ANANT SINGH @ ANANT KUMAR SINGHversusTHE STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS.

                        [2017] 5 S.C.R. 147



          ANANT SINGH @ ANANT KUMAR SINGH                                A
                                 v.
                THE STATE OF BIHAR AND ORSt
                 (Criminal Appeal No. 533of2017)
                          APRIL 12,2017                                  B

                   [R. F. NARIMAN AND
              MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, JJ.]
      Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981 - s.23(2) and ss.2(d), 12
and 17 - First preventive order dated 5. 09.16 issued against            C
appellant by respondent-State - The same was revoked vide
revocation order dated 17.9.2016 - Second detention order dated
21.9.16 issued on the same grounds as the previous detention order
dated 5.9.16 except certain other grounds all of which had arisen
prior to 17. 9.16 - Writ petition by appellant challenging the second
detention order contending that since the first detention order was      D
revoked, the second detention order in view of s.23(2) ought to
have been passed on the fresh grounds only and not on same grounds
and since that was not done the second detention order was illegal
- Writ petition dismissed - On appeal, held: Admittedly, the second
order of detention dated 21.9.2016 is passed only on grounds which
                                                                         E
arose prior to the order of revocation order dated 17.9.2016- Thus,
it would fall foul of s.23(2) - The expression "'where fresh facts
have arisen" in s.23(2) is followed by "'the date of revocation or
expiry.... "- Therefore, literal language of s.23(2) leads only tv the
conclusion that it is the date of revocation order and not the date of
original order of detention that is referred to - The Act being a        F
statute providing for preventive detention, has to be construed
keeping the subjects liberty in mind, i.e. it has tu be construed
keeping Arts. 21 and 22 of the Constitution in mind - Detention
order dated 21.9.2016 is set aside - Preventive detention -
Constitution of India - Arts. 21 and 22 - Rule of interpretati:m -       G
Literal rule of interpretation.
      Allowing the appeal, the Court
     HELD: 1.1. The second order of detention dated 21.9.2016
was passed only on grounds which arose prior to the order of
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                              147
148           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2017] 5 S.C.K


A     revocation dated 17.9.2016. Thus, it would fall foul of Section
      23(2) of the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981. [Para 7) !154-C-
      D]
           Hadibandhu Das v. District Magistrate, Cuttack &
           Another [1969) 1 SCR 227 - followed.
B          Jagdev Singh v. State of Jammu & Kashmir AIR 1968
           SC 327 - distinguished.
         1.2. The State contended that the expression "where fresh
   facts have arisen ... " in Section 23(2) would show that these facts
   should have arisen after the date of the first order of de~ention,
 C and since facts have arisen after s•h September, 2016, the
   provisions of Section 23(2) are satisfied. This submission goes
   contrary to the express language of Section 23(2). The expression
   "where fresh facts have arisen .. " is followed by "the date of
   revotation or expiry....".Accepting State's submission would mean
 D substituting the last expression with the words "the date of the
   detention order". This cannot be done. The 1981 Act !:>eing a
   statute which provides for preventive detention, it has to be
   construed keeping the subject's liberty in mind, that is, it has to
   be construed keeping Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution in
   mind. Here no supposed object of the Act can be looked at to
 E defezt the aforesaid Articles of the Constitution particularly when
   the literal language of Section 23(2) leads only to the conclusion
   that it is the date of the revocation order and not the datP. of the
   original order of detention that is referred to. [Para 11) (159-A-
      D]
 F          Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate Burdwan & Anr.
            AIR 1964 SC 334 : [1964) SCR 921; Har Jas Dev
            Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors. (1973) 2 SCC 575 :
            (1974] 1 SCR 28; Chhagan Bhagwqn Kahar v. N. L.
            Kaina & Ors. (1989) 2 SCC 318 - referred to.
 G                           Case Law Reference
      (1964) SCR 921                followed                Para4
      (1969] 1 SCR 227              distinguished           Pi;ra 7
      [1968) SCR 197                referred to             Para 7
      (1974] 1 SCR 281              referred to             Para9
 H    (1989) 2 sec 318              referred to             Pi.ra 9
 ANANT SINGH @ ANANT KUMAR SINGH v. THE STATE OF                            149
                 BIHAR AND ORS.

