to move away from the strictly literal
rule of interpretation back to the rule of the old English case
of Heydon [Heydon case, (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a : 76 ER 637],
E where the Court must have recourse to the purpose, object, text
and context of a particular provision before arriving at a judicial
result. In fact, the wheel has turned full circle. It started out by
the rule as stated in 1584 in Heydon case [Heydon case, (1584)
3 Co Rep 7a : 76 ER 637], which was then waylaid by the literal
interpretation rule laid down by the Privy Council and the House
F of Lords in the mid-1800s, and has come back to restate the rule
somewhat in terms of what was most felicitously put over 400
years ago in Heydon case [Heydon case, (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a :
76 ER 637].”
27. A purposive interpretation of Section 29A, depending both on
G the text and the context in which the provision was enacted, must,
therefore, inform our interpretation of the same. We are concerned in
the present matter with sub-clauses (c), (f), (i) and (j) thereof.
28. It will be noticed that the opening lines of Section 29A contained
in the Ordinance of 2017 are different from the opening lines of Section
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29A as contained in the Amendment Act of 2017. What is important to A
note is that the phrase “persons acting in concert” is conspicuous by
its absence in the Ordinance of 2017. The concepts of “promoter”,
“management” and “control” which were contained in the opening lines
of Section 29A under the Ordinance have now been transferred to sub-
clause (c) in the Amendment Act of 2017. It is, therefore, important to
B
note that the Amendment Act of 2017 opens with language which is of
wider import than that contained in the Ordinance of 2017, evincing an
intention to rope in all persons who may be acting in concert with the
person submitting a resolution plan.
29. The opening lines of Section 29A of the Amendment Act refer
to a de facto as opposed to a de jure position of the persons mentioned C
therein. This is a typical instance of a “see through provision”, so that
one is able to arrive at persons who are actually in “control”, whether
jointly, or in concert, with other persons. A wooden, literal, interpretation
would obviously not permit a tearing of the corporate veil when it comes
to the “person” whose eligibility is to be gone into. However, a purposeful D
and contextual interpretation, such as is the felt necessity of interpretation
of such a provision as Section 29A, alone governs. For example, it is
well settled that a shareholder is a separate legal entity from the company
in which he holds shares. This may be true generally speaking, but
when it comes to a corporate vehicle that is set up for the purpose of
submission of a resolution plan, it is not only permissible but imperative E
for the competent authority to find out as to who are the constituent
elements that make up such a company. In such cases, the principle laid
down in Salomon v. A Salomon and Co. Ltd. [1897] AC 22 will not
apply. For it is important to discover in such cases as to who are the real
individuals or entities who are acting jointly or in concert, and who have F
set up such a corporate vehicle for the purpose of submission of a
resolution plan.
30. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is as well settled as
the Salomon (supra.) principle itself. In Life Insurance Corporation
of India v. Escorts Ltd. & Ors., (1986) 1 SCC 264, this Court held: G
“90. It was submitted that the thirteen Caparo companies were
thirteen companies in name only; they were but one and that one
was an individual, Mr Swraj Paul. One had only to pierce the
corporate veil to discover Mr Swraj Paul lurking behind. It was
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420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A submitted that thirteen applications were made on behalf of thirteen
companies in order to circumvent the scheme which prescribed a
ceiling of one per cent on behalf of each non-resident of Indian
nationality or origin, or each company 60 per cent of whose shares
were owned by non-residents of Indian nationality/origin. Our
attention was drawn to the picturesque pronouncement of Lord
B
Denning M.R. in Wallersteiner v. Moir [(1974) 3 All ER 217]
and the decisions of this Court in Tata Engineering and
Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar [(1964) 6 SCR
885], CIT v. Sri Meenakshi Mills Ltd. [(1967) 1 SCR 934]
and Workmen v. Associated Rubber Industry Ltd. [(1985) 4 SCC
C 114]. While it is firmly established ever since Salomon v. A.
Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1897 AC 22] was decided that a company
has an independent and legal personality distinct from the individuals
who are its members, it has since been held that the corporate
veil may be lifted, the corporate personality may be ignored and
the individual members recognised for who they are in certain
D
exceptional circumstances Pennington in his Company Law (4th
Edn.) states:
“Four inroads have been made by the law on the principle of
the separate legal personality of companies. By far the most
extensive of these has been made by legislation imposing
E taxation. The government, naturally enough, does not willingly
suffer schemes for the avoidance of taxation which depend
for their success on the employment of the principle of separate
legal personality, and in fact legislation has gone so far that in
certain circumstances taxation can be heavier if companies
F are employed by the taxpayer in an attempt to minimise his tax
liability than if he uses other means to give effect to his wishes.
Taxation of companies is a complex subject, and is outside the
scope of this book. The reader who wishes to pursue the subject
is referred to the many standard text books on corporation tax,
income tax, capital gains tax and capital transfer tax.
G
The other inroads on the principle of separate corporate
personality have been made by two sections of the Companies
Act, 1948, by judicial disregard of the principle where the
protection of public interest is of paramount importance, or
where the company has been formed to evade obligations
H
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imposed by the law, and by the courts implying in certain cases A
that a company is an agent or trustee for its members.”
In Palmer’s Company Law (23rd Edn.), the present position in
England is stated and the occasions when the corporate veil may
be lifted have been enumerated and classified into fourteen
categories. Similarly in Gower’s Company Law (4th Edn.), a B
chapter is devoted to ‘lifting the veil’ and the various occasions
when that may be done are discussed. In Tata Engineering and
Locomotive Co. Ltd. [(1964) 6 SCR 885] the company wanted
the corporate veil to be lifted so as to sustain the maintainability of
the petition, filed by the company under Article 32 of the
Constitution, by treating it as one filed by the shareholders of the C
company. The request of the company was turned down on the
ground that it was not possible to treat the company as a citizen
for the purposes of Article 19. In CIT v. Sri Meenakshi Mills
Ltd. [(1967) 1 SCR 934] the corporate veil was lifted and evasion
of income tax prevented by paying regard to the economic realities D
behind the legal facade. In Workmen v. Associated Rubber
Industry Ltd. [(1985) 4 SCC 114] resort was had to the principle
of lifting the veil to prevent devices to avoid welfare legislation. It
was emphasised that regard must be had to substance and not the
form of a transaction. Generally and broadly speaking, we may
say that the corporate veil may be lifted where a statute itself E
contemplates lifting the veil, or fraud or improper conduct is
intended to be prevented, or a taxing statute or a beneficent statute
is sought to be evaded or where associated companies are
inextricably connected as to be, in reality, part of one concern. It
is neither necessary nor desirable to enumerate the classes of F
cases where lifting the veil is permissible, since that must
necessarily depend on the relevant statutory or other provisions,
the object sought to be achieved, the impugned conduct, the
involvement of the element of the public interest, the effect on
parties who may be affected etc.” (Emphasis supplied.)
G
31. This statement of the law was followed in Union of India v.
ABN Amro Bank and others, (2013) 16 SCC 490, at paragraphs 43
and 44 as follows:
“43. We are of the view that in a given situation the authorities
functioning under FERA find that there are attempts to overreach H
422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A the provision of Section 29(1)(a), the authority can always lift the
veil and examine whether the parties have entered into any
fraudulent, sham, circuitous device so as to overcome statutory
provisions like Section 29(1)(a). It is trite law that any approval/
permission obtained by non-disclosure of all necessary information
or making a false representation tantamount to approval/permission
B
obtained by practising fraud and hence a nullity. Reference may
be made to the judgment of this Court in Union of
India v. Ramesh Gandhi [(2012) 1 SCC 476].
44. Even in Escorts case [(1986) 1 SCC 264], this Court has taken
the view that it is neither necessary nor desirable to enumerate
C the classes of cases where lifting the veil is permissible, since that
must necessarily depend on the relevant statutory or other
provisions, the object sought to be achieved, the impugned conduct,
the involvement of the element of the public interest, the effect on
parties who may be affected, etc. In Escorts case [(1986) 1 SCC
D 264], this Court held as follows: (SCC pp. 335-36, para 90)
“90. … Generally and broadly speaking, we may say that the
corporate veil may be lifted where a statute itself contemplates
lifting the veil, or fraud or improper conduct is intended to be
prevented, or a taxing statute or a beneficent statute is sought
E to be evaded or where associated companies are inextricably
connected as to be, in reality, part of one concern.””
32. Similarly in Balwant Rai Saluja & Anr. etc. etc. v. Air
India Ltd. & Ors., (2014) 9 SCC 407, this Court in following Escorts
Ltd. (supra.), held:
F “70. The doctrine of “piercing the corporate veil” stands as an
exception to the principle that a company is a legal entity separate
and distinct from its shareholders with its own legal rights and
obligations. It seeks to disregard the separate personality of the
company and attribute the acts of the company to those who are
G allegedly in direct control of its operation. The starting point of
this doctrine was discussed in the celebrated case
of Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1897 AC 22] Lord Halsbury
LC, negating the applicability of this doctrine to the facts of the
case, stated that: (AC pp. 30 & 31)

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KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

“[a company] must be treated like any other independent person A
with its rights and liabilities [legally] appropriate to itself …
whatever may have been the ideas or schemes of those who
brought it into existence.”
Most of the cases subsequent to Salomon case [1897 AC 22],
attributed the doctrine of piercing the veil to the fact that the B
company was a “sham” or a “façade”. However, there was yet
to be any clarity on applicability of the said doctrine.
71. In recent times, the law has been crystallised around the six
principles formulated by Munby, J. in Ben Hashem v. Ali
Shayif [Ben Hashem v. Ali Shayif, 2008 EWHC 2380 (Fam)]. C
The six principles, as found at paras 159-64 of the case are as
follows:
(i) Ownership and control of a company were not enough to
justify piercing the corporate veil;
(ii) The court cannot pierce the corporate veil, even in the D
absence of third-party interests in the company, merely because
it is thought to be necessary in the interests of justice;
(iii) The corporate veil can be pierced only if there is some
impropriety;
E
(iv) The impropriety in question must be linked to the use of
the company structure to avoid or conceal liability;
(v) To justify piercing the corporate veil, there must be both
control of the company by the wrongdoer(s) and impropriety,
that is use or misuse of the company by them as a device or
F
facade to conceal their wrongdoing; and
(vi) The company may be a “façade” even though it was not
originally incorporated with any deceptive intent, provided that
it is being used for the purpose of deception at the time of the
relevant transactions. The court would, however, pierce the
corporate veil only so far as it was necessary in order to provide G
a remedy for the particular wrong which those controlling the
company had done
72. The principles laid down by Ben Hashem case [Ben
Hashem v. Ali Shayif, 2008 EWHC 2380 (Fam)] have been
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424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A reiterated by the UK Supreme Court by Lord Neuberger
in Prest v. Petrodel Resources Ltd. [(2013) 2 AC 415], UKSC
at para 64. Lord Sumption, in Prest case [(2013) 2 AC 415], finally
observed as follows: (AC p. 488, para 35)
“35. I conclude that there is a limited principle of English law
B which applies when a person is under an existing legal obligation
or liability or subject to an existing legal restriction which he
deliberately evades or whose enforcement he deliberately
frustrates by interposing a company under his control. The
court may then pierce the corporate veil for the purpose, and
only for the purpose, of depriving the company or its controller
C of the advantage that they would otherwise have obtained by
the company’s separate legal personality. The principle is
properly described as a limited one, because in almost every
case where the test is satisfied, the facts will in practice disclose
a legal relationship between the company and its controller
D which will make it unnecessary to pierce the corporate veil.”
73. The position of law regarding this principle in India has been
enumerated in various decisions. A Constitution Bench of this Court
in LIC v. Escorts Ltd. [(1986) 1 SCC 264], while discussing the
doctrine of corporate veil, held that: (SCC pp. 335-36, para 90)
E “90. … Generally and broadly speaking, we may say that the
corporate veil may be lifted where a statute itself contemplates
lifting the veil, or fraud or improper conduct is intended to be
prevented, or a taxing statute or a beneficent statute is sought
to be evaded or where associated companies are inextricably
F connected as to be, in reality, part of one concern. It is neither
necessary nor desirable to enumerate the classes of cases
where lifting the veil is permissible, since that must necessarily
depend on the relevant statutory or other provisions, the object
sought to be achieved, the impugned conduct, the involvement
of the element of the public interest, the effect on parties who
G may be affected, etc.””
33. Similarly in Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper
Construction Company (P) Ltd. & Another, (1996) 4 SCC 622, this
Court held:

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ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 425
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

“24. In Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1897 AC 22] the House A
of Lords had observed,
“the company is at law a different person altogether from the
subscribers …; and, though it may be that after incorporation
the business is precisely the same as it was before, the same
persons are managers, and the same hands receive the profits, B
the company is not in law the agent of the subscribers or trustee
for them. Nor are the subscribers as members liable, in any
shape or form, except to the extent and in the manner provided
by that Act.”
Since then, however, the courts have come to recognise several C
exceptions to the said rule. While it is not necessary to refer to all
of them, the one relevant to us is “when the corporate personality
is being blatantly used as a cloak for fraud or improper conduct”.
[Gower: Modern Company Law — 4th Edn. (1979) at p. 137.]
Pennington (Company Law — 5th Edn. 1985 at p. 53) also states
that “where the protection of public interests is of paramount D
importance or where the company has been formed to evade
obligations imposed by the law”, the court will disregard the
corporate veil. A Professor of Law, S. Ottolenghi in his article
“From peeping behind the Corporate Veil, to ignoring it
completely” says E
“the concept of ‘piercing the veil’ in the United States is much
more developed than in the UK. The motto, which was laid
down by Sanborn, J. and cited since then as the law, is that
‘when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the F
law will regard the corporation as an association of persons’.
The same can be seen in various European jurisdictions.”
[(1990) 53 Modern Law Review 338]
Indeed, as far back as 1912, another American Professor L.
Maurice Wormser examined the American decisions on the subject G
in a brilliantly written article “Piercing the veil of corporate
entity” [published in (1912) XII Columbia Law Review 496] and
summarised their central holding in the following words:
“The various classes of cases where the concept of corporate
entity should be ignored and the veil drawn aside have now
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426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A been briefly reviewed. What general rule, if any, can be laid
down? The nearest approximation to generalisation which the
present state of the authorities would warrant is this: When
the conception of corporate entity is employed to defraud
creditors, to evade an existing obligation, to circumvent a statute,
to achieve or perpetuate monopoly, or to protect knavery or
B
crime, the courts will draw aside the web of entity, will regard
the corporate company as an association of live, up-and-doing,
men and women shareholders, and will do justice between real
persons.”
25. In Palmer’s Company Law, this topic is discussed in Part II
C of Vol. I. Several situations where the court will disregard the
corporate veil are set out. It would be sufficient for our purposes
to quote the eighth exception. It runs:
“The courts have further shown themselves willing to ‘lifting
the veil’ where the device of incorporation is used for some
D illegal or improper purpose…. Where a vendor of land sought
to avoid the action for specific performance by transferring
the land in breach of contract to a company he had formed for
the purpose, the court treated the company as a mere ‘sham’
and made an order for specific performance against both the
E vendor and the company.”
Similar views have been expressed by all the commentators on
the Company Law which we do not think necessary to refer to.
26. The law as stated by Palmer and Gower has been approved
by this Court in TELCO v. State of Bihar [(1964) 6 SCR 885].
F The following passage from the decision is apposite:
“… Gower has classified seven categories of cases where the
veil of a corporate body has been lifted. But, it would not be
possible to evolve a rational, consistent and inflexible principle
which can be invoked in determining the question as to whether
G the veil of the corporation should be lifted or not. Broadly stated,
where fraud is intended to be prevented, or trading with an
enemy is sought to be defeated, the veil of a corporation is
lifted by judicial decisions and the shareholders are held to be
the persons who actually work for the corporation.”
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ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 427
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

