Holding

A magistrate cannot suo motu or on the informant’s prayer direct further investigation under Section 173(8) after cognizance is taken; only the investigating agency may seek such investigation.

Summary

The appellant, Amrutbhai Shambhubhai Patel, filed a petition under Section 173(8) of the CrPC seeking a court‑ordered further investigation by the police after a charge‑sheet had been filed and the trial was underway. The trial court had granted the direction, but the High Court set it aside, holding that a magistrate cannot order further investigation after taking cognizance and the accused has appeared. The Supreme Court examined the scope of Section 173(8) and the powers of a magistrate under Sections 156, 190, 202, 311 and 319 of the CrPC. It concluded that only the investigating agency may request further investigation under Section 173(8); a magistrate has no suo motu or informant‑driven power to do so once cognizance is taken. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The extent of a magistrate's power to direct further investigation under Section 173(8) of the CrPC after cognizance has been taken and the accused has appeared.
Whether an application by the informant, without a request from the investigating agency, can compel a magistrate to order further investigation.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898s. 173, s. 176
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 156(3), s. 173(2), s. 173(5), s. 173(6), s. 173(8), s. 190, s. 202, s. 311, s. 319

Subjects

Section 173(8)further investigationmagistrate powerscognizanceCriminal Procedure Codeinvestigating agencysuo motu jurisdictioninformant

Judgment

[2017]4 S.C.R. 105 ,

. AMRUTBHAI SHAMBHUBHAI .PATEL _ ,_. A
t I J ~ J ' ... • ' ~ j -·

' ,_
' .
... :•• SUMANBHAI KA!'JTIBi-r.AI P~T,EL &o~s.
- {CriminalAppealNo.1171of2016) --·-
FEBRUARY02, 20!7 ,. :, . ""'. ·" B
''
[DIPAK MISRA AND AMITAVA ROY, JJ.] ', .1

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.ll3(Bj - P~wer,of
Magistrate to direct ftlrther investigatiOn suo motu 01~ acting oi1 'I he
request or prayer of the complainantlinforma11t '.after cognizance
and appearance of the- accused person - Held: Neither the
c
Magistrate suo motu nor 0J1 mi application filed by the 'coinJJlainarltl
informant has power to direct ftirther i11vestigaiio11 ·- Such a course
i'vould be open only on the request of the inve~:tigating agency and
that too; in circumstmices \'varranting further investigation on the
detection of material evidence o_nly to ~·ecure fair_ investigation and D
trial.'... Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 -'s.113. · · ·
- · . _ 1 . _ ·· _.. 1 . , ~ 4 rl i l~ l 'I

. Dismissing the appeal, the Court
iiEiD: 1.1: A plain comparison of Section 173, CrPC, 1973
and, 18~8. would amply demonstrate that though these.relate to
the report of a police officer on completion of investigation and E
the ste1>s to ensue pursuant thereto, outlining as well the duties
_of.the officer in-cliarge of the concerned police station, amongst
others to communicate, the action taken by him to th~ 1>erson, if
any, by whom the information relating to the commission of offence
was first given, it is explicit that the recast provisi.oii of tl1e 1973 F
Code did incorporate sub-clause 8 as a significant addition to the
earlier provision. The Forty-first Report of the Law Commission
.of India on. the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 dealt with the
aspect of reopening of investigation in the context of the existing
Section 173 of the Code 1898. [Paras 15, 16] (119-11; 120-A]
G
1.2. The Bill to consolidate and amend the law relatil1g to
criminal procedure followed a'nd was circulated in the Gazette
of India, Extraordinary, Part II, published on' December 10,
1970 proposing, the Code of Crimhial Procedure, 1970. The
Statenlent of Objects and Reasiins 'Clearly disClosed ·that the
H
105
SUPREME COURT REPORTS · [2017]~ S.C.R,

·. A recominendati~lis th~of Commission tooverhaul tlie Cod~ 1898
as made were )ccepted. and vis-a-vis Section i 73, ~hich
corresponded to Section 176 ii! the.·· report. tbe, amendment· ..
pi'opose4 was to facilitate. collectio1i of evide1ice .by the police
after filing Jhe cl1arge•sheet. and productil)n thereof before ~he
Court, subject to the. accused being given usual facilities for
co11ies. The remodelled Section 173 was identical fo form and .
substance to tlie one, as proposed by the Commission in. chime· · .
lvit11 its recommendation as contain.ed in the Report. Sub-Clause .
. (7) of the new Section '173, as proposed by the Comniissiol.1 and ·.
integrated inthe BHI, however eve11tuaHy appeared as sub,clause ·
C ·. · (8}to the. Section under Code 1973~ ·Tlie newly added sub~se.ction ·
(8), as Its text evinces, permits further investigatio1l bf ti1e · ·.
concerned officer. in~charge of die police sfatio1fin respect· of an'
·. offence after a report under sub-secti1nl l had. ~een forwarded to
· the Magistrat(i!nd also to lay before(he Magistrate aJurther ·•
D. report,)n .the form prescribed, whe1:.e. µporfsucb investigat~on,
ile obtains fiirther evide1Jce, oral or docu1i1e11tary. Jt .is fiirther '
orclailled that <in sllbmissio11 of such further report, the • '
es,seutialities engraftedin sub-sectious 2 tO 6 would apply also in .
rClation to all such report or repo1;ts. (Paras 18, 19} [122,C-G]
. t.3. The integra.tio;1of~ub-section 8 axiomatically
ls
subsequc1it to the 41" Report of the Law Commission Report of
I.1idia conveying· its reconuneildation that after the submission of·
· affoal re110rt under Section 173, a competent police officer,i11 . ·
the event of availability Qf evidence b.earii1g on the guilt or ·
innocence oLthe accused ougbtto .he pcrinitted to examine the.
sanie and submita ·further reporffo the. Magistrate concerned •.
· Tl1is assiunes significance, having regard to. the language·.
·. co11sCiously applied to design Section 173(8)in the 1973. Code.
N~ticeably, though the officer in~charge of a police station, in
·.categorical terms, bas been empowered thereby to conduct
further investigation and to lay a supplementary report
· . 'assi111ifali1ig the evidence, oral otdocu1nenfary, obtained' hr course
o(the said pursuit, llo sucl1 authorization has been e:xt.euded to
• the .Magistrate as the Court is in seisi~ of the prQcecdings. It Is,
however. no longer res integra that a Magistrate, if exigent to do
· so; to espouse tile cause of justice, ca~ trigger further
. ·..:. ·.· .· ·. . ·.. ·. ··.: •, . ..·: ·. ·.: ·, . . . . . .

AMRUTBHAI SHAMBHUBHAI PATEL v. SUMANBHAI 107
KANTIBHAI PATEL & ORS.
. .
· investigation even after a fiual report is submiUed imd.er Section . A
173(8). [Para 20] [122-.GcJI; 123-A-C)
Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Administration) (1979)
2 SCC 322; Reeta Nag v. State of West Bengal & Or.s.
(2009) 9 SCC 129 : [2009] 13 SCR 276; Tula Ram and ·
. others v. Kishore Sirigh (1977) 4 SCC 459 : (1978] · 1 · · B
SCR 615; Devarapalli Lakshniinarayana Reddy and
. others v. . V: Narayana Reddy mid others (1976) .3 S(:C .
.· 252 : (1976] Suppl. SCR 524 -'- relied oi1.
2. However; after cognizance is taken by the Magistrate
on the basis of a report submitted by the police oil the comp!Ction C
. of the investigation, no direcliori for further investigation· cal1 be .·..
. made by the Magistrate suo mo.tu .and it would be permissible .
only if such arequest is nmde by the investigating authority ou . ·
the detectio1i of fresh facts havilig bearing 011 the ·case a11d.
necessitating further explvration thereof in the interest of
complete and fair trial..
.
[Para 33] [129-B
. .
1··
' •'
D .
·. S~nkatha Singh and othei·s v. State of Uttar Pr·adesh. .. ·.
·.· ·. AIR 1962 SC 1208 :. [1962] Sui>pl. SCR SJ7; Master .
· · Construction Company (P) Lid. v: State iifOrissa at1d
miother AIR1966SC1047 : {1966] SCR 99; Ral1dhi1' .
. Singh Rana v. Stqte (Delhi Ad11iinistratio11) (1997) 1 sec .
.. 361 : (1996] 10 Suppl. SCR880; Dinesh [Jalmia 1: CBI
..(2007) 8 sec . 710. _: relied OJI. .. . . .. .
.
Aniit Kapoo~ v. Ramesh Chander and another (2012) 9 ..
·.· SCC 460 : (2012) 7 SCR 988; State of Pzmjab v. CBF
· and others (20U) 9 SCC.182: {2011]11- SCR 28l;.:
· ·Minu Ku;nari and another .v. State ofBihar and others ·
(200.6) A SCC 359 : p006J 3, SCl'l loS6; llemant .
- . DhaSincma v:. CBI and another (2001) 7 SCC $36 : ·
. [2001]. l Suppl. S<;R 646 ~ Distinguished;
. J. Chapter XIV of the Code d~lineates the c1>ndition:~ .
. requisite for initiation of 1iroc~etli11gs before a Magistrate. Section .·. ··
of
190, which deals _with cognizance offences by Magistrate, sets .··
out tbafany Magistrat~ of the fil"st Class and .any Magistrate. of .
·the second dass, specially empolvered, conteni plated, may take .as
cognizance ofany offence either µpon receiyiug a co.1ilJ>lai11t of
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] 4 S.C.R.

