Holding

A lease deed that expressly provides that its term commences only upon a future approval is not operative at the date of execution, and Section 47 of the Registration Act does not pre‑date its commencement.

Summary

The Indian Oil Corporation advertised for petrol pump dealerships in October 2011. Anapurna Jaiswal applied on 11 November 2011 and was placed first, leading to a lease deed dated 8 November 2011. The lease stipulated that its term of 30 years would commence only upon approval of the petrol pump, meaning no lease existed at the time of the application. Jaiswal claimed entitlement to 35 marks for holding a long‑term lease, invoking Section 47 of the Registration Act to argue that registration made the lease operative from its execution date. The Supreme Court held that the lease was expressly conditioned on a future approval, that Section 47 does not alter the stipulated commencement, and therefore no lease existed on the application date, denying the entitlement to the marks. The appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

When does a lease deed become operative if it is conditioned on a future event such as approval of a petrol pump?
Does registration under Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908, affect the commencement date of a lease deed?
Is the applicant entitled to marks for a long‑term lease when the lease was not effective on the date of application?
How should Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 be interpreted with respect to the period of a lease conditioned on future approval?

Legislation cited

Registration Act, 1908s. 47
Transfer of Property Act, 1882s. 105, s. 5

Subjects

leasefuture conditionregistration acttransfer of property actpetrol pump dealershipmarks allocationjudicial reviewcontract to be performed in future

Judgment

204 [2021]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 9 S.C.R. 204 [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A ANAPURNA JAISWAL
v.
INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No.6119 of 2021)
B SEPTEMBER 30, 2021
[K. M. JOSEPH AND PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI
NARASIMHA, JJ.]
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – s.105 – Registration Act,
1908 – s.47 – An advertisement was published on 12.10.2011 by
C
the respondent-Corporation inviting applications for grant of
dealership of petrol pumps – Appellant applied on 11.11.2011 –
After evaluation, the appellant was placed in the first position – A
complaint was made – Pursuant thereto, the respondent took the
view that the lease dated 08.11.2011 which was the foundation for
D the offer made by the appellant would commence from the date of
approval of the petrol outlet – This meant that the possession over
the premises did not amount to a lease and on the date of the
execution of the lease deed the lease had not come into force –
Appellant made several representations, which were rejected by the
Corporation – Writ petition filed before the High Court was also
E
dismissed – On appeal, held: In the instant case, here is a lease
deed which contemplated the period of the lease commencing at a
point of time in the future – What is more it would commence only
with effect from the date of approval of the petrol pump – The parties
in fact contemplated in clause 7 that in case the petrol pump was
F not approved then the second party (the appellant) must handover
the land transferred on rent to the first party – Further, a perusal of
clause 5 would reveal that lease period is explained as after ‘the
expiry of 30 years’ and it speaks about the renewal of the lease
period – The completion of the lease period which is after the expiry
of the 30 years again would have to be reckoned only with effect
G
from the date of approval of the petrol pump – Therefore, it is clear
that the lease which the appellant laid store by contemplated the
period of the lease commencing not on the date of the lease but at a
point of time in the future – The lease did not take effect on the date
of the lease namely 08.11.2011 or on date of application 11.11.2011
H
204
ANAPURNA JAISWAL v. INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. 205
AND ORS.