27. In DHN Food Distributors Ltd. v. London Borough of A
Tower Hamlets [(1976) 3 All ER 462] the court of appeal dealt
with a group of companies. Lord Denning quoted with approval
the statement in Gower’s Company Law that
“there is evidence of a general tendency to ignore the separate
legal entities of various companies within a group, and to look B
instead at the economic entity of the whole group”.
The learned Master of Rolls observed that “this group is virtually
the same as a partnership in which all the three companies are
partners”. He called it a case of “three in one” — and, alternatively,
as “one in three”. C
28. The concept of corporate entity was evolved to encourage
and promote trade and commerce but not to commit illegalities or
to defraud people. Where, therefore, the corporate character is
employed for the purpose of committing illegality or for defrauding
others, the court would ignore the corporate character and will D
look at the reality behind the corporate veil so as to enable it to
pass appropriate orders to do justice between the parties
concerned. The fact that Tejwant Singh and members of his family
have created several corporate bodies does not prevent this Court
from treating all of them as one entity belonging to and controlled
by Tejwant Singh and family if it is found that these corporate E
bodies are merely cloaks behind which lurks Tejwant Singh and/
or members of his family and that the device of incorporation
was really a ploy adopted for committing illegalities and/or to
defraud people.” (emphasis supplied)
34. It is thus clear that, where a statute itself lifts the corporate F
veil, or where protection of public interest is of paramount importance,
or where a company has been formed to evade obligations imposed by
the law, the court will disregard the corporate veil. Further, this principle
is applied even to group companies, so that one is able to look at the
economic entity of the group as a whole. G
35. The expression “acting jointly” in the opening sentence of
Section 29A cannot be confused with “joint venture agreements”, as
was sought to be argued by Shri Rohatgi. He cited various judgments
including Faqir Chand Gulati v. Uppal Agencies Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.,
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428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A (2008) 10 SCC 345, and Laurel Energetics Private Limited v.
Securities and Exchange Board of India, (2017) 8 SCC 541, to
buttress his submission that a joint venture is a contractually agreed
sharing of control over an economic activity. We are afraid that these
judgments are wholly inapplicable. All that is to be seen by the expression
“acting jointly” is whether certain persons have got together and are
B
acting “jointly” in the sense of acting together. If this is made out on
the facts, no super added element of “joint venture” as is understood in
law is to be seen. The other important phrase is “in concert”. By
Section 3(37) of the Code, words and expressions used but not defined
in the Code but defined inter alia by the SEBI Act, 1992, and the
C Companies Act, 2013, shall have the meanings respectively assigned to
them in those Acts. In exercise of powers conferred by Sections 11 and
30 of the SEBI Act, 1992, the 2011 Takeover Regulations have been
promulgated by SEBI.
36. Originally, the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and
D Takeovers) Regulations, 1994, defined “persons acting in concert” as
follows:
“(d) “person acting in concert” comprises persons who, pursuant
to an agreement or understanding acquires or agrees to acquire
shares in a company for a common objective o purpose of
E substantial acquisition of shares and includes:
i. a company, its holding company, or subsidiaries of such companies
or companies under the same management either individually or
all with each other.
ii. a company with any of its directors, or any person entrusted
F with the management of the funds of the company;
iii. directors of companies, referred to in clause (i) and his
associates; and
iv. mutual fund, financial institution, merchant banker, portfolio
manager and any investment company in which any person has
G
an interest as director, fund manager, trustee, or as a shareholder
having not less than 2% of the paid-up capital of that company.
Explanation – For the purposes of this clause “associate” means:-

H
ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 429
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

A. Any relative of that person within the meaning of section 6 A
of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956);
B. the director or his relative whether individually or in
aggregate holding more than 2% of the paid-up equity capital
of such company.”
This was replaced in 1997 by the Regulations of 1997, and then B
further by the 2011 Takeover Regulations.
37. The Justice P.N. Bhagwati Committee Report on Takeovers,
1997, pursuant to which the Regulations of 1997 were framed, stated as
follows:
C
“2.22 Definition of ‘Persons acting in concert’
“Persons acting in concert” have particular relevance to public
offers, for often an acquirer can acquire shares or voting rights in
a company “in concert” with any other person in a manner that
the acquisitions made by him remain below the threshold limit, D
though taken together with the voting rights of persons in concert,
the threshold may well be exceeded. It is therefore, important to
define “persons acting in concert”.
To be acting in concert with an acquirer, persons must fulfil certain
“bright line” tests. They must have commonality of objectives
E
and a community of interests which could be acquisition of shares
or voting rights beyond the threshold limit, or gaining control over
the company and their act of acquiring the shares or voting rights
in a company must serve this common objective. Implicit in the
concerted action of these persons must be an element of
cooperation. And as has been observed, this cooperation could be F
extended in several ways, directly or indirectly, or through an
agreement – formal or informal. The committee was of the view
that the present definition of “persons acting in concert” in sub-
clause (d) of regulation 2 needed to be strengthened by
incorporating all the ingredients discussed in the foregoing
G
paragraph to bring out clearly the import of acting in concert.
Any person fulfilling the “bright line” tests would be acting in
concert. But there could also be certain persons who, by their
position in relation to an acquirer or by the very nature of their
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430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A business, could be generally presumed to be acting in concert,
unless proved to the contrary. In other words, a rebuttable
presumption of being persons in concert with burden of proof
cast on them will be raised against these persons. The Committee
was of the view that while the net of presumption should be cast
to include all such persons, it should not be cast too widely so as
B
to impinge on the freedom of any person to carry on his normal
business activities. In other words, there should be well defined
bounds of presumption.
xxx xxx xxx
C 2.23 Burden of proof on ‘persons acting in concert’
The Committee further noted that in the existing Regulations, there
is no burden of proof on the ‘persons acting in concert’. Once the
burden of proof is cast on the persons presumed to be acting in
concert, it would be important to ensure that the persons are
D grouped in categories such that the persons may be presumed to
be acting in concert only with another person belonging to the
same category. A general reading of the existing provisions implies
that a person belonging to any one of the categories mentioned in
sub-clauses (i) to (iv) of clause (d) of regulation 2 could be
presumed to be acting in concert with a person belonging to any
E other category. Thus, a company could be presumed to be acting
in concert with a merchant banker, mutual fund, or any other body
even though they may all be distinctly independent entities without
any connection whatsoever. Such irrebuttable presumption of a
common motive amongst unrelated parties would be illogical and
F not legally tenable. A distinction must be made between persons
who could be presumed to be acting in concert unless proved to
the contrary and others who may be acting in concert even though
such a presumption cannot be raised against them. In this context,
it may be noted that the UK City Code of Takeovers and Mergers,
for this very reason, has divided the persons acting in concert into
G groups in such a manner that these persons would in the natural
course of affairs be presumed to be acting in concert only with
another person in the same group. This served to set the pattern
for raising rebuttable presumptions.

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ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 431
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

The Committee recommends that A

• In the definition of persons acting in concert, the persons
be grouped in such a manner in the same group or
category that they bear such relationship amongst
themselves as could justify raising of a presumption in
B
the normal course of affairs that they are acting in
concert. For example, a sponsor of a mutual fund could be
presumed to be acting in concert with the trustee company
or asset management company of the same mutual fund;
similarly a merchant banker may be presumed to be acting
in concert with his client as acquirer. But no presumption C
may be made that persons in one group are acting in concert
with persons in another group. It has to be proved by evidence
that they are acting in concert. (Reference: Part II of the
Report – sub-clause (e) of sub-regulation (1) of regulation
2).
D
The definition of the persons acting in concert as defined above
would imply a rebuttable presumption. The question which arises
is who would rule whether the presumption has been rebutted.
The responsibility of ruling will lie with SEBI and over a period of
time, jurisprudence on the subject will develop.”
E
38. By Regulation 2(1)(q) of the 2011 Takeover Regulations,
“persons acting in concert” is defined as follows:-
“(q) “persons acting in concert” means,—
(1) persons who, with a common objective or purpose of acquisition
of shares or voting rights in, or exercising control over a target F
company, pursuant to an agreement or understanding, formal or
informal, directly or indirectly co-operate for acquisition of shares
or voting rights in, or exercise of control over the target company.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the persons
falling within the following categories shall be deemed to be persons G
acting in concert with other persons within the same category,
unless the contrary is established,—
(i) a company, its holding company, subsidiary company and
any company under the same management or control;
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432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A (ii) a company, its directors, and any person entrusted with the
management of the company;
(iii) directors of companies referred to in item (i) and (ii) of this
sub-clause and associates of such directors;
(iv) promoters and members of the promoter group;
B
(v) immediate relatives;
(vi) a mutual fund, its sponsor, trustees, trustee company, and
asset management company;
(vii) a collective investment scheme and its collective investment
C management company, trustees and trustee company;
(viii) a venture capital fund and its sponsor, trustees, trustee
company and asset management company;
(viiia) an alternative investment fund and its sponsor, trustees,
trustee company and manager;
D
(ix) [***]
(x) a merchant banker and its client, who is an acquirer;
(xi) a portfolio manager and its client, who is an acquirer;

E (xii) banks, financial advisors and stock brokers of the acquirer,
or of any company which is a holding company or subsidiary
of the acquirer, and where the acquirer is an individual, of the
immediate relative of such individual:
Provided that this sub-clause shall not apply to a bank whose
F sole role is that of providing normal commercial banking
services or activities in relation to an open offer under these
regulations;
(xiii) an investment company or fund and any person who has
an interest in such investment company or fund as a shareholder
or unitholder having not less than 10 per cent of the paid-up
G
capital of the investment company or unit capital of the fund,
and any other investment company or fund in which such person
or his associate holds not less than 10 per cent of the paid-up
capital of that investment company or unit capital of that fund:

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ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 433
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

Provided that nothing contained in this sub-clause shall apply A
to holding of units of mutual funds registered with the Board;
Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause ¯ “associate”
of a person means,—
(a) any immediate relative of such person;
B
(b) trusts of which such person or his immediate relative is a
trustee;
(c) partnership firm in which such person or his immediate
relative is a partner; and
(d) members of Hindu undivided families of which such person C
is a coparcener;”
39. It will be seen from the wide language used, that any
understanding, even if it is informal, and even if it is to indirectly cooperate
to exercise control over a target company, is included. Under sub-clause
(2) of clause (q), a deeming fiction is enacted, by which a presumption is D
raised in the categories mentioned, that a person falling within one
category is deemed to be acting in concert with another person mentioned
in the same category, unless the contrary is established. The corporate
veil is not merely torn but is left in tatters by sub-clauses (i) to (iv) of
Regulation 2(1)(q)(2). What is also important to note is that “immediate
E
relatives” are also covered by sub-clause (v) – i.e., father and son,
brothers, etc. Also of importance is the definition of “associate” in the
explanation to Regulation 2(1)(q)(2), which subsumes not merely
immediate relatives but other forms in which a person can be associated
with another - which includes the form of trust, partnership firm and
HUF. What is of great importance is that wherever persons act jointly F
or in concert with the “person” who submits a resolution plan, all such
persons are covered by Section 29A. It is interesting to note that the
report of the Insolvency Law Committee of March, 2018, wanted to
curtail the wide definition of persons acting jointly or in concert as follows:
“14.3 The term ‘person acting jointly or in concert’ has not been G
defined in the Code and using the definition provided in the SEBI
(Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations,
2011 results in inclusion of an extremely wide gamut of person
within the scope of section 29A. In practice, it is unclear whether
the term ‘connected person’ in clause (j) applies to only the
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434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A resolution applicant or even ‘persons acting jointly or in concert
with such person’. If the latter interpretation is taken, this provision
would be applicable to multiple layers of persons who are related
to the resolution applicant even remotely. Further, ARCs, banks
and alternate investment funds which are specifically excluded
from the definition of ‘connected person’ provided in section 29A
B
may be caught by the term ‘person acting jointly or in concert
with such person’. The Committee felt that section 29A was
introduced to disqualify only those who had contributed in the
downfall of the corporate debtor or were unsuitable to run the
company because of their antecedents whether directly or
C indirectly. Therefore, extending the disqualification to a
resolution application owing to infirmities in persons
remotely related may have adverse consequences. Such
interpretation of this provision may shrink the pool of
resolution applicants. Accordingly, the Committee felt that
the words, “…, if such person, or any other person acting
D
jointly or in concert with such person” in the first line of
section 29A must be deleted. This would clarify that section
29A is applicable to the resolution applicant and its
connected person only. Further, in order to ensure that
anyone who acts with a common objective along with the
E resolution applicant to acquire shares, voting rights or
control of the corporate debtor is required to pass the test
laid down in section 29A, the Committee felt that the
following clause must be added as clause (iv) to the definition
of connected person in the explanation to clause (j), “(iv)
any persons who along with the resolution applicant, with a
F
common objective or purpose of acquisition of shares or voting
rights in, or exercising control over a corporate debtor,
pursuant to an agreement or understanding, formal or
informal, directly or indirectly co-operate for acquisition of
shares or voting rights in, or exercise of control over the
G corporate debtor.””
This part of the report has not been accepted by the legislature, as none
of the suggested changes in the law have been made.
40. In Technip SA v. SMS Holding (Pvt.) Ltd. & Ors., (2005)
5 SCC 465, this Court after referring to the Bhagwati Committee Report
H of 1997, stated as follows:-
ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 435
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

“54. The standard of proof required to establish such concert is A
one of probability and may be established
“if having regard to their relation etc., their conduct, and their
common interest, that it may be inferred that they must be
acting together: evidence of actual concerted acting is normally
difficult to obtain, and is not insisted upon” [CIT v. East Coast B
Commercial Co. Ltd., (1967) 1 SCR 821]. (SCR p. 829 H)
55. While deciding whether a company was one in which the
public were substantially interested within the meaning of Section
23-A of the Income Tax Act, 1922 this Court said:
“The test is not whether they have actually acted in concert C
but whether the circumstances are such that human experience
tells us that it can safely be taken that they must be acting
together. It is not necessary to state the kind of evidence that
will prove such concerted actings. Each case must necessarily
be decided on its own facts.” [CIT v. Jubilee Mills Ltd., (1963) D
48 ITR 9 (SC), p. 20]
56. In Guinness PLC and Distillers Co. PLC [Guinness PLC
and Distillers Company PLC (Panel hearing on 25-8-1987 and
2-9-1987 at p. 10052 — Reasons for decisions of the Panel.)] the
question before the Takeover Panel was whether Guinness had E
acted in concert with Pipetec when Pipetec purchased shares in
Distillers Company PLC. Various factors were taken into
consideration to conclude that Guinness had acted in concert with
Pipetec to get control over Distillers Company. The Panel said:
“The nature of acting in concert requires that the definition be F
drawn in deliberately wide terms. It covers an understanding
as well as an agreement, and an informal as well as a formal
arrangement, which leads to cooperation to purchase shares
to acquire control of a company. This is necessary, as such
arrangements are often informal, and the understanding may
arise from a hint. The understanding may be tacit, and the G
definition covers situations where the parties act on the basis
of a ‘nod or a wink’…. Unless persons declare this agreement
or understanding, there is rarely direct evidence of action in
concert, and the Panel must draw on its experience and
common sense to determine whether those involved in any
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436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A dealings have some form of understanding and are acting in
cooperation with each other.” [Guinness PLC and Distillers
Company PLC (Panel hearing on 25-8-1987 and 2-9-1987 at
p. 10052 — Reasons for decisions of the Panel.)]”
(emphasis supplied)
B 41. In M/s. Daiichi Sankyo Company Ltd. v. Jayaram
Chigurupati & Ors., (2010) 7 SCC 449, this Court referred to the
concept of “persons acting in concert” and held that there must be a
shared common objective for substantial acquisition of shares of a target
company under the SEBI regulations. A fortuitous relationship coming
into existence by accident or chance obviously cannot amount to “persons
C acting in concert”. This Court held:-
“49. The other limb of the concept requires two or more persons
joining together with the shared common objective and purpose
of substantial acquisition of shares, etc. of a certain target
company. There can be no “persons acting in concert” unless
D there is a shared common objective or purpose between two
or more persons of substantial acquisition of shares, etc. of the
target company. For, dehors the element of the shared common
objective or purpose the idea of “person acting in concert” is as
meaningless as a criminal conspiracy without any agreement to
E commit a criminal offence. The idea of “persons acting in concert”
is not about a fortuitous relationship coming into existence by
accident or chance. The relationship can come into being only by
design, by meeting of minds between two or more persons leading
to the shared common objective or purpose of acquisition or
substantial acquisition of shares, etc. of the target company. It is
F another matter that the common objective or purpose may be in
pursuance of an agreement or an understanding, formal or informal;
the acquisition of shares, etc. may be direct or indirect or the
persons acting in concert may cooperate in actual acquisition of
shares, etc. or they may agree to cooperate in such acquisition.
G Nonetheless, the element of the shared common objective or
purpose is the sine qua non for the relationship of “persons acting
in concert” to come into being.” (emphasis supplied)
When coming to the presumption created by the provision, this Court
held that the deeming provision is left open to rebuttal as indicated by the
H
ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 437
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

