ANIGLASE YOHANNANversusRAMLATHA AND ORS.

A                              ANIGLASE YOHANNAN
                                        v.
                              · RAMLATHA AND ORS.

                                SEPTEMBER 23, 2005

B                   [ARIJIT PASAYA T AND C.K. THAKKER, JJ.]


           Specific Relief Act, 1963-Section J6(c) rlw Explanation (ii)-Suit for
    specific performance of agreement to sell-Relief-Grant of-Held: Conduct
C   of the plaintiff must be blemishless throughout-On facts, the plaint contained
    essential facts leading to the inference that the plaintiff was always ready
    and willing to perform his part of the contract-Hence, the suit ought to be
    decreed.

          A suit for specific performance of ExtAl, agreement for sale, was filed.
D The defendant resisted the suit contending that he executed Ext.Al in favour
    of the plaintiff only as security for the amount advanced by the plaintiff to
    him and; further that the plaintiff had executed another agreement (Ext.Bl)
    in favour of the defendant agreeing not to enforce the specific performance of
    the agreement. The Trial Court found that the plaintiff was not the author of
    Ext.Bl and that Ext.Al was not executed as security for repayment of the
E   amount advanced, as contended by the defendant. But, it denied the relief of
    specific performance of the contract on ground that the plaintiff failed to plead
    and prove that he was still ready and willing to perform his part of the contract
    and hence the reqliirements of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
    were not complied with. Instead, the plaintiff was only given a decree for
F   realization of the sum paid as advance with 6% interest p.a. But both Single
    Judge and Full Bench of the High Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to
    a decree in the manner prayed for. Hence the present appeal.

          Dismissing the appeal, the Court

          HELD: 1.1. The basic principle behind Section 16(c) read with
G
    Explanation (ii) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is that any person seeking
    benefit of the specific performance of contract must manifest that his conduct
    has been blemishless throughout entitling him to the specific relief. The
    provision imposes a personal bar. If the pleadings manifest that the conduct
    of the plaintiff entitles him to get the relief on perusal of the plaint he should
H                                          440
                   ANJGLASE YOHANNAN v. RAMLATHA                            441
not be denied the relief. Section 16(c) mandates the plaintiff to aver in the       A
plaint and establish as the fact by evidence aliunde that he has always been
ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. [448-A-C)

        1.2. In the present case, the agreement for sale was executed on
15.2.1978 and the period during which the sale was to be completed was
indicated to be six months. Undisputedly, immediately after the expiry of the       B
six months period lawyer's notice was given calling upon the present appellant
to execute the sale deed. It is also averred in the plaint that the plaintiff met
the defendant several times and requested him to execute the sale deed. On
finding inaction in his part, the suit was filed in September, 1978. Para 3 of
the plaint indicates that the plaintiff was always ready to get the sale deed       C
prepared after paying necessary consideration. In para 4 of the plaint
reference has been made to the lawyer's notice calling upon the defendant to
execute the sale deed. In the said paragraph it has also been described as to
how after the lawyer's notice was issued plaintiff met the defendant. In para
5 it is averred that defendant is bound to execute the sale deed on receiving
the balance amount and the plaintiff was entitled to get the document executed      D
by the defendant It is also not in dispute that the balance amount of the agreed
consideration was deposited in Court simultaneously to the filing of the suit
When the factual background is considered in light of the principles set out
above, the inevitable conclusion is that the judgments of the Single Judge
and the Full Bench of High Court do not suffer from any infirmity to warrant        E
interference. [444-G-H; 445-A-C; 448-D]

      Syed Dastagir v. T.R. Gopalakrishna Settty, [1999] 6 SCC 337; Motilal
Jain v. Ramdasi Devi (Smt.) and Ors., [2000] 6 SCC 420 and Surya Narain
Upadhyaya v. Ram Roop Pandey and Ors., AIR (1994) SC 105, relied on.

      Prem Raj v. The D.L.F. Housing and Construction (Private) Ltd. and
                                                                                    F
Anr., AIR (1968) SC 1355 and Ardeshir H. Mama v. Flora Sassoon, AIR (1928)
PC 208, referred to.

      Cork v. Amhergate etc. and Railway Co., (1851) 117 ER 1229, referred
to.                                                                                 G
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6260 of2004.

      From the Judgment and Order dated 9.4.2003 of the Kerala High Court
in A.F.A.No. 10 of2003.
                                                                                    H
    442                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A         T.L.V. Iyer, Jay Kishore Singh Rahul Kumar and Subramonium Prasad
    for the Appellant.