– As a result, the appellant cannot be possibly entitled to the benefit A
of 35 marks which is vouchsafed only for those applicants who
inter alia had a long-term lease as on the date of the application –
As far as s.47 of the registration Act is concerned, on facts, it would
not have the effect of preponing the period of the lease as
commencing from the date of the execution of the lease – The lease
B
would operate on its terms and the period of the lease would
commence only upon approval being granted despite it being
registered – Thus, there is no reason to interfere with the impugned
judgment passed by the High Court.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
C
HELD: 1. A lease of immovable property is a transfer of
immovable property. The transfer consists of the transfer of a
right to enjoy immovable property. It creates an interest in the
property. One of the essential elements of the lease is the period
of time for which the demise holds good. A lease may be for certain
time which may be express or implied. It may also be in perpetuity. D
Therefore, when one thinks of a lease of an immovable property
one of the essential terms would be the period for which the lease
operates. In this case, the lease or the period of the lease is 30
years. The question would immediately arise as to when the lease
bears life. The expression ‘certain time’ is premised on there E
being a beginning in point of time and the end again with reference
to time. ‘Certain time’ would in other words be a period of time.
The answer is given by the lease itself, namely that the period
begins with effect from the date of approval of the petrol pump.
In other words, here is a lease deed which contemplated the
period of the lease commencing at a point of time in the future. F
What is more it would commence only with effect from the date
of approval of the petrol pump. The parties in fact contemplated
in clause 7 that in case the petrol pump was not approved then
the second party (the ‘appellant’) must handover the land
transferred on rent to the first party. [Para 13][211-C-G] G
2. A perusal of clause 5 would reveal that lease period is
explained as after ‘the expiry of 30 years’ and it speaks about the
renewal of the lease period. The completion of the lease period
which is after the expiry of the 30 years again would have to be
H
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A reckoned only with effect from the date of approval of the petrol
pump. Therefore, it is clear that the lease which the appellant
laid store by contemplated the period of the lease commencing
not on the date of the lease but at a point of time in the future. In
fact, the point of time or the event upon which the period of lease
was to begin with itself uncertain. Maybe it is true that it could
B
come into effect upon future events taking shape on the principle
that in equity on the future event happening relating to the subject
matter of the lease, the lease could have affected the property in
the future. But we need not explore the matter on those lines
any further as it is clear that the lease did not take effect on the
C date of the lease namely 8.11.2011. If that be so there was also
no lease in place as on the date of the application namely
11.11.2011. [Para 14][212-A-D]
3. The appellant attempted to derive support from Section
47 of the Registration Act, 1908. Section 47 of the Registration
D Act, 1908 is only intended to give effect to the lease deed which
is registered at a later point of time than when it is executed. It is
intended to provide that the document which is registered will
have efficacy on its own terms with effect from the time when it
was supposed to have come into effect under the document. In
E other words, the fact that it is registered at a later point of time
could not detract from the document commencing to operate
when it would have commenced but for it not having been
registered. In fact, if one applies Section 47 of the Registration
Act, to the facts of this case it would not have the effect of
preponing the period of the lease as commencing from the date
F of the execution of the lease. The lease would operate on its
terms and the period of the lease would commence only upon
approval being granted despite it being registered. [Para 15][212-
D-F]
Jugalkishore Saraf v. M/s. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd., AIR
G 1955 SC 376 – relied on.
Case Law Reference
AIR 1955 SC 376 relied on Para 11

H
ANAPURNA JAISWAL v. INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. 207
AND ORS.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.6119 of A
2021.
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.08.2016 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in Writ-C No.15151 of 2015.
Ms. Kamini Jaiswal, Rohit Kumar Singh, Ms. Rani Mishra, Advs.
for the Appellant. B

Mrs. Priya Puri, Mrs. Rashmi Sachdeva, Yati Sharma, Ranjay
Dubey, Mrs. Smriti Sinha, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
K. M. JOSEPH, J. C
1. Leave granted.
2. An advertisement was published on 12.10.2011 by the
respondent inviting applications for grant of dealership of petrol pumps.
The appellant made her application on 11.11.2011. On the basis of the
D
evaluation done, the appellant was placed in the first position. While so it
appears that on the basis of complaint, the matter was looked into and
order dated 12.11.2014 came to be issued by which the respondent took
the viewthat the lease dated 08.11.2011 which was the foundation for
the offer made by the appellant would commence from the date of
approval of the petrol outlet. This meant that the possession over the E
premises did not amount to a lease and on the date of the execution of
the lease deed the lease had not come into force. The lease deed was
more like a firm offer thanowned proposition. Thereafter, on 12.12.2014
the appellant got a rectification/ clarificatory deed registered. Four
representations were made by the appellant. The corporation rejected
F
by order dated 25.02.2015 the request.This led to the Writ Petition, which
stood dismissed by the impugned order.
3. We heard Ms. Kamini Jaiswal, learned counsel for the appellant
and Ms. Priya Puri, learned counsel for the respondent-corporation.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant would take us to through the G
lease deed dated 08.11.2011 which was registered on the same day and
point out that under the lease deed possession was handed over to the
appellant by the lessor on 08.11.2011 itself. In this regard, she
soughtsupport from clause 7 of the said lease deed which reads as follow:-