words “unless the contrary is established” (see paragraph 54 of A
Daiichi (supra.)). Finally, this Court held that whether a person is or is
not acting in concert would depend upon the facts of each case. (see
paragraph 57 of Daiichi (supra.)).
42. When we come to sub-clause (c) of Section 29A, the first
thing that was argued, at which the parties were at loggerheads, was the B
time at which sub-clause (c) can be said to operate. According to Shri
Rohatgi, in the original sub-clause (c), pre-amendment, the time must
necessarily be the date of commencement of the corporate insolvency
resolution process, as is mentioned by the Section itself. According to
Messrs Salve and Singhvi, it is clear that since submission of a resolution
plan is spoken of, it is the time of submission of such plan and not any C
anterior stage.
43. According to us, it is clear that the opening words of Section
29A furnish a clue as to the time at which sub-clause (c) is to operate.
The opening words of Section 29A state: “a person shall not be eligible
to submit a resolution plan…”. It is clear therefore that the stage of D
ineligibility attaches when the resolution plan is submitted by a resolution
applicant. The contrary view expressed by Shri Rohatgi is obviously
incorrect, as the date of commencement of the corporate insolvency
resolution process is only relevant for the purpose of calculating whether
one year has lapsed from the date of classification of a person as a non- E
performing asset. Further, the expression used is “has”, which as Dr.
Singhvi has correctly argued, is in praesenti. This is to be contrasted
with the expression “has been”, which is used in sub-clauses (d) and
(g), which refers to an anterior point of time. Consequently, the
amendment of 2018 introducing the words “at the time of submission
of the resolution plan” is clarificatory, as this was always the correct F
interpretation as to the point of time at which the disqualification in sub-
clause (c) of Section 29A will attach. In fact, the amendment was made
pursuant to the Insolvency Law Committee Report of March, 2018.
That report clearly stated:
“In relation to applicability of section 29A(c), the Committee also G
discussed that it must be clarified that the disqualification pursuant
to section 29A(c) shall be applicable if such NPA accounts are
held by the resolution applicant or its connected persons at the
time of submission of the resolution plan to the RP.”
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438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A 44. The ingredients of sub-clause (c) are that, the ineligibility to
submit a resolution plan attaches if any person, as is referred to in the
opening lines of Section 29A, either itself has an account, or is a promoter
of, or in the management or control of, a corporate debtor which has an
account, which account has been classified as a non-performing asset,
for a period of at least one year from the date of such classification till
B
the date of commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution process.
For the purpose of applying this sub-section, any one of three things,
which are disjunctive, needs to be established. The corporate debtor
may be under the management of the person referred to in Section 29A,
the corporate debtor may be a person under the control of such person,
C or the corporate debtor may be a person of whom such person is a
promoter.
45. The expression “management” would refer to the de jure
management of a corporate debtor. The de jure management of a
corporate debtor would ordinarily vest in a Board of Directors, and would
D include, in accord with the definitions of “manager”, “managing
director” and “officer” in Sections 2(53), 2(54) and 2(59) respectively
of the Companies Act, 2013, the persons mentioned therein.
46. The expression “control” is defined in Section 2(27) of the
Companies Act, 2013 as follows:-
E “(27) “control” shall include the right to appoint majority of the
directors or to control the management or policy decisions
exercisable by a person or persons acting individually or in concert,
directly or indirectly, including by virtue of their shareholding or
management rights or shareholders agreements or voting
F agreements or in any other manner;”
47. The expression “control” is therefore defined in two parts.
The first part refers to de jure control, which includes the right to appoint
a majority of the directors of a company. The second part refers to de
facto control. So long as a person or persons acting in concert, directly
G or indirectly, can positively influence, in any manner, management or
policy decisions, they could be said to be “in control”. A management
decision is a decision to be taken as to how the corporate body is to be
run in its day to day affairs. A policy decision would be a decision that
would be beyond running day to day affairs, i.e., long term decisions. So
long as management or policy decisions can be, or are in fact, taken by
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ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 439
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

virtue of shareholding, management rights, shareholders agreements, A
voting agreements or otherwise, control can be said to exist.
48. Thus, the expression “control”, in Section 29A(c), denotes
only positive control, which means that the mere power to block special
resolutions of a company cannot amount to control. “Control” here, as
contrasted with “management”, means de facto control of actual B
management or policy decisions that can be or are in fact taken. A
judgment of the Securities Appellate Tribunal in M/s Subhkam Ventures
(I) Private Limited v. The Securities and Exchange Board of India
(Appeal No. 8 of 2009 decided on 15.1.2010), made the following
observations qua “control” under the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of
Shares and Takeover) Regulations, 1997, wherein “control” is defined C
in Regulation 2(1)(e) in similar terms as in Section 2(27) of the Companies
Act, 2013. The Securities Appellate Tribunal held:
“6. …The term control has been defined in Regulation 2(1)(c) of
the takeover code to “include the right to appoint majority of the
directors or to control the management or policy decisions D
exercisable by a person or persons acting individually or in concert,
directly or indirectly, including by virtue of their shareholding or
management rights or shareholders agreements or voting
agreements or in any other manner.” This definition is an inclusive
one and not exhaustive and it has two distinct and separate E
features: i) the right to appoint majority of directors or, ii) the
ability to control the management or policy decisions by various
means referred to in the definition. This control of management
or policy decisions could be by virtue of shareholding or
management rights or shareholders agreement or voting
agreements or in any other manner. This definition appears to be F
similar to the one as given in Black’s Law Dictionary (Eighth
Edition) at page 353 where this term has been defined as under:
“Control - The direct or indirect power to direct the management
and policies of a person or entity, whether through ownership
of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise; the power or G
authority to manage, direct, or oversee.”
Control, according to the definition, is a proactive and not a reactive
power. It is a power by which an acquirer can command the
target company to do what he wants it to do. Control really means
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440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A creating or controlling a situation by taking the initiative. Power
by which an acquirer can only prevent a company from doing
what the latter wants to do is by itself not control. In that event,
the acquirer is only reacting rather than taking the initiative. It is a
positive power and not a negative power. In a board managed
company, it is the board of directors that is in control. If an acquirer
B
were to have power to appoint majority of directors, it is obvious
that he would be in control of the company but that is not the only
way to be in control. If an acquirer were to control the
management or policy decisions of a company, he would be in
control. This could happen by virtue of his shareholding or
C management rights or by reason of shareholders agreements or
voting agreements or in any other manner. The test really is
whether the acquirer is in the driving seat. To extend the metaphor
further, the question would be whether he controls the steering,
accelerator, the gears and the brakes. If the answer to these
questions is in the affirmative, then alone would he be in control
D
of the company. In other words, the question to be asked in each
case would be whether the acquirer is the driving force behind
the company and whether he is the one providing motion to the
organization. If yes, he is in control but not otherwise. In short
control means effective control.”
E 49. We think that these observations are apposite, and apply to
the expression “control” in Section 29A(c).
50. Section 29A(c) speaks of a corporate debtor “under the
management or control of such person”. The expression “under”
would seem to suggest positive or proactive control, as opposed to mere
F negative or reactive control. This becomes even clearer when sub-
clause (g) of Section 29A is read, wherein the expression used is “in the
management or control of a corporate debtor”. Under sub-clause
(g), only a person who is in proactive or positive control of a corporate
debtor can take the proactive decisions mentioned in sub-clause (g),
G such as, entering into preferential, undervalued, extortionate credit, or
fraudulent transactions. It is thus clear that in the expression
“management or control”, the two words take colour from each other,
in which case the principle of noscitur a sociis must also be held to
apply. Thus viewed, what is referred to in sub-clauses (c) and (g) is de
jure or de facto proactive or positive control, and not mere negative
H
ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 441
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

control which may flow from an expansive reading of the definition of A
the word “control” contained in Section 2(27) of the Companies Act,
2013, which is inclusive and not exhaustive in nature.
51. In a recent judgment delivered by one of us (Nariman, J.) in
Chintalapati Srinivasa Raju v. Securities and Exchange Board of
India, (2018) 7 SCC 443, this Court after referring to the definition of B
“control” in the SEBI regulations, held on facts that an executive director,
on a fixed monthly salary, post resignation, cannot be held to be a person
exercising “control” within the meaning of the SEBI regulations. This
Court referred to with approval the following test laid down in
Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Kishore R. Ajmera,
(2016) 6 SCC 368:- C

“26. It is a fundamental principle of law that proof of an allegation
levelled against a person may be in the form of direct substantive
evidence or, as in many cases, such proof may have to be inferred
by a logical process of reasoning from the totality of the attending
facts and circumstances surrounding the allegations/charges made D
and levelled. While direct evidence is a more certain basis to come
to a conclusion, yet, in the absence thereof the Courts cannot be
helpless. It is the judicial duty to take note of the immediate and
proximate facts and circumstances surrounding the events on
which the charges/allegations are founded and to reach what would E
appear to the Court to be a reasonable conclusion therefrom. The
test would always be that what inferential process that a
reasonable/prudent man would adopt to arrive at a conclusion.”
(emphasis supplied)
52. The third concept is that of a promoter. “Promoter” is defined F
by Section 2(69) of the Companies Act, 2013 as follows:
“(69) “promoter” means a person—
(a) who has been named as such in a prospectus or is identified
by the company in the annual return referred to in Section 92; or
G
(b) who has control over the affairs of the company, directly or
indirectly whether as a shareholder, director or otherwise; or
(c) in accordance with whose advice, directions or instructions
the Board of Directors of the company is accustomed to act:
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442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A Provided that nothing in sub-clause (c) shall apply to a person
who is acting merely in a professional capacity;”
53. Here again, sub-clause (a) refers to a de jure position, namely,
where a person is expressly named in a prospectus or identified by the
company in an annual return as a promoter. Sub-clauses (b) and (c)
B speak of a de facto position. Under sub-clause (b), so long as a person
has “control” over the affairs of a company, directly or indirectly, in any
manner, he could be said to be a promoter of such company. Under sub-
clause (c), such person need not be a member of the Board of Directors
of a company, but can be a person who in fact advises, directs or instructs
the Board to act. Under the proviso, only a person who acts in a
C professional capacity is excluded from the talons of sub-clause (c).
54. The interpretation of Section 29A(c) now becomes clear. Any
person who wishes to submit a resolution plan, if he or it does so acting
jointly, or in concert with other persons, which person or other persons
happen to either manage or control or be promoters of a corporate debtor,
D who is classified as a non-performing asset and whose debts have not
been paid off for a period of at least one year before commencement of
the corporate insolvency resolution process, becomes ineligible to submit
a resolution plan. This provision therefore ensures that if a person wishes
to submit a resolution plan, and if such person or any person acting
E jointly or any person in concert with such person, happens to either
manage, control, or be promoter of a corporate debtor declared as a
non-performing asset one year before the corporate insolvency resolution
process begins, is ineligible to submit a resolution plan. The first proviso
to sub-clause (c) makes it clear that the ineligibility can only be removed
if the person submitting a resolution plan makes payment of all overdue
F amounts with interest thereon and charges relating to the non-performing
asset in question before submission of a resolution plan. The position in
law is thus clear. Any person who wishes to submit a resolution plan
acting jointly or in concert with other persons, any of whom may either
manage, control or be a promoter of a corporate debtor classified as a
G non-performing asset in the period abovementioned, must first pay off
the debt of the said corporate debtor classified as a non-performing
asset in order to become eligible under Section 29A(c).
55. However, Messrs Salve and Singhvi have argued that the
expression “before submission of resolution plan” contained in the
H
ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 443
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

proviso must be read in a commercially sensible manner. The provision A
must, therefore, be interpreted to make it workable, and create a situation
so that banks can recover the maximum possible amounts from the NPAs
generally, and not merely from the NPAs of the corporate debtor in
respect of which it is receiving resolution plans. In this context, therefore,
if there is a system by which a person who presents a resolution plan
B
can pay off the entire amount of the NPAs as a part of its resolution
plan, to be appropriated before the resolution plan is accepted and
implemented, it would fully subserve the object of both the proviso and
the statute generally. According to them, the words of a statute can be
altered suitably to avoid hardship or absurdity. We are afraid that we
cannot accept the aforesaid submission. The plain language of the proviso C
makes it clear, that ineligibility can only be removed if the necessary
payment is made before submission of a resolution plan. It is not possible
to accede to the argument that, commercially speaking, no person would
ever make a speculative bid, where he would pay off the debt of another
related corporate debtor, classified as an NPA, without being certain
D
that his resolution plan would be accepted, as this would narrow the pool
of resolution applicants to nil, and therefore stultify the object sought to
be achieved by the proviso to Section 29A(c). First, it is clear that there
may be persons who may submit resolution plans, either by themselves,
or in concert, or jointly with other persons who do not have debts which
are declared as NPAs. Also, it is very difficult to say that in no E
circumstance whatsoever would a person submitting a resolution plan
pay off the NPA dues of another person, with whom it is acting in concert
or jointly. The dues may be such that it may be worth the while of the
person, together with the persons with whom he is acting in concert or
jointly, to first pay off the dues of the concerned corporate debtor whose
F
account has been declared to be an NPA, as such dues may be negligible
when compared with the gaining of control of the corporate debtor that
is sought to be run as a going concern as per a resolution plan submitted.
It is, therefore, impossible to say that the plain, literal, meaning of the
language used by the proviso leads to absurdity or hardship. This
interpretation is also in line with the object sought to be achieved, namely, G
that other corporate debtors who are declared as NPAs, whose debts
may never be cleared in full, are required to be cleared as a condition
precedent to submission of a resolution plan under the Code. In order,
therefore, to make the statute “workable”, as is suggested by Messrs
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444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A Salve and Singhvi, we cannot disregard the plain language of the proviso
and substitute words which would have the opposite effect.
56. Since Section 29A(c) is a see-through provision, great care
must be taken to ensure that persons who are in charge of the corporate
debtor for whom such resolution plan is made, do not come back in
B some other form to regain control of the company without first paying
off its debts. The Code has bifurcated such persons into two groups, as
a perusal of sub-clauses (c) and (g) of Section 29A shows. If a person
has been a promoter, or in the management, or control, of a corporate
debtor in which a preferential transaction, undervalued transaction,
extortionate credit transaction or fraudulent transaction has taken place,
C and in respect of which an order has been made by the Adjudicating
Authority under the Code, such person is ineligible to present a resolution
plan under Section 29A(g). This ineligibility cannot be cured by paying
off the debts of the corporate debtor. Therefore, it is only such persons
who do not fall foul of sub-clause (g), who are eligible to submit resolution
D plans under sub-clause (c) of Section 29A, if they happen to be persons
who were in the erstwhile management or control of the corporate debtor.
57. It is important for the competent authority to see that persons,
who are otherwise ineligible and hit by sub-clause (c), do not wriggle out
of the proviso to sub-clause (c) by other means, so as to avoid the
E consequences of the proviso. For this purpose, despite the fact that the
relevant time for the ineligibility under sub-clause (c) to attach is the
time of submission of the resolution plan, antecedent facts reasonably
proximate to this point of time can always be seen, to determine whether
the persons referred to in Section 29A are, in substance, seeking to
avoid the consequences of the proviso to sub-clause (c) before submitting
F a resolution plan. If it is shown, on facts, that, at a reasonably proximate
point of time before the submission of the resolution plan, the affairs of
the persons referred to in Section 29A are so arranged, as to avoid
paying off the debts of the non-performing asset concerned, such persons
must be held to be ineligible to submit a resolution plan, or otherwise
G both the purpose of the first proviso to sub-section (c) of Section 29A,
as well as the larger objective sought to be achieved by the said sub-
clause in public interest, will be defeated.
58. When we come to sub-clause (f), it is clear that, if any of the
persons mentioned in Section 29A is prohibited by SEBI from either
H
ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 445
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

trading in securities or accessing the securities market – again, ineligibility A
of the person submitting the resolution plan attaches. Under sub-clause
(i), if a person situate abroad is subject to any disability which corresponds
to sub-clause (f), such person also gets interdicted. In E.V. Mathai v.
Subordinate Judge, Kottayam & Ors., (1969) 2 SCC 194, the
expression “corresponding to” was explained as follows:-
B
“It was argued by Mr Daphtary that Section 4 was not applicable
because a different intention appeared from Section 34(1) of the
Act of 1965. We find ourselves unable to accept this contention.
The proviso to Section 34(1) lays down that a legal proceeding
which could have been instituted, continued or enforced under
the repealed Act of 1959 may be instituted under the corresponding C
provisions of the new Act. Mr Daphtary tried to meet this by
urging that Section 11(4) of the Act of 1959 did not contain any
corresponding provision. Sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the 1959
Act laid down that:
“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any D
other law or contract a tenant shall not be evicted, whether in
execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with
the provisions of this Act:
Provided....”
E
Sub-section (4)(i) of Section 11 however gave the landlord a right
to apply for eviction and for an order directing him to be put in
possession of the building:
“if the tenant has without the consent of the landlord transferred
his right under the lease or sub-let the entire building or any F
portion thereof, if the lease does not confer on him any right to
do so, or the landlord has not consented to such sub-letting;”
We find ourselves unable to accept Mr Daphtary’s argument that
the above quoted provision of Section 11 of the Act of 1959 was
not “a corresponding provision” within the meaning of the proviso
G
to sub-section (1) of Section 34 of the Act of 1965. To correspond
means to “be in harmony with or be similar, analogous to”. It does
not mean to “be identical with” and therefore the relevant provisions
of Section 34 (1) of the Act of 1965 must be held to be a provision
corresponding to Section 11(4) of the Act of 1959.”
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446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A 59. In the light thereof, it is clear that if a person is prohibited by a
regulator of the securities market in a foreign country from trading in
securities or accessing the securities market, the disability under sub-
clause (i) would then attach.
60. When we come to sub-clause (j), a “connected person” is
defined as meaning the three categories of persons mentioned in the
B
three sub-clauses therein. The first sub-clause of Explanation 1 again
takes us back to the same three definitions of “promoter”, “management”
and “control” of the resolution applicant. Under sub-clause (ii), again, a
“connected person” is a person who is either the promoter, or in
management or control, of the business of the corporate debtor during
C implementation of the resolution plan. And under sub-clause (iii), holding
companies, subsidiary companies and associate companies as defined
under the Companies Act, 2013, or related parties of persons referred to
in clauses (1) and (2) also become connected persons1
1
By the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Act of 2018 a new
D definition of “related party” has been inserted with effect from 6.6.2018, as section
5(24-A) of the Code, as follows:-
“(24-A) “related party”, in relation to an individual, means—
(a) a person who is a relative of the individual or a relative of the spouse of the
individual;
(b) a partner of a limited liability partnership, or a limited liability partnership or a
partnership firm, in which the individual is a partner;
E (c) a person who is a trustee of a trust in which the beneficiary of the trust includes the
individual, or the terms of the trust confers a power on the trustee which may be
exercised for the benefit of the individual;
(d) a private company in which the individual is a director and holds along with his
relatives, more than two per cent. of its share capital;
(e) a public company in which the individual is a director and holds along with relatives,
more than two per cent. of its paid-up share capital;
F (f) a body corporate whose board of directors, managing director or manager, in the
ordinary course of business, acts on the advice, directions or instructions of the
individual;
(g) a limited liability partnership or a partnership firm whose partners or employees in
the ordinary course of business, act on the advice, directions or instructions of the
individual;
G (h) a person on whose advice, directions or instructions, the individual is accustomed to
act;
(i) a company, where the individual or the individual along with its related party, own
more than fifty per cent. of the share capital of the company or controls the appointment
of the board of directors of the company.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause,—
(a) “relative”, with reference to any person, means anyone who is related to another, in
H the following manner, namely:—
ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 447
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

