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Supreme Court of India

APPASAHEB AND ANR.versusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Citation
2007 INSC 9
Decided
5 January 2007
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Holding

A demand for money to meet ordinary domestic expenses does not qualify as a demand for dowry; consequently, the essential element of Section 304‑B IPC was not established and the conviction was set aside.

Summary

Appasaheb and his mother-in-law were convicted under IPC Section 304‑B (dowry death) for the suicide of their wife, Bhimabai, who allegedly took poison after being harassed for dowry. The prosecution alleged that the accused demanded money for domestic expenses and for purchasing manure, which the wife could not provide. The Supreme Court examined the definition of "dowry" in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and held that a demand for money to meet ordinary household needs does not constitute dowry. Since the essential ingredient of Section 304‑B – a demand for dowry – was not proved, the conviction could not stand. The Court therefore set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellants. The appeal was allowed and the appellants were released.

Issues considered

  • Whether a demand for money for domestic expenses or purchase of manure amounts to a demand for "dowry" within the meaning of Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 for the purpose of invoking Section 304‑B IPC.
  • Whether the conviction under Section 304‑B IPC can be sustained in the absence of a proven dowry demand.

Legislation cited

Subjects

dowry deathSection 304-B IPCdowry definitiondomestic expensessuicidecriminal appealstatutory interpretation

Judgment

A                           APPASAHEB AND ANR.
                                        v.
                          STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

                                JANUARY 5, 2007

B                [G.P. MATHUR AND R.V. RA VEENDRAN, JJ.]

         Penal Code, 1860-Section 304-B-Applicabi/i~cope of-Held:
    Demand of money for meeting domestic expenses or for purchasing manure
    nat demand for 'dowry' so as to attract section 304-B-Thus, essential
    ingredient of section 304-B, demand for dowry not established-Conviction
c   of accused for causing harassment to wife in connection with demand of
    dowry leading to suicide by wife, not sustainable-Dowry Prohibition Act,
    1961-Section 2.

         Words and Phrases: 'Dowry '-Meaning of. in the context of Dowry
    Prohibition Act, 1961.
D
           According to the prosecution case, B-wife ended her life within two
    and a half years of marriage by consuming poison because of harassment
    caused to her by appellant no I-husband and appellant no 2-mother-in-law
    in connection with demand of dowry. Charges were framed under section
E   498-A, section 304-B and section 306 read with section 34 IPC. Trial
    Court acquitted the appellants of charges under section 498-A and section
    306 read with section 34 IPC but convicted and sentenced under section
    304-B IPC. High Court upheld the order. Hence the present appeal.
    Allowing the appeal, the Court

F        HELD: 1.1. The two essential ingredients of section 304-B IPC, apart
    from others, are (i) death of woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury
    or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances, and (ii) woman is
    subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her
    husband for, or in connection with, any demand for "dowry". The explanation
    appended to sub-section (1) of section 304-B says that "dowry" shall have
G
    the same meaning as in section 2 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
                                                             [Para 9) [171-C)

         1.2. In view of the definition of the word 'dowry' under section 2 of
    Dowry Prohibition Act any property or valuable security should be given
H   or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly at or before or any time
                                        164
                            APPASAHEBv. STATE                                165

 after the marriage and in connection with the marriage of the said parties.        A
 Therefore, the giving or taking of property or valuable security must have
 some connection with the marriage of the parties and a correlation between
 the giving or taking of property or valuable security with the marriage of
 the parties is essential. Being a penal provision it has to be strictly
 construed. It is well settled principle of interpretation of Statute that if the
 Act is passed with reference to a particular trade, business or transaction        B
 and words are used which everybody conversant with that trade, business
 or transaction knows or understands to have a particular meaning in it,
 then the words are to be construed as having that particular meaning.
                                                   (Para 9] (171-G, H, 172-A]

       2.1. The main witnesses regarding the alleged demand of money and            c
 also harassment and beating to B are her father and mother. Accepting the
 statements of father and mother on their face value the utmost which can
 be held is that the appellant no.1 had asked his wife to bring money for
 meeting domestic expenses and for purchasing manure.
                                                   [Para 8] (170-D, 171-AJ          D
      2.2. A demand for money on account of some financial stringency or
 for meeting some urgent domestic expenses or for purchasing manure
 cannot be termed as a demand for dowry as the said word is normally
 understood. Therefore, the evidence adduced by the prosecution does not
 show that any demand for 'dowry' as defined in section 2 of the Dowry              E
 Prohibition Act was made by the appellants as what was allegedly asked for
 was some money for meeting domestic expenses and for purchasing
 manure. Since an essential ingredient of section 304-B IPC viz. demand for
 dowry is not established, the conviction of the appellants cannot be sustained.
                                                          [Para 9] [172-B, C]
                                                                                    F
     Union of India v. Garware Nylons Ltd, AIR (1996) SC 3509 and
 Chemicals and Fibres ofIndia v. Union ofIndia, AIR (1997) SC 558, relied
 on.

