ANUP LAL YADAV & ANR.versusSTATE OF BIHAR

                     [2014] 10 S.C.R. 689


                  ANUP LAL YADAV & ANR.                            A
                                v.
                      STATE OF BIHAR
              (Criminal Appeal No. 775 of 2007)
                   SEPTEMBER 26, 2014.
                                                                   B
 [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI AND N.V. RAMANA, JJ.]

       Penal Code, 1860: ss. 3021149 - Previous enmity
 between two factions - Mob of about 300-400 persons led by
 appellant no. 1 and other accused attacked ruthlessly persons C
 of other faction killing 14 persons, burning 47 houses and
-injuring large number of persons - Conviction ulss.3021149
 - Held: Evidence of eye witnesses was trustworthy and
 inspired confidence - There was no denial on part of accused
 as to their participation in the atrocities - Appellants were part o
 of the unlawful assembly sharing the common object of the
 offence committed - Once it is established that unlawful
 assembly had common object, it is not necessary that all
 persons forming the unlawful assembly must be shown to
 have committed some overt act rather they can be convicted E
 u/s. 149 - No interference with the conviction order.

     Dismissing the appeals, the Court

     Held: 1. The facts and circumstances of the case
showed that the huge mob was led and instigated by the F
appellant and other accused who had actively
participated in the carnage and slaughtered innocent
villagers with deadly weapons. There was no denial on
the part of the accused as to their participation in the
atrocities. In such circumstances, the Court cannot G
ignore the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution
witnesses who categorically described the role played by
the accused. The plea of the accused/appellants cannot
be accepted that the accused were merely passive
                          689                            H
    690      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A   onlookers who joined the mob out of curiosity and they
    had no common intention and did not share the common
    object of the unlawful assembly. The appellants were
    part of the unlawful assembly sharing the common object
    of killing, rioting and looting the villagers. Each one of the
B   accused played an active role in furtherance of the
    common object of the assembly and the Courts below
    were perfectly right in convicting the accused/appellants
    under Section 149, IPC. Once it is established that the
    unlawful assembly had a common object, it is not
c   necessary that all persons forming the unlawful assembly
    must be shown to have committed some overt act, rather
    they can be convicted under Section 149, IPC. [Paras 15,
    20, 21] [699-E-G; 702-D-H; 703-A]

         Yunis v. State of M.P. (2003) 1 SCC 425; State of
D   Rajasthan v. Shiv Charan (2013) 12 SCC 76: 2013 (8)
    SCR 336; Lalji v. State of U.P. (1989) 1 SCC 437: 1989 (1)
    SCR 130; Suba/ Ghorai v. State of W.B. (2013) 4 SCC 607 .
    - relied on.

E        Bhudeo Manda/ & Ors. v. State of Bihar (1981) 2 SCC
    755: 1981 (3) SCR 291; Santosh v. State of Madhya
    Pradesh (1975) 3 SCC 727:1975 (3) SCR 463; Ku/dip
    Yadav v. State of Bihar (2011) 5 SCC 324: 2011 (5)
    SCR 186; Shaji v. State of Kera/a (2011) 5 SCC 423: 2011
F   (6) SCR 210; Badal Murmu v. State of WB. (2014) 3 SCC
    366: 2014 (2) SCR 323; State of A.P. v. Thakkidiram Reddy
    (1998) 6 SCC 554: 1998 (3) SCR 1088 - referred to.
                         Case Law Reference:
          1981 (3) SCR 291        referred to          Para 10
G
          1975 (3) SCR 463        referred to          Para 10
          2011 (5) SCR 186        referred to          Para 10
          2011 (6) SCR 210        referred to          Para 10
          2014 (2) SCR 323        referred to          Para 10
H
        ANUP LAL YADAV v. STATE OF BIHAR                     691


    1998 (3) SCR 1088           referred to           Para 13        A
    (2003) 1 sec 425            relied on             Para 13
    2013 (8) SCR 336            relied on              Para 13,
                                                            19
    1989 (1) SCR 130            relied on             Para 16        B
    (2003) 1 sec 425            relied on              Para 17
    (2013) 4 sec 607            relied on              Para 18
    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 775 of 2007.                                                     c
    From the Judgment & Order dated 23.11.2006 of the High
Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Appeal No. 566 of
1993(08).