61. We now come to the equally important question as to the A
timelines within which the insolvency process is to be completed.
62. Previous legislation, namely, the Sick Industrial Companies
(Special Provisions) Act, 1985, and the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks
and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, which made provision for rehabilitation
of sick companies and repayment of loans availed by them, were found B
to have completely failed. This was taken note of by our judgment in
Madras Petrochem Ltd. and Anr. v. Board for Industrial and
Financial Reconstruction and Ors., (2016) 4 SCC 1:
“40. An interesting pointer to the direction Parliament has taken
after enactment of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of C
Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002
is also of some relevance in this context. The Eradi Committee
Report relating to insolvency and winding up of companies dated
31-7-2000, observed that out of 3068 cases referred to BIFR from
1987 to 2000 all but 1062 cases have been disposed of. Out of the
cases disposed of, 264 cases were revived, 375 cases were under D
negotiation for revival process, 741 cases were recommended
for winding up, and 626 cases were dismissed as not maintainable.
These facts and figures speak for themselves and place a big

(i) members of a Hindu Undivided Family, E
(ii) husband,
(iii) wife,
(iv) father,
(v) mother,
(vi) son,
(vii) daughter,
(viii) son’s daughter and son,
F
(ix) daughter’s daughter and son,
(x) grandson’s daughter and son,
(xi) grand daughter’s daughter and son,
(xii) brother,
(xiii) sister,
(xiv) brother’s son and daughter, G
(xv) sister’s son and daughter,
(xvi) father’s father and mother,
(xvii) mother’s father and mother,
(xviii) father’s brother and sister,
(xix) mother’s brother and sister, and
(b) wherever the relation is that of a son, daughter, sister or brother, their spouses shall
also be included;” H
448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A question mark on the utility of the Sick Industrial Companies
(Special Provisions) Act, 1985. The Committee further pointed
out that effectiveness of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special
Provisions) Act, 1985 as has been pointed out earlier, has been
severely undermined by reason of the enormous delays involved
in the disposal of cases by BIFR. (See Paras 5.8, 5.9 and 5.15 of
B
the Report.) Consequently, the Committee recommended that the
Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 be
repealed and the provisions thereunder for revival and rehabilitation
should be telescoped into the structure of the Companies Act,
1956 itself.
C 41. Pursuant to the Eradi Committee Report, the Companies Act
was amended in 2002 by providing for the constitution of a National
Company Law Tribunal as a substitute for the Company Law
Board, the High Court, BIFR and AAIFR. The Eradi Committee
Report was further given effect to by inserting Sections 424-A to
D 424-H into the Companies Act, 1956 which, with a few changes,
mirrored the provisions of Sections 15 to 21 of the Sick Industrial
Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. Interestingly, the
Companies Amendment Act, 2002 omitted a provision similar to
Section 22(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions)
Act, 1985. Consequently, creditors were given liberty to file suits
E or initiate other proceedings for recovery of dues despite pendency
of proceedings for the revival or rehabilitation of sick companies
before the National Company Law Tribunal.
42. This Amendment Act came under challenge, which challenge
culminated in the Constitution Bench decision in Union of India v.
F R, Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association, (2010) 11 SCC 10
by which the amendments were upheld, with certain changes
recommended by the Constitution Bench of this Court.
43. Close on the heels of the amendment made to the Companies
Act came the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions)
G Repeal Act, 2003. This particular Act was meant to repeal the
Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985
consequent to some of its provisions being telescoped into the
Companies Act. Thus, the Companies Amendment Act, 2002 and
the SICA Repeal Act formed part of one legislative scheme, and
H neither has yet been brought into force. In fact, even the Companies
ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 449
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

Act, 2013, which repeals the Companies Act, 1956, contains A
Chapter 19 consisting of Sections 253 to 269 dealing with revival
and rehabilitation of sick companies along the lines of Sections
424-A to 424-H of the amended Companies Act, 1956.
Conspicuous by its absence is a provision akin to Section 22(1) of
the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 in
B
the 2013 Act. However, this Chapter is also yet to be brought into
force. These statutory provisions, though not yet brought into force,
are also an important pointer to the fact that Section 22(1) of the
Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 has been
statutorily sought to be excluded, Parliament veering around from
wanting to protect sick industrial companies and rehabilitate them C
to giving credence to the public interest contained in the recovery
of public monies owing to banks and financial institutions. These
provisions also show that the aforesaid construction of the
provisions of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial
Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 vis-à-vis
D
the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, leans
in favour of creditors being able to realise their debts outside the
court process over sick industrial companies being revived or
rehabilitated. In fact, another interesting document is the Report
on Trend and Progress of Banking in India 2011-2012 for the year
ended 30-6-2012 submitted by Reserve Bank of India to the Central E
Government in terms of Section 36(2) of the Banking Regulation
Act, 1949. In Table IV.14 the Report provides statistics regarding
trends in non-performing assets bank-wise, group-wise. As per
the said Table, the opening balance of non-performing assets in
public sector banks for the year 2011-2012 was Rs 746 billion but
F
the closing balance for 2011-2012 was Rs 1172 billion only. The
total amount recovered through the Securitisation and
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security
Interest Act, 2002 during 2011-2012 registered a decline compared
to the previous year, but, even then, the amounts recovered under
the said Act constituted 70% of the total amount recovered. The G
amounts recovered under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks
and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 constituted only 28%. All this
would go to show that the amounts that public sector banks and
financial institutions have to recover are in staggering figures and
at long last at least one statutory measure has proved to be of
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450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A some efficacy. This Court would be loathe to give such an
interpretation as would thwart the recovery process under the
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and
Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 which Act alone seems
to have worked to some extent at least.” (emphasis supplied)
B 63. These two enactments were followed by the Securitization
and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities
Interest Act, 2002. As has been noted hereinabove, amounts recovered
under the said Act recorded improvement over the previous two
enactments, but this was yet found to be inadequate.
C 64. The Code was passed after great deliberation and pursuant to
various Committee Reports, as has been held in Innoventive Industries
Ltd. v. ICICI Bank & Anr. (2018) 1 SCC 407 at paragraph 12. The
Statement of Objects and Reasons, which is reproduced in the said
paragraph, makes it clear that the existing framework for insolvency
and bankruptcy was not only inadequate and ineffective, but resulted in
D undue delays in resolution. One of the primary objects of the Code,
therefore, is to resolve such matters in a time bound manner. This would
not only support the development of credit markets and encourage
entrepreneurship, but would also improve ease of doing business and
facilitate more investment, leading to higher economic growth and
E development.
65. Paragraph 16 of the said judgment refers to the report of
November, 2015 of the Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee and refers
to speed being of essence as follows:
“Speed is of essence
F
Speed is of essence for the working of the bankruptcy code, for
two reasons. First, while the “calm period” can help keep an
organisation afloat, without the full clarity of ownership and control,
significant decisions cannot be made. Without effective leadership,
the firm will tend to atrophy and fail. The longer the delay, the
G more likely it is that liquidation will be the only answer. Second,
the liquidation value tends to go down with time as many assets
suffer from a high economic rate of depreciation.
From the viewpoint of creditors, a good realisation can generally
be obtained if the firm is sold as a going concern. Hence, when
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ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 451
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delays induce liquidation, there is value destruction. Further, even A
in liquidation, the realisation is lower when there are delays. Hence,
delays cause value destruction. Thus, achieving a high recovery
rate is primarily about identifying and combating the sources of
delay.”
66. The Committee then chose certain principles within which the B
new Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code would work. One of them is that
the Code will ensure a time bound process, which will not be extended,
to better preserve the economic value of the asset (see Principle No.8
set out at page 427 of Innoventive Industries (supra.)).
67. After setting out the Scheme of the Code, this Court further C
went on to hold:
“31. The rest of the insolvency resolution process is also very
important. The entire process is to be completed within a period
of 180 days from the date of admission of the application under
Section 12 and can only be extended beyond 180 days for a further D
period of not exceeding 90 days if the committee of creditors by a
voting of 75% of voting shares so decides. It can be seen that
time is of essence in seeing whether the corporate body can be
put back on its feet, so as to stave off liquidation.”
xxx xxx xxx E
33. Under Section 30, any person who is interested in putting the
corporate body back on its feet may submit a resolution plan to
the resolution professional, which is prepared on the basis of an
information memorandum. This plan must provide for payment of
insolvency resolution process costs, management of the affairs of F
the corporate debtor after approval of the plan, and implementation
and supervision of the plan. It is only when such plan is approved
by a vote of not less than 75% of the voting share of the financial
creditors and the adjudicating authority is satisfied that the plan,
as approved, meets the statutory requirements mentioned in
Section 30, that it ultimately approves such plan, which is then G
binding on the corporate debtor as well as its employees, members,
creditors, guarantors and other stakeholders. Importantly, and this
is a major departure from previous legislation on the subject, the
moment the adjudicating authority approves the resolution plan,
the moratorium order passed by the authority under Section 14
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A shall cease to have effect. The scheme of the Code, therefore, is
to make an attempt, by divesting the erstwhile management of its
powers and vesting it in a professional agency, to continue the
business of the corporate body as a going concern until a resolution
plan is drawn up, in which event the management is handed over
under the plan so that the corporate body is able to pay back its
B
debts and get back on its feet. All this is to be done within a period
of 6 months with a maximum extension of another 90 days or else
the chopper comes down and the liquidation process begins.”
68. It is in this backdrop that we must consider the provisions of
the Code, insofar as the Code requires either that the corporate debtor
C be taken over by another management and run as a going concern or, if
that fails, go into liquidation. Some of the relevant provisions of the
Code, insofar as this case is concerned, are set out hereinbelow:
“5. (12) “insolvency commencement date” means the date
of admission of an application for initiating corporate insolvency
D resolution process by the Adjudicating Authority under Sections
7, 9 or Section 10, as the case may be:
Provided that where the interim resolution professional is not
appointed in the order admitting application under Section 7, 9 or
Section 10, the insolvency commencement date shall be the date
E on which such interim resolution professional is appointed by the
Adjudicating Authority;
xxx xxx xxx
(14) “insolvency resolution process period” means the period
F of one hundred and eighty days beginning from the insolvency
commencement date and ending on one hundred and eightieth
day;
xxx xxx xxx
(25) “resolution applicant” means a person, who individually
G or jointly with any other person, submits a resolution plan to the
resolution professional pursuant to the invitation made under clause
(h) of sub-section (2) of Section 25;
(26) “resolution plan” means a plan proposed by resolution
applicant for insolvency resolution of the corporate debtor as a
H going concern in accordance with Part II;
ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 453
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

(27) “resolution professional”, for the purposes of this Part, A
means an insolvency professional appointed to conduct the
corporate insolvency resolution process and includes an interim
resolution professional;
xxx xxx xxx
7. Initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process by B
financial creditor.—(1) A financial creditor either by itself or
jointly with other financial creditors, or any other person on behalf
of the financial creditor, as may be notified by the Central
Government, may file an application for initiating corporate
insolvency resolution process against a corporate debtor before C
the Adjudicating Authority when a default has occurred.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, a default
includes a default in respect of a financial debt owed not only to
the applicant financial creditor but to any other financial creditor
of the corporate debtor. D
(2) The financial creditor shall make an application under sub-
section (1) in such form and manner and accompanied with such
fee as may be prescribed.
(3) The financial creditor shall, along with the application furnish—
E
(a) record of the default recorded with the information utility or
such other record or evidence of default as may be specified;
(b) the name of the resolution professional proposed to act as an
interim resolution professional; and
(c) any other information as may be specified by the Board. F
(4) The Adjudicating Authority shall, within fourteen days of the
receipt of the application under sub-section (2), ascertain the
existence of a default from the records of an information utility or
on the basis of other evidence furnished by the financial creditor
under sub-section (3). G
(5) Where the Adjudicating Authority is satisfied that—
(a) a default has occurred and the application under sub-section
(2) is complete, and there is no disciplinary proceedings pending
against the proposed resolution professional, it may, by order, admit
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A such application; or
(b) default has not occurred or the application under sub-section
(2) is incomplete or any disciplinary proceeding is pending against
the proposed resolution professional, it may, by order, reject such
application:
B Provided that the Adjudicating Authority shall, before rejecting
the application under clause (b) of sub-section (5), give a notice
to the applicant to rectify the defect in his application within seven
days of receipt of such notice from the Adjudicating Authority.
(6) The corporate insolvency resolution process shall commence
C from the date of admission of the application under sub-section
(5).
(7) The Adjudicating Authority shall communicate—
(a) the order under clause (a) of sub-section (5) to the financial
D creditor and the corporate debtor;
(b) the order under clause (b) of sub-section (5) to the financial
creditor,
within seven days of admission or rejection of such application, as
the case may be.
E xxx xxx xxx
12. Time-limit for completion of insolvency resolution
process.—(1) Subject to sub-section (2), the corporate insolvency
resolution process shall be completed within a period of one
hundred and eighty days from the date of admission of the
F application to initiate such process.
(2) The resolution professional shall file an application to the
Adjudicating Authority to extend the period of the corporate
insolvency resolution process beyond one hundred and eighty days,
if instructed to do so by a resolution passed at a meeting of the
G committee of creditors by a vote of sixty-six per cent of the voting
shares.
(3) On receipt of an application under sub-section (2), if the
Adjudicating Authority is satisfied that the subject-matter of the
case is such that corporate insolvency resolution process cannot
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ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 455
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

be completed within one hundred and eighty days, it may by order A
extend the duration of such process beyond one hundred and eighty
days by such further period as it thinks fit, but not exceeding ninety
days:
Provided that any extension of the period of corporate insolvency
resolution process under this section shall not be granted more B
than once.
xxx xxx xxx
30. Submission of resolution plan.—(1) A resolution applicant
may submit a resolution plan along with an affidavit stating that
he is eligible under Section 29-A to the resolution professional C
prepared on the basis of the information memorandum.

(2) The resolution professional shall examine each resolution plan
received by him to confirm that each resolution plan— D
(a) provides for the payment of insolvency resolution process costs
in a manner specified by the Board in priority to the payment of
other debts of the corporate debtor;
(b) provides for the payment of the debts of operational creditors
in such manner as may be specified by the Board which shall not E
be less than the amount to be paid to the operational creditors in
the event of a liquidation of the corporate debtor under Section
53;
(c) provides for the management of the affairs of the corporate
debtor after approval of the resolution plan; F
(d) the implementation and supervision of the resolution plan;
(e) does not contravene any of the provisions of the law for the
time being in force;
(f) conforms to such other requirements as may be specified by G
the Board.
Explanation.—For the purposes of clause (e), if any approval of
shareholders is required under the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of
2013) or any other law for the time being in force for the
implementation of actions under the resolution plan, such approval
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456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A shall be deemed to have been given and it shall not be a
contravention of that Act or law.
(3) The resolution professional shall present to the committee of
creditors for its approval such resolution plans which confirm the
conditions referred to in sub-section (2).
B (4) The committee of creditors may approve a resolution plan by
a vote of not less than sixty-six per cent of voting share of the
financial creditors, after considering its feasibility and viability, and
such other requirements as may be specified by the Board:
Provided that the committee of creditors shall not approve a
C resolution plan, submitted before the commencement of the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2017
(Ord. 7 of 2017), where the resolution applicant is ineligible under
Section 29-A and may require the resolution professional to invite
a fresh resolution plan where no other resolution plan is available
D with it:
Provided further that where the resolution applicant referred to in
the first proviso is ineligible under clause (c) of Section 29-A, the
resolution applicant shall be allowed by the committee of creditors
such period, not exceeding thirty days, to make payment of overdue
E amounts in accordance with the proviso to clause (c) of Section
29-A:
Provided also that nothing in the second proviso shall be construed
as extension of period for the purposes of the proviso to sub-
section (3) of Section 12, and the corporate insolvency resolution
F process shall be completed within the period specified in that sub-
section.
Provided also that the eligibility criteria in Section 29-A as amended
by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance,
2018 (Ord. 6 of 2018) shall apply to the resolution applicant who
has not submitted resolution plan as on the date of commencement
G
of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance,
2018.
(5) The resolution applicant may attend the meeting of the
committee of creditors in which the resolution plan of the applicant
is considered:
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ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 457
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