      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal                     A
No. 533 of2017.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 18.01.2017 of the High Court
ofjudicature at Patna in Criminal Writ Petition Case No. 11950 of'.:!016.
      U. R. Lalit, Sr. Adv, Chandra Bhushan Prasad, Mehul Shi>rma,
Kripa Shankar Prasad, Advs. for the Appellant.                              B

       Basant R, Sr. Adv, M. Shoeb Alam, Mojahid Karim Khan, A.dvs.
for the Respondents.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
       R. F. NARIMAN, J. 1. The present appeal arises out of a              C
preventive detention order dated 21.9.2016 by which the appellant was
preventively detained under the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981 ("the
Act" for short) for the maximum period of one year. The facts relt:vant
to decide this appeal are as follows:
       2. The appellant is alleged to be a history-sheeter who has been D
involved in at least 31 grave crimes - many of them murder, attempt to
murder and kidnapping. He has been in jail since 24.6.2015 in connection
with these crimes. A preventive detention order dated 5. 9.2016 was first
passed against the appellant under section 12(2) of the aforesaid Act. A
representation against the aforesaid order was also made by the appellant
                                                                          E
on 12.9.2016, but for want of State Government approval within the
time specified under the said Act, the order was rendered. ineffective
"with effect from today". This was, in fact, stated to be so by an order
dated 17.9.2016, which "revoked" the said detention order As this was
the case, the present detention order was passed on 21. 9.2016. It is not
disputed that this order has been passed on the self same grounds as the F
order dated 5.9.2016 with certain other grounds that have arisen, all of
which are prior to 17.9.2016. This order was approved by the Under
Secretary to the State Government on 26.9.2016. A representation was
made to the District Magistrate dated 28.9.2016 who acts under
delegated power under the State Government. This representation was G
rejected on 6.10.2016 by the under Secretary to the Government of
Bihar. On the very date, a second representation was sent, this time to
the State Government. This representation has not been adverted to or
disposed of by the State Government. On 20. l 0.2016, the Advisory Board,
constituted under Section 18 of the Act, stated that the grounds of
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150             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2017) 5 S.C.R.



A     detention were made out under the Act, and finally on 25.10.2016, the
      second order of detention was confirmed by the State Government. A
      writ petition was filed by the appellant challenging the aforesa'.d order.
      By the impugned judgment dated 18.1.201 7, it was held that the appellant
      was a history-sheeter with a long standing record of criminal anttcedents
      and involved in grave offences even though he is acquitted in 18 of31
B
      cases. There are at least 13 cases including serious offences in which,
      apart from other cases, he is facing trial. It was further found that this
      is not a case where the detention order is passed on stale grounds. It
      was also held that this order was passed "apart from old cases other
      than cases in the grounds justifying detention" including 3 recent entries
 C    which are called "sanhas" entries in different police stations wit!i regard
      to the appellant's conduct. It was further held that the appellant's
      representation made to the State Government on 6.10.2016 nol having
      been disposed of can make no difference inasmuch as this representation
      and the first representation are virtually the same - the first representation
 D    had been considered and rejected. The Court held that the first was
      considered by the District Magistrate who opined that it ought to be
      rejected, and this was considered by the State Government, which took
      the same view. It was also held that no mala-fides were involved, and
      the plea that the appellant was not informed as to the authority to whom
      he should make the representation, was dismissed by stating that the
 E    detention order itself stated that it could be made through the Jail
      Superintendent. The appellant states that he is an illiterate person who
      cannot read and write but is advised by well-wishers and lawyers who
      are well informed, and that since, through his advisors, he has made a
      representation that was rejected, no prejudice was caused to him. The
       Division Bench found no infirmity or illegality in the order impugned.
 F
              3. Mr. U.R. Lalit, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of
      the appellant, has argued five points before us. According to him when
      the first preventive detention order namely, 5'h September, 2016 has been
      "revoked", the second order can only be passed on fresh grounds which
      arise after the order of revocation, namely after 17 .9.2016. Since it is
 G    an admitted case thatthe grounds on which the 21.9.2016 order passed,
      are all prior to this date, there is a direct infraction of Section 23(2) of
      the Act, and that therefore this itself would be sufficient to render the
      said detention order illegal. He raised four other points - that the order
      does not mention the authority to whom the representation is to be made,
 H
 ANANT SINGH@ANANT KUMAR SINGH v. THE STATE OF                                    151
         BIHAR AND ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

