Holding

A civil suit seeking an injunction against the hearing authority under s.68‑D is not maintainable as the Act confers exclusive jurisdiction on the authority and bars civil court intervention.

Summary

The petitioner, a stage‑carriage permit holder, objected to a scheme published under section 68‑C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 that would grant the State Transport Undertaking exclusive rights on certain routes. Before the hearing authority under section 68‑D could approve the scheme, he filed a civil suit seeking a declaration that the scheme was ultra vires and an injunction restraining the authority from proceeding. The civil court refused to stay the suit, and subsequent revision and writ petitions were dismissed. The petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court via a special leave petition, contending that the suit was maintainable. The Court held that the jurisdiction of the hearing authority is exclusive, the Act’s provision of finality bars civil courts from entertaining such injunctions, and the suit fails to disclose a cause of action under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC, thus it is not maintainable.

Issues considered

Whether a civil suit for injunction restraining the hearing authority under s.68‑D of the Motor Vehicles Act is maintainable.
Whether the Motor Vehicles Act, by declaring the scheme final, impliedly bars the jurisdiction of civil courts.
Whether the suit discloses a cause of action under the Code of Civil Procedure.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 9, s. Order 7 Rule 11
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939s. 68-0, s. 68-A(b), s. 68-C, s. 68-D

Subjects

Motor Vehicles Actsection 68-Csection 68-Dhearing authorityinjunctioncivil suit maintainabilityexclusive jurisdictionCode of Civil ProcedureOrder 7 Rule 11special leave petition

Judgment

A

ANWAR
v.
IST ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE,
B BULANDSHAHR & ORS.

AUGUST 11, 1986

[E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND RANGANATH MISRA, JJ.]

Motor Vehicles A ct, 1939: ·s. 68-D (-)Civil suit for injunction rest-
c raining proceedings before Hearing Authority-Whether maintainable.

Section 68-C, occurring in Chapter IVA of the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1939 provides for puhlicatim of the scheme· where any State Transport
Undertaking is of opinion that it is necessary in the public interest that
D road transport services in relation to any area or route be run and
operated by such undertaking. Section 68-D( I) provides for filing of
objections to the scheme before the State Government, s. 68-0(2) for
appro"al or modification of the scheme by the State Government after
giving a hearing to objectors, while s.68-0(3) states that the approved
or modified scheme when published shall become final.
E
Before the Hearing Authority could give its approval, the peti-
tioner in the Special Leave Petition, a stage carriage permit holder, who
had earlier filed objections to the scheme published under s. 68-C, filed
a civil suit for declaration that the said scheme was illegal, void and ultra
vires and for an injunction. It was contended by the defendants-res-
F pondents that the suit was not maintainable since the jurisdiction of the
Civil Courts in such matters was impliedly barred. During the pen·
dency of that suit the petitioner filed an application before the Civil ~-
I
Court for staying the hearing of the suit till the disposal of a special
leave petition before the Supreme Court in which question relating to
the maintainability of suits of similar nature was involved. The Court
G declined to grant the request and fixed the suit for arguments. The
revision to the District Judge and the writ petition to the High Court
preferred by the petitioner were dismissed.

In the special leave petition to the Court on the question: Whether
a suit is maintainable in a Civil Court for an injunction restraining the
- H Hearing Authority nuder s. 68-D of the Motor Vehicles Act from pro-

540
ANWAR v. IST ADDL. JUDGE 541

ceeding with the hearing and approving the scheme. A

Dismissing the special leave petition,

HELD: The Civil Judge was right in dedining to stay· further
proceedings in the suit. This is a ·suit which should have been rejected at
the threshold under Order 7 rule I I of the Code of Civil Procedure. on B
the ground that it did not disclose a cause of action. [546F-G]

The Jurisdiction conferred on the hearing authority under s. 68-
D of the Motor Vehicles Act is exclusive in character and it is not open
to a civil court to issue an order. of injunction restraining the said
authority from proceeding with the hearing of the case and exercising C
itS statutory functions. [545H; 546A]