A facts which constitute such offence or. upon a police report of
such facts. or. upon· information
. received from· any person. other ,

than the police officer, or upon his own knowie4ge that such
offence had been committed.' Section 156, which equips police a
officer with the power to investigate a cognizable case mandates
vide sub-section 3 thereof that any Magistrate empowered under
B
Sectio'n 190 may order such an investigation. The procedure for
dealing with com11laints to Magistrate is lodged under Chapter
XV of the Code. Section 202 appearing .therein predicates that
any Magistrate on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which
he is authorized to take cognizance or which had been made over
c to him under Section 192, may, if he tbinks fit and shall in a case
where the accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which
he .exercises his jurisdiction, postpone the issue of process
against the accused and either enquire into the case himself or
direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by 1 such
other person as he thinks flt for the purpose of deciding whether
D
or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. The contents of
this text of Section 202(1) of the Code unmistakeably attest that
the investigation that can be directed by the Magistrate, to be
undertaken by a poli~e officer would essentially be in the form of
an enquiry for the singular purpose of enabling him to decide
E whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the
complai~t of an offence, of which he is authorised to take
cognizance. This irrefutably is at the pre-cog1iizance stage and
thus logically before the issuance of process to the accused and
his attendance in response thereto. Whereas Section 311 of the
Code empowers a Court at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other
F·
proceeding, to suinmon any person as a witness, or examine any
person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or
recall and re-examine any person already examined, if construed
to be essential to be just decision of the case, Section 319
authorizes a Court to proceed against any person, who though
G not made an accused appears, in course of the inquiry or trial, to
have 'committed the same and can be tried together. These two
• ~' " - • 4 • ,/

provisions of the Code explicitly accoutre a Court to summon a
I
mat~aa1 I
• I
wit~ess or' exanih1e a person present
, ,
at any 'stage of ~ny 1I : >~

iiiq u1~y; tdal or ot~e~ pi:oce.eding, if ~t considers it to be essenJial
to the just decision of the case and eve'n proceed against any
J • ._)
H • • I , j •: I ' , • _ : • I ' , L I.
AMRUTBHAI SHAMBHUBHAI PATEL v. SUMANBHAI I 09
KANTIBHAI PATEL & ORS.

person, though not·an accused in such enquiry or trial, ifit appears A
from the evidence available that he had committed an offence
and that he can be tried together with the other accused persons.
[Para 46) [133-G-I-I; 134-A-G]
4. Though the investigaHng agency concerned has been
invested with the power to undertake further investigation B
desirably after informing the Court thereof, before which it had
submitted its report and obtained its approval, no such power is
available therefor to the Magistrate after cognizance has been
taken on the basis of the earlier report, process has been issued
and accused has entered appearance in response thereto. At
that stage, neither the Magistrate suo motu nor on an application c
filed by the complainant/informant can direct further investigation.
Such a course would be open only on the request of the
investigating agency and that too, in circumstances warranting
further investigation 011 the detection of material evidence only
to secure fair investigation and trial, the life purpose of the D
adjudication in hand. [Para 47) [134-1-1; 135-A-C]
5. The un-amended and the amended .sub-Section (8) of
Section 173 of the Code if read in juxtaposition, would
overwhelmingly attest that by the latter, the investigating agency/
officer alone has been authorized to conduct further investigation E
without limiting the stage of the l>roceedings relatable thereto.
This power qua the investigating agency/officer is thus
legislatively intended to be available at any stage of the
proceedings. The recommendation of the Law Commission in its
41" Report which manifestly heralded the amendment,
significantly had limited its (Jroposal to the empowerment of the F
investigating agency alone. [Para 48) [135-D)
6. In contradistinction, Sections 156, 190, 200, 202 and 204
of the Cr.P.C clearly outline the powers of the Magistrate and
the courses open for him to chart in the matter of directing
invesligation, taking of cognizance, framing of charge, etc. Though G
the Magistrate has the power to direct investigation under Section
156(3) at the pre-cognizance stage even after a charge-sheet or
a closure report is submitted, once cognizance' is taken and the
accused person appears pursuant thereto, he would be bereft of
H
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.··

A any competence to. direct further investigation either suo n19tu
or
or acting on the .request prayer o( the complainantfinfo~;nant.
. The direc~ion f~r investigation by tl1e Magistrate under Se'etion
a
' 202, wbile dealing with a coi:l1plaii1t; tho'ugh' is at post-cogi1izance
stage, it is in the nature· of an inquiry to derive satisfaction as to
whether the proceedings initiated ought to be furthered or not.
B
Such a direction for investigation is not in the nature of further
investigation,
. as contemplated'
under Section 173(8) of the Code.
Had it been the intention of the legislature to invest such a power,
Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C would have been worded accordingly
to accommodate and ordain the same having regard to the
C . backdrop of the incorporation thereof. In a way, in view of the
three options open to the Magistrate; after a report is submitted
by the police on completion of the investigation, the Magistrate,
in both the contingencies, namely; when he takes cognizance of
the offence or discharges the accused, would be committed to a
course, whereafter though the investigating agency may for good
D
reasons inform him and seek his permission to conduct further
investigation, he suo motu cannot embark upon such a step or
take that initiative on the req nest or prayer made by the
complainant/informant. Not only such power to the Magistrate to
direct further investigation suo motu or on the request or prayer
E of the complainant1informant after cognizance is taken and the
accused person appears, pursuant to the process, issued or is
dis'Charged is incompatible with the statutory design and
dispensation, it would even otherwise render the provisions of
Sections 311 and 319 Cr.P.C., whereunder any witness can be
summoned by a Court and a person can be issued notice to stand
F
trial at any stage, in a way redundant. Axiomatically, thus the
impugned decision annulling the direction of the Magistrate for
further investigation is unexceptional and does not merit any
interference. Even otherwise on facts, having regard to the
progression of the developments in the trial, and more particularly,
G the delay on the part of the informant in making the request for
further investigation, it was otherwise not entertainable as has
been rightly held by the High Court. [Para 49] [135-E-H; 136-A-F]
Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police & Anr.
(1985) 2 sec 537 : [1985] 3 SCR 942 - relied on.
H
AMRUTBHAI SHAMBHUBHAI PATEL v. SUMANBHAI 111
KANTlBHAI PATEL & ORS.

Chandra Babu alias Moses v. State through Inspector A
of Police and others (2015) 8 SCC 774 : [2015] 6
SCR 1002 - distinguished.
Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali @ Deepak & Ors. (2013) 5
SCC 762 : (2012] 1~ SCR 1005; King Emperor v.
Khwaja Nazir Ahmad AIR 1945 PC 18; Abhi11a11da11 B
Jha & Ors. v. Dinesh Mishra AIR 1968 SC 117 : (1967]
SCR 668; Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi v. State of
Gujarat and others (2004) 5 SCC 347 : [2004] 3
SCR 762 - referred to.
Case Law Reference c
(1<)79) 2 sec 322 relied on Para6
AIR 1945 PC18 referred to Para 7
(1967] SCR 668 referred to Para8 ·
[1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 880 relied on Paras D
12Q041 3 SCR 762 referred to Para9
120091 13 SCR 276 relied on Pal'a 10
(19851 3 SCR 942 relied on Para 22
(1~781 1 SCR 615 relied Oil Para 29 E

[1976] Suppl. SCR 524 relied Oil Para 31
(19621 Suppl. SCR 817 relied on Para 32
[1966] SCR 99 relied on Para 32
F
(2007) s sec 770 relied Oil Para 32
[2012] 13 SCR 1005 referred to ·. · Para 34
12Q121 7 SCR 988 distinguished Para 36
120111 11 SCR 281 distinguished Para 37
G
120061 3 SCR 1086 distinguished Para 38
1200111 Suppl: SCR 646 distinguished Para38
(2015] 6 SCR 1002 distinguished · Para 4'2

