Holding

A partial stay of execution is covered by s.15(1) of the Limitation Act, 1908, and the period of such stay must be excluded when computing the limitation period under s.48 CPC.

Summary

Anandilal and others, the original decree‑holders, had obtained a decree against the respondents which was affirmed by the High Court. During the pendency of the appeal, the High Court stayed execution of the decree under Order XLI, r.5 of the CPC, but only the sale of the attached properties was stayed, not the attachment itself. The decree‑holder later purchased the decree and sought execution, which was opposed on the ground that the application was barred by the 12‑year limitation period under s.48 CPC. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the period of the partial stay (August 16, 1940 to November 24, 1944) could be excluded from the limitation period under s.15(1) of the Limitation Act, 1908. The Court held that "execution" in s.15(1) has a broad meaning and includes any stay of any process of execution, even if partial, and therefore the stay period must be excluded. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the lower court’s decision allowing the exclusion was affirmed.

Issues considered

The partial stay of execution of a decree falls within the meaning of "execution" under s.15(1) of the Limitation Act, 1908.
Whether the period of such partial stay should be excluded for the purpose of computing the 12‑year limitation period under s.48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 48
Limitation Act, 1908s. 15(1)

Subjects

Limitation ActSection 15(1)partial stay of executionSection 48 CPCcomputation of limitation periodexecution of decreebeneficent constructioncivil procedure

Judgment

806

,
A
ANANDILAL & ANR.
v.
RAM NARAIN & ORS.

May 10, · 191J4
B

[A.P. SEN AND V. BALKRISHNA ERADI, JJ,j

Limitation Act 1908 s: 15 U) and Code of Civil Procedure 1908 s. 48.
ExecUtion of decree-Partial .s"ay of-Decree_ holder whether etitftled to cliwm
C eX~lusion of j)erioi in computation -of limitation.

• • J
Words and Phrases : l•E~ecution'~-Meani'ng o/-_S. 15 . ( J) Limilatlon -1
Aci1908.

The predecess_or·l.i:i-title of respon;Jeot No·. 1 obtained a decree agaitist.
D the p_r-edeCessor·in-:title 9f respondent Nos. 2- and 3. The decrtie was
affirmed by the State High Court on April S, 1938. During the pendenoy of
the app-~al, the Higb-Cocirt &tayed execution· of the decree u·ader Order XLI,
r. 5 of the Code Clf Civil Procedure ·on .condition that the api)ellents-
defendants furn\sb.ed security for the"dlte satisfaction of the dCcree.· Against
the decree Passed- .by the High Cciu.it tht defendants preferred all appeal
bef~r~ the' Judicial CotQmftteA of the State-~ -In.the_ appeai, the Judicial
E Committe~ passed an interi.m order d1t~d August J.6, 194_0 directing that
until .further orders "the prop.:.rties attached ill ex:ecution- shall -continue
to remain und~r att·a~hrrient but further proceedings for the.saJe thereof
Shall i-en1ain stayed o·n --Novomber 24, .-1944. the Judicial Committee
distUissed th~ _s~id -appeJl-anJ the ini'erim stay.stood diSsolved.

F Respo~dent Nu. 1 ·-·who h.td purGhased th~ decree fcom the beirS of
ihe original d~cree·holder resumcd-thC eXccution of th:i decree. The exeCu·
· tion applicati9n filed by him .wJs dismissed for default on June 11, 192f.5,
restored 6n DeCemhcr I."4,- "1946 but again disdlisscd for default on Jai:iuary
·2_1, 1954. Thei'_eafter,. a fresh application for execution, was ·filed on
FcbruarY. '1 s i 19 54. This application was oPposed by 1hc surety .appeij_an ls
G on th~ ·grcund that it was barred by limitation having be-en filed· beyond tho
period of 12 years presCfib~d .hY s, 48 of the Co'de of Civil Procedure..