and that this would violate both Article 22(5) of the Constitution and            A
Section 17 of the Act. He cited a number ofauthorities in support of this
proposition. He also argued that since the appellant was already in jail
for over a year before the preventive detention order was passea, the
basic requirements of Section 12( 1) of the Act were not met, namely,
that the State Government must not only be satisfied, with respect to a           B
person, with a view to prevent such person from acting in any manner
prejudicial to the public order, but that it must further be satisfied that
there is reason to fear that the activities of anti-social elements cC'nnot
be prevented otherwise than by the immediate arrest of such person.
According to him, a person already having been arrested does not satisfy
the second part of Section 12(1) of the Act, and the order would therefore        C
fail on this ground also. Two other grounds were raised, namely, that the
District Magistrate has acted contrary to Section 12(3) of the Act read
with Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and that the State
Government has not at all dealt with the second representation made to
it on 6.10.2016, and that this would also be fatal to the impugned order.         D
        4. Mr. R. Basant, learned senior counsel appearing for the State,
countered each one of the aforesaid submissions. He began by handing
over to us two lists - one of pending cases which were against the
appellant and another list of 18 acquittals. According to him both these
lists show that the appellant is a desperate criminal who has been able to
get out of the clutches of the law in that either witnesses of the prosec:ition   E
have not turned up at all, or or they invariably turned hostile. All the
acquittals are on this basis, and it is reasonably apprehended that even in
other cases, the same result will ensue. He also adverted to the definition
contained in Section 2(d) of the Act namely, "anti-social element" and
stated that even in jail, such person could be an anti-social element as he       F
could be a member or leader of the gang who habitually commits or
attempts to commits or abets the crime of an offence punishable vnder
Chapter XVI or XVII of the Penal Code. The appellant could continue
to conspire and carry on with his nepharious activities even when in jail.
He further countered the other submissions as well stating that at least
insofar as the representation to the authority not being named is                 G
concerned, no prejudice was caused to the appellant, inasmuch as the
Jail Superintendent, to whom he was to send his representation would
forward it to the State Government in any case. Also the appellant was
not in any doubt as to which authority he has to make a representation.
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152           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2017] 5 S.C.R.


A In fact, he made a representation to the District Magistrate and that ~his
  really is a technical ground without any substance. He also stated, relying
  upon the judgment of this Court in Rameshwar Shaw Vs. District
  Magistrate Burdwan & Anr. reported in AIR 1964 SC 334, pf.lragraph
  12 in particular, that the detention order specifically states that it is
  apprehended that the accused may be released from the jail at aay time,
B
  as in fact he was so released, having been given bail by a subsequent
  order, and may again commit such serious crimes in the urban and rural
  areas of Patna district, and that this ground therefore does not avail the
  appellant. So far as the District Magistrate acting contrary to section
   12(3) of the Act is concerned, according to the learned counsel, this
C ground also does not obtain and has not been raised earlier. He also
  supported the High Court judgment insofar as the State Government not
  dealing with the se.cond representation is concerned. According to him,
   it was almost identical with the first representation, and the first
   representation has been fully dealt with in the rejection order dated
D 6.10.2016 by the State Government.
            5. We must first set out the relevant provisions of the Ac~, which
      read as follows:
            "2. (d) "Anti-Social element" means a person who -
               (i) either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang,
 E             habitually commits or attempt to commit or abets the
               commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI or
               Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code; or


            12. Power to make order detaining certain persons.-(!) The State
 F          Government may, if satisfied with respect to any person that with
            a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to
            the maintenance of public order and there is reason to fear that
            the activities of anti-social elements can not be prevented otherwise
            than by the immediate arrest of such person, make an order
 G          directing that such anti-social element be detained.
            (2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to
            prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a
            District Magistrate, the State Government is satisfied that it is
            necessary so to do, it may by an order in writing direct, that during
 H
ANANT SINGH@ANANT KUMAR SINGH v. THE STATE OF                                153
        BIHAR AND ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