H
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A “7. That, in case, the petrol pump is not approved, then, the second
party shall have to hand over the land transferred on rent to the
first party.”
She would, therefore, point out that the lease deed had come into
effect on 08.11.2011. Clause 1 reads as follow: -
B “1. That, the period of this lease-deed will be 30 years, which
shall take into account w.e.f. date of approval of petrol pump.”
5. She pointed out that this cannot detract from the lease coming
into being in law on 08.11.2011. The lease bearing life from 08.11.2011 is
consistent with and supported by the fact that the appellant derived
C possession on the said date under the said lease deed. In this regard, she
also drew our attention to Section 47 of The Indian Registration Act,
1908 which reads as follows: -
“47. Time from which registered document operates. - A
registered document shall operate from the time which it would
D have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been
required or made, and not from the time of registration.”
6. She would further point out that the action of dislodging the
appellant from the first position she has rightfully earned was based on
an alleged complaint. She pointed out with reference to the document at
E page 117A produced along with the rejoinder affidavit,that it is a clear
case where the complaint is sprung up which is not genuine which can
be seen from the fact that after serial No. 333 in place of serial No.334,
serial No.335 is over written.
7. Per contra, Ms. Priya Puri, learned counsel for the respondent-
F corporationsupported the impugned judgment. She would point out that
letter of intent has already been issued in terms of the decision which is
upheld by the High Court in favour of another party. However, on the
basis of the order of status quo passed by this Court, effect could not be
given to the decision.
G 8. The appellant undoubtedly secured 85.93 marks. Apart of the
85.93 marks is attributable to 35 marks which she derived on the basis
of her being a lessee under lease deed dated 08.11.2011 which we have
adverted to. The relevant provision under which marks were awarded
in this regard to her reads as follow: -
H
ANAPURNA JAISWAL v. INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. 209
AND ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

Parameter Sub-heads Description Max Evaluation A
Marks
Capabilit y to provide land Suitable land for “……..” 35 Based on
and infrastructure/facilities retail outlet verifying the
(Max. 35 marks applicable to ‘B’ site documents
individual and non- Having clear title to submitted and
individual) land “own evaluation of
land”/Registered sales committee as
deed /having land on explained in B
long lease (registered) Pt.14 and 15
for a minimum period below.
of 19 years 11 months
as on date of
application.

C

‘…. ‘ 25

‘B’ site
Having “firm offer” of
land for purpose/long
lease
D

9. The learned counsel for the appellant would point out that the
lease deed in fact was for the period of 30 years and, therefore, the
lease deed was fully compliant with the requirement. In fact, it was
much more as the required period was 19 years and 11 months whereas
E
the lease in her favour was for a period of 30 years.
10. However, this is not to be the end of the inquiry. The
requirement under the clause is that to earn 35 marks the applicant must
have inter alia a long lease (Registered for a minimum period of 19
years and 11 months as on the date of the application). What has weighed
F
with the corporation in deciding to dislodge the appellant from the first
position is that the lease dated 08.11.2011 was to become operative only
from the date of the approval of the petrol pump. In other words, there
was no lease deed in effect as on the date of the application which is
admittedly 11.11.2011.
Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 read as follow: - G

5. “Transfer of property” defined- In the following sections
“transfer of property” means an act by which a living person
conveys property, in present or in future, to one or more other
living persons, or to himself, [or to himself] and one or more other
living persons; and “to transfer property” is to perform such act. H
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A 11. This provision has been subject matter of discussion by this
Court and we need only refer toJugalkishore Saraf v. M/s. Raw Cotton
Co. Ltd.,AIR 1955 SC 376.Therein in his concurring opinion Justice
Bhagwati held:
“The words “in present or in future” qualify the word “conveys”
B and not the word “property” in the section and it has been held
that a transfer of property that is not in existence operates as a
contract to be performed in the future which may be specifically
enforced as soon as the property comes into existence.
As was observed by the Privy Council in 12 Moo Ind App 275
C (PC) (E):
“But how can there be any transfer, actual or constructive, upon
a contract under which the vendor sells that of which he has not
possession, and to which he may never establish a title? The bill
of sale in such a case can only be evidence of a contract to be
D performed ‘in future’, and upon the happening of a contingency,
of which the purchaser may claim a specific performance, if he
comes into Court shewing that he has himself done all that he
was bound to do.”
It is only by the operation of the equitable principle that as soon as
E the property comes into existence and is capable of being identified,
equity taking as done that which ought to be done fastens upon
the property and the contract to assign thus becomes a complete
equitable assignment. In the case of a decree to be passed in the
future therefore there could be no assignment of the decree unless
and until the decree was passed and the agreement to assign
F fastened on the decree and thus became a complete equitable
assignment. The decree not being in existence at the date of the
transfer cannot be said to have been transferred by the assignment
in writing and the matter resting merely in a contract to be
performed in the future which may be specifically enforced as
G soon as the decree was passed there would be no transfer
automatically in favour of the “transferee” of the decree when
passed.
It would require a further act on the part of the “transferor” to
completely effectuate the transfer and if he did not do so the only
H
ANAPURNA JAISWAL v. INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. 211
AND ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