The DiStricf ·Judge rcjeci·ed the· objection by the appellants holding
th.at alth.ouith the stay of execution wa:; par.tial .as only s.ale of. the attached
H properties ·had been ___ stayed .by- tne Judicla_l Committee, the decree-holder
was entilled to the benefit of s. lS (1) of the Limitation Act.
ANANDILAL v. RAM NARAIN
• 807
'
The appellants preferred an appeal before the. High Court which was ,A
allowed by a Single JUdge, who held that an order of
partial stay like .
the one granted by the Judicial Committee only postponed the sale of the
attached properties .~d did not have the .effect of making the decree
inexecutable ond therefore s. 15 \!)of .the Limitation Act was not attract~d.

Respondent No. 1 preferred a Letters Patent Arpeal and a Full Bc~ch B
of the High Court held tha.t the word . "execU:tioii'-' ins: tS (1) must .be
I con~trued in a broad sense, tha:t fr did not ex~lude a part'ial stay of exeCll· ·
-'f
tion ·aod · therefore the deciec·holder was entitled to tho exclusion o,f the
• period from August· 16, 1940 to November 24, 1944 under s. JS (l) of
the -Limitation Act for_ computation of the period of 12 years prescribed
under s·.. 48 of the Code. of Civil Piocedurr.

Dismfasing the Appeal to this Court~
·.
HELD,: · 1:. The word ''execution,' ins; 15 (1) embraCes all ·the
appropriate means by which a decree is.• eriforc~d. It includes all processes
and proce~dings iff.aid of, or supplemental to execution. [814B]
- i
2. .There is no rational basis for adopting a na·rrow arid~ restricted
construction On a beneficient provision Uke s, 15 (l). There is no reason
why I!. 15 (1) !ihould be giveil a -restricted meaning _as· allowing the benefit
to a decrce·hoider where there is a complete or ab~olute stay of executioll.
3nd not a ':partia;i stay i.e. a sfay ·which makes the decree altogether inexe.. E
eatable. [814C] ,.

3. Stay of any process of execution is stay of executi_on within the
,meaning of-s. 15· { 1). Where · an injunction or order has ·preven·t~d the
detee ..holder · from execut'iog the decree, then irrespe_ctive of the parti~ular
stage of execution, or the"partic.ular prop~rty: against \Vhich, Or the Parti .. ·
F.
cular judgment-debtor against '\vhom, execution was stayed~ -ibe effect or
such injunction or order is . to prolong tbe life of. the decree itself by the
period during wbicb the injunction or o~der remaided in force.--· [s-140.-El

Kundo Mal & OrS. ~· Firm Dau/at. Ram Vidya Prakash, AIR 1940
Lab. 15, Virchanif Kapur Chand v. Morua/appa. & Anr., AIR 1944 Born.
G
303, Chanbasappa v. Holibasappa, ILR (1924) 48 Bom. 485 and Kirtyqnand·
Singh v. PrithiC/umd Lal., AIR 1929 Pat: 59.7, reversed.

Bail/jam v. Bai Ruxmani, AIR 1914 B.om. 2i1 and GovindnaJh
Chaudhuri v. Basiruddin Monda/, AIR 1921 Cot. 606, and Sitar.am and
Others v. Chunnilalsa ILR 1944 Nag. 250 approved.
H
)
Kirtyanand Singh v. Prithi ·Ch~ndla/, AlR ·1933 PC $2 expl~ioed.
SU.PREME COURT REPORTS (1984) 3 S.C.R.
1
....
.A CIVIL APPELLATE JUIUSDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 109 of 1971.
'
Appeal by Certificate from the Judgment and Decree.dated
17th October, 1969 of the Madhya Pradesh .High Court, in Letters
Patent Appeal No. 16 of i962
B V.A ..Bobde and A.G.Ratnaparkhi for the appeilants.