Provided that the resolution applicant shall not have a right to vote A
at the meeting of the committee of creditors unless such resolution
applicant is also a financial creditor.
(6) The resolution professional shall submit the resolution plan as
approved by the committee of creditors to the Adjudicating
Authority. B
31. Approval of resolution plan.—(1) If the Adjudicating
Authority is satisfied that the resolution plan as approved by the
committee of creditors under sub-section (4) of Section 30 meets
the requirements as referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 30, it
shall by order approve the resolution plan which shall be binding C
on the corporate debtor and its employees, members, creditors,
guarantors and other stakeholders involved in the resolution plan:
Provided that the Adjudicating Authority shall, before passing an
order for approval of resolution plan under this sub-section, satisfy
that the resolution plan has provisions for its effective D
implementation.
(2) Where the Adjudicating Authority is satisfied that the resolution
plan does not confirm to the requirements referred to in sub-section
(1), it may, by an order, reject the resolution plan.
(3) After the order of approval under sub-section (1),— E
(a) the moratorium order passed by the Adjudicating Authority
under Section 14 shall cease to have effect; and
(b) the resolution professional shall forward all records relating to
the conduct of the corporate insolvency resolution process and
F
the resolution plan to the Board to be recorded on its database.
(4) The resolution applicant shall, pursuant to the resolution plan
approved under sub-section (1), obtain the necessary approval
required under any law for the time being in force within a period
of one year from the date of approval of the resolution plan by the
Adjudicating Authority under sub-section (1) or within such period G
as provided for in such law, whichever is later:
Provided that where the resolution plan contains a provision for
combination, as referred to in Section 5 of the Competition Act,

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458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A 2002 (12 of 2003), the resolution applicant shall obtain the approval
of the Competition Commission of India under that Act prior to
the approval of such resolution plan by the committee of creditors.
32. Appeal.—Any appeal from an order approving the resolution
plan shall be in the manner and on the grounds laid down in sub-
B section (3) of Section 61.
xxx xxx xxx
33. Initiation of liquidation.—(1) Where the Adjudicating
Authority,—

C (a) before the expiry of the insolvency resolution process period
or the maximum period permitted for completion of the corporate
insolvency resolution process under Section 12 or the fast track
corporate insolvency resolution process under Section 56, as the
case may be, does not receive a resolution plan under sub-section
(6) of Section 30; or
D
(b) rejects the resolution plan under Section 31 for the non-
compliance of the requirements specified therein,
it shall—
(i) pass an order requiring the corporate debtor to be liquidated in
E the manner as laid down in this Chapter;
(ii) issue a public announcement stating that the corporate debtor
is in liquidation; and
(iii) require such order to be sent to the authority with which the
corporate debtor is registered.
F
(2) Where the resolution professional, at any time during the
corporate insolvency resolution process but before confirmation
of resolution plan, intimates the Adjudicating Authority of the
decision of the committee of creditors approved by not less than
sixty-six per cent of the voting share to liquidate the corporate
G debtor, the Adjudicating Authority shall pass a liquidation order as
referred to in sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of clause (b) of sub-
section (1).
(3) Where the resolution plan approved by the Adjudicating
Authority is contravened by the concerned corporate debtor, any
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ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 459
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

person other than the corporate debtor, whose interests are A
prejudicially affected by such contravention, may make an
application to the Adjudicating Authority for a liquidation order as
referred to in sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of clause (b) of sub-
section (1).
(4) On receipt of an application under sub-section (3), if the B
Adjudicating Authority determines that the corporate debtor has
contravened the provisions of the resolution plan, it shall pass a
liquidation order as referred to in sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of
clause (b) of sub-section (1).
(5) Subject to Section 52, when a liquidation order has been passed, C
no suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted by or against
the corporate debtor:
Provided that a suit or other legal proceeding may be instituted by
the liquidator, on behalf of the corporate debtor, with the prior
approval of the Adjudicating Authority. D
(6) The provisions of sub-section (5) shall not apply to legal
proceedings in relation to such transactions as may be notified by
the Central Government in consultation with any financial sector
regulator.
(7) The order for liquidation under this section shall be deemed to E
be a notice of discharge to the officers, employees and workmen
of the corporate debtor, except when the business of the corporate
debtor is continued during the liquidation process by the liquidator.
xxx xxx xxx
F
60. Adjudicating Authority for corporate persons.—(1) The
Adjudicating Authority, in relation to insolvency resolution and
liquidation for corporate persons including corporate debtors and
personal guarantors thereof shall be the National Company Law
Tribunal having territorial jurisdiction over the place where the
registered office of the corporate person is located. G
(2) Without prejudice to sub-section (1) and notwithstanding
anything to the contrary contained in this Code, where a corporate
insolvency resolution process or liquidation proceeding of a

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460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A corporate debtor is pending before a National Company Law
Tribunal, an application relating to the insolvency resolution
or liquidation or bankruptcy of a corporate guarantor or personal
guarantor, as the case may be, of such corporate debtor shall be
filed before such National Company Law Tribunal.
B (3) An insolvency resolution process or liquidation or bankruptcy
proceeding of a corporate guarantor or personal guarantor, as the
case may be, of the corporate debtor pending in any court or
tribunal shall stand transferred to the Adjudicating Authority dealing
with insolvency resolution process or liquidation proceeding of
such corporate debtor.
C
(4) The National Company Law Tribunal shall be vested with all
the powers of the Debts Recovery Tribunal as contemplated under
Part III of this Code for the purpose of sub-section (2).
(5) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other
D law for the time being in force, the National Company Law
Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to entertain or dispose of—
(a) any application or proceeding by or against the corporate debtor
or corporate person;
(b) any claim made by or against the corporate debtor or corporate
E person, including claims by or against any of its subsidiaries
situated in India; and
(c) any question of priorities or any question of law or facts, arising
out of or in relation to the insolvency resolution or liquidation
proceedings of the corporate debtor or corporate person under
F this Code.
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Limitation Act, 1963
(36 of 1963) or in any other law for the time being in force, in
computing the period of limitation specified for any suit or
application by or against a corporate debtor for which an order of
G moratorium has been made under this Part, the period during which
such moratorium is in place shall be excluded.
61. Appeals and Appellate Authority. - (1) Notwithstanding
anything to the contrary contained under the Companies Act, 2013,

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ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 461
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

any person aggrieved by the order of the Adjudicating Authority A
under this part may prefer an appeal to the National Company
Law Appellate Tribunal.
(2) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within thirty
days before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal:
Provided that the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal may B
allow an appeal to be filed after the expiry of the said period of
thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not
filing the appeal but such period shall not exceed fifteen days.
(3) An appeal against an order approving a resolution plan under
Section 31 may be filed on the following grounds, namely— C

(i) the approved resolution plan is in contravention of the provisions
of any law for the time being in force;
(ii) there has been material irregularity in exercise of the powers
by the resolution professional during the corporate insolvency D
resolution period;
(iii) the debts owed to operational creditors of the corporate debtor
have not been provided for in the resolution plan in the manner
specified by the Board;
(iv) the insolvency resolution process costs have not been provided E
for repayment in priority to all other debts; or
(v) the resolution plan does not comply with any other criteria
specified by the Board.
(4) An appeal against a liquidation order passed under Section 33
may be filed on grounds of material irregularity or fraud committed F
in relation to such a liquidation order.
62. Appeal to Supreme Court.—(1) Any person aggrieved by
an order of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal may
file an appeal to the Supreme Court on a question of law arising
out of such order under this Code within forty-five days from the G
date of receipt of such order.
(2) The Supreme Court may, if it is satisfied that a person was
prevented by sufficient cause from filing an appeal within forty-

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462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A five days, allow the appeal to be filed within a further period not
exceeding fifteen days.
xxx xxx xxx
64. Expeditious disposal of applications.—(1) Where an
application is not disposed of or an order is not passed within the
B period specified in this Code, the National Company Law Tribunal
or the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, as the case
may be, shall record the reasons for not doing so within the period
so specified; and the President of the National Company Law
Tribunal or the Chairperson of the National Company Law
C Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be, may, after taking into
account the reasons so recorded, extend the period specified in
the Act but not exceeding ten days.
(2) No injunction shall be granted by any court, tribunal or authority
in respect of any action taken, or to be taken, in pursuance of any
D power conferred on the National Company Law Tribunal or the
National Company Law Appellate Tribunal under this Code.”
69. Since the present case deals, on facts, with financial creditors,
we may set out how the corporate insolvency resolution process is to
work from the inception. Before admission of an application under Section
E 7 by a financial creditor, the Adjudicating Authority is, under Section
7(4), to first ascertain the existence of a default within 14 days of receipt
of the application, as specified in Section 7(4). Upon satisfaction that
such default has occurred, it may then admit such application, subject to
rectification of defects, which the proviso in Section 7(5) says must be
done within 7 days of receipt of such notice from the Adjudicating
F Authority by the applicant. The time frame within which ascertainment
of default is to take place, as well as the time within which the defect is
to be rectified, have both been held by a judgment of this Court to be
directory in nature, the reason being that the stage of these provisions is
before admission of the application (see Surendra Trading Co. v.
G Juggilal Kamlapat Jute Mills Company Ltd. & Ors. (2017) 16 SCC
143). The corporate insolvency resolution process commences from
the date of admission of the application vide Section 7(6). Section 7(7)
makes it incumbent upon the Adjudicating Authority to communicate the
order accepting or rejecting the application to the financial creditor and
the corporate debtor within a period of 7 days of such admission or
H rejection.
ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 463
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

70. The time limit for completion of the insolvency resolution A
process is laid down in Section 12. A period of 180 days from the date
of admission of the application is given by Section 12(1). This is
extendable by a maximum period of 90 days only if the Committee of
Creditors, by a vote of 66%2, votes to extend the said period, and only if
the Adjudicating Authority is satisfied that such process cannot be
B
completed within 180 days. The authority may then, by order, extend the
duration of such process by a maximum period of 90 days (see Sections
12(2) and 12(3)). What is also of importance is the proviso to Section
12(3) which states that any extension of the period under Section 12
cannot be granted more than once. This has to be read with the third
proviso to Section 30(4), which states that the maximum period of 30 C
days mentioned in the second proviso is allowable as the only exception
to the extension of the aforesaid period not being granted more than
once.
71. What is important to note is that a consequence is provided, in
the event that the said period ends either without receipt of a resolution D
plan or after rejection of a resolution plan under Section 31. This
consequence is provided by Section 33, which makes it clear that when
either of these two contingencies occurs, the corporate debtor is required
to be liquidated in the manner laid down in Chapter III. Section 12,
construed in the light of the object sought to be achieved by the Code,
and in the light of the consequence provided by Section 33, therefore, E
makes it clear that the periods previously mentioned are mandatory and
cannot be extended.
72. In fact, even the literal language of Section 12(1) makes it
clear that the provision must read as being mandatory. The expression
“shall be completed” is used. Further, sub-section (3) makes it clear F
that the duration of 180 days may be extended further “but not exceeding

2
It is pertinent to note that the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment)
Act, 2018 (26 of 2018), inter alia amended the Code, with retrospective effect from 6th
June, 2018, in so far as the requirement in certain sections of approval of 75% of the
Committee of Creditors for various decisions was reduced to 51% in Section 21(8) (i.e. G
the minimum percentage of votes required for any decision of the Committee, where not
otherwise provided for in the Code), and to 66% in Sections 12(2) (i.e. extension of time
for completion of the process by 90 days), 22(2) (i.e. appointment of resolution
professional), 27(2) (i.e. replacement of resolution professional), 28(3) (i.e. approval
for certain actions by the resolution professional), 30(4) (i.e. approval of resolution
plan), and 33(2) (i.e. initiation of liquidation).
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464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A 90 days”, making it clear that a maximum of 270 days is laid down
statutorily. Also, the proviso to Section 12 makes it clear that the extension
“shall not be granted more than once”.
73. After admission of the application under Section 7 by the
Adjudicating Authority, the scheme of the Code is as follows:
B (i) Under Sections 13 to 15, a moratorium is declared; a public
announcement of the initiation of the corporate insolvency
resolution process and call for submission of claims is made; and
an Interim Resolution Professional is to be appointed under Section
16 of the Code. This action is to be completed by the Adjudicating
C Authority within a period of 14 days from the insolvency
commencement date, i.e., the date of admission of the application
under Section 7 by the Adjudicating Authority.
(ii) Under Section 17, the corporate debtor’s affairs are to be
managed by the Interim Resolution Professional so appointed, and
D the Board of Directors of the corporate debtor shall stand
superseded. The officers and managers of the corporate debtor
are now to report to the Interim Resolution Professional, who has
the authority to act on behalf of the corporate debtor.
(iii) Under Section 18(1), some of the important duties of this
E Interim Resolution Professional are set out, which are to collect
all information relating to the financial position of the corporate
debtor and, most importantly, to constitute a Committee of
Creditors. That this has to be done at the very earliest, is clear
from the scheme of the corporate insolvency resolution process
which, as has been stated earlier, cannot exceed the maximum
F period of 270 days from the date of admission of the financial
creditors’ application.
(iv) Under Section 21, the Interim Resolution Professional is to
constitute this Committee of Creditors after collating all claims
received against the corporate debtor and after determination of
G the financial position of the corporate debtor, both of which need
to be done at the very earliest. This Committee of Creditors is to
comprise of financial creditors of the corporate debtor. All decisions
of this Committee of Creditors are to be taken by a majority vote
of not less than 51% of the voting share of each financial creditor.
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(v) Under Section 22, the first meeting of the Committee of A
Creditors is to be held within 7 days of its constitution in order to
appoint a Resolution Professional. The Committee of Creditors
either continues the Interim Resolution Professional or replaces
the Interim Resolution Professional by a majority vote of 66%.
The application to replace the Interim Resolution Professional is
B
then to be sent to the Adjudicating Authority, who is to forward
the same to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India
(hereinafter referred to as the “IBBI”) for confirmation. Upon
such confirmation, the Adjudicating Authority then appoints the
Resolution Professional. In case the IBBI does not confirm the
name of the proposed Resolution Professional within 10 days of C
receipt of the same, the Adjudicating Authority is then to direct
the Interim Resolution Professional to continue to function as the
Resolution Professional until such time as the IBBI confirms the
appointment of the Resolution Professional.
(vi) It is this Resolution Professional who is then to conduct the D
corporate insolvency resolution process, which really begins at
this stage (see Section 23). Section 25 then lays down some of
the duties of this Resolution Professional, which are to continue
the business operations of the corporate debtor, subject to the
prior approval of the Committee of Creditors over the matters
stated in Section 28. One of the important duties of the Resolution E
Professional under Section 25 is to invite prospective resolution
applicants to submit resolution plans.
(vii) Under Section 29, the Resolution Professional is to prepare
an information memorandum giving relevant information, as may
be specified by the IBBI, to persons interested in formulating a F
resolution plan.
(viii) Section 30 is an important provision in that a resolution
applicant may submit a resolution plan to the Resolution
Professional, who is then to examine the said plan to see that it
conforms to the requirements of Section 30(2). Once this plan G
conforms to such requirements, the plan is then to be presented to
the Committee of Creditors for its approval under Section 30(3).
This can then be approved by the Committee of Creditors by a
vote of not less than 66% under sub-section (4). What is important
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466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A to note is that the Committee of Creditors shall not approve a
resolution plan where the resolution applicant is ineligible under
Section 29A, and may require the Resolution Professional to invite
a fresh resolution plan where no other resolution plan is available.
Once approved by the Committee of Creditors, the resolution plan
is to be submitted to the Adjudicating Authority under Section 31
B
of the Code. It is at this stage that a judicial mind is applied by the
Adjudicating Authority to the resolution plan so submitted, who
then, after being satisfied that the plan meets (or does not meet)
the requirements mentioned in Section 30, may either approve or
reject such plan.
C (ix) An appeal from an order approving such plan is only on the
limited grounds laid down in Section 61(3). However, an appeal
from an order rejecting a resolution plan would also lie under
Section 61.
(x) As has been stated hereinbefore, the liquidation process gets
D initiated under Section 33 if, (1) either no resolution plan is submitted
within the time specified under Section 12, or a resolution plan
has been rejected by the Adjudicating Authority; (2) where the
Resolution Professional, before confirmation of the resolution plan,
intimates the Adjudicating Authority of the decision of the
E Committee of Creditors to liquidate the corporate debtor; or (3)
where the resolution plan approved by the Adjudicating Authority
is contravened by the concerned corporate debtor. Any person
other than the corporate debtor whose interests are prejudicially
affected by such contravention may apply to the Adjudicating
Authority, who may then pass a liquidation order on such application.
F
74. Regulation 40A of the CIRP Regulations presents a model
timeline of the corporate insolvency resolution process, on the basis that
the time available is 180 days. It states as follows:-
“40A. Model time-line for corporate insolvency resolution
G process.
The following Table presents a model timeline of corporate
insolvency resolution process on the assumption that the interim
resolution professional is appointed on the date of commencement
of the process and the time available is hundred and eighty days:
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ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 467
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

A
Description of Latest
Section/Regulation Norm
Activity Timeline

Commencement of
Section 16(1) CIRP and …. T
appointment of IRP B

Within 3 Days
Public
of
Regulation 6(1) announcement T+3
Appointment
inviting claims
of IRP
C
For 14 Days
Section
Submission of from
15(1)(c)/Regulations T+14
claims Appointment
6(2)(c) and 12 (1)
of IRP
D
Up to 90th day
Submission of
Regulation 12(2) of T+90
claims
commencement

Verification of
claims received E
Regulation 13(1) T+21
under regulation
Within 7 days
12(1)
from the
receipt of the
Verification of
claim
claims received
Regulation 13(2) T+97 F
under regulation
12(2)

Section Within 2 days
Application for
21(6A)(b)/Regulation from T+23
appointment of AR
16A verification of
G
claims received
Report certifying under
Regulation 17(1) T+23
constitution of CoC regulation
12(1)

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468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A W ithin 7 days
of the
Se ction
1 st m ee tin g of the c onstitution of
22 (1) /R eg ulation T +30
CoC the Co C, but
19 (1)
with se ve n
da ys’ no tic e
B Res olution to In the firs t
Se ction 22 (2) ap point R P b y the me eting of th e T +30
CoC C oC

Ap pointm e nt of O n a pp rova l by
Se ction 16 (5) …..
RP the A A
C IR P performs the If RP is not
fun ction s o f R P a ppoin ted by
Regula tion 17( 3) T +40
till the R P is 40 th d ay of
ap pointe d. c omm e nc em e nt

W ithin 7 days
D of appo intm en t
Ap pointm e nt of of RP , b ut n ot
Regula tion 27 T +47
va lu er later than 40 th
da y of
c omm e nc em e nt

Subm ission of
E ap plication fo r
B efore issue of
withd rawal o f W
Eo I
ap plication
ad mitted.