    such period as may be specified in the order, such District              A
  · Magistrate may also, if satisfied as provided in sub-sectiori ( 1)
    exercise the powers conferred upon by the said sub-section:
  , Provided that the period specified in an order made by the State
    Government under this sub-section shall not, in the first instance
    exceed three months, but the State Government may, if satisfied          B
    as aforesaid that it is necessary so to do, amend such order to
    extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding
    three months at any one time.
   (3) When any order is made by District Magistrate, he shall
   forthwith report the fact to the State Government together with           c
   the grounds on which the order has been made, and such other
   particulars as, in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter, and no
   such order shall remain in force for more ~han 12 days aft,r the
   making thereof unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by
   the State Government:
                                                                             D
   Provided that where under Section 17 the grounds of detention
   are communicated by the officer making the order after five days
   but not later than ten days from the date of detention, this sub-
   section shall apply subject to the modification that, for the words
   "twelve days"' the words "fifteen days" shall be substituted.
   17. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed to person affocted      E
   by the order.-(!) When a person is detained in pursuance of a
   detention order, the authority making the order shall, as soon as
   may be, but ordinarily not later than five days and in exceptional
   circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later
   than ten days from the date of detention, communicate to him the          F
   grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him
   the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the
   order to the State Government.
   (2) Nothing in sub-section ( 1) shall require the authority to disclose
   facts which it considers to be against the public interest to disclose.   G
   23. Revocation of detention orders.-( 1) Without prejudice to the
   provision of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, i 897
   ( 10 of 1897), a detention order may, at any time, be revoked
   or modified-
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154            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] 5 S.C.R.


A              (i) notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer
               mentioned in sub-section(2) of Section 12, or by the State
               Government to which that officer is subordinate.
            (2) The revocation or expiry of a detention order shall not bar the
            making of a fresh detention order under Section 12 against the
B           same person in any case where fresh facts have arisen after the
            date of revocation or expiry on which the State Government or an
            officer mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 12, as the case
            may be, is satisfied that such an order should be made."
             6. Since, according to us, Mr. Lalit is on firm ground on the first
c     point that he has raised before us, we do not propose to go into any of
      the other points.
           7. As has been stated hereinabove, the second order of detention
  . dated 21.9.2016 is passed only on grounds which arose prior to the order
    ofrevocation dated 17.9.2016, it would fall foul of Section 23(2) of the
D Act. Mr. Lalit relied heavily upon the judgment of this Court in
    Hadibandhu Das vs. District Magistrate, Cuttack & Another 1969
    (1) SCR 227 in support of the proposition that the expression "revocation"
    is not be narrowly construed, and would include any detention order,
    whether legal or illegal; and whether it has lapsed by time or has othel"Wise
    not complied with statutory requirements, which would include technical
E defects. He stated that this judgment has been repeatedly followed. On
    the other hand, Mr. Basant submitted before us, relying upon a Federal
    Court judgment and an earlier Constitution Bench judgment of this Court
    in Jagdev Singh vs. State o(Jammu & Kashmir AIR 1968 SC 327 that
    if a detention order fails because of technical defects, the self same
F grounds can always be utilised in the second detention order.
         8. In Hadibandhu Das vs. District Magistrate. Cttttack &
   Another 1969 (1) SCR 227 (supra) a second order of detention had
   been passed after revocation of the first order dated 20.1.1968. This
   was done because the said order had not been valid for want of service
 G within 5 days as provided in Section 7(1) of the Preventive Detention
   Act of 1950. Learned counsel for the State of Orissa contended that,
   under a pari materia provision to Section 21 (3) of the Bihar Act, namely,
   Section 13(2) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 the expression
   "revocation" would not cover detention orders which fail because of
   techn!cal defects. The Federal Court judgment relied upon by Mr. Basant
 H
 ANANT SINGH @ ANANT KUMAR SINGH v. THE STATE OF                              155
         BIHAR AND ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