                             WITH                                    D

Crl. A. No. 1163 of 2007.

    T. Mahipal, Prem Sunder Jha for the Appellants.

    Gopal Singh, Prerna Singh for the Respondent.                    E

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     N.V. RAMANA, J. 1. These appeals are preferred by the
appellants/accused aggrieved by the judgment and order
passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature F
at Patna in Criminal Appeal No. 566 of 1993 whereby the High
Court affirmed the conviction and sentence passed by the 8th
Additional Sessions Judge, Purnia, Bihar in Sessions Trial No.
28 of 1978 under Sections 302/149, 436/149, 380/149, 323/
149, 145 and 147 of the Indian Penal Code against them.        G

     2. The prosecution case, in short, is that in the early hours
of 25th September, 1974 appellant Su rang Lal Yadav (Accused
No. 5), a member of Santhala community, riding on a horse and
carrying a sword in his hand entered the village Singhimari          H
    692       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A   leading a mob of about 300 to 400 persons, all armed with
    various kinds of deadly weapons such as bows, arrows,
    ballams, bhalas, kulharis, dandas and with burning flames in
    their hands. The mob led by accused Surang Lal Yadav
    attacked ruthlessly the Badhyas, a Muslim minority community,
B   most of them were migrants from Bangladesh. The mob went
    on looting movable properties of the villagers, setting their
    houses on fire, injuring and killing innocent persons
    indiscriminately. In the said incident, 14 persons were killed,
    47 houses were burnt, several properties were looted and a
c   number of persons were injured. On the basis of a complaint
    given by one Amzad Ali (PW 2) at about 1 p.m. on 25th
    September, 1974 to the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, an
    FIR was registered and investigation took place. The genesis
    of the case is a Government land which was in occupation of
o   the accused persons but allegedly encroached by the Badhyas.

          3. After investigation, charge sheet was filed against
    several persons including the appellants herein. Most of the
    other accused persons were shown as absconded. The case
E   of 27 accused persons including the appellants was committed
    for trial. The Trial Court framed charges against 18 accused
    persons including the appellants. The other accused, who were
    committed to face trial, had jumped their bail bonds and
    absconded. Finally, statements under Section 313, Cr.P.C.
F   were recorded in respect of seven accused persons only.

             4. To bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution
-·.. has examined in all 38 witnesses. The informant-Amzad Ali
   ·. · was examined as PW 2 who was the eyewitness to the incident.
        In his examination, he had narrated the whole incident and
 G identified as many as 33 persons in the mob who actively
        participated in the arson, looting and disclosed their names.

         5. PW 1-Dr. V.N. Sinha, the Civil Assistant Surgeon of
     Sa9ar Hospital, Purnia who conducted postmortem
H    examination on the dead bodies of six persons found sharp
       ANUP LAL YADAV v. STATE OF BIHAR                    693
               [N.V. RAMANA, J.]
edged piercing injuries and cutting wounds on the bodies of        A
the deceased and he opined that these persons died on
account of the ante mortem injuries sustained by them before
48 to 72 hours of their death. Postmortem of other eight
deceased persons was carried out by PW 35-Dr. T.P.
Chatterjee, the Deputy Superintendent of Kishanganj Hospital       B
who also found sharp edged piercing and cutting injuries and
penetrating wounds on the bodies of the deceased. In his
opinion, their death occurred within 72 hours.

     6. The Trial Court, after considering the conspectus of the   C
circumstances and materials on record, came to the conclusion
that the prosecution has successfully proved the guilt of the
accused. Accordingly, the Trial Court convicted and sentenced
the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life for the
offence punishable under Section 302/149, IPC. They were
                                                                   0
further convicted and sentenced to undergo R.I. for five years
for the offence committed under Section 436/149, R.I. for two
years for the offence under Section 380/149 and R.I. for one
year for the offence under Section 323/149, IPC. Accused No.
5-Surang Lal Yadav was further sentenced to undergo R.I. for       E
one year for the offence punishable under Section 145, IPC
whereas the other accused were convicted and sentenced to
undergo R.I. for six months for committing the offence under
Section 147, IPC. All the sentences were however directed to
run concurrently.
                                                                   F
     7. All the seven accused assailed the judgment and order
of the learned Trial Judge in appeal before the High Court of
Judicature at Patna. The High Court allowed the appeal in
respect of two accused persons while maintaining conviction
and sentence passed by the Trial Court against the other           G
accused. We are now concerned with only three accused who
challenged the judgment of the High Court before us in these
Criminal Appeals.