Whenever a statute uses the expression that a decision of an
authority shall be final, the jurisdiction of a civil court to go into the
correctness or otherwise of the decision is taken away. The civil courts
then have jurisdiction only to examine whether ·the provisions of the D
statute have not hem complied with or the tribunal had or had not acted in
conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. Their
jurisdiction is barred insofar as merits of the case is concerned. [546B;D-E]

In the instant case the scheme had been duly published under s
68-C by an authority which had the power to·publishit and the author- ~
ity which was hearing the case under s. 68-D had the power to do so.All
the contentions urged in the plaint related to the merits of the scheme
and the desirability of bringing ttie scheme into force and these can be
raised by an aggrieved person before the Hearing Authority under s.
68-D of the Act. It is for the Hearing Authority to consider the objec-
tions and to pass appropriate orders thereon. [546B-D] F

' Parliament has created a special inachinery by the provisions con-
tained in Chapter IVA of the Act for bringing into force an approved or
modified scheme which would have the effect of excluding completely or
partially other persons from operating motor service vehicles on any
route or in any area. The very object of enacting that Chapter can be G
frustrated by interested parties by resorting'to a civil court with the sole
purpose of delaying the implementation of a scheme if suits as in the
instant case are allowed to be entertainetl. [545C-D; 546E-F]

H.C. Narayariappa and Ors. v. The State of Mysore & Ors.,
[1960] 3 S.C.R. 742 referred to. H
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 119861 3 S.C.R.

A CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition
(Civil) No. 8001 of1986

From the Judgment and Order dated 8. 7. 1986 of the Allahabad
High CourtinW.P. No. 9664of 1986.
B
U .R. Lalit and T. Sridharan for the Petitioner.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by i(.

MISRA, J. The short question whi~h arises for consideration in

c
this case is whether a suit is maintainable in a civil court for an injunc-
tion restraining the Hearing Authority appointed under section 68-D
of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act')
r-
from proceedings with the hearing of matters under that provision and
from approving a scheme published under section 68-C of the Act
either with or without any modification.
D
_The petitioner is the holder of a permit issued under Chapter JV
of the Act to ply a stage carriage on Bulandshahr-Siana-Garh-Bugrasi-
Brijghat-Bhasians-Shambhaoli-Babugarh-Jadol-Jahangirabad route in
the State of Uttar Pradesh. The State Transport Undertaking of the
State of Uttar Pradesh published a scheme dated March 7, 1975 in the
E U.P. Gazette dated April 5, 1975 under section 68-C of the Act pro-
posing to operate its stage carriages to the exclusion of all private
operators on the route referred to above. The petitioner filed his ob-
jections to the said scheme along with several others. After a number
of adjournments the Hearing Authority empowered under section 68-
D of the Act was able to conclude the proceedings by April 26, 1979
and it is alleged that the Authority in the course of the hearing ob-
served that it would finalise and approve the scheme by 21.5.1979.
-\•
Before the Hearing Authority could give its approval to the scheme
under section 68-D of Act, the petitioner filed Original Suit No. 145 of
1979 on the file of the Civil Judge, Bulandshahr for a declaration that
the above scheme published under section 68-C of the Act was illegal,
void and ultra vires and for an injunction restraining the defendants in
G
the suit from finalising and approving the scheme and acting upon it
after it was published. The State Transport Undertaking, i.e., the
Ottar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, the State of Uttar
Pradesh and the Regional Transport Authority, Meerut were implea- ~-
ded as the defendents in the suit. The defendants contested the suit.
H One of the pleas raised in their written statement was that ti.e suit was
ANWAR v. !ST ADDL. JUDGE [MISRA. J.I 543
(

not maintainable in a civil court for the reliefs prayed for by the A
petitioner. During the pendency of the suit the petitioner filed an
application before the Civil Court for staying the hearing of the.suit till
the disposal of a special leave petition before this Court since the
question relating to the .maintainability of suits of similar nature was
involved in the said special leave petition. The learned Civil Judge B
declined to grant the request of the petitioner and fixed the suit for
arguments on November 8, 1985. Aggrieved by the order of the Civil
Judge, the petitioner filed a revision petition before the Additional
District Judge, Bulandshahr. That revision petition was dismissed.
Against the order of Additional District Judge, the petitioner filed a
-~· writ petitior: on the file of the High Court of Alla~abad. That petition
was also dismissed. This special leave petition is filed against the order c
of the High Court of Allahabad.