before us was considered by this judgment in some detail (at page 232         A
and 233). Negativing the State ofOrissa counsel's case, the Constitation
Bench of this Court held:
      "Counsel for the State of Orissa contended that the detaining
      authority is prevented from making a fresh order on the same
      grounds on which the original order which had been revoked was          B
      made, provided the order revoked was a valid order initial!~' and
      had not become illegal on account of failure to comply with
      statutory provisions like s. 7 or s.9 of the Preventive Detention
      Act. Counsel says that the order which is illegal or has become
      illegal is not required to be revoked, for it has no legal existence,
      and a formal order of revocation of a previous order which has no       C
      legal existence does not fall within the terms ofs.13(2). He strongly
      relies in support of this argument upon s.13(2) as it stood before it
      was amended by Act 61 of 1952:
         The revocation of a detention order shall not bar the maki,1g of
          a fresh detention order under section 3 against the same D
         person"
      "The phraseology of sub-s. (2) of s. 13 before it was amended
      was explicit : there was no bar against a detaining authority making
      a fresh order of detention after revoking a previous order cased
      on the same or other grounds. It contained no implication that a E
      fresh order may be made only if it was founded on fresh grounds.
          Counsel also relied in support ofhis argument upon the decision
      of the Federal Court in Basanta Chandra Ghose v. King Emperor
      [1945] F.C.R. 81; Naranjan Singh Nathawan v. The State of
      Punjab [1952] S.C.R. 395; Shibban Lal Saksena v. The State of F
      Uttar Pradesh and others [1954] S.C.R. 418. In Basanta Chandra
      Ghose's case (supra) an order was made under r. 26 of the
      Defence of India Rules on March 19, 1942. The order was revoked
      on July 3, 1944, and a fresh order for detention of the detenue
      was passed on that very date under Ordinance III of 1944. It was
      urged on behalf of the detenue that the authority was debarred, G
      except on fresh grounds, from passing a fresh order of detention
      after cancellation of an earlier order, and the High Court was not
      justified in presuming that fresh materials must have existed when
      the order of July 1944 was made. Spens, C.J., rejecteci the
      contention. He observed in dealing with that ground:
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156     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2017] 5 S.C.R.



A        "It may be that in cases in which it is open to the Court to
         examine the validity of the grounds of detention a decision that
         certain alleged grounds did not warrant a detention will preclude
         further detention on the same grounds. But where the earlier·
         order of detention is held defective merely on formal grounds
         there is nothing to preclude a proper order of detention being
B
         based on the pre-existing grounds themselves, especially in
         cases in which the sufficiency of the grounds is not examinable
         by the Courts."
           That case arose from an order of detention under Ordinance
      III of 1944.
 c
          In two latter judgments of this Court in Naranjan Singh
      Nathawan's case (supra) and Shibban Lal Saksena's case (surpa)
      decided under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, it was ruled
      that where the previous order was revoked on grounds of
      irregularity in the order, the detaining authority was not debarred
D     from making a fresh order complying with the requirements of
      law in that behalf.
          Relying upon these cases the Solicitor-General contended that
      it was settled law before s.13(2) was amended by Act 61 of 1952
      that a detaining authority may issue a fresh order after revocation
 E    ofan earlier order of detention if the previous order was defective
      in point of form or had become unenforceable iri consequence of
      failure to comply with the statutory provisions of the Act, and that
      by the Amending Act it was intended merely to affirm the existing
      state of law, and not to enact by implication that revocation of a
 F    defective or invalid order attracts the bar imposed by s.13(2).
      There is, in our judgment, nothing in the language used by the
      Parliament which supports that contention. The power of the
      detaining authority must be determined by reference to the
      language used in the statute and not be reference to any
      predilections about the legislative intent. There is nothing in s.13(2)
 G    which indicates that the expression "revocation" means only
      revocation of an order which is otherwise valid and operative :
      apparently it includes cancellation of all orders-invalid as well as
      valid. The Act auth.orises the executive to put severe restrictions
      upon the personal liberty of the citizens without even the semblance
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 ANANT SINGH @ ANANT KUMAR SINGH v. THE STATE OF                            157
         BIHAR AND ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

      of a trial, and makes the subjective satisfaction of an executive     A
      authority in the first instance the sole test of competent exercise
      of power. We are not concerned with the wisdom of the
      Parliament in enacting the Act; or to determine wh.ether
      circumstances exist which necessitate the retention on the statute
      book of the Act which confers upon the executive extraordinary        B
      power of detention for long period without trial. But we would be
      loath to attribute to the plain words used by the Parliament a
      restricted meaning so as to make the power more harsh and its
      operation more stringent. The word "revocation" is not, in our
      judgment, capable of a restricted interpretation without any
      indication by the Parliament of such an intention.                    C
         Negligence or inaptitude of the detaining authority in making a
      defective order or in failing to comply with the mandatory provisions
      of the Act may in some cases enure for the benefit of the detenue
      to which he is not entitled. But it must be remembered that the
      Act confers power to make a serious invasion upon the liberty of D
      the citizens by the subjective determination of facts by an executive
      authority, and the Parliament has provided several safeguards
      against misuse of the power. The very fact that a defective order
      has been passed, or that it has become im;alid because of default
      in strictly complying with the mandatory provisions of the law
      bespeaks negligence on the part of the detaining authority, and E
      the principle underlying s.13(2) is, in our view, the outcome of
      insistence by the Parliament that th.e detaining authority shall fully
      apply its mind to and cornply with ·ihe requirements of the statute
      and of insistence upon refusal to countenance slipshod exercise
      of power.                                                              F
        Without, therefore, expressing any opinion on the question
      whether the order passed by the State Government on January
      28, 1968, was justified, we are of the view that it was incompetent
      by virtue of sub.s.(2) of s.13 of the Preventive Detention Act,
      l~Q"                                                                  G
      9. This judgment has been followed repeatedly. In Har Jas Dev
Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Ors .. 1973 (2) SCC 575 (paragraph 4)
was a case like the present of the detention order failing because of
technical defects, and in Chhagan Bhagwan Kahar Vs. N.L. Kaina &
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158            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] 5 S.C.R.