          P. Krishnamoorthy and M.T. George for the Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
           ARIJIT PASA YAT, J. The defendant in a suit for specific performance
    of contract questions correctness of the judgment rendered by a Full Bench
    of the Kerala High Court holding that the plaintiff-respondent no. I is entitled
    to a decree in the manner prayed for. Though the Trial Court held that the
    requirements of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (in short 'the
C   Act') were not complied with and plaintiff was entitled only to the money
    paid, in appeal by the plaintiff, learned Single Judge of the High Court as well
    as in appeal before the Full Bench of the High Court, held otherwise. Plaintiffs
    suit for specific performance was decreed.

          The factual background as highlighted by the original plaintiff, who·
D after his death was substituted by additional plaintiffs nos. 2 to 5 (respondents·
    herein) is essentially as follows:

           The suit was filed by the plaintiff for specific performance of Ext. A I
    agreement for sale. His case is that the defendant executed Ext.A I agreement
E   in his favour agreeing to sell the suit property for a consideration of Rs.
    12,000. An advance of Rs. 8,000 was paid on the date of the agreement i.e.
    15.2.1978. The period fixed for the execution of the sale deed was six months
    from the date of the agreement. Though the plaintiff was ready and willing
    to perform his part of the contract, the defendant was not prepared to execute
    the sale deed. The defendant resisted the suit contending that though he
F   executed Ext.A I agreement in favour of the plaintiff, it was executed only as
    security for the amount paid by the plaintiff to him. It was also contended
    that the property covered by the agreement is owned by the defendant and
    his wife jointly and since the property has not been partitioned, the defendant
    had no legal right to enter into an agreement for the sale of the entire property.
G   The defendant further pleaded that on 15.2.1978 itself, (Ext.BI) the plaintiff
    had executed an agreement in favour of the defendant agreeing not to enforce
    the specific performance of the agreement. On these contentions, the defendant
    wanted the suit to be dismissed.

          The suit was originally decreed by the trial Court. On appeal filed by
H the defendant as A.S. No. 227/1980, the High Court set aside the decree and
            ANIGLASEYOHANNANv. RAMLATHA [PASAYAT,J.]                           443

judgment of the trial Court and remanded the case for the purpose of                   A
considering the genuineness of Ext.B 1 document. After remand Ext.B 1
agreement was sent for expert opinion and Ext.C 1 report was obtained. The
trial Court found that the plaintiff was not the author of Ext.B 1 and Ext.Al
agreement was not executed as security for the repayment of the amount
advanced, as contended by the defendant. But, the trial Court denied the
relief of specific performance of the contract on the ground that the plaintiff        B
has failed to plead and prove that he is still ready and willing to perform his
part of the contract. However, the plaintiff was given a decree for realization
of a sum of Rs. 8,000 paid as advance with 6% interest per annum from
15.2.1978. Dissatisfied with the decree, the additional plaintiffs 2 to 5 filed
appeal before the High Court.                                                          C
      Learned Single Judge held that the averments in the plaint clearly
indicate readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to fulfill his part of contract.
It was held that the plaint contains essential facts which lead to inference of
plaintiff's readiness and willingness. In the appeal before the Full Bench of
the High Court several points were raised. Ultimately, however, the challenge          D
was restricted to the question whether the learned Single Judge's view in the
background of Section 16(c) of the Act was correct. The High Court held that
the same was in order.

      Mr. T.L.V. Iyer, learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that
both the learned Single Judge and the Full Bench considered the true scope             E
and ambit of Section 16(c) of the Act. According to him the requirements were
mandatory and the averments in the plaint should clearly establish that the
plaintiff established that he was willing to perform the essential terms of the
contract.
                                                                                       F
       In response, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the
learned Single Judge has referred to various averments in the plaint, the
conduct of the parties and attending circumstances and keeping in view the
settled position in law recorded the findings which are essentially of facts,
has come to hold that the plaintiff's suit was to succeed. The Full Bench also
concurred with the view.                                                               G
     In order to appreciate the rival submissions Section 16(c) needs to be
quoted along with the Explanations. The same reads as follows:

        "16. Personal bars to relief
                                                                                       H
    444                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A           (a) ....... ..

            (b) ........ .

             (c) who fails to aver and prove that he has perfonned or has always
             been ready and willing to perfonn the essential terms of the contract
B            which are to be perfonned by him, other than tenns of the perfonnance
           . of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant.

          Explanation - For the purpose of clause (c) -

           (i)     where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential
                   for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit
c                  in Court any money except when so directed by the Court;

           (ii)    the plaintiff must aver performance of, or readiness and
                   willingness to perform, the contract accordingly to its true
                   construction."