W ithin 7 days
F of its re ceipt or
7 days o f
Se ction CoC to d ispose o f
c onstitution of W +7
12 A/R egula tio n the a pplic ation
C oC ,
30 A
wh ich eve r is
later.

G Filing a pp lica tio n
of w ith draw al, if
W ithin 3 days
ap pro ved b y C o C
of appr oval by W +1 0
with 90 %
C oC
m ajo rity voting,
by R P to A A
H
ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 469
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

RP to form a n A
Within 75 days
opinion on
of the T +75
pref erential a nd
com mencement
other tr ansactions

RP to make a
Within 115
determination on B
Regulation 35A days of T+115
pref erential a nd
com mencement
other tr ansactions

RP to file
Within 135
applications to AA
days to T+135
for appr opriate
com mencement C
relief

Within 2 wee ks
of appointment
Submission of I M of RP, but not
Regulation 36(1 ) th T +54
to CoC later than 54
day of D
com mencement

Publish For m G Within 75 days
of T +75
Invita tion of EoI com mencement
E
At least 15
days from issue
Submission of EoI T +90
of EoI (Assume
15 days)

Within 10 days
F
Pr ovisional List of from the la st
Regulation 36A T+100
RAs by RP day of receipt
of EoI

Fo r 5 days
Submission of
from the d ate
objections to T+105 G
of provisional
provisional list
list

Within 10 days
Final List of RAs
of the r eceipt T+115
by RP
of objec tions
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470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A Issue of RFRP, Within 5 days
including of the issue of
T+105
Evaluation Matrix the provisional
and IM list
Regulation 36B At least 30
B
days from issue
Receipt of
of RFRP T+135
Resolution Plans
(Assume 30
days)

C Submission of
As soon as
CoC approved
Regulation 39(4) approved by T+165
Resolution Plan to
the CoC
AA

Approval of
D
Section 31(1) resolution plan by T=180
AA

AA: Adjudicating Authority; AR: Authorised Representative;
E
CIRP: Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process; CoC: Committee
of Creditors; EoI: Expression of Interest; IM: Information
Memorandum; IRP: Interim Resolution Professional; RA:
Resolution Applicant; RP: Resolution Professional; RFRP: Request
for Resolution Plan.”
F It is of utmost importance for all authorities concerned to follow this
model timeline as closely as possible.
75. What has now to be determined is whether any challenge can
be made at various stages of the corporate insolvency resolution process.
Suppose a resolution plan is turned down at the threshold by a Resolution
G Professional under Section 30(2). At this stage is it open to the concerned
resolution applicant to challenge the Resolution Professional’s rejection?
It is settled law that a statute is designed to be workable, and the
interpretation thereof should be designed to make it so workable. In
Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi v. S. Teja Singh, [1959] Supp.
H 1 S.C.R. 394, this Court said, at page 403:
ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 471
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

“We must now refer to an aspect of the question, which strongly A
reinforces the conclusion stated above. On the construction
contended for by the respondent, S.18-A(9)(b) would become
wholly nugatory, as ss.22(1) and 22(2) can have no application to
advance estimates to be furnished under s.18-A(3), and if we
accede to this contention, we must hold that though the legislature
B
enacted s.18-A(9)(b) with the very object of bringing the failure
to send estimates under s.18-A(3) within the operation of s.28, it
signally failed to achieve its object. A construction which leads to
such a result must, if that is possible, be avoided, on the principle
expressed in the maxim, “ut res magis valeat quam pereat”.
Vide Curtis v. Stovin [1889] 22 Q.B.D.513 and in particular the C
following observations of Fry, L. J., at page 519:
“The only alternative construction offered to us would lead to
this result, that the plain intention of the legislature has entirely
failed by reason of a slight inexactitude in the language of the
section. If we were to adopt this construction, we should be D
construing the Act in order to defeat its object rather than with
a view to carry its object into effect”.
Vide also Craies on Statute Law, p. 90 and Maxwell on The
Interpretation of Statutes, Tenth Edn., pp. 236-237. “A statute
is designed”, observed Lord Dunedin in Whitney v. E
Commissioners of Inland Revenue [1925] 10 Tax Cas.88,
110, “to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a court
should be to secure that object, unless crucial omission or clear
direction makes that end unattainable”.
76. Given the timeline referred to above, and given the fact that a F
resolution applicant has no vested right that his resolution plan be
considered, it is clear that no challenge can be preferred to the Adjudicating
Authority at this stage. A writ petition under Article 226 filed before a
High Court would also be turned down on the ground that no right, much
less a fundamental right, is affected at this stage. This is also made
clear by the first proviso to Section 30(4), whereby a Resolution G
Professional may only invite fresh resolution plans if no other resolution
plan has passed muster.
77. However, it must not be forgotten that a Resolution Professional
is only to “examine” and “confirm” that each resolution plan conforms
to what is provided by Section 30(2). Under Section 25(2)(i), the H
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A Resolution Professional shall undertake to present all resolution plans at
the meetings of the Committee of Creditors. This is followed by Section
30(3), which states that the Resolution Professional shall present to the
Committee of Creditors, for its approval, such resolution plans which
confirm the conditions referred to in sub-section (2). This provision has
to be read in conjunction with Section 25(2)(i), and with the second
B
proviso to Section 30(4), which provides that where a resolution applicant
is found to be ineligible under Section 29A(c), the resolution applicant
shall be allowed by the Committee of Creditors such period, not exceeding
30 days, to make payment of overdue amounts in accordance with the
proviso to Section 29A(c). A conspectus of all these provisions would
C show that the Resolution Professional is required to examine that the
resolution plan submitted by various applicants is complete in all respects,
before submitting it to the Committee of Creditors. The Resolution
Professional is not required to take any decision, but merely to ensure
that the resolution plans submitted are complete in all respects before
they are placed before the Committee of Creditors, who may or may not
D
approve it. The fact that the Resolution Professional is also to confirm
that a resolution plan does not contravene any of the provisions of law
for the time-being in force, including Section 29A of the Code, only means
that his prima facie opinion is to be given to the Committee of Creditors
that a law has or has not been contravened. Section 30(2)(e) does not
E empower the Resolution Professional to “decide” whether the resolution
plan does or does not contravene the provisions of law. Regulation 36A
of the CIRP Regulations specifically provides as follows:-
“(8) The resolution professional shall conduct due diligence based
on the material on record in order to satisfy that the prospective
F resolution applicant complies with-
(a) the provisions of clause (h) of sub-section (2) of section
25;
(b) the applicable provisions of section 29A,

G and
(c) other requirements, as specified in the invitation for
expression of interest.
(9) The resolution professional may seek any clarification or
additional information or document from the prospective resolution
H applicant for conducting due diligence under sub-regulation (8).
ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 473
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

(10) The resolution professional shall issue a provisional list of A
eligible prospective resolution applicants within ten days of the
last date for submission of expression of interest to the committee
and to all prospective resolution applicants who submitted the
expression of interest.
(11) Any objection to inclusion or exclusion of a prospective B
resolution applicant in the provisional list referred to in sub-
regulation (10) may be made with supporting documents within
five days from the date of issue of the provisional list.
(12) On considering the objections received under sub-regulation
(11), the resolution professional shall issue the final list of C
prospective resolution applicants within ten days of the last date
for receipt of objections, to the committee.”
78. Thus, the importance of the Resolution Professional is to ensure
that a resolution plan is complete in all respects, and to conduct a due
diligence in order to report to the Committee of Creditors whether or not D
it is in order. Even though it is not necessary for the Resolution
Professional to give reasons while submitting a resolution plan to the
Committee of Creditors, it would be in the fitness of things if he appends
the due diligence report carried out by him with respect to each of the
resolution plans under consideration, and to state briefly as to why it
does or does not conform to the law. E

79. Take the next stage under Section 30. A Resolution
Professional has presented a resolution plan to the Committee of Creditors
for its approval, but the Committee of Creditors does not approve such
plan after considering its feasibility and viability, as the requisite vote of
not less than 66% of the voting share of the financial creditors is not F
obtained. As has been mentioned hereinabove, the first proviso to Section
30(4) furnishes the answer, which is that all that can happen at this stage
is to require the Resolution Professional to invite a fresh resolution plan
within the time limits specified where no other resolution plan is available
with him. It is clear that at this stage again no application before the G
Adjudicating Authority could be entertained as there is no vested right or
fundamental right in the resolution applicant to have its resolution plan
approved, and as no adjudication has yet taken place.
80. It is the Committee of Creditors which will approve or
disapprove a resolution plan, given the statutory parameters of Section 30.
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474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A Under Regulation 39 of the CIRP Regulations, sub-clause (3) thereof
provides:-
“(3) The committee shall evaluate the resolution plans received
under sub-regulation (1) strictly as per the evaluation matrix to
identify the best resolution plan and may approve it with such
B modifications as it deems fit:
Provided that the committee shall record the reasons for approving
or rejecting a resolution plan.”
This regulation shows that the disapproval of the Committee of Creditors
on the ground that the resolution plan violates the provisions of any law,
C including the ground that a resolution plan is ineligible under Section
29A, is not final. The Adjudicating Authority, acting quasi-judicially, can
determine whether the resolution plan is violative of the provisions of
any law, including Section 29A of the Code, after hearing arguments
from the resolution applicant as well as the Committee of Creditors,
D after which an appeal can be preferred from the decision of the
Adjudicating Authority to the Appellate Authority under Section 61.
81. If, on the other hand, a resolution plan has been approved by
the Committee of Creditors, and has passed muster before the
Adjudicating Authority, this determination can be challenged before the
E Appellate Authority under Section 61, and may further be challenged
before the Supreme Court under Section 62, if there is a question of law
arising out of such order, within the time specified in Section 62. Section
64 also makes it clear that the timelines that are to be adhered to by the
NCLT and NCLAT are of great importance, and that reasons must be
recorded by either the NCLT or NCLAT if the matter is not disposed of
F within the time limit specified. Section 60(5), when it speaks of the NCLT
having jurisdiction to entertain or dispose of any application or proceeding
by or against the corporate debtor or corporate person, does not invest
the NCLT with the jurisdiction to interfere at an applicant’s behest at a
stage before the quasi-judicial determination made by the Adjudicating
G Authority. The non-obstante clause in Section 60(5) is designed for a
different purpose: to ensure that the NCLT alone has jurisdiction when it
comes to applications and proceedings by or against a corporate debtor
covered by the Code, making it clear that no other forum has jurisdiction
to entertain or dispose of such applications or proceedings.

H
ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 475
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

82. One thing that must be made clear at this stage is that when A
Section 33 speaks of the “Adjudicating Authority” in sub-section (1), it
is referring to both the Adjudicating Authority as well as the Appellate
Authority. An Adjudicating Authority may decide in favour of a resolution
plan, which order may then be set aside by the Appellate Authority. This
order of the Appellate Authority, setting aside the order of the Adjudicating
B
Authority, would then be the order which rejects the resolution plan for
the purposes of Section 33. The same would apply to an ultimate order
of rejection by the Supreme Court under Section 62. This is on the
principle that, as stated in Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul & Ors. v.
Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri & Ors. AIR 1941 FC 5 and followed in a
number of our judgments, an appeal is a continuation of the original C
proceedings.
83. Given the fact that both the NCLT and NCLAT are to decide
matters arising under the Code as soon as possible, we cannot shut our
eyes to the fact that a large volume of litigation has now to be handled
by both the aforesaid Tribunals. What happens in a case where the D
NCLT or the NCLAT decide a matter arising out of Section 31 of the
Code beyond the time limit of 180 days or the extended time limit of 270
days? Actus curiae neminem gravabit - the act of the Court shall
harm no man - is a maxim firmly rooted in our jurisprudence (see Jang
Singh v. Brijlal & Ors. [1964] 2 S.C.R. 146 at page 149, and A.S.
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak & Ors. [1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 1 at page 71). E
It is also true that the time taken by a Tribunal should not set at naught
the time limits within which the corporate insolvency resolution process
must take place. However, we cannot forget that the consequence of
the chopper falling is corporate death. The only reasonable construction
of the Code is the balance to be maintained between timely completion F
of the corporate insolvency resolution process, and the corporate debtor
otherwise being put into liquidation. We must not forget that the corporate
debtor consists of several employees and workmen whose daily bread is
dependent on the outcome of the corporate insolvency resolution process.
If there is a resolution applicant who can continue to run the corporate
debtor as a going concern, every effort must be made to try and see that G
this is made possible.3 A reasonable and balanced construction of this

3
Regulation 32 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process)
Regulations, 2016, states that the liquidator may also sell the corporate debtor as a
going concern.
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476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A statute would therefore lead to the result that, where a resolution plan is
upheld by the Appellate Authority, either by way of allowing or dismissing
an appeal before it, the period of time taken in litigation ought to be
excluded. This is not to say that the NCLT and NCLAT will be tardy in
decision making. This is only to say that in the event of the NCLT, or the
NCLAT, or this Court taking time to decide an application beyond the
B
period of 270 days, the time taken in legal proceedings to decide the
matter cannot possibly be excluded, as otherwise a good resolution plan
may have to be shelved, resulting in corporate death, and the consequent
displacement of employees and workers.
84. Coming to the facts of the present case, let us first examine
C the resolution plan presented by Numetal. Numetal was incorporated in
Mauritius on 13.10.2017, expressly for the purpose of submission of a
resolution plan qua the corporate debtor, i.e., ESIL. Two other companies,
viz., AHL and AEL, were also incorporated on the same day in Mauritius.
Shri Rewant Ruia, son of Shri Ravi Ruia (who was the promoter of
D ESIL) held the entire share capital of AHL, which in turn held the entire
shareholding of AEL, which in turn held the entire share capital of
Numetal. At this stage there can be no doubt whatsoever that Shri
Rewant Ruia, being the son of Shri Ravi Ruia, would be deemed to be a
person acting in concert with the corporate debtor, being covered by
Regulation 2(1)(q)(v) of the 2011 Takeover Regulations.
E
85. On 18.10.2017, AEL transferred its shareholding of 26.1% in
Numetal to a group company, viz., ECL. This group company is ultimately
owned by ‘Virgo Trust’ and ‘Triton Trust’, the beneficiaries of which
are companies owned by Shri Ravi Ruia, his brother Shri Shashikant
Ruia and their immediate family members. The object of including ECL,
F as stated in the relevant extract from Numetal’s expression of interest is
as follows:
“The Company satisfies the minimum tangible net worth
requirement of INR 30 Billion considering ECL, as a group
company that holds 26.1% (Twenty Six point one Percent) shares
G in the Company, has net worth of USD 2,974 million (US Dollars
Two Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy Four million) or INR 192.8
Billion (Rupees One Hundred Ninety Two Point Eight Billion) as
on 31st March 201 (immediately preceding completed financial
year). Please refer Annexure I for the certificate of Chartered
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ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 477
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