A     Ors. reported in 1989 (2) SCC 318 at paragraphs 7 and 12, this Court
      went even further and stated that the quashing of an order of detention
      by a court would also fall within the meaning of"revocation".
              10. However, not to be deterred by this line of precedent, Mr.
      Basant, learned senior counsel for the respondent stated that a
 B    Constitution Bench judgment of this Court reported in AIR 1968 SC 327
      (supra) which was under the Defence oflndia Rules specifically stated
      as follows:
            "( 6). These cases certainly show that a fresh order of detention
            can be passed on the same facts, if for any reason the earlier
 c          order of detention has to be revoked by the Government. Further
            we do not find anything in the Defence of India Act (hereinafter
            referred to as the Act) and the Rules which forbids the State
            Government to cancel one order of detention and pass another in
            its place. Equally we do not find anvthing in the Act or the Rules
            which will bar the Government from· passing a fresh order of
 D          detention on the same facts in case the earlier order of detention
            or its continuance is held to be defective for any reason. This is of
            course subject to the fact that the fresh order of detention is not
            vitiated by mala tides. So normally a fresh order of detention can
            be passed on the same facts provided it is not mala fide, if for any
 E          reason the previous order of detention or its continuance is ncit
            legal on account of some technical defect as in the present cases."
             11. According to Mr. Basant, this would directly cover his case,
      and not being considered by the Constitution Bench judgment in 1969
      (1) SCR 227 (supra), the ratio of this case ought to govern. We find it
 F    difficult to agree with this contention. First and foremost, the Defence
      of India Rules 1962 did not have a pari materia provision to Section
      23(2) of the Act as in the present case. It was in this context that it was
      stated that nothing barred the Government from passing a fresh order of -
      detention on the same facts, regard being had to the language of the
      Defence oflndia Rules which did not contain any bar to the passing of
 G    a second detention order on the same facts. In any case we find that
      the direct judgment which covers this case is the judgment of this Court
      in Hadibandhu Das case (supra) which, as has been stated earlier, has
      repeatedly been followed, and, is therefore, the law declared by this
      Court on this subject. Shri Basant then referred us to the language of
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 ANANT SINGH @ANANT KUMAR SINGH v. THE STATE OF                                159
         BIHAR AND ORS. [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]

Section 23(2), namely, the expression "where fresh facts have arisen ... ". A
According to learned senior counsel, this expression would show that
these facts should have arisen after the date of the first order of detention,
and since facts have arisen after s•h September, 2016, the provisions of
Section 23(2) are satisfied. We are afraid that this submission goes
contrary to the express language of Section 23(2). The expression "where B
fresh facts have arisen .. " is followed by "the date of revocation or
expiry.... ". Accepting Shri Basant's submission would mean that we
have to substitute the last expression with the words "the date of the
detention order". This cannot be done for two very good reasons. First
and foremost, the 1981 Act being a statute which provides for preventive
detention, it has to be construed keeping the subject's liberty in mind, C
that is, it has to be construed keeping Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution
in mind. Here no supposed object of the Act can be looked at to defeat
the aforesaid Articles of the Constitution particularly when the literal
language of Section 23(2) leads only to the conclusion that it is the date
of the revocation order and not the date of the original order of detention D
that is referred to. Accordingly, even this contention is without substance.
       12. Accordingly, we set aside the judgment of the High Court and
allow the appeal of the appellant. This necessarily means that the
detention order dated 21. 9.2016 is set aside. The passing of this judgment
will not stand in the way of the State Government taking any other action
against the appellant which they can take in accordance with law.              E


Divya Pandey                                                 Appeal allowed.