     8. Learned senior counsel appearing for the accused/          H
    694      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A appellants mainly contended that the identification of the
  appellants as accused by the prosecution witnesses is highly
  doubtful. He submitted that there was enmity and rivalry
  between the accused group and the group of prosecution
  witnesses. On the fateful day, an open fight broke up between
B the two factions, several persons died and several others were
  injured. The brother of Anup Lal Yadav (accused-Appellant No.
  1) was also killed on the same day and the brother of Su rang
  Lal Yadav was also murdered a day earlier to the incident, in
  which Amzad Ali (P.W. 2) was an accused. Moreover, Amzad
c Ali (PW 2) once contested an election against accused Surang
  Lal Yadav and lost the election. Thus there was enmity
  prevailing between the two groups. All the prosecution
  witnesses are interested witnesses and they wanted to retaliate
  by implicating the accused in the present case. It is evident from
o their depositions that they had made bald and vague
  allegations against the accused and no specific overt act has
  been attributed to any of the accused by any of the witnesses.
  Therefore, implication of accused for the offences charged
  against them is not justified by the Courts below and they erred
E in convicting the accused on a wrong assumption of facts
  without taking into consideration the intrinsic worth of the
  evidence of prosecution witnesses.

       9. Learned counsel submitted that mere presence of the
F accused at the place of incident would not amount to their
  unlawful assembly. From the depositions of prosecution
  witnesses, it can be discerned that there was no common
  object among the accused and they did not commit any overt
  act in pursuit of common object. Mere presence of accused
  with arms at the place of incident would not be sufficient to
G establish their involvement in the crime. A majority of witnesses
  did not identify the accused and there was no clinching
  evidence to show that the appellants-accused shared the
  common object by forming unlawful assembly. The Courts below
  have totally failed to appreciate the fact that the witnesses
H
       ANUP LAL YADAV v. STATE OF BIHAR                     695
               [N.V. RAMANA, J.]
deposed that after noticing the crowd from a far off distance,      A
they hid in the paddy field which was chest high, thus their
identifying the accused persons from that distance cannot be
believed. The Trial Court did not pay any heed to the
submissions of the accused and went on convicting the accused
unjustifiably under Section 149, IPC also and the High Court        B
committed a grave error in affirming the same. More
particularly, in view of the admitted enmity between the parties,
the informant (PW 2) being an accused in the murder case of
the brother of Appellant No. 1 and in view of depositions of
witnesses not attributing any specific overt act to the accused,    C
the conviction of the accused under Section 149, IPC is
unsustainable.

     10. Relying on Bhudeo Manda/ & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar
(1981) 2 sec 755, learned counsel argued that in order to           0
convict an accused with the aid of Section 149, IPC the Court,
after discussing the entire evidence, must give a clear finding
as to the 'common object' of the unlawful assembly, whereas
in the case on hand the Trial Court has not given any
observation with regard to common object of unlawful assembly.      E
Also placing reliance on Santosh Vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh (1975) 3 sec 727, learned counsel submitted that
each member of a mob need not necessarily be held liable for
the actions of every other member of that mob. In support of
the contention that the accused could not have been convicted
                                                                    F
with the aid of Section 149, IPC in the absence of clear finding
on common object of the unlawful assembly, learned counsel
has further relied on this Court's judgments in Ku/dip Yadav
Vs. State of Bihar (2011) 5 SCC 324; Shaji Vs. State of Kera/a
(2011) 5 SCC 423 and Badal Murmu Vs. State of WB. (2014)            G
3 sec 366.
    11. Learned senior counsel finally submitted that the
accused appellants have already undergone sentence of about
seven years and the incident had taken place about forty years
                                                                    H
    696     SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A   back and there is no reason to continue the accused to suffer
    in jail.