H
112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1171 of20!6.
From ti1e Judgment and Order dated 10.04.2015 of the High Court
of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Special Criminal Application No. 2268 of
2014.
B Sanjay Hegde, Sr. Adv., D. N. Ray, Tattvam Patel, Lokesh K.
Choudhary, Mrs. Sumita Ray, Advs. for the Appellant.
Ms. Nitya Ramakrishan, Nitin Sangra, Brijraj Jhala, Mrs. V.D.
Khanna, Zakir Hussain, D. Khanna, Shamik Sanjanwala, Ms. Hemantika
· Wahi, Ms. Jesal Wahi, Advs. for the Respondents.
c
.• The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
AMITAVA ROY, J. · 1. The assail is of the verdict dated
10.04.2015 rendered by the High Court, setting at naught the order dated
27 .5.2014 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gandhinagar, whereby
D the Trial Court had allowed the application filed by the appellant, the
original informant, under Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (for short, hereinafter referred to as "the Code/1973
Code") for further investigation by the police.
2. We have heard Mr. Sanjay Hegde, learned senior counsel for
the appellant and Mis. Zakir Hussain, Nitya Ramakrishan, and Shamik
E
Sanjanwala, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1,2 and 3
respectively.
3. The facts indispensable for the present adjudication, portray
that the appellant had lodged a First Information Repo11 (for short
hereafter referred to as "FIR") against the respondents under Sections
F
406, 420, 426, 467, 468, 471, 477B and 1208 of the Indian Penal Code
· (for sho11 also referred to as "!PC"). The materials offered in the FIR
and the investigation by the police that followed, divulged that there was
a dispute between the parties relating to agricultural land and that the
appellant/informant had alleged forgery of the signatures and thumb
G impression of his as well as of his family members in the register
maintained by the Notary (Public). After the charge-sheet was submitted,
charge was framed against the respondents and they stood the trial
accordingly, as they denied the imputations. As would be gleanable from
the records, the oral evidence of the appellant/first informant was
concluded on 03 .07.2012 followed by that of the investigating officer of
H
AMRUTBHAI SHAMBHUBHAI PATEL v. SUMANBHAI 113
KANTIBHAI PATEL & ORS. [AMITAVA ROY, J.]

the case on 10.09.2013. Subsequent thereto, the statements of the A
respondents were recorded under Section 313 Cr.PC on 03.12.2013,
whereafter an application was filed at the cu-Jminating stages of the trial
by the appellant/informant seeking a direction under Section I 73(8) from
the Trial Court for further investigation by the police and in parti~ular to
call for a repo1t.from the Forensic Science Laboratory as regards one
B
particular page of the register of the Notary(Public), which according
to the appellant/informant was of debatable authenticity, as it appeared
to have been affixed/pasted with another page thereof. To be precise,
this application was filed at a stage when the case was fixed for final
, arguments.
4. The Trial Court, however, by the order impeached before the c
High Court granted the prayer made and issued a direction to the police
for further investigation. Significantly, prior thereto in Special Leave
Petition being SLP (Cr!.) No.9106 of 2010, this Court had directed
expeditious disposal of the trial. It is also worthwhile to record that the
application filed by the appellant/infonnant under Section 173(8) of Cr.PC D
had been opposed by the respondents herein, who being dissatisfied with
the. order of the Trial Court, thus impugned the same before the High .
Court.
5. The High: Court, as the impugned decision would disclose
exliaustively· examined the purport of Section 173(8) in the particular E
cmitext of the scope of flirther investigation by the police after it had
submitted a charge sheet and the Trial Court had taken cognizance on
the basis. thereof and had proceeded with the trial, 'following the
appearance of the accused persons. It, amongst others took note of the
41" Report of the Law Commission of India which after reflecting 0n
the oftly adopted view of the Courts that once a final report under Section F
173 had been submitted by the police, the latter could not touch the case
again and reopen the investigation, recommended that it ought to be
.. made clear that und.er the said provision of the Code, it was sti II permissible
for the.police to examine any evidence even after the submission of the
charge-sheet and to submit a report to the Magistrate. Thus, tl1e Law G
Commission's emphasis was to obviate any'hindrance in the way of the
investigating agency, which 'in certain fact situations could be unfair to
the prosecution as well :as to the accused. . ·
. ' .
6. The High Court having regard to this recommendation and the
incorporation of Section 173(8) as a sequitur thereof held that it was H
114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A . pennissible for the investigating officer or the officer-in-charge of the
police station to undertake a further investigation evenafter the filing of
the charge sheet, but neither the informant nor the accused could claim
as a matter of right, any direction from the Court directing such further
investigation under the said provision after a charge-sheet was filed.
The High Court traced the law as expounded by this Court from its
B renderings in R(lmL(l/ N(lra11g v. State (DelhiAd111i11istratio11), (1979)
2 SCC 322 vis-a-vis the scope and purport of Section 173 of Cr.P.C. in
particular, qua further investigation by the police after it had submitted
charge-sheet in a case. The exposition by this Court in Ram L(l/ N(lrm1g
(supra) that neither Sections 173 nor 190 of the Code of Criminal
c Procedure, 1898 did suggest exhaustion of the power of the pol ice to
further investigate even after the Magistrate had taken cognizance of
the offence already on record and that the police could exercise such·
right as often as necessary when fresh information would come to light
and it desired to make further investigation was noted. However, while
doing so, it was observed that in deference to the Court, the police ought
D
to ordinarily seek its formal permission to make further investigation.
The High Court in this perspective, observed that a fu11her investigation
could in a given factual setting, sub-serve the interest of the prosecution
and even of the defence.
7. The High Court in its verdict also adverted to the decision of
E the Privy Council in King Emperor v. Khwaja N(/zir Ahmad,· AIR
1945 PC 18 which stressed upon the restraint of the jt:1diciary against
interference with the police in matters which were within its province,
holding that the·roles of these two institutions Wt:re complet'nentary and
not overlapping, subject however to the right of the Courts to intervene·
·F in an approp~iate <;a~e ,for directions in the nature ofhapeas corpus.
-8. The decision of this Court in Ablii11mulm1 J/w & Ors. v. Dilleslt · ·
Mis/if([,· AIR 1968 SC 117 to the effect that the Magistrate <:ould not
direct the police the course of investigation or to submit a charge-sheet
when it had already submitted a final report, was referred to as well.
G Reference to the explication of law laid down by this Court in Rm1d/1ir
Si11glt Rana v. State (Del/ti Admillistratio11), ( 1997) I SCC 361 on the
powers available to a Magistrate at different stages of a case before
him in the singular context of its competence to direct further investigation
with reference thereto, was relied upon. It was noted as well that a
Magistrate, of his own, could not order fu11her investigation after an
H
AMRUTBHAl SHAMBHUBHAI PATEL v. SUMANBHAI 115
KANTIBHAI PATEL & ORS. [AMITAVA ROY, J.]