..
S.S: Khanduja for the. respondents. \

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
-\:'
·. . SJJN, L The shmt point involved in this appeal by certificate
c fr?m the judgment and order of a Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh
H/gh Court dated October 17, !969 is whether a partial stay of
execution. of the decree like the one. in question staying sale of the
attached property is within sub-s (1) of s, 15 of the Iimita•ion Act,
190$ so as to erititle the decree-holder fo claim exclusion of the
D period duri~g ·whi.ch there . was stay of sale but the property ·. ~ ·
was to .co.nt ·nue under a.ttachment,. for the purpose of computation
of the p(jtiod of limitation provided by s.. 48 of the Code of'
Civil Procedure, 1908. Since the question involved is a substantial ·
Question of law, the High Court _has granted a certitica~e of fitness
Under Art. 133 (!) CC'1 of the Constitution. · ··
.
Facts are ·somewhat comp!ic'ated but it is necessary to diseri-
. tangle them ·to bring out the poirit in controvers~. .One Ghasiram,
the predecessor•in-title ·of the present respondent No, 1. Ram Narain
obtained a decree for Rs. 5,548.18 p. from the Court of the District·
of
Jµdge, Ujjain against one Bheraji, the predecessor-in-title 1espon•
F dents Nos. 2 and 3 Chunnilal and An~ndilal, now the Judgment-
·debtors. The decree was affirmed in appeal by the Gwalior High Court
: on April 5, 1938. During the pendency of the appeal, the High
Court stayed execution of the decree under Order XLI, r. 5 of the
Code on condition that the appelfants-defendants furnished ·security
. for the due satisfaction of. the decree. Ratanlal, father of the two
G appellants Anandifal ancl Jarikilal; executed a surety dated August 3,
1927. Against the decree passed by the High. Court, the defendants
preferred a revision· before the Judicial Committee of the. Gwalior
State .which came to be dismissed .oJL February 14, !94l. While the
revision was pending before the Judicial·. Committee, the decree-
H holder Ghasiram put the decree in execution against the judgment-
as
debtors also against the surpty on February 23, 1939 for attachment
and sale of their immoveable properties. It appears that some
ANANDILAL v. RAM NARAIN (Sen, J.) 809

houses and certain zamindari. lands of the surety Ratanlal were A
attached in execution .,,f the decree. He. raised· objections to the
attachment of his property but the same were rejected on ·December
9, 1939. Against the order dismissing his ·objections, ·the surety
Ratanlal filed an appeal before the Gwalior High Court which· was
dismissed on July 22, 1940. He then filed a Mi8cellaneous Appeal
before the Judicial Committee of th~ Gwalior State. · B

'
•
It is common ground.that in thai appeal the Judicial Committee
passed an interim order dated Augu~t 16, 1940 directing that until
further order; the nroperties attached in execution sh~ll conti!rne
to rema;n under attachment but further proceedings for the sale
thereof shall remain stayed. On November 24, 1944 the Judicial c
Committee dismissed the said appeal and consequently the interim
stay stood· dissolved. Thereafter, the present respondent No. 1
Ram Narain appears to have purchased the decree from the heirs
of the original decree· holder 11nd the execution proceedings were ,.
resumed. The execution application filed by him was however
dismissed for default on June lt, l 945 . .It was restored on December
r
14, 1946 but was again dismissed for default on January 21, 1954 as·
the counsel for the dscree·holder stated that he had no instruction.
: Thereafter, a fresh 'application for execution was filed by the decree-
hold<rr on February 18, 1954. This application was opposed by the
surety Ratanlal inter ali'!. on the ground that it wa; barred by limita-
tion having been filed beyond the period of 12 years prescribed by E
s. 48 ofthe Code.

The question is whether respondent No. 1 Ram Narain, the
assignee'holder, was entitled.to exclusion.of the period from August
16, 1940 to November 241 1944 under. s. 15 (l) of the Limitation F
Act for computation of the period of 12 years· prescribed und·er s. 48
of.the Code. The District Judge, Ujjain rejected the· objection
raised by the appellants holding that although the stay of execution
. ) was partial in as much as only sale of t]\e attached pro.perties had
been staye'd by the Judicial Committee, the decree·holder was
·entitled to the benefit of s. 15 (!). The appellants preferred an G
appeal. before·the High Court which was allowed by the learned
Single .Judge by his order dated February· 9, 1962. The learned
Single Judge held that an order of partial stay like the one in ques-
tion granted by the Judicial Committee which only postponed the
sale of the attached properties did. not have the effect of making the
decree inexecutable. and therefore s. 15 (I) of the Limitation Act . H
•
81() SUPRE!JE COURT REPORTS (1984] 3 s.c·R.