        12. On the other hand, Ms. Prerna Singh, learned counsel
  appearing for the State, vehemently opposed the submissions
8 made by the counsel for the accused-appellants. She
  contended that a strong mob of around 400 assailants entered
  the village Singhimari armed with bows, arrows, ballams,
  bha/as, ku/haris and other deadly weapons and mercilessly
  attacked the villagers, looted their properties and burnt several
c houses. The ghastly attack was led by the accused Surang Lal
  Yadav riding on a horse back wielding a sword in his hand and
  the other accused had actively participated in the heinous crime
  which resulted in killing of 14 innocent persons and injuring
  several others. The prosecution has examined as many as 38
0 witnesses including PW 2 (Amjad Ali)-the informant who was
  the eyewitness. He deposed in clear and categorical manner
  that the accused Surarig Lal Yadav was leading the mob which
  went on a killing spree in the village on the date of occurrence.
  PW 4-Abdul Mokim, another eyewitness deposed that he had
E carried the dead bodies to Kishanganj Hospital in a cart on the
  instruction of police. PW 11-Sk. Samayul deposed that when
  he tried to run away from the mob, accused Sahdeo-appellant
  herein, gave a lathi blow. Nonetheless, 26 witnesses have in
  clear terms explained the role played by Surang Lal Yadav.
F Accused-appellant Anup Lal Yadav was identified by not a few
  but 14 prosecution witnesses, whereas accused/appellant
  Sahdeo was identified by 11 witnesses. They deposed in
  unequivocal terms that from the paddy field, they had clearly
  seen the occurrence of brutal killing of their kith and kin and
G devastation of properties at the hands of accused/appellants
  led by Surang Lal Yadav.

      13. Strongly rebutting the argument of learned senior
  counsel for the accused/appellants that the Trial Court ought not
  have charged the accused under Section 149, IPC learned
H counsel submitted that the common intention of the accused
       ANUP LAL YADAV v. STATE OF BIHAR                       697
               [N.V. RAMANA, J.]
appellants was writ large that they wanted to create havoc in         A
the area occupied by the victims and to fill terror in their minds.
In pursuance of this common object, the accused used deadly
weapons against the victims and killed 14 innocent persons
besides injuring several others. She submitted that the law is
abundantly clear that if an offence is committed by any member        B
of an unlawful assembly in furtherance of common object of that
assembly, every member of that unlawful assembly is guilty of
that offence. Specific overt act of each member of unlawful
assembly needs not to be proved when the accused are proved
to be members of that assembly. In support of her contention,         C
she relied upon the decisions of this Court in State of A.P. Vs.
Thakkidiram Re®y (1998) 6 SCC 554; Yunis Vs. State of
M.P. (2003) 1 SCC 425 and State of Rajasthan Vs. Shiv
Charan (2013) 12 SCC 76.
                                                                      D
     14. Learned counsel further submitted that after carrying
out a thorough investigation and recording the statements of
eyewitnesses, police has filed the charge sheet. The Trial Court
had undertaken a detailed procedure of trial and examined
number of witnesses. Only after conducting a full fledged trial       E
and on a careful analysis of the facts and circumstances of the
case, the Trial Court convicted the accused for the offences for
which they were charged with. The Trial Court rightly came to
a conclusion that it may not be possible to attribute specific act
to every member of unlawful assembly of about 400 people.
                                                                      F
Therefore, the Trial Court observed that "it is established
beyond doubt that there was a mob of about 400 persons with
a 'common object' to commit murder of bharia musa/maan
and set their houses on fire and loot their moveable". The High
Court also undertook the exercise of reappreciation of entire         G
evidence and then only affirmed the conviction and sentence
order passed by the Trial Court. The High Court observed that
"the conduct of the accused persons prior and during the
course of occurrence, clearly demonstrate that their common
object was to commit loot, arson and murder." Hence, learned
                                                                      H
    698      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A   counsel finally submitted that, the judgments of Courts below
    do not call for any interference by this Court.