accused, pursuant to the process issued against him on the basis of the A
charge-sheet already submitted, had appeared in the case.
9. The pronouncement of this Court in llaswiblwi Valiblwi
Qureshi v. State of Gujarat and others, (2004) 5 SCC 347 ruling that
the police had the power to conduct further investigation de hors any
direction from the Couit even after it had taken cognizance was relied
B
upon to reinforce its conclusion.
10. The enumeration of this Court in Reeta Nag v. State of West
Bei1gal & Ors., (2009) 9· SCC 129 also to the same effect was adverted
to .. The High Court thus deduced on the basis of an in-depth survey of
the state of law, as above, on the import and ambit of Section 173(8)
Cr.P.C. that in absence of any application or prayer made by the c
investigating authority for further investigiition in the case, the Trial Coutt
had erred in allowing the application filed by the appellant/infomiant for
the same.
11. Without prejudice to this finding, the High Court was further
of the ·view that having regard to the sequence of events and the delay D
on the part ofthe informai1t to make such a prayer at the closing stages
of the trial, it was not entertainable. In arriving at this determination, the
High Court, amongst others marked that the evidence of the appellant/
infonnant had been recorded in the year 2012 when he did have sufficient
opportunity to scrutinise the document in question but for inexplicable
reasons did wa·it for more than two years to register the prayer for . E
further investigation. It was of the view that the attendant factual setting
did not demonstrate any defective investigation which demanded curation
through a further drill and that in any view of the matter, additional report
from the Forensic Science Laboratory had not been called for. This is
more so, as in the view of the High Court, the entire register of the F
Notary (Public) had been seized by the investigating officer and that any·
unusual or suspicious feature therein would have been certainly examined
by the FSL and .findings in connection therewith recorcied. The High
Court thus interferedwith the order of the Magistrate permitting further
investigation by the police in the case and ordered for expeditious disposal
of the trial. . •. . .; :.. . G
· ·". .12. Whereas:the learned·;senioi' counsel for·the· appellant has
sttenuouslyurged that the impugned order is patently indefensible,
· .•;inasmuch as, If maintained, it would result io traves.ty ofjustice and that
· not only the Trial Court was within its .competence to order further
investigation in the attendant facts and circumstances but also the same H
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A was essential to unravel the truth bearing on the charge level led against
the respondents-accused, the impugned order has been endorsed on
behalf of the respondents pleading that the same has been in abidance
of the consistent judicially pronounced postulations qua the scope and
purport of Section 173{8) Cr.P.C. and that no interference therewith. is
warranted.
B
13. Having regard to'the contentious assertions, expedient it would
be to retrace the law propounded by this Court on the impo11 and impact
of Section 173 Cr.PC, with particular reference to sub-Section (8)
thereof. For immediate reference, the afore-stated provision is.extracted
in full as hereunder: ·
c
"173. Report of police officer on completion of
investigation.- (I) Every investigation under this Chapter shall
be completed without unnecessary delay.
(IA) The investigation in relation to rape of a child may be
D completed within three months from the date on which the
information was recorded b:y the officer in charge of the police
station.
(2) (i) As soon as it is completed, the officer in charge of the
police station shall forward to a Magistrate empowered to take
E· cognizance of the offence on a police report, a repo11 in the forin
prescribed by the State Government, dtatlng- · · · · .
(a) the names of the pa11ies;
(b) the nature of the information;
· (c) the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted
F
with the circumstances of the case;
(d) whether any offence appears to have been committed and,
if so, by whom;
(e) whether the accused has been arrested;
G (f) whether he has been released on his bond and, if so, weather
. with or without sureties;
(g) whether he has been forwarded in custody under section
170;
(h) whether the report of medical examination of the woman
H
AMRUTBHAI SHAMBHUBHAI PATEL v. SUMANBHAI 117
KANTIBHAIPATEL & ORS. [AMITAVA ROY, J.]

has been attached where investigation relates to an offence A
under section 376, 376A, 376B, 376C or 3760 of the Indian
Penal Code (4~ of 1860). ·
(ii) The officer shall also communicate, in such manner as may
be prescribed by the State Government, the action taken by him,
to the person, if any, by whom the informatio.n relating to the B
conimission of the offence was first given. .
(3) Where a superior officer of police has beeri appointed under
section 158, the report, shall, in any case in which the State
Government by general or special order so directs, be sub111itted
through that officer, and he may, pending the orders of the c
Magistrate, direct the officer in charge of the police station to
make further investigation,
(4) Whenever it appears from a report forwarded under this section
that the accused has been released on his bond, the Magistrate
shall make such order- for the discharge of such bond or otherwise D
as he thinks fit.
(5) When such report is in respect of a case to which section 170
applies, the police officer shall forward to the Magistrate along
with the report- ,
(a) all. documents or relevant extracts thereof on which the . · E
prosecution proposes to rely other than those already sent to
the Magistrate. during investigation; · ..
(b) the statements- recorded under section 161 of all the
persons whom the prosecution proposes to exami11e ·as its
witnesses. F
(6) lfthe police officer is of opinion that any part of any such
statement is not relevant to the subject~ matter of the proceedings
or:that its disclosure to the accused is not essential in the interests
ofjustice and is inexpedient in the public interest, he shall indicate
that part of the statement and append a note requesting the G
Magistrate to exclude that part from the copies to be ·granted to ·
the accused and stating his reasc,ms for making 5uch request. : ·
(7) Where the· police officer investigating the case finds it
convenient so to do; he may furnish to the accused copies of aH or
. any ofthe documents referred to in sub- section (5). H
118. SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A (8) Nothing in this section shall be deemt:d to preclude
further investigation in respect of an offence after a report
under sub- section (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate
and, where upon such investigation, the .officer in charge of
the police station obtains further evidence, oral or
documentary, he shall forward to. the Magistrate a further
B
report or reports regarding such evidence in the form
prescribed; and the provisions of sub- sections (2) to (6)
shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or
reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under
sub- se~t_ion (2)."
c 14. It would be appropriate at this juncture to set out as well the
Section I ?3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 18.98.
·"Section 173. Report of police-officer.-
(!) Every investigation under this Chapter shall be completed
D without unnecessary delay, and, as soon as it is completed, the
officer in charge of the police-statioi1 shall-
(a) forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of
the offence on a police-report a report, in the form prescribed by
the State Government, setting forth the names of the parties, the
E nature of the information and the names of the persons who appear
to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case, and stating
whether the accused (if arrested) has been forwarded in custody,
or has been released on his bond,· and, if so, whether. with or
without sureties, and
(b) communicate, in such. manner as may be prescribed by the
F
State Government, the action taken by him to the person, if any,
by whom the information relating to the commission of the offence
was first given.
(2) Where a superior officer of police has been appointed under
section 158, the report shall, in any cases in which the State
G
Government by general or special· order so directs, be submitted
through that officer, and he may, pending the orders of the
Magistrate, .direct the officer in charge of the police-station to
make further investigation.
(3) Whenever it appears from a report forwarded under this section
H
AMRUTBHAI SHAMBHUBHAI PATEL v. SUMANBHAI 119
KANTIBHAI PATEL & ORS. [AMITAVA ROY, J.]

that the accused has been released on his bond, the Magistrate A
shall make such order for the discharge of such bond or otherwise
as he thinks fit.
(4) After forwarding a report under this section, the officer in
charge of the police-station shall, before the commencement of
the inquiry or trial, furnish or cause to be furnished to the accused, B
free of cost, a copy of the report forwarded under sub-section (I)
and of the first information report recorded under section 154 and
of all other documents or relevant extracts thereof, on which the
prosecution proposes to rely, inc Ju ding the statements and
confessions, if atiy recorded under section 164 and the statements
recorded under sub-section (3) of section 161 of all the persons c
whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses.
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section{4), ifthe
police-officer is ofopinion that any part ofany state11ient recorded
under sub-section (3) of section I 61 is not relevant to the subject-
matter of the inquiry or trial of that its disclosure to the accused is D
not essential in the interests of justice and is inexpedient in the
public interests, he shall exclude such part from the copy of the
statement furnished to the accused and in such a cause, he shall
make a report to the Magistrate stating his reasons for excluding
such part. E
Provided that at the commencement of the inquiry or trial, the
Magistrate, shall after perusing the part so excluded and
considering the report of the police-officer, pass such orders as
he thinks fit and ifhe so directs, a copy of the part so excluded or
such.portion thereof, as he thinks proper, shall be furnished to the F
acc1,1sed.
15. A plain comparison of these two prqvisions would amply
demonstrate that though these relate to the report of a police officer on
completion of investigation and the steps to ensue pursuant thereto,
outlining as well the duties of the officer ip-charge of the concerned
G
police station, amongst others to communicate, the action taken by him
to the person, ifany, by whom the information relating to the commission
of offence was first given, it is explicitthat the recast provision of the
1973 Code did incorporate sub-clause.8 as a significant addition tot11e
earlier provision. · ·
H
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A I6. The Fo11y-first Report of the Law Commission of India (for
short, hereinafter to be referred to as "the Commission") on the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1898 dealt with the aspect of reopening of
investigation in the context of the existing Section l 73 of the Code 1898
and recommended in the following terms:
B "14.23: A report under section I 73 is normally the end of the
investigation. Sometimes, however, the police officer after
submitting the report under section l 73 comes upon evidence
bearing on the guilt or innocence of the accused. We should have
thought that the police officer can collect that evidence and send
it to the magistrate concerned. It appears, however, that courts
c have sometimes taken the narrow· view that once a final report
ynder section 173 has been sent, the police cannot touch the case
again and cannot re-open the investigation. This view places a
hindrance in the way of the investigating agency, which can be
very unfair to the prosecution and. for that matter, even to the
D accused. It should be made clear in section 173 that the competent
police officer can examine such evidence and send a report to the
magistrate. Copies concerning the fresh material must of course
be furnished to the accused."
17. The Commission in the above perspective proposed a revision
E ofSecti011173 of Code 1898 ii1 the following terms:
"14.24: We propose that section 173 should be r~vised as follows:-
173. (I) Every investigation under this Chapter shall be completed
without unnecessary delay.
(2) As soon as it is completed, the officer in ch!ttge of the police
F
station shall forward to a Magistrate empowered to take
cognizance of the offence on a po 1ice-report a report, in the form
prescribed by the State Government, stating-
(a) the names of the parties;
G (b) the nature of the information;
(c) the nmnes ofthe persons who appear to be acquainted with
the circums~ances of the case;
(d) l1ihether any offence appears to have been committed,' a11d
.. · if so, by whom;
H
AMRUTBHAI SHAMBHUBHAI PATEL v. SUMANBHAI 121
KANTIBHAI PATEL & ORS. [AMITAVA ROY, J.]