-._.. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner in this case
on the question of maintainability of the suit out of which this petition
arises.
D
The question for consideration in this case is, as mentioned
'
above, whether a suit is maintainable in a civil court for an injunction
restraining the Hearing Authority under section 68-D of the Act from
proceedirig with the hearing and approving the scheme either with or
without modificatipn. The contention of the respondents before the
E
trial court was that the suit ~as not maintainable for the reliefs prayed
for by the petitioner since the jurisdiction of the civil courts in such
matters was impliedly barred.

Chapter IV A of the Act was introduced into the Act by Act JOO
of 1956. Section 68-D of the Act provides that the provisions of the·
F
Chapter IVA and the rules and orders made thereunder shall have
..;- effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in
Chapter IV of the Act or any other law for the time being in force or in
any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law. Chapter IV A
contains certain special provisions relating to the State Transport Un-
dertakings. A 'State Transport Undertaking' is defined by section
G
68-A(b) of the Act as any Undertaking providing road transport
service where such undertaking is carried on by (i) the Centr~l Gov-
ernment or a State Government; (ii) any Road Transport Corporation,
estabiished under section 3 of the Road Transport Corporations Act,
1950; and (iii) any municipality or any corporation or company owned
or controlled by the Central Government or one or more State Gov- H
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 3 S.C.R.

A ernments, or by the Central Government and one or more State Gov- -~ 4..
ernments. Chapter IVA of the Act provides for the preparation and
approval of a scheme enabling the State Transport Undertaking to
operate road transport services to the exclusion complete or partial of
other persons. The procedure laid down for the preparation of the
scheme is contained in sections 68-C and 68-0 of the Act. Section 68-C
B
of the Act provides that where any State Transport Undertaking is of
opinion that for the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate,
economical and properly co-ordinated road transport service, it is
......
necessary in the public interest .that road transport services in general
or any particular class of such service in relation to any area or route or
portion thereof should be run and operated by the State Transport
c Undertaking, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other
persons or otherwise, the State Transport Undertaking may prepare a
scheme giving particulars of the nature of the service proposed ·to be
rendered, the area or route proposed to be covered and such other
particulars respecting thereto as may be prescribed, and shall cause
every such scheme to be published in the Official Gazettee and also in
D
such manner as the State Government may direct. Section 68-D of the
Act provides that on the publication of any scheme in the Official
Gazette any person already providing transport facilities by any means
along or near the area or route proposed to be covered by the scheme,
any association representing persons interested in the provision of
road transport facilities recognised in this behalf by the State Govern-
E ment and any local authority or police authority within whose jurisdic-
tion any part of the area or route proposed to be covered by the
scheme lies, may within thirty days from the date of its publication in r
the Official Gazette file objections to it before the State Government.
The State Government may, after considering the objections and after
giving an opportunity to the objector or his representatives and the
F representatives of the State Transport Undertaking to be heard in the
matter if they so desire, approve or modify the scheme_ The scheme as
approved or modified as stated above shall then be published in the
Official Gazette by the State Government and the same shall there-
upon become final and shall be called the approved scheme and the
area or route to which it relates shall be called the notified area or
G notified route. Under section 68-l of the Act .the State Government is
authorised to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the
provisions of this Chapter. The rules which are promulgated provide
for the details relating to the manner in which objections or represen-
tations can be filed under section 68-D(i) and the procedure to be
followed at the hearing of persons who have filed such objections
H
ANWAR v. !ST ADDL JUDGE [MISRA, J,] 545