          15. We have heard learned counsel on both sides and
    perused the depositions of prosecution witnesses in detail and
8   other material available on record including the opinions of
    Doctors who conducted postmortem on the dead bodies. It
    appears from the record that on the fateful day, a great turmoil
    took place in which several innocent villagers lost their
    properties, kith and kin. We notice that some of the accused
C   are still at large. We have carefully gone through the
    contentions raised by the counsel on either side. An
    examination of the deposition of PW-2 (Amzad Ali) reveals that
    at about 8 a.m. on the day of incident, he had witnessed the
    devastation carried on by the mob under the supervision of
    accused Surang Lal Yadav who was riding on a horse carrying
0
    a sword in his hand. He categorically stated that he had seen
    from the paddy field that the mob, most of them were
    undoubtedly Santhals, armed with deadly weapons and burning ·
    wooden pieces done to death about 10-12 persons, caused
    damage to the properties of the villagers and set several
E   houses ablaze. He further stated that he had identified 33
    persons in the mob including the appellants herein and
    disclosed their names. In the cross examination, he deposed
    that he was hiding in the paddy field for an hour from where he
F   witnessed the activities of the mob led by Surang Lal Yadav.
    Another eyewitness PW 3 (Abdul Sattar) also deposed that
    Surang Lal Yadav was carrying a sword in his hand and Anup
    Lal Yadav (appellant herein) had a 'Bhala' in his hand while they
    were committing the offences. PW 3 further deposed that when
G   he was fleeing with fear, Hopna Santhal (absconded accused)
    hit on his head with a lathi from behind. PW 13 (lmazuddin) also
    in clear terms deposed that Surang Lal, the leader (Mukhiya)
    was instigating the mob saying kill these bhariya people.
    Another witness Kalu @ Kalimuddin (PW 16) identified Sahdev
H   Chamar (appellant herein) among others. Other prosecution
        ANUP LAL YADAV v. STATE OF BIHAR                     699
                [N.V. RAMANA, J.]
witnesses PW 17 (Abu! Kabir), PW 18 (Naijiruddin), PW 19             A
(Abdul Kudus), PW 20 (Ainu! Haque), PW 22 (Samul Haque)
who all are also eyewitnesses, narrated the roles played by the
accused and they all categorically stated that Surang Lal Yadav
was leading and instigating the mob to kill the villagers. Besides
these individuals, we have also gone through the depositions         B
of PW 24-Devendra Pd. (a shop owner), PW 27-Muzaffar
Husain (the author of the written report), PW 28-Dhanik Lal
Sah (a witness of inquest report of some dead bodies) and PW
37-Rana Krishna Singh (1.0.). The evidences of these
prosecution witnesses are corroborating and consistent. PW           C
38 (Shivaji Singh), ASI has categorically deposed about the
occurrence of the incident and the roles played by the accused.
He deposed that at about 10.15 a.m. on 25th September, 1974
he visited the village Singhmari and witnessed the gathering
of large number of Santhals (accused persons) while the              D
persons belonging to the victim community were running helter
skelter. The evidence of the prosecution is trust worthy and
inspires confidence in the mind of the Court and by any stretch
of imagination it cannot be believed that the accused were
falsely implicated. Thus, from the facts and circumstances of        E
the case, it is evident that the huge mob was led and instigated
by Surang Lal Yadav (appellant) and Anup Lal Yadav and
Sahdev Chamar (other appellants) who had actively
participated in the carnage and slaughtered innocent villagers
with deadly weapons. It is worthwhile to note that there is no       F
denial on the part of the accused as to their participation in the
atrocities. In such circumstances, the Court cannot ignore the
overwhelming evidence of the prosecution witnesses who
categorically described the role played by the accused.
                                                                     G
    16. In Lalji Vs. State of U.P. (1989) 1 SCC 437, this Court
observed:

     "Section 149 makes every member of an unlawful
     assembly at the time of committing of the offence guilty of
     that offence. Thus this section created a specific and          H
    700       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A         distinct offence. In other words, it created a constructive
          or vicarious liability of the members of the unlawful
          assembly for the unlawful acts committed pursuant to the
          common object by any other member of that assembly.
          However, the vicarious liability of the members of the
B         unlawful assembly extends only to the acts done in
          pursuance of the common objects of the unlawful assembly,
          or to such offences as the members of the unlawful
          assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution
          of that object. Once the case of a person falls within
c         the ingredients of the section the question that he did
          nothing with his own hands would be immaterial. He
          cannot put forward the defence ;uthat he did not with
          his own hand commit the off-ence committed in
          prosecution of the common object of the unlawful
          assembly or such as the members of the assembly
D
          knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of
          that object. Everyone must be taken to have intended
          the probable and natural results of the combination
          of the acts in which he joined. It is not necessary that
          all the persons forming an unlawful assembly must
E         do some overt act. When the accused persons
          assembled together, armed with lathis, and were
          parties to the assault on the complainant party, the
          prosecution is not obliged to prove which specific
          overt act was done by which of the accused. This
F         section makes a member of the unlawful assembly
          responsible as a principal for the acts of each, and all,
          merely because he is a member of an unlawful assembly.
          While overt act and active participation may indicate
          common intention of the person perpetrating the crime, the
G         mere presence in the unlawful assembly may fasten
          vicariously criminal liability under Section 149. It must be
          noted that the basis of the constructive guilt under Section
          149 is mere membership of the unlawful assembly, with
          the requisite common object or knowledge.
H
      . ANUP LAL YADAV v. STATE OF BIHAR                      701
                [N.V. RAMANA, J.]
     17. In Yunis Vs. State of M.P. (2003) 1 SCC 425, learned         A
counsel appearing for the appellant therein argued that no overt
act was imputed to his client and he was being implicated only
on the basis of Section 149 IPC. This Court ascribing no merit
to the argument, held that "even if no overt act is imputed to a
particular person, when the charge is under Section 149 /PC,          B
the presence of the accused as part of an unlawful assembly
is sufficient for conviction". Accordingly the Court in that case
observed that the appellant was a member of the unlawful
assembly which itself is sufficient to hold him guilty when his
presence has not been disputed.                                       C

   18. Relying on Lalji Vs. State of U.P. this Court in Subal
GhoraiVs. State of WB. (2013) 4 SCC 607 held;

    "If an offence is committed by a member of the
     unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common                   D
     object, any member of the unlawful assembly who
     was present at the time of commission-of offence and
     who shared the common object of that assembly
     would be liable for the commission of that offence
     even if no overt act was committed by him. If a large            E
     crowd of persons armed with weapons assaults
     intended victims, all may not take part in the actual
     assault. If weapons carried by some members were
     not used, that would not absolve them of liability for
     the offence with the aid of Section 149 /PC if they              F
     shared common object of the unlawful assembly".

    19. Further, in State of Rajasthan Vs Shiv Charan, (2013)
12 SCC 76 it was opined by this Court:

     'The pivotal question of applicability of Section 149 IPC        G
     has its foundation on constructive liability which is the sine
     qua non for its application. It contains essentially only two
     ingredients, namely, (/) offence committed by any member
     of any unlawful assembly consisting five or more members
     and; (//) such offence must be committed in prosecution          H
    702       SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A         of the common object (Section 141 IPC) of the assembly
          or members of that assembly knew to be likely to be
          committed in prosecution of the common object. It is not
          necessary that for common object there should be a
          prior concert as the common object may be formed
B         on the spur of the moment. Common object would
          mean the purpose or design shared by all members
          of such assembly and it may be formed at any stage.
          Even if the offence committed is not in direct
          prosecution of the common object of the unlawful
c         assembly, it may yet fall under the second part of
          Section 149 /PC if it is established that the offence
          was such, as the members knew, was likely to be
          committed".

       20. Thus, by appreciating the entire evidence on record,
D we are unable to accept the contention advanced by learned
  senior counsel for the accused/appellants that the accused were
  merely passive onlookers who joined the mob out of curiosity
  and they had no common intention and did not share the
  common object of the unlawful assembly. In the light of
E aforementioned decisions of this Court, we are also not able
  to appreciate the contention of the appellants that no overt act
  has been attributed to each of the accused hence application
  of Section 149, IPC is not justified. We have no hesitation to
  come to a conclusion that the appellants were part of the
F unlawful assembly sharing the common object of killing, rioting
  and looting the villagers. Each one of the accused played an
  active role in furtherance of the common object of the assembly
  and the Courts below were perfectly right in convicting the · ,.
  accused/appellants under Section 149, IPC.
G
       21. Hence, in our considered opinion, the prosecution has
  proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. In view of the settled
  principles of law, once it is established that the unlawful
  assembly had a common object, it is not necessary that all
H persons forming the unlawful assembly must be shown to have
         ANUP LAL YADAV v. STATE OF BIHAR                  703
                 [N.V. RAMANA, J.]
committed some overt act, rather they can be convicted under      A
Section 149, IPC. We, therefore, find no error in the order of
conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court and affirmed
by the High Court calling our interference under Article 136 of
the Constitution.
                                                                  B
     22. The appeals fail and are hereby dismissed.

Devika Gujral                                Appeals dismissed.