(e) whether the accused has be(!n arrested; A
(f) whether he has been released on his bond under section
169, and, if so, whether with or without sureties,-
(g) whether he has been forwarded in custody under section 170.
The officer shall also corilmunicate, in such manner as may be B
prescribed by the State Government, the action taken by him to
the person, if any, by whom the information relating to the
commission of the offence was first given.
(3) Where a superior officer of police has been appointed under
section 158, the report shall, in any cases in which the State C
Government by general or special order so directs, be submitted ·
through ~hat officer, and he may; pending. the orders of the
Magistrate, direct that officer in charge of the police-station to
make further investigation.
(4) Whenever it appears from a report forwarded under this section
D
that the accused has been released on his bond, the Magistrate
shall make such order for the discharge of such bond or otherwise
as he thinks fit.
(5) When such report is in respect of a case to which section
170 applies, the police-officer shall forward to the Magistrate
E
along with the report-
( a) all documents or relevant extracts thereof on which the
prosecution proposes to rely other than those already sent to
the Magistrate during investigation; and
(b) the statements recorded under..... section 161 of all persons F
whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses.
(6) If the police officer is of opinion that any pait of any such
statement is not relevant to the subject-matter of the proceedings
or that its disclosure to the.accused is not essential in the interests
ofjustice and is inexpedient in the public interest, he shall indicate G
that part of the statement and append a note requesting the
Magistrlfte to exclude that part from the copies to be granted
to the accused and stating his reasons for making such
request.

H
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20)7] 4 S.C.R.

A . (7) Nothing in this section shall be.deemed to preclude
further investigation in respect of an offence after a report
under sub-section (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate.
Where upon such investigation, the officer in charge of the
police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary
he shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports
B
regarding such evidence in the form prescribed; and the
provisions of sub-sections (2) to (5) shall, as fa..-·as may be,
apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in
relation to a report under sub-section (2)."
18. The Bill to consolidate and amend the law relating to criminal
c procedure followed and was circulated in the Gazette of India,
Extraordinary, Part II, published on December 10, 1970 proposing, the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1970. The Statement of Objects and
Reasons clearly disclosed that the recommendations of the Commission
to overhaul the Code 1898 as made were accepted and vis-a-vis Section
D 173, which corre~ponded to Section 176 in the aforementioned report,
the amendment proposed was to facilitate.collection of evidence by the
police after filing the charge-sheet and production thereof before the
Court, subject to the accused being give1i usual facilities for copies. The
remodelled Sectio·n I 73 was identical in form and substance to the one,
as proposed by the Commission in chime with its recommendation as
E contained in the Report. Sub-clause (7) of the new Section 173, as
proposed by the Commission and integrated in the Bill, however eventually
appeared as sub-clause (8) to. the Section under Code 1973.
1·9. The newly added sub-section (8), as its text evinces, permits
fu11her investigation by the concerned officer in-charge of the police
F station in respect of an offence after a report under sub-section 2 had
been forwarded to the Magistrate and also to lay before the Magistrate
a further report, in the form prescribed, whereupon such investigation,
he obtains further evidence, oral or documentary. It is further ordained
that on submission of such further rep011, the essentialities en grafted in
G sub-sections 2 to 6 would apply also in relation to all such report or
reports ..
20. The integration of sub-section 8 is axiomatically subsequent
to the 41" Report of the Law Commission Report offodia conveying its
recommendation that after the submission of a final rep011 under Section
H
AMRUTBHAI SHAMBHUBHAI PATEL v. SUMANBHAI 123
KANTIBHAI PATEL & ORS. [AMJTAVA ROY, J.]

173, a competent police officer, in the event of availability of evidence A
bearing on the guilt or in·nocenceofthe ·ac·cused ought to be permitted to
examine the same and submit a further report to the Magistrate
concerned. This assumes significance, having regard to the language
consciously applied to design Section 173(8) in the 1973 ·Code.
Noticeably, though the officer in-charge of a police station, in categorical
B
terms, has been empowered thereby to -conduct further investigation
and to lay a supplementary rep()rt assimilating the evidence, oral or
documentary, obtained in course of the said pursuit, no such authorization
has been extended to the Magistrate as the Court is in seisin of the
proceedings. It is, however no longer res integra that a Magistrate, if
exigent to do so, to espouse the cause of justice, can trigger fu1ther c
investigation even after a final report is submitted under Section 173(8).
Whether such a power is available suo motu or on the prayer made by
the informant, in absence of request by the investigating agency after
cognizance has been taken and the trial is in progress after the accused
has appeared in response to the process issued is the issue seeking
D
scrutiny herein.
21. Though noticeably the High Court, i.n the decision impugned,
has aptly referred to and relied upon the relevant pronouncements of
this Court on the issue involved, the autho~ities cited at the Bar in course
of the arguments demand recapitulation.
E
22: In Blwgww1t Si11gll v. Commissio11er of Police & Alir.,
(1985) 2 SCC 537, a three Judge· Bench of this Court was seized with
the poser as to whether in a case where the First Information Report is
lodged and after completion of the investigation initiated on the basis
thereof, the police submits a report that no offence has been committ"d,
the Magistrate if is inclined to accept the same, can dr-op the proceeding F
without issuing notice to the first informant or to the injured or in case
where the incident has resulted in de,ath, to the relatives of the deceased.
This Cou1t in its adjudicative pursuit, embarked upon a scrutiny of the
provisions of Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C., dealt with Sections 154, 156,
157 thereof before eluding to Section 173 of the Code. It noticed that G
under sub-Section (l).ofSection 154, every information relating to the
commission ofa cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in-charge
of a police· station has to be reduced into writing by him or under his
direction and is to be read over to the informant and every such
information whether given in writing or reduced to writing, shall be signed
H
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 4 S.C.R.

A by the person giving it and that a copy thereof shall be given forthwith to
the informant, free of cost. It noticed that under Section 156( 1), the
officer in-charge of a police station is vested with the power to
investigate any cognizable case without the order of the Magistrate and
that sub-Section (3) authorized the Magistrate empowered under Section
. 190 Cr.P.C. to order an investigation, as mentioned in sub-Section (I).
B
The prescription under Section 157( 1) requiring the officer in-charge of
a police station to forthwith send a report of the information to a Magi st.rate
empowered to take cognizance of such offence upon a police report, in
case he has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is
empowered under Section 156 to investigate, was taken note of. The
c mandate of Section 157(2) for the police officer to notify the informant,
in case he was of the view that no sufficient ground for entering on an
investigation had been made out, was also referred to. ·
23. It noted as well that under Section l 73(2)(i), the officer in-
charge, as soon as the investigation is completed, is required to forward
D to the Magistrate empowered, a report in the prescribed form so as to
enable the Court to take cognizance· of the offence based thereon. This
Court also adverted to Section 190 enumerating the modes of taking
cognizance of an offence by a Magistrate, as specified therein, either
upon receiving a complaint of facts which constituted such offence or
upon a police report of such facts or upon information received from
E any person other than a police officer or upon his own knowledge that
such offence had been committed.
24. In the conspectus of the provisions ofCr.P.C. traversed, this
Colll1 held the view that an,informant who lodges the first information
report does not fade away therewith and is very much concerned with
F the action initiated by the officer in-charge of the pol ice station pursuant
thereto, so much so, that not only a copy of the said report is to be
supplied to him free of cost and in case, no investigation is intended, he
has to be notified of such decision. The reason, in the contemplation of
this Court, for the officer in-charge of a pol ice station to communicate
G the action taken by him to the informant and a report to the Magistrate
under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. was that the informant, who sets the
machinery of investigation into motion, was-required to know what was
the result of the exercise initiated on the basis thereof, as he would be
vitally interested therein and hence, the obligations cast by law on the
officer in-charge.
H
AMRUTBHAI SHAMBHUBHAI PATEL v. SUMANBHAI 125
KANTIBHAI PATEL & ORS. [AMITAVA ROY, J.]