I\ . was not attracted. He understood the decision of Grille, C.J. and
J .. Sen, J. in Sitaram & .Ors. v. Chunilalsdi}) as laying. down that
s. 15 (I) was applicable only when there is absolute stay of excution ..

Aggrieved by the decision of the learned Single judge, respon- •
·a, dent No. 1 preferred a Letters Patent Appeal which was referred by
a Division Bench to a Full Bench as the question wh,et.her a partial
stay was within s. 15 (I) of ,the Limitation Act was o! considerable
importance. After dealing with.all the authorities on the subject,
the Full Bench answered the question in the affirmative. It was of
· the view that the Limiiation Act .like any other enactment must
c. receive a -,construction which the language in its .pl;\ in meaning is
capable· of bearing and that there was no justification for placing a
narrow and restricted construction. on the word, ·"exec.ution"
occurring in the phrase "execution of the decree'' in s. 15 (1) of the .
Limitation Act as implying an absolute bar to the execution of the
, ·decree-~ AcGording to the Full Bench, such a construction was not ·
D. warranted as it would involve reading into the section words such as
"totally; wholly, as a whole, or. by all possible means" which are
not·there. According to its plain language,.it held, thats. 15(1) did
not exclude ·a partial stay of execution. After referring. to several
decisions of differcnf High Courts, the Full 'Aench particularly. placed
relianc~ on the deeisjon of the Culcutta High Court in Sreenath Roy
. E. v.Radhanath. Mookerjfj!(2) holding that. the words "executioa of
the decree"· mean enforcement of. the decree by what is known as
by any of the "processes of execution'.'. It accordingly held that
the word "execiltion" in S; 15 (I) mu~t be cconstrued in a broad sense
taking in all or any of the v;irious · processes of execution and ob-
. served that the decision in Sitaram's case,' supra, does not fake a
F contrary view.. The Full Bench therefore held that the decree-
holder was entitled to the exclusion of the•period from August 16,
1940 to November 24, 19.44 under s. 15 ( l) of the Limitation A.ct·· '
in reckoning the·period of 12 years prescribed by s. 48 of the Code.
We concur with the view expressed by the Full Bench.

G It ·is well settled that s. 48 ofthe C~de was controlled by
8 , 15 (!) of the Limitation Act. S, 48 of the Code enacted a rule of
limitation and prescribed a period of 12 years for an application fbr
execution of decrees and orders.·· ·It has since been. repealed bys. 28
of the Limitation Act, 1963 which enact~ that "in the Code of Civil
H (1) IL!l. (1944) Nag. 2SO
(Z) lLR (1983) 9 cal. 773.
ANANDILAL v. RAM NARAIN (Sen, J.) . 811

Proced.ure. 190.8, (Act V of 1908), s. 48 shall be omitted". In its A
phcj a new provision Art. 136 has been introduced and that pres-
cribes "for the execution of any·decree (other than a decree .granting
a m1ndatory injunction)' or order of any Ci vii Court a period of 12
years, etc." Thus, the substanc' ofs.48 continues to be,the law· and
for that reason, and also for. the reason that with regard to pending
applications,· the .law as laid down in the decisions foterpreting B
s. 48 might have to be referred to, it is necessary to give reasons.