D          In Ardeshir H. Mama v. Flora Sassoon, (AIR 1928 PC 208), the Privy
    Council observed that where the injured party sued at law for a breach, going
    to the root of the contract, he thereby elected to treat the contract as at an
    end himself and as discharged from the obligations. No further perfonnance
    by him was either contemplated or had to be tendered. In a suit for specific
    perfonnance on the other hand, he treated and was required by the Court to
E   treat the contract as still subsisting. He had in that suit to allege, and if the
    fact was traversed, he was required to prove a continuous readiness and
    willingness from the date of the contract to the time of the hearing, to perfonn
    the contract on his part. Failure to make good that avennent brings with it
    and leads to the inevitable dismissal of the suit. The observations were cited
F   with approval in Prem Raj v. The D.L.F. Housing and Construction (Private)
    Ltd. and Anr., AIR (1968) SC 1355.

          The requirements to be fulfilled for bringing in compliance of the Section
    16(c) of the Act have been delineated by this Court in several judgments.
    Before dealing with the various judgments it is necessary to set out the
G   factual position. The agreement for sale was executed on 15.2.1978 and the
    period during which the sale was to be completed was indicated to be six
    months. Undisputedly, immediately after the expiry of the six months period
    lawyer's notice was given calling upon the present appellant to execute the
    sale deed. It is also averred in the plaint that the plaintiff met the defendant
H   several times and requested him to execute the sale deed. On finding inaction
            ANIGLASE YO HANNAN v. RAMLATHA [PASAYAT, J.]                      445

in his part, the suit was filed in September, I 978. This factual position has        A
been highlighted in the plaint itself. Learned Single Judge after noticing the
factual position as reflected in the averments in the plaint came to hold that
the plaint contains essential facts which lead to inference to plaintiffs readiness
and willingness. Para 3 of the plaint indicates that the plaintiff was always
ready to get the sale deed prepared after paying necessary consideration. In          B
para 4 of the plaint reference has been made to the lawyer's notice calling
upon the defendant to execute the sale deed. In the said paragraph it has also
been described as to how after the lawyer's notice was issued plaintiff met
the defendant. In para 5 it is averred that defendant is bound to execute the
sale deed on receiving the balance amount a11d the plaintiff was entitled to
get the document executed by the defendant. It is also not in dispute that the        C
balance amount of the agreed consideration was deposited in Court
simultaneously to the filing of the suit. While examining the requirement of
Section 16(c) this Court in Syed Dastagir v. T.R. Gopalakrishna Settty, [I 999]
6 sec 337 noted as follows:

        "So the whole gamut of the issue raised is, how to construe a plea            D
        specially with reference to Section 16(c) and what are the obligations
        which the plaintiff has to comply with in reference to his plea and
        whether the plea of the plaintiff could not be construed to conform
        to the requirement of the aforesaid section, or does this section
        require specific words to be pleaded that he has performed or has             E
        always been ready and is willing to perform his part of the contract.
        In construing a plea in any pleading, courts must keep in mind that
        a plea is not an expression of art and science but an expression
        through words to place fact and law of one's case for a relief. Such
        an expression may be pointed, precise, sometimes vague but still it
      · could be gathered what he wants to convey through only by reading             F
        the whole pleading, depending on the person drafting a plea. In India
        most of the pleas are drafted by counsel hence the aforesaid difference
        of pleas which inevitably Jiffer from one to the other. Thus, to gather
        true spirit behind a plea it should be read as a whole. This does not
        distract one from performing his obligations as required under a statute.     G
        But to test whether he has performed his obligations, one has to see
        the pith and substance of a plea. Where a statute requires any fact
        to be pleaded then that has to be pleaded may be in any form. The
        same plea may be stated by different persons through different words;
        then how could it be constricted to be only in any particular
        nomenclature or word. Unless a statute specifically requires a plea to        H
    446                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A          be in any particular fonn, it can be in any fonn. No specific phraseology
           ·or language is required to take such a plea. The language in Section
            16(c) does not require any specific phraseology but only that the
           plaintiff must aver that he has performed or has always been and is
           willing to perfonn his part of the contract. So the compliance of
           "readiness and willingness" has to be in spirit and substance and not
B           in letter and fonn. So to insist for a mechanical production of the exact
           words of a statute is to insist for the form rather than the essence.
           So the absence of fonn cannot dissolve an essence if already pleaded."

          Again in Motilal Jain v. Ramdasi Devi (Smt.) and Ors., (2000] 6 SCC
C 420 it was noted as follows:
                 The other contention which found favour with the High Court, is
            that plaint avennents do not show that the plaintiff was ready and
            willing to perfonn his part of the contract and at any rate there is no
            evidence on record to prove it. Mr. Choudhary developed that
D         . contention placing reliance on the decision in Varghese case [1969]
            2 SCC 539. In that case, the plaintiff pleaded an oral contract for sale
          . of the suit property. The defendant denied the alleged oral agreement
            and pleaded a different agreement in regard to which the plaintiff
            neither amended his plaint nor filed subsequent pleading and it was
            in that context that this Court pointed out that the pleading in specific
E           performance should conform to Fonns 47 and 48 of the First Schedule
            of the Code of Civil Procedure. That view was followed in Abdul
            Khader case (1989] 4 SCC 313 : AIR ( 1990) SC 682.