        3 The appellants were also charged under sections 498-A and 306
· read with Section 34 IPC but were acquitted ofthe said charges by Sessions        G
  Judge, which order has attained finality for the reason that the State did
  not prefer appeal against the same. Appeal before the High Court and also
  in this Court has been preferred by appellants challenging their conviction
  under Section 304-B read with Section 34 IPC. Therefore, no opinion is
  expressed as to whether the appellants could be held guilty of having             H
    166                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2007] 1 S.C.R.

A   committed the offence under Section 498-A or 306 IPC on the basis of
    evidence available on record as their acquittal under the aforesaid charges
    has attained finality and cannot be reversed in the appeal filed by the
    appellants challenging their conviction under secti"on 304-B IPC.
                                               [Para 10) [172-E, F, 173-A, BJ

B        State of Andhra Pradesh v. Thadi Narayana, AIR (1962) SC 240,
    referred to.

            CRIMJNAL APP ELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1613 of
    2005.

C        From the Judgment and Final Order dated 23.2.2005 of the.High Court
    of Judicature of Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad in Crl. A. No. 9/1993.

            Sudhanshu Choudhari and Naresh Kumar Advs. for the Appellants.

        Sushil Karanjkar and Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure Advs. for the
D   Respondent.

            The Judg111ent of the Court was delivered by

         G.P. MATHUR, J. : 1. This appeal, by special leave, has been preferred
    against the judgment and order dated 23.2.2005 of Bombay High Court
E   (Aurangabad Bench), by which the appeal preferred by the appellants was
    dismissed and their conviction under Section 304-B read with Section 34 IPC
    and sentence of 7 years RI imposed thereiinder by the learned Sessions
    Judge, Aurangabad, was affirmed.

          2. The deceased Bhimabai was daughter of PW. l Tukaram Eknath
F   Tambe resident of village Sanjkheda and she was ..married to appellant no.
    1 Appasaheb son of Sheshrao Palaskar about two and half years prior to
    the date of incident which took place on 15.9.1991. The appellant no. 2,
    Kadubai is the mother of the appellant no. 1 and both the appellants were
    residing in the same house in village Palshi. According to the qise of
G   prosecution, a sum of Rs. 5000 and some gold ornaments had been given
    at the time of marriage of Bhimabai. For about six months Bhimabai was
    treated well but thereafter the accused started asking her to bring Rs. 1,000-
    1,200 from her parents to meet the household expenses and also for
                                                                                     '-.
    purchasing manure. Whenever Bhimabai went to her parental home, she
    used to tell her parents that her husband and mother-in-law (accused
H
                       APPASAHEB v. STATE [MATHUR, J.]                         167

     appellants) were harassing her and used to occasionally beat her. Her father     A
     PW. I Tukaram along with some of his relatives went to the house of the
     accused and tried to persuade them not to ill-treat Bhimabai. Thereafter, the
     accused treated Bhimabai properly but after about four months they again
     started harassing her. A few days before Nag Panchami festival Bhimabai
     came to her parental home and complaine<,l that the accused were not giving
     her proper food, clothings and even footwear. She also told her parents that
                                                                                      B
     her husband had asked her to bring an amount of Rs.1,000-1,200 for the
     purpose of household expenses and manure. The case of the prosecution
     futher is that in the evening of 15.9.199I a person came from village Paishi
     on a motorcycle and informed PW. I Tukaram that Bhimabai was unwell.