25. This Court assayed the courses open to the Magistrate on A
receipt of a report by the police on the completion of the inyestigation. It
was enunciated that if the report submitted by the police divulged that
no offence had been committed, there again, the Magistrate would be
left at liberty to adopt one of the three courses, namely; he could accept
the report and drop the proceeding, or he could disagree with the report
B
and taking the view that there was sufficient ground for proceeding
further, take cognizance of the offence and issue process or he could
direct further investigation to be made by the police under sub-Section
(3) of Section 156. Noticeably, these three courses referred to hereinabove
are at the pre-cognizance stage and can be opted for by the Magistrate
depending on his satisfaction on an assessment of the materials. then on c
record.
26. Be that as it may, this Court held that whereas neither the
informant nor the injured nor the relative of the deceased in case of
death, would be prejudicially affected in case the Magistrate decides to
take cognizance of the offence and to issue a process, they would certainly D
be prejudiced in case, the Court holds the view that there is no sufficient
ground for proceeding further and is inclined to drop the proceeding.
Having regard to the scheme of Sections 154, 157 and 173 in particular
of the Cr.P.C and the pattern of consequences to follow in the two
contingencies referred to herein above, this Court propounded that in
case the Magistrate is not i1iclined to take cognizance of the offence and E
issue process, the informant must be given an opportunity of being heard
so that he can make his submissions to persuade the Magistrate to take
cognizance of the offence and issue process. Qua the requirement of
issuance of such notice to the injured person or to a relative of the
deceased, in case of death, who is/are not the informant( s) who had F
lodged the first information repmt, it was elucidated that it would be
open for the Magistrate in the exercise of his discretion, ifhe thinks fit,
to give such notice. However, the locus standi of the injured person or
any relative of the deceased, though not entitled to notice .on the
Magistrate to apply for the Court at the time of consideration of the
report, if he/they otherwise come to know of such stage of th~ proceeding, G
was recognized, so much so that in case he/they would want to advance
any submission with regard to the report, the Magistrate would be bound
to hear him/them a.s the case may be.
27. This verdict in re the issue presently involved is significant, so
far as it outlines the different modes of taking cognizance of an offence H
126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A by a Magistrate and also the procedures and powers available to him on
the submission ofa police report following the completion ofinvestigation.
This decision is pellucid in its statement that the Magistrate, on receipt
of the report, at that stage before taking cognizance of the offence alleged,
may direct further investigation under sub-Section (3) of Sec,ticm 156
Cr.P.C. and require the police to make further report and that such power
B
can be exercised suo motu, contingent on its satisfaction of the necessity
thereof to espouse the cause of justice.
28. The question that fell for appraisal in Randliir Singh Rana
~ (supra) was as to whether a judicial Magistrate, after taking cognizance
of an offence, on the basis ofa police report and after appearance of the
c accused in pursuance of the process issued, can order of its own, further
investigation in the case. The significantly additional feature of this query
is the stage of the proceedings for directing further investigation in the
case i.e. after the appearance of the accused in pursuance of the process
already issued. This Court reiterated that such power was available to
D the police, after submission of the charge-sheet as was evident from
Section 173(8) in Chapter XII of the Code, 1973. That it was not in
dispute as well that before taking cognizance of the offence under Section
190 of Chapter XIV, the Magistrate could himself order investigation as
contemplated by Section 156(3) of the Code was noted as well. This
Court also noticed the power under Section 311 under Chapter XXIV to
E summon any person as a witness at any stage of an inquiry/trial or other
proceedings, if the same appeared to be essential to the just decision of
the case.
29. It recalled its earlier rendering in Tula Ram and others v.
Kis/wre Sillgfl, (1977) 4 SCC 459 to the effect that the Magistrate
F could order investigation under Section 156(3) only at the pre-cognizance
stage under Sections 190, 200 and 204 Cr.P.C and that after he decides
to take cognizance under the provisions of Chapter XIV, he would not
be entitled in law to order any investigation under Section 156(3), and
further though in cases not falling within the proviso to Section 202, he
G could order such investigation by the police, the same would be in the
nature of an inquiry only as contemplated by Section 202.
30. This Court also recounted its observations in Ram Lal Nanmg
(supra) to the effect that on the Magistrate taking cognizance upon a
police report, the right of the police to further investigate even under the
1898 Code was not exhausted and it could exercise such right often as
H
AMRUTBHAISHAMBHUBHAI PATEL v. SUMANBHAT 127
KANTIBHAI PATEL & ORS. [AMITAVA ROY, l]

necessary, when fresh information would come to light. That this A
proposition was integrated in explicit terms in sub-Section (8) of Section
173 of the new Code, was noticed. The desirability of the police to
ordinarily infonn the Court and seek its fonnal permission to make further
investigation, when fresh facts come to light, was stressed upon to
maintain the independence of the judiciary, the interest of the purity of
B
administration of criminal justice and the interest of the comity of the
various agencies and institutions entrusted with different stages of such
dispensation.
31. The pronouncement of this Court in Dev""'P"lli
L"kshmi11ar"y(llW Reddy ""d others v. V. N"raya11a Reddy "nd
others, ( 1976) 3 sec 252 emphasizing on the distinction in the power to c
order police investigation under Section 156(3) and under Section 202( 1)
of the Cr.P.C, was referred to. It was ruled that the two powers operate
in separate distinct spheres at different stages, the former being
exercisable at the pre-cognizance stage and the latter at the post-
cognizance stage when the Magistrate is in seisin of the case. It was
D
underlined that in the case of a complaint regarding the commission of a
cognizable offence, the power under Section 156(3) could be invoked by
the Magistrate before he takes cognizance of the offence under Section
190(l)(a), but once such cognizance is taken and he embarks upon the
procedure embodied in Chapter XV, he would not be competent to reve11
to the pre-cognizance stage and avail Section 156(3). On the other E
hand, it was observed that Section 202 would be invocable at a stage
when some evidence has been collected by the Magistrate in the
proceedings under Chapter XV, but is deemed to be insufficient to take
a decision as to the next step and in such an event, the Magistrate would
be empowered under Section 202 to direct, within the limits circumscribed
F
by that provision, an investigation for the purpose of deciding whether or
not, there is sutficient ground for proceeding. It was thus exposited that
the object of an investigation under Section 202 is not to initiate a fresh
case on police report but to assist the Magistrate in completing the
proceedings already instituted upon a complaint before him. It was thus
concluded on an appraisal of the curial postulations above referred to, G
that the Magistrate of his own, cannot order further investigation after
the accused had entered appearance pursuant to a process issued to
him subsequent to the taking of the cognizance by him.
32. The scope of the judicial audit in Reeta N"g (supra), to
reiterate, was whether, after the charge-sheet had been filed by the H
128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 4 S.C.R.

A investigating agency under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C, and charge had been
framed against some of the accused persons on the basis thereof, and
other co-accused had been discharged, the Magistrate could direct the
investigating agency to conduct a re-investigation or fu11her investigation
under sub-Section (8) of Section 173. The recorded facts revealed that
the Magistrate had in the contextual facts d[rected for re-investigation
B
and to submit a repo1t, though prior thereto, he had taken cognizance of
the offences involved against six of the original sixteen accused persons,
discharging the rest The informant had thereafter filed an application
for re-investigation of the case and the prayer was acceded to. This
Cou1t referred to its earlier decisions in Sa11katlut Si11gli and otliers v.
c State of Utlar Pradeslt, AIR I 962 SC 1208 and Master Co11structio11
. Company (P) Ltd. v.' State of Orissa and a11otlier, AIR 1966 SC I04 7
to the effect that after the Magistrate had passed a final order framing
charge against some of the accused persons, it was no longer within his
competence or jurisdiction to direct a re-investigation into the case. The
decision in Rmidhir Si11glt Rmut (supra), which propounded as well
D
that after taking cognizance of an offence on the basis of a police report
and after the appearance of the accused, a Magistrate cannot of its own
order further investigation, though such an order could be passed on the
application of the investigating authority, was recorded. It was reiterated
with reference to the earlier determination of this Cou1t in Diues/i
E Dalmia v. CBI, (2007) 8 SCC 770 that the power of the investigating
officer to make a prayer for conducting further investigation in terms of
Section 173(8) of the Code was not taken away only because a charge-
sheet had been filed under Section I 73(2) and a further investigation
was permissible even if cognizance had been taken by the Magistrate.
This Court, therefore summed up by enouncing that once a charge-
F sheet was filed under Section I 73(2) Cr.P.C and either charges have
been framed or the accused have been discharged, the Magistrate may
on the basis of a protest petition, take cognizance of the offence
complained pf or on the application made by the investigating authority,
permit fmther investigation under Section I 73(8), but lie cannot suo motu
G direct a further investigation or order a re-investigation into a case on
account of the bar of Section I 67(2) of the Code. It was thus held that
·as the investigating authority did not apply for further investigation and
an application to that effect had been filed by the defacto complainant
under Section 173(8), the order acceding to the said prayer was beyond
the jurisdictional competence of the Magistrate. It was, however observed,
H
AMRUTBHAJ SHAMBHUBHAI PATEL v. SUMANBHAI . 129
KANTIBHAI PATEL & ORS. [AMITAVA ROY, J.]