           However, a different note was struck by this Court in Chandiok case          '
           (1970] 3 SCC 140: AIR (1971] SC 1238. In that case 'A' agreed to
F          purchase from 'R' a leasehold plot. 'R' was not having lease of the
           land in his favour from the Government nor was he in possession of
           the same. 'R', however, received earnest money pursuant to the
           agreement for sale which provided that the balance of consideration
           would be paid within a month at the time of the execution of the
G          registered sale deed. Under the agreemeot 'R' was under obligation
           to obtain permission and sanction from the Government before the
           transfer of leasehold plot. 'R' did not take any steps to apply for the
           sanction from the Government. 'A' filed the suit for specific
           performance of the contract for sale. One of the contentions of 'R'
           was that 'A' was not ready and willing to perfonn his part of the
H          contract. This Court observed that readiness and willingness could
            ANIGLASE YO HANNAN v. RAMLATHA [PASA YAT, J.]                    447
       not be treated as a straitjacket fonnula and that had to be detennined        A
       from the entirety of facts and circumstances relevant to the intention
       and conduct of the party concerned. It was held that in the absence
       of any material to show that 'A' at any stage was not ready and
       willing to perfonn his part of the contract or that he did not have the
       necessary funds for payment when the sale deed would be executed
       after the sanction was obtained, 'A' was entitled to a decree for             B
       specific perfonnance of contract.

       That decision was relied upon by a three-Judge Bench of this Court
       in Syed Dastagir case [1999] 6 SCC 337 wherein it was held that in
       construing a plea in any pleading, courts must keep in mind that a            C
       plea is not an expression of art and science but an expression through
       words to place fact and law of one's case for a relief. It is pointed out
       that in India most of the pleas are drafted by counsel and hence they
       inevitably differ from one to the other; thus, to gather the true spirit
       behind a plea it should be read as a whole and to test whether the
       plaintiff has perfonned his obligations, one has to see the pith and          D
       substance of the plea. It was observed :

            "Unless a statute specifically requires a plea to be in any particular
            fonn, it can be in any form. No specific phraseology or language
            is required to take such a plea. The language in Section 16(c) of
            the Specific Relief Act, 1963 does not require any specific              E
            phraseology but only that the plaintiff must aver that he has
            performed or has always been and is willing to perfonn his pa1t
            of the contract. So the compliance of 'readiness and willingness'
            has to be in spirit and substance and not in letter and fonn."

       It is thus clear that an avennent of readiness and willingness in the         F
       plaint is not a mathematical fonnula which should only be in specific
       words. If the avennents in the plaint as a whole do clearly indicate the
       readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to fulfil his part of the
       obligations under the contract which is the subject-matter of the suit,
       the fact that they are differently worded will not militate against the       G
       readiness and willingness of the plaintiff in a suit for specific
       performance of contract for sale."

      Lord Campbell in Cork v. Ambergate etc. and Railway Co., (1851) 117
ER 1229 observed that in common sense the meaning of such an averment
of readiness and willingness must be that the non-completion of the contract         H
     448                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. J S.C.R.

A was not the fault of the plaintiffs, and that they were disposed and able to
     complete it had it not been renounced by the defendant.

            The basic principle behind Section 16(c) read with Explanation (ii) is that
     any person seeking benefit of the specific performance of contract must
     manifest that his conduct has been blemishless throughout entitling him to
B    the specific relief. The provision imposes a personal bar. The Court is to grant
     relief on the basis of the conduct of the person seeking relief. If the pleadings
     manifest that the conduct of the plaintiff entitles him to get the relief on
     perusal of the plaint he should not be denied the relief.

C            Section 16(c) of the Act mandates the plaintiff to aver in the plaint and
      establish as the fact by evidence aliunde that he has always been ready and
    · willing to perform his part of the contract. On considering almost identical fact
      situation it was held by this Court in Surya Narain Upadhyaya v. Ram Roop
      Pandey and Ors., AIR (1994) SC 105 that the plaintiff had substantiated his
      plea.
D
            When the factual background is considered in the light of principles set
     out above, the inevitable conclusion is that the judgments of the learned
     Single Judge and the Full Bench do not suffer from any infirmity to warrant
     interference.

E             The appeal is dismissed but without any order as to costs.

     B.B.B.                                                        Appeal dismissed.