remedy of the “transferee” would be to sue for specific A
performance of the contract to transfer.”
12. Section 105 specifically deals with lease ofimmovable property,
and it reads as follows: -
“105. Lease defined- A lease of immovable property is a transfer
of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express B
or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or
promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other
thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions
to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on
such terms.” C
13. A lease of immovable property is a transfer of immovable
property. The transfer consists of the transfer of a right to enjoy
immovable property. It creates an interest in the property. One of the
essential elements of the lease is the period of time for which the demise
holds good. A lease may be forcertain time which may be express or D
implied. It may alsobe in perpetuity. Therefore, when one thinks of a
lease of an immovable property one of the essential terms would be the
period for which the lease operates. In this case, the lease or the period
of the lease is 30 years.The question would immediately arise as towhen
the lease bears life. The expression ‘certain time’ is premised on there
being a beginning in point of time and the end again with reference to E
time. ‘Certain time’ would in other words be a period of time. The answer
is given by the lease itself, namely that the period begins with effect
from the date of approval of the petrol pump. In other words, here is a
lease deed which contemplated the period of the lease commencing at a
point of time in the future. What is more it would commence only with F
effect from the date of approval of the petrol pump. The parties in fact
contemplated in clause 7 that in case the petrol pump was not approved
then the second party (the ‘appellant’ herein) must handover the land
transferred on rent to the first party.
14. Whatever doubts one may have is dispelled by clause 5 which G
reads as follows: -
“5. That after completion of leased period, viz., after expiry
of 30 years, both parties shall have option renewal period by a
lease deed in respect of land transferred on rent on the basis of
mutual consent.
H
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A A perusal of clause 5 would reveal that lease period is explained
as after ‘the expiry of 30 years’ and itspeaks about the renewal of the
lease period. The completion of the lease period which is after the expiry
of the 30 years again would have to be reckoned only with effect from
the date of approval of the petrol pump. Therefore, it is clear that the
lease which the appellant laid store by contemplated the period of the
B
lease commencing not on the date of the lease but at a point of time in
the future. In fact, the point of time or the event upon which the period
of lease was to begin with itself uncertain. Maybe it is true that it could
come into effect upon future events taking shape on the principle that in
equity on the future event happening relating to the subject matter of the
C lease, the lease could have affectedthe property in the future. But we
need not explore the matter on those lines any further as it is clear that
the lease did not take effect on the date of the lease namely 8.11.2011.
If that be so there was also no lease in place as on the date of the
application namely 11.11.2011.
D 15. The appellant attempted to derive support from Section 47 of
the Registration Act, 1908. Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908 is
only intended to give effect to the lease deed which is registered at a
later point of time than when it is executed. It is intended to provide that
the document which is registered will have efficacy on its own terms
with effect from the time when it was supposed to have come into effect
E under the document. In other words, the fact that it is registered at a
later point of time could not detract from the document commencing to
operate when it would have commenced but for it not having been
registered. In fact, if one applies Section 47 of the Registration Act, to
the facts of this case it would not have the effect of preponing the period
F of the lease as commencing from the date of the execution of the lease.
The lease would operate on its terms and the period of the lease would
commence only upon approval being granted despite it being registered.
16. The result of this discussion is that the appellant cannot be
possibly entitled to the benefit of 35 marks which is vouchsafed only for
G those applicants who inter alia had a long-term lease as on the date of
the application.
17. There is another aspect we must bear in mind. We are dealing
with a case where what is sought is judicial review of the decision to
award largesse. A fairly large measure of free play in the joints is
H vouchsafed to a public authority when it comes to understanding the
ANAPURNA JAISWAL v. INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. 213
AND ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

terms under which the offer is made. We cannot be oblivious to this A
aspect as well. The fact that in the rectification deed also which was
executed much after the date of the advertisement and application an
attempt is made to correct the original lease deed and to indicate that it
was as a result of an error that clause 1 which we have referred to
came to be inserted also would fortify us in our reasoning which we
B
have employed in finding that appellant is not entitled to 35 marks.
18. In the light of above discussion, we see no reason to interfere
with the impugned judgment passed by the High Court. The appeal is
dismissed.
No order as to costs. C
Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

Ankit Gyan Appeal dismissed.

D

E

F

G

H