that a Magistrate could, if deemed necessary, take recourse to the A
provisions of Section 319 Cr.P.C at the stage of trial.
33. This decision reinforces the view that after cognizance is taken
by the Magistrate on the basis of a report submitted by the police on the
completion of the investigation, no direction for further investigation can
be made by the Magistrate suo motu and it would be permissible only if B
such a request is made by the investigating authority on the detection of
fresh facts having bearing on the case and necessitating further exploration
thereof in the interest of complete and fair trial.
34. The query in Vi11ay Tyagi v. lrsluul Ali® Deepak & Ors.,
(2013) 5 SCC 762 was whether in exercise of powers under Section c
173 Cr.P.C, the Trial Court has the jurisdiction to ignore any of the
police reports, where there was more than one, whether by the same or
different investigating agencies submitted in furtherance of the orders
of a Court. The respondents therein were sought to be prosecuted by
filing a First Information Report under Sections 120B, 121 and 122 of
the IPC read with Section 25 of the Arms Act and Sections 4 and 5 of D
Explosives Substance Act, 1908. The FIR was filed by the Special Cell
ofDelhi Police, which the respondents alleged had been lodged to falsely
implicate them. Being aggrieved, the respondents cha! lenged this action
before the High Court and inter alia prayed that the inv~tigation in the
case be transferred to the CBI. As the High Court did not, though it had E
issued notice in the writ petition, stay the investigation, eventually the
Special Cell ofDellli Police did file a charge-sheet before the Trial Court.
The High Court finally, while disposing of the writ petition and being
satisfied, directed the CBI to undertake an inquiry into the matter and
submit a report. Subsequent thereto the CBI filed its report indicating in
substance that the recoveries, amongst others made from the respondents F
in course of the inquisition m.ade by the Special Cell of Delhi Police did
·not inspire confidence and that fu11her investigation was needed.
35. The CBI, after detailed investigation, submitted a closure
report, whereafter one of the respondents filed an application before the
Trial Court seeking discharge. This prayer was declined by the Trial G
Court as pre-matured, observing that no definite conclusion could be ·
drawn at that stage to ascertain the truthfulness of the version of the
two different agencies. The High Coui1, being approached under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C by one of the respondents, seeking to quash the First
Information Report, it disposed of the same by holding that once the H
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A report had been filed by the CBI, it ought to be construed as a investigating
agency, and thus its closure report should be considered by the Trial
Court and thus remanded the case by observing that in undertaking the
exercise, as directed, the Trial Court should not be influenced by the
report of the Special Cell of Delhi Police. This order formed the subject
matter of challenge before this Court.
8
36. After referring to Section 156(3) in particular and Section 190
Cr.P.C, this Court reverted to Section 173 and ruled that a very wide
power was vested in the investigating agency to conduct further
investigation after it had filed its report in tenns of sub-Section (2) thereof.
It held on an elucidation of tl'ie ·contents of Section 173(8) that the
c investigating agency was thus competent to file a report supplementary
to its primary report and that the formerwas to be treated by the Court
in continuation of the latter, and that on an examination thereof and
following the application of mind, it ought to proceed to hear the case in
the manner prescribed. 1t was elaborated that after taking cognizance
D of the offence, the next step was to frame charge in terms of Section
228 of the.Code unless the Court found, upon consideration of the record
of the case and the documents submitted therewith, that there did exist
no sufficient ground to. proceed against the accused, in which case it
would discharge him on reasons to be recorded in terms of Section 227
of the Code. Alluding to the text of Section 228 of the Code which is to
E.
the effectthat ifaJudge is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming
that the accused had committed an offence, he could frame a charge
and try him, this Court propounded that the word "presuming'; did imply
that the opinion was to be formed on the basis of the records of the case
and the documents submitted therewith along with the plea of the defence
F to a limited extent, if offered at that stage. The view of this Com1 in
Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chamfer and another, (2012) 9 SCC 460
underlining the obligation oftlle Court to consider the record of the case
and the documents submitted therewith to form an opinion as to whether
there did exist or not any sufficie1lt ground to proceed against an accused
was underlined. This aspect was dilated ·upon logically to respond to the
G · query in the contextual facts as to whether both the repo11s submitted
by the Special Cell· 6f the Delhi Police and the CBI were required to be
taken note of by the Trial Court.
.. 37. Additionally,' this Col!i:t also dwelt upoi1 the three facets of
investigation in succession: Le. (i) initial investigation (ii) further
H
. AMRUTBHAI SHAMBHUBHAI PATEL v. SUMANBHAI 131
KANTIBHAI PATEL & ORS. [AMITAVA ROY, J.]

investigation and (iii) fresh or de novo or reinvestigation. Whereas initial A
investigation was alluded to be one conducted in furtherance of registration
of an FIR leading to a final report under Section 173(2) of the Code,
further investigation was a phenomenon where the investigating officer
would obtain further oral or documentary evidence after the final report
had already been submitted, so much so that the report on the basis of
B
the subsequent disclosures/discoveries by way of such evidence would
be in consolidation and in continuation of the previous investigation and
the report yielded thereby. "Fresh investigation" "reinvestigation" "de
novo investigation", however is an exercise, which it was held, could
neither be undertaken by the investigating agency suo motu nor could be
. ordered by the Magistrate and that it was essentially within the domain c
of the higher judiciary to direct the same and that too under limited
compelling circumstances warranting such probe to ensure a just and
fair investigation and trial. Adverting to Section 173 of the Code again,
this Court recalled its observations in State ofPunjab v. CBI mu/ others,
(2011) 9 sec 182 that not only the police had the power to conduct
D
further investigation in terms of Section 173(8) of the Code, even the
Trial Court could direct further investigation in contradistinction to fresh
investigation even where the report had been filed.
38. The decisions in Minu Ku11u1ri mu/ <mother v. State ofBilwr
t111d others, (2006) 4 sec 359 and Ilema11t D/UIS/lUlll(I v. CBI {//ld
another, (2001) 7 SCC 536 to the effect that a Court could order further E
investigation under Section 173(8) of the Code even after a report had·
been submitted under Section 173 (2) thereof, was adverted to.
39. Noticeably, none of these decisions, however pertain to a
situation where after the final report had been submitted, cognizance
had been taken, accused had appeared and trial is underway, the Court F
either suo motu or on the prayer of the informant had directed further
investigation under Section 173(8) in absence of a request to that effect
made by the concerned investigating officer.
40. The rendition in Blwgwa11t Siltgh (supra) was also relied
upon. It was eventually held, by drawing sustenance from the . G
pronouncement in Blwgwa11t Singh (s11pra) that a Magistrate before
wh01n a report under Section 173(2) of the Code had been filed, was
empowered in law to direct furtj1er imri;:stigation and require the police
to submit a further or a supplementary report. To reiterate, in Blwgwm1t
Singh (supra), this Court had in particular dealt with the courses open H
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A to a Magistrate, once a charge-sheet or a closure report is submitted on
the completion of investigation under Section 173(2) of the Code and
thus did essentially concentrate at the pre-cognizance stage of the
proceedings.
41. From the issues sought to be answered in this decision and
B having regard to the overall text thereof, it is not possible to discern that
the power of the Magistrate, even at the post cognizance stage or after
the accused had appeared in response to the process issued, the suo
motu power of the Magistrate to direct further investigation was intended
to be expounded thereby. Significantly, the adjudication was essentially
related to the pre-cognizance stage.
c
42. In Chandra Babu alias Moses v. State tlirougl1 Inspector
of Police and others, (2015) 8 SCC 774, the appellant had filed a FIR
with the Kulasckaram Police Station against the respondents-accused
alleging unlawful assembly and assault resulting in multiple injuries. After
the initial investigation, the same was transferred to the District Crime
D Branch Police, Kanyakumari which eventually filed a final report in favour
of the respondents-accused, which was accepted by the learned
Magistrate. Meanwhile, however the appellant/informant filed a protest
petition before the Magistrate praying for a direction to the CBCID to
reopen the case and file a fresh report. As before any decision on this
E protest petition, the final report filed by the police had already been
accepted, the appellant approached the High Com1, which called for the
report from the learned Magistrate and finally interfered with the order
accepting the final report and directed the Magistrate to consider the
same along with the protest petition. The Magistrate next held that there
was no justification for ordering reinvestigation of the case and directed
F that the protest petition be treated as a separate private complaint.
43. This order being challenged again before the High Court, the
matter was remanded to the learned Magistrate with a direction to
consider the final report and the other materials on record and pass
appropriate orders after hearing both the public prosecutor and the de
G facto complainant. This time, the learned Magistrate returned a finding
that the investigation by the District Crime Branch was a biased one and
that the final report was not acceptable and consequently forwarded the
complaint for further investigation by the CBC ID, which was a different
investigating agency. The matter was taken to the High Court by one of
H the respondents/accused; whereupon it annulled the direction of the
AMRUTBHAI SHAMBHUBHAl PATEL v. SUMANBHAI 133
KANTIBHAI PATEL & ORS. [AMITAVA ROY, J.]