There has been a sharp divergence of jµdicial authority on the
._question whether a partial stay was within s. 15 (l) cf the Limitation
Act, ·The preponderance of judicial opinion appears to be in favour c
'of the view that s. 15 ( l) contemplates an absolute stay. There .is
aJong line of decisions starting from Kundo Mal & Ors. v. Firm
Daul~! Ram Vidya PrakashC'l where Din Muhammad, J. laid down
. that if execution ·is not compktely and abs.olutely s\ayed, s. 1·5 {I)
of the Limitation Act does not come into play, down to Virchand
Kapw Chand v. Maruq/appa & Anrl2l where Sen, J. reaffirmed · D
. thats. 15 (!) contemplates an absolute stay which reneders the
decree-holder incapable of taking ont any proceeding for execution
of the decree, w)lich are all b1sed on the dictum of. M2cleod, C. J ..
in Chanbasappa v. Holiba.wppal3J to the effect that s. 15 (I) . only
applies to an absolute stay. The Patm High Court also took the
same view in Kirtyanand Singh v. Prithi Chand La/( 4 ). The dicta E
of Maclood, C. J. in Chanbbsappo's case and of Din Muhammad, J.
in Kundo Mal's case do not give any reasons for the view taken.
Sen, J.. in Virchand's case and however gave .reasons for taking the
view that s. 15 (1) contemplates an.absolute stay which renders the
decree-holder incapable of taking· out any proceeding for execution
of the decree. The learned Judge observed that a partial stay e.g. F

\ . a stay of ex,cution in one particular mode is not stay of execution
'within tho meaning -of s. 15 (I) if it is open to the decree.-holder to
,J execute his decree in any other manner. He referred to the contrary
. view taken by the Bombay. High Court in Bai Ujam v. JJai Ruxmani('l
by the Rangoon High Court in Nachiappa Reddy v. M3tmg fe( 6 )'and
G
(I) AIR (1940) Lah. 75.
(2) AIR ( 194 0 Born. 303.

~·.·
(3) !LR (1924) 48 Bom.4 85.
(4) AIR (1929) Pat. 597 •
.(5) AIR (1914 Born. 2J.l. H
(6) AIR 0918) UB 4.
812 SUPREME COURT REP.ORTS (1984) 3 S.C.R
A by the Culcutta High Court in Govindnath Chqudhur; v. Basiruddin
Mondo1( 1 ) where it had.'been held that st-;,y of execution Qf a part of
the decree or against a particular property will nevertheless save ·
limitation for execution of the decree as a whole, and remarked •
that in view of the decision· of the Privy Council in Kirtyanand
Singh v. Pl'i/hi ChandLaf,(2) these decisions were no longer good
B law. We find it difficult to accept the reasoning.

The decision of the Privy Council in Kirtyanand Singh' s case -\'
does not lay do\vn any. contrary proposition. There, the point
appears to have arisen from an order passed by the Court in the
c Raj Suit to the effect that "the decre.e-holder were to wait· for some
time for payment". That order .was subsequently set aside having
been in operation for about . seven months.. 1 he decree-holders'
.contention was that they were entitled to the benefit of s: 15 (!)with
respect to the afore.said peri9d of seven months. Lord Tomlin,
deliv,ering the judgment of the Judicial Committee, construed the 4
D ~foresa;d order as meaning not an order staying execution within
,· s. 15 0) of the Limitation Act, and observed:

Now the first thing to be observed is that at lhe time
when that order was made, there was in fact no application
for execution pending ~tall. It was an order again made
E
in the Raj Snit and not in the rent suits; it was a.n .order
. made on application by the decr-ee-holders seeking leave to I
proceed against property in the h~nds of the receiver in the·
Raj snit. It was an order which did no: stay at al/, but
simply said that so far as I.hat application in that suit. was
F con.cerned the appellants were to wait. That seems to their
Lordships not to to be in any sen!Je within th.e meaning of the
a
section stay of the execution by injuncti011 or order."
,
- . (Emphasis supplied)

In Lala Baijnath Prosad & Ors. v. Nursinghdas Guji'ati( 3) the
G
Calcutta High Court appears to have adopted a middle ,course.
Chakravarti, C. J. delivering the judgment of the Court observed:

"If the decree·holder is prevented altogether from
--------·----
(I) AIR (1921) Cal. 606.
H
(2)· AIR (1933) PC 52.
(3) A{R (1958) Cal. J,
ANANDILAL v. RAM NARAIN (Sen, J.) 813

executing his decree, it is but reasonable that time should A
· not run against him so long as he remaills disabled arid the
• section says so. But there seems to be no reason why the
section should be construed as meaning that even when the .
injunction or order is limited to one or some of s~veral
judgment-debtors or to one or some of their properties or to
• some particular mode. of execution and ~ve.n when the B
''f de,ree-holder is left free to proceed against the other judge-
ment-debtors or other properties or in other way, he will
be entitled to the benefit of the section.

The learned Chief Ju~tice observed tliat in such a case the
execution of the !lecree is n()t stayed but only execution in c'ertain ·
c
waysand against certain persons or properties 1s prevented, and
then added : '

"B\lt assuming 'stayed' include 'stayed iu part', the utmost
that ·Can be claimed under the terms of the section is that
D
if a decree-holder is restrained for a time from proceeding
against some particular judgment-debtor or some particular ·
property or in some particular way, aud'whcn the bar is .
lifted, he applies for execution against the same judgment'
debter or the same property or in the same way, he will be
entitled to exclude the period during ivhich )le remained· Le.
E
strained.'~

We feel that, there is no justification for placing a rigid con:
struction on a beneficent provision like s. 15(1) of the Limitation
Act. It is not necessary for us to go into the history of the legisJa,
lion which has been dealt with at length in many of the decisions F
laying down that s. 48 of the Code is controlled by s, 15('l) of the
Limitation Act., All that' we need say is that both the enactments .
have throughout been treated as supplementary to each other, and
'I concern w:ith procedural ·law. rt is also true that in co~struing·
statutes of limitati'on considerations of hardship and anamoly are
out of place. Nevertheless, it is, we think, permissible to adopt· G
,.
a beneficent construction of a rule of limitation if alternative construc-
tions arc possible. It is plain on the terms of s. 15(1) t)at the
word "execution" appearing in the collocation of words "the
execution- of which has been stayed" must be consfru,d in a liberal
and bro~d sense. As observed by the Calcutta High Court in
Sree~ath Roy's case, Sl!pra, the w9rds "execution of the decree" H
mean the enforcement of the decr~e ·by what js known as "process
of execution".
·'
814 SUPREME COURT REPQKTS [1984) 3 s.c.a

A Agreeing with the Full Bench, we aie inclined to the view
that \he word "execution" ins. ·15(1) embraces all the appropriate
means by which a decree is enforced. It includes all process an,d ·
proceeding in aid of, or supplemental to, execution. We find no
rationai basis for adopting a·narrow and restricted coµstniction on a
beneficent provision like the one contained in s. 15(1). There is no
B reason wby s 15 (!)should be given a restricted meaning as allowing
a
the ben~fit to a decree-holder where there is complete or 'absolute
stay of execution and not a partial stay i e. a stay which make& the
decree altogether inexecutable. Nor can we subscribe to the
proposition that in cases of partial stay, the benefit ~nder s. 15(1)
can be had only where &n execution application is directed against
c the same judgment-debtor or the ~ame property, as ~gainst whom an
execution was previously. stayed. Stay of any process of execution
is therefore. stay of execution within the meaning of the. section.
Where an injunction cir order has prevented the dec;n,e·holder from
executing the decree, then irrespective o~ the particular stage of
execution, .or the particular property against which, or the particular
D
judgment-debtor against whom, execution was stayed, the effect of
such injunction or order is to prolong the life of the decree· itself
by lhe period during which the injunction or order. remained iu
· force. The majority view to the contrary taken by some of the High
Courts overlooks the well settled principle that when the law pres-
cribes more than one modes. of execution, it i~ for the decree-holder
E
to choose ·which of them he will pursue ..

For these reasons, the appeal must fail and is dismissed with
costs.

F N.V.K. Appeal dismis.•ed.

' ''