Accountant of the Company certifying satisfaction of the minimum A
tangible net worth requirement in terms of the Eligibility Criteria
which includes A, a certificate of Chartered Accountant certifying
ECL’s tangible net worth. It is pertinent to note that in case the
company is considered as a consortium potential resolution
applicant, it continues to satisfy the minimum tangible net worth
B
requirement since the total tangible net worth of the Company,
computed on the basis of the weighted average of AEI’s and
ECL’s net worth proportionate to their respective shareholding in
the Company, is INR 50.33 Billion, which is in excess of INR 30
Billion”.
86. The very next day, Shri Rewant Ruia settled an irrevocable C
and discretionary trust, viz., the ‘Crescent Trust’, and settled the entire
share capital of AHL into the Trust, at a par value of USD 10,000. The
beneficiaries of this Trust were general charities, as well as entitles owned
by Shri Shashikant Ruia (brother of Shri Ravi Ruia, promoter of the
corporate debtor), and entities owned by Shri Rewant Ruia himself. D
87. On 20.11.2017, Shri Rewant Ruia settled ‘Prisma Trust’, another
irrevocable and discretionary trust, whose beneficiaries are “general
charities” and one ‘Solis Enterprises Limited’, a company incorporated
in Bermuda, whose share capital is held by Shri Rewant Ruia. Numetal,
vide a response dated 30.3.2018, admitted that while the trust deed E
relating to Prisma Trust allowed the trustee to benefit any English or
Bermuda charity, “no particular charity is named at this stage”. The
Trustee of AEL is one ‘Rhone Trustee’, Singapore. What is important
to note is that Shri Rewant Ruia was the ultimate natural person who
held the beneficial interest in AEL through Prisma Trust, through Solis
Enterprises Limited. This emerges from Section 6.7 of the resolution F
plan submitted by Numetal to the Resolution Professional. Interestingly
enough, in an affidavit dated 5.3.2018, the Trustee of Prisma Trust
submitted:
“that the Trustee (for itself and each person controlled by it), hereby
confirm that AEL or Rewant Ruia neither are nor will, following G
the implementation of the Resolution Plan, be a promoter of or
have control over or have any management rights in the RA or
ESIL (or the resultant company upon completion of the Merger)
(including without limitation, the rights to appoint directors on the
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478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A board of the RA or ESIL, or any specific veto rights or the right to
direct the policy or management of the RA or ESIL in any
manner).”
88. The Resolution Professional, after looking at this affidavit,
correctly noted that statements of such a nature would not have been
B made by a truly independent trustee of a discretionary trust, which
demonstrates that the trustee was under the complete control of Shri
Rewant Ruia. This in turn indicates that Prisma Trust is one more
smokescreen in the chain of control, which would conceal the fact that
the actual control over AEL is by none other than Shri Rewant Ruia
himself.
C
89. “Curiouser and Curiouser” was the expression of Alice, in
Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland. In this wonderland of Shri Rewant
Ruia, one day later on 22.11.2017, the trustees of the Prisma Trust now
acquired 100% of the shareholding of AHL for a par value of
approximately USD 10,000 from the trustees of the Crescent Trust. On
D this very date, merely one day before the Ordinance bringing into force
Section 29A was promulgated, ECL transferred its shareholding of 26.1%
of the share capital of Numetal to Crinium Bay, an indirect wholly owned
subsidiary of VTB Bank, whose shares in turn are held by the Russian
Government. AEL also transferred shares representing 13.9% of the
E share capital of Numetal to Crinium Bay, thus making Crinium Bay’s
total holding in Numetal 40%. On the same date, AEL also transferred
shares representing 25.1% of the share capital of Numetal to Indo, and
also transferred shares representing 9.9% of the share capital of Numetal
to TPE. These transfers are likely to have taken place between 10.2.2018
and 12.2.2018. At the time of submission of its first Resolution Plan
F dated 12.2.2018, the shareholding of Numetal was as follows:
Crinium Bay : 40%
Indo : 25.1%
TPE : 9.9%
G
AEL : 25%
90. It is important to note that, as of this date, Shri Rewant Ruia,
who is the ultimate beneficiary in the chain of control of the trusts which
in turn controlled AEL, was very much on the scene, holding through
AEL 25% of the shareholding of Numetal.
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ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 479
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

91. One other extremely important fact needs to be noticed at this A
stage. The earnest money in the form of Rs. 500 crores, credited to the
account of the corporate debtor, has been provided to Numetal by AEL
as a shareholder of the resolution applicant, viz. Numetal. It is important
to note that this earnest money deposit of Rs.500 crores made by AEL
continues to remain with the Resolution Professional till date, despite the
B
fact that, by the time the second resolution plan was submitted by Numetal
on 2.4.2018, AEL had exited as a shareholder of Numetal. It is also
important to note that under clause 4.4.4 of the request for proposal for
submission of resolution plans for ESIL, the earnest money deposit stands
to be forfeited if any condition thereof is breached or the qualifications
of the potential resolution applicant are found to be untrue. At this stage, C
it is important to reproduce relevant extracts of the resolution plan first
submitted by Numetal in response to the request for proposal. The
same are as under:
“4. … the Resolution Applicant is a newly established company
that has been incorporated to provide a platform to create and D
sustain a leading Indian steel business and is focused on the
acquisition and turnaround of the Corporate Debtor.
Accordingly, to implement the Plan, Numetal believes that it has
access to the right mix and balance of the financial and technical
market experience which can be provided to the Corporate Debtor. E
Numetal is held by four independent shareholders, who possess
complementary skill-sets in financial, operational, trading and
industrial sectors together with regional expertise that will support
the business in the medium and longer term.
xxx xxx xxx F
5.2. … (i) Numetal is backed by seasoned and experienced
shareholders who bring deep expertise from different industries
covering Finance, Steel, Oil and Gas, Metal Mining, Trading
expertise across geographies. Crinium Bay Holdings Limited
(“Crinium Bay”) an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of VTB G
Bank PJSC (“VTB Bank”). VTB Bank is one of the largest
emerging market groups listed on Moscow Exchange (“MOEX”)
and London Stock Exchange (“LSE”) with current market
capitalization of approximately US$ 12.3bn (approximately INR
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480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A 79,000 Crores) and total assets in excess of approximately US$
220bn (approximately INR 14,08,000).
xxx xxx xxx
VTB Banks support to provide financing, credit assistance to the
Resolution Applicant is set out in Annexure 2 and is subject to the
B terms of the letter provided therein.
The other shareholders in Numetal also have material businesses
with international operations focused on the steel, materials and
resources sector-

C (a) Tyazhpromexport JSC (“TPE”) a leading engineering agency
in Russia in ferrous and non ferrous metallurgy project operations
and construction with experience with over 60 years and wholly
owned by Russian State corporation, Rostec;
(b) Indo International Trading FZCO (“Indo” or “IITF”), a leading
D commodity trading company; and
(c) Aurora Enterprise Trading (sic) Limited (“AEL” or “Aurora”)
a financial investor with regional expertise.
Numetals (sic) shareholders bring together a wealth of experience
in technical and operational capabilities, banking and finance,
E commodity trading and regional expertise for the benefit of creating
long term steel business.
xxx xxx xxx
6.3. …The shareholders of Numetal bring to the table, considerable
experience from difference industries covering finance, steel, oil
F and gas, metals and mining chemicals and other sectors across
geographies. They have extensive experience in the field of
management of distressed assets/situations, restructuring of debt,
turnaround of corporates and improvement of strategies for cash
flows. In addition these shareholders have a good understanding
G of Asian markets having dealt with large corporates in these
markets. The above factors coupled with the financial strength
of its shareholders, put Numetal in a strong position to implement
the turnaround successfully.
xxx xxx xxx
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ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 481
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

(c) … Aurora Enterprises Limited (“AEL”) brings a careful focus A
on financial returns and expertise of the Indian business and
commercial sector to Numetal. AEL is a pure financial investor.
The beneficiaries of such discretionary trust are general charities
and Solis Enterprise Limited, a company incorporated in Bermuda,
the share capital of which is held by Mr. Rewant Ruia. B
Mr. Rewant Ruia is the son of Ravi Ruia, who is one of the existing
promoters of the Corporate Debtor.”
92. Clause 6.7 of Numetal’s resolution plan stipulated that it
satisfied the minimum tangible net worth requirement, as set out under
the request for proposal, because Crinium Bay held 40% of the C
shareholding of Numetal, and that VTB Bank, Crinium Bay’s holding
company had sufficient net worth, as on 31.12.2016, to comply with the
requirement under the request for proposal. The Resolution Professional,
in its affidavit before the Adjudicating Authority, took note of this plan
and, therefore, stated: D
“Under Para 1 of the Eligibility Criteria for Potential Resolution
Applicants published by this Respondent on the website of the
Corporate Debtor, potential resolution applicants were given the
option of satisfying the minimum tangible net worth net owned
funds requirement at a “Group Level” by taking into consideration E
the financial of entities controlling or controlled by or under common
control with the potential resolution applicant. It is evident from
the foregoing that Numetal took advantage of this provision and
relied upon the financial wherewithal of its constituents/
shareholders. Numetal has not submitted or relied upon its stand-
alone financials to satisfy the eligibility criteria. It is submitted F
that having taken advantage of this provision it is not open to
Numetal to contend that this Respondent cannot look at its
constituents/ shareholders when determining the issue of eligibility
under Section 29A of the Code. Further, it is submitted that even
though the RFP document does not allow a resolution applicant to G
look at its constituents/ shareholders for the purposes of
demonstrating its experience, it is clear from the foregoing that
Numetal has extensively relied on the experience of its constituents/
shareholders to demonstrate its experience. It is submitted that
having relied on the experience of its constituents/shareholders it
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482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A is not open to Numetal to contend that this Respondent cannot
look at its constituents/shareholders when determining the issue
of eligibility under Section 29A of the Code.”
93. The excerpted portions of Numetal’s resolution plan make it
clear that, since Numetal itself was a newly incorporated entity, with no
B financial or experience credentials of its own, it therefore relied entirely
on the credentials of each of its constituent shareholders. This shows
that Numetal itself revealed in its resolution plan that its corporate veil
should be lifted, for without lifting this veil, none of the parameters of the
request for proposal could have been met by Numetal itself. It is thus
clear that the four shareholders of Numetal were persons “acting jointly”
C within the meaning of Section 29A. This being the case, it is clear that
Shri Salve’s argument that VTB Bank is a “connected person”, being
ineligible under sub-clause (j), would have to be rejected, as VTB Bank
is itself, through its wholly owned subsidiary of Crinium Bay, a person
acting jointly with the three other shareholders of Numetal, and would,
D therefore, fall within the first part of Section 29A itself. This being so, it
cannot be said that VTB Bank is a person “connected to” any one of
the persons acting jointly, as it is itself a person acting jointly, and therefore
covered by the first part of Section 29A.
94. It is important to note that on 29.3.2018, AEL transferred its
E 25% shareholding in Numetal to the other three constituent shareholders,
thereby leaving its shareholding in Numetal as ‘Nil’. In response to the
Resolution Professional’s invitation, the second Resolution Plan, therefore,
submitted by Numetal on 2.4.2018, did not have AEL as a constituent of
Numetal; instead, Crinium Bay continued with 40% of the shareholding
of Numetal, with TPE’s holding now augmented to 29.5% and Indo’s to
F 34.1%.
95. Given the fact that Shri Rewant Ruia is a person deemed to
be acting in concert with his father Shri Ravi Ruia (who was a promoter
of the corporate debtor ESIL), there is no doubt whatsoever that Section
29A(c) would be attracted as on the date of submission of the first
G resolution plan, viz. 12.2.2018, as AEL was held by Prisma Trust, whose
ultimate beneficiary is Shri Rewant Ruia himself. This would show that
the NPA declared over a year before the date of commencement of the
corporate resolution process of ESIL (i.e. in 2015) would render Numetal
ineligible to submit a resolution plan. The only manner in which Numetal
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ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 483
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

could successfully present a resolution plan would be to first pay off the A
debts of ESIL, as well as those of such other corporate debtors of the
Ruia group of companies, which were declared as NPAs prior to the
aforesaid period of one year, before submitting its resolution plan.
However, if the date of the second resolution plan is to be seen, Shri
Rewant Ruia appears to have disappeared from the scene altogether, as
B
the three entities left are stated to be independent entities in the form of
two Russian entities and one UAE entity. Viewed on 2.4.2018, therefore,
could it be said that Shri Rewant Ruia had disappeared from the scene
altogether, so as to obviate the application of Section 29A(c)? The obvious
answer is no. This is for two reasons. First, as has been stated earlier,
the Rs.500 crores that has been deposited towards submission of earnest C
money continues to remain deposited by AEL even post 2.4.2018, showing
thereby that Shri Rewant Ruia continues to be present, insofar as
Numetal’s second resolution plan is concerned. Further, having regard
to the reasonably proximate state of affairs before submission of the
resolution plan on 2.4.2018, beginning with Numetal’s initial corporate
D
structure, and continuing with the changes made till date, it is evident
that, the object of all the transactions that have taken place after Section
29A came into force on 23.11.2017 is undoubtedly to avoid the application
of Section 29A(c), including its proviso. We therefore hold that, whether
the first or second resolution plan is taken into account, both would clearly
be hit by Section 29A(c), as the looming presence of Shri Rewant Ruia E
has been found all along, from the date of incorporation of Numetal, till
the date of submission of the second resolution plan.
96. Another argument raised by Shri Salve is that VTB Bank is
ineligible to present a resolution plan, as the major constituent of Numetal,
through its wholly owned subsidiary of Crinium Bay, as VTB Bank is F
ineligible as sub-clause (f) read with sub-clause (i) of Section 29A have
been attracted.
97. In February/March 2014, the Russian Federation annexed the
Ukrainian region of Crimea. Consequently, on 6.3.2014, the President of
the United States issued Executive Order 13660, pursuant to the G
International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the National
Emergencies Act. The said order sought to block the property of Russian
entities contributing to the situation in Ukraine. Summarizing the executive
order issued by the President, the Department of Treasury’s Office of
Foreign Assets Control commented:-
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484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A “The Ukraine/Russia-related sanctions program implemented by
the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) began on March 6,
2014, when the President, in Executive Order (E.O.) 13660,
declared a national emergency to deal with the threat posed by
the actions and policies of certain persons who had undermined
democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine; threatened the
B
peace, security, stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of
Ukraine; and contributed to the misappropriation of Ukraine’s
assets. In further response to the actions and polices of the
Government of the Russian Federation, including the purported
annexation of the Crimea region of Ukraine, the President issued
C three subsequent Executive orders that expanded the scope of
the national emergency declared in E.O. 13660. Together, these
orders authorize, among other things, the imposition of sanctions
against persons responsible for or complicit in certain activities
with respect to Ukraine; against officials of the Government of
the Russian Federation; against persons operating in the arms or
D
related materiel sector of the Russian Federation; and against
individuals and entities operating in the Crimea region of Ukraine.
E.O. 13662 also authorizes the imposition of sanctions on certain
entities operating in specified sectors of the Russian Federation
economy. Finally, E.O. 13685 also prohibits the importation or
E exportation of goods, services, or technology to or from the Crimea
region of Ukraine, as well as new investment in the Crimea region
of Ukraine by a United States person, wherever located.”
98. The Office of Foreign Assets Control thereafter issued
Directive Number 1 under Executive Order 13662, stating:-
F “DIRECTIVE 1 (AS AMENDED ON SEPTEMBER 29, 2017)
UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 13662
Pursuant to sections 1(a)(i), 1(b), and 8 of Executive Order 13662
of March 20, 2014, “Blocking Property of Additional Persons
Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine” (the Order) and 31 C.F.R.
G § 589.802, taking appropriate account of the Countering Russian
Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017, and following the
Secretary of the Treasury’s determination under section 1(a)(i)
of the Order with respect to the financial services sector of the
Russian Federation economy, the Director of the Office of Foreign
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ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 485
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

Assets Control has determined, in consultation with the Department A
of State, that the following activities by a U.S. person or within
the United States are prohibited…”
After this, the Office of Foreign Assets Control issued Directive Number
2, under Executive Order 13662, stating:-
“DIRECTIVE 2 (AS AMENDED ON SEPTEMBER 29, 2017) B
UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 13662
Pursuant to sections 1(a)(i), 1(b), and 8 of Executive Order 13662
of March 20, 2014, “Blocking Property of Additional Persons
Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine” (the Order) and 31 C.F.R.
§ 589.802, taking appropriate account of the Countering Russian C
Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017, and following the
Secretary of the Treasury’s determination under section 1(a)(i)
of the Order with respect to the energy sector of the Russian
Federation economy, the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets
Control has determined, in consultation with the Department of D
State, that the following activities by a U.S. person or within the
United States are prohibited, except to the extent provided by law
or unless licensed or otherwise authorized by the Office of Foreign
Assets Control:
(1) For new debt issued on or after July 16, 2014 and before E
November 28, 2017, all transactions in, provision of financing for,
and other dealings in new debt of longer than 90 days maturity of
persons determined to be subject to this Directive or any earlier
version thereof, their property, or their interests in property.
(2) For new debt issued on or after November 28, 2017, all F
transactions in, provision of financing for, and other dealings in
new debt of longer than 60 days maturity of persons determined
to be subject to this Directive or any earlier version thereof, their
property, or their interests in property.
All other activities with these persons or involving their property
G
or interests in property are permitted, provided such activities are
not otherwise prohibited pursuant to Executive Orders 13660,
13661, 13662, or 13685 or any other sanctions program
implemented by the Office of Foreign Assets Control.”