--   PW. I then immediately went to the house of the accused along with some
     of his relatives. There he saw that Bhimabai was lying dead and froth was
                                                                                      C

     coming out of her mouth which indicated that she had consumed some
     poisonous substance. The Police Patil of the village PW.3 Sandu Mohanrao
     Patil lodged an accidental death report at 9.00 p.m. on 15.9.I99I atthe police
     station. On the basis of the said accidental death report, PW.6 Sandeepan        D
     Kamble, Police Sub-Inspector, visited the house of the accused, held inquest
     on the dead body ofBhimabai, and thereafter sent the same for post-mortem
     examination. PW.I Tukaram lodged the FIR of the incident at 7.00 p.m. on
     I6.9.I99I at P.S. Chikalthana, on the basis of which Case Crime No. 144 of
     I99I was registered against the appellants under Sections 498-A, 306 and
     304-BIPC.                                                                        E

           3. After completion of investigation, charge sheet was submitted
     against the appellants and in due course, the case was committed to the
     Court of Sessions. The learned Sessions Judge framed charges under
     Sections 498-A, 304-B read with Section 34 IPC and Section 306 read with         F
     Section 34 IPC against both the appellants. The appellants pleaded not
     guilty and claimed to be tried. The prosecution in order to establish its case
     examined six wintesses and filed some documentary evidence. The learned
     Sessions Judge after consideration of the material on record acquitted the
     appellants of the charges under Sections 498-A and 306 read with Section
     34 IPC but convicted theni under Section 304-B IPC and imposed a sentence        G
     of 7 years RI thereunder. The appeal preferred by the appellants was
     dismissed by the High Court by the judgment and order dated 23.2.2005.

           4. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants, learned counsel
     for the State of Maharashtra and have perused the records.                       H
    168                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2007] I S.C.R.

A        5. The post-mortem examination on the body of deceased Bhimabai
    was conducted by a team of two doctors of Department of Forensic
    Medicine and Toxicology, Medical College, Aurangabad, namely, Dr. S.M.
    Jawale and Dr. H.V. Godbole on 16.9.1991. The doctors did not find any sign
    of external or internal injury on the body of the deceased and in their
    opinion, the cause of death was insecticide poisoning. The viscera was
B   preserved for chemical analysis. The report of the post-mortem examination
    was admitted by the defence.

          6. The specific case of the prosecution is that Bhimabai ended her life
    by consuming poison because of harassment caused to her by the appellants
c   for or in connection with demand of dowry. It is, therefore, necessary to
    briefly examine the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. PW. 1 Tukaram,
    father of the deceased, has given details of the prosecution version of the
    incident in his statement in Court. He has deposed that in the marriage he
    had given Rs. 20,000 as dowry. Initially, Bhimabai was treated well for about
    six months, but thereafter the appellants started ill-treating her. Whenever
D
    Bhimabai came to her parental home, she used to complain that for some
    domestic reasons she was being harassed. When she had visited her
    parental home on the last occasion, she had said that h~r husband Appasaheb
    had asked her to bring Rs. 1,000-1,200 for domestic expenses and for
    purchasing manure as he had no sufficient money. Bhimabai had complained
E   to him that she was not being given proper food, clothings and even
    footwear and occasionally the appellant no. I used to beat her. The last time
    she visited her parental home was during the festival of Nag Panchami and
    at that time she looked depressed. The witness has further deposed that on
    the date of incident, a man came from village Palshi on motorcycle and
F   informed that he should immediately go there as Bhimabai was not well. He
    then went to village Palshi along with other persons of his family where he     ,...
    reached after sun set. He saw that Bhimabai was lying dead and froth was
    coming out of her mouth which was smelling of Thimet (insecticide). In his
    cross-examination he has admitted that his statement that he had given
    Rs.20,000 in dowry at the time of marriage was incorrect and in fact he had
G   given Rs. 5,000 as dowry and the total •!xpenses incurred in the marriage was
    about Rs. 20,000. He has also deposed that it was after about 1-1/2 years
    of marriage that Bhimabai first complained to him about the harassment
    being caused to her. There used to be some bickering in the marital life of
    Bhimabai and her husband on trifling matters. He has admitted that it was
H   appellant no. l who had sent a person on motorcycle who had given
\
    "                     APPASAHEBv. STATE[MATHUR,J.]                             169