learned Magistrate for reinvestigation, holding that not only there were A
material discrepancies in the evidence brought on record, but also there
was no exceptional circumstance for such a course to be adopted by the
Magistrate. It was also of the view, having regard to the scheme of the
Section 173(8) of the Code that the investigating officeron ly could request
for further investigation.
B
44. While disapproving the approach of the High Court in
reappreciating the facts in the exercise of its revisionaljurisdiction, this
Court adverting, amongst others to the three Judge Bench exposition in
Bltagwant Singli (supra) reiterated that a Magistrate could disagree
with the police report and take cognizance and issue process and summon
the accused, if satisfied as deemed fit in the attendant facts and c
circumstances. The rendition in Vt1wy Tyagi (supra) was also alluded
to. It was ultimately expounded that the learned Magistrate had really
intended to direct further investigation, but as a different investigating
agency had been chosen, the word re-investigation had been used. This
Court thus construed the direction for investigation by the CBI to be one D
for further investigation and upheld the same, but nullified the selection
of a new investigating agency therefor. As a corollary, the investigating
agency that had investigated the case earlier and had submitted the final
report, was directed by this Cou1t to undertake further investigation to
be supervised by the Superintendent of Police and to submit a report
before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate to be dealt with in accordance E
with law.
45. This decision too was concerned with a fact situation, pertaining
to the pre-cognizance stage of the proceedings before the learned
Magistrate and therefore, does not, in our comprehension, further the
/ F
case of the appellant.
46. As adumbrated hereinabove, Chapter XIV of the Code
delineates the conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings before a
Magistrate. Section 190, which deals with cognizance of offences by
Magistrate, sets out that any Magistrate of the first Class and any
Magistrate of the second class specially empowered, as contemplated, G
may take cognizance of any offence either upon receiving a complaint
of facts which constitute such offence or upon a police repmt of such
facts or upon information received from any person other than the police
officer, or upon his own knowledge that such offence had been committed.
Section 156, which equips a police officer with the power to investigate H
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A a cognizable case mandates vide sub-section 3 thereof that any Magistrate
empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation. The
procedure for dealing with complaints to Magistrate is lodged under
Chapter XV of the Code. Section 202 appearing therein predicates that
any Magistrate on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is
authorized to take cognizance or which had been made over to him
B
under Section 192, may, if he thinks fit and shall in a case where the
accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which he exercises his
jurisdiction, postpone the issue of process against the accused and either
enquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a
police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit for the purpose of
c · deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. The
contents of this text of Section 202(1) of the Code unmistakeably attest
that the investigation that can be directed by the Magistrate, to be
undertaken by a police officer would essentially be in the form of an
enquiry for the singular purpose of enabling him to decide whether or
not there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the complaint of an
D
offence, of which he is authorised to take cognizance. This irrefutably
is at the pre-cognizance stage and thus logically before the issuance of
process to the accused and his attendance in response thereto. As
adverted to hereinabove, whereas Section 31 I of the Code empowers a
Court at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding, to summon
E any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though
not summoned as a witness, or recall and re-examine any person already
examined, if co.nstrued to be essential to be just decision of the case,
Section 3 19 authorizes a Court to proceed against any person, who though
not made an accused appears, in course of the inquiry or trial, to have
committed the same and can be tried together. These two provisions of
F
the Code explicitly accoutre a Court to summon a material witness or
examine a person present at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other
proceeding, if it considers it to be essential to the just decision of the
case and even proceed against any person, though not an.accused in
such enquiry or trial, if it appears from the evidence available that he
G had committed an offence and that he can be tried together with the
other accused persons.
47. On an overall survey of the pronouncements of this Court on
the scope a11d purport of Section 173(8) of the Code and the consistent
trend of explication thereof, we are thus disposed to hold that though the
H
AMRUTBHAI SHAMBHUBHAI PATEL v. SUMANBHAI 135
KANTIBHAI PATEL & ORS. [AMITAVA ROY, J.]

investigating agency concerned has been invested with the power to A
undertake further investigation desirably after informing the Court
thereof, before which it had submitted its report and obtaining its approval,
no such power is available therefor to the learned Magistrate 11fter
cognizance has been taken on the basis of the earlier report, process has
been issued and accused has entered appearance in response thereto.
B
At that stage, neither the learned Magistrate suo motu nor on an
application filed by the complainant/informant can direct further
investigation. Such a course would be open only on the request of the
investigating agency and that too, in circumstances warranting further
investigation on the detection of material evidence only to secure fair
investigation and trial, the life purpose of the adjudicatiori in hand. c
48. The un-amended and the amended sub-Section (8) of Section
173 of the Code if read in juxtaposition, wou Id overwhelri1ingly attest
that by the latter, the investigating agency/officer alone has been
authorized to conduct further investigation without limiting the stage of
the proceedings relatable thereto. This power qua the investigating D
agency/officer is thus legislatively intended to be available at any stage
of the proceedings. The recommendation of the Law Commission in its
41" Report which manifestly heralded the amendment, significantly had
limited its proposal to the empowennent.ofthe investigating agency alone.
49. In contradistinction, Sections 156, 190, 200, 202 and 204 of E
the Cr.P.C clearly outline the powers of the Magistrate and the courses
open for him to chart in the matte.r of directing investigation, taking of
cognizance, framing of charge, etc. Though the Magistrate has the power
to direct investigation under Section 156(3) at the pre-cognizance stage
even after a c}large-s!ieet or a closure report is submitted, once cognizance
is taken and the-accused person appears pursuant thereto, he would be F
bereft of any competence to direct further investigation either suo motu
or acting on the request or prayer of the complainant/informant. The
direction for investigation by the Magistrate under Section 202, while
dealing with a complaint, though is at a post-cognizance stage, it is in the
nature of an i!Jquiry to derive satisfaction as to whether the proceedings G
initiated ought to be furthered or not. Such a direction for investigation is
not in the nature of further investigation, as contemplated under Section
173(8) of the Code. If the power of the Magistrate, in such a scheme
envisaged by the Cr.P.C to order further investigation even after the
cognizance is taken, accused persons appear and charge is framed, is
H
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A acknowledged or approved, the same would be discordant with the state
of law, as enunciated by this Court and also the relevant layout of the
Cr.P.C. adumbrated hereinabove. Additionally had it been the intention
of the legislature to invest such a power, in our estimate, Section 173(8)
of the Cr.P.C would have been worded accordingly to .accommodate
and ordain the same having regard to the backdrop of the incorporation
B
thereof. In a way, in view of the three options open to the Magistrate,
after a report is submitted by the police on completion of the investigation,
as has been amongst authoritatively enumerated in Blwgwant Singlt
(supra), the Magistrate, in both the contingencies, namely; when he takes
cognizance of the offence or discharges the accused, would be committed
c to a course, whereafter though the investigating agency may for good
reasons inform him and seek his permission to conduct further
investigation, he suo motu cannot embark upon such a step or take that
initiative on the request or prayer made by the complainant/informant.
Not only such power to the Magistrate to direct further investigation suo
motu or on the request or prayer of the complainant/informant after
D I
cognizance is taken and the accused person appears, pursuant to the
process, issued or is discharged is incompatible with the statutory design
and dispensation, it would even otherwise render the provisions of
Sections 311 and 319 Cr.P.C., whereunder any witness can be summoned
by a Court and a person can be issued notice to stand trial at any stage,
E in a way redundant. Axiomatically, thus the impugned decision annuli ing
the direction of the learned Magistrate for further investigation is
unexceptional and does not merit any interference. Even otherwise on
facts, having regard to the progression of the developments in the trial,
and more particularly, the delay on the part of the informant in making
the request for further investigation, it was otherwise not entertainable
F
as has been rightly held by the High Court.
50. In the result, the appeal, being devoid ofany merit, fails and is
dismissed. ·

Devika Gujral Appeal dismissed.