and/or representations and the representatives of the State Transport A
Undertaking. The rules also provide for the particulars to be incor-
porated in the scheme published under section 68-C of the Act. From
the above provisions it is clear that on the publicatio~ of the scheme
under section 68-C of the Act any person who is aggrieved by the
proposed introduction of the scheme is entitled to file his representa-
B
tions and objections and to appear before the Hearing Authority un-
der section 68-D of the Act and make his submissions in support of his
objections or representations. Sub-section (ii) of section 68-D of the
Act authorises the Hearing Authority to approve the scheme either
with or without modification. By necessary implication it can also
--~ reject a scheme if it feels that it is not necessary to introduce the
- i scheme. When the scheme is approved or modified under section 68-D c
of the Act, such approved or modified scheme is required to be
published in the Official Gazette and ori such publication it becomes
final. It is thus seen that Parliament has created a special machinery by
the provisions contained in Chapter IVA of the Act for bringing into
force an approved or modified scheme which would have the effect of
excluding completely or partially other persons from operating motor D
service vehicles on any route or in any area. After the scheme become
final, as provided in sub-section (iii) of section 68-D of Act, the trans-
port authorities concerned can issue permits only in accordance with
the scheme and the other provisions contained in Chapter IVA of the
Act. This Court in H.C. Narayanappa and Ors. v. The State of Mysore
and Ors., [1960] 3 S.C.R. 742 at page 753 has observed that the
scheme approved or modified and published under section 68-D of the E
Act may properly be regarded as 'law', within the meaning of Article
19(6) of the Constitution, made by the State excluding private
operators from notified routes or notified areas, and immune from the
attack that it infringes the fundamental right guaranteed by Article
19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
F
Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides that the
courts (subject to the provisions contained therein) have jurisdiction
to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance
is either expressly or impliedly barred. It is no doubt true that there is
no express provision in the Act taking away the jurisdiction of the civil
courts to try a suit in which the validity of the proceedings under
G
Chapter IVA of the Act is called in question. But we are of opinion
that
. .
the jurisdiction of the civil courts is impliedly barred from
•>
enter-
-<. tammg suits of the present nature. The jurisdiction of the State
Government (the Hearing Authority under section 68-D of the Act) is
exclusive in character, and it is not open to a civil court to issue an
·' order of in juntion restraining the Hearing Authority from proceeding H
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11986} 3 S.C.R.

A with the hearing of the case and exercising its statutory functions.
Whenever statute uses the expression that a decision of an authority
shall be final, the jurisdiction of a civil court to go into the correctness
or otherwise of the decision is taken away. We have gone through the
plaint presented in this case. It is not disputed.that the scheme had been
duly published under section 68-C of the Act by an authority which had
B
the power to publish it and that the authority which was hearing the
case under section 68-D of the Act had the power to do so. All the
contentions urged in the plaint relate to the merits of the scheme and
•••
the desirability of bringing the scheme into force. All such objections
relating to the merits of a scheme or the desirability of bringing such
scheme can be raised by an aggrieved person before the Hearing Au-
c thority under section 68-D of the Act and it is for the Hearing Author-
ity to consider such objections and representations and to pass ap-
propriate orders thereon. Where the Statute gives finality to the orders
of a special tribunal the civil courts jurisdiction must be held to be -+-
excluded insofar as the merits to the case is concerned. If jurisdiction is
so excluded, the civil courts have jurisdiction only to examine whether
D the provisions of the Statute have not been complied with or the tri-
bunal had or had not acted in conformity with the fundamental princi-
ples of judicial procedure. In cases of the present nature where invari-
ably reliance is placed by the private operators on Article 19(1)(g) of
the Constitution, a writ petition lies before the High Court. In such
cases a suit is hardly the remedy which. can be availed by them. If suits
E of this nature are allowed to be entertained, the very object of the
several provisions of Chapter IVA of the Act can be frustrated by
interested parties by resorting to a civil court with the sole object of
delaying the implementation of a scheme. Such attempts should be
curbed at the earliest opportunity. The learned Civil Judge was right in
declining to stay the further proceedings in the suit. This is a suit which
....'
_

F
should have been rejected at the threshold under Order 7 rule 11 of the
Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that it did not disclose a cause
of action. We, therefore, do not find any ground to interfere with the
orders of the High Court, the District Judge and the Civil Judge. The
Civil Judge is directed to dispose of the suit in the light of the observa-
ti9ns made in this order. The petition fails and is dismissed. •
G

P.S.S. Petition dismissed.