        information regarding Bhimabai being unwell and that both the appellants          A
        were present at the time of her funeral. PW.2 Babaji is real brother offather-
        in-law of PW. I Tukaram. He has deposed that on an earlier occasion he had
        gone along with PW. I and some others to the house of appellant no. I to
        persuade him not to harass Bhimabai and to treat her well. In his cross-
        examination he has admitted that when he had gone to village Palshi to talk
        with the appellants regarding the ill-treatment being meted out to Bhimabai,
                                                                                          B
        there was no talk regarding monetary giving and taking. He also admitted
        that he had not gone to attend that funeral of Bhimabai. PW.5 Sumanbai is
        the mother of the deceased Bhimabai. She has stated in her examination-in-
        chief that Bhimabai was being ill-treated by the appellants and the reason
        for ill-treatment was that they were demanding money to be brought from           C
        her parental home. The last time Bhimabai visited her parental home was on
        the occasion of the festival of Nag Panchami and she had complained that
        she was being ill-treated and was sometimes given beating for bringing
        money from her parents. She has specifically stated that for a period of six
        months after the marriage, Bhimabai was treated well and thereafter she had
                                                                                          D
        started complaining about the harassment being caused to her. In her cross-
        examination, PW.5 Sumanbai has stated that after news about the condition
        of Bhimabai was given by a man from village Palshi, she along with her
        husband and some other relations went there and noticed that Bhimabai was
        lying dead in the house and froth was coming out of her mouth. She has
        further stated that she did not make any enquiry as to how Bhimabai had           E
        died. In her statement under Section 16I Cr.P.C. which was recorded very
        next day of the incident i.e. on 16.9.1991 she did not state that cause of ill-
        treatrnent was "a demand for money and a consequent beating". When
        confronted with her aforesaid statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C., she
        replied that she did not know why there was no mention in the said                F
        statement that the cause for ill-treatment was "a demand for money and a
        consequent beating". She further stated that it will be correct to say that her
        daughter was receiving ill-treatment as a result of "domestice cause". The
        learned trial Judge then sought clarification from the witnessses by putting
        the following question. :-
                                                                                          G
                    "Que:-        What do you mean by "domestic cause"?

                    Ans.:-        What I meant was that there was demand for
                                  money for defraying expenses of manure etc. and
                                  that was the cause."                                    H
                                                                                      'l
                                                                                      I



    170                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2007) 1 S.C.R.

A               In the very next paragraph she stated as under :-

                        "It is not true to suggest that in my statement before the
                        police I never said that ill-treatment was as a result of
                        demand for money from us and its fulfillment. I cannot
                        assign any reason why police did not write about it in
B                       my statement."

          7. PW. 3 Sandu, Police Patil of village Palshi has deposed that at about
    4.20 p.m. on I5.9.I99I, Narayan who is uncle of appellant no.I, Appasaheb,             ...:
    informed him that the wife of Appasaheb had expired. He then went to the
c   house of the appellant and saw Bhimabai lying with froth coming out of her
    mouth. Thereafter, he gave a report about the incident in writing at the police
    station. In his cross-examination, he admitted that he did not make detailed
    enquiries as to what was the cause of death and where the incident had
    taken place. He has further deposed that Bhimabai had come to his house
    about six months earlier and had said all was not well between her and her
D
    husband, but she had not given any specific details.

          8. The main witnesses regarding the alleged demand of money and also
    harassment and beating to Bhimabai are her father and mother, viz., PW. I
    Tukaram and PW.5 Sumanbai. In his examination-in-chief PW. I has said that
E   whenever his daughter came to her parental home, she used to complain that
    she was being subjected to harassment by the appellants on account of
    some "domestic reasons" and further that her husband (appellant no.I) had
    told her that while coming back from her parental home she should bring Rs.
     I,000-1,200 for expenses and for manure as he had no sufficient money.
    PW.5 Sumanbai has deposed that Bhimabai was receiving ill-treatment as a
F
    result of "domestic cause" and to a specific question put by the Courl as
    to what she meant by "domestic cause" she gave a reply that there was a
    demand for money for defraying expenses of manure etc. It is important to
    note that in her statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. which was recorded on
    the very next day of the death of Bhimabai, this witness did not state that
G   the cause for ill-treatment was "a demand for money and a consequent
    beating". The evidence on record does not indicate that the police had any
    reason to favour the accused and deliberately omitted to mention about the
    alleged demand of money while recording the statement of PW.5 Sumanbai
                                                                                            '-
    under Section 161 Cr. P.C. The evidence shows that the accused come from
H   very humble background and they could not have exerted any kind of
                      APPASAHEB v. STATE [MATHUR, J.]                         171

    influence, financial or otherwise, upon the police so as to manage a             A
    statement favourable to them when in the course of investigation the
    statements of witnesses were being recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C.
    Accepting the statements of father and mother on their face value that
    utmost which can be held is that the appellant no. l had asked his wife
    Bhimabai to bring money for meeting domestic expenses and for purchasing
    manure.
                                                                                     B

          9. Two essential ingredient of Section 304-B IPC, apart from others, are
    (i) death of women is caused by any bums or bodily injury or occurs
    otherwise than under normal circumstances, and (ii) women is subjected to
    cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for,         C
    or in connection with, any demand for "dowry". The explanation appended
    to sub-section (1) of Section 304-B IPC says that "dowry" shall have the
    same meaning as in Section 2 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

         Section 2 of Dowry Prohibition Act reads as under :-
                                                                                     D
             "2. Definition of "dowry" - In this Act "dowry" means any
             property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either
             directly or indirectly-

             (a)   by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage;    E
                   or

             (b)   by the parent of either party to a marriage or by any other
                   person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person,
                   at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with    F
                   the marriage of the said· parties, but does not include dowry
                   or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal
                   Law (shariat) applies.