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486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A 99. The names of persons determined to be subject to the directives
issued under Executive Order 13662 are published in the ‘Sectoral
Sanctions Identification List’, published by the Office of Foreign Assets
Control. A perusal of this list shows that VTB Bank is listed therein,
along with various entities affiliated to it.
B 100. Similarly, under EU Council Regulation 833 of 2014 dated
31.7.2014, certain restrictive measures in view of Russian actions
destabilizing the situation in Ukraine were taken against certain Russian
entities, of which VTB Bank was one. These measures included:
“(5) It is also appropriate to apply restrictions on access to the
C capital market for certain financial institutions, excluding Russia-
based institutions with international status established by
intergovernmental agreements with Russia as one of the
shareholders. Other financial services such as deposit business,
payment services and loans to or from the institutions covered by
this Regulation, other than those referred to in Article 5, are not
D covered by this Regulation.”
Under Article I of this regulation, ‘transferable securities’ was defined
as :
“(f) ‘transferable securities’ means those classes of securities
E which are negotiable on the capital market, with the exception of
instruments of payment, such as:
(i) shares in companies and other securities equivalent to shares
in companies, partnerships or other entities, and depositary
receipts in respect of shares,
F (ii) bonds or other forms of securitised debt, including depositary
receipts in respect of such securities,
(iii) any other securities giving the right to acquire or sell any
such transferable securities or giving rise to a cash settlement;”
Article V thereto provided:-
G
“It shall be prohibited to directly or indirectly purchase, sell, provide
brokering or assistance in the issuance of, or otherwise deal with
transferable securities and money-market instruments with a
maturity exceeding 90 days, issued after 1 August 2014 by…”

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ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 487
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

Further, Annexure III thereto listed VTB Bank as one of the institutions A
subject to the ‘restrictive measures’.
101. What has been argued on behalf of Shri Rohatgi is that, in
order to be covered by sub-clause (f) read with sub-clause (i) of Section
29A, the person must be subject to a disability, which corresponds to a
prohibition by SEBI in India from trading in securities or accessing the B
securities markets. Sub-clauses (f) and (i) therefore refer to persons
who, on account of their antecedents, may adversely impact the credibility
of the processes under the Code. This is in fact stated in the Preamble
of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2017,
dated 23.11.2017, which introduced Section 29A into the Code, as follows:
C
“AND WHEREAS in order to strengthen further the insolvency
resolution process, it has been considered necessary to provide
for prohibition of certain persons from submitting a Resolution
Plan who, on account of their antecedents, may adversely
impact the credibility of the processes under the Code.”
(emphasis supplied) D

102. What is stressed by Shri Rohatgi is that, in his speech while
introducing the Amendment Bill in Parliament, the Finance Minister
stated:-
“and a person who is prohibited under SEBI cannot apply. E
So these are statutory disqualifications.”
In the light of this object, Section 29A(i) will have to be read as a disability
which corresponds to Section 29A(f) in view of the antecedent conduct
on the part of the person applying as a resolution applicant in a jurisdiction
outside India. F
103. What will be noticed is that the sanctions that have been
imposed by the authorities of both the United States and the Council of
the European Union are not on account of any misconduct on the part of
VTB Bank. Rather, they have been imposed politically, because of the
conduct of a particular country, i.e. Russia, which has sought to undermine
G
Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, by illegally
annexing Crimea and Sevastopol. We are of the view that Shri Rohatgi
is right, inasmuch as VTB Bank cannot be said to have been prohibited
by an authority outside India from trading in securities or accessing the
securities markets, due to any fraudulent and/or unfair trade practices
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488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A relating to the securities market generally. A prohibitory sanction by an
authority situate outside India for political reasons would thus not be
covered by sub-clause (i). However, Shri Salve pointed to an order
dated 19.9.2017 of the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
which held:
B “A. Respondents Violated Section 4c(a)(1) and (2) of the
Act
Respondents’ RUB/USD block trades constituted unlawful
fictitious sales and caused prices to be reported or recorded that
were not true and bona fide prices. Section 4c(a)(1) and (2) of
C the Act makes it unlawful “for any person to offer to enter into,
enter into, or confirm the execution of a transaction that is ... a
fictitious sale” or that “is used to cause any price to be reported,
registered, or recorded that is not a true and bona fide price.”
xxx xxx xxx
D Respondents’ RUB/USD block trades were fictitious sales under
the Act. Respondents designed the block trades to accomplish
through the use of the futures market that which was not otherwise
possible for VTB to accomplish in the swaps market. Through
the block trades, VTB was able to transfer its cross-currency
risk to VTB Capital which could then hedge the risk in the swaps
E market. VTB obtained pricing from VTB Capital for these
transactions that was more favorable than it admittedly could have
obtained from third-parties in the futures market. With this
structure, Respondents, as intended, negated market risk and
avoided price competition. Accordingly, Respondents’ block trades
F were “fictitious from the standpoint of reality and substance” and
in violation of Section 4c(a)(1) and (2)(A) of the Act. In re
Goldwurm, 7 Agric. Dec. 265, 275 (providing that cotton futures
trades entered for purpose of accomplishing income tax reporting
goals were “fictitious from the standpoint of reality and
substance”). Further, Respondents’ trades caused prices to be
G reported to or recorded by the CME that were not true and bona
fide prices in violation of Section 4c(a)(2)(B) of the Act. See In
re Morgan Stanley & Co., [2012 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut.
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 32,218 (CFTC June 5, 2012) (settlement order)
(finding violation of Section 4c(a) where unlawfully executed
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ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 489
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

exchanges for related positions caused non-bona fide prices to be A
reported or recorded).
xxx xxx xxx
V.
FINDINGS OF VIOLATION
B
Based on the foregoing, the Commission finds that, during the
Relevant Period, VTB and VTB Capital violated Section 4c(a)(1)
and (2) of the Act and Regulation 1.38(a).”
104. VTB Bank had submitted an offer before the US Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, in which it, without admitting or denying
the findings or conclusions, had offered to cease and desist from violating C
the regulations aforementioned, to pay a civil monetary penalty in the
amount of USD five million, and had ordered its successors and assigns
to comply with the conditions consented to. This offer was accepted by
the Commission, and by way of settlement, apart from what was offered
by the respondents, the respondents further agreed, in the said Order D
dated 19.9.2017 as follows:-
“3. Respondents further agree that they shall comply with the
following additional undertakings:
a. Respondents shall not enter into privately negotiated futures,
options or combination transactions with one another on or E
through any U.S.-based futures exchange for a period of two
years from the date of this Order;”
105. A reading of this order makes it clear that, even assuming
that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission is an authority which
corresponds with SEBI (Shri Rohatgi has argued that in the United States F
the Securities Exchange Commission is the authority which corresponds
with SEBI in India), it is clear that there is no prohibition by the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission of the United States interdicting VTB Bank
from trading in securities or accessing the securities market. All that
VTB Bank has done is consent to a cease and desist order; consent to G
pay a monetary penalty in the amount of USD five million; and further
consent to not enter into privately negotiated futures options with a
particular subsidiary, viz. VTB Capital, on or through any US-based
futures exchange for a period of two years from the date of the order.
Obviously, a prohibition regarding privately negotiated futures options,
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490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A or combination transactions with one another, is not a prohibition from
trading in securities or accessing the securities market. We thus agree
with Shri Rohatgi that Crinium Bay, being a wholly owned subsidiary of
VTB Bank, does not therefore incur any disqualification under sub-clause
(f) read with sub-clause (i) of Section 29A.
B 106. This brings us to the Appellant, i.e., AMIPL. So far as Uttam
Galva is concerned, the corporate structure is as follows:- AMSA is a
listed company in Luxemburg. This company is the ultimate parent
company of the resolution applicant, through its wholly owned subsidiary
AMBD, a company incorporated in Luxemburg, which in turn holds
100% of the shares in Oakey Holding BV, a company incorporated in
C the Netherlands, which in turn holds 99.99% shares in AMIPL, a company
incorporated in India. AMNLBV is a company incorporated in the
Netherlands, and is a 100% subsidiary of AMSA. It is this group company
of Shri L.N. Mittal that held 29.05% of the shareholding in Uttam Galva
(as on 7.2.2018).
D 107. On 4.9.2009, a Co-Promotion Agreement was executed
between AMNLBV and the Indian promoters of Uttam Galva, who are
stated to be the Miglani family, who are residents of Mumbai. As per
the Co-Promotion Agreement, the foreign promoter, viz., AMNLBV was
entitled to nominate one half of the non-independent directors on the
E board of Uttam Galva, the other half being nominated by the Miglanis.
Both of them were to jointly nominate all of the independent directors.
Clause 16 of the said agreement, read with Schedule II thereof, provides
a list of matters which require the affirmative vote of AMNLBV. It is
important to notice that the original shareholding of AMNLBV in Uttam
Galva was 32%. This shareholding was reduced to 29.05% in the hands
F of AMNLBV, the Miglani group holding 31.82% as of December 2017.
The rest of the shares were held by the public. This Co-Promotion
Agreement, therefore, not only names AMNLBV as the foreign promoter
of Uttam Galva, but also makes it clear that Uttam Galva would be
jointly managed and controlled by the foreign and Indian promoters.
G Pursuant to this Co-Promotion Agreement, on 7.9.2009 AMNLBV issued
a letter of offer to acquire 35,226,233 fully paid shares of the face value
of Rs.10, representing 25.76% of the share capital of Uttam Galva. In
this letter, it was disclosed to the public at large that AMNLBV was
becoming a promoter of this company, with significant affirmative voting

H
ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 491
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

rights. On 20.9.2011, a Non Disposal Undertaking was provided by A
AMNLBV, as promoter of Uttam Galva, to the lender banks of Uttam
Galva, which included the State Bank of India. On 31.3.2016, Canara
Bank and Punjab National Bank declared Uttam Galva’s accounts as
NPA. It is important to note that, in all the annual returns of Uttam
Galva till date, AMNLBV’s shareholding has been shown as ‘promoter’s
B
shareholding.’ All the annual reports, upto 2017, contained a list of
promoters, which included AMNLBV as one such, holding 29.05%% of
the share capital of the company, and having significant influence over
the company. Shri Salve’s argument that, in point of fact, no control was
actually exercised as AMNLBV never appointed any directors or
exercised its voting rights, cannot be accepted as that makes no difference C
to the de jure position of AMNLBV being a “promoter” as defined in
Section 2(69)(a) of the Companies Act, 2013.
108. On 7.2.2018, a few days before AMIPL submitted its first
resolution plan, AMNLBV sold its entire shareholding in Uttam Galva
by way of an off market sale, to a company of the Indian co-promoters, D
viz., ‘Sainath Trading Company Private Limited’. Shares that were
purchased for Rs.120 each, were sold for Re.1 each, when the market
value of the shares on the said date was admittedly Rs.19.50 per share.
The aforesaid sale of shares was done without making an open offer
under the 2011 Takeover Regulations, on the basis that it was an inter
se transfer of shares between promoters, and therefore exempt from E
such requirement under Regulation 10 of the said regulations. Also, as a
matter of fact, the sale of the said shares was effected without taking
the consent of the lenders of Uttam Galva, which consent was necessary
as per the Non Disclosure Undertaking that was executed by AMNLBV.
On 7.2.2018, consequent to the aforesaid inter se transfer, the Co- F
Promotion Agreement is said to have stood automatically terminated.
By way of abundant caution, a formal deed of termination was entered
into. AMNLBV addressed letters to the NSE and the BSE to record
the aforesaid inter se transfer, who accordingly declassified AMNLBV
as a promoter of Uttam Galva on 21.3.2018 and 23.3.2018 respectively.
G
109. It is absolutely clear that Shri L.N. Mittal, who is the ultimate
shareholder of the resolution applicant, viz. AMIPL, is directly the ultimate
shareholder of AMNLBV as well, which is an L.N. Mittal Group
Company. When the corporate veil of the various companies

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492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A aforementioned is pierced, both AMIPL and AMNLBV are found to be
managed and controlled by Shri L.N. Mittal, and are therefore persons
deemed to be acting in concert as per Regulation 2(1)(q)(2)(i) of the
2011 Takeover Regulations. That AMNLBV is a promoter of Uttam
Galva is clear from the aforementioned facts, being expressly stated as
such in Uttam Galva’s annual returns. The reasonably proximate facts
B
prior to the submission of both resolution plans by AMIPL would show
that there is no doubt whatsoever that AMNLBV’s shares in Uttam
Galva were sold only in order to get out of the ineligibility mentioned by
Section 29A(c), and consequently the proviso thereto. The fact that the
lenders with whom AMNLBV had a Non Disposal Undertaking have
C not yet moved any forum for a declaration that the sale of the shares,
being without their consent, is non est, does not absolve AMNLBV
from having failed to first obtain their consent before selling off its shares
in Uttam Galva. Such sale is directly contrary to the Non Disposal
Undertaking given to the lenders. Quite apart from this, it is also clear
that shares worth Rs.19.50 each were sold at a distress value of Re.1
D
each, so as to overcome the provisions of Section 29A(c) and the proviso
thereto. It is clear therefore that the Uttam Galva transaction clearly
renders AMIPL ineligible under Section 29A(c) of the Code.
110. Insofar as the transaction with regard to KSS Petron is
concerned, the facts are as follows:- on 3.3.2011, Fraseli, an entity
E registered and incorporated in Luxemburg, which is managed and
controlled by Shri L.N. Mittal, held 32.22% of the shareholding of KSS
Global, a company domiciled in the Netherlands. On 19.5.2011, by a
Shareholders Agreement entered into between KSS Holding, KSS Infra
EALQ, Fraseli and KSS Global, the first three companies were each
F given a right to appoint an equal number of directors on the board of
directors of KSS Global, which in turn held 100% of the share capital of
KSS Petron, a company incorporated in India. Fraseli was also granted
affirmative voting rights on decisions regarding certain specified matters,
both at the board and the shareholder level, in respect of KSS Global
and all companies controlled by it, which would include KSS Petron. As
G has been stated hereinabove, KSS Petron was declared as an NPA on
30.9.2015. As in the case of Uttam Galva, Fraseli divested its
shareholding in KSS Petron on 9.2.2018, i.e., only three days before
AMIPL submitted its first resolution plan. On the same day, the directors
nominated by Shri L.N. Mittal, through Fraseli, resigned from the board
H of KSS Global.
ARCELORMITTAL INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. SATISH 493
KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

111. From the aforementioned facts, there can be no doubt A
whatsoever that Fraseli, being a company managed and controlled by
Shri L.N. Mittal, holding one third of the shares in KSS Global, which in
turn held 100% of the share capital in KSS Petron, was in joint control of
KSS Petron, if the corporate veil of all these companies is disregarded.
Further, the Shareholders Agreement of 19.5.2011 makes it clear that
B
the joint control of KSS Global would be between three entities, viz.,
KSS Holding, KSS Infra EALQ and Fraseli, each of whom had the right
to appoint an equal number of directors on the board of directors of KSS
Global. Not only this, but Fraseli was also granted affirmative voting
rights as aforementioned, on certain important specified matters. There
would be no doubt whatsoever that, just before presentation of the C
resolution plan of 12.2.2018, AMIPL would be hit by Section 29A(c), as
a group company of Shri L.N. Mittal exercised positive control, by its
shareholding, right to appoint directors and affirmative voting rights, over
KSS Global, which in turn held 100% shareholding in KSS Petron. Again,
as in the case of Uttam Galva, there can be no doubt whatsoever that
D
the sale of Fraseli’s shareholding in KSS Global, together with the
resignation of the Mittal directors from the board of directors of KSS
Global, is a transaction reasonably proximate to the date of submission
of the resolution plan by AMIPL, undertaken with the sole object of
avoiding the consequence mentioned in the proviso to Section 29A(c).
Having regard to the law laid down by us in this judgment, it is, therefore, E
clear that AMIPL is ineligible under Section 29A(c) of the Code, on this
account as well.
112. Shri Rohatgi also argued before us that Shri Pramod Mittal,
brother of Shri Laxmi Mittal, also held shares in two other companies
which were declared to be NPAs more than one year prior to the date F
of commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution process of
ESIL. We have been informed by Shri Salve that Shri Pramod Mittal
parted company with Shri L.N. Mittal as far back as 1994, and cannot
therefore be regarded as a person acting in concert with Shri L.N. Mittal.
Since this aspect of the case has not been argued before the authorities
below, though raised in an I.A. by Numetal before the Appellate Authority, G
we will not countenance such an argument for the first time before this
Court.
113. Since it is clear that both sets of resolution plans that were
submitted to the Resolution Professional, even on 2.4.2018, are hit by
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494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.

A Section 29A(c), and since the proviso to Section 29A(c) will not apply
as the corporate debtors related to AMIPL and Numetal have not paid
off their respective NPAs, ordinarily, these appeals would have been
disposed of by merely declaring both resolution applicants to be ineligible
under Section 29A(c). Shri Subramanium, on behalf of the Committee
of Creditors, requested us to give one more opportunity to the parties
B
before us to pay off their corporate debtors’ respective debts in
accordance with Section 29A, as the best resolution plan can then be
selected by the requisite majority of the Committee of Creditors, so that
all dues could be cleared as soon as possible. Acceding to this request, in
order to do complete justice under Article 142 of the Constitution of
C India, and also for the reason that the law on Section 29A has been laid
down for the first time by this judgment, we give one more opportunity
to both resolution applicants to pay off the NPAs of their related corporate
debtors within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of this
judgment, in accordance with the proviso to Section 29A(c). If such
payments are made within the aforesaid period, both resolution applicants
D
can resubmit their resolution plans dated 2.4.2018 to the Committee of
Creditors, who are then given a period of 8 weeks from this date, to
accept, by the requisite majority, the best amongst the plans submitted,
including the resolution plan submitted by Vedanta. We make it clear
that in the event that no plan is found worthy of acceptance by the
E requisite majority of the Committee of Creditors, the corporate debtor,
i.e. ESIL, shall go into liquidation. The appeals are disposed of,
accordingly.

Devika Gujral Appeals disposed of.
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