-         In view of the aforesaid definition of the word "dowry" any property
    or valuable security should be given or agreed to be given either directly       G
    or indirectly at or before or any time after the marriage and in connection
    with the marriage of the said parties. Therefore, the giving or taking of
    property or valuable security must have some connection with the marriage
    of the parties and a correlation between the giving or taking of property or
    valuable security with the marriage of the parties is essential. Being a penal   H
    172                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (2007] 1 S.C.R.

A   provision it has to be strictly construed. Dowry is a fairly well known social
    custom or practice in India. It is well settled principle of interpretation of
    Statute that ifthe Act is passed with reference to a particular trade, business
    or transaction and words are used which everybody coversant with that
    trade, business or transaction knows or understands to have a particular
    meaning in it, then the words are to be construed as having that particular
B   meaning. (See Union of India v. Garware Nylons Ltd, AIR (1996) SC 3509
    and Chemicals and Fibres of India v. Union of India, AIR (1997) SC 558).
    A demand for money on account of some financial stringency or for meeting         .:
    some urgent domestic expenses of for purchasing manure cannot be termed
    as a demand for dowry as the said word is normally understood. The
C   evidence adduced by the prosecution does not, therefore, show that any
    demand for "dowry" as defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act
    was made by the appellants as what was allegedly asked for was some
    money for meeting domestic expenses and for purchasing manure. Since an
    essential ingredient of Section 304-B IPC viz. demand for dowry is not
D   established, the conviction of the appellants cannot be sustained.

           10. Learned counsel for the appellants has also submitted that there is
    absolutely no evidence either direct or circumstantial to show that Bhimabai
    committed suicide. He has submitted that the insecticide Thimet is extensively
    used by the farmers for preservation of crop and is kept stored in their
E    houses and it could be a case where Thimet accidentially got mixed with
     some food item and was consumed by Bhaimabai. It has thus been submitted
    that no offence under Section 306 IPC is made out against the appellants.
     We do not consider it necesary to examine this question. As already stated,
    the appellants were also charged under Sections 498-A and 306 read with
p   Section 34 1PC but were acquitted of the said charges by the learned
    Sessions Judge, which order has attained finality for the reason that the
    State did not prefer appeal agains the same. The appeal before the High
    Court and also in this Court has been preferred by the appellants chailenging
    their coviction under section 304-B read with section 34 IPC. It has been held
    in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Thadi Narayan, AIR (1962) SC 240 that
G   Section 423(1 )(b)(i) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (which corresponds
    to Section 386(b)(i) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) is clearly confined
    to cases of appeals preferred against orders of conviction and sentence, the
    powers conferred by this clause cannot be exercised for the purpose of
    reversing an order of acquittal passed in favour of a party in respect of an
H   offence charged, in dealing with an appeal preferred by him against the order
                             APPASAHEB v. STATE [MATHUR, J.]                        173


..   ../
           of conviction in respect of another offence charged and found proved.
           Therefore, we have refrained from expressing any opinion as to whether the
                                                                                           A

           appellants could be held guilty of having committed the offence under
           Section 498-A or 306 !PC on the basis of evidence available on record as
           their acquittal under the aforesaid charges has attained finality and cannot
           be reversed in the appeal filed by the appeUants challenging their conviction
           under Section 304-B IPC.
                                                                                           B

                 11. In view of the discussion made above, the appeal is allowed. The
           judgment and order dated 23.2.2005 of the High Court and the judgment and
           order dated 4.1.1993 of the learned Sessions Judge convicting the appellants
           under Section 304-B !PC are set aside and the appellants are acquitted of       C
           the said charge. The appellant fio.1 is in custody. He shall be released
           forthwith unless wanted in some other case. The appellant no. 2 is on bail.
           The <;ureties and bail bonds furnished by her are discharged.

           N.J.                                                        Appeal allowed.
                                                                                           D




-
       I

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